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AegisSovereignAI: The Trust Integration Layer for the LF AI & Data Ecosystem. Verifiable identity, hardware integrity, and sovereignty for the Distributed Enterprise - from Silicon to Prompt.

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lfedgeai/AegisSovereignAI

AegisSovereignAI: Trusted AI for the Distributed Enterprise

AegisSovereignAI is the Trust Integration Layer for the Linux Foundation AI ecosystem. It delivers verifiable trust for AI workloads across the distributed enterprise - from Centralized Clouds to the Far Edge - unifying open standards from the CNCF (SPIFFE/Keylime/OPA) and IETF (RATS/WIMSE) into a contiguous Chain of Trust from Silicon to Prompt.

We don't just integrate with AI frameworks; we actively harden them. From defining Zero-Trust Governance Middleware for LangChain to proposing Hardware-Verified Location APIs for the Linux Foundation CAMARA Project, we are driving security standards directly into the tools developers and carriers use daily.

The Missing Link in the LF AI Ecosystem

Our architecture is designed to complement the emerging Linux Foundation AI stack:

  • Complements OPEA (Open Platform for Enterprise AI): While OPEA defines the reference architecture for building RAG pipelines, AegisSovereignAI provides the Hardened Runtime - ensuring those microservices only boot on verified hardware.
  • Complements AAIF (Agentic AI Foundation): While AAIF standardizes how agents communicate (via the Model Context Protocol, MCP), AegisSovereignAI defines Who is communicating - securing agent-to-agent interactions with hardware-rooted Mutual TLS.

We bridge the gap between these frameworks and the physical infrastructure, providing cryptographic proof that your AI agents are running on verified hardware, in authorized jurisdictions, and acting within sovereign policy limits.

AegisSovereignAI 3-Layer Trust Model

The Trusted AI Stack

AegisSovereignAI addresses the three critical layers required to unlock regulated markets across a distributed fleet:

1. Infrastructure Security (The Foundation)

  • Hardware Supply Chain: We utilize TPM Endorsement Keys (EK) and BMC-based Inventory Attestation to detect component swapping or firmware downgrades before the OS even boots.
  • Runtime Integrity ("Self-Healing Trust"): We simplify security operations by binding Keylime (IMA/EVM) integrity checks directly to the SPIRE Agent's periodic re-attestation loop.
    • The Mechanism: The Agent must prove its binary integrity (via TPM Quote) every renewal cycle.
    • The Result: If the spire-agent or kubelet binaries are tampered with, the Server denies the renewal. The compromised node is naturally cut off from the mesh, requiring no manual "Kill Switch" infrastructure.

2. Workload Identity (The Bridge)

  • Proof of Residency (PoR): We issue cryptographic certificates that bind the Workload Identity (executable hash) to the Hardware Identity (TPM). This replaces weak bearer tokens with hardware-rooted proof of possession.
  • Proof of Geofencing (PoG): We extend PoR to include Location Identity (GNSS/Mobile Sensors), ensuring data sovereignty by preventing AI agents from running in disallowed jurisdictions.

3. AI Governance & Compliance (The New Layer)

  • Zero-Trust Data Filtering: Middleware that enforces OPA (Open Policy Agent) rules on RAG retrieval contexts.
  • Immutable Audit Logs: Generation of compliance artifacts that capture the "Immutable Triad" (User Input + Context Hash + Model Config), turning "trust" into a mathematically verifiable feature.

Why It Matters

  • Unified Control Plane: Eliminate security silos. Apply a single, rigorous trust policy that spans your Multi-Cloud, On-Premise Data Centers, and Edge locations.
  • Unlock Regulated Markets: Meet strict data sovereignty and integrity requirements with verifiable proof that spans user, device, and workload.
  • Reduce Audit Friction: Provide clear, end-to-end evidence that identity pillars are authentic.
  • Turn Trust into a Feature: Make holistic, hardware-rooted trust a customer-visible advantage.

Built on Open Standards

AegisSovereignAI does not reinvent the wheel. Instead, we act as the unifying control plane that cryptographically binds best-in-class open-source projects into a cohesive trust fabric.

  • SPIFFE/SPIRE (CNCF): The industry standard for Workload Identity. We use SPIRE to issue short-lived, verifiable X.509 certificates that replace static API keys.
  • Keylime (CNCF): The standard for Remote Attestation. We use Keylime to validate TPM quotes and Linux Kernel integrity (IMA) in real-time.
  • Open Policy Agent (OPA) (CNCF): The standard for Policy-as-Code. We use OPA to make granular "Allow/Deny" decisions on RAG data retrieval.
  • LangChain: The leading framework for LLM Orchestration. Our governance middleware is designed as a drop-in LangChain component.

Contributions

We actively contribute to open standards and upstream projects to harden the global AI supply chain.

