Add PotentiallyUnguardedProtocolHandler query for Java and C++

[ex0dus-0x]

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To fix the problem, we need to ensure that user input supplied to the command is properly validated and cannot be used to trigger malicious command execution or open arbitrary protocols. The safest approach is to check that the url parameter represents only URLs with an http or https scheme, matching the already-correct approaches in neighboring "safe" functions in the file.

Specifically, before constructing and starting the ProcessBuilder, we should:

• Parse the user-provided input as a URI.
• Check that the scheme is http or https.
• Only if this check passes, proceed with the command execution as before.

This fix only needs additional code in the bad6_rundll32 method. No import changes are needed, as the required classes (URI, URISyntaxException) are already imported.

The method must be updated to perform the scheme check, and must declare or handle URISyntaxException. For consistency with the file's style, using a throws clause is acceptable.

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To fix this problem, the code should avoid passing user input into the shell by concatenation. Instead, validate the URL properly and use the overloaded method of Runtime.exec that takes a command array, so that metacharacters are not interpreted by the shell. Additionally, further sanitize or validate the URL to ensure it is a legitimate web URL. The most robust fix is to:

• Parse the user input as a URI.
• Check that the scheme is "http" or "https".
• Pass the value as a separate argument to Runtime.exec(String[]) rather than using concatenation.

Alternatively, if possible, restrict the allowed URLs using a whitelist or rigorous pattern. However, according to the code's intent and surrounding examples, switching to an array-based invocation with validation is most appropriate.

Lines to change:
In safe5_rundll32 (lines 76–82), specifically the line:

Runtime.getRuntime().exec("rundll32 url.dll,FileProtocolHandler " + url);

Change to:

Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[] { "rundll32", "url.dll,FileProtocolHandler", url });

No new imports are needed, as all required classes are already imported.

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To fix this issue, we must ensure that the parameter passed to the xdg-open command cannot be exploited for command injection. The best general fix is to validate the user-supplied URL to ensure only legitimate URLs are allowed, limiting the schemes to http and https (as seen in neighboring "safe" methods in the same file). Then, construct the command using an array form of exec(), which avoids shell command line parsing altogether, reducing injection risk.

Specifically, in bad7_xdgopen, parse the string as a URI, check that its scheme is "http" or "https", and if so, use Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[]{"xdg-open", url}). This mirrors the safe patterns in the file while preserving original logic, and only permits opening actual network URLs.

Changes need to be made in bad7_xdgopen:

• Parse url as a URI.
• Check its scheme.
• If permitted, proceed with the exec as an array form to avoid shell parsing.
  Also, add a throws URISyntaxException to the exception list for the method, as new URI(url) may throw this.

General fix:
To fix this vulnerability, always avoid inserting raw user input into system command strings without rigorous validation and escaping. Instead, use the variant of exec (or ProcessBuilder) that accepts a string array, so that arguments are interpreted literally rather than by a shell. Additionally, ensure proper validation so only intended URLs (with correct schema and structure) are used.

Detailed fix for the code shown:
In method safe8_xdgopen, instead of concatenating url into a string and executing it as a shell command, pass the arguments as a String array:

new String[] { "xdg-open", url }

Also, maintain the existing scheme check (as in line 109). To be extra secure, you may also want to validate that url is a valid HTTP/HTTPS URI.

Files/lines to change:
File: java/test/query-tests/security/PotentiallyUnguardedProtocolHandler/PotentiallyUnguardedProtocolHandler.java
Change lines 110:

Runtime.getRuntime().exec("xdg-open " + url);

to:

Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[] {"xdg-open", url});

No extra imports or methods are required.

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The best general-purpose fix is to avoid passing unsanitized user input directly into the shell command. Instead, validate that url is safe; for a handler like macOS open, typically only http(s) URLs are expected.
A robust fix is to:

• Parse and validate the URL, ensuring that only acceptable schemes ("http", "https") are allowed.
• Optionally, use the overload of Runtime.exec that accepts a String array, supplying "open" as one element and the URL as another. This avoids string concatenation and disables any shell interpretation.
• Validation should be done before the exec call. If the input is invalid, do not launch the command.

For this file, replace the vulnerable code in method bad9_open (lines 119-122), so user input must be validated for scheme and then passed as a separate arg. Mirror the approach used in safer methods above, such as safe10_open.

Required changes:

• In bad9_open, check that the URL starts with http:// or https:// (or, stronger, parse as URI and check the scheme).
• Use Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[]{"open", url});
• If the validation fails, do not run the command (optionally: throw exception, log, or silently ignore).

No new imports are needed, as java.net.URI and java.net.URISyntaxException are already imported.

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The best way to fix this vulnerability is to avoid passing user input directly to a shell, and instead invoke system utilities through an argument array, so the input is never interpreted by a command shell. This is achieved by using Runtime.exec(String[]) or ProcessBuilder. Additionally, further validation should occur to ensure only intended URLs (for example, well-formed http/https URLs) are accepted. It's also best to use the absolute path to the executable as the first argument, followed by the user input as a separate argument, thus avoiding shell interpretation entirely.

For file java/test/query-tests/security/PotentiallyUnguardedProtocolHandler/PotentiallyUnguardedProtocolHandler.java, function safe10_open, replace the string concatenation with a parameterized command, and consider using new ProcessBuilder(...) or Runtime.getRuntime().exec(String[]) with an array.