  • IETF Draft: Verifiable Geofencing & Unified Identity

    • Status: Active Internet-Draft (IETF WIMSE/RATS Working Group)
    • Scope: Defines the protocol for cryptographically binding a Workload Identity (SPIFFE) to its Physical Location and Hardware Identity (TPM).
    • Implementation: The open-source reference implementation for this standard is available in our Hybrid Cloud PoC.
  • LangChain Proposal: Zero-Trust Governance Middleware

    • Status: Draft / RFC (To be submitted to LangChain Community)
    • Scope: Standardizing Policy-as-Code and Verifiable Audit Logs for Enterprise RAG systems. This proposal solves "Context Contamination" by cryptographically binding the retrieved context to the model decision.
  • CAMARA Project Proposal: Hardware-Verified Location API

    • Status: Draft / RFC (To be submitted to Linux Foundation CAMARA Project)
    • Scope: Extending the CAMARA Device Location Verification API to support a "Premium Tier" backed by TPM Attestation. This replaces network-based assurance with hardware-rooted "Proof of Residency," enabling Telcos to serve regulated markets (Banking/Defense) with unforgeable location proofs.

Stakeholders

  • Ramki Krishnan (Vishanti Systems) (Project Lead / Maintainer)
  • Andreas Spanner (Red Hat)
  • Michael Epley (Red Hat)
  • A. Prasad (Oracle)
  • Srini Addepalli (Aryaka)
  • Vijaya Prakash Masilamani (Independent)
  • Bala Siva Sai Akhil Malepati (Independent)
  • Dhanush (Vishanti Systems)
  • Pranav Kirtani (Independent)

Problem Statement: The Distributed Trust Gap

In a modern distributed enterprise, inference happens everywhere—from secure cloud data centers to branch offices and tactical edge servers. This sprawl creates fragmented security models where the "Cloud" is secure (IAM), but the "Edge" is exposed (Physical Access). This inconsistency creates amplification points for emerging Multi-Agent threats.

A. Infrastructure Threats

  1. Token Replay & Identity Abuse: Bearer tokens (RFC 6750) can be stolen and replayed. Even "Cloud Identity" is vulnerable if the underlying host is compromised.
  2. Weak Location Assurance: IP-based geofencing is easily bypassed via VPNs. AI agents inheriting false location claims can trigger compliance violations.
  3. Physical Exposure: Edge nodes in semi-trusted environments (factories, retail) are vulnerable to physical tampering and hardware substitution.

B. Application & Governance Threats

  1. Data Provenance Gaps: In distributed RAG pipelines, there is no cryptographic link between what was measured and who measured it. Poisoned data can corrupt decision pipelines without detection.
  2. MCP Protocol Risks: In the Model Context Protocol (MCP), "confused deputy" attacks can allow agents to access resources beyond their scope. Unverified MCP servers can inject malicious tools or exfiltrate data.
  3. Model Placement Risks:
    • Local Placement: Host compromise grants control over both the orchestration logic and the model weights (IP theft).
    • Remote Placement: Weak endpoint verification allows "Man-in-the-Middle" attacks on inference requests.

Core Solution Architecture

1. Unified Workload Identity

We extend the standard software identity (SPIFFE) by cryptographically binding it to the physical reality of the device. This creates a "Unified ID" that serves as the root of trust for all three critical security assertions:

  • A. Proof of Residency (PoR)

    • Challenge: Weak bearer tokens in exposed environments allow identity theft and replay attacks.
    • Solution: We bind Workload Identity (Code Hash) + Host Hardware Identity (TPM PKI) + Platform Policy (Kernel Version). This generates a certificate that proves what is running and where it is running.
  • B. Proof of Geofencing (PoG)

    • Challenge: Unreliable IP-based location checks are easily bypassed via VPNs.
    • Solution: We extend PoR to include Location Hardware Identity (GNSS/Mobile Sensors). This enables verifiable enforcement of geographic policy at the workload level, ensuring data sovereignty even on the far edge.
  • C. Supply Chain Security

    • Challenge: Counterfeit hardware and firmware downgrades in physical deployments.
    • Solution: We enforce a layered hardware gate:
      • Enrollment: Restricted to manufacturer-issued TPM Endorsement Keys (EK).
      • Inventory: Out-of-band verification of components (NICs, GPUs) against purchase orders via BMC.

2. Zero-Trust RAG Governance

Security does not stop at identity; it must extend to the data the AI consumes.

  • Challenge: "Context Contamination" and the "GenAI Audit Paradox." In RAG systems, malicious actors can inject poisoned data into the retrieval pipeline, and standard logs cannot prove why a model made a specific decision.
  • Solution: We introduce a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) middleware that sits between the vector database and the LLM.
    • Pre-Computation: It enforces OPA (Open Policy Agent) rules to filter retrieved context before the model sees it.
    • Post-Computation: It generates an immutable audit log that cryptographically binds the User Prompt + Retrieved Context Hash + Model Response.

Additional Resources

References

  1. Simply NUC: Banks Data Closer to Customers
  2. Keylime Documentation
  3. SPIFFE/SPIRE Documentation

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